1. REPUBLIC VS LIM Facts: Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
Shefiled a petition to the court for correction of four erroneous
entries in her birth certificate to wit: 1) her surname Yu was
misspelled as Yo 2) her fathers name was written as Yo Diu To (Co
Tian) when it should have been YuDio To 3) her nationality was
entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino 4) that she
was a legitimate child when she should have been described as
illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. After
the trial court conducted the appropriate proceeding, it granted
the petition sought by respondent to set the records straight and
in their proper perspective. However, petitioner herein filed an
appeal specifically on the correction of her citizenship (from
Chinese to Filipino) not having complied with the legal
requirements for election of citizenship. It cited Article IV, Sec
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625 whichprovides
the election of citizenship of a legitimate child of a Filipino
mother and alien father upon reaching the age of maturity. Issue:
Whether or not respondent needs to elect Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority?
legitimate children. The case at bar clearly states that
respondent is an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien
father. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
2. TECSON VS COMELEC Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.(FPJ), filed his certificate
of candidacy forthe position of President of the Republicof the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ngNagkakaisang (KNP) Party, in
Pilipino the
2004national elections. In his certificate of candi dacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be anaturalborn citizen of the
Philippines,stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or"Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be20 August 1939 and his place of birth
tobe Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a
petition before the Commissionon
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and todeny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
made of
amaterial misrepresentation in hiscertificate candidacy by
claiming to
bea natural-
born Filipino citizen when intruth, according to F ornier, his
parentswere foreigners; his mother, Bessie KelleyPoe, was an
American, and his father,Alla n Poe, was a Spanish national,
beingthe son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanishsubject. Holding: The
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to And even if Allan F. Poe was a
Filipinocitizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornierbase d the
allegation of the illegitimate birth
4. Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente
Ching B.M No. 914, October 1, 1999.
of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poecontra cted a prior
marriage to a certain
Facts: Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino mother and a father
of Chinese national on April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam subject
upon submission of proof of his Phil. Citizenship. He passed the
bar at the age of 35 years old. There was a question regarding his
citizenship
PaulitaGomez before his marriage to Bessie Kell eyand, (2) even
if no such prior
marriage hadexisted, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly onlya
year after the birth of FPJ.Issue:Whether FPJ was a natural born
citizen, so as tobe allowed to run for the offcie of the
Presidentof the Philippines.Held:Any
therefore he was not allowed to take oath. The Solicitor General
was asked to give comment on the case at bar.
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only
be drawn from thepresumption that
ISSUE: WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration
of the status of his citizenship.
having died in 1954 at 84years old, Lorenzo would have been
born
sometime in the year 1870, when thePhilippines was under Spanish
rule, and RULING: The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine with
citizenship" the 1 in strict of
that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of reside nce upon his
death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residencebefore dea th, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
hadeffected in 1902. That
compliance
provisions
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should
elect his Phil. Citizenship within a
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would therebyextend
to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution,during respondent FPJ which regime has
reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority
which is 21 years old at that time. With almost 14 years that
elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed to exercise
such right of citizenship election beyond a reasonable period of
time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty.
for being a Chinese citizen
seenfirst light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate.
5. CO VS. HRET
1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and voted there during those
Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident ofLaoang, Northern
Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the
second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who
vied for the position of representative in the second
legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng
was proclaimed the duly
elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were
placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born
did citizens. more than Besides, merely
privaterespondent
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here
in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required
that a person should have a house in order to establish
hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or
relative. To require him to own property in order to be
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a
resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether
or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In
the year 1895, the private
eligible
to
run a
for
Congress
would
be The
tantamountto
property
qualification.
Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, votingand residence requirements. 7. REPUBLIC vs. DELA
ROSA
respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
fromChina and established his
residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of
the private respondent,Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but
was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe
court an application for
FACTS This case is a consolidation of 3 petitions that primarily
aims to declare the naturalized citizenship of Juan Frivaldo as
invalid and consequently, nullify his
naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the
private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.For the
elections of 1984 and
proclamation as governor of Sorsogon. It appears that Frivaldo
had served as governor of Sorsogon for six terms already and was
only compelled to renounce his citizenship when he sought political
asylum in US due to the precarious political atmosphere here in the
country during the Marcos regime. As he wasnt
able
to
reacquire
his
citizenship
through
of time, as it should have been filed within three days.
repatriation or through act of Congress, he was forced to file a
petition for naturalization on September 1991. The judge set the
hearing on March 16 1992 and ordered the publication of the order
in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation---for three consecutive
ISSUES 1. W/N Comelec was correct in
dismissing the petitions for being filed out of time? 2. W/N the
proceedings were invalid making Frivaldo not a Filipino citizen and
thus ineligible for public office? 3. W/N Hermo may be proclaimed
winner upon nullification of Frivaldos
weeks, at least once every week, the last publication to be made
six months before the scheduled hearing. However, Frivaldo asked
the court if the hearing could be moved to an earlier date as he
intends to participate in the May 1992 elections, the last day of
filing of certificate of candidacy being March 15 1992, a day ahead
of the scheduled hearing. The court granted his request and set the
hearing on Feb 21 1991. Of this RULING
proclamation?
1. Comelec erred in dismissing the petitions on the ground that
they were filed out of time. The petitions, by their nature, are
quo warranto. As such, they are not covered by the 10-day appeal
period provided in Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2. The
proceedings were invalid and Comelec should have cancelled
Frivaldos certificate of candidacy. The Court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case due to the following irregularities: (1)
there was no order published advancing the date of the hearing, (2)
the petition was heard within 6 months from last publication of the
petition, (3) Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance when there was
still a
advancement of hearing, neither publication nor posting of
notice was made. Six days after said hearing, Judge Dela Rosa
rendered a decision granting Frivaldos application and allowed him
to take his oath of allegiance on that same day. To this,
petitioner Quiterio Hermo, Frivaldos rival for governorship in
Sorsogon, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging
jurisdictional
defects in the proceedings. Subsequently, two petitions were
filed mainly alleging that Frivaldo is an American citizen and is
therefore ineligible to run, and that the courts decision is null
and void for being fraught with legal infirmities. In one of the
petitions, petitioner Hermo prayed that the votes casted in favor
Frivaldo be declared as stray votes and that he be declared winner
instead. These petitions were all dismissed by Comelec on the
ground that such petitions were filed out
pending appeal , and (4) Frivaldo did not observe the 2-year
waiting period. Thus, as qualifications for public office is a
continuing requirement, once lost
(citizenship), title may be seasonably challenged. 3. Hermo
cannot be proclaimed as
would not make respondent Ong a naturalborn citizen. For his
part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen
and presented a certification from the Bureau declaring of
Immigration him to and be the DOJ such.
winner. Well settled is the rule that upon disqualification of
the winner in an election, the second placer cannot be proclaimed
as winner having failed to obtain the mandate of the majority of
the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino
citizen
9. KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA RULING: Only natural-born Filipino
citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court Decision
of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a
naturalborn citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are
circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings FACTS: The series of
events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and
deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed This
case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by
Executive out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the
existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of
evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in
the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving
in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship
under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done,
respondent Ong cannot
xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the
Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision
of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father.
Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that
respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to
Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted
that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was
finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by
itself,
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation
of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by
injunction from doing so.
4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent,
maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the
late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is
10. AZNAR VS COMELEC
a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No.
0855103 issued
FACTS: 1) On November 19, 1987, private
on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for
more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in
the Philippines since 1965. 5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988,
respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor
of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. 2) On
January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its
incumbent Provincial COMELEC Chairman a filed with for the the
COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of
sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the petition for Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not
respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring
dual-citizenship? HELD: SC dismissed petition for certiorari
upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
petition
disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United
States of America. 3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a
Formal Manifestation issued and Miriam that by submitting the a
Certificate Immigration
then
Deportation Defensor private
Commissioner Santiago
certifying
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate
of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) No.
133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
(Annex "B1").
respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any
of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition
for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R.
Valles, against private vehemently denies having taken the oath of
allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in
the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present,
both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship
cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine HELD: The
respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino.
Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of
registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of
citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. has dual citizenship. DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. Private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental.No pronouncement as to costs. At most,
she
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for
governor of Davao
Oriental. FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia on May 16,
1934 to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. She ran for
governor.
Petitioner, her opponent, filed a case for disqualification on
the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen since she was issued
an alien certificate application of for registration; an there was
an of
immigrant
certificate
residence and she was a holder of an Australian passport.
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either
"'express" or "implied".
11. VALES VS COMELEC This is a petition forcertiora ri under
Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997
13. TABASA VS CA
Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in
Manila.
Nature of the Case: The instant petition for review1[2] under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by
the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
interposed by petitioner Joevanie
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D.
Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28,
1996
On the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8,
Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a
charge sheet which alleged: 1. That on 3 August
Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to
the United States.
1995, Tabasa arrived in the Philippines and was admitted Facts:
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a as a balikbayan;
2.
That in a letter dated
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when
petitioner was seven years old (minor), his father, Rodolfo Tabasa,
became a naturalized citizen2 of the United States. By derivative
petitioner also acquired American citizenship. On August 3, 1995
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines, and was admitted as a
balikbayan for one year. After that petitioner was arrested and
detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996,
pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay,
Aklan.
16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul
General of U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents
Passport had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
3.
Hence,
Tabasa
is
now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily
to deported Law and
pursuant
Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Miriam
Commissioner
Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.
On May 29, 1996 - BID ordered petitioners deportation to his
country of origin, the United States. US Consul filed a request
with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the Tabasa on the ground
that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued
against him, and that the Tabasas passport has been revoked.
and/or Restraining Order
Temporary
Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no
warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration a
final authorities order of
before
deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his
passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to
admission or to
Schonemann Commissioner
vs. Santiago
a
change
of
his
immigration status as a non-quota immigrant
Sc ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the
because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in
Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to
him, the alien loses the privilege to
Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a naturalborn citizen
of the
remain in the country. Further, under Office
Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, deportation
summary proceedings
Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization
when he was seven years old due to the
lie where the passport of the alien has expired. Thus, it is
apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the
country.
naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years
old. On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to
produce the
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with
Preliminary Injunction
person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of
petitioners
detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting
him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA On
June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within
which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be
considered submitted for decision. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of
Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a
PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171, and that
because he is now a Filipino deported citizen, or he cannot by be
the
economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioners
parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. CA concluded
that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is
to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The
court ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us. Issue
whether or not the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA 8171. Note: If there is no valid repatriation,
then he can be summarily deported undocumented alien. Ratio: RA
8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of for his being an
detained
respondent Bureau. On August 7, 1996 Decision, denied Tabasas
petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully
acquiredby repatriationhis
Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos,
was enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation
of only two classes of persons: (1) Filipino women who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by
Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that
although he became an American citizen by
derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in
1968, there is no
evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity, as explicitly provided
in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the
marriage to aliens and (2) have natural-born lost Filipinos
who
their
Philippine minor
repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or
citizenship
including their
children, on account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire
Philippine
citizenship
through
naturalization when he was still a minor. Petitioner overlooks
the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is
available only to natural-born
repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a: (1)
Person opposed to
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born
Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced
citizenship his due to Philippine political or
organized government or affiliated with any association or group
of persons doctrines government; who uphold and teach
opposing
organized
(2)
Person deending or teaching
economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the
law. This includes a situation where
the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3)
Person
convicted
of
a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a
naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The
crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4)
Person suffering from mental
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine
citizenship on his children
alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
Tabasa does not qualify as a naturalborn Filipino who had lost
his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic
necessity under RA 817.
of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To claim the benefit of
RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171 Where to file a
petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171 Petitioner theorizes
that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of
a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost by his Philippine
derivative He has to file his petition for repatriation with the
Special Committee which on was
Naturalization
(SCN),
designated to process petitions for
citizenship
repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No.
285) Applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents
in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and
other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship.These
requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the
qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the
reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship. What
petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; then,
lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case
of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in
case of a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino
citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic
necessity should be specified. P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech
on House Bill No. 1248, it is
incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting
Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude
those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other
than political or economic necessity. Petitioner contends it is not
necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act
of renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a
necessary and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance, and
his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization
cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political
or economic necessity. While it is true that renunciation of
allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act,
it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or
economically motivated as alleged by petitioner.
executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered,
together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently
issued him a certificate of such registration. At that time, the
SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8,
1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. Although A.O.
No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to
RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a
confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic.
Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for
repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171 SCN requires a
petitioner for repatriation to set forth, the reason/s why
petitioner
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it
is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that
the reason for his loss of
citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their
Philippine
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic
Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Even if we concede that petitioner
Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA
citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to
undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is
unsuccessful. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that
petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a
minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by
derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship.
Reasons why the petitioner cannot reacquire Philippine citizenship.
1. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation
on June 13, 1996. 2. Neither can petitioner be a naturalborn
Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. 3. He lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of
law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It
8171,
still
he
failed
to
follow
the
procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to
file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on
Naturalization (SCN), which was designated repatriation. Therefore,
passport petitioner was Tabasa, whose his to process petitions
for
cancelled
after
admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can
be
summarily deported.
His subsequent
repatriation cannot bar such deportation especially considering
that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
was his father who could have been motivated reasons by in
economic deciding to or political for
DOCTRINE: Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a
privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987
Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the
qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It
has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets
the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the
State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire
apply
naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly who to
the
natural-born
Filipinos
could
prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to
political and economic reasons, and extended
indirectly to the minor children at the time of
repatriation.
citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner
Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is
justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.
revolution
to
help
in
the
restoration
of
democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated
their assertion that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not
reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on
January 18, 1988. He was
HELD: WHEREFORE, this petition for review is
therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They
also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was
not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and
void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for
DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Appeals costs to the petitioner. is AFFIRMED. No
14. FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a Frivaldo was
Facts: Petitioner
Juan
G.
citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after
his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was
disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election
did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could
not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the
Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's
argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not
only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He
agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's
incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.
proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the
League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its
President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo;
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January
20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that
he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos.
His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen
of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988,
as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article
XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all
times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of
the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the
people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. elective The office qualifications cannot
be prescribed erased by for the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when
the deficiency is lack of
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987,
Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A.
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws,
which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a
pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the
gift is gone and cannot be
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was
one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot
agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization
was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show,
by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.
Petition
Dismissed.
Petitioner
JUAN
G.
FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province
of
repatriation pursuant to Republic Act 8171. Thus, Altajeros
claimed that his Filipino
citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as
mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Altajeros sought the dismissal
of the petition. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election
director for Region V and hearing officer of the case, recommended
that Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said
province once this decision becomes final and executory.
15. ALTAREJOS VS. COMELEC Facts: Ciceron P. Altarejos was a
candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in
the 10 May 2004 national and local elections. On 15 January 2004,
Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San
Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify
and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Altajeros on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that
he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that
[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign
country. Almie, et. al. alleged that based on a letter from the
Bureau of Immigration dated 25 June 2001, Altajeros was a holder of
a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien
position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004
national and local elections; on the ground that Altajeros failed
to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of Section 2
of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his
Filipino citizenship inasmuch as he has not submitted any document
to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of
repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration. In its Resolution promulgated on 22 March 2004, the
COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of
Director
Zaragoza. On 25 March 2004, Altajeros filed a motion for
reconsideration. On 7 May 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of
merit. On 10 May 2004, the election day itself, Altajeros filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
Altajeros is eligible to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in
light of his repatriation under RA 8171. Held: Section 2 of
Republic Act 8171 provides that "Repatriation shall be effected by
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
Certificate of Registration E139507 issued on 3 November 1997,
and an Immigration Certificate of Residence 320846 issued on 3
November 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. On 26 January 2004,
Altajeros filed an Answer stating, among others, that he did not
commit false representation in his application for candidacy as
mayor because as early as 17 December 1997, he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization, after he filed a petition for
the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall
thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration
and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to
the repatriated citizen." The law is clear that repatriation is
effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of
the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and
the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen. Herein, Altajeros took his Oath of
Allegiance on 17 December 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation
was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6
years or on 18 February 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on
1 March 2004. Altajeros, therefore, completed all the
May 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of
this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions
disqualifying Altajeros to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
However, considering that Altajeros failed to prove before the
COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of
repatriation,as he submitted the necessary documents proving
compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his
motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no
longer consider said evidence. It is, therefore,
incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are
repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their
repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to
prevent a repetition of the present case.
16. BENGZON VS. HRET
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27,
1960, ofFilipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was
the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March
17, 1994, respondent
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate
of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.
Republic Act 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree 725.
They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation
of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling
in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts
to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation
subsists. Accordingly, Altajeross repatriation retroacted to the
date he filed his application in 1997. He was, therefore, qualified
to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the 10
Cruz
reacquired
his Philippine citizenship Republic Act No.
for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980,
using an Australian an Alien passport, Certificate and of
through repatriation under
2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of
obtained
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from
immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on
Immigration and
Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen
ofthe Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that
"no person shall be a Member of the House of
Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his
ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino
citizenship. According to the records of the
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo
was still an
Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriationsimply
Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct
evidence was
presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a
naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time
required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted
Australian
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided. This means that a
citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of
this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance.
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections
held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed
a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is
18. LABO vs. COMELEC FACTS:
disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of
alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be
Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the
Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In
1980, the marriage was declared void
annulled.
ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court
concerned only the COMELEC's
complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the
Court held that such
technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on
significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case.
jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the
petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC
lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his
citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the
case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a
foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in
the interest of the speedy administration of justice.
2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine
citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of
citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods
prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2)
1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's
citizenship?
naturalization, and (3) repatriation. - Contrary to Labo's
claim, his naturalization in
2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? 3. Is he qualified to
hold public office in the Philippines? 4. If Labo is not eligible
to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the
elections, replace him?
Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The
Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to
national interest. The contention that his marriage to an
Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino
citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that
HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for
quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay
the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the
petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require
the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the
petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he
still
marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been
automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian
citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of
bigamy. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino
citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is
totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically
motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine
of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.
of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private
respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent of is the
not a United citizen of States.
thePhilippines but 3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office
in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was
elected.
COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private
respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local
Government code that provides that persons who possess dual
citizenship are disqualified from running any 4. Despite getting
the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the
position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the
people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not
entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall
replace Labo. public position. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration which remained pending until after election.
Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
COMELEC
reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified
to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the
board of canvassers proclaimed private
*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.): Although no
decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC
for review, it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to
hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however,
that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship
because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during
the pendency of the case.
respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of
the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private
respondent
disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold
office as Vice-Mayor.
Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is
20. MERCADO VS MANZANO
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo
Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati
City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner
of the said election but the
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered
as a dual citizen because he is born
proclamation was suspended due to the petition
of
Filipino
parents
but
was
born in
San
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the
other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
of the Philippines to
posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers
and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born
in thePhilippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have Dual
22. AAJS, CALILUNG VS DATUMANONG
renounced Philippine citizenship.
FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to
stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled
"An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent,
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended,
and for Other Purposes."
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present
post, private and respondent in effect
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as
it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that
states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
elected Philippine citizenship
renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. ISSUE: By is
recognizing RA 9225 & allowing dual
allegiance,
unconstitutional?
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
of another country; that he will defend and support the
HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision.
The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance.
In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek
elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of
having more than one citizenship.
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that
would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the
judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance FACTS: This is a petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First
Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running
as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 23. JACOT VS COMELEC elections.
Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, Petitioner Nestor
Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, on January 25,
2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225. Upon approval
of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired
Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and
political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is 24. DE
GUZMAN VS COMELEC
Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on
the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US
citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He
sought to reacquire Republic his Philippine Act citizenship No.
under 9225.
disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in the May 14, 2007
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship
so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?
elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship
in accordance with RA 9225. HELD: We find that petitioner is
disqualified
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a
general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in
Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship
is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired
from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1.
Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; 2. Natural born
citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law,
becomes citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they
are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioners oath of
allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with
section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking
elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to
renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from
running for vice mayor.
26. CORODORA VS COMELEC
the supreme court recently ruled that a naturalborn Filipino,
who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an
american father and filipino mother, is exempt from the twin
requirements of swearing to an oath of allegiance and executing a
renunciation of foreign citizenship under the citizenship
retention and reacquisition act (ra 9225) before citizens of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
phils. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.]
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in RA NO. 9225 do not apply to him."