G.R. No. L-54908 January 22, 1990
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.MITSUBISHI METAL
CORPORATION, ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS,respondents.
G.R. No. 80041 January 22, 1990
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.MITSUBISHI METAL
CORPORATION, ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS,respondents.
Gadioma Law Offices for respondents.
REGALADO,J.:
These cases, involving the same issue being contested by the
same parties and having originated from the same factual
antecedents generating the claims for tax credit of private
respondents, the same were consolidated by resolution of this Court
dated May 31, 1989 and are jointly decided herein.
The records reflect that on April 17, 1970, Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corporation (hereinafter, Atlas) entered
into a Loan and Sales Contract with Mitsubishi Metal Corporation
(Mitsubishi, for brevity), a Japanese corporation licensed to
engage in business in the Philippines, for purposes of the
projected expansion of the productive capacity of the former's
mines in Toledo, Cebu. Under said contract, Mitsubishi agreed to
extend a loan to Atlas 'in the amount of $20,000,000.00, United
States currency, for the installation of a new concentrator for
copper production. Atlas, in turn undertook to sell to Mitsubishi
all the copper concentrates produced from said machine for a period
of fifteen (15) years. It was contemplated that $9,000,000.00 of
said loan was to be used for the purchase of the concentrator
machinery from Japan.1
Mitsubishi thereafter applied for a loan with the Export-Import
Bank of Japan (Eximbank for short) obviously for purposes of its
obligation under said contract. Its loan application was approved
on May 26, 1970 in the sum of 4,320,000,000.00, at about the same
time as the approval of its loan for 2,880,000,000.00 from a
consortium of Japanese banks. The total amount of both loans is
equivalent to $20,000,000.00 in United States currency at the then
prevailing exchange rate. The records in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue show that the approval of the loan by Eximbank to
Mitsubishi was subject to the condition that Mitsubishi would use
the amount as a loan to Atlas and as a consideration for importing
copper concentrates from Atlas, and that Mitsubishi had to pay back
the total amount of loan by September 30, 1981.2
Pursuant to the contract between Atlas and Mitsubishi, interest
payments were made by the former to the latter totalling
P13,143,966.79 for the years 1974 and 1975. The corresponding 15%
tax thereon in the amount of P1,971,595.01 was withheld pursuant to
Section 24 (b) (1) and Section 53 (b) (2) of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 131, and duly
remitted to the Government.3
On March 5, 1976, private respondents filed a claim for tax
credit requesting that the sum of P1,971,595.01 be applied against
their existing and future tax liabilities. Parenthetically, it was
later noted by respondent Court of Tax Appeals in its decision that
on August 27, 1976, Mitsubishi executed a waiver and disclaimer of
its interest in the claim for tax credit in favor ofAtlas.4
The petitioner not having acted on the claim for tax credit, on
April 23, 1976 private respondents filed a petition for review with
respondent court, docketed therein as CTA Case No. 2801.5The
petition was grounded on the claim that Mitsubishi was a mere agent
of Eximbank, which is a financing institution owned, controlled and
financed by the Japanese Government. Such governmental status of
Eximbank, if it may be so called, is the basis for private
repondents' claim for exemption from paying the tax on the interest
payments on the loan as earlier stated. It was further claimed that
the interest payments on the loan from the consortium of Japanese
banks were likewise exempt because said loan supposedly came from
or were financed by Eximbank. The provision of the National
Internal Revenue Code relied upon is Section 29 (b) (7) (A),6which
excludes from gross income:
(A) Income received from their investments in the Philippines in
loans, stocks, bonds or other domestic securities, or from interest
on their deposits in banks in the Philippines by (1) foreign
governments, (2) financing institutions owned, controlled, or
enjoying refinancing from them, and (3) international or regional
financing institutions established by governments.
Petitioner filed an answer on July 9, 1976. The case was set for
hearing on April 6, 1977 but was later reset upon manifestation of
petitioner that the claim for tax credit of the alleged erroneous
payment was still being reviewed by the Appellate Division of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. The records show that on November 16,
1976, the said division recommended to petitioner the approval of
private respondent's claim. However, before action could be taken
thereon, respondent court scheduled the case for hearing on
September 30, 1977, during which trial private respondents
presented their evidence while petitioner submitted his case on the
basis of the records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
pleadings.7
On April 18, 1980, respondent court promulgated its decision
ordering petitioner to grant a tax credit in favor of Atlas in the
amount of P1,971,595.01. Interestingly, the tax court held that
petitioner admitted the material averments of private respondents
when he supposedly prayed "for judgment on the pleadings without
off-spring proof as to the truth of his allegations."8Furthermore,
the court declared that all papers and documents pertaining to the
loan of 4,320,000,000.00 obtained by Mitsubishi from Eximbank show
that this was the same amount given to Atlas. It also observed that
the money for the loans from the consortium of private Japanese
banks in the sum of 2,880,000,000.00 "originated" from Eximbank.
From these, respondent court concluded that the ultimate creditor
of Atlas was Eximbank with Mitsubishi acting as a mere "arranger or
conduit through which the loans flowed from the creditor
Export-Import Bank of Japan to the debtor Atlas Consolidated Mining
& Development Corporation."9
A motion for reconsideration having been denied on August 20,
1980, petitioner interposed an appeal to this Court, docketed
herein as G.R. No. 54908.
While CTA Case No. 2801 was still pending before the tax court,
the corresponding 15% tax on the amount of P439,167.95 on the
P2,927,789.06 interest payments for the years 1977 and 1978 was
withheld and remitted to the Government. Atlas again filed a claim
for tax credit with the petitioner, repeating the same basis for
exemption.
On June 25, 1979, Mitsubishi and Atlas filed a petition for
review with the Court of Tax Appeals docketed as CTA Case No. 3015.
Petitioner filed his answer thereto on August 14, 1979, and, in a
letter to private respondents dated November 12, 1979, denied said
claim for tax credit for lack of factual or legal basis.10
On January 15, 1981, relying on its prior ruling in CTA Case No.
2801, respondent court rendered judgment ordering the petitioner to
credit Atlas the aforesaid amount of tax paid. A motion for
reconsideration, filed on March 10, 1981, was denied by respondent
court in a resolution dated September 7, 1987. A notice of appeal
was filed on September 22, 1987 by petitioner with respondent court
and a petition for review was filed with this Court on December 19,
1987. Said later case is now before us as G.R. No. 80041 and is
consolidated with G.R. No. 54908.
The principal issue in both petitions is whether or not the
interest income from the loans extended to Atlas by Mitsubishi is
excludible from gross income taxation pursuant to Section 29 b) (7)
(A) of the tax code and, therefore, exempt from withholding
tax.Aproposthereto, the focal question is whether or not Mitsubishi
is a mere conduit of Eximbank which will then be considered as the
creditor whose investments in the Philippines on loans are exempt
from taxes under the code.
Prefatorily, it must be noted that respondent court erred in
holding in CTA Case No. 2801 that petitioner should be deemed to
have admitted the allegations of the private respondents when it
submitted the case on the basis of the pleadings and records of the
bureau. There is nothing to indicate such admission on the part of
petitioner nor can we accept respondent court's pronouncement that
petitioner did not offer to prove the truth of its allegations. The
records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue relevant to the case were
duly submitted and admitted as petitioner's supporting evidence.
Additionally, a hearing was conducted, with presentation of
evidence, and the findings of respondent court were based not only
on the pleadings but on the evidence adduced by the parties. There
could, therefore, not have been a judgment on the pleadings, with
the theorized admissions imputed to petitioner, as mistakenly held
by respondent court.
Time and again, we have ruled that findings of fact of the Court
of Tax Appeals are entitled to the highest respect and can only be
disturbed on appeal if they are not supported by substantial
evidence or if there is a showing of gross error or abuse on the
part of the tax court.11Thus, ordinarily, we could give due
consideration to the holding of respondent court that Mitsubishi is
a mere agent of Eximbank. Compelling circumstances obtaining and
proven in these cases, however, warrant a departure from said
general rule since we are convinced that there is a misapprehension
of facts on the part of the tax court to the extent that its
conclusions are speculative in nature.
The loan and sales contract between Mitsubishi and Atlas does
not contain any direct or inferential reference to Eximbank
whatsoever. The agreement is strictly between Mitsubishi as
creditor in the contract of loan and Atlas as the seller of the
copper concentrates. From the categorical language used in the
document, one prestation was in consideration of the other. The
specific terms and the reciprocal nature of their obligations make
it implausible, if not vacuous to give credit to the cavalier
assertion that Mitsubishi was a mere agent in said transaction.
Surely, Eximbank had nothing to do with the sale of the copper
concentrates since all that Mitsubishi stated in its loan
application with the former was that the amount being procured
would be used as a loan to and in consideration for importing
copper concentrates from Atlas.12Such an innocuous statement of
purpose could not have been intended for, nor could it legally
constitute, a contract of agency. If that had been the purpose as
respondent court believes, said corporations would have
specifically so stated, especially considering their experience and
expertise in financial transactions, not to speak of the amount
involved and its purchasing value in 1970.
A thorough analysis of the factual and legal ambience of these
cases impels us to give weight to the following arguments of
petitioner:
The nature of the above contract shows that the same is not just
a simple contract of loan. It is not a mere creditor-debtor
relationship. It is more of a reciprocal obligation between ATLAS
and MITSUBISHI where the latter shall provide the funds in the
installation of a new concentrator at the former's Toledo mines in
Cebu, while ATLAS in consideration of which, shall sell to
MITSUBISHI, for a term of 15 years, the entire copper concentrate
that will be produced by the installed concentrator.
Suffice it to say, the selling of the copper concentrate to
MITSUBISHI within the specified term was the consideration of the
granting of the amount of $20 million to ATLAS. MITSUBISHI, in
order to fulfill its part of the contract, had to obtain funds.
Hence, it had to secure a loan or loans from other sources. And
from what sources, it is immaterial as far as ATLAS in concerned.
In this case, MITSUBISHI obtained the $20 million from the
EXIMBANK, of Japan and the consortium of Japanese banks financed
through the EXIMBANK, of Japan.
When MITSUBISHI therefore secured such loans, it was in its own
independent capacity as a private entity and not as a conduit of
the consortium of Japanese banks or the EXIMBANK of Japan. While
the loans were secured by MITSUBISHI primarily "as a loan to and in
consideration for importing copper concentrates from ATLAS," the
fact remains that it was a loan by EXIMBANK of Japan to MITSUBISHI
and not to ATLAS.
Thus, the transaction between MITSUBISHI and EXIMBANK of Japan
was a distinct and separate contract from that entered into by
MITSUBISHI and ATLAS. Surely, in the latter contract, it is not
EXIMBANK, that was intended to be benefited. It is MITSUBISHI which
stood to profit. Besides, the Loan and Sales Contract cannot be any
clearer. The only signatories to the same were MITSUBISHI and
ATLAS. Nowhere in the contract can it be inferred that MITSUBISHI
acted for and in behalf of EXIMBANK, of Japan nor of any entity,
private or public, for that matter.
Corollary to this, it may well be stated that in this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that when a contract of loan
is completed, the money ceases to be the property of the former
owner and becomes the sole property of the obligor (Tolentino and
Manio vs. Gonzales Sy, 50 Phil. 558).
In the case at bar, when MITSUBISHI obtained the loan of $20
million from EXIMBANK, of Japan, said amount ceased to be the
property of the bank and became the property of MITSUBISHI.
The conclusion is indubitable; MITSUBISHI, and NOT EXIMBANK, is
the sole creditor of ATLAS, the former being the owner of the $20
million upon completion of its loan contract with EXIMBANK of
Japan.
The interest income of the loan paid by ATLAS to MITSUBISHI is
therefore entirely different from the interest income paid by
MITSUBISHI to EXIMBANK, of Japan. What was the subject of the 15%
withholding tax is not the interest income paid by MITSUBISHI to
EXIMBANK, but the interest income earned by MITSUBISHI from the
loan to ATLAS. . . .13
To repeat, the contract between Eximbank and Mitsubishi is
entirely different. It is complete in itself, does not appear to be
suppletory or collateral to another contract and is, therefore, not
to be distorted by other considerationsaliunde. The application for
the loan was approved on May 20, 1970, or more than a month after
the contract between Mitsubishi and Atlas was entered into on April
17, 1970. It is true that under the contract of loan with Eximbank,
Mitsubishi agreed to use the amount as a loan to and in
consideration for importing copper concentrates from Atlas, but all
that this proves is the justification for the loan as represented
by Mitsubishi, a standard banking practice for evaluating the
prospects of due repayment. There is nothing wrong with such
stipulation as the parties in a contract are free to agree on such
lawful terms and conditions as they see fit. Limiting the
disbursement of the amount borrowed to a certain person or to a
certain purpose is not unusual, especially in the case of Eximbank
which, aside from protecting its financial exposure, must see to it
that the same are in line with the provisions and objectives of its
charter.
Respondents postulate that Mitsubishi had to be a conduit
because Eximbank's charter prevents it from making loans except to
Japanese individuals and corporations. We are not impressed. Not
only is there a failure to establish such submission by adequate
evidence but it posits the unfair and unexplained imputation that,
for reasons subject only of surmise, said financing institution
would deliberately circumvent its own charter to accommodate an
alien borrower through a manipulated subterfuge, but with it as a
principal and the real obligee.
The allegation that the interest paid by Atlas was remitted in
full by Mitsubishi to Eximbank, assuming the truth thereof, is too
tenuous and conjectural to support the proposition that Mitsubishi
is a mere conduit. Furthermore, the remittance of the interest
payments may also be logically viewed as an arrangement in paying
Mitsubishi's obligation to Eximbank. Whatever arrangement was
agreed upon by Eximbank and Mitsubishi as to the manner or
procedure for the payment of the latter's obligation is their own
concern. It should also be noted that Eximbank's loan to Mitsubishi
imposes interest at the rate of 75%per annum, while Mitsubishis
contract with Atlas merely states that the "interest on the amount
of the loan shall be the actual cost beginning from and including
other dates of releases against loan."14
It is too settled a rule in this jurisdiction, as to dispense
with the need for citations, that laws granting exemption from tax
are construedstrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is
the exception. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming
exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so
claimed, which onus petitioners have failed to discharge.
Significantly, private respondents are not even among the entities
which, under Section 29 (b) (7) (A) of the tax code, are entitled
to exemption and which should indispensably be the party in
interest in this case.
Definitely, the taxability of a party cannot be blandly glossed
over on the basis of a supposed "broad, pragmatic analysis" alone
without substantial supportive evidence, lest governmental
operations suffer due to diminution of much needed funds. Nor can
we close this discussion without taking cognizance of petitioner's
warning, of pervasive relevance at this time, that while
international comity is invoked in this case on the nebulous
representation that the funds involved in the loans are those of a
foreign government, scrupulous care must be taken to avoid opening
the floodgates to the violation of our tax laws. Otherwise, the
mere expedient of having a Philippine corporation enter into a
contract for loans or other domestic securities with private
foreign entities, which in turn will negotiate independently with
their governments, could be availed of to take advantage of the tax
exemption law under discussion.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA
Cases Nos. 2801 and 3015, dated April 18, 1980 and January 15,
1981, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112024 January 28, 1999
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS,petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COURT OF
APPEALS,respondent.
QUISUMBING,J.:
This petition for review assails the Resolution1of the Court of
Appeals dated September 22, 1993affirmingthe Decision2and a
Resolution3of the Court Of Tax Appeals which denied the claims of
the petitioner for tax refund and tax credits, anddisposingas
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL, THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review,
is DENIED due course. The Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
dated May 20, 1993 and its resolution dated July 20, 1993, are
hereby AFFIRMEDin toto.
SO ORDERED.4
The Court of Tax Appeals earlier ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, Petitioner's claim for refund/tax credits of overpaid
income tax for 1985 in the amount of P5,299,749.95 is hereby denied
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. The 1986
claim for refund amounting to P234,077.69 is likewise denied since
petitioner has opted and in all likelihood automatically credited
the same to the succeeding year. The petition for review is
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
The facts on record show the antecedent circumstances pertinent
to this case.
Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a
commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine
laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and
second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total
income tax of P5,016,954.00. The taxes due were settled by applying
PBCom's tax credit memos and accordingly, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) issued Tax Debit Memo Nos. 0746-85 and 0747-85 for
P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively.
Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses so that when it
filed its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31,
1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of
P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year.
But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from
leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR
withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69
in 1986.
On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00
representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second
quarters of 1985.
Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for
refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property
rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.
Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on
November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The
petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine
Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
The losses petitioner incurred as per the summary of
petitioner's claims for refund and tax credit for 1985 and 1986,
filed before the Court of Tax Appeals, are as follows:
1985 1986
Net Income (Loss) (P25,317,288.00) (P14,129,602.00)
Tax Due NIL NIL
Quarterly tax.
Payments Made 5,016,954.00
Tax Withheld at Source 282,795.50 234,077.69
Excess Tax Payments P5,299,749.50* P234,077.69
=============== =============
*CTA's decision reflects PBCom's 1985 tax claim as
P5,299,749.95. A forty five centavo difference was noted.
On May 20, 1993, the CTA rendered a decision which, as stated on
the outset, denied the request of petitioner for a tax refund or
credit in the sum amount of P5,299,749.95, on the ground that it
was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period provided for by
law. The petitioner's claim for refund in 1986 amounting to
P234,077.69 was likewise denied on the assumption that it was
automatically credited by PBCom against its tax payment in the
succeeding year.
On June 22, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the CTA's decision but the same was denied due course for lack
of merit.6
Thereafter, PBCom filed a petition for review of said decision
and resolution of the CTA with the Court of Appeals. However on
September 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe CTA's
resolution dated July 20, 1993. Hence this petition now before
us.
The issues raised by the petitioner are:
I. Whether taxpayer PBCom which relied in good faith on the
formal assurances of BIR in RMC No. 7-85 and did not immediately
file with the CTA a petition for review asking for the refund/tax
credit of its 1985-86 excess quarterly income tax payments can be
prejudiced by the subsequent BIR rejection, applied retroactivity,
of its assurances in RMC No. 7-85 that the prescriptive period for
the refund/tax credit of excess quarterly income tax payments is
not two years but ten (10).7
II. Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred in affirming
the CTA decision which denied PBCom's claim for the refund of
P234,077.69 income tax overpaid in 1986 on the mere speculation,
without proof, that there were taxes due in 1987 and that PBCom
availed of tax-crediting that year.8
Simply stated, the main question is: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax refund or tax credits on
the ground of prescription, despite petitioner's reliance on RMC
No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten
years?
Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are
not yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The
circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the
two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers
may claim refund or tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax
with the BIR within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil
Code. The pertinent portions of the circular reads:
REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 7-85
SUBJECT: PROCESSING OF REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF EXCESS CORPORATE
INCOME TAX RESULTING FROM THE FILING OF THE FINAL ADJUSTMENT
RETURN.
TO: All Internal Revenue Officers and Others Concerned.
Sec. 85 And 86 Of the National Internal Revenue Code
provide:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions are implemented by Section 7 of Revenue
Regulations Nos. 10-77 which provide;
xxx xxx xxx
It has been observed, however, that because of the excess tax
payments, corporations file claims for recovery of overpaid income
tax with the Court of Tax Appeals within the two-year period from
the date of payment, in accordance with sections 292 and 295 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. It is obvious that the filing of
the case in court is to preserve the judicial right of the
corporation to claim the refund or tax credit.
It should he noted, however, that this is not a case of
erroneously or illegally paid tax under the provisions of Sections
292 and 295 of the Tax Code.
In the above provision of the Regulations the corporation may
request for the refund of the overpaid income tax or claim for
automatic tax credit. To insure prompt action on corporate annual
income tax returns showing refundable amounts arising from overpaid
quarterly income taxes, this Office has promulgated Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 32-76 dated June 11, 1976, containing the
procedure in processing said returns. Under these procedures, the
returns are merely pre-audited which consist mainly of checking
mathematical accuracy of the figures of the return. After which,
the refund or tax credit is granted, and, this procedure was
adopted to facilitate immediate action on cases like this.
In this regard, therefore, there is no need to file petitions
for review in the Court of Tax Appeals in order to preserve the
right to claim refund or tax credit the two year period. As already
stated, actions hereon by the Bureau are immediate after only a
cursory pre-audit of the income tax returns. Moreover, a taxpayer
may recover from the Bureau of Internal Revenue excess income tax
paid under the provisions of Section 86 of the Tax Code within 10
years from the date of payment considering that it is an obligation
created by law (Article 1144 of the Civil Code).9(Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner argues that the government is barred from asserting a
position contrary to its declared circular if it would result to
injustice to taxpayers. CitingABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs.
Court of Tax Appeals10petitioner claims that rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no
retroactive effect if it would be prejudicial to taxpayers, In
ABS-CBN case, the Court held that the government is precluded from
adopting a position inconsistent with one previously taken where
injustice would result therefrom or where there has been a
misrepresentation to the taxpayer.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 246 of the National Internal
Revenue Code explicitly provides for this rules as follows:
Sec. 246Non-retroactivity of rulingsAny revocation, modification
or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in
accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or
circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given
retroactive application if the revocation, modification or reversal
will be prejudicial to the taxpayers except in the following
cases:
a). where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material
facts from his return or in any document required of him by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue;
b). where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which
the ruling is based;
c). where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through Solicitor
General, argues that the two-year prescriptive period for filing
tax cases in court concerning income tax payments of Corporations
is reckoned from the date of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax
Return, which is generally done on April 15 following the close of
the calendar year. As precedents, respondent Commissioner cited
cases which adhered to this principle, to witACCRA Investments
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,11andCommissioner of Internal
Revenuevs.TMX Sales,Inc.,et al..12Respondent Commissioner also
states that since the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return of the
petitioner for the taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed on
April 15, 1986, the latter had only until April 15, 1988 to seek
relief from the court. Further, respondent Commissioner stresses
that when the petitioner filed the case before the CTA on November
18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such
failure is fatal to petitioner's cause of action.
After a careful study of the records and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner's contention, the relaxation of revenue regulations by
RMC 7-85 is not warranted as it disregards the two-year
prescriptive period set by law.
Basic is the principle that "taxes are the lifeblood of the
nation." The primary purpose is to generate funds for the State to
finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the common
weal.13Due process of law under the Constitution does not require
judicial proceedings in tax cases. This must necessarily be so
because it is upon taxation that the government chiefly relies to
obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost
importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of
taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as
possible.14
From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit
should be exercised within the time fixed by law because the BIR
being an administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its
functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental
matters.
Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977
(now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997) provides for the prescriptive period
for filing a court proceeding for the recovery of tax erroneously
or illegally collected,viz.:
Sec. 230.Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No
suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any
sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed
with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
In any case,no such suit or proceedings shall begun after the
expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment;Provided however, That the Commissioner may, even without a
written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face
of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears
clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or
credit with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2)
years after payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced.
The two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed from
the time of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of the
tax for the year.
InCommissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine American Life
Insurance Co.,15this Court explained the application of Sec. 230 of
1977 NIRC, as follows:
Clearly, the prescriptive period of two years should commence to
run only from the time that the refund is ascertained, which can
only be determined after a final adjustment return is accomplished.
In the present case, this date is April 16, 1984, and two years
from this date would be April 16, 1986. . . . As we have earlier
said in the TMX Sales case, Sections 68.1669,17and 7018on Quarterly
Corporate Income Tax Payment and Section 321 should be considered
in conjunction with it19
When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC
7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on
claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular
created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of
1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law;
rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by
Congress.
It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are
considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific
and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from
time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely
accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the
executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to
great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is
not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be
erroneous.20Thus, courts will not countenance administrative
issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in
harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.21
In the case ofPeople vs. Lim,22it was held that rules and
regulations issued by administrative officials to implement a law
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter.
Appellant contends that Section 2 of FAO No. 37-1 is void
because it is not only inconsistent with but is contrary to the
provisions and spirit of Act. No 4003 as amended, because whereas
the prohibition prescribed in said Fisheries Act was for any single
period of time not exceeding five years duration, FAO No 37-1 fixed
no period, that is to say, it establishes an absolute ban for all
time. This discrepancy between Act No. 4003 and FAO No. 37-1 was
probably due to an oversight on the part of Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Of course, in case of
discrepancy, the basic Act prevails, for the reason that the
regulation or rule issued to implement a law cannot go beyondthe
terms and provisions of thelatter. . . . In this connection, the
attention of the technical men in the offices of Department Heads
who draft rules and regulation is called to the importance and
necessity of closely following the terms and provisions of the law
which they intended to implement, this to avoid any possible
misunderstanding or confusion as in the present case.23
Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in
estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.24As
pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No.
7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an
administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230
of 1977 NIRC. for being contrary to the express provision of a
statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to
do so would, in effect, amend the statute.
It is likewise argued that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
after promulgating RMC No. 7-85, is estopped by the principle of
non-retroactively of BIR rulings. Again We do not agree. The
Memorandum Circular, stating that a taxpayer may recover the excess
income tax paid within 10 years from date of payment because this
is an obligation created by law, was issued by the Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On the other hand, the decision,
stating that the taxpayer should still file a claim for a refund or
tax credit and corresponding petition fro review within thetwo-year
prescription period, and that the lengthening of the period of
limitation on refund from two to ten years would be adverse to
public policy and run counter to the positive mandate of Sec. 230,
NIRC, - was the ruling and judicial interpretation of the Court of
Tax Appeals. Estoppel has no application in the case at bar because
it was not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue who denied
petitioner's claim of refund or tax credit. Rather, it was the
Court of Tax Appeals who denied (albeit correctly) the claim and in
effect, ruled that the RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is out
of harmony with or contrary to the express provision of a statute
(specifically Sec. 230, NIRC), hence, cannot be given weight for to
do so would in effect amend the statute.25
Art. 8 of the Civil Code26recognizes judicial decisions,
applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal system of
the country. But administrative decisions do not enjoy that level
of recognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not
operate to vest a taxpayer with shield against judicial action. For
there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by the administrative officials and such
wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to
correct or overrule the same.27Moreover, the non-retroactivity of
rulings by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not applicable
in this case because the nullity of RMC No. 7-85 was declared by
respondent courts and not by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Lastly, it must be noted that, as repeatedly held by this Court, a
claim for refund is in the nature of a claim for exemption and
should be construed instrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer.28
On the second issue, the petitioner alleges that the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in affirming CTA's decision denying its
claim for refund of P234,077.69 (tax overpaid in 1986), based on
mere speculation, without proof, that PBCom availed of the
automatic tax credit in 1987.
Sec. 69 of the 1977 NIRC29(now Sec. 76 of the 1997 NIRC)
provides that any excess of the total quarterly payments over the
actual income tax computed in the adjustment or final corporate
income tax return, shall either(a) be refunded to the corporation,
or (b) may be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax
liabilities for the quarters of the succeeding taxable year.
The corporation must signify in its annual corporate adjustment
return (by marking the option box provided in the BIR form) its
intention, whether to request for a refund or claim for an
automatic tax credit for the succeeding taxable year. To ease the
administration of tax collection, these remedies are in the
alternative, and the choice of one precludes the other.
As stated by respondent Court of Appeals:
Finally, as to the claimed refund of income tax over-paid in
1986 the Court of Tax Appeals, after examining the adjusted final
corporate annual income tax return for taxable year 1986, found out
that petitioner opted to apply for automatic tax credit. This was
the basis used (vis-avisthe fact that the 1987 annual corporate tax
return was not offered by the petitioner as evidence) by the CTA in
concluding that petitioner had indeed availed of and applied the
automatic tax credit to the succeeding year, hence it can no longer
ask for refund, as to [sic] the two remedies of refund and tax
credit are alternative.30
That the petitioner opted for an automatic tax credit in
accordance with Sec. 69 of the 1977 NIRC, as specified in its 1986
Final Adjusted Income Tax Return, is a finding of fact which we
must respect. Moreover, the 1987 annual corporate tax return of the
petitioner was not offered as evidence to contovert said fact.
Thus, we are bound by the findings of fact by respondent courts,
there being no showing of gross error or abuse on their part to
disturb our reliance thereon.31
WHEREFORE, the, petition is hereby DENIED, The decision of the
Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED, with COSTS against the
petitioner.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984
ANTERO M. SISON, JR.,petitioner,vs.RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; ROMULO VILLA, Deputy
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; TOMAS TOLEDO Deputy
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; MANUEL ALBA, Minister of
Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commissioner on Audit, and
CESAR E. A. VIRATA, Minister of Finance,respondents.
Antero Sison for petitioner and for his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO,C.J.:
The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory
relief or prohibition proceeding1on the validity of Section I of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 depends upon a showing of its
constitutional infirmity. The assailed provision further amends
Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which
provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable
compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes,
and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or
any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust
fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of
individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f)
adjusted gross income.2Petitioner3as taxpayer alleges that by
virtue thereof, "he would be unduly discriminated against by the
imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the
exercise of his professionvis-a-visthose which are imposed upon
fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers.4He characterizes the
above sction as arbitrary amounting to class legislation,
oppressive and capricious in character5For petitioner, therefore,
there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due
process clauses6of the Constitution as well as of the rule
requiring uniformity in taxation.7
The Court, in a resolution of January 26, 1982, required
respondents to file an answer within 10 days from notice. Such an
answer, after two extensions were granted the Office of the
Solicitor General, was filed on May 28, 1982.8The facts as alleged
were admitted but not the allegations which to their mind are "mere
arguments, opinions or conclusions on the part of the petitioner,
the truth [for them] being those stated [in their] Special and
Affirmative Defenses."9The answer then affirmed: "Batas Pambansa
Big. 135 is a valid exercise of the State's power to tax. The
authorities and cases cited while correctly quoted or paraghraph do
not support petitioner's stand."10The prayer is for the dismissal
of the petition for lack of merit.
This Court finds such a plea more than justified. The petition
must be dismissed.
1. It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a
much wider scope, The reason was so clearly set forth by retired
Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their
well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times."11Hence the
need for more revenues. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative,
has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state
functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To
praphrase a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the
government, their prompt and certain availability is of the
essence.12
2. The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm,
"is an attribute of sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the
powers of of government."13It is, of course, to be admitted that
for all its plenitude 'the power to tax is not unconfined. There
are restrictions. The Constitution sets forth such limits .
Adversely affecting as it does properly rights, both the due
process and equal protection clauses inay properly be invoked, all
petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue
measure. if it were otherwise, there would -be truth to the 1803
dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax involves
the power to destroy."14In a separate opinion inGraves v. New
York,15Justice Frankfurter, after referring to it as an 1,
unfortunate remark characterized it as "a flourish of rhetoric
[attributable to] the intellectual fashion of the times following]
a free use of absolutes."16This is merely to emphasize that it is
riot and there cannot be such a constitutional mandate. Justice
Frankfurter could rightfully conclude: "The web of unreality spun
from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of Mr.
Justice Holmess pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to destroy
while this Court sits."17So it is in the Philippines.
3. This Court then is left with no choice. The Constitution as
the fundamental law overrides any legislative or executive, act
that runs counter to it. In any case therefore where it can be
demonstrated that the challenged statutory provision as petitioner
here alleges fails to abide by its command, then this Court must so
declare and adjudge it null. The injury thus is centered on the
question of whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable
net income derived from business or profession than on compensation
is constitutionally infirm.
4, The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He
alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as here. does not
suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such
unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here would
condemn such a provision as void or its face, he has not made out a
case. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that
were the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they arc not fixed rules but rather broad
standards, there is a need for of such persuasive character as
would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail.18
5. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked
where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in
the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to
amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse
of power. It then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such
an arbitrary act amounted to the exercise of an authority not
conferred. That properly calls for the application of the Holmes
dictum. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure
is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public
purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and
unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds.19
6. Now for equal protection. The applicable standard to avoid
the charge that there is a denial of this constitutional mandate
whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the lice power or
the power of eminent domain is to demonstrated that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that
all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumtances which if not
Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest."20That same formulation applies as
well to taxation measures. The equal protection clause is, of
course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal of
the laws benefits being available to all and the affairs of men
being governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of
the very essence of the Idea of law. There is, however, wisdom, as
well as realism in these words of Justice Frankfurter: "The
equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a
disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal
protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions.
They do not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are
expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, address
to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies.
The Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same."21Hence the constant reiteration of the view that
classification if rational in character is allowable. As a matter
of fact, in a leading case of Lutz V. Araneta,22this Court, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is
inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.'"23
7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of
uniformity. According to the Constitution: "The rule of taxation
shag be uniform and equitable."24This requirement is met according
to Justice Laurel inPhilippine Trust Company v. Yatco,25decided in
1940, when the tax "operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject may be found. "26He likewise added:
"The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or
perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable."27The problem
of classification did not present itself in that case. It did not
arise until nine years later, when the Supreme Court held:
"Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at
the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation,
... .28As clarified by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation"
complained of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and
equity" it "is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause
and is therefore uniform."29There is quite a similarity then to the
standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the
tax "applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed
in similar situation."30
8. Further on this point. Apparently, what misled petitioner is
his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a
tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader
tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and
at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be
classified into different categories. To repeat, it. is enough that
the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that
make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation
embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the, discernible basis of
classification is the susceptibility of the income to the
application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for
all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax
rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of
compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is
practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are e not entitled
to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the
same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of
professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen,
there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to
produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the
disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the
basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the
Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income
taxation as regards professional and business income.
9. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the petition is
without merit, considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to
show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision;31(2) the
force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal protection,
and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the
distinction between compensation and taxable net income of
professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect
classification,
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,petitioner,vs.THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 August 25, 1994
JUAN T. DAVID,petitioner,vs.TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as
Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of Finance;
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and
their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES,respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 August 25, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioners,vs.THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.;
PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L.
PAVIA; and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA,petitioners,vs.HON. LIWAYWAY V.
CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance,respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 August 25, 1994
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
(CREBA),petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 August 25, 1994
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME
CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON,
RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S.
DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and WIGBERTO
TAADA,petitioners,vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS,respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 August 25, 1994
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,vs.HON.
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance,respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE BOOK-SELLERS,petitioners,vs.HON. ROBERTO
B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO,
as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of
Customs,respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.
Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for petitioners in
G.R. No. 115525.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S.
Roco.
Villaranza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for petitioner in G.R.
No. 115754.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedon From Debts
Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices
for petitioners in G.R. No. 115873.
R.B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No.
115931.
Reve A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.
MENDOZA,J.:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange
of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code.
These are various suits forcertiorariand prohibition,
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on
various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of
this Court, as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference
Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of
Rights (Art. III)?
1. 1
2. 4
3. 5
4. 10
B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the
Constitution?
1. Art. VI, 28(1)
2. Art. VI, 28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated
above. As will presently be explained not all of these questions
are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the
Constitution are self executing and, therefore, judicially
enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally
charged with the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the
provisions relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act
No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated
the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in
the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but
was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in
the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President
signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are
cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No.
7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House
of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:
Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and theyeasandnaysentered in the
Journal.
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and
August 31, 1993, several bills1were introduced in the House of
Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These
bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which
recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197,
entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238
OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading
starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was
approved by the House of Representatives after third and final
reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later
referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report
recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF
TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution
of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No.
734 and H.B. No. 11197."
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill
(S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the bill and approved it on
second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the
bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its
members, with one abstention.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then
referred to a conference committee which, after meeting four times
(April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No.
11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in
accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees."
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING
THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND
ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved
by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate
on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the
President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It
became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No.
7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on
May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was
suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of
business entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but
its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to
4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30,
1994.
First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did
not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact
the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that
although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal
Constitution,2it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall
originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word
"exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American
version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716
must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not
the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution
to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third
version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At
this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to
"propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make
the House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the
Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate
for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power3and
thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the
fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing
here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is
vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of
Representatives."4The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not
the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on
the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for
comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on
the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the
Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate5has
never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the
House of Representatives.
In the United States, the validity of a provision ( 37) imposing
anad valoremtax based on the weight of vessels, which the U.S.
Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against
the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in
the Senate in contravention of Art. I, 7 of the U.S.
Constitution.6Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a
provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the House. The
U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills
following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In
1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting
clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and
the House subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate
likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the
Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in
the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922.7Given,
then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can
propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required by the Constitution to originate in the House.
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in
substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No.
1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to
"take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630.
There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No.
11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners
admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter.
In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills
of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from
the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore,
understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993,
eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had
been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the
Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had
received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by
the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter,
if the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of
bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No.
253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several
other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was
filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of
those earlier bills.
Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the
power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next
argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution8because
the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24,
1994. But this was because on February 24, 19949and again on March
22, 1994,10the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only
of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The
phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualifies the two
stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has
passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed
in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to
the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses
of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply
dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause
(i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval)
would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate
the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing
the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to
meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing
that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time
saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring
immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with
the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three
days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a
law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special
election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution
such a law is required to be made within seven days of the
convening of Congress in emergency session.11
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the
requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice. For example, the bill defining
thecertiorarijurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation
with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed
on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the
same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the
President as urgent.12
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that
presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for
the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its
passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate
days, also.
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in
this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition
stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being
an unusual condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to
controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification.
To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third
readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's
certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this
Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S.
No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day,
the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the
study of a vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the
writ ofhabeas corpusor declaration of martial law under Art. VII,
18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI,
23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard
of review.
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President
certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is because S. No.
1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was
before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the
pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became
Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference Committee
prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is
claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions
not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that
these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference
Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the last two days of
its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind
closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were
not the result of the give and take that often mark the proceedings
of conference committees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact
that the Conference Committee met in executive sessions. Often the
only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet
behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no
compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the
suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the
conferees on the basis solely of their "secret meetings" on April
21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks of
the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by
ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the
stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes
characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses
in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United
States.
In any event, in the United States conference committees had
been customarily held in executive sessions with only the conferees
and their staffs in attendance.13Only in November 1975 was a new
rule adopted requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of
either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close the
meetings.14
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a
Conference Committee, it has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees
are not expected to make any material change in the measure at
issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have
already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a
difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house
amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out
everything following the enacting clause and substituting
provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now
altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft
essentially a new bill. . . .15
The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment
in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which
being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House
and Senate bills.16
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of
a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the
Senate bill.17If the committee can propose an amendment consisting
of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose
several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the
nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to
the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its
report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of
Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.
The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a
third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.18
Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the
Senate and the House of Representatives a conference committee can
only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House
bill, and that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee
inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to it. The
following provisions are cited in support of this contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House
of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint
resolution,thedifferences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houseswhich shall meet within ten days after
their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference
committee in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule
III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to
the subject measure,and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless
the report has been filed with the Secretary of the Senate and
copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
85. Conference Committee Reports. In the event that the House
does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or
joint resolution,the differences may be settled by conference
committees of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always
be in order, except when the journal is being read, while the roll
is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of
the pages of such reports shall be signed by the
conferees.Eachreport shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless
copies thereof are distributed to the Members: Provided, That in
the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed
sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above
provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee
to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, 112 of
the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no
Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the
Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and
as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's
Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's
Manual:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the
differences committed to them. . . and may not include subjects not
within disagreements, even though germane to a question in
issue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in case there is no
specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative
practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement.
It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports
include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed
to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S.
Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in
these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's
Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative
practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought
in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house. Thus, Art. VI, 16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."
This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules
of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of
the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain
a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or
amendments to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and
capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard
practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks
and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the
House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have
already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern."19Our concern is with
the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment
of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are
satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these
cases.
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's
Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of
the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the
compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that
it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis,
with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both
houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then
again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not
be wholly satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only
to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress,
not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of
requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to
study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in
the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was
considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of
that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out
the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had
prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill; that for
its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and
prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report
was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably
after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a
matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of
the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference
Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our
view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity
of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our
cases20manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of
a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment
was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not
been obtained21or that certain provisions of a statute had been
"smuggled" in the printing of the bill22have moved or persuaded us
to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the
government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute.
In fact in one case23we "went behind" an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that
the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled
bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in
effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should
decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill.
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic
Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner
in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, 26(1) which
provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is
contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for
removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the
VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill
which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in
its title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE- ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is 103, which
originally read:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the
value-added tax:
. . . .
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL
because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from
the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or in the near future,"
in consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate
income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, 103 of
the NIRC now provides:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the
value-added tax:
. . . .
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except
those granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491,
1590. . . .
The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted
to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.
The question is whether this amendment of 103 of the NIRC is
fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no
mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the
statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the
purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of
doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the
exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be
mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to 103 of the NIRC,
in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that
the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of
Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that,
if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at
bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been
withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps
for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass
unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their
existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any
more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No.
1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of
P.D. No. 1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in ou