Case 1:20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page ... · 2 days ago · Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 10 of 26 Pageld # 10 documents andmaterialsand

Case 1:20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 2 of 26 Pageld 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICTOF HAWAII

UNITED STATES

CR . NO. 20-001016DKW -RT

VS.

AFFIDAVITOF CHRIS JENSEN

ALEXANDER YUK CHING MA

AFFIDAVIT OF FBISPECIAL AGENT CHRIS JENSEN

1 . I am a SpecialAgent oftheFederalBureau of Investigation (“ FBI” ),

and havebeen so employed since 2012.I am currently assigned to the Honolulu

Field Office of the FBI. SinceMay 2013 , I have been assigned to a

Counterintelligencesquad where my primary responsibility is the investigationof

matters involving foreign counterintelligence. I have completed FBItraining in

foreign counterintelligencematters, which hasincluded training in criminal

violations associated with espionage. I have also worked extensively with

representativesofother U.S.intelligenceagencies on matters related to foreign

counterintelligence . In the course ofmy career, Ihave participated in the service of

multiple federalsearch warrants relating to counterintelligenceinvestigations. I

have led many counterintelligence investigations, including those related to

Case 1:20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 08/13/20 Page 3 of 26 3

espionagematters. In 2017, I receivedan award from the U.S.Departmentof

Defense related to a counterintelligence investigation where I served as the FBI's

lead investigator. I havereceived specialized training on the tactics,methods

techniques , and tradecraft of persons disclosing classified information in an

unauthorized manner. In addition , I haveworked collectively on this investigation

with multipleFBIagents and analystswho possessmany years of experiencein

counterintelligence investigations such as the one described in the affidavit. As a

result of thebackground, training, and experience, ofboth myself, andthe other

agents with whom I am collectively working on this investigation , I am familiar

with tactics,methods, techniques, and tradecraftof foreign intelligence services

and their agents, as well as personswhomaybeacting in violation ofU.S.laws

forbidding espionageactivity aswell as persons disclosing classified information

in an unauthorizedmanner.

2 . The statements contained in this affidavit are based , in part, on

information gathered through court- authorized search and surveillanceprocesses,

my own personalobservations and review ofaudio and video recordingsmade

during the conduct of the investigation , information provided by other government

agencies that your affianthas found to be reliable, and conclusions reachedby me

baseduponmytraining and experience as an FBISpecialAgent. Because this

affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of securing authorization for

2

Case 1:20-mj-01016-DKW -RT Document1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 4 of 4

theexecution ofan arrest warrant, I havenot included each and every fact known

tomeconcerning the investigation . I have set forth only the facts that I believe are

necessary to establish thenecessary foundation supporting issuance of the

requested process.

ALEXANDERMA

3 Alexander Yuk ChingMA ("MA ), age 67, is a naturalized United

States citizen who resides in Honolulu, Hawaii. Hewasborn in HongKongin

1952 and cameto Honolulu, Hawaii, in or about 1968, where he finished primary

school and attendedthe University ofHawaiiatManoa.

4 MA joined the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) in 1982. In 1983,

MA was assigned as a CIA officer overseas. As a CIA officer,MA held a TOP

SECRET security clearance and had access to classified national defense

informationof the United States. In addition to his TOP SECRETclearance,MA

had access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (“ SCI ). This access included

the identities of covert CIA officers ; the identities of clandestine human sources ;

details ofsensitive intelligence collection operations and methods details of CIA

clandestinetraining cryptographic information related to CIA communications

and details of clandestine tradecraft the CIA employs to avoid detection by hostile

foreign intelligence services. Asa CIA officer, MA was trained in methodsof

covert communication, surveillancedetection, andoperationalsecurity, for

3

Case 1:20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 5 of 26 5

purposes of conducting authorized intelligence activities for theUnited States. In

1989,MA resigned from the CIA .

5 According to recordsprovided by U.S.Customsand Border

Protection (“CBP ), when MA arrived in Honolulu on November 24, 2000, he told

CBP agents during a secondary inspection that he had been residing in China for at

leastthe previous five years and thathe was an “ importer and exporter. MA was

carrying $ 9,000 cash in U.S.currency.

COCONSPIRATOR # 1

6 Coconspirator # 1 (“ CC # 1 ), age 85, is a naturalized United States

citizen who resides inLosAngeles, California. CC was born in Shanghai,

People'sRepublic ofChina (" PRC" ), and cameto the United States in 1961. CC# 1

is related by blood to MA. CC # 1 joined the CIA in 1967 and worked as an officer

from 1971to 1982.Formultiple years during CC # CIA employment, CC # 1 was

assigned overseas. As a CIA officer, CC# 1held a TOP SECRETsecurity clearance

andhad accessto classified nationaldefense information of theUnited States In

addition to CC # TOP SECRET clearance, CC# 1had access to SCI. This access

included the identities of covert CIA officers; the identities of clandestine human

sources; details ofsensitive intelligence collection operations and methods; details

of CIA clandestine training cryptographic information related to CIA

communications and details of clandestine tradecraft the CIA employs to avoid

4


detection by hostile foreign intelligence services. As a CIA officer, CC# 1 was

trained in methods of covert communication , surveillance detection , and

operational security , for purposes of conducting authorized intelligence activities

for the United States.

7 In 1983, CC # 1 resigned from the CIA after it was determined CC # 1

was inappropriately using CC# official position to assist PRCnationals in

obtaining entry into the United States. After ending employmentwith the CIA ,

CC # 1resided in Los Angeles, California . In or about 1998, CC # 1was convicted

on two (2) counts ofviolating 18 U.S.C. 1014 (FalseStatement to a Lending

Institution)

8 . TheFBIinvestigation into CC# 1 has revealed that CC # 1 currently

suffers from an advanced and debilitating cognitive disease. Due solely to CC#

presentcognitive issues we do not seek an arrest warrant for CC# 1 at this time.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 . The CIA is a U.S.government intelligence agency with various

offices, and is a componentof theUnited States IntelligenceCommunity. The CIA

is responsible for, among other things, collecting ( including through clandestine

means), producing, anddisseminating foreign intelligenceand counterintelligence

used to inform U.S.policymakers conducting counterintelligence activities ;

conducting administrative and technical support activities conducting covert

5

Case 1:20-mj-01016-DKW -RT Document1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 7 of 26 7

action activities approved by the President; and conducting foreign liaison

relationships with intelligence and security services of foreign governments. The

collection offoreign intelligence is, in part, done through the use of sources or

assets. Sources or assets are people who agree to help a foreign intelligence service

by providing information to that service in response to tasking from foreign

intelligenceofficers or agents.

CHINESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICESAND ASSOCIATED TERMS

10 . The PRC intelligence services encompass both the civilian and

militarycomponentsofChinese intelligence programs. TheMinistryofState

Security ("MSS handlescivilian intelligence collection and is responsible for

counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, and well as political security . The

MSS consists of a centralministry, provincialstate security bureaus, andmunicipal

state security bureaus. The Shanghai State Security Bureau ( SSSB ) is a

provincialstate security bureaucharged with collecting intelligence within the

geographic region surrounding Shanghai. BecausetheSSSB reports directly the

MSS, and is a department thereof,MSS and SSSB will be collectively referred to

in this affidavit as theMSS.

Among other things, the MSS is tasked with collecting intelligence

information that would be of value to the PRC'spolitical, economic, andnational

security , and actively recruits human intelligence sources in order to gather

6

Case 1: 20 -mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page8 of 8

intelligenceinformation and state secretsof foreign countries. TheMSS operates

in part through the use of intelligence officers (" ) who focus their attention on

conducting clandestineand overt human source operations to gather intelligence

information. TheUnited States is a primarytargetoftheMSS intelligence

gatheringmission.

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

12. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 signed on April 17, 1995, as

amendedby Executive Order 13292on March 25, 2003, andExecutiveOrder

13526 on December 29, 2009, national security information is classified as " TOP

SECRET," "SECRET, or " CONFIDENTIAL National security information is

information owned by produced by, produced for, and under the control of the

United States government that is classified as follows:

a. Information is classified as TOP SECRET if the unauthorized

disclosure of that informationreasonably could be expected to cause

exceptionally grave damage to the nationalsecurity that the original

classification authority is able to identify and describe.

b Information is classifiedas SECRETifthe unauthorizeddisclosureof

that information reasonably could be expected to cause serious

damage to the national security that the original classification

authority is able to identify and describe.

7


c . Information is classified as CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized

disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause

damage to the national security that the original classification

authority is able to identify and describe.

13 Access to nationalsecurity information classified at any levelcan be

further restricted through designation in SCIcategories. Only individuals with the

appropriate security clearance and additionalSCIpermissionscan have authorized

access to such classifiednationalsecurity information.

14 Information classified at any levelcan only belawfully accessed by

persons determined by an appropriate United States government official to be

eligible for access to the classified information and to have a "need to know the

classified information . Classified information should only be stored in an approved

facility and container

SECURITY CLEARANCES

15 Both MAand CC # 1 worked during their CIA careers in the East- Asia

and Pacific region. Both MA and CC# 1held U.S.security clearances atthe TOP

SECRET//SCIleveland had access to a broadrange ofhighly sensitiveclassified

material.

. BecauseMA and CC # 1 held security clearances, the U.S. government

entrusted them with access to sensitive government materials, including classified

8

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 10 of 26 Pageld # 10

documents andmaterials and informationrelating to the nationaldefense thatwas

closely held by the government .

17. Throughout their careers, as a prerequisite to their access to classified

information,MAand CC # 1 signed severalnondisclosureagreements in which they

acknowledged both the harm that could result from the unauthorized disclosure of

classified informationand the applicabilityof criminalpenalties should they make

in violation of their security oaths disclosures of such informationto personsnot

authorized to receive it.

APPLICABLE LAW

18. Title 18 United States Code, Section 794 a ) provides:

Whoever, intent or reason to believe that it is to beused to the injury of

the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates,

delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit to

any foreign government ... any representative, officer , agent,

employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly , anydocument, writing, code book, signal book, sketch , photograph,

photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map,model note, instrument,

appliance, or information relating to thenationaldefense, shall be punished

by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life[

Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(c ) makes it a crimeto conspire to violate

Section794( a )

9

Case 1: 20-mj-01016-DKW -RT Document1 Filed08/13/20 Page 11 of 26 Pageld 11

PROBABLE CAUSE

19 . The FBI'sinvestigation has revealed that beginning at least by early

2001, former CIA officerMAbecame a compromised asset of the MSS. The

investigation has revealedthatbeginning on March 24, 2001, and continuing

through March 26, 2001,MA and former CIA officer CC # 1 conducted a series of

meetings with at least five (5 )MSS intelligence officials in a Hong Kong hotel

room . During thesemeetings,MAand CC # disclosed a substantialamountof

highly classified national defense information of the United States to the MSS

officers .

20. Your affiant has reviewed both audio and video recordings of these

March 2001meetings, and the recordings have also been reviewed by appropriate

officials within the CIA. Based on our collective review , it hasbeen determined

that during the three days of intensive questioning byMSS intelligence officials

MA and CC# voluntarily and knowingly revealed U.S.classified information

including, butnot limited to , the following subjectmatters:

a . Their CIA work experience and activities;

b Information concerning CIA international operations, including thecover used by CIA officers and CIA activities;

c . Cryptographic informationused in classified and sensitiveCIA

communications and reports

d. Information concerningthe internalstructureand organizationof theCIA ;

Case 1: 20-mj-01016- DKW -RT Document1 08/13/20 Page 12 of 26 Pageld 12

e. Information concerning CIA officer identities;

f . Information concerning CIA human assets;

g. Information concerning CIA use ofoperational tradecraft;

h. InformationconcerningCIA technical departments;

i Information concerning CIA secure communication practices; and

j Information concerning CIA staffing practices.

21. Your affianthas reviewed a videotapeoftheMarch 26 , 2001meeting

betweenMA, CC# 1, and theMSS officers.MAidentified importantaspectsofthe

tape, such aslocation , people present, and topics discussed, during an FBI

undercover operation described later in this affidavit. The videotape and

accompanyingaudio depictMSS officials payingMAand CC# 1 $50,000 in U.S.

currency , whichMA counted while CC# 1continued to provide classified

information to theMSS officersattendingthemeeting.

22 Following theMarch 2001HongKongmeetings, MA continued to

remain in contactwithMSSofficials andto work on their behalf. The investigation

has revealed that as a mechanism once again give himself access to U.S.

government information, MA applied for employmentwith the FBI. OnDecember

26 , 2002, MA applied with the FBIfor the position of “ SpecialAgent. On or

about December 30 , 2002, after being advised by theFBI that he did notmeet the

11

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 13 of Pageld # 13

age requirements for the FBISpecialAgent position,MA submitted an online job

application to the FBIfor a contract linguist/monitor/ tester position .

23 On or aboutApril 14, 2003,MA submitted a written application for a

contract linguist position , in Chinese languages , at the FBIHonolulu Field Office,

in Honolulu, Hawaii. On or about April21, 2003,MAused a prepaid calling card

to callhisMSShandlersto notify them of the status ofhis efforts to gain FBI

employment

24 . OnoraboutMay 20, 2004,MA was notified thathis background

investigation for the contract linguist position was complete that an

employment contract wouldbe ready for review in several weeks. agreed to

continue the hiring process.

25 . On or about August 10, 2004, one day beforereporting to work with

theFBI, MAtelephoned a suspected accompliceand stated thathewould be

working for the other side.

26 On or about August 11, 2004, MA reported to work with the FBIto

begin employmentand acknowledgedwith his signature on an FBInondisclosure

agreementhis understandingofthe secrecy requirements of his employmentwith

the FBI, including secrecy concerning his FBIwork product andmaterials

provided to him . The nondisclosure agreement specifically cautioned him that

12

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 14 of Pageld 14

federal criminallawsprohibited the unlawfulgatheringand disclosureofsuch

materials. In the nondisclosure agreement,MA acknowledged , I understand the

need for this secrecy agreement; therefore , I agree that I will never divulge,

publish , or reveal either by word or conduct, or by othermeans of disclosure, to

any unauthorized recipientwithoutofficialwritten authorization by theDirectorof

theFBIor his delegate , any information from the investigatory files of the FBIor

any informationrelatingto materialcontained in the files, or discloseany

informationor produceanymaterialacquired as a partoftheperformanceofmy

contract

27. OnoraboutAugust11, 2004, during a security briefing the FBI

conducted with MA, the FBI advised MA that because hewas working in a

controlled security environment designed for the storage of classifiedmaterials, he

could not use any personaldevices , including laptop computers, cellular

telephones, personal digital assistants, digital cameras, or removable media, to

perform his duties, including translating materials or storing FBI information .

Additionally, theFBIinstructedMA that he was never to remove any documentor

digitalmaterialfrom the secure FBIworkspace. Your affiantknowsfrom his years

of work in FBIsecure spacesthatall employeesand contractorsare trained and

instructed on the importance ofsecurity protocols, including the prohibition against

13

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 15 of 15

bringingphotographic equipment, digitalmedia, andmobile devices into secure

space designed for the handling, storage, and discussion of classified information .

As a former employeeofthe CIA , MA was instructedon theprotocols and

procedures regarding devices that could notbebrought into secure workspaces In

addition, MAalso understoodthathe could notdepart secure workspaceswith

classified information unless specifically authorized to do so .

28 In August 2004, MA began work for theFBIHonolulu Field Office as

a Chinese languages contract linguist. As a partofhis employment,MA

understoodhewouldhave access to classifiedU.S.nationaldefense information.

The investigation has revealed that between in or about August 2004 and in or

about November 2010 ,MA regularly gathered documents marked with U.S.

classificationmarkingsfrom the secureFBIworkspacewith the intentto provide

them to hisMSShandlersduringregulartripshemadeto China.

29. On or about September 8 , 2004 ,while working in the secure FBI

workspace ,MA used his assigned FBIcomputer to "burn onto a CD -ROM disc

digital photographic imagesofdocuments related to guided missile and weapons

system technology research .

30. On or aboutJuly 27, 2005, in violation of FBIpolicy and thesecurity

protocols upon which he had been instructed ,MAbrought a digital camera into the

secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents.

14


31. On or about August 18, 2005,MAbroughta digitalcamera into the

secure FBIworkspace and photographedtranslation documents.

32 On or about August 22, 2005,MA brought a digital camera into the


33 On or about August 26, 2005,MA broughta digital camera into the

secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents .

34. On or about September6 , 2005,MAbroughta digital camerainto the


35. On or aboutSeptember 12, 2005,MA brought a digitalcamera into

the secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents.

36 . On or aboutSeptember 16 , 2005, MA brought a digital camera into

the secure FBIworkspace and photographed translation documents .

37 On or about October 3 , 2005, MAbrought a digital camera into the


38. In or about February 2006 ,MA exchanged several e-mailmessages

and phone calls with MSS IOs. In the exchanges , they discussedMA's upcoming

travelplansto Shanghaiin late February 2006. TheMSS officers toldMA they

would book MA's hotel and pick him up from the airport .

39. On or about February 17, 2006 MAdepartedHonolulu, Hawaiifor

Shanghai, PRC via Narita International Airport in Tokyo, Japan .

15

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 17 of 26 17

40. On or aboutFebruary 23, 2006 , MAreturned to the Honolulu

InternationalAirport, arriving from Tokyo followinghis travel in Shanghai.

During Customs screening, CBP agents interviewed and searchedMA. During the

interview , CBP determined thatMAwas in possessionof $ 20,000 in U.S.

currency. In addition,MA had a set of golf clubs he did notpreviously own.

41. On or aboutFebruary 23, 2006,MA forwarded twoe-mailmessages

from his personale-mail accountto the MSS. The first e-mailmessage contained

information regarding classified CIA activities . The second e-mailmessage was an

e-mailmessageMAhad received from a Taiwanese diplomatic .

42 On or about February 27, 2006 , MA sent CC # 1 an e -mailmessage to

advise CC # 1 that MA was going to forward to CC # 1 photographs of suspected

human sources thatMSS operativeswanted CC# 1 to identify.

43 On or aboutMarch 2, 2006 ,MAtelephoned CC# 1 at therequestof

theMSS to inquire with CC # 1 as to the identities of the persons in the photographs

sent toMAby the MSS, whichMAin turn to CC # 1. CC# 1 agreed to provide

MA and the MSS with the identities of the individuals in the photographs.

44. On or aboutMarch 6 , 2006 ,MA received an e-mailmessage from the

MSS with an attachment consistingof one photo of five puppiessittingon a park

bench. TheFBIassesses that this photographwas sent in order to promptMA

16


arrange for CC # 1to provide identity information on five (5 ) individuals who had

been suspectedhuman sources.

45 On or about March 16 , 2006 , MA possessed at his residence a digital

memory card with photographsof five 5) individuals, one ( 1) picture of a piece of

paper with names written in Chinese labeled a” through “ e," and eight(8)

photographs of a document that had been removed from the secure FBIworkspace .

46 On or aboutMarch 28, 2006 , CC# sentan emailmessage toMA

wherein CC # identifiedtwoofthe five individualsdepicted in the photographs

provided by theMSS.

47 On or about May 31, 2006 ,MA arranged for his wife to fly to

Shanghai, PRC. TheFBI assesses that one purpose of this trip was for MA's wife

to meetwith MA'sMSS contacts, and the investigation has revealed thatMA's

wife likely delivered a laptop computer to theMSS during this trip .

48. Onor aboutJune 10, 2006 , one ofMA'sMSS handlers sentMA an

emailmessage thanking him for sending hiswife and delivering the present."

49. On or about June 16, 2006 ,MA departed Honolulu for Hong Kong for

the purpose ofmeeting with hisMSS handlers.

50 . On or aboutJuly 15, 2006 ,MAreturnedto Honolulu from China and

declared $ 7,000 in U.S.currency to CBP at the Honolulu International Airport.

17


51. On or about May 2, 2007,MA photocopied and removed copies of

translation documents from the secure FBIworkspace .

52 On or aboutOctober 24, 2007, MA photocopied and removed copies

of translation documents from the secure FBIworkspace .

53 On or aboutMarch 27, 2008,MAphotocopied and removed copiesof

translation documents from the secureFBIworkspace.

54. On or aboutMay 8, 2008,MAphotocopied and removedcopies of

translation documents from the secure FBIworkspace .

55 On or about June 2, 2008, one ofMA'sMSShandlerstelephonedMA

and said his would have a lot ofwork orders this year .

56 . On or about August 15, 2008, oneofMA'sMSShandlers telephoned

MA and reminded MA to call him if a “ good opportunity arises.

57. Onor aboutFebruary 3, 2009, MA photographed and removed

documents with classificationmarkings from the secure FBIworkspace and

removedcopiesoftranslation documents from the secure FBIworkspace.

58. On or about April21, 2009, MA photocopied and removeddocuments

with classificationmarkingsfrom the secure FBIworkspace.

59 On or aboutDecember 2, 2009, during a telephoneconversation,

CC # 1 told MA that CC # 1 hadmetwith an MSS contact in Yunnan , China during a

recenttrip to China.

18

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 20 of 26 Pageld 20

60. On or aboutJanuary 14, 2010,MA photographed documents in the

secure FBIworkspacewith his cellular phone.

61 On or aboutMarch 6 , 2010, one ofMA'sMSS handlers telephoned

him to discuss meetingin HongKongin lateMarch . Approximatelyone ( 1) hour

after thiscall, theMSShandlercalledMA again, and they confirmed travel

schedule to HongKong.During this call, the MSS handler advisedMA thathis

" leadership eagertomeetMA

62 Onor aboutMarch 17, 2010,MAboarded a flight from Honolulu to

Seoul, South Korea. In his possession as heboarded the flightwas a document

with SECRET classificationmarkings thatMAhad taken from the secure FBI

workspace . In addition,MA possessed a Chinese language document that he had

improperly removed from the secure FBIworkspace .

63 On or aboutMarch 31, 2010 ,MA sent one ofhisMSS handlers an e

mailmessage requesting"reimbursement for businessexpenses. MA provided

thebank accountnumber at a HongKongbank for paymentpurposes.

64. On or aboutMay 17, 2010 ,MAreceived a telephone call from an

MSS officer. During the ensuingconversation, theMSS officer apologized for not

seeingMA duringMA'srecent travel to China and extended an invitation to meet

in Shanghai in the future. During the call, the MSS officer told MAheshould

communicate with CC # 1 moreoften and determine ifCC # 1 would be willing to

19

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 21of 26 21

��

discusstheir" businessventure. In the experienceofyour affiant, and the

collective experienceof the other counterintelligence agents with whom I have

worked on this investigation , it is not unusual for espionage actors and foreign

counterintelligence agents to utilize substitute terminology when discussing their

activities. In this investigation, MSS officerscommonly used the term " business

to discuss MA's espionage activities conducted on their behalf.

65 . On or about May 19, 2010 , MA sent one ofhis MSS handlers an e

mailmessagetelling the officerhe neededmoney when he was next in Hong

Kong

66 . On or about August28, 2010, MAreceived a telephone call from an

MSS officer . During the conversation , theMSS officer inquired how " business "

was goingand invited MAto visit with him in Shanghai, preferably in March

2011.

67. On or about November 2 , 2010 , MA inserted a digital storage device

into his FBI computer at the secure FBIworkspace .

68. On or about November 23, 2010, MA inserted a digital storage device

into his FBI computer at the secure FBIworkspace.

69. On or about November 30 , 2010 , MA inserted a digital storage device

into his FBIcomputer at the secure FBIworkspace .

20

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 22 of 26 Pageld # 22

70. In January 2019, the FBIconducted an undercover contact withMA.

An FBIUndercover Employee (UCE), posing as a representative ofthe MSS,

conducted a meetingwith MA in MA'sHonolulu business office. TheUCE

showed MA a copy of the video recording of theMarch 26 , 2001meeting

described above as a mechanism to convince MA that theUCE truly was employed

by the MSS, and askedMA for assistance in identifying certain parties present

during theMarch 2001meetings. TheUCE told MAthat theUCEwas conducting

an investigation on behalfof the PRC government into how MA had been treated,

includingthe amounthe had been compensated, by certainMSS officers.

71. After seeing the video recordingof theMarch 26 , 2001meetingwhere

MAandCC# 1 provided classified information to the MSS,MAappeared to be

convinced that the UCE truly was a representativeoftheMSS.MA then told the

UCE that MA had provided classified information to theMSS and that he had

continued to work with some of theMSS officials present in the video recording of

theMarch , 2001meeting.MAthen assisted theUCE in identifyingsomeofthe

MSSofficialspresentduringthemeetingusingthe videotape. During themeeting

with theUCE,MA verified the authenticityofthe video recordingoftheMarch

26 , 2001meetingand confirmed that it accurately depicted the personspresent

during the meeting, including himself,CC # 1 and severalMSS officers.

21


(Screenshottaken from the covert video and audio recordingmadeby the UCEduring themeeting with MA in January 2019.)

72 On March 13, 2019 , the UCE calledMA to ask him ifhewould meet

with him again.MA agreed and metwith the UCE On this occasion , the UCE

provided MA with $2,000 cash in U.S. currency. The UCE toldMA the money

was to acknowledgehis work on behalfof China.MAaccepted themoney and

counted it. (See screenshot from UCE video below ; see also Exhibit A.) MAtold

the UCE he was willing to continue to help the MSS, and confirmed thathe

had providedmultiple items of valuable U.S. government information to the MSS

duringthe timehe worked for the FBI.

22


(MA counting $ 2,000 provided to him by the UCE as a

" token appreciation for hiswork on behalf of China.)

73. On August 12 , 2020, the UCE metagain with MA. On this occasion ,

the UCE provided MAwith $2,000 cash in U.S.currency contained within a red

envelope. The UCE toldMAthat the money was from his employer in

appreciation ofMA'sefforts to assist them . MA accepted themoney, counted it,

and placed the envelope containing the money in his pants pocket

74. MA told the UCE during themeeting that hewanted themotherland”

to succeed. The UCE asked MA about his past work with theMSS. MA told the

UCE that: (a)hehad already given theMSS allof the information he possessed;

23

Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 25 of 25

( b) a lot of the information heprovided to theMSS was contained on a laptop

computer that had been given to him by hisMSS handler and that he returned; (c )

MAwas firstapproachedbytheMSSwhenhewas living in China, andthatthe

MSS officerwho approachedhim was direct and open abouthis affiliationwith the

Chinese government; and (d ) the reason theMSS approachedhim was to get to

CC # 1, whose membership in an anti-communist organization was viewed as a

threat by the Chinese government.

75 . Duringthemeeting,MA also told the UCEthathewas willing to

continue to help the Chinese government, possibly asa consultant, but thathe

would prefer to discuss opportunitiesafter the COVID -19pandemichassubsided

//

//

//

//

//

24


76 . Based on the above facts, youraffiantasserts thatthere isprobable

cause to believe thatMA conspired with CC# 1 andmultiple PRC intelligence

officers to gather and communicate national defense information of the United

States to thePRC in violation of 18U.S.C.Sections794 a ) and ( )

Chris Jensen

SpecialAgentFederal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn and subscribed beforeme this 13th, day ofAugust, 2020 .

DISTRICT

Judge

25

Case 1:20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document 1 Filed 08/13/20 Page ... · 2 days ago · Case 1: 20-mj-01016 -DKW -RT Document1 Filed 08/13/20 Page 10 of 26 Pageld # 10 documents andmaterialsand

Documents