Federal Programs Branch
Trial Attorney Email:
[email protected]
February 19, 2010
Paul J. Orfanedes, Esq. 501 School St., SE Suite 700 Washington,
D.C. 20024 (202) 646-5172 POrfanedes@Judicial Watch. org
Re: Judicial Watch v. C.I.A., Case No. 09-cv-01352-CKK
(D.D.C.)
Dear Paul:
Enclosed is a set of documents provided today to plaintiffs in
Amnesty Int'! v. CIA, Case No. 07-cv-5435 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y.), which
are also likely responsive to the Freedom of Information Act
request at issue in the above-captioned case. Pursuant to the
Court's January 25, 2010 Minute Order we will provide a complete
set of responsive, non-exempt records with Bates stamps no later
than Thursday, April 15, 2010 .
Trial Attorney ohn R. Coleman
United States Department of Justice
.---------__:.,_____ __ -· -·-· ----,·
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director Central Intei li9e_n_Ge _ .FROM:
Christopher J. Walker , Director
SUBJECT: Informa tion: . for 12 . April . sSCI. Hearing. .
Here. is the .information that you requ sted:
·
2. A list ot all Members and Staff hdefed on CIA Int r o_gat1on
pro<;fram. (Attaqhme t 2)'
0 -Total Members and Staff briefed on Interrogation" prog.ram (no
·EIT iscussion) me)==
0 · Mem0ers and Staff briefed on Int rrogationT·ot'al program irtcl
ding'EITs) . ( 68 )
3. :A l ist· of all Members and Staff. briefed on CIA: Rendition
program 2001--present. '(Attac;:hment 3).· . ..
·. 4. Lis't of current SSq: i.nformatiorf request to CIJ:li,.. ·
(Attaahltle t 4 l · _
stop er J. Walker·
11 p:r:il 2007 April 2007 hearing
OCA 2007-00193
Distribution: DD/CIA ADD/CIA AGG DAC without attachments DD/OCA
OCA/COS. D/OCA Chron
·I i
CLASSIFIED DRAFT
3/13/02
.· . ru Q 'ida Op rative al Nashiri in Custody
06/27/03 . Death.ofDetmnee in Afghanistan · 11/13/0.3 .
. 01/29/04 . 05f.12/04 . ·Recent steps taken to investigate
activities at Abu
Gharib rison in Ba hdad and.related matters . 05/2p/04
.
.
SSC! SSC! SSC!
. EITs HPSGI Goss .. Member Harman ·.
EITs SSC! · Chairman G aharn ' Vice.Chairman
EITs SSCI Chainnan Graham Vice Chalnnan
. {•
. · "
..
CllS
SSC!
10-Feb-2003 ..
HPSCI . .
Member Hannan Chairman Roberts
Member Harman
31-0ct-2003 HAC/DEF . .
. 4-Jun-2004 SAC None· · dlscuss(on of SAC/DEF None.
.. . . . .
15-Jul-2004 · Sen. Bill Frist . . .
· . Provided overview of renditions, · · SGAC Vice Chairman
Ro.ckefeller
detention and : . .
15-Feb-2005 HPSCI Leonard Boswell . .
. . Jane-Harman . Alcee Pater Hoekstra: ..
Vice Chairman Rockefeller SSC!EITs
..
. .
' ,,
Chairman Hoekstra Jane Harman
'
Son. Clinton Sen . .:John Sen. Mark Seh. James Inhale Sen. ·Edward
Sen. Carl Leyln · · Sen. Lieberman
'
14'0ct-2005 SSCI
..
'
'
8-Nov-2005 EITs · · HASC Chairman Hunter S·Nov-2005 EITs . HPSCI
Cl)alnnan Hoekstra
· 18-Nov-2006 .
.,
. .
lnvesUoatlons interrooaUon practices
lntelliaence Roaers
lnlelliaence
Members
Mac
. detainee, and
Dutch .. · Todd Tiahrt
· 7-Mar-2006 of facilities, SSC! and mecharilcs of threshold · · ..
f()r admission and value of. .,
15·Mar-2006 Status of of EITs, value.of · Cha1rman Roberts SSC!
Vice Chalrman·Rockefeller Evan
Bond.
..,. John Warner
Committee
HPSCI
Members
HPSCI.
8-Ma ·2006 SSC\
6.JUn·2G06 PSCJ
7.Jun·2006 CTG Di;talnee Pro ram . SSC\· Chairman:Roberts
6,Jun-2006 CTC Detainee ram. ·..:: HPSCI Chairman Hoekstra
. '· Rankin Member· Harman 11.JuHW06
GTC Detainee. Prci ram
·senate
6..Se ·2006 Full'Detainee.Pro ram, Incl· din EITs HPSCI Re
.Halman
6..Se ·2006 · · Full Detainee Pro ram lncludin 13 EITs SSC\ Full
S$CI
4:
5-Sep-2006
19-Sap,2006
9-Apr-2007
to the Hiii
SSC!
and-Murtha
16-Noy-2006 HPSGI Full HPSCI
Renditions ROI EITs
Burr S;ixby:Qharnbliss James Gibbons
. Noiman Sisiky'
28 March 200) SSC! flichard ·Shelby Evah Bayh .. · John Edwaros Bob
Graham. Joh Kyl R\char0 Lugar
· Pat Rob·ilrts ... John Rockefeller
Flori Wyden
·1Alcea Hastings Nancy f>elosl · . Cotlln Peter5on · · Douglas
Be'reuter GafY.Condlt
·,nm Roemer. ·
SSC!
SSGI
i-lAC/D
OB·July-2003 .
HAC!DEF . Visclosky . Ttahrt ·sabo ·
Msrtilisr Harman HAC/OEF . .. : None
. 15-Jul-2004 IG. flep,ort on CTC Program .. SSCI Chairman·Rabarts
·Vice Chaimiari Ffockefetier
:16-Jul-2004 -.SSCI
S CI Roberts
·Members
4-Ap.r-2005. ·
SMD brier
14-Jul-2005 SSC!
· 9-Sep-2005 sscr
1-4-0ct-2005 . SSC!
ii. Tod.d Tiahrt ·i'e- r-r o-r""is .m. =pr--ve-n""t1'"°' on...,A
c.,-tt - -----ti---- ,-'-
Detain$] Proqraj '
c -·.·- J
. . . ·. Reye·s
. Rienzi McH.ugh
Ruppef1sberger· Wison
. . Davb Holt
Thombeny Harman
Everett Cramer
1 Mar-2006 (ON! defer question 19_ OCIA)
r · .....
. )'
'·
\.'
,.
· . ·intelligence ·
. Christopher Bond Saxby Chambllss Rus$al! Feingold Dianne
i=elnsteln
Chuck'Haget ·.Carl Lavin°
· 31-Mar-2006
SSCI
HPSCI
HPSC( .-
HPSCI
HPSCI
8-May-2006 SSCt
·
17-May-2006 . IG provides staff wi,th-feedbabk on thil.f-i.PSCJ
draft. report on rendttlon_s,detalnees, Interrogations
HPSCI
.. . ·.. .. . i
I '
. ' - . .
• . .
. . .. . . . ·:
.HPSCI . .
· HACIDEF
10 AUg 2006
15 Sep 2006.
.sscr
·.HPSCI ,
·
. · · '.. · : . .
.. ,
Stat11• of r-1" hinh\\r,f11P. terr&ist prog amj SSCl!1•
SSCI\
·:c : ,.
17 Oct 2006
HPSCI Rep. Re)'"es
. . ··
. . · . .... . ··
' '
n/a D 0 t St t.ue a e · a us
4/3/2007· . DoD transcripts
· .-
5 4r12i2001 On schedule ..
4/13/2007 DNI .c.oordinatlon
23 4/16/2007 On scheduie
13 'i5 2·
. -----·- ·-· - -- ·- -· ·
sen! 4/11/07 Sent 4/1 i/07 with interim letter·. sent 419/07
Sent 4/i 0/07 Sent 4/9/07 Completed with brie·fing on 4/3/07
Completed
TOPSE-CRET
.... . "
(b)(3) . AT: l6:l5 (b )(5)
HANDLE VIA CHANNELS 30 Noveffiber 2oq4
Memorandum for the Record KEY: C/2004-00730 ·
EVENT: PLACE:
FOR: HPSCI SUBJECT: INTERROGATIONS
. SUP.PORT . GC MULLER, SCOTI BRIEFER .
@SCI GOSS, PORTER [R-FL] CHAIRMAN 'ffPSCI HARMA}'f, JANE [D-CA] REP
· B:flSCi HPSCJJSTAFF :
STA.Ff STAFF
:J]:xecuth e Summary:
Summary Text: _ .
(S) This briefing was at the reque:it · of D/OCA. '.There were
three purposes. One was for U1e IG to pres ent his recen ·report on
interrogations and to answ r ques.tions. '.The second was for an
update on the status of the interrogation ·
proces . ·The third purpose was to aUow theGeneral Co_U:nsel to
infonn them of legal !Ind policy issues U1at had .. · re<iently
ari en and-give an appreciation of where all thatstood. · ·
•
•
•·
·
responded th t it began with Abu Zabayda. Th·e IG indicated that
the interrogations were legal, including the use 6r · enhanced
techniques. The General Counsel said that the. effort was working
effectively under the DOJ l August 2002 ·
memo which was the legal foundation for the de riefings and
interrogations .. The IG indicated that the 1 August memo did no
address Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or - Punishment. AThe
article 16that required signatory Sstates to ptt?vent in any
territory sµbject to the_ir jurisdiction acts of cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment not aIDOUf\ting to torture. The
que:ition was whether CIA's
1 use of th.e enhanced techniques woul9 transgress U.S. obligations
under Article 16. The IO indicated he was also : bothered in fuat
the DOJ 1 August document dio not address interrogations as_.we c
ed them out He said that for the ..
"Pagel of3
TOP SECRET
I -=============-
guidance Jan
Al I ! _:---
whether! Jiad acti'o-v"'i ti e-s.-Th . -e-IG-sa_i_d_n_o.__JRep the!
d i
the..__ ____ _
C05431975
most pa!i !etaine s were well handled, except for the event In
Novembe 2003 in which a
CrA officer brandis.hed a handgun in front of a detainee. He
indicated that·was the event previously reported. to the
· Chairman a nd Ranking Democratic Member. The DOJ, the IG ind
icated, took no action on that case. It was 10" true··
that non of the detainees who had died had been subjected to the
nhanced techniques.
deaths we e communicaied "to the two
. ·Ther:::=:=J death in ·
which David Passaro1 a CIA contractor, was involved. Passaro was
recently indicted on four counts of assault. He allegedly beat a
person who subsequently·died. It took a period of time for DOJ to
move to the indietment because ·people who needed to be
interviewed.were scat;tered. The IG said the common link in these.
cases is that the Agency off!cers lacke(l timely guidance,
training, experience arid judgment .
J The JG then turned to the waterbo. He s d tliat th! e peopl6 had
been . .ard issue.. . interrogated with the waterboard. On.one, the
IG felt it had been used excessivelv. beyond what the IG thought
was the
agre ment with DOJ. Khalid Shelkh Mohammed (K M) got 183 . The lG
.· in'dicated the guidance in cables ·sent to the field evolved
over time and that the .did not get to every.body who was involved
in debriefing interrogations. ·In 2003,. the DCI 1. . 11...'1
v11lrl:in0P.. seven months ·after i:he first
· debriefiµgs began. ann addre r.<l onlv·those Haiman asked if
we were talkipg about the She· askecl. why the DCI guidance was
late. The IGi dicated that guidance had
.gone ou.t earlier, but the real guidan6e·was in J anu ary of 2003.
The DDO explained that aftef9/l 1 _"we were hrown .. iiito a fmy
·of ar•1ivi rv." Th6te Wa fots of confusion 6Ver intertogations,
the erihiiii ced program, and wbat ' . authorized. for instanc.e,
no one was:authorized to do interrogations. This was also true a1 .
He indicated that every ill'.tance of wrongdoing was promptly
reported and investigated by the IG. H" «aiil there was · ·
IO_beirig kept. in the dark.
·
The Chairman sked stood down in their ..Harrnan oted th.at . not
spec
onlv authorized capture and detention. Sne asked whether we had
questioned detainees before c:J The GC said yes, but enhanceo
techniques ha d .been used l?efore Abu Zabayda and there was
Abu Zabayda and enhanced techniques which started in August 2002.
In Augus 2002 there was a lengthy unclassified opinion by DOJ
generally discussing interrogations. In a separate and classified
opinion addressed to John Rizz . OGC, POJ concluded the·ten CIA
which included the · · waterboard, were legal for use with Abu
Zabayda.
I'age 2of3 . I
C05431975
ts). The GC laid out the legal analyst?. The Attomey·Generarh d c
msist ntly advised the NSC Pri clpals that the CIA techniques did
not violate US .statutes, met all obligations under the treaties,
including Article 16 of the Torture·.. . . Convention', and would
not violate U.S. constitution standards weie those
·
Follow-up Action Items: A:dditlonal 'liirormation:
T
TOP.SEeRE'r/.
C05431975
trSl I
AT: 10:45 (b)(3)
30 November 2004
EVENT: MEMBERBRIEFING DATE: 02/0412003 TIME: 10:30 STATUS:
COMPLETED PLACE: 211 HART· ·
FOR: SSCI. SUIIJECT:. SENSITNE NOTIF1CATION
ATTENDEES:
SSCI SSCI SSCIISTAF.F
STAFF
· ·
The fust part of the briefing by Pavitt in great detail the
importance of the. information provided by Zubayda and Nashiri,
both of who·m had infonnation of on-going terrorist operations,
information that might well have saved American lives, the
difficulty of getting that information from them, and the
importance of the enhanced teehnlques in getting that information.
Both Zubayda and;Nashiri were described as founts
· of useful inforination, even though it seem. r.IF.nr that they
have not, even under enhanced rev.ealed know of imoortM1 r.
The enhanced _tt;chniques were described in considerabl detail,
including how the water board was used. The General Counsel
described the process by which the techniques were approved by a
bevy of lawyers from the· NSC, the Vice President's office and the
Justice Department, including the Criminal Division and the
Attorney Gene(al_
";. Page 1 of2
who cpined that the technique were legal under U.S. law.
. .
I
Pavitt and Muller briefly described the circumstances surrol!nding
the existence of tapes of the Zubayda debriefing, the inspection of
those tapes by OGC lawyers, the compaiison of the tapes with the
cables describiing the same interrogations. According to Muller;
the. match was perfect and· who did the review was _ satisfied that
the.interrogations were carried out in full accordance with the
guidance. Muller indicated that.it was our in tention to destroy
these tapes, which were created in any case ·as but ail aide to the
interrogati.ons, as soon as the Inspector General had completed
.his report. (In a subsequent briefing to Congressmen Goss and
Hannan, Muller said that the interrogators themselves were greatly
concerned that the tapes might leak.one day and put themselves and
their
· families at risk.) Senator Roberts listened carefully and gave
his as$ent.
Throughout the briefing Senator Roberts posed no objection to what
he had heard. It seemed clear that he supported the ·interrogation
effort .
. Roberts': asked me whether I h·a·a "taken up the line" the
Committee's, actually Senator .· Grnham's, late November request to
undertake its own "assessment!• of the.enhanced interrogatio . I
explained to Senator Roberts the dialogue I had had with , and our
responce that we would not support reading another staffer itlto
the pi·ogram nor allow. any staffer to review the interrogations in
real time or visit the clandestine site where
' the interrogation s were taldng ·place. Quickly, the Senator
interjected that he saw no reason for the Committee to pursue uch
request ·and could think of " ten reasons right off why it is a
terrible idea" for ·the Committee to do any· such thing as had been
proposed. Turning to '• he asked whether they thought other\vise
and they indicated that they agreed with the Senator.
Di ector of Congressional Affairs
Distribution: Orig - DAC (Official OCA Record)• . '1-D/OCA •.
l - General. Counsel
·-·----__J
SubJect: S:K;1 a.tiour tmeimg now on tor this at1emoon 2-5
FYI, Apparently learning the briefing with the VP had bean moved to
tomorrow, the SSCI (unclear exactly : ·who) Is calling for a 3-hour
briefing this f.lflernoon oh lhe detentlon/interrogation/rehdi!ion
progr1,1.m. lt only
· ·
Given the scope of the e.xpected 3-hour sessio Q;h9uld be
represented as well. ·
1l10P: ·'SECRET.
3 0 November 2 o O 4
Memorandum for the Record KEY: C/2004-00520
EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING DATE! 05/10/2004 TThlEt 17:15 STATUS:
COM;PLETED . . PLACE: 119 DJRKSBN·
.FOR: SAClDEF . SUBJECT: INTERROGATIONS
A'I"11ENI)EES: NA1v1E MOSKOWITZ, STANI.Ey
. SAC/DEF STAFF
E:teco.tiv Stumn+u:Y= . . · .
Qn 10May 2004, crA's Germrcl Counsel outlined for the staffers the
legal regimen $,it or¢.ed our .intet,:rogaUon ;ieth1ties : that
principally arose ftOtn the Gene · m i\H<l Na . dn{d tbe ·
differe etWe<m the two <:teneva agtecinents as they pertained
to ' tltuation. e fodiekted _that . CIA
was.follow g Geii.eva. and Jn-fact that some of our rules might be
descrioea as more sttjrigen.t than Genev equ:tted.. . .. .. . The
General Counsel had prerious.ly recei White H911se concmrence to
ncknowledge tlw.1:..with feSiitw·
conµtenerrotlsm. whlch was approved by the White Bp:use . . fllld
the Attorney General. These wete deemed lawful and were not stricuy
under the G eva agreement. Re indicate<l that tile Chai.mien and
RnaJdp.g Mempers of the Senate und HOUS(! Intelligence Committees
had been briefe(.! a.swell aS
staff directors., but those are rli:e only Membersistaff of
Congress that had been briefed. .Mr.· Indicated that·he · would
pass 011 the etiflls of the General Counsel's brief mg to his p
cipsJ. ?1- Inouye; ·
Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congres$iorial Affairs
Distribution: 1 -"DAC (Official OCA Record) .;.. 1-GC f-D/OCA
'7ollow-up Action rt :
CIA/OCA/ (8 June 2005)
\SSCI cover letter to QFR_060705 .doc Enclosurel: SSCI QFRs June
05
Distribution: Original Addressee (w/encls)
1 Chron (w/encls)-
The attachec:t docurneot contains classified National Security
Councll lnlormatlon. It is to be read all<l di ssed only by
persons aulh<lriz ed by law.
. Your signature acknowtedges you are such a person and you'
promise you wiU show or discuss lnformailon contained In the
document only with persons who are auU1otized by law lo have such
access -to tt1is document.
PeistinS handling Ulls documef11 ackMwledge he or sho knows and
uoderstands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate
tully with ;my lawful lnvestiga· lion by the United States
Government into any unauthclized disclosure of classi fied
informatlon conlained herein.
Access: List
CONTROL NO.
COPY OF
Handle Vta
HUMINT Channels
Mr.. Minority Staff Director Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D . C . 20510
Dear
l . Enclosed are responses- to question . posed by° you and other
staff members of your Comrni.ttee during the 15 April 2005
.Countert rrorism briefing. Our response to Question 6 relat ive
·
to the Interagency ntelligence Comm ttee on Terrorism (IICT)
will be forthcoming.
. J.in . Bec use of the sensitivi ty of the information, access:
should be limited only to those irtdividuals·on your staff briefed
on this compartment.
Should you have any questions regarding j::his matter, .j,e')
please do not hesitate to call me ·or contact of my
staff at
S incerely ,
Joe Wippl
use in the various speeches cited in the Congressional
Notification if th ere was no corrobation of the reporting?
Who
authorized the declassification of this material? Who :ma.de
the
dec i sion to use this uncorroborated reporting?
Response:
2
/ II
Question 5- One of the briefers said that lying is a
detainee
::itrategy, as are allegations of torture, and" that this is
in
their Training Manual.. Please provide details via reporting,
-finished intelligence, or prDvide a copy of this portion of
the
Training· Manual ..
Response;
The Training Manual can be found- on the.Inter:net in variousµ1>
locations, one being the Department of Justice website. The
.address to the specif c page is:
http://w'ww.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm
(The search term "al Qaeda Training Manual" can be used to get to
.the manual once you are on the DOJ webs te.)
3 /, II
4
---
Ques . tion 9. P],ease provide copies of the DoJ opinions
provided
to ·CIA on issues such as renditions, detainees, and
inte ogations-to include how to interpret Article 16 of the
International Convention Against Torture. If we qannot
provide
copies, please provide dates for the array of opinions so
that
SSCI can ask DoJ for them.
Response:
(,Bf_ In order for the SSCI to have the most current opinion,
. . .
- -------- --·- ----- -----·-------------
_ ___ __ _
-·
· ·· - - ·· ---· · · - --- · -
. .
General Michael V. Hayden· Director, Central In
elligence.Agency
12 APRIL 1007
(U) Thank you Mr..Chainnan:and members of the Committee.
·
(Jf!:fl CNF)This ·statement for the Record will focus on the
<letention pro/sram authonzed by the ". - .md established in the
wake of the March 2002 captur of senior aI-Qa'.ida. lieutenant A.bu
Zubaydah, expanding· on ·
. effort : · ·
-
'[NF)History of the Detention Program . . ((fS/l MF) As I mentioned
in m·y 14 February statement on the renditions program, in
: ... the wake of the 11 September attacks on this. country-which
represented the most devastating . single assault on our territory
in the nation's history-the Presid<_;nt directed all agencies of
the US Government to work to ass:ur thafoo such barbaric act could
happen ag . The
t until e ofkey al-Qa'ida Iieutenant Ab-;, Zubaydah in March 2002 .
\hat the
.
I
•
•
<jsf( a>W} While FBI and crA; continued unsucces fully to try
to glean information from Abu Zu9aydah using esti,blished US
Government inteirogation techniques,·ai1 of those in vol v¢ were
mindful that the perpetrators of the 11 Scpteinber attacks were
stiH and, . -- acoor<lTnito available intelligence reportclly,
were ctivelyworkingto attack the US ·
·: · again. CIA also knew from its "il1telligence holdings that Abu
Zubaydal_i was :withholding ·,' - .information that could help us
track down al-Qa'ida .leaders and prevent attacks. As a
result,
CIA began to_ develop its own interrogation program, keeping in
mind at .all times tliat any new · interrogation techriiques must
comply with US law and US international obligations under the
--,,-.1984-UN Convention Against torture arid Other Cruel
Irihtimari an<lDegriidmg Treatmenfor · ·· · Punishment ·
. r;it(i ·. . · . :.'.NF)A handful of tec ues were developed fo.r
potential ·use; these techniques are effective, safe, and do
not·violate applicabie US laws or treaty obligations. In August
2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques
in.the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. M stated by the President in
his speech on ·6 September 2006, "It became clear that lie (Abu
Zubaydah). had received training on how to resist interrogation.
And so the CIA used an
alternative set ofpro dures ... the.proced:ur were tough,-and they
were ·safe, arid lawful, and : · . . necessary."
• Prior to usjng.any new tedmique on AbuZubaydall, CIA sought and
obtained from the .Depa$1ent of Justice fili opinion confirming
that none-of these new techniques violated -US statutes prohibiting
torture or US obligations urider the UN COnyention Against·
Torture.
2
,,--:
II
·
• After the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah Qecame one of our
most important sources ofintelligerice on al Qa'ida.. . _ . ____
_
. . ¢. Tlie Procedures Governing-the Interrogation Progra_in
.. (JZff . ID*f) The CIA interrogation program from late 2002 until
the passage of th · -.Detainee Treatment Act in 2005 included the
use of 13 "exceptional interrogation techniques" · ·(EITs) derived
from the Department of Defense's SERE.training program, which is
used to prepare us serviceme _forpossible capture, detention, "and
"interrogation in hostile areas.
.. • All terrogation. sessions inwhich one of these lawful
procedure$ are authorized for use
plUst be 9bserved by non-participants to ensur:e the procedures are
applie4 appropriately and safely. These observers are authorized to
terminate an interrogation immediately honld .they_b.elie:Ve
anything unauthorized is oe<;wring. .. _
• Any deviations from approved program procedi.ires and practices
are to be immediately --reported action .. refemtl to CIA's Office
of the Inspector General and the Department of J\istice, as
appropriate. ·
(U) Shortly after 11 September 2001, the majority and minority
leaders of the Seriate, the Speaker and the minority leader of the
House, and the chairs and ranking members of the .· · intelligency
committees were l:Jriefed on'.
Briefings to the. chairs, ranking members, and majority and
minority staff directors have been provided o"n multiple occasions
since that time, and in the f l of2o05, in .
connection with discussion on the Detainee Treatment Ac several
other m.embers were briefed on the program, including the
interrogation procedures. ·
. 3
and_ direct so-µrces ofeoUection. i;; llls-s pt b ioo6 ;p e6h
d
· ·F J-Caprunng OThef'J.'erroffats:
• The Department of Justice (DOI) has reviewed procedures proposed
by tJ:le CIA on more · · than one occasion and determined them to
be lawful.
• The program has been investigated and audited by the CIA's Office
of the Inspector General (OIG), \vhich wai given full and complete
access to all <!.Spects ofthe·prograrrt.
·rµF)Benefits of the Program: Capturi g T rrorists, Saving
Lives·
.)W)Since .the .2002jqception of the program, high value detainee
reporting has become a cruci11I pillar of US counterterrorism
efforts. CIA assesses that a significant number of its knowledge of
al-Qa'ida has been derived from .detainee reporting, and well over
half of our finished intelligence· products on th group since 2002
make some refererrc to this
· . reporting.
• For both warning and opei:ational purposes, detainee reporting is
dis seminated l::>roadly • among US intelligence and hiw
enforcement entities .and
. . • For today' s briefing, l'.m going to hig}l.light a Jew key
areas where detainee reporting has
played a significant r.ole:·capturing other terrorists, disrupting
plots, advancing our analytical Understanding ofand operat!ons
against al-Qa'ida, and helping to corroborate
. _ other TI1e President discussed some of these successes · som
ofth.is material w brl fed to staff.memb-ers
during previous Congi;esses, ·but I believe it is worthwhile for
the sake of the current . C.ommittee tQ provide this explicitly
9etailed account to.you today, so that you can get a better sense
of why we view this pr9gram as so key to our fight agai.J:!st
al-Qa'ida. .. .
--- -----{.%-- .:=---. Detainees-have pfa.yeci-some roli-:frotrr
identification of photos to providing in depth targeting
information-in nearly every capture of · al-Qa'ida members and
associat since 2002.
• In March 2003, former al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad ' (KSM) prov'ided information about an al-Qa ida
operative, Majid ·Khan, whom he was
aware had recen ly been captured. KS)\1-possibly believing the
detained operative was ·
"tal)dng" admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering
$50,000
• Khan---Confronted with KSM's infonnation about the
money-acknowledged that he ·
delivered the money to an operative named "Zubair" and provided
Zubair's physical
4
captures
' , 9escription and contact number. Based on that information,
Zubair was captured in June 2003.
• During debriefiilgs, Zubair revealed that he worked directly for
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader and al-Qa'ida's South Asia
representative Hambali.
. we used the information provided by Zubair to arrest
Hambali.
• Next, KSM-when explicitly queried on the issue-identified
Hambali's brother, 'Abd al-Hadi, as a prospective successor to
Hambali. information from multiple detainees, including KSM,
narrowed down 'Abd al-Hadi's location and enabled his capture in
Karachi in September 2003.
• Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi identified a cell of
JI operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for possible
al-Qa'ida operations. When confronted with his brother's'
revelations, Hambali admitted that he was grooming members of the
cell for US operations-at the behest ofKSM-probably to continue
trying to implement KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the
tallest building on the US West Coast.
. ) In addition to these two . . . _
involve law enforcemenes use of our detainee reporting:
key cases, a number ofother significant have resulted thanks to
detamee reportmg. It 1s unportant to highlight that these
cases
TOP SECRET/,-·
6
• Jose Padilla:. After his capt\lre in March 2002, Abu Zubaydah
provided information - I I leading to the identifieation ofalleged
al-Qa'ida operative Jose Padilla. Arrested by the
FBI in 2002 as he arrived at O'Hare Airport in -Chicago, he was
transferred to military custody in Charleston, South Carolina,
where he i currently being held.
•.· «' • Iyman Faris: Soon after his arrest, KSM described an
Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris,
already under suspic on for his contacts with al Qa'ida _ operative
Majid Khan. FBI and CIA shar¢ intelligence from interviews of;KSM,
Khan, and Faris on a near real-tii'ne basis and quickly ascertained
that Faris had met and accepted operational taskings from KSM on
several occasions. Faris is urrently serving a 20-year sentence for
conspiracy and material support to a terrorist organization.
-,NF) r
·<JJtt1 . isrupting plots: .On of the fall.:quts of detaining
these addition terrorists has been the thwarting of a number of
al-Qa'ida operations it). the Uni ted States and
_overseas.
• ·The West Coast Airliner Plot: li1 the early planning tage of the
attacks o_f 11 September, al-Qa'ida leaders considered an ambitious
plot that.called for striking both coasts of the .
United States with as many as ten .planes in orie operati9n. Usama
Bin Ladin (UBL) reportedly scaled bac that plan to the US East
Coast only-saving the yrest Coast for a follow-on :attack-and UBL
specifically mentioned California as a-target to be attacked in the
we ks follow ing H September, according to detainee reporting.
Operatives. . assigned to this plot were detained during 2002 arid
2003, includ ng K.SM. Evidence
/,
Tl!I
• Heathrow Airport plot: Shortly after his capture in March _2003,
KSM divulged limited -infonnation about his plot to use commercial
airliners to attack Heathrow Airport and oth r targets i.n the
United Kingdom; he discu5sed this plot probably because he believed
that key Heathrow plotter Rirnzi bin al-Shibh, who had been
detained six months previously, had al eady revealed the
information. KSM speculated that the operation was completely
disrupted with the detention of senior al-Qa'ida planner Khallad
Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi; a variety of othe:r reporting
sugge;.;ts this assessment is accurate.-
• The Karachi plots. Key members of al-Qa'ida's Pakistan network
who were detained in 2.003. have provided details ·of the anti-U:S.
attacks they were planning in Karachi against the US Consulate,
Westerners at the airport, and Western housing cornp{mnds.
) Advan_cing Our Understanding o_f Al-Qa ida: P.riorto the capture
ofAbu_·
Zubaydah in March2002, we had large gaps in knowledge of
al-Qa:'ida's organizational struc?Iie, key members and associates,
intentions and tapabilities, possible targets lot tbv next attack,
and. its presence ar;-ound the globe. Within months ofhis arrest,
Abu Zubaydah provided details about al Qa'.ida's organizational
structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. For example, it was
Abu Zubaydah,_ early in his detention, who identified KSM as the
mastermind of 9/11. Until that time, KSM did not even appear in our
chart of key aJO-Qa'ida rpembers and associates.
7
• In the years since 9/11, successive detain.ees have helped us
gauge our.progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida by providing
updated information oi:l the changing structure and health of the
organization, in part beeause they can help illuminate other
sensitive collection platforms for us.
8
;l}>fF)Army Ffold Manual
[J!!1f. ·1£NF(The Army Field Manual (FM 2.22.3)..goveffis the
interrogation of large numbers ot detamees held qy the US Military,
who m:e captured in the course of traditional military hostilities.
It is used by U.S. military personnel to help them collect tactical
military intelligence from-milit;µ-y detainees. Should the CIA be
limited only to the interrogation .techniques contained in the new
Army Field Manual, _
_ would not be sufficient to justify · ,.
9
. i -· -._,
I
. . . .. '
. . · '
( // · - ' We have been advi_sed there is no/no" classified annex
describing_or authori ng addition?! hniques. It must be noted
that.the cover sheet for FM 2.22. clearly· states the manual is
"Approved for. public el ease; d strib tion is .u;nlimited", hence
UNCLASSIFIED. Coriseq:uently, we must ·assume that AQ and other
organizations have or can
._easily obtain a copy and train their people to resist these
techniques an.d the methodology: Renee, we have not only laid ·out
O\lr game plan for the taking.but have included the entire
playbool<: as well. As a res'ult, should our.ir)terrogation of
AQ suspects be lirni.ted to the
·techniques outlined in.the field manu3.I, we are left with very
little offense and ai-e relegated to rely primariIY:on defense ..
Without the approval of EITs to compliment the t hniques approved
iii FM 2.22.3, we have·s1;verely restricted our attempts to obtain
timely mfonnati()n from HVDs whQ possess information tha will help
us save lives and dis[4pt operatioru. Limiting our -interrogations
tools to those detai1eq in the field manual will increase the
probability that a determiped, res!lien HvD will be able to
withhold critical, time-sensitive, actionable mtelligence that
could prevent an imminent, catastrophic attack. In essence, we
would be back to a ·pre-9/11 posttire.
10
(U) The Way Forward
·
US law.. Currently, seven EITs are under consideration. ·
- / J At the entrance to an office in CIA's ·counterterrorism
Center is a sign and a reminder: "Today's date is September 12th,
2001." We make no apologies for this attitUde or for the lawful and
legitimate actions we have taken_ to counter al-Qa'ida. And let me
be dear, our enemy is still potent ·and able to. attack us here and
overseas.
• While al-Qa'ida has conducted. no new attack on the US Homelai;d,
this is not for lack of . trying. Al-Qa' ida was within weeks, if
not days, of mounting an attack against planes
13
Military Try Suspected Terrorists,"
flying" into the United States from London last summer that could
have been more lethal than the 11 September attacks and its leaders
also continue to try to gain access to chemical, radiological,
biological, and. nuclear weapons.
• Al-Qa'ida's only obstacle to attacking us again is our continued
assertive effort to stop them. CIA's detention and interrogation
program remains critical to our ability to silstain this effort and
protect the Ainerican people frqm another .attack. As .the
Preiiden't stated in his 6 September 2006 speech to the nation on
The Creation of Commisions to
.. : the most important source of information on where the ·
terrorists are hiding a.Ild what they are plarming is the
terrorists, themselves." ..
Thank you.
Subject: Phone call from N$CILGL re NY Times article
I was called this morning by NSC Legal (who was calling at request
of WH Counsel) In response to NY Times article over' the weekend
that SSC! wbuld hold h$aring's ·o!l CIA's· dete.ntionlinterrogation
·of terrorists. · NSC Legal (Dan Levin) asked whether any such
hearing were scheduled. I told him ! was unaware of any such
hearings and that weekend reporting caught me by surprise. I also
referred him to the Wolf Blitzer transcript (in todays Media
Highlights) that indicated that SSC! was not planning to
"investigate" but to "monitor" any GIA activities.
· Mr. lt;lvin asked me to check and get back to him whether SSCI
has actually asked for any hearing. if \hey have not yet, but do at
some point in the future, he would like to l<how soonest.
7 ;203·00214