G.R. No. 133706Supreme Court 3rd Division (Panganiban,
J.)Francisco Estolas vs. Adolfo MabalotMay 7, 2002
FACTS:
Adolfo Mabalot was awarded with an agricultural land by virtue
of PD 27. Corresponding Certificate of Land Transfer was issued on
November 11, 1973. In May 1978, he needed money for medical
treatment and passed the land to Francisco Estolas in exchange of
P5,800 and P200 worth of rice. According to Mabalot, the transfer
was only a verbal mortgage but Estolas treated the same as sale.
Department of Agrarian Reform then issued a Transfer Certificate
Title in favor of Estolas. In 1988, Mabalot tried to redeem the
land from petitioner but was unsuccessful. DAR Regional Office
decided in favor of the petitioner contending that there was
abandonment on the part of the respondent. DAR Central Office,
however, reversed its regional offices decision. Estolas appealed
but Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent, contending that
the transfer of land to petitioner is void and there was no
abandonment by respondent since failure on the redemption was due
to a higher redemption price set by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the transfer of the agricultural land valid?
LAW:
Presidential Decree 27 provides that title to land acquired
pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of
the government shall not be transferable except to the grantees
heirs by hereditary succession or back to the government by other
legal means.
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. It affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and cited that there is no room
for interpretation in the provision of PD 27 regarding transfer of
agricultural land. It affirmed, as well, CAs decision on the
non-abandonment of the subject land by the respondent.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The award of
agricultural land by virtue of PD 27 is based on the premise that
farmers must be given opportunities to achieve a dignified
existence and to make them more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens. To protect that interest, the law provides
that transfer of title shall only be made if such would constitute
either transfer to the awardees heirs or to the government. This
would ensure that these small farmers will not be deceived or
enticed to sell the property in consideration of urgent financial
needs. Such provision of the law accorded the farmers or grantees
the protection they need from abusive lenders or creditors.
G.R. No. 109568Supreme Court 1st Division (Austria-Martinez,
J.)Roland Sigre vs. August 8, 2002Court of Appeals & Lilia
Gonzales
FACTS:
Lilia Gonzales, in her capacity as a co-administratrix of the
estate of Matias Yusay, filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus, seeking to prohibit Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
from accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and for LBP to
turnover to Gonzales the rentals previously remitted by Sigre.
Sigre was a tenant of Gonzales in an irrigated rice land in Iloilo.
He remitted rental payments to Gonzales until the issuance of
memorandum circular no. 6 series of 1978 by the Department of
Agrarian Reform, which set the guidelines in the rental payments by
farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of PD No. 27.
Pursuant to the issuance, Sigre stopped paying Gonzales and
remitted the rentals to LBP instead. Gonzales questioned the
validity of the circular and the constitutionality of PD 27. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Gonzales and ordered LBP to
return the rentals to the respondent and Sigre to revert direct
payment to Gonzales. Rolando Sigre, who substituted Ernesto, filed
consolidated petitions for review alleging that erred and acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Is the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 invalid? Is PD No. 27
unconstitutional?
LAW:
PD No. 27 decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage
of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they
till and providing the instruments and mechanism therefor.
PD No. 816 provides that rentals are to be paid to the landowner
by agricultural lessee until after the valuation of the property
shall have been determined.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rolando Sigre and granted
his consolidated petitions. The Court ruled that DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 6 is not in conflict with PD 816, which states that
tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the
landowner until the value of the property has been determined or
agreed upon by the landowner and DAR. The circular only supplements
such Presidential Decree by mandating that tenant-farmer pays
rental to LBP after the value has been determined. Moreover, the
Court reiterated that there is no question on the constitutionality
of PD 27, providing for the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of soil and transferring to them the ownership of the land
they till.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. DAR Memorandum
Circular and PD 816 are not in conflict with each other, rather,
they complement each other. With the promulgation of DAR circular,
the petitioner is now obliged to remit rental payments to Land Bank
of the Philippines since the value of the property has been
ascertained. The respondents contention is without merit as the
constitutionality of PD 27 has long been settled.
G.R. No. 128557Supreme Court 2nd Division (Bellosillo, J.)Land
Bank of the Philippines vs.December 29, 1999Court of Appeals and
Jose Pascual
FACTS:
An action for mandamus was filed by Jose Pascual after the
refusal of Land Bank of the Philippines to pay private respondent
pursuant to the final decision rendered by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). LBP was ordered to pay Php 1.9M plus
interest as just compensation to Jose Pascual. The computation was
based on the increased value of the Government Support Price, which
was Php 300 per cavan of palay and Php 250 per cavan of corn. The
petitioner refused to pay the respondent alleging the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and that it acted beyond its
authority. It also asserted that the writ of mandamus could not be
issued, as there are other remedies available in the ordinary
course of law.
ISSUE:
Is the Land Bank of the Philippines bound to pay the Php 1.9M
plus 6% interest per annum as just compensation to Jose
Pascual?
LAW:
EO 228 provides that the valuation of rice and corn lands
covered by PD 27 shall be based on the average gross production
determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in
accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of
1973 and related issuance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
average gross production shall be multiplied by 2.5, the product
shall be multiplied by Php 35, the government support price for one
cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Php 31, the
government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on
October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of
the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of
determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the
landowner.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
granting the compensation of Php 1.9M but it deleted the 6%
interest per annum, as it is no longer applicable. Administrative
Order No. 13, which provides compensation to landowners for
unearned interests is no longer applicable since the PARAD already
increased the GSP from Php 35 to Php 300 per cavan of palay and
from Php 31 to Php 250 per cavan of corn.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court to modify the
decision of the Court of Appeals. I believe that imposing 6%
interest per annum on top of the Php 1.9M value of the lands is
unconscionable. It goes beyond the just compensation required by
law to be given to landowners. By PARADs decision to increase the
basis of land valuation, the landowner has already been justly
compensated. The need for imposing the interest is uncalled
for.
G.R. No. 132048 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Quisumbing, J.)Hon.
Antonio Nuesa and Restituto Rivera vs. March 6, 2002Court of
Appeals, DARAB and Jose Verdillo
FACTS:
An award over two (2) parcels of agricultural land was granted
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in favor of Jose Verdillo. He
then filed an application with the Regional Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to purchase the lots after twenty-one
years. Restituto River, who was in possession of and cultivating
the land for the time being, filed a letter of protest against
Verdillo. He also filed an application to purchase the land. After
investigation, Antonio Nuesa, the Regional Director of DAR, ordered
the cancellation of the grant to Verdillo. A petition was
consequently filed by Verdillo with the Provincial Adjudication
Board for the annulment of the said decision.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the petition of
Verdillo on the ground of improper remedy but the DARAB Provincial
Adjudicator denied it and the DAR Appellate Adjudication affirmed
the same. Hence, petitioners submit this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Does the Court of Appeals act in grave abuse of discretion when
it sustained DARABs decision?
LAW:
RA 6657 and other relevant laws and issuances provide that the
Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program.
RULING:
The Court ruled that DARAB officials and boards, provincial and
central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking
cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and
respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded the lots in
question. It emphasized the importance of observing jurisdictional
limits set by enabling laws for the implementation of the agrarian
reform program. DARABs decision is unjustified, as it should not,
in the first place, take cognizance of the case. Hence, Court of
Appeals decision was reversed and DAR Regional Directors order
granting the land in favor of Restituto Rivera was reinstated.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court, not only on the
basis of jurisdictional authority, but also based on the principle
of equity. Restituto Rivera has been in possession of the land and
he has also been cultivating the same. It is only equitable that he
be awarded with the agricultural land. Jose Verdillo, who was
originally granted with the award of land, did not act upon it
until after the lapse of twenty-one years. He did not object nor
initiated an action to stop Rivera from possessing and cultivating
the land. Hence, it can be inferred that he was estopped from
filing an action to recover the land by way of the grant. As Rivera
cultivates the agricultural land for quite some time now, it is
pursuant to the objectives of agrarian reform that he reaps the
fruits of his labor.
G.R. No. 139285 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Velasco Jr.,
J.)Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. December 21,
2007Secretary of Agrarian Reform & DAR Regional Director
(Region V)
FACTS:
The Archbishop of Caceres owned several parcels of land planted
with rice, corn and coconut trees. He filed petitions for exemption
from Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under PD 27 of these lands with
the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office in Naga City. Two
petitions were however denied by the Regional Director of
Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioner contended that such
lands were donations and he held the property only in trust
capacity. He argued that the donations had stipulations prohibiting
him to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the
subject lands, from which he concluded that he was the landowner as
contemplated by the PD 27 and RA 6657. The petition was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals, hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Are the subject lands exempt from Operation Land Transfer under
PD 27?
LAW:
RA 6657 provides for an exclusive list of exemptions as
follows:
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. a) Lands actually, directly,
exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds
and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.b)
Private lands actually, directly, exclusively used for prawn farms
and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act:
Provided, that said prawn farms and fishponds have not been
distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued
under the Agrarian Reform Program. In cases where the fishponds or
prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, the consent of the farmworkers shall no longer be
necessary; however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on
incentives shall apply.c) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites
and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and
seedlings research and pilot production center, church sites and
convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal
colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government
and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (As
amended by RA 7881)
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
holding that subject lands are not exempt from the Operation Land
Transfer of PD 27 and RA 6657. Supreme Court held that the
Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the Filipino
faithful as the lands in question clearly do not fall under any of
the exemptions enumerated by the law. The law is clear on the
exemptions granted and there is no room for interpretation.
According to the decision in this case, the Archbishop, as a
religious leader, can just take solace in the fact that his lands
are going to be awarded to those who need and can utilize them to
the fullest.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court that the land in
question should not be exempt from the OLT of PD 27. The ultimate
goal of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is to accord land to
the landless who can utilize such to its fullest. With the nobility
of this law, it is only proper that exemptions be strictly
construed. Only exclusions contemplated by law should be allowed to
ensure that its purpose would not be defeated. Moreover, I find the
contention of the Archbishop rather unbecoming of a religious
leader. He, among anybody else, should have understood the reason
behind the Operation Land Transfer of CARL. By filing the petitions
for exemptions, it was as if he wanted to deprive the landless the
lands that should be awarded to them.
G.R. No. 154654 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Velasco Jr.,
J.)Josephine Taguinod & Vic Aguila vs. September 14, 2007Court
of Appeals, Antonino Samaniego, et al.
FACTS:
Salud Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots based
on homestead patents. Said lots were transferred to Vic Aguila, who
was then a minor, and to Josephine Taguinod. Both lots were held
under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 with 12 tenants
or farmer-beneficiaries identified. Salud Aguila, on behalf of Vic
Aguila, filed an application for retention over the said land. And
when Vic Aguila reached the age of majority, he filed a
letter-protest for exclusion or exemption from OLT. Taguinod filed
the same letter-protest seeking for exclusion and exemption from
OLT. The DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended
the approval of applications of Salud and Taguinod to the DAR
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) for retention of the lots
in question. PARO did grant the application, which led the
beneficiaries to file a counter-protest.
The issue was then elevated to the Regional Director of DAR, who
ruled that the application for retention be granted to the
petitioners of not more than seven (7) hectares of land. Lots in
excess of 7 hectares must be placed under the control of the
Operation Land Transfer. Petitioners filed motions for
reconsideration.
Taguinod filed an appeal with the Office of the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, contending that she was the rightful
owner of the disputed land after redeeming the property from Salud
Aguila, her adoptive mother, when such land was subjected to a
mortgage. The Secretary affirmed the decision of the DAR Regional
Director and denied the petitioners appeal. The Secretary also
found that Salud Aguila was disqualified to retain 7 hectares of
land.
With this decision, the petitioners interposed appeal before the
Office of the President. The Office of the President ruled in favor
of the petitioners. It anchored its ruling on the fact that the
land in question was derived from a homestead patent. As such,
these lands are exempt from the coverage of PD 27.
The respondents, then, filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The CA reversed the decision of the Office of the President and
reinstated the decision of the Secretary of DAR. CA agreed with the
Office of the President that the rights of the homesteaders are
superior to those of tenants invoking agrarian reform laws.
However, petitioners failed to establish the identities of the
original homestead patentees and that they are direct compulsory
heirs of the original patentees.
ISSUE:
Are the lots previously covered by homestead patents outside the
ambit of PD 27?
LAW:
RA 6657, Sec. 6 provides that original homestead grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead
at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas
as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
According to SC, it is a settled rule that homestead grantees
rights are superior to those of tenants invoking rights under the
agrarian reform law. However, in this case, the petitioners failed
to prove the identities of the original homestead grantees and
establish that they were indeed direct compulsory heirs of the
grantees to avail of the exemption. As exclusions from the coverage
of PD 27 must be strictly construed, failure on the part of the
petitioners to prove that they are covered by the exemptions
provided for by law extinguishes their rights to avail of the same.
Premised on the said grounds, the petitioners are disqualified to
avail of the right of retention over the land as they are not small
landowners and the lands in dispute are subject to the Operation
Land Transfer of PD 27.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Since
petitioners failed to prove that they hold superior rights over the
subject land, they are not entitled to the exemptions accorded by
the law. Granting them with the right of retention over the said
land would defeat the very purpose of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. Promotion of social justice is the paramount
consideration of the program; hence, it is a deviation from this
core purpose if retention will be granted to the petitioners who
still own several parcels of land aside from the lots in question.
It is more in accordance with law that qualified
farmer-beneficiaries will be granted parcels of land, which they
can till and fully utilize to improve their living.
G.R. No. 164195 Supreme Court 3rd Division (Chico-Nazario.,
J.)Apo Fruits Corp & Hijo Plantation vs. December 19, 2007Court
of Appeals & Land Bank of the Phils.
FACTS:
Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Incorporated were
owners of 5 parcels of land in Davao. These companies voluntarily
offered to sell their lands to the Department of Agriculture
pursuant to RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The
parties were not able to come into agreement as to the price of the
lands in question. Thus, the petitioners brought the matter to
before the DAR Adjudication Board to determine just compensation.
Pending the determination of the just compensation, the government
deposited P26M and P45M to Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo
Plantation, Inc., respectively. DAR also registered said lands in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines and distributed the
same to farmers under CARP.
Three years passed but DARAB failed to render decision on the
valuation of land and determination of just compensation. Hence,
petitioners filed a complaint for the determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Davao, which
rendered decision in favor of AFC and HPI. RTC ruled that the
purchase price of the land should be higher than what was initially
offered by DAR, considering the permanent improvements on AFCs and
HPIs lands.
Department of Agrarian Reform appealed the RTC decision to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Was the price set forth by the Department of Agrarian Reform
within the ambit of just compensation as contemplated by the
law?
LAW:
RA 6657, Sec. 57 provides that the Special Agrarian Courts (SAC)
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners.
Sec. 17 of the same Act provides that in determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that just compensation was not accorded
to the petitioners, AFC and HPI. DARABs failure to determine just
compensation for a span of three years was prejudicial to the
landowners. DAR was not able to justify why a lower purchase price
was offered for the said lots. The Court ruled that to allow the
taking of landowners properties and to leave them empty-handed
while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
According to the decision, just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount of be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Although the
welfare of the less privileged farmers is the main consideration of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, payment of just compensation
to landowners should not be taken for granted. While the government
reserves its right to uphold the law and protect small farmers, it
should not also oppress the landowners and deprive them of just
compensation in exchange of their properties. With the facts
presented in the case, it can be concluded that the landowners have
given the government, especially DAR, ample time to determine just
compensation. But the latters failure to determine and award such
compensation prejudiced their rights as property owners. It is only
just and proper to award P1.38B to the petitioners.
G.R. No. 122363 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Bellosillo,
J.)Victor Valencia vs. Court of Appeals April 29, 2003
FACTS:
Victor Valencia, a government retiree, owned two parcels of
land, which he leased out to Glicerio Henson for ten (10) years.
Henson constituted Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on
the property during his lease. Valencia then leased the same land
to Fr. Andres Flores for five years after the expiration of the
first lease contract. Fr. Flores also designated several people as
workers, including Crescenciano and Marciano. The petitioner
acquired said parcels of land through a homestead grant by the
government.
After the expiration of the contract between Valencia and
Flores, the petitioner demanded the workers to vacate the said
land. However, the workers refused and continued cultivating the
land. They applied for Certificates of Land Transfer under the
Operation Land Transfer Program of PD 27, instead. The Department
of Agrarian Reform granted the applications and CLTs were issued to
the respondents.
Valencia then filed actions for recovery of possession over the
subject land on the ground that the tenants and the government
unjustly withheld these lands from him. He also contested the
existence of the tenancy relationship between him and the
tenant-beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
Were the subject lands wrongfully taken from the petitioner?
LAW:
RA 3844, Sec. 6 states that a Civil Law Lessee is not
automatically authorized to employ a tenant without the consent of
the landowner.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The subject lands
were unlawfully taken from Valencia when the Department of
Agriculture issued Certificates of Land Transfer to the respondents
(tenants). First, the lands in question were acquired by the
petitioner through a homestead grant, which is excluded from the
coverage of PD 27. Second, the tenant-beneficiaries were not really
tenants of the landowner. The lessee, Fr. Flores, was the one who
hired the workers to cultivate the land. Such designation of
workers was beyond the scope of authority of a Civil Law Lessee and
was made without the consent of the landowner. The security of
tenure guaranteed by the laws may only be invoked by tenants de
jure, and not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. The
Court also emphasized that while it is true that in case of
reasonable doubt, the it has to tilt the balance in favor of the
poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion, it is never justified to give preference to the poor
simply because they are poor or reject the rich simply because they
are rich. Justice must always be served for the poor and the rich
alike according to the mandate of the law.
OPINION:
I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. I strongly agree
with Justice Bellosillo that decisions of the Court should not
favor the poor just because they are poor. Although the agrarian
reform program is especially implemented to promote social justice
and provide opportunity for the farmers to own the lands they till
and decently provide a living for their families, the Court has to
maintain its independence and must decide always according to the
mandate of the law. In this case, the landowner was unlawfully
deprived of his property. The parcels of land were taken away from
him pursuant to PD 27. However, according to the same law, the
subject property is exempt from the Operation Land Transfer Program
as it was acquired through a homestead title. Moreover, the
tenant-beneficiaries did not qualify as right beneficiaries of the
program because they are not lawful tenants of the landowner. They
were designated to cultivate the land without the tacit consent of
Valencia. With all these facts, I believe that while it is not
beneficial to the respondents, the decision was fair enough to
enable the real owner to recover possession of his property.
G.R. No. 78742 Supreme Court En Banc (Cruz, J.)Association of
Small Landowners in the Phils. July 14, 1989vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
The case at bar is a consolidation of four cases harping on the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive Order
Nos. 228 and 229, and Republic Act No. 6657. The petitioners in
this case question the unreasonable taking of their land without
just compensation. The lands were taken from the petitioners before
the payment of just compensation. The landowners also raised the
issue that the mode of payment of compensation for the lands
subjected to the agrarian reform program was unfair and prejudicial
to them.
ISSUE:
Are the executive orders 228 and 229 in violation of the
constitutional provision that no property shall be taken without
due process or just compensation?
LAW:
RA 6657, Section 16 provides for the procedure on the
acquisition of private lands. Included in this section is the
payment of just compensation. The Department of Agrarian Reform
shall send notice to the landowners for the acquisition of land and
offer to pay corresponding value of the land. If the landowner
accepts the offer of DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall
pay the owner the purchase price of the land within 30 days after
the delivery of the deed of transfer in favor of the government.
Otherwise, the DAR shall conduct an administrative summary
proceeding to determine the value of the land. Upon payment of the
purchase price to the landowner, or in case the offer was rejected,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The lands will then be distributed to
the beneficiaries. Any party who disagrees with the decision may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. It found no basis to render the executive orders
unconstitutional. As regard the just compensation in question, the
court ruled that the case does not deal with the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Neither does it involve
exercise of ordinary expropriation. The expropriation involved
pertains to vast areas of land amounting to a hundreds of billion
pesos. Hence, just compensation in cases like this need not be paid
fully in money.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The agrarian
reform program involves a massive transfer of landownership from
private individuals and corporations to the government, and as
such, a large sum of money is needed to pay for just compensation.
Hence, it is not to be expected that all land subject to the
implementation of the agrarian reform program will be paid at once
and in full before they shall be taken away by the State. It will
be detrimental to the economy and would affect other government
projects if all landowners will be paid with just compensation at
the same time for the full amount. While the government is mandated
to pay for just compensation whenever it takes away private
property, it should also ensure that such taking would not affect
other projects of the government intended for other
stakeholders.
G.R. No. 119398 Supreme Court 3rd Division (Panganiban,
J.)Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. vs. July 2, 1999Court of Appeals, PCSO
& Fernando Carrascoso, Jr.
FACTS:
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was an owner of several racehorses. He
entered in the sweepstakes races on March 6, 1986 to September 18,
1989. He sent letters of demand to private respondents for the
collection of prizes and other fees due him. The respondents
however responded consistently that the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) was withholding the demanded prizes. When
petitioner filed an action for collection before the Regional Trial
Court, the PCGG advised private respondents that it is no longer
objecting to the remittance of the prize winnings. Petitioner,
however, refused to accept payment of prizes.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered
PCSO and Carrascoso to pay the prize winnings with interest. The
Court of Appeals however reversed the decision of the trial court
on holding that the respondents are in bad faith. CA is of the
opinion that the respondents were just carrying out the
instructions of the PCGG.
ISSUE:
Was the withholding of the petitioners winnings in violation of
his property rights without due process of law? Did the respondents
act in bad faith when it withheld the remittance of winnings?
LAW:
Civil Code Article 32 provides that it is not necessary that the
public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of ones duties.
Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal
damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that
right.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The respondents did not act in bad faith when they withheld the
prize winnings of the petitioner upon the instructions of the PCGG.
Hence, the moral and exemplary damages should not be awarded.
However, the Court agreed with the petitioner and the trial court
that the petitioners constitutional right has been violated.
Although the PCSO and private respondent only acted upon the
instructions of the PCGG, they could have also sought legal basis
for the order issued by the latter. A little exercise of prudence
would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for
the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. Hence,
Cojuangco was unlawfully deprived of his property. Nominal damage,
amounting to Php 50,000 was then awarded to the petitioner.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court in holding the
respondents liable for nominal damages and for the payment of the
prize winnings. Despite the existence of an order issued by the
PCGG, the respondents are still liable for damages for failure to
exercise prudence in inquiring into the legality and applicability
of the withholding order. Even if the petitioner has properties
subject to examination of the PCGG, the property in question is not
part of the sequestration proceedings.
G.R. No. 118712 Supreme Court 3rd Division (Francisco, J.)Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. July 5, 1996Court of Appeals, Pedro
Yap, et. Al.
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed after the petition
for review on certiorari was denied. The petitioners contend that
contrary to the Courts conclusion, the opening of the trust
accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient
compliance with the mandate of the RA 6657. The respondents, on the
other hand, argue that there is no legal basis for allowing the
withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting
landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of
their properties.
In this case, the private respondents parcels of land were
subjected to the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The
landowners did not accept the offer made by the Department of
Agrarian Reform, hence, they demanded for reassessment of land
valuation. Pending the determination of the final valuation, the
petitioners opened trust accounts as a mode of deposit pursuant to
Section 16 of RA 6657. ISSUE:
Was the opening of trust account for the rejecting landowners
compliant to the mandate of RA 6657?
LAW:
Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides that Upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response form the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines
RULING:
The Court denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of RA
6657 as to the procedure for acquisition of private lands is clear
and unambiguous. Hence, including the opening of trust accounts
within the ambit of Section 16 (e) is tantamount to expanded
construction. The Court also ruled that to allow the taking of the
landowners properties and in the meantime leave them empty-handed
by withholding the payment of compensation while the government
speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or
worse, for government to subsequently decide to abandon the
property and return it to the owners when it has already been
rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive
exercise of eminent domain.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. It is
prejudicial and oppressive for the landowners to be deprived of
just compensation especially when their properties have already
been taken away from them. The Constitution guarantees that when a
private property is to be taken from an individual or corporation,
just compensation must be given. In this case, the Department of
Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines were not compliant
with the mandate of the law regarding payment of just compensation
to the landowners.
G.R. No. L-61293 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Regalado,
J.)Domingo Maddumba & Anita Maddumba February 15, 1990vs.
GSIS
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus, compelling respondent GSIS to
accept payment of LBP bonds at their face value for a pre-existing
obligation.
Government Service Insurance System conducted a public bidding
of several foreclosed properties. Domingo and Anita Maddumba
participated in the bidding and gave a managers check and cash as
proposal bond. Upon receipt of notice of award, the petitioner
offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at face value.
Such bonds were issued to him as payment for his Riceland acquired
by the government pursuant to PD 27. GSIS, however, rejected the
offer. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25%
down payment and all future installments. When the second
installment became due, the petitioner sent a letter to GSIS Board
of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly
amortizations with his LBP bonds. He invoked the provision of
Section 85 of RA 3844, as amended by PD No. 251. GSIS however,
denied the petitioners request. GSIS would only accept the LBP
bonds if they be discounted because acceptance at face value would
impair the actuarial solvency of GSIS. Hence, petitioner filed an
action for mandamus.
ISSUE:
Can GSIS be compelled to accept payment of LBP bonds?
LAW:
Sec. 85 of RA 3844 provides that The bonds issued by the Bank
may be used by the holder thereof and shall be accepted for any of
the following: xxx Payment for the purchase of shares of stocks or
assets of government-owned and controlled corporations. Upon offer
by the bondholders, the corporation owned and controlled by the
Government shall, through its Board of Directors, negotiate with
such bondholder with respect to the price and other terms and
conditions of the sale. In case there are various bondholders
making the offer, the one willing to purchase under terms and
conditions most favorable to the corporation shall be preferred. If
no price is acceptable to the corporation, the same shall be
determined by the Committee of Appraisers composed of three
members, one to be appointed by the corporation, another by the
bondholder making the highest or only offer, and the third by the
members so chosen. The expense of appraisal shall be borne equally
by the corporation and the successful purchaser. Should the
government offer for sale to public any or all shares of stocks or
assets of any of the government-owned or controlled corporations,
the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank shall be
preferred, provided that the various bids be equal in every respect
in the medium of payment.
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus in favor the
petitioners. GSIS is ordered to accept payment of LBP bonds at face
value. It not disputed that under Sec. 85 of RA 3844, GSIS is
compelled to accept LBP bonds as payment for the purchase of its
assets, and in fact, the bidder who offers to pay in LBP bonds is
entitled to preference. Moreover, such provision cushions the
impact of dispossession. Acceptance of LBP bonds, instead of money,
entails a bigger sacrifice on the part of the landowners when they
departed with their property pursuant to the implementation of the
agrarian reform program. Thus, discounting the LBP bonds for
acceptance as payment, thereby reducing their effective value,
imposes additional burden on the landowners part.
OPINION:
I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. GSIS, as a
government owned and controlled corporation, must accept the
payment of LBP bonds as payment for the purchase price of the asset
sold. The bonds were issued by the government and it would seem
peculiar if the GSIS rejects these bonds, being an instrumentality
of the government, as well. To dishonor such bonds would impair the
integrity of the debt instruments issued by the government.
Discounting of the bonds gave the landowner double burden: first,
when his property was taken away from him and compelled to receive
LBP bonds as payment of just compensation and second, when such
bonds would be accepted and used in a diminished value.
G.R. No. 86889 Supreme Court En Banc (Paras, J.)Luz Farms vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform December 4, 1990
FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business. Along with others in the same business, Luz Farms stand
to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of
RA 6657 and its implementing guidelines. The petition prayed for
the declaration of the aforesaid laws and guidelines
unconstitutional. Luz Farms contend that the term agriculture as
used by the law, did not mean to include livestock, poultry and
swine.
ISSUE:
Are the aforementioned provisions of CARL unconstitutional?
LAW:
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.
RULING:
The Supreme Court declared section 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA
6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage NULL and VOID. During the deliberations
in the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it can be concluded that
the framers of the law did not intend to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated
agrarian reform program.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The Constitution
only includes agriculture as subject of the agrarian reform
program. The intention of the legislators in drafting the law was
to provide farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands they
till and receive just share of its fruits. To include livestock,
poultry and swine within the ambit of the agrarian reform program,
is giving expanded interpretation of the law, which is in itself,
clear and unambiguous. The decision of the Court to render the
provision null and void is in accordance with the mandate of the
Constitution. No one must be deprived of his property without due
process of law.
Kristie Xyla R. AmaroCEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st
Semester, SY 2013-2014)Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation