Case 09-cv-01352-CKK (D.D.C.) Amnesy Int'! CIA,

Federal Programs Branch
Trial Attorney Email: [email protected]
February 19, 2010
Paul J. Orfanedes, Esq. 501 School St., SE Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20024 (202) 646-5172 POrfanedes@Judicial Watch. org
Re: Judicial Watch v. C.I.A., Case No. 09-cv-01352-CKK (D.D.C.)
Dear Paul:
Enclosed is a set of documents provided today to plaintiffs in Amnesty Int'! v. CIA, Case No. 07-cv-5435 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y.), which are also likely responsive to the Freedom of Information Act request at issue in the above-captioned case. Pursuant to the Court's January 25, 2010 Minute Order we will provide a complete set of responsive, non-exempt records with Bates stamps no later than Thursday, April 15, 2010 .
Trial Attorney ohn R. Coleman
United States Department of Justice
.---------__:.,_____ __ -· -·-· ----,·
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director Central Intei li9e_n_Ge _ .FROM: Christopher J. Walker , Director
SUBJECT: Informa tion: . for 12 . April . sSCI. Hearing. .
Here. is the .information that you requ sted:
·
2. A list ot all Members and Staff hdefed on CIA Int r o_gat1on pro<;fram. (Attaqhme t 2)'
0 -Total Members and Staff briefed on Interrogation" prog.ram (no ·EIT iscussion) me)==
0 · Mem0ers and Staff briefed on Int rrogationT·ot'al program irtcl ding'EITs) . ( 68 )
3. :A l ist· of all Members and Staff. briefed on CIA: Rendition program 2001--present. '(Attac;:hment 3).· . ..
·. 4. Lis't of current SSq: i.nformatiorf request to CIJ:li,.. · (Attaahltle t 4 l · _
stop er J. Walker·
11 p:r:il 2007 April 2007 hearing
OCA 2007-00193
Distribution: DD/CIA ADD/CIA AGG DAC without attachments DD/OCA OCA/COS. D/OCA Chron
·I i
CLASSIFIED DRAFT
3/13/02
.· . ru Q 'ida Op rative al Nashiri in Custody
06/27/03 . Death.ofDetmnee in Afghanistan · 11/13/0.3 .
. 01/29/04 . 05f.12/04 . ·Recent steps taken to investigate activities at Abu
Gharib rison in Ba hdad and.related matters . 05/2p/04
.
.
SSC! SSC! SSC!
. EITs HPSGI Goss .. Member Harman ·.
EITs SSC! · Chairman G aharn ' Vice.Chairman
EITs SSCI Chainnan Graham Vice Chalnnan
. {•
. · "
..
CllS
SSC!
10-Feb-2003 ..
HPSCI . .
Member Hannan Chairman Roberts
Member Harman
31-0ct-2003 HAC/DEF . .
. 4-Jun-2004 SAC None· · dlscuss(on of SAC/DEF None.
.. . . . .
15-Jul-2004 · Sen. Bill Frist . . .
· . Provided overview of renditions, · · SGAC Vice Chairman Ro.ckefeller
detention and : . .
15-Feb-2005 HPSCI Leonard Boswell . .
. . Jane-Harman . Alcee Pater Hoekstra: ..
Vice Chairman Rockefeller SSC!EITs
..
. .
' ,,
Chairman Hoekstra Jane Harman
'
Son. Clinton Sen . .:John Sen. Mark Seh. James Inhale Sen. ·Edward Sen. Carl Leyln · · Sen. Lieberman
'
14'0ct-2005 SSCI
..
'
'
8-Nov-2005 EITs · · HASC Chairman Hunter S·Nov-2005 EITs . HPSCI Cl)alnnan Hoekstra
· 18-Nov-2006 .
.,
. .
lnvesUoatlons interrooaUon practices
lntelliaence Roaers
lnlelliaence
Members
Mac
. detainee, and
Dutch .. · Todd Tiahrt
· 7-Mar-2006 of facilities, SSC! and mecharilcs of threshold · · .. f()r admission and value of. .,
15·Mar-2006 Status of of EITs, value.of · Cha1rman Roberts SSC! Vice Chalrman·Rockefeller Evan
Bond.
..,. John Warner
Committee
HPSCI
Members
HPSCI.
8-Ma ·2006 SSC\
6.JUn·2G06 PSCJ
7.Jun·2006 CTG Di;talnee Pro ram . SSC\· Chairman:Roberts 6,Jun-2006 CTC Detainee ram. ·..:: HPSCI Chairman Hoekstra
. '· Rankin Member· Harman 11.JuHW06
GTC Detainee. Prci ram
·senate
6..Se ·2006 Full'Detainee.Pro ram, Incl· din EITs HPSCI Re .Halman
6..Se ·2006 · · Full Detainee Pro ram lncludin 13 EITs SSC\ Full S$CI
4:
5-Sep-2006
19-Sap,2006
9-Apr-2007
to the Hiii
SSC!
and-Murtha
16-Noy-2006 HPSGI Full HPSCI
Renditions ROI EITs
Burr S;ixby:Qharnbliss James Gibbons
. Noiman Sisiky'
28 March 200) SSC! flichard ·Shelby Evah Bayh .. · John Edwaros Bob Graham. Joh Kyl R\char0 Lugar
· Pat Rob·ilrts ... John Rockefeller
Flori Wyden
·1Alcea Hastings Nancy f>elosl · . Cotlln Peter5on · · Douglas Be'reuter GafY.Condlt
·,nm Roemer. ·
SSC!
SSGI
i-lAC/D
OB·July-2003 .
HAC!DEF . Visclosky . Ttahrt ·sabo ·
Msrtilisr Harman HAC/OEF . .. : None
. 15-Jul-2004 IG. flep,ort on CTC Program .. SSCI Chairman·Rabarts ·Vice Chaimiari Ffockefetier
:16-Jul-2004 -.SSCI
S CI Roberts
·Members
4-Ap.r-2005. ·
SMD brier
14-Jul-2005 SSC!
· 9-Sep-2005 sscr
1-4-0ct-2005 . SSC!
ii. Tod.d Tiahrt ·i'e- r-r o-r""is .m. =pr--ve-n""t1'"°' on...,A c.,-tt - -----ti---- ,-'-
Detain$] Proqraj '
c -·.·- J
. . . ·. Reye·s
. Rienzi McH.ugh
Ruppef1sberger· Wison
. . Davb Holt
Thombeny Harman
Everett Cramer
1 Mar-2006 (ON! defer question 19_ OCIA)
r · .....
. )'
'·
\.'
,.
· . ·intelligence ·
. Christopher Bond Saxby Chambllss Rus$al! Feingold Dianne i=elnsteln
Chuck'Haget ·.Carl Lavin°
· 31-Mar-2006
SSCI
HPSCI
HPSC( .-
HPSCI
HPSCI
8-May-2006 SSCt
·
17-May-2006 . IG provides staff wi,th-feedbabk on thil.f-i.PSCJ draft. report on rendttlon_s,detalnees, Interrogations
HPSCI
.. . ·.. .. . i
I '
. ' - . .
• . .
. . .. . . . ·:
.HPSCI . .
· HACIDEF
10 AUg 2006
15 Sep 2006.
.sscr
·.HPSCI ,
·
. · · '.. · : . .
.. ,
Stat11• of r-1" hinh\\r,f11P. terr&ist prog amj SSCl!1•
SSCI\
·:c : ,.
17 Oct 2006
HPSCI Rep. Re)'"es
. . ··
. . · . .... . ··
' '
n/a D 0 t St t.ue a e · a us
4/3/2007· . DoD transcripts
· .-
5 4r12i2001 On schedule ..
4/13/2007 DNI .c.oordinatlon
23 4/16/2007 On scheduie
13 'i5 2·
. -----·- ·-· - -- ·- -· ·
sen! 4/11/07 Sent 4/1 i/07 with interim letter·. sent 419/07
Sent 4/i 0/07 Sent 4/9/07 Completed with brie·fing on 4/3/07 Completed
TOPSE-CRET
.... . "
(b)(3) . AT: l6:l5 (b )(5)
HANDLE VIA CHANNELS 30 Noveffiber 2oq4
Memorandum for the Record KEY: C/2004-00730 ·
EVENT: PLACE:
FOR: HPSCI SUBJECT: INTERROGATIONS
. SUP.PORT . GC MULLER, SCOTI BRIEFER .
@SCI GOSS, PORTER [R-FL] CHAIRMAN 'ffPSCI HARMA}'f, JANE [D-CA] REP · B:flSCi HPSCJJSTAFF :
STA.Ff STAFF
:J]:xecuth e Summary:
Summary Text: _ .
(S) This briefing was at the reque:it · of D/OCA. '.There were three purposes. One was for U1e IG to pres ent his recen ·report on interrogations and to answ r ques.tions. '.The second was for an update on the status of the interrogation ·
proces . ·The third purpose was to aUow theGeneral Co_U:nsel to infonn them of legal !Ind policy issues U1at had .. · re<iently ari en and-give an appreciation of where all thatstood. · ·
•
•
•·
·
responded th t it began with Abu Zabayda. Th·e IG indicated that the interrogations were legal, including the use 6r · enhanced techniques. The General Counsel said that the. effort was working effectively under the DOJ l August 2002 ·
memo which was the legal foundation for the de riefings and interrogations .. The IG indicated that the 1 August memo did no address Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or - Punishment. AThe article 16that required signatory Sstates to ptt?vent in any territory sµbject to the_ir jurisdiction acts of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment not aIDOUf\ting to torture. The que:ition was whether CIA's
1 use of th.e enhanced techniques woul9 transgress U.S. obligations under Article 16. The IO indicated he was also : bothered in fuat the DOJ 1 August document dio not address interrogations as_.we c ed them out He said that for the ..
"Pagel of3
TOP SECRET
I -=============-
guidance Jan
Al I ! _:--- ­
whether! Jiad acti'o-v"'i ti e-s.-Th . -e-IG-sa_i_d_n_o.__JRep the! d i
the..__ ____ _
C05431975
most pa!i !etaine s were well handled, except for the event In Novembe 2003 in which a
CrA officer brandis.hed a handgun in front of a detainee. He indicated that·was the event previously reported. to the
· Chairman a nd Ranking Democratic Member. The DOJ, the IG ind icated, took no action on that case. It was 10" true··
that non of the detainees who had died had been subjected to the nhanced techniques.
deaths we e communicaied "to the two
. ·Ther:::=:=J death in ·
which David Passaro1 a CIA contractor, was involved. Passaro was recently indicted on four counts of assault. He allegedly beat a person who subsequently·died. It took a period of time for DOJ to move to the indietment because ·people who needed to be interviewed.were scat;tered. The IG said the common link in these. cases is that the Agency off!cers lacke(l timely guidance, training, experience arid judgment .
J The JG then turned to the waterbo. He s d tliat th! e peopl6 had been . .ard issue.. . interrogated with the waterboard. On.one, the IG felt it had been used excessivelv. beyond what the IG thought was the
agre ment with DOJ. Khalid Shelkh Mohammed (K M) got 183 . The lG .· in'dicated the guidance in cables ·sent to the field evolved over time and that the .did not get to every.body who was involved in debriefing interrogations. ·In 2003,. the DCI 1. . 11...'1 v11lrl:in0P.. seven months ·after i:he first
· debriefiµgs began. ann addre r.<l onlv·those Haiman asked if we were talkipg about the She· askecl. why the DCI guidance was late. The IGi dicated that guidance had
.gone ou.t earlier, but the real guidan6e·was in J anu ary of 2003. The DDO explained that aftef9/l 1 _"we were hrown .. iiito a fmy ·of ar•1ivi rv." Th6te Wa fots of confusion 6Ver intertogations, the erihiiii ced program, and wbat ' . authorized. for instanc.e, no one was:authorized to do interrogations. This was also true a1 . He indicated that every ill'.tance of wrongdoing was promptly reported and investigated by the IG. H" «aiil there was · ·
IO_beirig kept. in the dark.
·
The Chairman sked stood down in their ..Harrnan oted th.at . not spec
onlv authorized capture and detention. Sne asked whether we had questioned detainees before c:J The GC said yes, but enhanceo techniques ha d .been used l?efore Abu Zabayda and there was
Abu Zabayda and enhanced techniques which started in August 2002. In Augus 2002 there was a lengthy unclassified opinion by DOJ generally discussing interrogations. In a separate and classified opinion addressed to John Rizz . OGC, POJ concluded the·ten CIA which included the · · waterboard, were legal for use with Abu Zabayda.
I'age 2of3 . I
C05431975
ts). The GC laid out the legal analyst?. The Attomey·Generarh d c msist ntly advised the NSC Pri clpals that the CIA techniques did not violate US .statutes, met all obligations under the treaties, including Article 16 of the Torture·.. . . Convention', and would not violate U.S. constitution standards weie those
·
Follow-up Action Items: A:dditlonal 'liirormation:
T
TOP.SEeRE'r/.
C05431975
trSl I
AT: 10:45 (b)(3)
30 November 2004
EVENT: MEMBERBRIEFING DATE: 02/0412003 TIME: 10:30 STATUS: COMPLETED PLACE: 211 HART· ·
FOR: SSCI. SUIIJECT:. SENSITNE NOTIF1CATION
ATTENDEES:
SSCI SSCI SSCIISTAF.F
STAFF
· ·
The fust part of the briefing by Pavitt in great detail the importance of the. information provided by Zubayda and Nashiri, both of who·m had infonnation of on-going terrorist operations, information that might well have saved American lives, the difficulty of getting that information from them, and the importance of the enhanced teehnlques in getting that information. Both Zubayda and;Nashiri were described as founts
· of useful inforination, even though it seem. r.IF.nr that they have not, even under enhanced rev.ealed know of imoortM1 r.
The enhanced _tt;chniques were described in considerabl detail, including how the water board was used. The General Counsel described the process by which the techniques were approved by a bevy of lawyers from the· NSC, the Vice President's office and the Justice Department, including the Criminal Division and the Attorney Gene(al_
";. Page 1 of2
who cpined that the technique were legal under U.S. law.
. .
I
Pavitt and Muller briefly described the circumstances surrol!nding the existence of tapes of the Zubayda debriefing, the inspection of those tapes by OGC lawyers, the compaiison of the tapes with the cables describiing the same interrogations. According to Muller; the. match was perfect and· who did the review was _ satisfied that the.interrogations were carried out in full accordance with the guidance. Muller indicated that.it was our in tention to destroy these tapes, which were created in any case ·as but ail aide to the interrogati.ons, as soon as the Inspector General had completed .his report. (In a subsequent briefing to Congressmen Goss and Hannan, Muller said that the interrogators themselves were greatly concerned that the tapes might leak.one day and put themselves and their
· families at risk.) Senator Roberts listened carefully and gave his as$ent.
Throughout the briefing Senator Roberts posed no objection to what he had heard. It seemed clear that he supported the ·interrogation effort .
. Roberts': asked me whether I h·a·a "taken up the line" the Committee's, actually Senator .· Grnham's, late November request to undertake its own "assessment!• of the.enhanced interrogatio . I explained to Senator Roberts the dialogue I had had with , and our responce that we would not support reading another staffer itlto the pi·ogram nor allow. any staffer to review the interrogations in real time or visit the clandestine site where
' the interrogation s were taldng ·place. Quickly, the Senator interjected that he saw no reason for the Committee to pursue uch request ·and could think of " ten reasons right off why it is a terrible idea" for ·the Committee to do any· such thing as had been proposed. Turning to '• he asked whether they thought other\vise and they indicated that they agreed with the Senator.
Di ector of Congressional Affairs
Distribution: Orig - DAC (Official OCA Record)• . '1-D/OCA •.
l - General. Counsel
·-·----__J
SubJect: S:K;1 a.tiour tmeimg now on tor this at1emoon 2-5
FYI, Apparently learning the briefing with the VP had bean moved to tomorrow, the SSCI (unclear exactly : ·who) Is calling for a 3-hour briefing this f.lflernoon oh lhe detentlon/interrogation/rehdi!ion progr1,1.m. lt only
· ·
Given the scope of the e.xpected 3-hour sessio Q;h9uld be represented as well. ·
1l10P: ·'SECRET.
3 0 November 2 o O 4
Memorandum for the Record KEY: C/2004-00520
EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING DATE! 05/10/2004 TThlEt 17:15 STATUS: COM;PLETED . . PLACE: 119 DJRKSBN·
.FOR: SAClDEF . SUBJECT: INTERROGATIONS
A'I"11ENI)EES: NA1v1E MOSKOWITZ, STANI.Ey
. SAC/DEF STAFF
E:teco.tiv Stumn+u:Y= . . · .
Qn 10May 2004, crA's Germrcl Counsel outlined for the staffers the legal regimen $,it or¢.ed our .intet,:rogaUon ;ieth1ties : that principally arose ftOtn the Gene · m i\H<l Na . dn{d tbe · differe etWe<m the two <:teneva agtecinents as they pertained to ' tltuation. e fodiekted _that . CIA
was.follow g Geii.eva. and Jn-fact that some of our rules might be descrioea as more sttjrigen.t than Genev equ:tted.. . .. .. . The General Counsel had prerious.ly recei White H911se concmrence to ncknowledge tlw.1:..with feSiitw·
conµtenerrotlsm. whlch was approved by the White Bp:use . . fllld the Attorney General. These wete deemed lawful and were not stricuy under the G eva agreement. Re indicate<l that tile Chai.mien and RnaJdp.g Mempers of the Senate und HOUS(! Intelligence Committees had been briefe(.! a.swell aS
staff directors., but those are rli:e only Membersistaff of Congress that had been briefed. .Mr.· Indicated that·he · would pass 011 the etiflls of the General Counsel's brief mg to his p cipsJ. ?1- Inouye; ·
Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congres$iorial Affairs
Distribution: 1 -"DAC (Official OCA Record) .;.. 1-GC f-D/OCA
'7ollow-up Action rt :
CIA/OCA/ (8 June 2005)
\SSCI cover letter to QFR_060705 .doc Enclosurel: SSCI QFRs June 05
Distribution: Original Addressee (w/encls)
1 Chron (w/encls)-
The attachec:t docurneot contains classified National Security Councll lnlormatlon. It is to be read all<l di ssed only by persons aulh<lriz ed by law.
. Your signature acknowtedges you are such a person and you' promise you wiU show or discuss lnformailon contained In the document only with persons who are auU1otized by law lo have such access -to tt1is document.
PeistinS handling Ulls documef11 ackMwledge he or sho knows and uoderstands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate tully with ;my lawful lnvestiga· lion by the United States Government into any unauthclized disclosure of classi­ fied informatlon conlained herein.
Access: List
CONTROL NO.
COPY OF
Handle Vta
HUMINT Channels
Mr.. Minority Staff Director Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate
Washington, D . C . 20510
Dear
l . Enclosed are responses- to question . posed by° you and other staff members of your Comrni.ttee during the 15 April 2005
.Countert rrorism briefing. Our response to Question 6 relat ive ·
to the Interagency ntelligence Comm ttee on Terrorism (IICT)
will be forthcoming.
. J.in . Bec use of the sensitivi ty of the information, access: should be limited only to those irtdividuals·on your staff briefed on this compartment.
Should you have any questions regarding j::his matter, .j,e') please do not hesitate to call me ·or contact of my
staff at
S incerely ,
Joe Wippl
use in the various speeches cited in the Congressional
Notification if th ere was no corrobation of the reporting? Who
authorized the declassification of this material? Who :ma.de the
dec i sion to use this uncorroborated reporting?
Response:
2
/ II
Question 5- One of the briefers said that lying is a detainee­
::itrategy, as are allegations of torture, and" that this is in
their Training Manual.. Please provide details via reporting, -finished intelligence, or prDvide a copy of this portion of the
Training· Manual ..
Response;
The Training Manual can be found- on the.Inter:net in variousµ1> locations, one being the Department of Justice website. The
.address to the specif c page is:
http://w'ww.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm
(The search term "al Qaeda Training Manual" can be used to get to .the manual once you are on the DOJ webs te.)
3 /, II
4
---
Ques . tion 9. P],ease provide copies of the DoJ opinions provided
to ·CIA on issues such as renditions, detainees, and
inte ogations-to include how to interpret Article 16 of the
International Convention Against Torture. If we qannot provide
copies, please provide dates for the array of opinions so that
SSCI can ask DoJ for them.
Response:
(,Bf_ In order for the SSCI to have the most current opinion,
. . .
- -------- --·- ----- -----·-------------
_ ___ __ _
-·
· ·· - - ·· ---· · · - --- · -
. .
General Michael V. Hayden· Director, Central In elligence.Agency
12 APRIL 1007
(U) Thank you Mr..Chainnan:and members of the Committee.
·
(Jf!:fl CNF)This ·statement for the Record will focus on the <letention pro/sram authonzed by the ". - .md established in the wake of the March 2002 captur of senior aI-Qa'.ida. lieutenant A.bu Zubaydah, expanding· on ·
. effort : · ·
-
'[NF)History of the Detention Program . . ((fS/l MF) As I mentioned in m·y 14 February statement on the renditions program, in
: ... the wake of the 11 September attacks on this. country-which represented the most devastating . single assault on our territory in the nation's history-the Presid<_;nt directed all agencies of the US Government to work to ass:ur thafoo such barbaric act could happen ag . The
t until e ofkey al-Qa'ida Iieutenant Ab-;, Zubaydah in March 2002 . \hat the
.
I
•
•
<jsf( a>W} While FBI and crA; continued unsucces fully to try to glean information from Abu Zu9aydah using esti,blished US Government inteirogation techniques,·ai1 of those in vol v¢ were mindful that the perpetrators of the 11 Scpteinber attacks were stiH and, . -- acoor<lTnito available intelligence reportclly, were ctivelyworkingto attack the US ·
·: · again. CIA also knew from its "il1telligence holdings that Abu Zubaydal_i was :withholding ·,' - .information that could help us track down al-Qa'ida .leaders and prevent attacks. As a result,
CIA began to_ develop its own interrogation program, keeping in mind at .all times tliat any new · interrogation techriiques must comply with US law and US international obligations under the
--,,-.1984-UN Convention Against torture arid Other Cruel Irihtimari an<lDegriidmg Treatmenfor · ·· · Punishment ·
. r;it(i ·. . · . :.'.NF)A handful of tec ues were developed fo.r potential ·use; these techniques are effective, safe, and do not·violate applicabie US laws or treaty obligations. In August 2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in.the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. M stated by the President in his speech on ·6 September 2006, "It became clear that lie (Abu Zubaydah). had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an
alternative set ofpro dures ... the.proced:ur were tough,-and they were ·safe, arid lawful, and : · . . necessary."
• Prior to usjng.any new tedmique on AbuZubaydall, CIA sought and obtained from the .Depa$1ent of Justice fili opinion confirming that none-of these new techniques violated -US statutes prohibiting torture or US obligations urider the UN COnyention Against· Torture.
2
,,--:
II
·
• After the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah Qecame one of our most important sources ofintelligerice on al Qa'ida.. . _ . ____ _
. . ¢. Tlie Procedures Governing-the Interrogation Progra_in
.. (JZff . ID*f) The CIA interrogation program from late 2002 until the passage of th · -.Detainee Treatment Act in 2005 included the use of 13 "exceptional interrogation techniques" · ·(EITs) derived from the Department of Defense's SERE.training program, which is used to prepare us serviceme _forpossible capture, detention, "and "interrogation in hostile areas.
.. • All terrogation. sessions inwhich one of these lawful procedure$ are authorized for use
plUst be 9bserved by non-participants to ensur:e the procedures are applie4 appropriately and safely. These observers are authorized to terminate an interrogation immediately honld .they_b.elie:Ve anything unauthorized is oe<;wring. .. _
• Any deviations from approved program procedi.ires and practices are to be immediately --reported action .. refemtl to CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the Department of J\istice, as appropriate. ·
(U) Shortly after 11 September 2001, the majority and minority leaders of the Seriate, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House, and the chairs and ranking members of the .· · intelligency committees were l:Jriefed on'.
Briefings to the. chairs, ranking members, and majority and minority staff directors have been provided o"n multiple occasions since that time, and in the f l of2o05, in .
connection with discussion on the Detainee Treatment Ac several other m.embers were briefed on the program, including the interrogation procedures. ·
. 3
and_ direct so-µrces ofeoUection. i;; llls-s pt b ioo6 ;p e6h d
· ·F J-Caprunng OThef'J.'erroffats:
• The Department of Justice (DOI) has reviewed procedures proposed by tJ:le CIA on more · · than one occasion and determined them to be lawful.
• The program has been investigated and audited by the CIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), \vhich wai given full and complete access to all <!.Spects ofthe·prograrrt.
·rµF)Benefits of the Program: Capturi g T rrorists, Saving Lives·
.)W)Since .the .2002jqception of the program, high value detainee reporting has become a cruci11I pillar of US counterterrorism efforts. CIA assesses that a significant number of its knowledge of al-Qa'ida has been derived from .detainee reporting, and well over half of our finished intelligence· products on th group since 2002 make some refererrc to this
· . reporting.
• For both warning and opei:ational purposes, detainee reporting is dis seminated l::>roadly • among US intelligence and hiw enforcement entities .and
. . • For today' s briefing, l'.m going to hig}l.light a Jew key areas where detainee reporting has
played a significant r.ole:·capturing other terrorists, disrupting plots, advancing our analytical Understanding ofand operat!ons against al-Qa'ida, and helping to corroborate
. _ other TI1e President discussed some of these successes · som ofth.is material w brl fed to staff.memb-ers
during previous Congi;esses, ·but I believe it is worthwhile for the sake of the current . C.ommittee tQ provide this explicitly 9etailed account to.you today, so that you can get a better sense of why we view this pr9gram as so key to our fight agai.J:!st al-Qa'ida. .. .
--- -----{.%-- .:=---. Detainees-have pfa.yeci-some roli-:frotrr identification of photos to providing in depth targeting information-in nearly every capture of · al-Qa'ida members and associat since 2002.
• In March 2003, former al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad ' (KSM) prov'ided information about an al-Qa ida operative, Majid ·Khan, whom he was
aware had recen ly been captured. KS)\1-possibly believing the detained operative was ·
"tal)dng" admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering $50,000
• Khan---Confronted with KSM's infonnation about the money-acknowledged that he ·
delivered the money to an operative named "Zubair" and provided Zubair's physical
4
captures
' , 9escription and contact number. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.
• During debriefiilgs, Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader and al-Qa'ida's South Asia representative Hambali.
. we used the information provided by Zubair to arrest Hambali.
• Next, KSM-when explicitly queried on the issue-identified Hambali's brother, 'Abd al-Hadi, as a prospective successor to Hambali. information from multiple detainees, including KSM, narrowed down 'Abd al-Hadi's location and enabled his capture in Karachi in September 2003.
• Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi identified a cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for possible al-Qa'ida operations. When confronted with his brother's' revelations, Hambali admitted that he was grooming members of the cell for US operations-at the behest ofKSM-probably to continue trying to implement KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US West Coast.
. ) In addition to these two . . . _
involve law enforcemenes use of our detainee reporting:
key cases, a number ofother significant have resulted thanks to detamee reportmg. It 1s unportant to highlight that these cases
TOP SECRET/,-·
6
• Jose Padilla:. After his capt\lre in March 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided information - I I leading to the identifieation ofalleged al-Qa'ida operative Jose Padilla. Arrested by the
FBI in 2002 as he arrived at O'Hare Airport in -Chicago, he was transferred to military custody in Charleston, South Carolina, where he i currently being held.
•.· «' • Iyman Faris: Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris, already under suspic on for his contacts with al Qa'ida _ operative Majid Khan. FBI and CIA shar¢ intelligence from interviews of;KSM, Khan, and Faris on a near real-tii'ne basis and quickly ascertained that Faris had met and accepted operational taskings from KSM on several occasions. Faris is urrently serving a 20-year sentence for conspiracy and material support to a terrorist organization.
-,NF) r
·<JJtt1 . isrupting plots: .On of the fall.:quts of detaining these addition terrorists has been the thwarting of a number of al-Qa'ida operations it). the Uni ted States and
_overseas.
• ·The West Coast Airliner Plot: li1 the early planning tage of the attacks o_f 11 September, al-Qa'ida leaders considered an ambitious plot that.called for striking both coasts of the .
United States with as many as ten .planes in orie operati9n. Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) reportedly scaled bac that plan to the US East Coast only-saving the yrest Coast for a follow-on :attack-and UBL specifically mentioned California as a-target to be attacked in the we ks follow ing H September, according to detainee reporting. Operatives. . assigned to this plot were detained during 2002 arid 2003, includ ng K.SM. Evidence
/,
Tl!I
• Heathrow Airport plot: Shortly after his capture in March _2003, KSM divulged limited -infonnation about his plot to use commercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport and oth r targets i.n the United Kingdom; he discu5sed this plot probably because he believed that key Heathrow plotter Rirnzi bin al-Shibh, who had been detained six months previously, had al eady revealed the information. KSM speculated that the operation was completely disrupted with the detention of senior al-Qa'ida planner Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi; a variety of othe:r reporting sugge;.;ts this assessment is accurate.-
• The Karachi plots. Key members of al-Qa'ida's Pakistan network who were detained in 2.003. have provided details ·of the anti-U:S. attacks they were planning in Karachi against the US Consulate, Westerners at the airport, and Western housing cornp{mnds.
) Advan_cing Our Understanding o_f Al-Qa ida: P.riorto the capture ofAbu_·
Zubaydah in March2002, we had large gaps in knowledge of al-Qa:'ida's organizational struc?Iie, key members and associates, intentions and tapabilities, possible targets lot tbv next attack, and. its presence ar;-ound the globe. Within months ofhis arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al Qa'.ida's organizational structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. For example, it was Abu Zubaydah,_ early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/11. Until that time, KSM did not even appear in our chart of key aJO-Qa'ida rpembers and associates.
7
• In the years since 9/11, successive detain.ees have helped us gauge our.progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida by providing updated information oi:l the changing structure and health of the organization, in part beeause they can help illuminate other sensitive collection platforms for us.
8
;l}>fF)Army Ffold Manual
[J!!1f. ·1£NF(The Army Field Manual (FM 2.22.3)..goveffis the interrogation of large numbers ot detamees held qy the US Military, who m:e captured in the course of traditional military hostilities. It is used by U.S. military personnel to help them collect tactical military intelligence from-milit;µ-y detainees. Should the CIA be limited only to the interrogation .techniques contained in the new Army Field Manual, _
_ would not be sufficient to justify · ,.
9
. i -· -._,
I
. . . .. '
. . · '
( // · - ' We have been advi_sed there is no/no" classified annex describing_or authori ng addition?! hniques. It must be noted that.the cover sheet for FM 2.22. clearly· states the manual is "Approved for. public el ease; d strib tion is .u;nlimited", hence UNCLASSIFIED. Coriseq:uently, we must ·assume that AQ and other organizations have or can
._easily obtain a copy and train their people to resist these techniques an.d the methodology: Renee, we have not only laid ·out O\lr game plan for the taking.but have included the entire playbool<: as well. As a res'ult, should our.ir)terrogation of AQ suspects be lirni.ted to the
·techniques outlined in.the field manu3.I, we are left with very little offense and ai-e relegated to rely primariIY:on defense .. Without the approval of EITs to compliment the t hniques approved iii FM 2.22.3, we have·s1;verely restricted our attempts to obtain timely mfonnati()n from HVDs whQ possess information tha will help us save lives and dis[4pt operatioru. Limiting our -interrogations tools to those detai1eq in the field manual will increase the probability that a determiped, res!lien HvD will be able to withhold critical, time-sensitive, actionable mtelligence that could prevent an imminent, catastrophic attack. In essence, we would be back to a ·pre-9/11 posttire.
10
(U) The Way Forward
·
US law.. Currently, seven EITs are under consideration. ·
- / J At the entrance to an office in CIA's ·counterterrorism Center is a sign and a reminder: "Today's date is September 12th, 2001." We make no apologies for this attitUde or for the lawful and legitimate actions we have taken_ to counter al-Qa'ida. And let me be dear, our enemy is still potent ·and able to. attack us here and overseas.
• While al-Qa'ida has conducted. no new attack on the US Homelai;d, this is not for lack of . trying. Al-Qa' ida was within weeks, if not days, of mounting an attack against planes
13
Military Try Suspected Terrorists,"
flying" into the United States from London last summer that could have been more lethal than the 11 September attacks and its leaders also continue to try to gain access to chemical, radiological, biological, and. nuclear weapons.
• Al-Qa'ida's only obstacle to attacking us again is our continued assertive effort to stop them. CIA's detention and interrogation program remains critical to our ability to silstain this effort and protect the Ainerican people frqm another .attack. As .the Preiiden't stated in his 6 September 2006 speech to the nation on The Creation of Commisions to
.. : the most important source of information on where the ·
terrorists are hiding a.Ild what they are plarming is the terrorists, themselves." ..
Thank you.
Subject: Phone call from N$CILGL re NY Times article
I was called this morning by NSC Legal (who was calling at request of WH Counsel) In response to NY Times article over' the weekend that SSC! wbuld hold h$aring's ·o!l CIA's· dete.ntionlinterrogation ·of terrorists. · NSC Legal (Dan Levin) asked whether any such hearing were scheduled. I told him ! was unaware of any such hearings and that weekend reporting caught me by surprise. I also referred him to the Wolf Blitzer transcript (in todays Media Highlights) that indicated that SSC! was not planning to "investigate" but to "monitor" any GIA activities.
· Mr. lt;lvin asked me to check and get back to him whether SSCI has actually asked for any hearing. if \hey have not yet, but do at some point in the future, he would like to l<how soonest.
7 ;203·00214