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1. Case Assigned HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT v. KUHLMEIER

2. What is the issue in the case?

Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment?

3. Who are the litigants? Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court.

What’s the background of the case? The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages onwhich the articles appeared be withheld from publication.

4. What was the outcome of the case?No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the FirstAmendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did notoffend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

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GREGG v. GEORGIAPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 74-6257Petitioner GreggRespondent GeorgiaDecided By Burger Court (1975-1981)Opinion 428 U.S. 153 (1976)Argued Wednesday, March 31, 1976Decided Friday, July 2, 1976AdvocatesRobert H. Bork(Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)G. Hughel Harrison(By appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the petitioner)G. Thomas Davis(Argued the cause for the respondent)Tags

Criminal Procedure Cruel and Unusual Punishment Death Penalty← Term: 1970-19791975Location: Georgia State Capitol

Facts of the Case A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana, Proffitt v. Florida, and Woodson v. North Carolina.

Question Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment?

ArgumentGregg v. Georgia - Oral ArgumentGregg v. Georgia - Opinion AnnouncementConclusion Decision: 7 votes for Georgia, 2 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual PunishmentNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conductedseparately, specific jury findings as to the severity

of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent tofuture capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

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← Term: 1980-19891986Location: South Dakota LegislatureFacts of the Case In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent offederal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a statethat permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.

Question Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate theTwenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age?

ArgumentSouth Dakota v. Dole - Oral Argument

Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Dole, 2 vote(s) againstLegal provision: 23 U.S.C. 158No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress,acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "thegeneral welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss ofhighway funds was not unduly coercive.

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FEINER v. NEW YORK← Term: 1950-19591950Location: Where Feiner made his speechFacts of the Case On March 8, 1949, Irving Feiner, a white student at Syracuse University, made an inflammatory speech on a street corner in Syracuse, New York. During the speech,which was intended to encourage listeners to attend a leftist rally, Feiner made several disparaging remarks about local politicians, organizations, and President Truman. A crowd gathered, and several listeners began

"muttering" and "shoving." One listener threatened Feiner. Two officers on the scene, fearing violence, asked Feiner twice to end his speech. After he refused,the officers arrested Feiner for inciting a breach of the peace. A trial court found Feiner guilty and sentenced him to thirty days in prison. On appeal, Feiner argued his arrest violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. The Onondaga County Court and the New York Court of Appeals each denied hisclaim.

Question Did Feiner's arrest for inciting a breach of the peace violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment?

Conclusion 

No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, the Court applied the "clear and present danger" principle it originally articulated in Schenck v. United States (1919). According to the Court, Feiner's arrest was a valid exercise of "the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets." The Chief Justice dismissed the notion that the arrest amounted to the suppression of free communication. "It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasionand undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace."

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Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill case briefTennessee Valley Authority v. Hill case brief437 U.S. 153 (1978)

CASE SYNOPSIS: Petitioner corporation sought review of a judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which agreed with the Secretary of Interior that operation of a particular federal dam would eradicate an endangered species, held that a prima facie violation of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536, occurred and ruled that an injunction requested by respondents should have been issued.

FACTS: The Supreme Court affirmed a court of appeals' judgment, which agreed with the Secretary of Interior that operation of a particular federal dam, the TellicoDam, would eradicate an endangered species, held that aprima facie violation of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act (Act), 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536, occurred, and ruled thatan injunction requested by respondents should have been

issued. The Court held that pursuant to the Act's explicit provisions, the survival of a relatively smallnumber of fish required the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress had expendedand continued to appropriate large sums of public money. The Court noted that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities and to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost because the valueof endangered species was "incalculable." The Court held that the continuing appropriations for the dam didnot constitute an implied repeal of the Act at least insofar as it applied to the project. The Court held that an injunction was the appropriate remedy because of "institutionalized caution" and the separation of powers.

CONCLUSION: The judgment finding that petitioner corporation's operation of a virtually completed federal dam would eradicate an endangered species, and that an injunction was the appropriate remedy, was affirmed because endangered species were afforded the highest priorities, and continuing appropriations did not constitute an implied repeal of the statute as it applied to the project.- See more at: http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2013/05/tennessee-valley-authority-v-hill-case.html#sthash.p7typiJR.dpuf

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ROSTKER v. GOLDBERGPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 80-251Appellee GoldbergAppellant RostkerDecided By Burger Court (1975-1981)Opinion 453 U.S. 57 (1981)Argued Tuesday, March 24, 1981Decided Thursday, June 25, 1981AdvocatesWade H. McCree(Argued the cause for the appellant)Donald L. Weinberg(Argued the cause for the appellees)Tags

Civil Rights← Term: 1980-19891980Location: CongressFacts of the Case After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not enact his recommendation that theMilitary Selective Service Act (MSSA) be amended to include the registration of females. A number of men challenged the constitutionality of the MSSA, and the challenge was sustained by a district court.

Question Did the MSSA's gender distinctions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

ArgumentRostker v. Goldberg - Oral ArgumentConclusion Decision: 6 votes for Rostker, 3 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Selective Service, Military Selective Service, or Universal Military Service and Training ActsIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Congress's decision to exempt women from registration "was not the'accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinkingabout females'" and did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court found that men and women, because of combat restrictions on women, were not "similarly situated" for the purposes of draft registration. The Court also upheld Congress's judgment that the administrative and military problems that would be created by drafting women for noncombat roles were sufficient to justify the Military Selective Service Act.

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KOREMATSU v. UNITED STATESPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 22Petitioner KorematsuRespondent United StatesDecided By Stone Court (1943-1945)Opinion 

323 U.S. 214 (1944)Argued Wednesday, October 11, 1944Decided Monday, December 18, 1944← Term: 1940-19491944Location: The White HouseFacts of the Case During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.

Question Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent?

Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Executive Order 9066; U.S. Const. amend. 5The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril."

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MUELLER v. ALLENPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 82-195Petitioner MuellerRespondent AllenDecided By Burger Court (1981-1986)Opinion 463 U.S. 388 (1983)Argued Monday, April 18, 1983Decided Wednesday, June 29, 1983AdvocatesDouglas C. Blomgren(Argued the cause for the respondents)William I. Kampf(Argued the cause for the petitioners)Tags

First Amendment← Term: 1980-19891982Location: Minnesota State LegislatureFacts of the Case A Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their

state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions.

Question Did the law violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

ArgumentMueller v. Allen - Oral ArgumentMueller v. Allen - Opinion AnnouncementConclusion Decision: 5 votes for Allen, 4 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Establishment of ReligionNo. The Court held that the law did not have "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools," nor did it "excessively entangle" the state in religion. Most importantly, argued JusticeRehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval" on religious schools. Thus, the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment Clause.

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New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)

Decision Date: January 15, 1985

Background: In a New Jersey high school, a teacher found two girls smoking in the bathroom and took them to the principal's office. One girl admitted to smoking but the other, known as T.L.O., denied it. The principal demanded tosee the girl's purse and found evidence that she was also selling marijuana at school. T.L.O. was taken to the police station where she admitted to selling marijuana. Based on her confession and the evidence in her purse, the state of New Jersey brought charges against her. In a juvenile court,T.L.O. argued that her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. The court sided with the school, and T.L.O. took her case to theNew Jersey Supreme Court, which later found that the search was unreasonable and the evidence could not be used. The state of New Jersey appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court.

Decision: In 1985, the Supreme Court, by a 6-3  margin, ruled that New Jersey and the school had met a "reasonableness" standard for conducting such searches at school. The high court said school administrators don't needto have a search warrant or probable cause before conductinga search because students have a reduced expectation of privacy when in school.

Related Links

← New Jersey v. T.L.O. decisionNew Jersey v. T.L.O. oral argument

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TINKER v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICTPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 21Petitioner John F. Tinker and Mary Beth Tinker, Minors et al.Respondent Des Moines Independent Community School District et al.Decided By Warren Court (1967-1969)Opinion 393 U.S. 503 (1969)Argued Tuesday, November 12, 1968Decided Monday, February 24, 1969AdvocatesDan L. Johnston(Argued the cause for the petitioner)Allan A. Herrick(Argued the cause for the respondents)Tags

First Amendment Miscellaneous← Term: 1960-19691968Location: Des Moines Independent Community School DistrictFacts of the Case In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for

a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year’s Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it,with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year’s Day, the planned end of the protest.

Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students’ right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district’s actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.

Question Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment?

ArgumentTinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist. - Oral ArgumentConclusion Decision: 7 votes for Tinker, 2 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and AssemblyYes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands

represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must beable to prove that the conduct in question would “materially and substantially interfere” with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district’s actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrotethat children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority’s opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action.

Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintainorder unless their actions can be proven to stem from amotivation other than a legitimate school interest.

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GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHTPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 155Petitioner Clarence Earl GideonRespondent Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of CorrectionsDecided By Warren Court (1962-1965)Opinion 372 U.S. 335 (1963)Argued Tuesday, January 15, 1963Decided Monday, March 18, 1963AdvocatesAbe Fortas(Appointed by the Court, argued the cause for the petitioner)Bruce R. Jacob(Argued the cause for the respondent)

J. Lee Rankin(By special leave of the Court, argued the cause for the AmericanCivil Liberties Union as amici curiae, urging reversal)George D. Mentz(Argued the cause for the State of Alabama, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance)Tags

Criminal Procedure Right to Counsel← Term: 1960-19691962Location: Bay County Circuit CourtFacts of the Case Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state courtwith a felony: having broken into and entered a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor offense. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court and argued that the trial court’s decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpusrelief.

Question Does the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminalcases extend to felony defendants in state courts?

ArgumentGideon v. Wainwright - Oral Argument, Part 1Gideon v. Wainwright - Oral Argument, Part 2Conclusion 

Decision: 9 votes for Gideon, 0 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Right to CounselYes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the framers of the Constitution placed a high value on the right ofthe accused to have the means to put up a proper defense, and the state as well as federal courts must respect that right. The Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own.

Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply a watered-down version of the Bill of Rights to the states. Since constitutional questions are always open for consideration by the Supreme Court, there is no need to assert a rule about the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. In his separate opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Tom C. Clark wrote that the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel as a protection of due process, and there is no reason to apply that protection in certain cases but not others. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decisionrepresented an extension of earlier precedent that established the existence of a serious criminal charge to be a “special circumstance” that requires the appointment of counsel. He also argued that the majority’s opinion recognized a right to be valid in state courts as well as federal ones; it did not apply a vast body of federal law to the states.

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REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA v. BAKKEPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 76-811Petitioner Regents of the University of CaliforniaRespondent BakkeDecided By Burger Court (1975-1981)Opinion 438 U.S. 265 (1978)Argued Wednesday, October 12, 1977Decided Monday, June 26, 1978AdvocatesReynold H. Colvin(Argued the cause for the respondent)Archibald Cox(Argued the cause for the petitioner)Wade H. McCree(Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)Tags

Civil Rights

← Term: 1970-19791977Location: University of California Medical School at DavisFacts of the Case Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession.Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admittedin the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

Question Did the University of California violate the FourteenthAmendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative actionpolicy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?

ArgumentRegents of the University of California v. Bakke - OralArgumentRegents of the University of California v. Bakke - Opinion AnnouncementConclusion Decision: 5 votes for Bakke, 4 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Equal ProtectionSplit Vote

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell,Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in hisopinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionallypermissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible asone of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extendinggains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

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WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ED. v. BARNETTEPrint this Page

Case BasicsDocket No. 591Petitioner West Virginia State Board of Ed.Respondent BarnetteDecided By Stone Court (1943-1945)Opinion 319 U.S. 624 (1943)Argued Thursday, March 11, 1943Decided Monday, June 14, 1943← Term: 1940-19491942Location: West Virginia Board of EducationFacts of the Case The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program of activities in allpublic schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the Flag; refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and charges of delinquency.

Question Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Barnette, 3 vote(s) against

Legal provision: US Const. Amend 1; W. Va. Code § 1734In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held thatcompelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag wasunconstitutional. The Court found that such a salute was a form of utterance and was a means of communicating ideas. "Compulsory unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to failure and wasantithetical to First Amendment values. Writing for themajority, Justice Jackson argued that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."

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