Career Patterns and Electoral Connections in the Brazilian State Legislatures

Career Patterns and Electoral Connections in the Brazilian State

Legislatures

Filipe Souza Corrêa

Federal University of Minas Gerais

Department of Political Science

Email: [email protected]

Phone: +55 31 94465445

Paper to be presented at:

23rd World Congress of Political Science

RC08 Legislative Specialists, Sub-National Parliaments

July 19-24, 2014, Montréal, Quebec, Canada

Abstract

This paper discuss the career patterns of Brazilian state legislators considering the

complexity of choices between elective positions in a federal system. Exploring the

geographical distribution of the vote for each candidate, I argue that the variation on the

electoral connections presented by the state deputies is associated to different ambitions

of political career, resulting consequently in different career patterns. It is important to

consider that the state legislative production is characterized by a limited competence in

making laws, as well as by strong proactive powers by the state executives, resulting in

a weak institutional incentive for the state deputies to produce laws. Therefore we

should expect a greater renovation of the parliament, but with different impacts

according to the electoral connections. In order to investigate this assumption, firstly, I

have collected information about the electoral trajectory of state deputies to four state

assemblies: Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul,

considering three distinct moments: before the election (2002 and 2004 state and

municipal elections), reference legislature (2006 state elections), and after (2008 and

2010 municipal and state elections). Then, I have investigated the relationship between

these patterns and the spatial distribution of votes using data from the 2006 election.

Results indicated that we cannot ignore the incentives of the electoral connections on

career trajectory choices.

Keywords: political career; electoral connections; subnational legislatures; state

legislators; re-election

1

1 INTRODUCTION1

The following article has as its focus of analysis the career patterns of state

deputies in Brazil, taking into account the effects of electoral connections within the

state milieu. The hypothesis is that electoral connections made by deputies and

identified from the different ways voting is geographically distributed also encourage

different political career ambitions. With this in mind, the determining factors for the

different career patterns taken by the state deputies are examined, considering the

impact of the various spatial configuration of votes on the political trajectory of these

legislators.

As such, it is necessary that the theoretical concept of electoral connections is

revisited, especially how it has been applied to the Brazilian institutional context. This

reflection will allow the introduction of new knowledge to the discussion regarding

political careers as they pertain to state legislative houses by emphasizing a dimension

that has not been thoroughly explored in the analysis of legislative careers. Beyond that,

this article proposes to shed light on the state’s Legislative branch, a part of the

Brazilian political system that has been little explored.

The hypothesis considered is that different spatial patterns of voting – understood

as electoral incentives for parliamentary behavior (electoral connections) – are

significantly associated with different career patterns shown by the legislators, even

making possible a theoretical revision of the progressive, static and regressive career

ambitions. In other words, I move forward from the hypothesis that career ambitions are

valued differently according to how the representative relates to its electoral base. Even

when considering risk calculations and the costs of a progressive ambition, as sustained

by Leoni, Pereira and Rennó (2003), it is taken as a hypothesis that the various possible

trajectories for the legislators are valued differently among them, especially from the

relationships they have established in their electoral bases, which is something not yet

explored by literature.

This article is divided in the following manner: the second section will present the

theoretical background on which the analysis of career trajectories of state deputies

using their electoral connections is based on. Thus, that section is subdivided into three

topics: the first presents the main elements of discussion regarding legislative careers in

Brazil; the second, some interpretations on the state’s legislative dynamic and its impact

on the interpretation of the careers of state deputies; and finally, in the third part, the

main theoretical elements of discussion regarding electoral connections in Brazil, with

special attention to the importance of comprehending multiple connections when it

comes to the interpretation of the career ambitions of deputies. The third section will

present the methodological aspects of the project, especially the construction of spatial

patterns of voting and identification of the deputies’ career trajectories. The fourth

section will present the results of the descriptive analysis of the career trajectory data in

order to respond to the initial hypothesis. The fifth and final section will show the main

conclusions and suggestions for future development of this research.

2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1 This is a corrected and updated version of the paper presented at the 37th Annual Meeting of the

Brazilian Association of Research in Social Sciences (ANPOCS) in September 2013. I thank to Marta

Mendes for the critics and suggestions as discussant of the earlier version of this paper on that occasion.

This research is funded by CAPES (doctoral scholarship).

2

2.1 Legislative careers in Brazil

When it comes to legislative career patterns, the literature on the subject in Brazil

is centred on the discussion of the degree of professionalization of the legislative houses

with the focus on the stability of the legislative career. This focus in large part follows

Polsby’s premise (1968) that the degree of deputy professionalization says a lot about

the degree of the house’s professionalization. That is, if the legislative position is

desirable – which, according to Polsby, is a direct result of the degree of

institutionalization –, then little variation in the composition of the legislative body can

be expected, given that deputies would tend to try and get re-elected. That premise led a

few scholars to look for the determining factors of re-election, with the goal of

explaining why some deputies want to be re-elected and some do not, as well as the

determining factors for success or failure of that action (LEONI; PEREIRA; RENNÓ,

2003; PEREIRA; RENNÓ, 2001; 2007).

Nonetheless, Samuels (2000) argues, firstly, that the rate of turnover for the

Brazilian Chamber of Deputies would be considered high, particularly when compared

to the United States’ House of Representatives. About this, Samuels (2000; 2003) states

categorically, in view of the data presented on costs and benefits of the available

positions for national legislators and on what deputies do after leaving the Chamber,

that the political career ambition of national legislators is progressive and focused on

executive positions at the state or municipal level given the concentration of power and

access to resources within these positions (elective or not) when compared to the

position of federal deputy. This find strongly contradicts the assumption of static

ambition, based on the premise of re-election2 (MAYHEW, 1974) when applied to the

Brazilian context (AMES, 2003). Furthermore, according to Samuels, that elevated rate

of turnover also exists because of the dynamic of the electoral competition; given that in

the Brazilian electoral system of proportional representation with open list, candidates

tend to compete for votes against candidates from their own party or coalition.

That assertion on the opportunity structure of political career sheds light on an

important aspect to be considered when discussing legislative careers in Brazil. That is,

the presence of a federative system with three levels of government, which makes career

choices much more complex, especially because of the possibility to move around those

different levels according to cost and benefit calculations associated with the various

positions and the odds of obtaining the one wanted. It is this conclusion derived from

Samuels’ work that is explored here.

In other words, this work is based on the assertion on the impact of federalism

over career ambitions of state legislators. However, it is argued that motivation for

progressive ambition at the local level cannot be treated in the same way as progressive

ambition in the state and national levels. This argument is based on the hypothesis that

the spatial configuration of the deputies’ electoral base is an important feature of this

difference, especially because of the close relationship some deputies may have with

their electoral bases. I shall return to this argument later on.

On another work that gained importance in the literature on legislative careers in

Brazil, Leoni, Pereira and Rennó (2003) endeavoured to identify the reasons for career

choices made by federal deputies between 1994 and 1998, considering upward,

regressive, and static career possibilities or retirement. The authors found that the

percentage of deputies attempting re-election is quite elevated, in contradiction with

Samuels’ argument (2000; 2003) of the predominance of progressive ambition among

federal deputies.

2 I shall return to this in topic 2.3.

3

With this finding, Leoni, Pereira and Rennó (2003) argue that the career choice is

not only made because of the nature of ambition, as Samuels’ states (2000), but also

because of the risk and cost calculus of venturing into a progressive career, which

makes static ambition appealing. The result found was that “the [deputies] who prefer

to stay in the Chamber are equally successful in the implementation of budget

amendments, in the presidency of permanent committees (although not in special

committees) and are not more vulnerable than the candidates who run for higher

offices” (LEONI; PERREIRA; RENNÓ, 2003, p. 64). However, it is important to point

out that the authors do not consider in their analysis the deputies who choose, during

their time in office, to run for mayor or to take over a position in the public

administration, which can hide important evidence when interpreting the influence of

electoral connections on career patterns.

On another article, Pereira and Rennó (2001) begin by questioning what are the

main determining factors for re-election of Brazilian federal deputies, given that re-

election (static ambition) is predominant among federal deputies. In this search for

factors that differentiate successful deputies from those who are not able to re-elect, the

authors highlight the importance both of local political aspects (degree of concentration

of voting, degree of dominance, campaign spending, maintaining of the electoral base,

amendments and pork barrel, and support from the governor) and political factors

related to congressional dynamic (number of bills, presence in votes, position in the

Chamber, seniority, previous experience, ideological position of the party, move to

another party, and support for the bills from the executive).

Pereira and Rennó (2001) based themselves on the premise that the Brazilian

political system – characterized by the personalization of the political process, intra-

party list competition, institutional fragility of parties, and the existence of electoral

coalitions – incentivizes granting resources to electoral bases more than performance on

matters of national interest. Regarding the Congress’ functioning, the authors follow the

position taken by Pereira (2000) that the Brazilian political system offers paradoxical

incentives for parliamentary behaviour, being party-oriented in the legislative field, and

personalistic in the electoral field.

Consequently, the main conciliatory mechanism for the paradoxical incentives of

the Brazilian political system would be the negotiation of budget amendments among

the deputies, on one side, and the party leaders and the Executive, on the other. Given

that, the results found by the authors points to the fact that their performance within the

Chamber as well as their performance when meeting the specific interests of certain

regions present a direct impact on their chances for re-election. Nonetheless, the authors

point out in their conclusions that the latter is, in fact, the one with higher electoral

gains, with the argument that there seems to be a disconnection between the deputy’s

performance in the Chamber and their electoral performance following that.

It becomes evident, from the brief presentation done thus far, that the literature

focuses on the discussion of political careers at the national level, which reflects, in part,

the emphasis given by Brazilian political science to the understanding of how the

national legislative functions, with the state and municipal legislatives only recently

getting their due attention. From the evidence found up to now, especially coming from

the defence of the importance of federalism to understand the legislative career in the

national field, as Samuels argued (2003), a significant connection can be verified

between career preferences in the national field and other levels of government.

However, despite their conclusions having an impact on the discussion of career

ambition at the state and municipal level, it is argued here that the conclusions presented

4

thus far on the “opportunity structure” cannot explain the diversity of incentives from

the Brazilian electoral system.

Regarding legislative careers in states’ legislative assemblies, the only work

known thus far is Anastasia, Correa and Nunes (2012). In this article, the authors

explore the career trajectories of state deputies from the legislative assemblies of Ceará,

Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, along four election periods: 1990, 1994, 1998 and

2002. The trajectories were analyzed using the concepts of progressive, static and

regressive ambitions, but the data was analyzed separately using the answers to the

questions: “where do deputies come from?” and “where do they go?”. The results found

indicate a predominance of static ambition as an answer for both questions. However,

the high number of deputies without information is a relevant limiting factor for the

reliability of the percentages found. As for the previous position held, the percentages

for city councilperson and civil servant are considerably high. When it comes to

subsequent positions, the percentages are quite high for deputies who were elected

mayor and federal deputy. The authors do mention an analysis of the electoral

connections, but the methodological strategy used (which differs greatly from the one

applied here) did not allow for conclusive results about the impact of electoral

connections on the career patterns of the state deputies.

Therefore, differently from previous works, this article looks to explore the career

trajectories of state deputies, highlighting that this shift implies considering an

opportunity structure different from the one presented by Samuels (2003). Not only that,

the institutional context of the states’ legislatives is very different when compared to the

Chamber of Deputies, thus implicating in different incentives for a legislative career

when career ambitions for both levels are compared. The next topic shall present some

interpretations on the dynamic of the state legislative, attempting to feature the effects

of this dynamic over the career ambitions of the deputies, especially regarding static

ambition.

2.2 The state legislative dynamic

Before proceeding with presenting the hypotheses related to electoral connections

in the state legislative arena, it is important to characterize the legislative dynamic in the

states. As said previously, the state’s legislative dynamic has not been in the Brazilian

political science mainstream when compared to what has been produced on the

Chamber of Deputies, particularly considering the period after redemocratization.

Therefore, the objective of this topic is to uncover some pertinent aspects of the studies

of the Legislative branch in the states in order to understand the career ambitions shown

by the state deputies, given that the institutional dimension has a relevant role in that

characterization.

First, the work of Fernando Abrucio (1998), “Os Barões da Federação” (The

Barons of the Federation), which has been a staple, especially to describe the

relationship between the states’ Executive and Legislative in the period immediately

after redemocratization. Starting from the gubernatorial election results in 1982,

Abrucio writes of the ascension of what he calls state ultrapresidencialism, in which the

governors became key players in politics, both in the Chamber of Deputies because of

the control over the states’ federal deputies, as well as in the states’ legislative

assemblies because of the control governors had on the deputies’ electoral bases. The

foundation for this control, according to Abrucio, is that governors concentrate

resources that can be mobilized, either to maintain political allies with participation in

state secretariats or by advancing projects in the electoral regions of political allies, or to

5

weaken the electoral bases of rivals by attributing the project or budget given to the area

to a candidate who is an ally.

However, the recent changes in the national macro-economic situation, and in

particular in the economic situation of the states beginning in 1994, create problems for

the theory of state ultrapresidentialism today. That is, if in fact the institutional

mechanisms created by the Federal Constitution of 1988 centralize agenda power in the

state executive, on the other hand the states do not possess the same resources they did

immediately after the constitutional assembly. Thus, from those changes it is to be

expected that the career of state deputies be less subjected to the control of the state

executive.

Another important work in the field of state legislatives is the book organized by

Fabiano Santos (2001), entitled “O Poder Legislativo nos estados: diversidade e

convergência” (The Legislative Branch in the states: diversity and convergence), in

which each chapter gives a brief analysis of the institutional context of one particular

assembly. It can be considered the first large attempt with the goal of exploring the

decision-making process in the states and identifying what is the role of the state

Legislative in this process when it comes to the role of the Executive, stressing the

institutional aspects that make up this relationship taking into account the current

interpretation on the Chamber of Deputies. However, the book does not make possible a

comparison of the assemblies researched with the objective of verifying how different

institutional adaptations shape different legislative dynamics from the perspective of the

Executive-Legislative relationship.

With this compared perspective as a starting point, it is important to stress here

the advances of an extensive research coordinated by Fabrício Tomio and Paolo Ricci.

The first results indicate, initially, a clear difference between the legislative dynamic of

the Chamber of Deputies and the assemblies researched; secondly, to a clear difference

in the decision-making dynamics between the legislative houses considered; and, lastly,

between different constitutional periods of the same legislative house (TOMIO; RICCI,

2009; 2010; 2012a; 2012b).

Two pieces of information that are extremely relevant can be obtained from the

conclusions of the authors. On the one hand, Tomio and Ricci (2010, p. 24) expose the

importance of institutional rules in the interpretation of the state’s legislative

production, underlining the limitation of the state’s normative breadth and the presence

of strong executives in the states with proactive power and legislative prerogatives.

From this, the consequence is that the state legislators have little legislative authority,

which usually falls on matters of limited distributive effect or of symbolic nature. On

the other hand, the authors mention that, despite those limitations, there is room for

legislative initiative on matters of broader scope, which makes interpreting the state

legislative dynamic slightly more complex than what Abrucio’s (1998) theory of state

ultrapresidentialism would lead to believe. The impact of this interpretation of state

representatives’ behaviour on career strategies is quite clear. If in fact the state

legislative is not an attractive position from the perspective of legislative possibility for

action, can a pattern of stability in state legislative careers be identified or is the position

a mere stepping-stone for higher posts, or even, if a “zigzag” career pattern can be

identified between the state legislative and the municipal executives. With that in mind,

it is glaring the need to explore the career patterns of state deputies, focusing on the

different connections shown – the hypothesis that will be developed in the next topic.

Another important dimension in the analysis of electoral connections of deputies

is the exploration of their perceptions and opinions. For this area of study, I quote the

work of Castro, Anastasia and Nunes (2009), which investigated the opinions of state

6

deputies through a survey conducted in twelve legislative assemblies. The authors used

the theoretical perspective of Arnold (1990) that was applied to the U.S. House of

Representatives, according to which the U.S. representative is not only oriented towards

a distributive logic aiming for re-election, given that their decision can vary according

to the decision-making context. Thus, they need to be aware of what position to aim for

as much as the possible effects of their decision (ARNOLD, 1990, p. 82). In addition,

the representative needs to know deeply the policy preferences of attentive publics

engaged with the topic at hand, as well as the potential preferences of inattentive

publics. An informational shortcut for this calculation, according to Arnold, is knowing

the preferences of consistent supporters. In other words, the preference intensity of

consistent supporters on certain subjects is the source of the intensity of reaction to the

behaviour of congressperson when it comes to the decision made.

By analyzing the opinions of state deputies, Castro, Anastasia and Nunes (2009, p.

986) confirm the importance of the existence of a defined electoral base and/or a group

of consistent supporters for particularist behaviour in the states researched. This result

indicates that for a significant portion of the interviewed state deputies, the relationship

with their electoral base matters to parliamentary behaviour. However, the authors also

mention in their final considerations that the analysis presented does not have as its

focus (because of limitations of the data used) an analysis of the deputies’ spatial

distribution of votes as a way of verifying if their opinions are compatible with the ones

of their electoral connections, nor how those connections cooperate in different

decision-making contexts.

2.3 The electoral connection and its impact on legislative careers

This topic revisits the concept of electoral connection as it stands for the Brazilian

institutional context, highlighting, in particular, the interpretation of its multiple

manifestations in this institutional context and the effects expected on legislative careers

at the state level.

The concept of electoral connection became widely known with the classic

“Congress: The Electoral Connection”, in which Mayhew (1974) has an extensive

discussion on the parliamentary behaviour of U.S. congresspersons. It is in this book

that Mayhew introduces the famous premise that the U.S. congresspersons are “single-

minded seekers of reelection” (MAYHEW, 1974, p. 5). To act on that premise,

according to Mayhew, congresspersons have to adapt their behaviour in order to

establish more contact with their constituencies. Consequently, the author identifies

three behaviours shown by U.S. congresspersons with the goal to establish that

connection: advertising, credit claiming and position taking.

However, while electoral districts in the U.S. have clear definitions of what is to

be the spatial configuration of the electoral base of any given congressperson, in Brazil,

proportional representation with open list and districts of large magnitude favour the

development of electoral bases with different spatial configurations within the same

district. Given that conclusion on the spatial distribution of votes for Brazilian federal

deputies, Barry Ames (2003), working from the concept of electoral connections as

described by Mayhew, defends the idea that the behaviour displayed by Brazilian

deputies would be strongly influenced by the way the geographical extraction of votes

takes place, taking up as reference, mainly, the behaviour of credit claiming as it is done

by U.S. congresspersons.

As a result, Ames (2003, p. 64) proposes the identification of two axes according

with which the spatial patterns of deputies’ votes structure themselves around: the axis

of concentration/fragmentation of votes in the municipalities in which the deputy can be

7

voted on, and the axis of dominance/sharing of votes in those municipalities.

Afterwards, these axes are combined to form a typology of four spatial patterns of

voting.

The concentrated-dominant type corresponds as close as possible to the type of

electoral connection described for the U.S. case, that is, deputies with extremely

concentrated votes in a few municipalities and with a trend to amass most of the votes

in them. That would be, then, the typical “district” deputy, given that the set of areas in

which he or she gets elected show an electoral race very similar to the ones in single-

member districts in the United States. Therefore, those deputies have the most incentive

for parochial behaviour given that their votes are extremely localized.

The second type, called fragmented-dominant, also creates incentive for

parochialism, according to Ames. Despite their horizontal distribution being

characterized by dispersion, the deputies show a tendency to obtain large part of votes

in non-contiguous municipalities. This pattern can be interpreted as a specificity of the

proportional representation system, which allows the candidates to campaign and get

votes from all the municipalities within the electoral district. However, according to

Ames (2003), due to the combination of a disperse distribution of votes and a strong

dominance over some non-contiguous municipalities, this spatial pattern would

correspond to the voting type presented by representatives who have made some sort of

deal with local political leaders, such as mayors from the same party, or who have had

some position in the state executive that allowed them to control the distribution of

policies that might have benefitted some locations in particular.

The third type, fragmented-shared, according to Ames (2003) would be common

for representatives of “interest groups” which can follow three types: representatives

whom with segments of the electorate have a great ideological affinity, voting

coherently despite their dispersion in the territory; representatives of segments of the

electorate who disperse themselves more or less uniformly throughout the electoral

district with some identity that has a significant impact on their voting intentions, such

as religious, ethnic and immigrant segments, and others; and deputies who had or have

an activity related to the media (owners of radio or TV stations, television hosts with

high ratings, etc.).

Lastly, the concentrated-shared type, which, according to Ames (2003) would

characterize itself by the high concentration of votes in a few municipalities, but with a

tendency to share those votes with other candidates. Still according to Ames (2003), this

pattern of voting would be typical (although not exclusive) of deputies elected in large

metropolitan areas and capitals, where the size of the electorate concentrated on a few

municipalities permits that several deputies obtain enough votes to be elected without

having any electoral dominance.

It is important to mention that the theory of electoral connections in Brazil has

been understood in a very limited way. Generally, works that look to explore the effects

of electoral incentives on parliamentary behaviour are centred on the search for

evidence of parochial behaviour, that is, the use of concentrated benefits (pork-barrel)

for electoral bases. This interpretational bias in the considerations on electoral

connections is due, in part, to the excessive emphasis given by Ames (2003) to

parochial parliamentary behaviour in the national arena. On the one hand, Ames

presents an interesting typology of spatial patterns of voting with the objective of

recognizing the different possible electoral connections because of the configuration of

the Brazilian electoral system. On the other, his excessively distributive interpretation of

parliamentary behaviour would be explained by the combination of an electoral system

with proportional representation and open list and a fragmented party system. These two

8

exogenous institutional factors combined would develop the predominance of an

incentive for parochial behaviour as a response to the personalism expressed in the form

of electoral extraction.

However, following the same line of analysis as Ames (2003), Carvalho (2003)

investigated the geography of votes for federal deputies elected between 1994 and 1998,

identifying the predominant types and regional differences regarding the preponderance

of determined spatial patterns of voting. Carvalho (2003) proposed to consider the

various possibilities of parliamentary behaviour – be it parochial or universal – resulting

from the different voting spatial patterns identified. Therefore, his analysis distances

itself from the misguided emphasis given by Ames on distributive behaviour, a

generalization that limited his analysis of parliamentary behaviour (CARVALHO, 2003,

p. 59). Carvalho (2003) used a survey on behaviour, values and attitudes of elected

legislators and a substantial qualitative analysis on the content of bills and amendments

proposed by Brazilian legislators to the Union’s budget. The results found are

compelling in showing the importance of electoral connections in the explanation of

parliamentary behaviour – despite the centralizing institutional mechanisms of the

federal legislative process –, contributing, thus, to the debate on how much the electoral

and parliamentary dynamics can be considered independent. In a direct dialogue with

Ames, Carvalho’s study points to the fact that the incentives for parochial behaviour are

not predominant in the Chamber of Deputies, which means that other incentives are also

present and must equally be an object of investigation.

In addition, studying attentively the characterization of the four types of spatial

patterns of voting such as presented by Ames, one can identify that the author considers

the possibility of a significant correlation between spatial patterns of voting and the

deputies’ careers. In this way, it is considered here that the investigation of electoral

connections cannot be limited to parliamentary behaviour on the plenary floor, with a

narrow focus on parliamentary behaviour. To put it in other words, it is proposed here

the consideration that incentives from the electoral system also affect significantly the

political careers of legislators.

Considering the concentrated-dominant type, given the strict relationship between

the deputies’ votes with the municipal limits that compose the districts, it can be

expected that these deputies show a strict relationship with the local political race. In

other words, it can be hypothesized that these deputies do not have an interest in

keeping a legislative career at the state level. This means that it can be expected that

these deputies come from offices of mayor or councilperson, and would be strong

candidates to mayoral candidacies later on given that the office of state deputy allows

the politician to maintain his or hers connection with the electoral base.

In the fragmented-dominant type, the hypothesis could be that these deputies

prefer to keep their parliamentary career at the state level, even as an ascension strategy

towards offices in the state Executive as a way of ensuring access to the necessary

resources to sustain the electoral performance in the places that make up their voting

base.

For the fragmented-shared type, the hypothesis is that this set of deputies do not

come from a municipal level position, given the spatial distribution of their votes, and

that they are prone to static ambition given their close relationship with state-wide

demands. However, the possibility that these deputies show progressive ambition

towards the office of federal deputy is not ruled out, although static ambition seems

more likely given the high costs of progressive ambition.

Lastly, when it comes to concentrated-shared type, is important to distinguish the

deputies who concentrate and share votes in the capital from the ones who do it in other

9

municipalities. The reason for this distinction is the fact that competition for mayoral

races in cities and towns other than the capital can be less costly. In other words, it can

be said that there is a greater incentive to compete for municipal executive office among

the deputies who concentrate and share votes in other municipalities than the ones who

do it in the capital, from which it can be concluded that among the latter a static

ambition would be predominant.

3 METHODOLOGY

The methodological starting point for this article is a taxonomy of the state

deputies elected in 2006 in the states of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do

Sul and São Paulo. This taxonomy is derived from the quantitative treatment of voting

records for the deputies in the municipalities, with the objective to operationalize the

concept of electoral connection by identifying the different spatial patterns of voting

(AMES, 2003; CARVALHO, 2003; CORRÊA, 2011).

This choice of states is justified by those being the five largest legislative

assemblies (there are 94 deputies in São Paulo, 77 in Minas Gerais, 70 in Rio de Janeiro

and 55 in Rio Grande do Sul). The high number of deputies would allow for consistent

and significant analysis of the effects of electoral connections on parliamentary

behavior, even making possible a comparative analysis of institutional constraints,

although because of the scope of this article, will not be an object of analysis.

Nonetheless, despite the limited number of cases not allowing for inferences on

the whole of Brazilian state deputies, it seems to be sufficient to test the significance of

the association between spatial patterns of voting and the career trajectory of deputies,

as the fourth section will show. It will allow, therefore, advancement in the discussion

of career patterns and electoral connections at the state level in Brazil.

3.1 Operationalizing the concept of electoral connections

3.1.1 Degree of concentration/dispersion

With the intention to verify how the votes for the elected deputies’ fit the

concentration/dispersion axis of state deputies voting analysis in each of the four states

considered, an index of the effective number of municipalities (Nmun) for each deputy was

calculated3. The construction of this index permits identifying an approximation of the

average number of municipalities where the state deputies had a significant amount of

votes4. From this index, it is possible to identify the degree of spatial concentration or

dispersion of the deputies’ votes considering the horizontal axis of their voting

distribution. The indicator is calculated using the following formula:

3 This methodological tool is an adaptation of the established index of the effective number of parties (N)

by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) which has the objective of measuring the “effective” number of parties

in a particular party system; that is, to provide an approximate number of parties that compete for the

majority of votes in any given party system. In other words, this index is nothing more than a

mathematical construct that facilitates the visualization of the degree of concentration/fragmentation of

the competition in a determined area. 4 There are reservations regarding the fact that this index does not include in its calculation any spatial

element that considers distance. Nonetheless, it was used firstly, because it presented satisfactory results

in Carvalho’s (2003) analysis; secondly, because it allows a comparison with the results found in his

analysis; lastly, especially because it excludes complications specific to spatial statistical analysis by

dealing with a very heterogeneous space.

10

∑

⁄

In which is the proportion of votes of deputy i in municipality j; and n is the

number of municipalities where deputy i received votes.

Box 1 shows the descriptive statistics of Nmun for each legislative assembly

considered. The results point to a clear trend towards concentration of votes in a few

municipalities in the cases of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The Minas Gerais and Rio

Grande do Sul assemblies show higher averages, indicating that the votes tend to be

more dispersed in those two states.

Box 1 – Descriptive statistics of the index of the actual number of municipalities (Nmun)

for the state deputies

Legislative Assemblies Number of

deputies Minimum Maximum Mean

Standard

deviation

São Paulo 94 1,13 43,23 5,86 6,09

Minas Gerais 77 1,44 56,17 14,07 13,62

Rio de Janeiro 70 1,05 21,65 3,56 3,64

Rio Grande do Sul 55 1,44 68,55 15,11 17,00

Source: the author, based on data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Portuguese) -

2006.

From the information of all the Nmun, a typology was constructed that

encompasses different degrees of concentration/dispersion of the deputies’ votes within

each state considered5. Meaning that, keeping the four types of vote

concentration/dispersion used by Carvalho (2003), the results of the index for each set

of deputies were submitted to a cluster analysis in order to group them into four

brackets6.

Box 2 shows the results of the classification of deputies according to the degree of

concentration/dispersion of their votes using the k-means procedure for each of the

legislative assemblies considered. The results of this classification reaffirm the

peculiarity found in most votes, with this trend being stronger in the cases of Rio de

Janeiro and São Paulo. In Minas Gerais, for instance, the high concentration bracket

corresponds to less than half of the cases.

Box 2 – Cluster analysis of the index of the effective number of municipalities per state

deputy

5 From here on out, the adjustments done in Côrrea (2011) for constructing the typology used in Carvalho

(2003) will be used. Because these were elections for different offices, it was not possible to follow the

same cutoff points as Carvalho, as well as the fact that the method used in Côrrea allows for an alternative

to the definition of arbitrary cutoffs in the index’s values. 6 The solution found for the classification of different degrees of concentration/dispersion of votes proved

satisfactory, given that this procedure has as its goal to find value groups of a same variable with averages

that distance significantly among themselves from a previously defined number of groups. In other words,

this procedure allows the classification of the type of concentration/dispersion of deputies’ votes among

each other from significant breaks in the distribution of the different indexes of concentration/dispersion.

11

São Paulo Minas Gerais Rio de Janeiro

Rio Grande do

Sul

Cluster Dep. % Dep. % Dep. % Dep. %

High concentration 68 72,3 35 45,5 51 72,9 33 60,0

Medium concentration 21 22,3 21 27,3 15 21,4 10 18,2

Medium dispersion 4 4,3 15 19,5 3 4,3 8 14,5

High dispersion 1 1,1 6 7,8 1 1,4 4 7,3

Source: the author, based on data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Portuguese) -

2006.

3.1.2 Degree of dominance/sharing

The result previously presented for the horizontal axis of vote distribution for state

deputies is interesting in that it shows the predominance of a concentrated pattern of

spatial distribution of voting in the four legislative assemblies studied. However, as

Carvalho (2003) highlights, the vertical axis of the votes for elected deputies as

proposed by Ames (2003) can modify substantially the interpretation of electoral

connections by taking into consideration deputies’ electoral dominance. According to

Carvalho (2003), the hypothesis that gives base to the study of the degree of vertical

distribution of elected deputies’ votes as well as being linked with the existence of less

competitive electoral markets, could also function as a strong incentive for parochial

parliamentary behaviour, given that the dominance over votes in any municipality

implies that this is an electoral stronghold clearly identified by its territorial boundaries.

The concept of dominance as formulated by Ames (2003) and used by Carvalho

(2003) and Côrrea (2011) allows for the comprehension of the degree in which any

given deputy is able to polarize the vote in relation to the other candidates in the

municipalities where he or she gets the most votes. Therefore, the concept of dominance

is nothing more than, according to the original formulation of Ames (2003, p. 65), an

index of average dominance that takes into consideration the percentage of the deputy’s

votes in the municipalities, weighted by his or hers votes in the municipality in relation

to the total votes received in the state. Thus, the index for average dominance (Dmun) is

calculated by the following formula:

∑(

)

In which is the total of votes received by candidate in municipality ; is the total

of valid votes for state deputies in municipality ; is the total of votes received by

deputy j in the whole state and n is the total number of municipalities where the deputy

received votes.

Box 3 shows the descriptive statistics of Dmun for each legislative assembly.

Despite this index not being immediately clear in its interpretation, it is possible to

notice a tendency to vote sharing in the four assemblies considered, with dominance

being a little greater in Minas Gerais and a little smaller in Rio de Janeiro.

Box 3 – Descriptive statistics for the index for average dominance (Dmun) of the state

deputies

12

Legislative Assemblies Number of

deputies Minimum Maximum Mean

Standard

deviation

São Paulo 94 0,01 0,70 0,236 0,200

Minas Gerais 77 0,03 0,70 0,332 0,172

Rio de Janeiro 70 0,01 0,53 0,146 0,144

Rio Grande do Sul 55 0,05 0,72 0,265 0,157

Source: the author, based on data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Portuguese) -

2006.

From the information of the indexes for average dominance calculated for each

elected deputy, a typology was constructed encompassing different degrees of

dominance with the goal of identifying different dominance profiles among the

deputies. The analysis done by Carvalho (2003) considered four degrees of vote

dominance among the federal deputies, using the standard deviation of the index of

dominance to classify them into four different degrees of dominance/sharing7.

All that is left to know is, therefore, how the state deputies are grouped according

to their degree of electoral dominance in the four selected assemblies. In Box 4, that

shows the results of the cluster analysis of the index of average dominance over

municipalities (Dmun), it can be noticed that the results do not point to dominance as the

most frequent type. On the contrary, vote sharing tends to be very high as in the case of

Rio de Janeiro, in which 55,7% of deputies presented high sharing of votes. The

deputies of Minas Gerais were the ones who presented a higher tendency towards

dominance when compared to the other states, with the percentage of deputies with high

dominance being 23,4%. However, despite not being predominant, vote dominance in

the case of the state deputies investigated, presented very noteworthy values considering

that the electoral system incentivizes vote dispersion. Therefore, the results presented

thus far indicate a local electoral connection for a considerable amount of deputies.

Box 4 – Cluster analysis of the index of average dominance over municipalities (Dmun)

of state deputies

São Paulo Minas Gerais

Rio de

Janeiro

Rio Grande

do Sul

Cluster Dep. % Dep. % Dep. % Dep. %

High dominance 5 5,3 18 23,4 6 8,6 3 5,5

Medium dominance 26 27,7 20 26,0 11 15,7 18 32,7

Medium sharing 26 27,7 25 32,5 14 20,0 20 36,4

High sharing 37 39,4 14 18,2 39 55,7 14 25,5

Source: the author, based on data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Portuguese) -

2006.

3.1.3 Spatial patterns of voting

7 For this study, the same grouping procedure applied in the construction of the degree of spatial

concentration/fragmentation of the deputies’ votes was used, since the cluster analysis by the k-means

method showed a satisfactory result in the construction of patterns of spatial dispersion of votes

(CÔRREA, 2011).

13

According to Ames’ (2003) analytical proposition, the existence of two axes of

configuration of spatial distribution for elected deputies’ votes (concentration and

dominance) allows a combination into a typology of spatial patterns, thus defining four

different incentive profiles for parliamentary behaviour (concentrated-dominant,

concentrated-shared, fragmented-dominant, and fragmented-shared), each

corresponding to a type of electoral connection.

Furthermore, among the state deputies classified as concentrated-shared it was

important to differentiate those who concentrate more than 50% of their votes in the

capital from those who concentrate the majority of their votes in other municipalities.

The justification for this distinction is the fact that it is possible that the deputies whose

voting spatial pattern was characterized as concentrated-shared show the same

incentives to local ambition as the concentrated-dominant. As it can be seen from the

results in Box 5, there is a predominance of the concentrated-dominant and

concentrated-shared in other municipalities types, although, in the case of Rio de

Janeiro, it is evident the weight of the capital’s presence in relation to the rest of the

state. Same as the case of São Paulo, where the percentage of deputies who concentrate

votes in the capital is equal to the percentage of deputies who concentrate and dominate

votes in smaller towns in the state.

Box 5 – Spatial pattern of voting for state deputies in municipalities

São Paulo Minas Gerais Rio de Janeiro

Rio Grande do

Sul

Spatial patterns of voting Dep. % Dep. % Dep. % Dep. %

Concentrated-dominant 31 33,0 26 33,8 16 22,9 19 34,5

Concentrated-shared in the

capital 31 33,0 7 9,1 28 40,0 8 14,5

Concentrated-shared in other

municipalities 27 28,7 23 29,9 22 31,4 16 29,1

Fragmented-dominant 0 0,0 12 15,6 1 1,4 2 3,6

Fragmented-shared 5 5,3 9 11,7 3 4,3 10 18,2

Source: the author, based on data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Portuguese) - 2006.

3.2 Identifying the deputies’ career trajectories

In order to identify the career trajectories of state deputies elected in 2006 in the

four legislative assemblies considered, a quantitative analysis was done of election

results from 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2010. Which means that for each deputy elected in

2006 the following situations were identified: if they ran in either of the previous

elections, and if they ran in either of the subsequent elections to the year of reference8.

Along with participation in elections for the selected years, other information

considered was for which office they ran and if they were elected or not. As said

previously, for the analysis of career ambitions, the unsuccessful cases in races after the

8 For this analysis, the 26 deputies who did not participate in the 2008 and 2010 elections were excluded

either because they left politics, had their terms revoked, their candidacies refused or took non-elective

positions. Given the small number of cases and the diversity of reason for abandoning the career, it was

decided to not analyze the trajectory of these deputies. It is expected that, with the increase of the number

of cases it will be possible to formulate hypotheses for these occurrences.

14

year of reference will not be excluded given that the interest in running for the office in

question would already be indicative of the interest of getting the coveted position9.

In order to identify the ambitions, the terms progressive, static and regressive

were kept as used by the literature. Next, the ambition for each trajectory segment was

characterized using the following hierarchy of preference for elective positions in terms

of the benefits gained: Governor is preferable to Senator, which is preferable to Mayor,

which is preferable to Federal Deputy, which preferable to State Deputy, which, lastly,

is preferable to the office of Councilperson. Consequently, seven classifying categories

of the trajectory segments were developed in relation to the nature of ambition and the

level of government of reference: national, state or local progressive, static, and

national, state or local regressive.

From the characterization of ambition in every trajectory segment, some trajectory

groups were separated by the path taken before arriving at the assembly in 2006. Within

these groups, it was attempted to identify the path taken after the reference legislature as

a way of capturing the main career ambition of the deputy, taking the trajectory as a

whole. The result of that classification can be seen in Box 6.

9 The existence of party strategies, characteristic influences of local competition, as well as coattail effects

of presidential and gubernatorial campaigns in the conditioning of the deputies’ careers and the chances

for success cannot be ignored. However, because of space limitations, those elements will not be explored

here. In addition, it is presupposed that just the identification of trajectories, highlighting those with

progressing ambitions is sufficient to explore the hypothesis in question. The argument here is that the

effect of the spatial configuration of the deputies’ votes on their career trajectories would come prior to

the conditioning factors listed above.

15

Box 6 – Classification of state deputies’ career trajectories according to origin and

predominant career ambition

Regarding the path taken before the arrival at the legislative assembly, it was

possible to identify seven trajectory groups. The first group is composed of deputies

16

who are beginners in politics and were elected for the first time for state deputy in 2006.

The second group is composed of deputies who ran for councilperson (elected or not) in

the 2004 elections. The third groups encompasses those who ran for mayor in 2004,

including those who were on their second term between the years 2000 and 2004 and

could not run for the same position10

. The fourth group is made up of individuals who

ran for state deputy in 2002 (elected or not) and did not run for any office in the 2004

elections. The fifth group encompasses individuals who ran for state deputy in 2002 and

ran for mayor in the 2004 elections. The sixth group is the set of deputies who ran for

councilperson in the 2004 elections, even having competed for the office of state deputy

in the previous election11

. Lastly, the seventh and final group is made up of the deputies

who ran for national positions in the 2002 elections (federal deputy or senator)12

.

As for the path taken afterwards, the options are: (1) competing for federal deputy

or senator in the 2010 elections, which means a national progressive ambition; (2)

competing for state deputy in the 2010 elections, which means static ambition; (3)

competing for mayor in 2008, being defeated (local progressive ambition) and later for

state deputy in 2010 (state regressive ambition); and, lastly, (4) winning for mayor in

2008, which means a local progressive ambition.

Therefore, what is left to discover is the predominant career ambition of state

deputies elected in 2006, given that the entry and exit paths were very diverse, which

corresponds to the diversity of possible political career trajectories in a tripartite

federative system. Consequently, it was opted to identify the predominant ambition of

the deputies from the trajectory after the 2006 election. Therefore, progressive ambition

at the national level is the trajectory in which the deputy ran either for federal deputy or

senator in 2010, purely static ambition is the one in which the deputy stood again for

state deputy in 2010, pseudo-static ambition is the one in which the deputy ran without

success for mayor in the 2008 elections, and, finally, progressive ambition at the local

level is the trajectory in which the deputy is successful in the competition for mayor in

2008.

Based on that classification, the next section will search for evidence regarding

the hypothesis previously mentioned, that the spatial patterns of voting (procedure

described in topic 3.1) show significant relationships with the different trajectories

identified, especially when it comes to the predominant ambition.

4 RESULTS

This section analyzes the significance of the association between the spatial

patterns of voting and the various career trajectories. Table 1 presents the results of the

crosstabs between spatial patterns of voting and the trajectory groups defined in topic

3.2. When the distribution of classified deputies in each spatial pattern of voting is

compared with the distribution of the total of deputies in each of the trajectory groups, a

few trends can be noticed which seem to confirm the hypothesis presented.

10 Although those individuals were not in elective office at the time of the 2006 elections, it was chosen to

include them in the third group because they share a similar trajectory to the others. 11 Therefore, given the regressive nature of ambition in the trajectory segment, from state deputy to

councilperson, it was decided to separate this set of deputies from the fifth group, even though both show

local ambition. 12 This group included the individuals who stood for local positions in the 2004 election because,

regardless of the fact that they ran for an executive local office, the entry trajectory is predominantly

regressive.

17

Table 1 – Career trajectory groups according to spatial patterns of votes

Trajectory groups Total

Spatial patterns of votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Concentrated-dominant N 8 6 17 41 8 1 3 84

% 9,5 7,1 20,2 48,8 9,5 1,2 3,6 100

Concentrated-shared in the

capital N 19 5 0 35 1 3 4 67

% 28,4 7,5 0,0 52,2 1,5 4,5 6,0 100

Concentrated-shared in

other municipalities N 9 8 7 44 10 3 2 83

% 10,8 9,6 8,4 53,0 12,0 3,6 2,4 100

Fragmented-dominant N 2 0 0 11 0 0 0 13

% 15,4 0,0 0,0 84,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 100

Fragmented-shared N 4 1 0 18 0 0 0 23

% 17,4 4,3 0,0 78,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 100

Total N 42 20 24 149 19 7 9 270

% 15,6 7,4 8,9 55,2 7,0 2,6 3,3 100

Note: χ² (24) = 53,288; p<0,05.

Source: the author, based on data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Portuguese) - 2002,

2004, 2006, 2008 e 2010.

First, considering that group 4 corresponds to the deputies who are from the

previous legislature, it is concluded that the assemblies studied renewed, on average,

over half of their deputies in the 2006 election, with the largest part of the new deputies

arriving at the assembly without any previous experience in representative office

(15,6%).

Regarding the different spatial patterns of votes, the deputies who present a

concentrated-dominant pattern when compared to the whole set of deputies, show a

tendency to arrive at the legislative assembly after having been mayor or having run in

the previous election. On the other hand, it is smaller the number of deputies who did

not hold a previous legislative office. This means that those deputies tend to be, on

average, more experienced than the others and this experience tends to be in the local

government.

When it comes to the set of deputies who have a concentrated-shared pattern in

the capital, an increase in the proportion of novice deputies, beginning their elective

careers or that had been away for a while is observed. Contrary to the previous group,

this set of deputies tends, on average, to be less experienced than the rest. This higher

concentration of novice deputies can be because of the elevated political competition in

the capitals where the renewal of the term becomes a challenge at the same time that the

concentration of population favours reaching the electoral quotient needed to be elected.

On the other hand, considering the set of deputies with concentrated-shared spatial

pattern in the other municipalities, there is little difference in the distribution of the

trajectory groups in comparison with the whole set of deputies. A slight increase in the

proportion of deputies of group 5 can be noticed, that is, the ones who were elected state

deputy in 2002 and tried without success for mayor in the 2004 elections. This higher

percentage of deputies in group 5 had also a smaller proportion of novice deputies in the

state legislative career 2006.

The set of deputies who presented a fragmented-dominant voting pattern is

smaller when compared to the others, considering the particular nature of this spatial

distribution. For this reason, any attempts at comparisons with deputies who presented

other voting patterns is limited. This does not, however, impede the realisation that

there is a certain trend to a larger proportion of deputies in group 4, that is, those who

18

were re-elected in the 2006 elections. Therefore, the link that this spatial pattern has

with the state politics dynamic is clear, at least when it comes to the entry trajectory.

Lastly, the result of the distribution of trajectory groups among the deputies with

fragmented-shared pattern differs little from the ones with a fragmented-dominant

profile. Once again, it can be said that these deputies have a strong link with state

dynamics from the perspective of the entry trajectory.

Table 2 below shows the association between the career trajectories’ predominant

ambition presented by the deputies and the spatial pattern of voting.

Table 2 – Types of predominant career ambition according to the spatial patterns of

voting

Type of predominant career ambition

Total

Spatial patterns of voting

National

progressive Static

Pseudo-

static

Local

progressive

Concentrated-dominant N 4 54 15 11 84

% 4,8 64,3 17,9 13,1 100

Concentrated-shared in the

capital N 5 61 1 0 67

% 7,5 91,0 1,5 0,0 100

Concentrated-shared in

other municipalities N 11 54 16 2 83

% 13,3 65,1 19,3 2,4 100

Fragmented-dominant N 1 12 0 0 13

% 7,7 92,3 0,0 0,0 100

Fragmented-shared N 10 13 0 0 23

% 43,5 56,5 0,0 0,0 100

Total N 31 194 32 13 270

% 11,5 71,9 11,9 4,8 100

Note: χ² (12) = 65,96; p<0,05.

Source: the author, based on data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Portuguese) - 2002,

2004, 2006, 2008 e 2010.

By comparing the composition of the spatial patterns of voting according with the

types of predominant ambition in the deputies’ trajectories, with the distribution of

those ambitions over the set of deputies, some interesting results were found.

Firstly, the connection between deputies with a concentrated-dominant pattern

with the local dynamics can be seen, given that 13,1% of the deputies from that group

have a local progressive predominant ambition. That, along with the 17,9% of deputies

with a pseudo-static ambition, add up to more than a quarter of the total of deputies

from that group.

The sets of deputies with concentrated-shared pattern in the capital and

fragmented-dominant pattern showed a larger proportion of deputies with a purely static

ambition. As said previously, both profiles have a strong link with the state political

dynamic and, excluding the ones who retired and other situations that hindered

candidacies, almost all of them sought re-election in 2010.

However, the set of deputies who have a concentrated-shared pattern in other

municipalities showed a pattern much closer to the one displayed by the deputies with

concentrated-dominant pattern. The difference between them is the concentration of

deputies with local level progressive ambition, which is greater among the deputies with

a concentrated-dominant pattern than among deputies with a concentrated-shared

pattern in other municipalities.

19

Lastly, the deputies with a fragmented-shared spatial pattern displayed a profile

much more balanced between static and national progressive ambitions. This indicates a

greater connection with the national political dynamic, with the office of state deputy a

stepping-stone in the path towards a career at the federal level.

5 CONCLUSIONS

This article presented some contributions in the study of legislative careers, in

both theoretical and empirical fields. Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, it was

shown the importance of a shift in focus regarding re-election, especially the

determining factors for success and failure, for the analysis of individual trajectories of

deputies, taking into account the different offices available and, mainly, considering that

the spatial configuration of deputies’ votes is an important conditioning element of

those trajectories.

Secondly, from an empirical perspective, it was drawn attention to the fact that it

is necessary, when analyzing the career trajectory of deputies, to take more than two

points in time, thus including the presence in races for offices in different levels

(national, state and municipal). This is because the analysis of two points in time can

hide ambitions towards different levels, especially in the case of pseudo-static ambition

in which the deputies run for local elections and, when they fail, seek out re-election for

legislative office. If only two points in time were analyzed, those deputies would be

wrongly classified as having static ambition, which is not compatible with their

presence in races for Executive municipal office.

There is another theoretical implication in the analysis of legislative career

ambitions that comes as a direct consequence of the methodological innovation

introduced when analyzing the deputies’ trajectory considering different points in time.

That is, when considering the deputies’ ambitions for elective offices in a federative

system, the loss in elections cannot be ignored in any federative level, running the risk

of hiding a predominantly local ambition, even if ill-fated. This realisation also

highlights the importance of the different degrees of competition associated with

different positions over the trajectories presented, especially when comparing the race

for state legislative office and for executive office in the municipalities. If in fact, a

significant portion of deputies presents a predominantly local career ambition – which

in no small measure corresponds to how their votes are distributed spatially – the

electoral competition at the municipal level can be an obstacle on the way to success. It

is important to note that the deputies who ran against current mayors were likely facing

incumbents, which would greatly minimize their chances for victory.

Lastly, from the results presented it can be said that static ambition is in fact

predominant among the state deputies elected in 2006 for the legislative assemblies

considered. This coincides greatly with the findings of Leoni, Pereira and Rennó (2001)

for the Chamber of Deputies. This empirical result is very important especially given

the current interpretation about the institutional dynamic of the states’ Legislatives,

which leads to expect that deputies would be more interested in other offices than

staying in the same position. Moreover, adopting Samuel’s (2003) argument that career

ambition is related to the nature of the position and that deputies’ ambition is

predominantly progressive, the result found here puts that assertion into perspective for

the state deputies. The explanation for that seems to be in the fact that the deputies’

spatial pattern of voting, displaying different types of relationships with the electoral

bases, directly conditions the deputies’ career trajectories.

20

It is my hope to increase the number of legislative assemblies studied, as well as

the number of years considered, in order to test the hypothesis used here in a more

robust manner, with a larger set of data and a greater institutional diversity, even

making possible the use of a compared perspective.

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