Case Digest 16-20

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/case-digest-16-20 1/17

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET

AL., petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDRE

LUISON, GRACE LUISON a!" #OSE DE

MAISIP, respondents.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution

of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another

motion to refer the case to and to e heard in oral

argument y the !ourt En Banc filed y petitioners, the

motion to refer the case to the !ourt en banc is granted

ut the motion to set the case for oral argument is

denied.

"etitioners in support of their contention that the filing

fee must e assessed on the asis of the amended

complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 #hey

contend that the !ourt of Appeals erred in that the filing

fee should e levied y considering the amount of

damages sought in the original complaint.

#he environmental facts of said case differ from the

present in that $

1. #he %agaspi case &as an action for recovery of

o&nership and possession of a parcel of land &ith

damages. $'hile the present case is an action for torts

and damages and specific performance &ith prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. %

2. (n the %agaspi case, the prayer in the complaint

see)s not only the annulment of title of the defendant to

the property, the declaration of o&nership and delivery of

possession thereof to plaintiffs ut also as)s for the

payment of actual moral, e*emplary damages and

attorney+s fees arising therefrom in the amounts

specified therein. & o&ever, in the present case, the

prayer is for the issuance of a &rit of preliminary

prohiitory in-unction during the pendency of the action

against the defendants+ announced forfeiture of the sum

of " %illion paid y the plaintiffs for the property in

/uestion, to attach such property of defendants that

maye sufficient to satisfy any -udgment that maye

rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to

e*ecute a contract of purchase and sale of the su-ect

property and annul defendants+ illegal forfeiture of the

money of plaintiff, ordering defendants -ointly and

severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and

e*emplary damages as &ell as 20 of said amounts as

maye proved during the trial as attorney+s fees and

declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of

plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to

ma)e the in-unction permanent. #he amount of damages

sought is not specified in the prayer although the ody of

the complaint alleges the total amount of over "78

%illion as damages suffered y plaintiff. 5

. pon the filing of the complaint there &as an honest

difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the%agaspi case. #he complaint &as considered as

primarily an action for recovery of o&nership and

possession of a parcel of land. #he damages stated

&ere treated as merely to the main cause of action

#hus, the doc)et fee of only "34.44 and "14.44 for the

sheriff+s fee &ere paid. '

(n the present case there can e no such hones

difference of opinion. As maye gleaned from the

allegations of the complaint as &ell as the designation

thereof, it is oth an action for damages and specific

performance. #he doc)et fee paid upon filing ocomplaint in the amount only of "514.44 y considering

the action to e merely one for specific performance

&here the amount involved is not capale of pecuniary

estimation is oviously erroneous. Although the tota

amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of

the complaint yet it is spelled out in the ody of the

complaint totalling in the amount of "78,704,444.44

&hich should e the asis of assessment of the filing

fee.

5. 'hen this under6re assessment of the filing fee in thiscase &as rought to the attention of this !ourt together

&ith similar other cases an investigation &as

immediately ordered y the !ourt. %ean&hile plaintif

through another counsel &ith leave of court filed an

amended complaint on Septemer 12, 1980 for the

inclusion of "hilips 'ire and !ale !orporation as co6

plaintiff and y emanating any mention of the amount of

damages in the ody of the complaint. #he prayer in the

original complaint &as maintained. After this !our

issued an order on ctoer 10, 1980 ordering the re6

assessment of the doc)et fee in the present case and

other cases that &ere investigated, on ovemer 121980 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the

amended complaint y stating the amounts &hich they

are as)ing for. (t &as only then that plaintiffs specified

the amount of damages in the ody of the complaint in

the reduced amount of "14,444,444.44. 7 Still no amoun

of damages &ere specified in the prayer. Said amended

complaint &as admitted.

n the other hand, in the %agaspi case, the trial court

ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of ",145.44 as

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original

complaint as it did not consider the damages to e

merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of

o&nership and possession of real property. 8 An

amended complaint &as filed y plaintiff &ith leave of

court to include the government of the epulic as

defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and

attorney+s fees prayed for to "144,444.44. Said

amended complaint &as also admitted.

9

(n the %agaspi case, the action &as considered not only

one for recovery of o&nership ut also for damages, so

that the filing fee for the damages should e the asis of

assessment. Although the payment of the doc)eting fee

of "34.44 &as found to e insufficient, nevertheless, it

&as held that since the payment &as the result of an

:honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to

e paid as doc)et fee: the court :had ac/uired

-urisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter

had &ere proper and regular.: 1( ence, as the

amended complaint superseded the original complaint,the allegations of damages in the amended complaint

should e the asis of the computation of the filing

fee.11

(n the present case no such honest difference of opinion

&as possile as the allegations of the complaint, the

designation and the prayer sho& clearly that it is an

action for damages and specific performance. #he

doc)eting fee should e assessed y considering the

amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.

As reiterated in the %agaspi case the rule is &ell6settled

:that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the

doc)et fee regardless of the actual date of filing in

court . 1$ #hus, in the present case the trial court did not

ac/uire -urisdiction over the case y the payment of only

"514.44 as doc)et fee. either can the amendment of

the complaint therey vest -urisdiction upon the

!ourt. 1% ;or an legal purposes there is no such original

complaint that &as duly filed &hich could e amended.

!onse/uently, the order admitting the amended

complaint and all suse/uent proceedings and actions

ta)en y the trial court are null and void.

#he !ourt of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present

case that the asis of assessment of the doc)et fee

should e the amount of damages sought in the original

complaint and not in the amended complaint.

#he !ourt cannot close this case &ithout ma)ing the

oservation that it fro&ns at the practice of counsel &ho

filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any

specification of the amount of damages in the prayer

although the amount of over "78 million is alleged in the

ody of the complaint. #his is clearly intended for no

other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct

filing fees if not to mislead the doc)et cler) in the

assessment of the filing fee. #his fraudulent practice &as

compounded &hen, even as this !ourt had ta)en

cogni<ance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation

petitioner through another counsel filed an amended

complaint, deleting all mention of the amount odamages eing as)ed for in the ody of the complaint. (t

&as only &hen in oedience to the order of this !ourt of

ctoer 18, 1980, the trial court directed that the amoun

of damages e specified in the amended complaint, that

petitioners+ counsel &rote the damages sought in the

much reduced amount of "14,444,444.44 in the ody of

the complaint ut not in the prayer thereof. #he design to

avoid payment of the re/uired doc)et fee is ovious.

#he !ourt serves &arning that it &ill ta)e drastic action

upon a repetition of this unethical practice.

#o put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth al

complaints, petitions, ans&ers and other simila

pleadings should specify the amount of damages eing

prayed for not only in the ody of the pleading ut also in

the prayer, and said damages shall e considered in the

assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading

that fails to comply &ith this re/uirement shall not i

accepted nor admitted, or shall other&ise e e*punged

from the record.

#he !ourt ac/uires -urisdiction over any case only uponthe payment of the prescried doc)et fee. An

amendment of the complaint or similar pleading &ill not

therey vest -urisdiction in the !ourt, much less the

payment of the doc)et fee ased on the amounts sought

in the amended pleading. #he ruling in the %agasp

case 1& in so far as it is inconsistent &ith this

pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

'==;=, the motion for reconsideration is denied

for lac) of merit. S D==D.

G.R. No). 799%7*%8 F+-a-y 1%, 1989

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., /SIOL0, E..

PHILIPPS a!" D.#. ARY, petitioners,

vs.

HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, P-+)2"2!3 #"3+,

-a!4 1(&, R+32o!a6 T-2a6 Co-, +o! C2y a!"

MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


GANCAYCO, J.:

Again the !ourt is as)ed to resolve the issue of &hether

or not a court ac/uires -urisdiction over a case &hen the

correct and proper doc)et fee has not een paid.

n ;eruary 28, 1985, petitioner Sun (nsurance ffice,

>td. ?S(> for revity@ filed a complaint &ith the egional

#rial !ourt of %a)ati, %etro %anila for the consignationof a premium refund on a fire insurance policy &ith a

prayer for the -udicial declaration of its nullity against

private respondent %anuel y "o #iong. "rivate

respondent as declared in default for failure to file the

re/uired ans&er &ithin the reglementary period.

n the other hand, on %arch 28, 1985, private

respondent filed a complaint in the egional #rial !ourt

of ue<on !ity for the refund of premiums and the

issuance of a &rit of preliminary attachment &hich &as

doc)eted as !ivil !ase o. 651177, initially against

petitioner S(>, and thereafter including =.B. "hilipps

and D.J. 'ary as additional defendants. #he complaint

sought, among others, the payment of actual,

compensatory, moral, e*emplary and li/uidated

damages, attorney+s fees, e*penses of litigation and

costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did

not /uantify the amount of damages sought said amount

may e inferred from the ody of the complaint to e

aout ;ifty %illion "esos ?"04,444,444.44@.

nly the amount of "214.44 &as paid y private

respondent as doc)et fee &hich prompted petitioners+counsel to raise his o-ection. Said o-ection &as

disregarded y respondent Judge Jose ". !astro &ho

&as then presiding over said case. pon the order of

this !ourt, the records of said case together &ith t&enty6

t&o other cases assigned to different ranches of the

egional #rial !ourt of ue<on !ity &hich &ere under

investigation for under6assessment of doc)et fees &ere

transmitted to this !ourt. #he !ourt thereafter returned

the said records to the trial court &ith the directive that

they e re6raffled to the other -udges in ue<on !ity, to

the e*clusion of Judge !astro. !ivil !ase o. 651177

&as re6raffled to Branch 145, a sala &hich &as thenvacant.

n ctoer 10, 1980, the !ourt en banc issued a

esolution in Administrative !ase o. 80614687026#!

directing the -udges in said cases to reassess the doc)et

fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment.

#he esolution also re/uires all cler)s of court to issue

certificates of re6assessment of doc)et fees. All litigants

&ere li)e&ise re/uired to specify in their pleadings the

amount sought to e recovered in their complaints.

n Decemer 13, 1980, Judge Antonio ". Solano, to

&hose sala !ivil !ase o. 651177 &as temporarily

assigned, issuedan order to the !ler) of !our

instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the

doc)et fee paid y private respondent and, in case of

deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.

n January 7, 1985, to forestall a default, a cautionary

ans&er &as filed y petitioners. n August 4,1985, anamended complaint &as filed y private responden

including the t&o additional defendants aforestated.

Judge %a*imiano !. Asuncion, to &hom !ivil !ase o

51177 &as thereafter assigned, after his assumption

into office on January 13, 1983, issued a Supplementa

rder re/uiring the parties in the case to comment on

the !ler) of !ourt+s letter6report signifying her difficulty in

complying &ith the esolution of this !ourt of ctoer

10, 1980 since the pleadings filed y private respondent

did not indicate the e*act amount sought to e

recovered. n January 2, 1983, private respondenfiled a :!ompliance: and a :e6Amended !omplaint

stating therein a claim of :not less than "l4,444,444. 44

as actual compensatory damages: in the prayer. (n the

ody of the said second amended complaint ho&ever

private respondent alleges actual and compensatory

damages and attorney+s fees in the total amount of aou

"55,341,32.74.

n January 25, 1983, Judge Asuncion issued another

rder admitting the second amended complaint and

stating therein that the same constituted propecompliance &ith the esolution of this !ourt and that a

copy thereof should e furnished the !ler) of !ourt for

the reassessment of the doc)et fees. #he reassessment

y the !ler) of !ourt ased on private respondent+s

claim of :not less than "14,444,444.44 as actual and

compensatory damages: amounted to "9,783.44 as

doc)et fee. #his &as suse/uently paid y private

respondent.

"etitioners then filed a petition for certiorari &ith the

!ourt of Appeals /uestioning the said order of Judie

Asuncion dated January 25, 1983.

n April 25, 1983, private respondent filed a

supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim o

"24,444,444.44 as d./mages so the total claim amounts

to aout "35,341,32.74. n ctoer 13, 1983, or some

seven months after filing the supplemental complaint

the private respondent paid the additional doc)et fee of

"84,93.44. 1

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


n August 1, 1987, the !ourt of Appeals rendered a

decision ruling, among others, as follo&sC

'==;=, -udgment is herey

renderedC

1. Denying due course to the petition in

!A6.. S" o. 1, 49710 insofar as it

see)s annulment of the order

?a@ denying petitioners+ motion to

dismiss the complaint, as amended, and

?@ granting the &rit of preliminary

attachment, ut giving due course to the

portion thereof /uestioning the

reassessment of the doc)eting fee, and

re/uiring the onorale respondent

!ourt to reassess the doc)eting fee to

e paid y private respondent on the

asis of the amount of

"20,541,747.44. $

ence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity

&ith the said -udgment of respondent court, private

respondent paid the additional doc)et fee of "32,52.94

on April 28, 1988. %

#he main thrust of the petition is that the !ourt of

Appeals erred in not finding that the lo&er court did notac/uire -urisdiction over !ivil !ase o. 651177 on the

ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper doc)et

fee. "etitioners allege that &hile it may e true that

private respondent had paid the amount of "182,825.94

as doc)et fee as herein6aove related, and considering

that the total amount sought to e recovered in the

amended and supplemental complaint is

"35,341,32.74 the doc)et fee that should e paid y

private respondent is "207,814.59, more or less. ot

having paid the same, petitioners contend that the

complaint should e dismissed and all incidents arising

therefrom should e annulled. (n support of their theory,

petitioners cite the latest ruling of the !ourt

in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, & as

follo&sC

#he !ourt ac/uires -urisdiction over any

case only upon the payment of the

prescried doc)et fee. An amendment of

the complaint or similar pleading &ill not

therey vest -urisdiction in the !ourt,

much less the payment of the doc)et fee

ased on the amounts sought in the

amended pleading. #he ruling in the

%agaspi !ase in so far as it is

inconsistent &ith this pronouncement is

overturned and reversed.

n the other hand, private respondent claims that the

ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to !ivi

!ase o. 51177 for at the time said civil case &as filedin court there &as no such Manchester ruling as yet

;urther, private respondent avers that &hat is applicale

is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v

Ramolete, 5&herein this !ourt held that the trial court

ac/uired -urisdiction over the case even if the doc)et fee

paid &as insufficient.

#he contention that Manchester cannot apply

retroactively to this case is untenale. Statutes

regulating the procedure of the courts &ill e construed

as applicale to actions pending and undetermined at

the time of their passage. "rocedural la&s areretrospective in that sense and to that e*tent. '

(n Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this !ourt held tha

the payment of the full amount of the doc)et fee is an

indispensale step for the perfection of an appeal. (n a

forcile entry and detainer case efore the -ustice of the

peace court of %anaoag, "angasinan, after notice of a

-udgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice

of appeal &ith said court ut he deposited only "8.44 for

the doc)et fee, instead of "13.44 as re/uired, &ithin the

reglementary period of appeal of five ?0@ days aftereceiving notice of -udgment. "laintiff deposited the

additional "8.44 to complete the amount of the doc)et

fee only fourteen ?15@ days later. n the asis of these

facts, this court held that the !ourt of ;irst (nstance did

notac/uire -urisdiction to hear and determine the appea

as the appeal &as not therey perfected.

(n Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified

declaration of intention to ecome a ;ilipino citi<en y

sending it through registered mail to the ffice of the

Solicitor eneral in 190 ut the re/uired filing fee &as

paid only in 1903, arely 0E2 months prior to the filing ofthe petition for citi<enship. #his !ourt ruled that the

declaration &as not filed in accordance &ith the lega

re/uirement that such declaration should e f iled at leas

one year efore the filing of the petition for citi<enship

!iting Lazaro, this !ourt concluded that the filing o

petitioner+s declaration of intention on ctoer 2, 190

produced no legal effect until the re/uired filing fee &as

paid on %ay 2, 1903.

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


(n Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated

in >a<aro and >ee &ere applied. (t &as an original

petition for quo arranto contesting the right to office of

proclaimed candidates &hich &as mailed, addressed to

the cler) of the !ourt of ;irst (nstance, &ithin the one6

&ee) period after the proclamation as provided therefor

y la&. 1( o&ever, the re/uired doc)et fees &ere paid

only after the e*piration of said period. !onse/uently,

this !ourt held that the date of such payment must edeemed to e the real date of filing of aforesaid petition

and not the date &hen it &as mailed.

Again, in !arica vs, "asquez, 11 this !ourt reiterated the

rule that the doc)et fee must e paid efore a court &ill

act on a petition or complaint. o&ever, &e also held

that said rule is not applicale &hen petitioner see)s the

proate of several &ills of the same decedent as he is

not re/uired to file a separate action for each &ill ut

instead he may have other &ills proated in the same

special proceeding then pending efore the same court.

#hen in Magaspi, 1$ this !ourt reiterated the ruling

in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon

payment of the doc)et fee regardless of the actual date

of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for

recovery of o&nership and possession of a parcel of

land &ith damages filed in the !ourt of ;irst (nstance of

!eu. pon the payment of "34.44 for the doc)et fee

and "14.44 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint &as

doc)eted as !ivil !ase o. 611882. #he prayer of the

complaint sought that the #ransfer !ertificate of #itle

issued in the name of the defendant e declared as null

and void. (t &as also prayed that plaintiff e declared as

o&ner thereof to &hom the proper title should e issued,

and that defendant e made to pay monthly rentals of

",044.44 from June 2, 1958 up to the time the property

is delivered to plaintiff, "044,444.44 as moral damages,

attorney+s fees in the amount of "204,444.44, the costs

of the action and e*emplary damages in the amount of

"044,444.44.

#he defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff

to pay the correct amount of the doc)et fee to &hich an

opposition &as filed y the plaintiff alleging that theaction &as for the recovery of a parcel of land so the

doc)et fee must e ased on its assessed value and that

the amount of "34.44 &as the correct doc)eting fee. #he

trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay ",145.44 as filing

fee.

#he plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended

complaint to include the epulic as the defendant. (n

the prayer of the amended complaint the e*emplary

damages earlier sought &as eliminated. #he amended

prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may

determine, attorney+s fees of "144,444.44 and the costs

of the action. #he defendant filed an opposition to the

amended complaint. #he opposition not&ithstanding, the

amended complaint &as admitted y the trial court. #he

trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the

additional doc)et fee &hich plaintiff assailed and then

challenged efore this !ourt. "laintiff alleged that he

paid the total doc)et fee in the amount of "34.44 andthat if he has to pay the additional fee it must e ased

on the amended complaint.

#he /uestion posed, therefore, &as &hether or not the

plaintiff may e considered to have filed the case even if

the doc)eting fee paid &as not sufficient. (n Magaspi, 'e

reiterated the rule that the case &as deemed filed only

upon the payment of the correct amount for the doc)et

fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the

complaintF that there &as an honest difference of opinion

as to the correct amount to e paid as doc)et fee in that

as the action appears to e one for the recovery ofproperty the doc)et fee of "34.44 &as correctF and tha

as the action is also one, for damages, 'e upheld the

assessment of the additional doc)et fee ased on the

damages alleged in the amended complaint as against

the assessment of the trial court &hich &as ased on the

damages alleged in the original complaint.

o&ever, as aforecited, this !our

overturned Magaspi in Manchester . Manchester involves

an action for torts and damages and specific

performance &ith a prayer for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order, etc. #he prayer in said case

is for the issuance of a &rit of preliminary prohiitory

in-unction during the pendency of the action against the

defendants+ announced forfeiture of the sum of "

%illion paid y the plaintiffs for the property in /uestion

the attachment of such property of defendants that may

e sufficient to satisfy any -udgment that may e

rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order

re/uiring defendants to e*ecute a contract of purchase

and sale of the su-ect property and annul defendants

illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. (t &as also

prayed that the defendants e made to pay the plaintiff -ointly and severally, actual, compensatory and

e*emplary damages as &ell as 20 of said amounts as

may e proved during the trial for attorney+s fees. #he

plaintiff also as)ed the trial court to declare the tender of

payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and

sufficient for purposes of payment, and to ma)e the

in-unction permanent. #he amount of damages sought is

not specified in the prayer although the ody of the

complaint alleges the total amount of over "78 %illon

allegedly suffered y plaintiff.

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


pon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the

amount of only "514.44 for the doc)et fee ased on the

nature of the action for specific performance &here the

amount involved is not capale of pecuniary estimation.

o&ever, it &as ovious from the allegations of the

complaint as &ell as its designation that the action &as

one for damages and specific performance. #hus, this

court held the plaintiff must e assessed the correct

doc)et fee computed against the amount of damages of aout "78 %illion, although the same &as not spelled

out in the prayer of the complaint.

%ean&hile, plaintiff through another counsel, &ith leave

of court, filed an amended complaint on Septemer 12,

1980 y the inclusion of another co6plaintiff and

eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the

ody of the complaint. #he prayer in the original

complaint &as maintained.

n ctoer 10, 1980, this !ourt ordered the re6

assessment of the doc)et fee in the said case and other cases that &ere investigated. n ovemer 12, 1980,

the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended

complaint y stating the amounts &hich they &ere

as)ing for. #his plaintiff did as instructed. (n the ody of

the complaint the amount of damages alleged &as

reduced to "14,444,444.44 ut still no amount of

damages &as specified in the prayer. Said amended

complaint &as admitted.

Applying the principle in Magaspi that :the case is

deemed filed only upon payment of the doc)et feeregardless of the actual date of filing in court,: this !ourt

held that the trial court did not ac/uire -urisdiction over

the case y payment of only "514.44 for the doc)et fee.

either can the amendment of the complaint therey

vest -urisdiction upon the !ourt. ;or all legal purposes

there &as no such original complaint duly filed &hich

could e amended. !onse/uently, the order admitting

the amended complaint and all suse/uent proceedings

and actions ta)en y the trial court &ere declared null

and void. 1%

#he present case, as aove discussed, is among theseveral cases of under6assessment of doc)et fee &hich

&ere investigated y this !ourt together

&ith Manchester . #he facts and circumstances of this

case are similar toManchester . (n the ody of the original

complaint, the total amount of damages sought

amounted to aout "04 %illion. (n the prayer, the amount

of damages as)ed for &as not stated. #he action &as for

the refund of the premium and the issuance of the &rit of

preliminary attachment &ith damages. #he amount of

only "214.44 &as paid for the doc)et fee. n January

2, 1983, private respondent filed an amended

complaint &herein in the prayer it is as)ed that he e

a&arded no less than "14,444,444.44 as actual and

e*emplary damages ut in the ody of the complaint the

amount of his pecuniary claim is appro*imately

"55,341,32.74. Said amended complaint &as admitted

and the private respondent &as reassessed the

additional doc)et fee of "9,783.44 ased on his prayer

of not less than "14,444,444.44 in damages, &hich hepaid.

n April 25, 1983, private respondent filed a

supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim o

"24,444,444.44 in damages so that his total claim is

appro*imately "35,341,324.74. n ctoer 13, 1983

private respondent paid an additional doc)et fee o

"84,93.44. After the promulgation of the decision of the

respondent court on August 1, 1987 &herein private

respondent &as ordered to e reassessed for additiona

doc)et fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and

after the promulgation of Manchester , on April 28, 1988private respondent paid an additional doc)et fee o

"32,12.92. Although private respondent appears to

have paid a total amount of "182,825.94 for the doc)e

fee considering the total amount of his claim in the

amended and supplemental complaint amounting to

aout "35,341,324.74, petitioner insists that private

respondent must pay a doc)et fee of "207,814.59.

#he principle in Manchester could very &ell e applied in

the present case. #he pattern and the intent to defraud

the government of the doc)et fee due it is ovious not

only in the filing of the original complaint ut also in the

filing of the second amended complaint.

o&ever, in Manchester , petitioner did not pay any

additional doc)et fee untilG the case &as decided y this

!ourt on %ay 7, 1987. #hus, in Manchester , due to the

fraud committed on the government, this !ourt held tha

the court a quo did not ac/uire -urisdiction over the case

and that the amended complaint could not have een

admitted inasmuch as the original complaint &as nul

and void.

(n the present case, a more lieral interpretation of the

rules is called for considering that, unli)e %anchester

private respondent demonstrated his &illingness to aide

y the rules y paying the additional doc)et fees as

re/uired. #he promulgation of the decision in

%anchester must have had that soering influence on

private respondent &ho thus paid the additional doc)e

fee as ordered y the respondent court. (t triggered his

change of stance y manifesting his &illingness to pay

such additional doc)et fee as may e ordered.

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


evertheless, petitioners contend that the doc)et fee

that &as paid is still insufficient considering the total

amount of the claim. #his is a matter &hich the cler) of

court of the lo&er court andHor his duly authori<ed doc)et

cler) or cler) in6charge should determine and, thereafter,

if any amount is found due, he must re/uire the private

respondent to pay the same.

#hus, the !ourt rules as follo&sC

1. (t is not simply the filing of the complaint or

appropriate initiatory pleading, ut the payment of the

prescried doc)et fee, that vests a trial court &ith

-urisdiction over the su-ect matter or nature of the

action. 'here the filing of the initiatory pleading is not

accompanied y payment of the doc)et fee, the court

may allo& payment of the fee &ithin a reasonale time

ut in no case eyond the applicale prescriptive or

reglementary period.

2. #he same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,

third party claims and similar pleadings, &hich shall not

e considered filed until and unless the filing fee

prescried therefor is paid. #he court may also allo&

payment of said fee &ithin a reasonale time ut also in

no case eyond its applicale prescriptive or


. 'here the trial court ac/uires -urisdiction over a claim

y the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of

the prescried filing fee ut, suse/uently, the -udgment

a&ards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has een left for determination y the

court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a

lien on the -udgment. (t shall e the responsiility of the

!ler) of !ourt or his duly authori<ed deputy to enforce

said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

'==;=, the petition is D(S%(SS=D for lac) of

merit. #he !ler) of !ourt of the court a quo is herey

instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing

fee that should e paid y private respondent

considering the total amount of the claim sought in the

original complaint and the supplemental complaint asmay e gleaned from the allegations and the prayer

thereof and to re/uire private respondent to pay the

deficiency, if any, &ithout pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No). 88(75*77 D+4+:+- $(, 1989

MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES a!" ANTONIA

NOEL, petitioners,

vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Da;ao "+6 No-+

-a!4+) 1 a!" $, P-+)2"+" y Ho!. Ma-42a6 F+-!a!"+

a!" Ho!. #+)) Maa), -+)<+42;+6y, PATSITA

GAMUTAN, C6+-= o> Co-, a!" GODOFREDO

PINEDA, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

(n the egional #rial !ourt at #agum, Davao de

orte, 1 three

?@ actions for recovery of possession ?acciones

pulicianas $ @ &ere separately instituted y odofredo

"ineda against three ?@ defendants, doc)eted as

follo&sC

1@ vs. Antonia oel !ivil !ase o. 2249

2@ vs. "onciano "anes !ivil !ase o. 2214

@ vs. %a*imo #acay !ivil !ase o. 2211.

!ivil !ases umered 2249 and 2211 &ere raffled to

Branch ( of the #rial !ourt, presided over y Judge

%arcial ernande<. !ivil o. 2214 &as assigned to

Branch 2, presided over y Judge Jesus %atas.

#he complaints % all alleged the same essential facts ?1@

"ineda &as the o&ner of a parcel of land measuring 794

s/uare meters, his o&nership eing evidenced y #!#

o. #653034F ?2@ the previous o&ner had allo&ed thedefendants to occupy portions of the land y mere

toleranceF ?@ having himself need to use the property

"ineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate

the property and pay reasonale rentals therefor, u

these demands had een refusedF and ?5@ the las

demand had een made more than a year prior to the

commencement of suit. #he complaints prayed for the

same reliefs, to &itC

1@ that plaintiff e declared o&ner of the

areas occupied y the defendantsF

2@ that defendants and their :privies and

allies: e ordered to vacate and deliver

the portions of the land usurped y

themF

@ that each defendant e ordered to

payC

1 @ " 2,444 as monthly rents from

;eruary, 1987F

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


2 @ Actual damages, as provenF

@ %oral and nominal damages as the

onorale !ourt may fi* F

5@ "4,444.44, :as attorney+s fees, and

representation fees of "0,444.44 per

day of appearanceF: &

and

5@ that he ?"ineda@ e granted such

:further relief and remedies ... -ust and

e/uitale in the premises.

#he prayer of each complaint contained a hand&ritten

notation ?evidently made y plaintiff+s counsel@ reading,

:"0,444.44 as and for,: immediately aove the

type&ritten &ords, :Actual damages, as proven,: the

intention apparently eing to ma)e the entire phrase

read, : "0,444.44 as and for actual damages as

proven. 5

%otions to dismiss &ere filed in ehalf of each of the

defendants y common counsel . ' =very motion alleged

that the #rial !ourt had not ac/uired -urisdiction of the

case $

. . . for the reason that the ... complaint

violates the mandatory and clear

provision of !ircular o. 7 of the ...

Supreme !ourt dated %arch 25,1988,y failing to specify all the amounts of

damages &hich plaintiff is claiming from

defendantF: and

. . . for ... failure ?of the complaint@ to

even allege the asic re/uirement as to

the assessed value of the su-ect lot in

dispute.

Judge %atas denied the motion to dismiss filed in !ivil

!ase o. 2214 ut ordered the e*punction of the

:allegations in paragraph 11 of the ... complaint

regarding moral as &ell as nominal damages . 7 n

motion of defendant "anes, Judge %atas later ordered

the stri)ing out, too, of the :hand&ritten amount of

+"0,444. 44 as and for.+ including the type&ritten &ords

+actual damages as proven+ ... in su6paragraph of

paragraph 5 in the conclusion and prayer of the

complaint ...: 8

#he motions to dismiss sumitted in !ivil !ases

umered 2211 and 2249 &ere also denied in separate

orders promulgated y Judge %arcial ;ernande<. 9 is

rder in !ase o. 2249 dated %arch 10, 1989 ?a@

declared that since the :action at ar is fo

eivindicatoria, Damages and Attorney+s fees ..

?d@efinitely this !ourt has the e*clusive -urisdiction,: ?@

that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages

:are only one aspect of the cause of action,: and ?c@

ecause of asence of specification of the amounts

claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, theyshould e :e*punged from the records.:

Ascriing grave ause of discretion to oth Judges

%atas and ;ernande< in the rendition of the rders

aove descried, the defendants in all three ?@ actions

have filed &ith this !ourt a :Joint "etition: for certiorari

prohiition and mandamus, &ith prayer for temporary

restraining order andHor &rit of preliminary prohiitory

in-unction,: praying essentially that said orders e

annulled and respondent -udges directed to dismiss al

the complaints :&ithout pre-udice to private respondent

"ineda+s re6filing a similar complaint that complies &ith!ircular o. 7.: #he -oint petition ?a@ re6asserted the

proposition that ecause the complaints had failed to

state the amounts eing claimed as actual, moral and

nominal damages, the #rial !ourts a /uo had no

ac/uired -urisdiction over the three ?@ actions in

/uestion6indeed, the respondent !ler) of !ourt should

not have accepted the complaints &hich initiated said

suits, and ?@ it &as not proper merely to e*punge the

claims for damages and allo& :the so6called cause o

action for :reivindicatoria: remain for trial: y itself. 1(

#he -oint petition should e, as it is herey, dismissed.

(t should e dismissed for failure to comply &ith this

!ourt+s !ircular o. 1688 ?effective January 1, 1989@

#he copies of the challenged rders thereto

attached 11 &ere not certified y the proper !ler) o

!ourt or his duly authori<ed representative. !ertification

&as made y the petitioners+ counsel, &hich is no

allo&ed.

#he petition should e dismissed, too, for anothe

e/ually important reason. (t fails to demonstrate anygrave ause of discretion on the part of the responden

Judges in rendering the rders complained of or, for tha

matter, the e*istence of any proper cause for the

issuance of the &rit of mandamus. n the contrary, the

orders appear to have correctly applied the la& to the

admitted facts.

(t is true that the complaints do not state the amounts

eing claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. (t

is also true, ho&ever, that the actions are not asically

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


for the recovery of sums of money. #hey are principally

for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature

of an accion puliciana. Determinative of the court+s

-urisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof,

not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or

connected &ith the issue of title or possession, and

regardless of the value of the property. uite oviously,

an action for recovery of possession of real property

?such as an accion plenaria de possesion@ or the titlethereof, 1$or for partition or condemnation of, or the

foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property 1% 6 in

other &ords, a real action6may e commenced and

prosecuted &ithout an accompanying claim for actual,

moral, nominal or e*emplary damagesF and such an

action &ould fall &ithin the e*clusive, original -urisdiction

of the egional #rial !ourt.

Batas "amansa Bilang 129 provides that egional #rial

!ourts shall e*ercise e*clusive original -urisdiction inter

alia over :all civil actions &hich involve the title to, or

possession of, real property, or any interest therein,e*cept actions for forcile entry into and unla&ful

detainer of lands or uildings, original -urisdiction over

&hich is conferred upon %etropolitan #rial !ourts,

%unicipal #rial !ourts, and %unicipal !ircuit #rial

!ourts.: 1& #he rule applies regardless of the value of the

real property involved, &hether it e &orth more than

"24,444.44 or not, infra. #he rule also applies even

&here the complaint involving realty also prays for an

a&ard of damagesF the amount of those damages &ould

e immaterial to the /uestion of the !ourt+s -urisdiction.

#he rule is unli)e that in other cases e.g., actions simply

for recovery of money or of personal property, 15 or

actions in admiralty and maritime -urisdiction 1' in &hich

the amount claimed, 17 or the value of the personal

property, is determinative of -urisdictionF i.e., the value of

the personal property or the amount claimed should

e*ceed t&enty thousand pesos ?"24,444.44@ in order to

e cogni<ale y the egional #rial !ourt.

!ircular o. 7 of this !ourt, dated %arch 25, 1988,

cannot thus e invo)ed, as the petitioner does, as

authority for the dismissal of the actions at ar. #hat

circular, avo&edly inspired y the doctrine laid do&nin Manchester Development Corporation v. Court o#

appeals, 159 S!A 032 ?%ay 7, 1987@, has ut limited

application to said actions, as shall presently e

discussed. %oreover, the rules therein laid do&n have

since een clarified and amplified y the !ourt+s

suse/uent decision in $un %nsurance &##ice, Ltd.

'$%&L( v. Asuncion, et al., .. os. 799768, ;eruary

1, 1989.

!ircular o. 7 &as aimed at the practice of certain

parties &ho omit from the prayer of their complaints :any

specification of the amount of damages,: the omission

eing :clearly intended for no other purposes than to

evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to

mislead the doc)et cler), in the assessment of the filing

fee.: #he follo&ing rules &ere therefore set do&nC

1. All complaints, petitions, ans&ers, and similapleadings should specify the amount of damages eing

prayed for not only in the ody of the pleading ut also in

the prayer, and said damages shall e considered in the

assessment of the filing fees in any case.

2. Any pleading that fails to comply &ith this re/uiremen

shall not e accepted nor admitted, or shall other&ise e

e*punged from the record.

. #he !ourt ac/uires -urisdiction over any case only

upon the payment of the prescried doc)et fee. An

amendment of the complaint or similar pleading &ill not

therey vest -urisdiction in the !ourt, much less the

payment of the doc)et fee ased on the amount sought

in the amended pleading.

#he clarificatory and additional rules laid do&n in $un

%nsurance &##ice, Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as

follo&sC

1. (t is not simply the filing of the complaint o

appropriate initiatory pleading, ut ?also@ the payment of

the prescried doc)et fee that vests a trial court &ith -urisdiction over the su-ect6matter or nature of the

action. 'here the filing of the initiatory pleading is not

accompanied y payment of the doc)et fee, the court

may allo& payment of the fee &ithin a reasonale time

ut in no case eyond the applicale prescriptive o


2. #he same rule applies to permissive counterclaims

third6party claims and similar pleadings, &hich shall not

e considered filed until and unless the filing fee

prescried therefor is paid. #he court may also allo&

payment of said fee &ithin a reasonale time ut also in

no case eyond its applicale prescriptive o


. 'here the trial court ac/uires -urisdiction over a claim

y the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of

the prescried filing fee ut, suse/uently, the -udgment

a&ards a claim not specified in the pleading, or i

specified, the same has een left for determination y

the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute

a lien on the -udgment. (t shall e the responsiility of the

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


!ler) of !ourt or his duly authori<ed deputy to enforce

said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

As &ill e noted, the re/uirement in !ircular o. 7 that

complaints, petitions, ans&ers, and similar pleadings

should specify the amount of damages eing prayed for

not only in the ody of the pleading ut also in the

prayer, has not een altered. 'hat has een revised is

the rule that suse/uent :amendment of the complaint or similar pleading &ill not therey vest -urisdiction in the

!ourt, much less the payment of the doc)et fee ased

on the amount sought in the amended pleading,: the trial

court no& eing authori<ed to allo& payment of the fee

&ithin a reasonale time ut in no case eyond the

applicale prescriptive or reglementary period.

%oreover, a ne& rule has een added, governing

a&ards of claims not specified in the pleading 6 i.e.,

damages arising after the filing of the complaint or

similar pleading6as to &hich the additional filing fee

therefor shall constitute a lien on the -udgment.

o&, under the ules of !ourt, doc)et or filing fees are

assessed on the asis of the :sum claimed,: on the one

hand, or the :value of the property in litigation or the

value of the estate,: on the other. 18 #here are, in other

&ords, as already aove intimated, actions or

proceedings involving real property, in &hich the value of

the property is immaterial to the court+s -urisdiction,

account thereof eing ta)en merely for assessment of

the legal feesF and there are actions or proceedings,

involving personal property or the recovery of money

andHor damages, in &hich the value of the property or

the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court+s

competence ?aside from eing the asis for fi*ing the

corresponding doc)et fees@. 19

'here the action is purely for the recovery of money or

damages, the doc)et fees are assessed on the asis of

the aggregate amount claimed, e*clusive only of

interests and costs. (n this case, the complaint or similar

pleading should, according to !ircular o. 7 of this

!ourt, :specify the amount of damages eing prayed for

not only in the ody of the pleading ut also in the

prayer, and said damages shall e considered in theassessment of the filing fees in any case.:

#&o situations may arise. ne is &here the complaint or

similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or

damages and there is no precise statement of the

amounts eing claimed. (n this event the rule is that the

pleading &ill :not e accepted nor admitted, or shall

other&ise e e*punged from the record.: (n other &ords,

the complaint or pleading may e dismissed, or the

claims as to &hich the amounts are unspecified may e

e*punged, although as aforestated the !ourt may, on

motion, permit amendment of the complaint and

payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the

meantime ecome time6arred. #he other is &here the

pleading does specify the amount of every claim, ut the

fees paid are insufficientF and here again, the rule no& is

that the court may allo& a reasonale time for the

payment of the prescried fees, or the alance thereof

and upon such payment, the defect is cured and thecourt may properly ta)e cogni<ance of the action, unless

in the meantime prescription has set in and

conse/uently arred the right of action.

'here the action involves real property and a related

claim for damages as &ell, the legal fees shall e

assessed on the asis of oth ?a@ the value of the

property and ?@ the total amount of related damages

sought. #he !ourt ac/uires -urisdiction over the action if

the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied y the

payment of the re/uisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid

at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time offull payment of the fees &ithin such reasonale time as

the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has

set in the meantime. But &here6as in the case at ar6the

fees prescried for an action involving real property have

een paid, ut the amounts of certain of the related

damages ?actual, moral and nominal@ eing demanded

are unspecified, the action may not e dismissed. #he

!ourt undenialy has -urisdiction over the action

involving the real property, ac/uiring it upon the filing of

the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the

prescried fee. And it is not divested of that authority y

the circumstance that it may not have ac/uired

-urisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages

ecause of lac) of specification thereof. 'hat should e

done is simply to e*punge those claims for damages as

to &hich no amounts are stated, &hich is &hat the

respondent !ourts did, or allo&, on motion, a reasonale

time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege

the precise amount of each item of damages and accept

payment of the re/uisite fees therefor &ithin the relevant

prescriptive period.

'==;=, the petition is D(S%(SS=D, &ithoupronouncement as to costs.

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


G.R. No. 1%(8'' S+<+:+- 1', 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,vs.

NATIONAL LAOR RELATIONS COMMISSION a!"

IENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

;A!#SC

"rivate respondent alleges that he started &or)ing asperations %anager of petitioner St. %artin ;uneralome on ;eruary 3, 1990. o&ever, there &as no

contract of employment e*ecuted et&een him andpetitioner nor &as his name included in the semi6monthlypayroll. n January 22, 1993, he &as dismissed from hisemployment for allegedly misappropriating "8,444.44."etitioner on the other hand claims that privaterespondent &as not its employee ut only the uncle of

Amelita %alaed, the o&ner of petitioner St.%artinIs;uneral ome and in January 1993, the mother of

Amelita passed a&ay, so the latter too) over themanagement of the usiness.

Amelita made some changes in the usiness operationand private respondent and his &ife &ere no longer allo&ed to participate in the management thereof. As aconse/uence, the latter filed a complaint charging thatpetitioner had illegally terminated his employment. #helaor ariter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer6employee relationshipe*isted et&een the parties and therefore his office hadno -urisdiction over the case.

(SS=C ' the decision of the >! are appealaleto the !ourt of Appeals.

>(C

#he !ourt is of the considered opinion that ever since

appeals from the >! to the S! &ere eliminated, thelegislative intendment &as that the special civil action for certiorari &as and still is the proper vehicle for -udicialrevie& of decisions of the >!. #he use of the&ordappealin relation thereto and in the instances&e have noted could have een a lapsus plumaeecause appeals y certiorari and the original action for certiorari are oth modes of -udicial revie& addressed tothe appellate courts. #he important distinction et&eenthem, ho&ever, and &ith &hich the !ourt is particularlyconcerned here is that the special civil action for certiorari is &ithin the concurrent original -urisdiction of

this !ourt and the !ourt of AppealsF &hereas to indulgein the assumption that appeals y certiorari to the S!are allo&ed &ould not suserve, ut &ould suvert, theintention of the !ongress as e*pressed in thesponsorship speech on Senate Bill o. 1590.

#herefore, all references in the amended Section 9 ofB." o. 129 to supposed appeals from the >! to theSupreme !ourt are interpreted and herey declared tomean and refer to petitions for certiorari under ule30!onse/uently, all such petitions should henceforth einitially filed in the !ourt of Appeals in strict oservanceof the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as theappropriate forum for the relief desired.

G.R. No. L*'''$( S+<+:+- $&, 198'

REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. #UDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE*PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO

INONGCAL ? FERNANDO CALION, respondents.

FERIA, J.:

#he !ourt rules that the application of the totality rule

under Section ?l@ of Batas "amansa Blg. 129 and

Section 11 of the (nterim ules is su-ect to the

re/uirements for the permissive -oinder of parties under

Section 3 of ule &hich provides as follo&sC

"ermissive -oinder of parties.6Al

persons in &hom or against &hom any

right to relief in respect to or arising out

of the same transaction or series o

transactions is alleged to e*ist, &hether

-ointly, severally, or in the alternative

may, e*cept as other&ise provided in

these rules, -oin as plaintiffs or e -oined

as defendants in one complaint, &here

any /uestion of la& or fact common to

all such plaintiffs or to all such

defendants may arise in the actionF ut

the court may ma)e such orders as may

e -ust to prevent any plaintiff odefendant from eing emarrassed o

put to e*pense in connection &ith any

proceedings in &hich he may have no

interest.

"etitioner has appealed y certiorari from the order of

Judge eilia S. %allare6"hillipps of the egional #ria

!ourt of Baguio !ity and Benguet "rovince &hich

dismissed his complaint for lac) of -urisdiction. "etitione

did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


the erroneous elief that the entire original record of the

case shall e transmitted to this !ourt pursuant to the

second paragraph of Section 9 of B"129. #his

provision applies only to ordinary appeals from the

regional trial court to the !ourt of Appeals ?Section 24 of

the (nterim ules@. Appeals to this !ourt y petition for

revie& on certiorari are governed y ule 50 of the

ules of !ourt ?Section 20 of the (nterim ules@.

o&ever, the order appealed from states that the first

cause of action alleged in the complaint &as against

respondent (gnacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the

amount of "11,35.44 representing cost of truc) tires

&hich he purchased on credit from petitioner on various

occasions from August to ctoer, 1981F and the second

cause of action &as against respondent ;ernando

!alion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of

"14,212.44 representing cost of truc) tires &hich he

purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions

from %arch, 1981 to January, 1982.

n Decemer 10, 198, counsel for respondent

Binongcal filed a %otion to Dismiss on the ground of lac)

of -urisdiction since the amount of the demand against

said respondent &as only "11,35.44, and under

Section 19?8@ of B"129 the regional trial court shall

e*ercise e*clusive original -urisdiction if the amount of

the demand is more than t&enty thousand pesos

?"24,444.44@. (t &as further averred in said motion that

although another person, ;ernando !alion, &as

allegedly indeted to petitioner in the amount of

"14,212.44, his oligation &as separate and distinct

from that of the other respondent. At the hearing of said

%otion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent !alion -oined

in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the

ground of lac) of -urisdiction. !ounsel for petitioner

opposed the %otion to Dismiss. As aove stated, the trial

court dismissed the complaint for lac) of -urisdiction.

"etitioner maintains that the lo&er court has -urisdiction

over the case follo&ing the :novel: totality rule

introduced in Section ?l@ of B"129 and Section 11 of

the (nterim ules.

#he pertinent portion of Section ?l@ of B"129 reads as

follo&sC

... "rovided,#hat &here there are

several claims or causes of action

et&een the same or different parties,

emodied in the same complaint, the

amount of the demand shall e the

totality of the claims in all the causes of

action, irrespective of &hether the

causes of action arose out of the same

or different transactions. ...

Section 11 of the (nterim ules provides

thusC

Application of the totality rule.6(n actions

&here the -urisdiction of the court is

dependent on the amount involved, thetest of -urisdiction shall e the aggregate

sum of all the money demands

e*clusive only of interest and costs

irrespective of &hether or not the

separate claims are o&ned y or due to

different parties. (f any demand is fo

damages in a civil action, the amount

thereof must e specifically alleged.

"etitioner compares the aove6/uoted provisions &ith

the pertinent portion of the former rule under Section 88

of the Judiciary Act of 1958 as amended &hich reads as

follo&sC

... 'here there are several claims o

causes of action et&een the same

parties emodied in the same complaint

the amount of the demand shall e the

totality of the demand in all the causes

of action, irrespective of &hether the

causes of action arose out of the same

or different transactionsF ut &here the

claims or causes of action -oined in asingle complaint are separately o&ned

y or due to different parties, each

separate claim shall furnish the

-urisdictional test. ...

and argues that &ith the deletion of the proviso in the

former rule, the totality rule &as reduced to clarity and

revity and the -urisdictional test is the totality of the

claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action

irrespective of &hether the causes of action arose out of

the same or different transactions.

#his argument is partly correct. #here is no difference

et&een the former and present rules in cases &here a

plaintiff sues a defendant on t&o or more separate

causes of action. (n such cases, the amount of the

demand shall e the totality of the claims in all the

causes of action irrespective of &hether the causes of

action arose out of the same or different transactions. (f

the total demand e*ceeds t&enty thousand pesos, then

the regional trial court has -urisdiction. eedless to state

if the causes of action are separate and independent

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


their -oinder in one complaint is permissive and not

mandatory, and any cause of action &here the amount of

the demand is t&enty thousand pesos or less may e

the su-ect of a separate complaint filed &ith a

metropolitan or municipal trial court.

n the other hand, there is a difference et&een the

former and present rules in cases &here t&o or more

plaintiffs having separate causes of action against adefendant -oin in a single complaint. nder the former

rule, :&here the claims or causes of action -oined in a

single complaint are separately o&ned y or due to

different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the

-urisdictional test: ?Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of

1958 as amended, supra@. #his &as ased on the ruling

in the case of Eda. de osario vs. Justice of the "eace,

99 "hil. 39. As &orded, the former rule applied only to

cases of permissive -oinder of parties plaintiff. o&ever,

it &as also applicale to cases of permissive -oinder of

parties defendant, as may e deduced from the ruling in

the case of Brillo vs. Bu)latan, thusC

;urthermore, the first cause of action is

composed of separate claims against

several defendants of different amounts

each of &hich is not more than "2,444

and falls under the -urisdiction of the

-ustice of the peace court under section

88 of epulic Act o, 293. #he several

claims do not seem to arise from the

same transaction or series of

transactions and there seem to e no

/uestions of la& or of fact common to all

the defendants as may &arrant their

-oinder under ule , section 3.

#herefore, if ne& complaints are to e

filed in the name of the real party in

interest they should e filed in the

-ustice of the peace court. ?87 "hil. 019,

024, reiterated in acula vs. %artine<,

88 "hil. 152, 153@

nder the present la&, the totality rule is applied also to

cases &here t&o or more plaintiffs having separatecauses of action against a defendant -oin in a single

complaint, as &ell as to cases &here a plaintiff has

separate causes of action against t&o or more

defendants -oined in a single complaint. o&ever, the

causes of action in favor of the t&o or more plaintiffs or

against the t&o or more defendants should arise out of

the same transaction or series of transactions and there

should e a common /uestion of la& or fact, as provided

in Section 3 of ule .

#he difference et&een the former and present rules in

cases of permissive -oinder of parties may e illustrated

y the t&o cases &hich &ere cited in the case of Eda. de

osario vs. Justice of the "eace ?supra( as e*ceptions

to the totality rule. (n the case of Soriano y !ia vs. Jose

?83 "hil. 02@, &here t&enty6nine dismissed employees

-oined in a complaint against the defendant to collec

their respective claims, each of &hich &as &ithin the

-urisdiction of the municipal court although the totae*ceeded the -urisdictional amount, this !ourt held that

under the la& then the municipal court had -urisdiction

(n said case, although the plaintiffs+ demands &ere

separate, distinct and independent of one another, their

-oint suit &as authori<ed under Section 3 of ule and

each separate claim furnished the -urisdictional test. (n

the case of (nternational !olleges, (nc. vs. Argon<a ?94

"hil. 574@, &here t&enty6five dismissed teachers -ointly

sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this !ourt also

held that the municipal court had -urisdiction ecause the

amount of each claim &as &ithin, although the tota

e*ceeded, its -urisdiction and it &as a case of permissive -oinder of parties plaintiff under Section 3 of ule .

nder the present la&, the t&o cases aove cited

?assuming they do not fall under the >aor !ode@ &ould

e under the -urisdiction of the regional trial court

Similarly, in the aovecited cases of Brillo vs. Bu)latan

and !acula vs. Martinez ?supra@, if the separate claims

against the several defendants arose out of the same

transaction or series of transactions and there is a

common /uestion of la& or fact, they &ould no& e

under the -urisdiction of the regional trial court.

(n other &ords, in cases of permissive -oinder of parties,

&hether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 3

of ule , the total of all the claims shall no& furnish the

-urisdictional test. eedless to state also, if instead of

-oining or eing -oined in one complaint separate actions

are filed y or against the parties, the amount demanded

in each complaint shall furnish the -urisdictional test.

(n the case at ar, the lo&er court correctly held that the

-urisdictional test is su-ect to the rules on -oinder o

parties pursuant to Section 0 of ule 2 and Section 3 ofule of the ules of !ourt and that, after a carefu

scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a

mis-oinder of parties for the reason that the claims

against respondents Binongcal and !alion are separate

and distinct and neither of &hich falls &ithin its

-urisdiction.

'==;=, the order appealed from is affirmed

&ithout pronouncement as to costs.

7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


G.R. No. 1&9$$7 D+4+:+- 11, $((%

LA SALETTE COLLEGE, R+<-+)+!+" y I) P-+)2"+!,

FR. ROMEO GON@ALES, MS a!" #ESUS T. AYAUA,

D+a! o> S"+! S+-;24+), petitioners,

vs.

VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent

PANGANIAN, J.:

An appeal is not perfected y the mere filing of a otice

of Appeal that has een served on the adverse party.

#he doc)et fees must li)e&ise e paid &ithin the

reglementary period. "etitioners have failed to sho& &hy

they merit an e*ception to these stringent rules.

#he !ase

Before us is a "etition for evie&1 under ule 50 of the

ules of !ourt, see)ing to set aside the ovemer 13,

24442 and the June 22, 2441 esolutions of the !ourt

of Appeals ?!A@ in !A6 !E D o. 423!. #he

ovemer 13, 2444 esolution disposed as follo&sC

:(n vie& of the foregoing, AppelleeIs K%otion for

econsiderationI is A#=D. #he esolution, dated

%arch 15, 2444, is herey =!A>>=D and S=# AS(D=

and the appeal is herey D(S%(SS=D.:5

#he June 22, 2441 esolution denied reconsideration.

#he ;acts

#he facts of the case are narrated y the trial court 0 as

follo&sC

:LespondentG is a onafide student of LpetitionerG

!ollege dating ac) LtoG the school year 198861989

ta)ing up the degree of Bachelor of Science in

!ommerce. (n the enrollment period for the second

semester held on ctoer 22 to ovemer 0, 199,

LrespondentG &as denied re6enrollment, despite repeated

pleas y * * * himself and y other interested parties

and his la&yer.

:n ovemer 13, 199, he filed his complaint and

as)ed for the issuance of a &rit of preliminary mandatory

in-unction to compel Lpetitioner college toG re6admit him.

n Decemer 28, 199, an order &as issued directing

Lpetitioner collegeG to admit LrespondentG for the second

semester ut still Lpetitioner collegeG refused to re6admit

LrespondentG, despite implementation of said order and

the pleas of LrespondentG thru his counsel so that he

could catch up &ith the ul) of the school days of the

semester and could graduate.

:Because of the adamant refusal of LrespondentG schoo

in re6admitting him and his defiance to the order and

ecause the period of the second semester L&as

already aout to close, LrespondentG amended his

complaint and concentrateLdG on damages, hence, thiscase.

:n the other hand, the Lpetitioner collegeG alleged that i

opened its enrollment period for the second semester of

school year 19961995 on 11 ctoer 199 up to 22

ctoer, 199 to 40 ovemer, 199. o&ever, classes

for the second semester of that school year commenced

on 20 ctoer, 199. During these periods fo

enrolment, LrespondentG never enrolled &ith the * * *

!ollege and neither did he accomplish the asic

re/uirements for enrolment. o&ever, on 40 ovemer

199, the * * * !ollege &as in receipt of a letter from Atty. uirino >. "ilotin dated on that same date

re/uesting for a reconsideration of an alleged decision

denying enrolment to the LrespondentG. pon receipt of

the said letter, it &as endorsed to LespondentG Bayaua

&ho in turn &rote Atty. "ilotin e*plaining among others

that &as not denied enrolment ut rather LtheG latter did

not enroll &ith the said !ollege. !onsidering, ho&ever

that the * * * !ollege started its regular classes on 20

ctoer, 199, in the event LrespondentG &as ale to

enroll on 3 ovemer, 199, he &ould have then

e*ceeded the re/uired asences for his supposed

enrolled su-ects.

:Since plaintiff failed to enrol on the last day fo

enrolment, there is no reason &hy the * * * !ollege

should rela* its rules to accommodate LrespondentG. #he

* * * !ollege merely imposed its disciplining authority

&hen it sets dates for the period to enrol and the matter

of admission of students is &ithin the amit of academic

freedom and eyond the province of the !ourts to

decide.:3

n ovemer 17, 1998, the trial court rendered -udgment in favor of respondent.7 "etitioners received

the Decision on ovemer 23, 1998. n the same date,

they filed a otice of Appeal, &hich the #! approved

on Decemer 2, 1998.

espondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the

ground of petitionersI failure to pay the doc)et fees &ithin

the reglementary period. #he trial court, ho&ever, denied

the %otion in its April 2, 1999 rder .8

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/dec2003/gr_149227_2003.html#fnt1




















7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


uling of the !ourt of Appeals

(n its ovemer 29, 1999 esolution, the !A dismissed

the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay :the

re/uired doc)eting fee &ithin the period for filing an

appeal.:9 But, upon their motion, the !A granted, in a

esolution dated %arch 15, 2444, reconsideration of

their appeal, &hich it reinstated :in the interest of

sustantial -ustice and considering that LpetitionersGalready paid the doc)et fees.:14 espondent moved for a

reconsideration on %arch 29, 2444.

After ree*amining the records of the case, the !A, in the

challenged ovemer 13, 2444 esolution, dismissed

the appeal filed y petitioners, ecause :the doc)et fees

&ere only paid after one ?1@ year and eleven ?11@ months

from the filing of the notice of appeal.:11 (t deemed it

imperative to reverse the %arch 15, 2444 esolution :to

conform &ith the la& and long settled -urisprudence:12 on

the matter. #hus, in the June 22, 2441 esolution, it

denied their %otion for econsideration.

ence, this "etition.1

(ssues

"etitioners sumit the follo&ing issues for our

considerationC

:1. 'hether or not the appeal &as seasonaly

filedF

:2. 'ith all due respect, the !ourt of Appeals did

not have the authority to dismiss the appeal.:15

(n the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of

the payment of the doc)et fees.

#he !ourtIs uling

#he "etition has no merit.

Sole (ssueC

*imeliness o# +ament o#

Appellate Court Doc)et -ees

#he payment of doc)et fees is not a trivial matter. #hese

fees are necessary to defray court e*penses in the

handling of cases.10 ;or this reason, and to secure a -us

and speedy disposition of every action and

proceeding,13 the ules on !ivil "rocedure17 mandates

the payment of doc)et and other la&ful fees &ithin the

prescried period.ap//i ther&ise, the -urisdiction o

the proper court to handle a case is adversely affected.18

#he aove rule applies s/uarely to this case, in &hich

the -udgment issued y the #!, in the e*ercise of its

original -urisdiction, &as elevated to the !A for revie&

ule 51 of the ules on !ivil "rocedure provides the

essential re/uirements for ma)ing such an appeal, as

follo&sC

:S=!. 2. Modes o# appeal .$

:?a@ rdinary appeal.$ #he appeal to the !ourt o

Appeals in cases decided y the egional #rial !ourt in

the e*ercise of its original -urisdiction shall e ta)en y

filing a notice of appeal &ith the court &hich rendered

the -udgment or final order appealed from and serving a

copy thereof upon the adverse party.

:S=!. . +eriod o# ordinar appeal . M #he appeal shal

e ta)en &ithin fifteen ?10@ days from notice of the

-udgment or final order appealed from.

:S=!. 5. Appellate court doc)et and other la#ul #ees . M

'ithin the period for ta)ing an appeal, the appellant shal

pay to the cler) of court &hich rendered the -udgment orfinal order appealed from, the full amount of the

appellate court doc)et and other la&ful fees. "roof of

payment of said fees shall e transmitted to the

appellate court together &ith the original record or the

record on appeal.

:S=!. 9. +er#ection o# appeal0 e##ect thereo# . $ A partyIs

appeal y notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to

him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

:(n appeals y notice of appeal, the court loses

-urisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the

appeals filed in due time and the e*piration of the time to

appeal of the other parties.

Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a

decision rendered y the #! in the e*ercise of its

original -urisdiction, the follo&ing re/uirements must e

complied &ith. ;irst, &ithin 10 days, a notice of appea

must e filed &ith the court that rendered the -udgment

or final order sought to e appealedF second, such notice

must e served on the adverse partyF and third, &ithin






















7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


the same 106day period, the full amount of appellate

court doc)et and other legal fees must e paid to the

cler) of the court that rendered the -udgment or final

order.

(t should e noted that full payment of the appellate

doc)et fees &ithin the prescried period is

mandatory,19 even -urisdictional,24 for the perfection of

the appeal. ther&ise, the appellate court &ould not eale to act on the su-ect matter of the action,21 and the

decision or final order sought to e appealed from &ould

ecome final and e*ecutory.22

(n the present case, petitioners insist that they

seasonaly paid the doc)et fees. After resolving thrice

the timeliness of the payment of the doc)et fees, the !A

finally found that these had een paid one ?1@ year and

11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.

#o recapitulate, on ovemer 23, 1998, petitioners

received the ovemer 17, 1998 #! Decision.

!onse/uently, they had 10 days to file their otice of

Appeal. #hey did so on ovemer 23, 1998, ut failed to

pay the doc)et fees. A revie& of the records sho&s that

they paid these only on July 8, 1999, 2 or after almost

seven ?7@ months from the mandated last day for

payment, &hich &as Decemer 11, 1998. !learly, the

ovemer 17, 1998 #! Decision, &hich petitioners

sought to appeal, had long ecome final and e*ecutory.

ela*ation of the ule on

onpayment of Doc)et ;ees

ot&ithstanding the mandatory nature of the

re/uirement of payment of appellate doc)et fees, &e

also recogni<e that its strict application is /ualified y the

follo&ingC first, failure to pay those fees &ithin the

reglementary period allo&s only discretionary, not

automatic, dismissalF second, such po&er should e

used y the court in con-unction &ith its e*ercise of

sound discretion in accordance &ith the tenets of -ustice

and fair play, as &ell as &ith a great deal of

circumspection in consideration of all attendant

circumstances.25

(n Mactan Cebu %nternational Airport Authorit v.

Mangubat,20 the payment of the doc)et fees &as delayed

y si* ?3@ days, ut the late payment &as accepted,

ecause the party sho&ed &illingness to aide y the

ules y immediately paying those fees. 1ambao v.

Court o# Appeals23 sa& us again rela*ing the ules &hen

&e declared therein that :the appellate court may e*tend

the time for the payment of the doc)et fees if appellant is

ale to sho& that there is a -ustifiale reason for * * * the

failure to pay the correct amount of doc)et fees &ithin

the prescried period, li)e fraud, accident, mista)e

e*cusale negligence, or a similar supervening casualty

&ithout fault on the part of the appellant.:27

(n the present case, petitioners have not sho&n any

satisfactory reason to &arrant the rela*ation of the

ules. (n fact, the manner in &hich they presented their

case efore us leaves too much to e desired. (ndeed,&e are almost tempted to say that they tried to mislead 66

nay, deceive 66 this !ourt as &ell as the appellate court.

#he present case calls for the ad-udication of &hether

petitioners paid the doc)et fees on time. ence, it is

essential that they specify the e*act dates &hen they

filed their notice of appeal and paid the corresponding

doc)et fees. But no&here in their pleadings did they do

so. All they said &as that the appeal had een

seasonaly filed.

(n accordance &ith the re/uisites for the perfection of an

appeal as enumerated earlier, petitioners should have

?1@ filed a notice of appeal &ith the #! of Santiago

(saela, &ithin 10 days from the issuance of the tria

court Decision eing appealedF ?2@ paid the doc)et fees

&ithin the same periodF and ?@ served the notice to the

adverse party.

#rue, petitioners filed their otice of Appeal &ithin the

prescried period, ut they paid the doc)et fees only

seven ?7@ months thereafter. #hey adamantly insisted on

page 3 of their "etition28

that :the appeal &asseasonaly filed,: ut later said that the :the appeal fee

&as paid immediately after 2 April 1999 &hen the court

a /uo denied the respondentIs motion fo

reconsideration and approved the appeal. * * *. 'ith the

foregoing therefore, the notice of appeal &as seasonaly

filed &ith the payment of doc)et fees on time.:29

#hey admitted, though, that ecause of the :e*cusale

negligence or mista)e: of their counsel, the officia

receipts for the otice of Appeal had not een attached.

#hey reasoned that they had failed to transmit the proof

of payment of the doc)et fees to the !A, ecause such:provision of civil procedure &as relatively ne& * * * at

that time.:4 At any event, respondent denies eing

served such notice.1

Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal &as

interrupted y respondentIs motion for reconsideration of

the #!Is approval of petitionersI notice of appeal, the

re/uired doc)et fees for the latter &ere still not paid on

time. ;rom ovemer 2, 1998, &hen petitioners filed

their otice of Appeal, until April 2, 1999, &hen the tria






























7/23/2019 Case Digest 16-20


court approved it &ith finality, they made no effort to pay

those fees. (t too) them more than t&o ?2@ months to

:immediately pay: the doc)et fees after eing informed

of the April 2, 1999 rder denying respondentIs motion

for reconsideration of the #! rder approving

petitionersI otice of Appeal. #his lapse of time hardly

reflected sincere &illingness to aide y the ules,

especially &hen respondent had raised the very issue of

nonpayment of doc)et fees as early as Decemer 28,1998.

n this point, petitionersI counsel is reminded of the role

that la&yers play in the dispensation of -ustice. Baas v.

$andiganbaan2 held thusC

:>a&yers are not merely representatives of the parties

ut, first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one

of their duties 66 assisting in the speedy and efficient

administration of -ustice 66 is more significant than that of

Lthe cause ofG their client, rightly or &rongly. * * *. 'e

stress that candor in all dealings is the very essence of memership in the legal profession. >a&yers are oliged

to oserve rules of procedure in good faith, not to

misuse them to defeat the ends of -ustice.:

'e stress that the payment of doc)et fees is not a mere

technicality of la& or procedure, ut an essentia

re/uirement for the perfection of an appeal.5 'ithou

such payment, the appellate court does not ac/uire

-urisdiction over the su-ect matter of the action, and the

decision or final order sought to e appealed from

ecomes final and e*ecutory.0 As laid do&n

in Baranga 23 o# Legazpi Cit v. %mperial C3

:#he right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due

process. (t is purely a statutory privilege, and may e

e*ercised only in the manner and in accordance &ith the

provisions of the la&. 'ell6rooted is the principle that

perfection of an appeal &ithin the statutory o

reglementary period is not only mandatory ut also

-urisdictional and failure to do so renders the /uestioned

decision final and e*ecutory, and deprives the appellate

court of -urisdiction to alter the final -udgment much less

to entertain the appeal.:7

'==;=, the "etition is herey D=(=D and theassailed esolutions A;;(%=D. !osts against petitioners.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/nov2002/gr_143689_2002.html








http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_140321_2000.html














Case Digest 16-20

Documents