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62 Hurtado vs. People of State of California [110 U.S. 516, 3 March 1884]
Matthews (J)
Facts: The constitution of the state of California adopted in 1879, in article
1, 8, provides as follows: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand juryshall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county." In
pursuance of the foregoing provision of the constitution, and of the several
sections of the penal Code of California, the district attorney of Sacramento
county, on 20 February 1882, filed an information against Joseph Hurtado,
charging him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio
Stuardo. Upon this information, and without any previous investigation of
the cause by any grand jury, Hurtado was arraigned on 22 March 1882, and
pleaded not guilty. A trial of the issue was thereafter had, and on 7 May
1882, the jury rendered its verdict, in which it found Hurtado guilty of
murder in the first degree. On 5 June 1882, the superior court of
Sacramento county rendered its judgment upon said verdict, that Hurtado
be punished by the infliction of death, and the day of his execution was
fixed for 20 July 1882. From this judgment an appeal was taken, and the
supreme court of the State of California affirmed the judgment. On 6 July
1883, the superior court of said county of Sacramento ordered that Hurtado
be in court on 11 July 1883, in order that a day for the execution of the
judgment in said cause should be fixed. In pursuance of said order, Hurtado,
with his counsel, appeared in court, and upon the court's inquiry, objected
to the execution of said judgment and to any order which the court mightmake fixing a day for the execution of the same, upon the grounds (1) that it
appeared upon the face of the judgment that Hurtado had never been
legally, or otherwise, indicted or presented by any grand jury, and that he
was proceeded against by information made and filed by the district
attorney of the county of Sacramento, after examination and commitment
by a magistrate of the said county; (2) that the said proceedings, as well as
the laws and constitution of California, attempting to authorize them, and
the alleged verdict of the jury, and judgment of the said superior court of
said county of Sacramento, were in conflict with and prohibited by
Amendments 5 and 14 of the constitution of the United States, and that
they were therefore void; (3) that Hurtado had been held to answer for the
said crime of murder by the district attorney of the said county of
Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had been tried and
illegally found guilty of the said crime, without any presentment or
indictment of any grand or other jury, and that the judgment rendered upon
the alleged verdict of the jury in such case was and is void, and if executed
would deprive Hurtado of his life or liberty without due process of law.
Thereupon the court overruled the said objections, and fixed 13 August
1883, as the time for the execution of the sentence. From this latter
judgment, Hurtado appealed to the supreme court of the state. On 18
September 1883, the supreme court of the state affirmed the said
judgment. A review of which, by a writ of error, by the US Supreme Court
was allowed.
Issue: Whether Hurtado was denied due process by being tried and found
guilty without being presented or indicted by a grand jury.
Held: The clause of the 14th article of amendment to the constitution of theUnited States, provides that "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." The phrase is to be
construed by the usus loquendi of the constitution itself. The same words
are contained in the 5th amendment. That article makes specific and
express provision for perpetuating the institution of the grand jury, so far as
relates to prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes under the laws of
the United States. It declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." It then immediately adds: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." The natural and obvious inference is
that, in the sense of the constitution, "due process of law" was not meant or
intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand
jury in any case. The conclusion is equally
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irresistible, that when the same phrase was employed in the 14th
amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was used in the same
sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that
amendment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of
the grand jury in all the states, it would have embodied, as did the 5th
amendment, express declarations to that effect. Due process of law in the
latter refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the
legislative powers conferred upon congress by the constitution of the
United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and
interpreted according to the principles of the common law. In the
fourteenth amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land
in each state which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved
powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right
of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure. The
14th amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the UnitedStates the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great
diversities in these respects may exist in two states separated only by an
imaginary line. On one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury,
and on the other side no such right. Each state prescribes its own modes of
judicial proceeding. Further, any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be
held to be due process of law. Herein, the Court is unable to say that the
substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of theproceeding by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right
on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the
witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law. The
Court found no error and thus aff irmed the judgment of the supreme court
of California.
Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919] En
Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted
Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans
(Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on the
reservation provided that said homestead applications be previouslyrecommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the
Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the
provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all
Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan
and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan
who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding
60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings
within the reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with
section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles
2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi
and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of
habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the
Manguianes liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or
imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code .
Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law,"
a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a
hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where
much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying
a law to particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind
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sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion
of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards
and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law. Due process of law" means simply that "first, that there shall
be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in
its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable
alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process
of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and
necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable
to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot
be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that the liberty of the
citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and thegeneral good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has
not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section
2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person
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of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance
with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We
are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not
unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
(and other consolidated cases)
I. THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary
of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implementedby G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of
the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, preventor suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the politicalopposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the
reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February
24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper
Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without
warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises
in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard
of the buildingwere several materials for publication. The law enforcers, acomposite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless
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arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential
Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the
exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant
to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunesofficesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
III. THE RULING
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant
to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the
following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless
arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for
the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that thearresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists
were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their
erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David
was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact
is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunesofficesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct
of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9
states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the
day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
68 Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986] Resolution En Banc,
Cruz (J) : 8 concur
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Taada,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI] sought a writ of mandamus to
compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant
to the President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as Director,
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Malacaang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The decision was
concurred only by 3 justices. Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration /
clarification of the decision on various questions. They suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor
General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. Meanwhile,
the February EDSA Revolution took place, which subsequently required the
new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section
18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official Gazette
only.
Held: Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is
not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result;
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Publication is required, even if
their enactment is otherwise provided or effective immediately. The term
"laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly
conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations forthe purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of
that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Publication requirements
does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on
case studies. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. It
should be published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this kind of
publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. Philippine
International Trading Co. vs Angeleson November 20, 2010 263 scra 420
69 Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) v. Angeles [GR 108461, 21
October 1996] Second Division, Torres (J) : 4 concur
Facts: On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International Trading Corporation
(PITC) was created as a government owned or controlled corporation under
Presidential Decree (PD) 252. On 9 May 1977, PD 1071 revised the
provisions of PD 252, where the purposes and powers of the said
governmental entity were enumerated under Sections 5 and 6 thereof. On 9August 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of
Instruction (LOI) 444, directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all
commodities) between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other
Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including the People's
Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed through the PITC.
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on 27 February 1987, then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) 133
reorganizing the DTI empowering the said department to be the "primary
coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government
for the country's trade, industry and investment activities." The PITC was
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made one of DTI's line agencies. Sometime in April 1988, following the State
visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries
agreed to make joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral
trade and to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance
between the value of their imports and exports during the period.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade
Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, under which was specified the
commodities to be traded between them. On August 1989, PITC issued
Administrative Order (AO) SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which, applications to
the PITC for importation from China (PROC) must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried
out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in
an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being
applied for or 1:1 ratio. Remington Industrial Sales Corp. and Firestone
Ceramics, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under
Philippine-laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC withPITC. They were granted such authority. Subsequently, for failing to comply
with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of
their importations, further import applications were withheld by PITC from
Remington and Firestone, such that the latter were both barred from
importing goods from PROC. On 20 January 1992, Remington filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
PITC in the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Makati Branch 58). On 4 January 1993,
Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles (Presiding Judge) upheld the petition for
prohibition and mandamus of Remington and Firestone (Civil Case 92-158),and declaring PITC AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its regulations null, void, and
unconstitutional. PITC filed the petition seeking the reversal of Angeles
decision.
Issue: Whether AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 binds Remington and Firestone.
Held: The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a
valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. Administrative Order
SOCPEC 89-08-01 is not, however, a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative
power. The original AO issued on 30 August 1989, under which therespondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the
context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e.,
PD 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. It was only on 30 March 1992
when the amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP
Law Center, and published in the National Administrative Register as
required by the Administrative Code of 1987.The fact that the amendments
to AO SOCPEC 89 08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center
in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to
the effectivity of the Administrative Order. Further, the Administrative
Order, without force and effect due to the lack of publication, thus cannot
exact any obligation from Remington and Firestone, specifically, charges for
the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service.
Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995], also Gatchalian v. de Leon
[GR 121245], and Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297] Second Division, Puno (J) :
2 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and
involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian.
Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by
Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to conduct the
preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on 30
June 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde,
and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Paraaque. During the
preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria
Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a
plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes
maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an
engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving Estrellita (12
stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds); and
the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence ofspermatozoa. The NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested
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by Webb in his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary
investigation that he did not commit the crime as he went to the United
States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines on 27 October
1992. The others Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and
Biong submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss
denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and
Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with
subpoena in their last known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel
issued a 26-page Resolution "finding
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probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an
Information for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the
same date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with
the RTC Paraaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch
258 presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de
Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest
against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited
himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality
considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the
bench. The case was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita
Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11
August 1995, Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at
Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for theissuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
with the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest
issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita
Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from
conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3)
dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused
therein. Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the
authorities after filing their petitions before the Court.
Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of
their right to fair trial.
Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however,
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of anAssistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their
long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. At no instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias
resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. Further , on the
contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the
DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent
haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high
profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the
fair administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an
issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always
stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting
the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for
the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
81 Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000] Resolution En
Banc, Puno (J): 6 concur, 1 dissents, 1 concurs based on prior opinion, 1
concurs in result
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13
November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic
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of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed
its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its
concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7
thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extraditionrequest upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of
the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the
Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez
to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371
(Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts),
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343
(Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in
name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued
Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the
aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested
copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as
all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample
time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of therequested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999,
Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary
of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to
furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and
to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition
request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13
July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in
court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the
United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in
favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him
a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of an extradition process.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a
copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e.,after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court
(Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for
extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no provision
in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand
from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while
the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as
the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant
the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a
potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the extradition process evaluation stage.
Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the
evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily
apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given set of
circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of
the government function involved as well as the private interest that has
been affected
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by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and
hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive
him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.
85 Roxas vs. Vasquez [GR 114944, 19 June 2001] First Division, Ynares-
Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were Chairman and Member,
respectively, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in
September 1990, the PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of 65 units
of fire trucks, and accordingly, the public bidding was held on 14 September1990. The lowest bidder, Aeolus Philippines, was disqualified since its fire
trucks had a water tank capacity of only 1,800 liters, far below the required
3,785 liter capacity. After ocular inspections made by a A Technical
Evaluation Committee, two fire trucks, namely Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino,
were recommended. The Bids and Awards Committee, however, voted to
award the contract in favor of the Korean company CISC, which offered
Ssangyong fire trucks. To avoid the possibility of failure to bid, the Bids and
Awards Committee reviewed its recommendations, and thus limited its
choice to the two brands recommended by Gen. Tanchanco and, by
majority vote, elected Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. as the lower bidder.
Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale of 65 units of Nikki-Hino fire
trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and
Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding Purchase Order was then prepared.
Pursuant to a disbursement voucher, the PNP paid Tahei Co., Ltd. the
amount of P167,335,177.24, representing marginal deposit for the 65 units
of fire truck. The Disbursement Voucher showed that, while the bid price of
Tahei Co. was only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the price appearing on the
Purchase Order was P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a discrepancy
of P292,778.00 per unit of fire truck, or a total of P19,030,570.00 for all 65fire trucks. The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the
bidding, awarding and purchase of the 65 fire trucks, thus prompting then
DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint on 12 February 1993 for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 before the Ombudsman,
against (1) Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP, (2) Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP,
(3) Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco, (4) Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.),
(5) P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP, (6) P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP, (7) Insp.
Reynaldo Osea, PNP, (8) Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP, (9) Dir. Nicasio
Custodio, PNP, (10) Supt. Obedio Espea, PNP, (11) Former DILG Secretary
Luis Santos, and (12) Ms. Generosa Ramirez. The Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military conducted a preliminary investigation where the accused
submitted their respective counter-affidavits. On 19 March 1993, it
recommended the indictment of all, except Generosa Ramirez. On review,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee recommended the
dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and
Ramirez. This latter recommendation was approved by the Special
Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum dated 15 April 1993.
Accordingly, the appropriate Information was filed by the Ombudsmanbefore the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 18956), against Nazareno, Flores,
Tanchanco, Custodio, Osea, Espena and Santos. Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan
and Ramirez were not included among the accused. However, upon motion
of Generals Flores and Tanchanco, a reinvestigation was conducted by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor. On 19 October 1993, without any notice to
or participation of Roxas and Nacpil, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
issued an Order, dismissing the charges against Flores and Tanchanco, and
recommending that Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be likewise indicted. Deputy
Special Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted for the approval of the
recommendation, while Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented.Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the recommendation. Roxas
and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended
that the Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be
dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman
Vasquez disapproved the recommendation in the second assailed Order
dated 10
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February 1994. Thus, on 27 March 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
an Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading
Roxas and Nacpil as additional accused. Roxas and Nacpil filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether the lack of notice to Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation
render the issuance of Office of the Ombudsman null and void.
Held: It is not material either that no new matter or evidence was presented
during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that
reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of
the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a
reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case
the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted. Neither do the lack of notice to, or
participation of, Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the
questioned issuances of Office of the Ombudsman null and void. At any
rate, Roxas and Nacpil cannot argue that they have been deprived of dueprocess. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Herein, the record clearly shows that
petitioners not only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the
preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration of the 19 October 1993 Order of the Ombudsman
impleading them as accused in Criminal Case 18956.
87 Suntay v. People [GR L-9430, 29 June 1957] En Banc, Padilla (J) : 9 concur
Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of
16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the
City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the
accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd
design and took her to somewhere near the University of the Philippines
(UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge of
her. On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City
Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for
the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City
wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City
Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed
against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a
passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20
January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where
he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia Nubla
subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which
was filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary
investigation had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February
1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an
order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the
Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10
February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the
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Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to
order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to
Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or
carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that
the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntays counselwrote to the Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be
reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the Court
reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary
denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion
for reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his
passport may be cancelled.
Held: Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When
discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact,
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such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder,
hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due
process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion
vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the
absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply
with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But
where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and
left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG
1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport.
Suntays suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can
reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part toflee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the
strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice.
92 Meralco vs. PSC [GR L-13638-40, 30 June 1964] En Banc, Paredes (J): 8
concur, 2 took no part
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Facts: On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two
applications with the Public Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and
reduction of its rates for commercial and other non- residential customers
for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and
the other for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate, schedule
RM-3 (PSC Case 85890). These applications were approved by the PSC in a
decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24 August 1955, the Meralco
filed another application for revision and reduction of its general power
rate, Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on
31 August 1955. Previous to these applications, Meralco filed 7 other
applications for revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954, upon petitionof Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an
audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing
Office (GAO) examined and audited the books and under date of 11 May
1956, it presented a report which was submitted to the Commission on 28
May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo,
reset the hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 "for the purpose of
considering such further revision of applicant's rates as may be found
reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de
Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the
PSC, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties,
announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was
to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues
"so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal
hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO
dated 11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the
Commission, in which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the
Meralco "a rate of return of only 8% on its invested capital.". The Solicitor
General submitted the case on the same report and letter of Dr. Gil and on aletter-report addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the Commission
on 21 November 1955. Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil.
Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to
file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO. On 31 July
1956, the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying its
objection, and prayed that the cases be reset for hearing to enable the
parties to present their proofs. Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases
for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as
requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the
report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based itsdecision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as
requested by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to refute the
facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on 27 December
1957, the PSC handed down a decision, granting the petition for the
reduction of rates. The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision,
filed on 14 January 1958 by Meralco, was denied by the Commission on a 2
to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958. Meralco filed the petition for review with
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
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Issue: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose
of proper notice and hearing in administrative cases.
Held: The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties
appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and
Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly
authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows
that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informalhearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is
only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of
understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of
27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing",
as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for
requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the
decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative
proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof
and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the
Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how
its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of
right without due process of law, which binds not only the government of
the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. Due
process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons
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who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
96 PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon [GR L-
81958, 30 June 1988] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female, for overseas placement." It challenged the Constitutional validity of
DOLEs Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic
and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and
(3) for being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also invoked Section 3 of
Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in
the absence of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable
injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. On
25 May 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the Court that on 8
March 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of
Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women.
Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes.
Equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they
are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined toexisting conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same
class. The classification made the preference for female workers rests
on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed
by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty,
the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence that,
except perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men abroad have been
afflicted with an identical predicament. Discrimination in this case is
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justified. Further, the impugned guidelines are applicable to all female
domestic overseas workers, not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given
universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary,
due to the fact that not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the
Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of
persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group
or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real
difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the
better rule is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the
cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.
98 People v. Hernandez [GR L-6025-26, 18 July 1956] Resolution En Banc,
Concepcion (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias
AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias
Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes
alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B.,
(5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo
alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson
alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William,
(10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13)
Julian Lumanog alias Manue, were accused of the crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies. The prosecution maintained that
Hernandez is charged with rebellion complexed with murders, arsons androbberies, for which the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense
contends, among other things, that rebellion can not be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery. The lower court sentenced Hernandez merely to
life imprisonment. A petition for bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on 28
December 1953, which was denied by a resolution of the Supreme Court
dated 2 February 1954. A similar petition for bail was filed by Hernandez on
26 June 1954 and renewed on 22 December 1955.
Issue: Whether Hernandez is entitled to right to bail.
Held: Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
constitute one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no
occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the
commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, the Supreme court has never in
the past convicted any person of the "complex crime of rebellion with
murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion
published in the Philippine Reports (US vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; US vs.
Baldello, 3 Phil. 509, US vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil.
155), the defendants therein were convicted of simple rebellion, although
they had killed several persons, sometimes peace officers. The ingredients
of a crime form
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part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot
be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. The law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised
Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing
serious violence among its essential elements, thus clearly indicating that
everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary
therefor, is embraced therein. National, as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the
main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot
be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with thesame, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. The policy of our statutes
on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof as
constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty. Further, the
settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century,
has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce
during the Spanish regime. Although the Government has, for the past 5 or
6 years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of
violators of said law and in their prosecution the established policy of the
State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged
since 1932. Furthermore, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of
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guilt is strong; it must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant's
criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment. Thus, in
conclusion, under the allegations of the amended information against
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means "necessary" for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and
that, in conformity with the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with
accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail.
101 Nunez v. Sandiganbayan [GR L-50581-50617, 30 January 1982] En Banc,
Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part.
Facts: Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayanon 21 February and 26 March 1979 for the crime of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance
with his co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. Thereafter, on 15
May, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
juridical grounds. A week later, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration was filed a day later, and was likewise denied.
Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court,
claiming that Presidential Decree 1486, which created the Sandiganbayan, is
violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of
the
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Constitution.
Issue: Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the
Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates against the accused, in light of the
difference of the procedures (especially appellate) in the Sandiganbayan vis-
a-vis regular courts.
Held: The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the
Sandiganbayan, with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." It
came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree.
Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a
special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, i.e.
dishonesty in the public service, the urgency of which cannot be denied. It
follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have
been aware as far back as 17 January 1973, when the present Constitution
came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether
petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is not necessarily offensive
to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the omission ofthe Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does not deprive protection of
liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the Sandiganbayan is passed
upon by 3-judge court of its division. Moreover, a unanimous vote is
required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other
justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them,
forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for rendering judgment." If convicted, the
Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any
error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
Case Digest on People v. Armando Gallardo January 25, 2000
On July 28, 1991, Edmundo Orizal was found dead in the rest house of
Ronnie Balao. The victim was found to have sustained seven (7) gunshot
wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2)
grazing wounds on the left arm and back. The two suspects Armando
Gallardo and Alfredo Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police
Department. They were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro
Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie
Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal. The trial court rendered decision finding
accused Armando Gallardo y Gander and Alfredo Columna y Correa guilty
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beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by evident premeditation and
aggravated by treachery and sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua. Hence, this appeal.
Held:
Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements,
namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the
confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. All
these requirements were complied with. It would have been different if the
accused were merely asked if they were waiving their Constitutional rights
without any explanation from the assisting counsel.
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107 Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan [GR 118533, 4 October 1995] Second
Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave.
Facts: On 15 December 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI),
through its board member Roger de Leon, charged Paraaque Mayor Dr.
Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and
follow-ups to implement Paraaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 744,
(series of 1992) which Olivarez himself approved on 6 October 1992.
Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's fair during
the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from 11
November 1992 to 15 February 1993 for which they will use a portion of the
service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts
to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the
same unless BCCI gives money to the latter. Attached to BCCIs Reply-
Affidavit was a copy of Executive Order dated 23 November 1992 issued by
Olivarez granting a group of Baclaran-based organizations/associations of
vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28November 1992 to 28 February 1993 using certain portions of the National
and Local Government Roads/Streets in Baclaran for fund raising. Graft
Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis conducted a preliminary investigation
and issued on 22 September 1993 a resolution recommending the
prosecution of Olivarez for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act (RA)
3019, as amended. On 16 February 1994, the information was filed against
Olivares (Criminal Case 20226). On 17 January 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law
and on ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was granted on 24
January 1994. On 9 February 1993, Ombudsman disapproved the
recommendation to withdraw the information as Olivarez does not refute
the allegation and that bad faith is evident with his persistent refusal to
issue permit. On 18 February 1994, Olivarez voluntarily surrendered and
posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary release.
On 21 February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-
examination and re- assessment of the prosecution's report and
documentary evidence with a view to set aside the determination of the
existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case; which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court. In view
of Olivarez's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not
guilty" entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, the prosecution filed a
Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994,
Olivarez filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into
Writing (With Entry of Appearance), Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea
and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused and Supplemental Pleading
with Additional Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused; which were
denied by the Sandiganbayan on 4 April 1994. The Sandiganbayan, however,
set aside the proceedings conducted on 3 March 1994 including Olivarez'sarraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in his record in
the interest of justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication
of the case due to technicalities. On 20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion
for reconsideration which was granted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the
case was remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for another
reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice. The
reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on 3
November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case. On 9 December
1994, DSP Jose de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation, finding Olivarez
liable by giving unwarranted benefit thru manifest partiality to another
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group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business
permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal and on 27 December 1994
directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing information. On 13
January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger
Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and on 16 January 1995,
Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of
Reinvestigation. The latter motion was denied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez
filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial of / inaction over
BCCIs application for license.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Held: Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he
issued a permit in favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors'associations by the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so many
requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same
permit. Worse, Olivarez failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right
to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran- based vendors'
associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of
legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It
would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it
was that of Olivarez. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred
to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to
take appropriate action on the letter- application of BCCI although the same
was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to
prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing
department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether Olivarez
was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond the
Court for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the
environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in
the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely
improbable, absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss
to add that Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has
the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any
charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Hence, he cannot
really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.
108 Tiu v. Court of Appeals [GR 127410, 20 January 1999] En Banc,
Panganiban (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 13 March 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President,
passed into law Republic Act 7227 ("An Act Accelerating the Conversion of
Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes.). Section 12 thereof created the Subic
Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special privileges, such as tax
exemptions and duty-free importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment to business enterprises and residents located and residing in the
said zones. On 10 June 1993, President Ramos issued Executive Order (EO)
97 clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. On 19 June 1993,
the President issued EO 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative (i.e. the secured area consisting of the
presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base). On 26 October 1994, Conrado
L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano Jr. and Isagani M. Jungco challenged before the
Supreme Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative
of their right to equal protection of the laws, inasmuch as the order granted
tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured
area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who
live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. In a Resolution
dated 27 June 1995, the Supreme Court referred the matter to the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular 1-95. Incidentally, on 1February 1995, Proclamation 532 was issued by President Ramos,
delineating the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and
Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition as there is no substantial difference between the
provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227, holding that EO 97-A
cannot be claimed to be unconstitutional while maintaining the validity of
RA 7227; that the intention of Congress to confine the coverage of the SSEZ
to the secured area and not to include the entire Olongapo City and other
areas rely on the deliberations in the Senate; and that the limited
application of the tax incentives is within the prerogative of the legislature,
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pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or
interest. Tiu, et. al.s motion for reconsideration was denied, and hence,
they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there was a violation of the equal protection of the laws
when EO 97-A granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and
residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and
denied such to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in"territory.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Held: The EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it
discriminatory. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. The classification
occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. It
was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that weregermane to the legislative purpose. There are substantial differences
between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate
their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the present business
operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso
investments and thousands of new jobs, and on the other hand, definitely
none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national;
in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business
activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to have any impact in
achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base
to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then,
hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives
accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, it will be easier to manage and monitor
the activities within the "secured area," which is already fenced off, to
prevent "fraudulent importation of merchandise" or smuggling. The
classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses
within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or
contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are
not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in
privileges granted and in obligations required. The equal-protection
guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there
are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation
of the constitutional clause. Herein, anyone possessing the requisite
investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his
or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.
coconut oil refiners vs. torres
Facts:
This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres
in his capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private
respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops
located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare Republic Act No.
7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and
duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital andequipment. It reads:
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and
capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as
well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw
materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of
goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of
thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].
Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits
the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw
materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being
violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private
respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail
establishments located outside.
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The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal
standing and unreasonable delay in filing of the petition.
Issues:
(1) Statutory Construction; Political Law; Taxation Law:
Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection clause.
(2) Political Law:
Whether or not the case can be dismiss due to lack of the petitioners legal
standing.
(3) Remedial Law:
Whether or not the case can be dismissed due to unreasonable delay in
filing of the petition.
Held:
(1) The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase tax and duty-free importations
of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of
incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public
respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their
restrictive interpretation, does not apply when