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DOI: 10.1177/0309816899068001041999 23: 21Capital & Class

John Michael Robertsarxism and Critical Realism: The Same, Similar, or Just Plain Different?

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1. Introduction

SINCE THEIR BIRTH in 1975 with the publication of RoyBhaskarsA Realist Theory of Science, critical realists havesought to advance an emancipatory project for the social

sciences. Attacking both empiricism and idealism, critical realismargues that through the abstraction of concepts from realitycausal mechanisms and structures can be examined which,although seen as the outcome of human praxis, operateindependently of human praxis. Thus individuals can criticallyunderstand the structures which constrain them. According toAndrew Collier therefore a theory is realist in a strong(critical)sense if it makes four claims about knowledge: 1) Objectivity, inthe sense that something might be real without appearing at all.2) Fallibility, in the sense that claims are always open to refutationby further evidence. 3) Transphenomenality, in the sense that

there is always a need to go beyond appearances. 4) Counter-phenomenality, in the sense that deep structures can contradictappearances(Collier 1994: 67).

Marxism and Critical Realism: TheSame, Similar, or Just Plain Different?1

by John Michael Roberts

The author examines the relationship between Marxism and criticalrealism. He problematises the suggestion that Marx implicitly utiliseda critical realist theoretical framework. He does this by exploring threeareas of inquiry: epistemology and ideology; the method ofabstraction; causal powers and social form. By exploring theseareas, the author demonstrates that critical realism in fact pursues adifferent theoretical project to that of Marxism. Moreover, by severingthe link between theory and practice, critical realism commitsfundamental theoretical problems and errors which it initially claimedto have surpassed. The author concludes by suggesting that theseproblems were inherent within the critical realist project from the outset.

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It also used to be suggested by critical realists that a greatdebt of inspiration was owed to the works of Marx. Marxsimilarly conceived science as a process of abstracting conceptsin order to comprehend underlying structures (Issac 1990: 18).

But such admiration is also tinged with enmity. For Marx isoften seen to be a deficientrealist because he advocates a formof historicism. At his worst, Marxs occasional adherence to amonistic hyper-naturalismchampions a form of biologicalevolution for the social sciences (Manicas 1987: 116). Bhaskarhas put the point more plainly. If Marxism is to make anyprogress as a research tradition and escape a form of historic-ism it has four stark choices: the neo-positivism of analyticalMarxism, the neo-Kantianism of Habermasian communicative

action theory, the neo-Nietzscheanism of post-Marxism ordialectical critical realism (Bhaskar 1993: 352). In other wordsMarxism should seek out a realist meta-theory (Outhwaite1990: 374) in order to explore the complex levels throughwhich the abstractdynamics of capital are mediated (Marsden1998: 31819).

Perhaps the disquiet today over Marxs realiststatus is tobe expected. After all Marx was never consciously working asa critical realist. But if this is the case some important questions

present themselves. To what extent could Marx ever beassimilated to the critical realist cause? How does Marxs realismdiffer from his materialism? Are they the same, similar or justplain different? These are certainly pertinent questions becausemany theorists still professing adherence to Marxism take thecritical realist assault seriously and attempt to incorporate Marxto a critical realist theoretical/methodological framework.2

My purpose in this paper is to problematise some of theassumptions underlying this incorporation. My argumentproceeds as follows. In section 2 I examine some epistemo-logical claims made by critical realists. It is my contention thattheir epistemological insights do not allow for the developmentof an adequate theory of knowledge for the simple reason thatthey do not nourish a critical theory of ideology in any objectivesense. In section 3 I examine some methodological claims madeby critical realists. It is my claim here that the critical realistmethod of abstraction seriously misinterprets the same

methodological project of Marx and thereby undermines theirassertion of uniting theory to practice. In section 4 I examinesome ontological claims made by critical realists. It is my

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contention here that they are not objectiveenough in theirself-professed aim of discovering causal powersbecause theyfail to discover at the same time the determinativeforce ofthose very same causal powers. I conclude by suggesting that

critical realists today prioritise method over the theory-practicedialectic. Marxists therefore have a fifth, more obvious optionthan those heralded by Bhaskar: the Marxism of Marx, namelyhistorical materialism.

2. Epistemology and Ideology

In this section I wish to suggest that the critical realist theory of

knowledge is inadequate. Its inadequacy stems from adebilitating subjectivism, itself predicated upon the separationof appearance from reality. The result of such a severance is alack of any critical theoretical tools with which to understandhow objective social structures can be transformed. This lack isthe outcome of a weak theory of ideology-critique. I begin firstby outlining a version of the critical realist theory of knowledge.

A critical realist theory of knowledge

Critical realists agree upon the basic premise that in order togain adequate knowledge of the world there is a necessity todevelop a naturalist theory of knowledge; the idea that there is anessential unity of method between the natural and social sciences(Bhaskar 1989: 67). But this statement is immediately qualifiedby Bhaskar. Just as similarities are evident between both naturaland social scientific methods, so are differences. Bhaskar suggeststhree: i.) social structures, unlike natural structures, do not existindependently of the activities they govern; ii.) social structures,unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of theagentsconceptions of what they are doing in their activity; iii.)social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relativelyenduring (so that the tendencies they ground may not beuniversal in the sense of space-time invariant) (Bhaskar ibid.:79). According to Bhaskar, these principles demonstrateontological, epistemological and relational limits to naturalism.

But if this is the case, how do we gain social scientific

knowledge? Bhaskars answer lies with his

transformationalmodel of social activity(TMSA). This model revolves around

the claim that society is both the condition and outcome of

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human praxis, while praxis is the (conscious) production and(unconscious) reproduction of society (Bhaskar ibid.: 92). Byadopting the TMSA we can gain adequate knowledge of themotivated productionsof society along with the unmotivated

conditionsnecessary for these productions. In line with his

limits to naturalism, however, Bhaskar strongly urges us tofollow an epistemological relativismobjects and structurescan only be known under particular definitions (Bhaskar1978: 249). This is an anti-foundationalist theory of knowledgeinsofar that beingis only contingently related to knowledge(Pratt 1995: 65). Bhaskar consequently avoids the pitfalls ofboth extreme relativism and extreme foundationalism byinsisting that there can only be relative degrees of truth or falsity,

adequacy or inadequacy, better or worse knowledge becauseknowledge is a practical experience which presupposes anontologically structured world. Beingis only ever contingentlyrelated to knowledge and the latter alters in form as newstructuresof reality are discovered (Outhwaite 1987: 3644).

But many fellow critical realists are not convinced byBhaskars argument (e.g. Benton 1981a; Collier 1994; Keat andUrry 1982). Collier for instance argues that knowledge neednot be characterised as an internal means of assessment

through specific descriptions. All thatepistemologydemands is that a theoretical practice be an enquiry into reality,that is, aims to measure its propositions against reality(Collier1979: 92). In this sense adequate knowledge of the world isarrived at through practice, through the testing of ideas againstthe real world. By invoking a correspondence theory oftruthstatements of the world correspond in some way oranother to the real worlda priori and relativist theories ofknowledge are rejected in favour of a definition of truth.Correspondhere is specially chosen to pick out the relationthat holds when as it is said, so it is (Collier 1994: 240). Buteven though Collier is critical of Bhaskars conception ofepistemology he nevertheless sets out from the sameepistemological assumptions, namely the need to situateknowledge within human praxis.

The philosophy of praxis and a materialist theory of knowledge

There can be no doubt that the philosophy of praxismaintainsstrong links within the Marxist tradition, the notebooks of

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Gramsci being a clear example. Praxis theory seeks to bridgethe gap between abstractand concreteby suggesting thatthrough practical activity humans reproduce the very structureswhich in turn produce them. Realitycan only be meaningful

for human actors to the extent that they creatively come to knowand understand it. Thus knowledge is generated throughpractical activity (Hoffman 1975: 1619; see also Hoffman1986). Yet although Marx undeniably does talk about thepractical activityof humans does this imply also: i.) that Marxis an adherent to praxis theory?; ii) that the praxis theorypursued by critical realists is a development of Marxs ideas?3

If Marx does speak incessantly about human activity, hedoes so in relation to a particular kind of human activity. Marx

insists that human labour, in contradistinction to human praxis,is the fundamental category for the reproduction of socialrelations. Labour is a useful category because it can alsoincorporate relations of exploitation, surplus-extraction and ashared cognitive schema. Labour-relations denote a total socialexperience because they establish the main parameters ofstruggle (Rosenberg 1994: 51: cf. Clarke 1991). Let me explainfurther.

At a meta-theoretical level we can say that the world upon

which humans labour is not a passive object. As Engels says,(the world) does not move in the eternal oneness of aperpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historicalevolution(Engels,Anti-Dhring1975: 36). Different layers ofthe world are a particular and relatively autonomousmanifestation and development of a universal materialsubstance. The world is in a state of motion. Consciousnessexists as a qualitative manifestation of this motion and, as aform of matter, consciousness assists labour in thinking aboutthe appropriation of this motion to meet human needs. Yet tothinkis to think about something. Thus although matterexists independently of consciousness, consciousness cannotexist independently of matter (Sayers 1983: 18). Thoughtitselfis a particular, distinct manifestation of matter. So much so,in fact, that history itself is a realpart of natural historyofnature developing into man(Marx 1970: 143). Consciousnessand human agency arise from natural-historical circumstances

in the form of a being for self-creation (Marx and Engels 1968:3940; see also Hoffman 1986: 117; Woolfson 1982).Consciousness, as a material substance, is thereby a reflection

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reality. As Marx announces: For Hegel, the process ofthinking is the creator of the real worldWith me the reverseis true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected inthe mind of man and translated into forms of thought (Marx

1988: 102).A proviso must be inserted at this juncture. Materialistreflection theory does not entail an empiricist reflection theory.The latter argues that consciousness merely registers images

via our senses in a mechanistic manner while the former arguesthat consciousness actively reconstructs the real, activeproperties of the object, as part of labouring activity, which itthen reflects in consciousness. We do not merely reflect reality,we also actively create reality. Life gives rise to the brain. Nature

is reflected in the human brain. By checking and applying thecorrectness of these reflections in his practice and technique,man arrives at objective truth(Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks1972: 201; see also LeninsMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism1964: 129).

This is an important point, if for no other reason than thefact that critical realists dismiss reflection theory exactly onthe grounds that it is contaminated by empiricism. In the samebreath they reject the monismassociated with reflection

theory because they see it as championing a sort of essentialismwhich seeks to reduce all cognitive relations to a single,ontologically, foundational cause (Bhaskar 1993: 217; Issac opcit.: 20; Lovering 1987: 290; 1990: 43; Sayer 1981: 1415). Notonly however is it clear that different forms of reflection theoryexist, but it is equally clear that the easy dismissal of reflectiontheory invites critical realists to espouse a form of the structure-agency couplet and the dilemmas which accompany it. It isdifficult to perceive the TMSA in any other light. Just asstructures constrain human actors so human actors produceconsequences which go beyond their intentions. This is asymmetricalvision of society and the problems which Bhaskardiscovered with similar theories, namely voluntarism anddeterminism, are embedded also within the TMSA (Bryant1995: 84). I will expand upon the dualistproblem here in latersections. For the moment I wish to stay with epistemology inorder to see how the critical realist dualistunderstanding of

this area translates into their ideology-critique. Let me firstbegin by saying something about the Marxist theory ofideology.

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A tale of two ideology-critiques

Marxism suggests that although a necessary relationship mustexist between reality and how we think about reality, there alsoexists a degree of contingency with this relationship.

Consciousness can always supply us with certain illusions aboutreality. Albeit, illusions still reflect truths about the objectiveworld and thereby present us with illusionary forms of reality(Hoffman 1984: 101ff.; Sayers 1985: 13441). Ideology is onemanifestation of this illusion.

Ideology, Marx consistently argued, relates to a limited socialpractice whereby the failure to solve contradictions in realityleads to an epistemological distortion concerning solutionsabout those contradictions. This distortion is not simply false

but is itself a real manifestation of a contradictory essence.Essence and appearance are therefore both forms of the samereality. Correspondingly if ideology inverts the world in whichwe live, this is only because the social relations of which ideologyplays a part are themselves already inverted. For example, thewage-form conceals the contradiction between the labourersfull day of work and the extraction of surplus-value. Ideology,by negating the inverted world of social relations in this manner,imbues appearances with an autonomous existence. Within

specific class relations, therefore, ideology conceals objectivecontradictions which emanate from those relations. Under theseconditions ideology can be said to benefit the interests of aruling class. We arrive at a criticaltheory of ideology (Larrain1979: 35 ff.).

Critical realists, on the other hand, do not conceive realityand knowledge as unity-in-opposites. Separation betweenreality and appearance is accomplished because phenomenalforms are argued to be only realitiesof a causally secondarykind relative to real essences(Benton 1977: 178). This impliesthat appearances merely conceal reality, a reality which is onlyavailable to thought. Knowledge merely flows from the actionof the subject, but is not acquired from nor reliant upon contactwith the object through experience (Sayers 1985: 30). Hencecritical realisms rejection of empiricism.

By severing appearance from reality critical realists can onlylegitimately investigate ideology and, hence, knowledge, from

a neutral standpoint. A neutral theory of knowledgeconfronts the world from a shaky epistemological platformbecause it has no objective realitywith which to compare its

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own truth-claims from those made by competing truth-claims.Or rather, knowledge is not seen to be a distinct and uniqueform of an objective reality. Implicitly, therefore, theepistemological validity of competing truth-claims must be

accepted and the chance to be critical diminishes considerably(Larrain 1994: 7980).To give one illustration, Benton asserts that ideology can be

divided into two facets: theoretical ideology and practicalideology. Specifically, (theoretical ideologies) may be thoughtof as articulations, in theoretical form, of the practical ideologiesof the different social classes, the totality of these together ineach case constituting the form of social consciousnesspeculiar to each class. Each theoretical ideology, then, is based

on a corresponding practical ideology, embodied in thepractices, experiences, struggles, etc. of the corresponding classand its individual members(Benton 1977: 179). What Bentonseems to suggest is that each social class experiences, in itsparticular structural position, aspects of certain causalmechanisms, themselves situated within a mode of production,which then feedinto the theoretical understanding which eachsocial class gains of their social world.

At first glance Bentons description sounds very Marxian.

Yet on closer inspection it is decidedly theoreticist (Albury et al.1981: 3758). For ideology is situated within subjectiveexperiences. Benton conflates the class struggle betweenworkers and capitalists, a subjective struggle, with the objectivecontradiction between capital and wage-labour. It is the lattercontradiction which Marx investigates in his epic, Capital,because this contradiction defines the social forms of humansubjectivity by establishing the historical precondition for socialexistence within capitalism (Clarke 1994: 140). Bentonexamines the content but not the form of ideology.

Ironically Benton, a naturalist, defends a position on ideologywhich many anti-naturalists would find no problem insupporting due to its subjectivist overtones.4 More to the point,the sort of critique offered by Benton and critical realistsgenerally resurrect some very awkward questions. How cannormative (emancipatory), as opposed to descriptive, claims besupported? How do people develop discursive, reflexive and

critical knowledge of underlying structures if a chasm is presentbetween knowledge and the objective world? How can structuresnot only be reproduced but also transformed? (Baert 1996).

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3. The Method of Abstraction

Another substantial area in which critical realists initiallyclaimed to follow Marx is with the method of abstraction.

Indeed the declaration that critical realists pursue socialscientificknowledge is usually grounded within this method.5

Nowadays abstraction can be referred to without any discussionof Marxs use of it.6 Of course there is nothing inherently wrongabout this. But it does indicate the extent to which criticalrealists have shifted their concerns from the attempt to linktheoretical and practical issues to the separation of each fromone another. Thus in this section I will suggest that criticalrealists utilise a method of abstraction which is not grounded

within the totality of social relations. As a result the criticalrealist method of abstraction, far from solving methodologicalproblems, actually reasserts them albeit in a new form.

Rational abstraction as Marxs abstraction?Clearly critical realists go beyond abstracting from mere surfaceappearances. They are against bad abstractionsand chaoticconceptions. A bad abstraction is one which is based upon anon-necessary relationship between certain objects(Sayer

1981: 9). Instead of identifying the internal powers associatedwith an object, a bad abstraction investigates contingent andexternal relations among different objects. An example wouldbe Max Webers connection between the Protestant ethic andthe development of capitalism. I will term this abstraction achaoticabstraction, or abstraction (1).

A rationalor good abstraction, by way of contrast, isolatesthe necessary and internal properties of an object, namely itsgenerative or causal powers. Once identified the diverse butcontingently combined determination of those properties canbe examined at a more concrete level. This move is particularlyimportant because only then will we be able to establish theactivation of the causal mechanism in question. An examplemight be the internal relationship between landlord and tenant,a relationship which assumes many guises in different contexts.In this way a precise definition of the object can be arrived atso that when a move is made back to the concrete one can gain

a more accurate understanding of the objects interaction witha diverse range of elements. The finished product is the

movement: concrete abstract, abstract concrete (Sayer

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1994: 87; see also Benton 1977: 1659; Dickens 1996: 5270;Keat and Urry op cit.: 11114; D. Sayer op cit.). I will term thisabstraction a rationalabstraction, or abstraction (2).

Critical realists claim to derive abstraction (2) from Marxs

recommendations on method presented in the Grundrisse (1973:100109) and subsequently reproduced inA Contribution to aCritique of Political Economy (1972: 20514). Marx also stressesthe isolation, in thought, of an object from its concretesurroundings. But critical realists are prone to leave Marxsmethod of abstraction just at this point. Yet a difficulty presentsitself if this is the case. In the Grundrisse and the ContributionMarx wishes to address the problem of how we come to have atheory. Marx was concerned primarily here with the

methodologicalproblem about how we take simple definitionsand build them up over time so that we gain a clear sense ofconcrete reality. He makes no epistemological claim as to whetheror not these definitions correspond to reality. He obviouslycouldnt do so because his remarks are shorn of any specificity.Therefore Marx is not interested in his methodologicaldescription given in the Grundrisse and the Contribution in tryingto ascertain whether or not concrete reality arrived at throughabstract definitions produces correct knowledge about the

capitalistworld (Ruben 1977: 15062). However critical realists,unlike Marx, do tend to use abstraction (2), an ahistoricalabstraction, to investigate specific social relations, such ascapitalism, and then claim that adequate knowledge is produced.Marxs descriptive point is turned into a proscriptive agenda.

The systematic nature of Marxs abstractionSo how does Marx proceed? If external method must be avoidedit would seem to be the case that method must inhere within,emerge from and reflect upon specific social relations and thesocial forms which those social relations produce. Its theorisationof its object, of its presence within its object and the validity ofits categories (as categories appropriate to the theorisation ofprecisely that object) are not three separate conceptual movesbut a single totalisation (Gunn 1989: 97101). By reflecting thedynamic nature of the world, immanent analysis endeavours toreveal the practical nature of theory such that thepotentialfor

change is disclosed in the actualanalysis (Postone 1996: 89). Letme term this abstraction as a systematic abstraction, orabstraction (3). Capitalprovides us with an example.

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In CapitalMarx claims that a commodity possesses bothabstract andconcrete labour. In other words labour possessesa dual function: it produces a useful product for others and itprovides a means to procure a good. Goods are obtained

through the exchange of commodities via the medium ofmoney. In order for a good to carry exchange-value theindividual labour embodied in the good must be abstractedfrom its concrete confines and subject to the socially necessarylabour-time taken to produce the commodity in question.Concrete labour must be transformed into abstract,homogeneous social labour, namely value (Marx 1988: 125 ff.).Thus the labour represented in the commodity is not individuallabour but social labour. And social labour is mediated through

the objective form of money. A double-sequence is achieved.Exchange-value first serves as the appearance of the quantitativerelationship between commodities. Marx then identifies sociallynecessary labour-time and abstract labour. From this base Marxreturns to exchange-value, but does so with a new vantagepoint. For exchange-value can now be identified in itsqualitative, objective form as the money-form (Banaji 1979:312). Under capitalism labour serves as the main sociallymediating activity which produces a set of structures that in

turn dominate labour. This is the value theory of labour(Elson1979). But how can Marx be certain that the commodity is thecorrect starting point at which to abstract?

Marx starts the opening chapter of his epic by noting: Thewealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of productionappears as an immense collection of commodities; theindividual commodity appears as its elementary form(Marx1988: 125). Why does Marx start with a form of appearance ifhis task was to comprehend an underlying reality existingbeneath distorted appearances? The reason is simply becausethe most basic form of appearance in capitalist society lies withthe exchange of commodities. Correspondingly the most basicconcept to be developed by bourgeois ideologues is that of thecommodity. The commodity, then, is the economic cell-formof bourgeois society. Or rather, the commodity represents themost abstract form of the double character of labour incapitalist society.

Needless to say, by starting with the commodity Marx hasas yet said little about the dynamics and reproduction ofcapital. For instance he has not at this stage of his analysis

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mentioned the extraction of surplus-value. However thecommodity is the ideal point from which to begin a critique ofcapital because itpresupposes that the society in which we areinterested is one dominated by an immense collection of

commodities. Marx thus grounds his analysis at the earliestopportunity within bourgeois social relations and

simultaneously fixes a point of entry from which to understandcapital and the commodification of labour power (Mattick Jr.1997). Even so, Marx does not wish to suggest that a completeunderstanding of the commodity can be acquired at this level.After all the commodity still assumes a form of appearance sothat its determination still resides in a relatively under-developed stage.

Three important observations are worth stressing at thispoint in the argument. First, abstraction (3) is reliant upon adistinction between the method of presentation and mode ofinquiry.

Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from

that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in

detail, to analyse its different forms of development and to track

down their inner connection. Only after this work has been

done can the real movement be appropriately presented. If thisis done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is now

reflected back in the ideas, then it may appear as if we have

before us an a priori construction(Marx CapitalI: 102).

Why is the distinction between the two so important? Thereason is related to the essence-appearance divide. If we wishto explain the developmental tendencies of capitalism we mustbe careful not to conflate those tendencies with actual historicaldevelopment, such as the emergence of capitalism in Englandor in France. To do so would merely collapse the divide. Insteadwe must demonstrate the inner connectionbetween forms ofexistence, forms peculiar to capitalism, and unravel thosetendencies in actual history. Categories derived are validatedby their ability to explain and express the inner movementbetween social forms. As each category is unfolded it isreflexively checked. Social relations are the context of the

argument itself. In this respect Marx advances retroactively, bythe ability to explain the developmental tendencies of capitalism(Postone op cit.: 141).

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Second, the commodity presupposes advanced capitalismand advanced capitalism presupposes its historical precondition,namely the separation of the labourer from the means ofproduction. And since we now understand the social relations

which determine and fuse together the entire circuit of capitalwe alter our understanding accordingly of the commodity,including its determining properties. Abstraction and determina-tion are therefore not the same thing (Clarke 1994: 137). Third,by beginning from a form of appearancefrom thecommodityMarx begins from the point of political economyfrom bourgeois forms of thoughtand automatically critiquesthose forms of thought at the same time by situating them withinthe historical limits of capitalist social relations. The commodity

is therefore not the start of the analysis but its result.

From retroduction to retroaction, or, the necessity to start correctly

The foregoing discussion suggests that the question of whereto begin the process of abstraction is absolutely fundamentalfor method. How do critical realists address this problem? Inone respect their starting point is arbitrary. It all depends uponthe object of investigation. No presupposition about the objectis made. All that is presupposed is a transcendental claim that

the world is structured in a certain way.Once a phenomenon is detected which requires us to

identify and explain the mechanism responsible for its existence,so critical realists argue, then it is necessary to build a model ofthe mechanism via the cognitive materials of knowledge aboutthe phenomenon already gained. Information is collected aboutthe mechanism which, if it was to exist, would account for thephenomenon in question (Bhaskar 1989: 1920; Collier1994: 22, 161, 163, 166; Sayer 1994: 107, 1589, 207). A three-phase scheme emerges: science identifies a phenomenon (ora range of phenomena), constructs explanations for it andempirically tests its explanations, leading to the identification ofthe generative mechanism at work, which then becomes thephenomenon to be explained; and so on(Bhaskar op cit.: 20).Correspondingly the intransitive realm (the real entities andstructures of the natural world) can only be explored throughthe transitive realm (models and concepts of the natural world)

(Bhaskar 1978: 21

4; Bhaskar 1989: 15

21: see also Keat andUrry op cit.: 62). However in normal conditions closed,experimental systems do not exist.7 Indeed the social sciences,

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whose object of investigation revolves around unpredictablehuman behaviour, do not have the luxury of experimentalclosed systems. Mechanisms and causal powers cannot survivein a vacuum but only within open systems. Critical realists term

this procedure retroduction.Some critical realists claim that Marx employs the method ofretroduction.8 Once we stress that the main problem withretroduction lies in its failure to posit a necessary cut offpointin retroducing generative mechanisms, namely that pertainingto specific, historical social relations, then we have no choicebut to dispute the critical realist claim here. More specificallywe can argue that retroaction holds three advantages overretroduction. First it is entirely legitimate to retroduce another

generative mechanism from the previous generative mechanismand so on. Infinite regress is thereby encouraged and we goround in circles trying to figure out the determining ideology(Baert op cit.; Gunn op cit.). This is not the case withretroaction.

Second, the retroduction of structures do not reflect themovement and development of a complex whole, despiteBhaskars claim to the contrary (Bhaskar 1989: 20). Retro-duction instead prefers to draw upon models, metaphors and/or

analogies of mechanisms which are familiar (on metaphor andrealism see Lewis 1996). To retroduce is not to retroduce fromreality. This is because the causal power discovered byabstraction (2) is not in any sense related to its objective

precondition. In effect abstraction (2) conflates the mode ofpresentation with the object of inquiry by examining thedetermining properties of a causal power from the level at whichit is abstracted.

Retroduction is therefore an analytical move but not asyntheticone. Retroduction isolates the causal properties of anobject from its contingent surroundings. But retroduction doesnot take the next step of drawing out all possible determinationsof the causal power linked to its socially mediated development.It cannot do so because there is no sense of universality in theimmediate phenomenon identified. So when the model of thecausal power in question has been constructed critical realistspass directly to the next level of retroduction. In other words

there is a sense of isolation between concepts. Critical realistsdevelop concepts which do not inhere within each other. Andso, for example, we do not have any ground to say that the

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commodity inheres within capital. As a result the relationshipbetween concepts is non-contradictory and ahistorical. Thetendencies of a causal mechanism become self-ascribed andself-referential and are seen to evolve in a linear manner (Arthur

1997; Banaji op cit.: 39

40; cf. Harris 1979: 352).Third, and somewhat ironically, the insistence that anunobservable mechanism can only be identified through theconstruction of a hypothetical model reinstates the empiricistnotion of sensory experience. According to critical realists,constructing the model in question is accomplished by analysingan observable object immediately presented to the senses. Tothe extent that this technique works in the natural sciences isnot the direct concern of this paper. What can be said, however,

is that it is just not the case that objects and relationships in thesocialworld are unobservable for sensory experience. Rather,objects and relationships reside in distinct ideological forms ofexistence which demand that we reach an understanding of thespecific (communicative) social relations which connect theseforms to one another (Stockman 1983: 207). In order to see howthese different methodological starting points impact upon aninvestigation of capitalism I turn to ontological issues.

4. Causal Powers and Social Forms

So far I have reproached critical realists on both epistemologicaland methodological grounds. I now wish inquire into theirontological claims. I will argue that although critical realistsoutline a theory of causality which has superficial similarity tothat utilised by Marx, they in fact pursue a different ontologicalproject altogether. Indeed, I shall demonstrate that criticalrealists confuse two issuesdetermination and causality and that such a confusion results in an argument for a neo-functionalist and neo-atomist theory of social structures andcausal powers. I will demonstrate this by firstly outlining thetheory of causality advanced by critical realism. Then I will showhow such a theory has been transferred into a characterisationof a mode of production. I follow this through to see how criticalrealists understand the causal power of capitalism. I conclude

the section by suggesting that problems implicit in the criticalrealist theory of causality imply that the main tenets of thecritical realist argument collapse.

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A critical realist theory of causality

A good way to approach the critical realist theory of causalityis to reconsider empiricism. Empiricists assert that causalityexists between two events when a regular, constant succession

can be observed between them. Critical realists are sceptical ofthis causal theory on two grounds. Firstly, empiricists reducea statements empirical content to the actual or hypotheticalregularity between independent objects. This is an atomisticconception of causality. Secondly, if causality can only bearrived at through observation then causal production as anindependent phenomenon must be an illusion, an illusionwhich realists wish to reject (Harrand Madden 1975).9

According to Bhaskar the empiricist error can be readily high-

lighted once we divide the world into three constituent domains:the empirical, the actual, and the real. While the empirical domainrefers to the experience of events, the actual domain refers to theevents themselves and these can be observed through experimentalactivity. The third domain is the most important and interestingof the three. The real domain refers to the intrinsic powers ofobjects which exist irrespective of whether they generate events(Bhaskar 1978: 56). As such objects can be said to comprisestructures which cause powers to emerge. And in talking about

the structure generating some power, you are also enquiringafter a mechanism generating an event (Collier op cit.: 43).

What critical realists defend here is a moderateessentialism,the claim that some things possess an evolving essence which, inturn, will enable us to isolate the causal properties of the object inquestion and relate those properties to external, contingent andnon-essentialist objects of investigation. Causality alludes to thestructure of an object and what it can do and only derivativelywhat it willdo in any particular situation (Sayer 1997: 4623;1994: 104). Water for example is not only composed of H2O.Water is composed of a complex number of levelshydrogenand oxygen atoms, protons, electrons, neutrons and so onwhich interact in a variety of ways (Manicas 1987: 255).Consequently objects possess differentiated powers andtendencies depending upon the contingent conditions withinwhich they are operating (Sayer op cit.: 107110).

The causal power of a mode of productionMany critical realists claim that Marx works implicitly with arealist theory of causality.10 Keat and Urry, for example,

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conceive a mode of production as comprising a number ofcomplex relationships which function in a particular waybecause they exist within the total structure of which they playa part. In any mode of production the single, causally dominant

structure is tied to the relations of production. This dominantcausal mechanism unifies each element of the mode ofproduction within an overall structure. (T)he causes and effectsof social phenomena are aspects, or applications, of thestructural relationships between the elements(Keat and Urry,op cit.: 97). For capitalism, the defining structure is that betweencapital and labour. This relationship is functionally necessaryfor the capitalist mode of production (CMP) because itestablishes the essential prerequisite for that mode as well as

establishing the main contradiction. One such prerequisite isthe establishment of value. Value, on Keat and Urrysestimation, is an underlying central structural mechanismofcapitalism which requires elucidation if we wish to understandthe surface phenomena of prices, profit, rent and interest (Keatand Urry op cit.: 1046). But can Marx be assimilated to therealist theory of causality so easily?

If we follow the methodological advice given by historicalmaterialism then the critical realist theory of causality is found

wanting. In Capitalvol. III Marx argues:

the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is

pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship

of rulers to ruled, as it grows out of production itself and, in

turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this,

however, is founded the entire formation of the economic

community which grows out of production relations

themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form

(Marx 1966: 791).

Marx locates the movement of history as one in whichdistinctive modes of surplus-extraction can be readily identifiedbetween different classes. In turn this implies that the means ofproducing a surplus exist as a contradictory unity with therelations of production. In order to ensure the continualreproduction of surplus-labour, the class character of the

economic form must stamp its dominance upon all of societyso that human activity is mediated by distinctive forms ofexploitative existence, such as the state.

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Undoubtedly the critical realist exploration of Marxsconception of a mode of production covers similar terrain.However critical realism encourages a neo-functionalist readingof this term. It conceives the driving contradiction of each mode

of production as being defined primarily between the forces ofproduction and the relations of productionone is functionallydependent upon the other and vice versa. Such a position doesnot, however, understand the relationship as a contradictoryunity. Instead the relationship is posited as a systematicdisequilibrium and class struggle is posed as the functionalresolution (Stockman 1983: 218). The problem is renderedmore precise once we begin to explore the specific form withinwhich each causal power inheres.

The value of determination and social formSocial forms of existence under capitalism reflectthe extractionof surplus-value because they comprise an underlying materialcontent related to capital accumulation. However social formsalso refract these social relations because forms exist as aqualitative and ideologically distinct moment of them.Therefore each social form simultaneously constitutes an objectof the ideological environment with autonomous value and

character (Medvedev 1978). This complex intrinsic-extrinsicdialectic is not functionalist because form does not arise as anecessity of class relations. Form is placed at a lower level ofabstraction than that of the class character of the capitalist modeof production because we explore how form has beenhistorically structured by those class relations (Clarke 1983;Holloway and Picciotto 1978; Jessop 1982; Pashukanis 1989).Depending upon the object of investigation, form and contentcan lead to different questions being asked. Emphasis uponform leads to questions about the kind of social relation beinginvoked whilst emphasis upon content leads to questions aboutwhat the social relation is about (Larrain 1983: 158).

Certainly, as Tony Smith suggests, causal powers andgenerative mechanisms are useful concepts to help usunderstand the qualitative nature of each social form. Forexample Smith insists that generative mechanisms can aid usin identifying tendencies operating in different social forms

which, in different concrete circumstances, might come intoconflict with one another. Likewise a mechanism can refer tothe various ways structures of social relations may determine

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what happens(Smith 1997: 181). Even though Smith is not acritical realistper se., he nevertheless comes dangerously closein committing a common critical realist mistake, namely theconflation of causality and determination. We will now see that

while causation is certainly a particular kind of determinativerelation, it is not the only such determinative relation nor themost important (Ruben 1990: 231).

The idea that an object of investigation possesses particularcausal powers which exist in contingent and open conditionsof existence says very little about the delimited and structuredform of the power in question. It tells us little in the sense thatthe causal power has yet to be situated within the totality fromwhich it is abstracted. For example the TMSA stipulates that,

within the social world, the causal power of social structuresare dependent upon unpredictable, interpersonal humanbehaviour. Causal powers, on this understanding, are relational.But this is vague and question begging. What does it mean tosay that causal powers are relational? How are they grounded?As Suchting suggests, if causal powers are conceived as beinginherent within each person, to the extent that structures onlyexist as the outcome of human behaviour, then we adopt anindividualist and voluntarist position, contrary to the theoretical

underpinnings of the TMSA (Suchting 1992: 28) Similarly theidea that value is a causal power, the critical realist assertion,in fact imbues value with a metaphysical status as somethingwhich is real before the development of advanced capitalism.As a result it is not at all clear how value can be said to determineanything, the reason being that as capital assumes ever morecomplex forms the determinative capacity of value recedes intothe background. In other words critical realists tend to conceive

value as existing outside of the totality of capitalist socialrelations (Arthur 1997). Plainly therefore to concentrate uponthe causal power of value alone will not be sufficient for a fullunderstanding of the determinate capacity of value. We requirea supplement to the theory of causal powers (Suchting 1992: 28).

Such a supplement can be discovered once an additionalquestion is posed: what historical conditions does valuepresuppose? This is not just a petty point but of immenseimportance. If we start our analysis with the production of value

we take production as being independent of exchange andcirculation. We thereby cease to view production, exchangeand circulation as moments in the totality of objective class

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relations. Critical realists, particularly those writing today, tendto downplay the unifying force of these moments, namely thehistoric separation of the labourer from the means ofproduction. This historic separation is the very foundation, or

the very essence, of our social relations.Or rather thisfoundation lies not outside the circuit of capital, it suffuses the

circuit as a whole(Clarke 1994: 140).The reason for its importance is simple. Before technological

innovation can be achieved capital must ensure that a supplyof labourers exist who are free to sell their labour-power andfree from ownership of the means of production. Securing boththe socialisation of productive forces and the privateappropriation of a surplus, this double-form of freedom also

generates the main contradiction of capitalism because it hasthe power to actualise potential contradictions, such as thecontradiction between use-value and exchange-value (Larrain1983: 150-157).

Obviously a critical realist theoretical framework can alsohighlight the importance of the capital-labour relationship.However the neo-functionalism pursued by critical realismimplies that this crucial relationship cannot be placed withinits proper social (class) relation. Keat and Urry, for example,

point out that the capital-labour relationship is the mostsignificant relationship in the CMP. Yet they stress that thisrelationship is essentially one based upon exchange.

Labour and capital, the two central elements within the CMP,

are defined functionally in terms of the dependence of labour on

capital. The relationship between labour and capital is

structured exploitatively through the capitalist appropriation

of surplus-value created by labour. The nature of wage-labour

is determined by this mode of appropriation (Keat and Urry

op cit.: 107).

If we take Keat and Urrys definition at face value, then classrelations cannot be discerned. For, as Clarke suggests, withincirculation capitalists and workers enter as individuals engagedin a free and equal exchange of commodities. No objective classinterests are present. If we turn our attention to production,

the problem still remains. Here we see only individualrelationships between capitalists and workers. Certainly workerscan act collectively to assert their claims over the product

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produced. But workers can also act in unison with the capitalistif they feel threatened by competing capitals. Therefore we canonly conclude that class interests are not defined individually,contra Keat and Urry (Clarke 1994: 139). The ramifications for

the critical realist project are disconcerting to say the least. Inorder to see why I must return momentarily to the commodity.

Essence as appearance and the return of atomismIn section 3 we saw that use-value cannot serve as the maincausal powerof capitalism because it is ahistorical. Throughouthistory people have produced useful objects in order to survive.So if we wish to establish the specific properties of capital wehave to look to exchange-value. Starting with the commodity,

therefore, reveals to us the initial determinations of thecommodity and hence the initial determinations of capital. Theyprovide, what Banaji terms, the dialectical-logical basis for thederivation of capital(Banaji op cit.: 31), or what was previouslycalled retroaction. However, and this is where Marxism differssignificantly to the critical realist theory of causality, at eachstage of the dialectical-logical process we return to exchange-

value, to a form of appearance. But this time the appearancerepresents a new development in the stage of capital. For

example Marx moves from use-value and exchange-value tovalue and money. As such our initial starting pointuse-valueand exchange-valueis now discerned as being mediatedratherthan immediate (ibid.: 30). As section 2 demonstrated, thereturn to appearances is crucial if we are to avoid dualism inthe hope of obtaining a critical grasp of reality.

If the movement and transformation of an essence is to beexplored by starting with and returning to its appearance then

viewing the world as comprising three domainsthe empirical,the actual, the realcollapses. It collapses, on a retroactiveunderstanding, because the three domains are implicitly unitedthrough a fourth domainthe historical. Or rather, the threedomains appear as qualitative manifestations of the movementof the fourth domain. Three further consequences follow. Firsteach generative mechanism is viewed externally by criticalrealists, severed from its internal and open nature to capital.Subsequently critical realism presents us with a new form ofobjectivism

or

atomism

to the extent that the notion ofcausality invoked is unable to be internally linked with a social

and ideological environment. And by prising apart structures

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from their social environment critical realists open themselvesup to the social constructionist attack that they reify those verysame social structures (see for example the critical observationsof Valera and Harr1996 and Jackson 1997).

Secondly, history is read backwards from the generativemechanism rather than, as Marxists would have it, exploringhow causal powers are themselves historically structured by thecontradictory unity of forces of production and relations ofproduction. Again we return to the conflation between themode of presentation and the object of inquiry.11 The problembecomes more obvious once we ask wider historical questions.Would it be possible to investigate the internal, mediated andcontradictory transition from feudalism to capitalism through

the use of generative mechanisms? The enclosedworld of eachgenerative mechanism suggests not (Carchedi 1983: 28).

Thirdly if causal powers only obtain their distinctive identitythrough historical social relations, such that causal powers arerelativised by an objective process, then the very idea of adistinction between two realmsintransitive and transitiveis also problematic. The reason for the difficulties lies with thedualism evident in the very distinction itself. Focusing uponthe intransitive realm encourages the belief in one true

representation of reality. Focusing upon the transitive realmencourages the belief that there is no one truerepresentationof reality. Both positions seemingly contradict one another andwe are left with no basis for an evaluative critique of socialnorms because causal powers are severed from beliefs (Fay1990: 34-41). We are also left with the added difficulty ofascertaining the empirical work necessary for testing anunderlying structure if the structure does not essentiallydetermine events in the actual world (Bryant op cit.: 88).

5. Conclusion

John Weeks suggests that Marxs value theory of labour makesfour disclosures about capitalist reality. First, it demonstrateshow capitalism reproduces its contradictory and exploitativeessence. Second, it seeks to situate that essence within an

historically specific form of class society. Thirdly, those classrelations explain the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalistrelations. Finally, the value theory of labour demonstrates why

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others might explain the transition and the dynamic ofcapitalism through an alternative framework (Weeks 1997: 91;see also Weeks 1981: 11). All four exist in a unity.

I have argued that although critical realists seek also to make

the same sort of disclosures, they do so in an essentially dualistmanner. Table 1 illustrates implicit differences which arise. Theoverall consequence of this dualism is the loss of the historicallystructured nature of theory. In its place we have an externalistconception of theory; theory which is separated from practice.Indeed, if it is the case that Marxists should today seek out acritical realist meta-theory (Outhwaite 1990), then we are leftwith an amusing and somewhat ludicrous conclusion: we canreject Marxs analysis of capitalism without having to renounce

his theoretical position (Clarke 1991: 31213).In many ways such an amusing conclusion is to be expected.

Praxis theory, as I suggested, invariably endorses dualism.Effectively such a move reduces Marxs practical insights to oneof theory and method. On this issue alone it should come as nosurprise that critical realists concur with one of the founders ofpraxis Marxism, Lukcs, and the latters protestation thatMarxism should be viewed first and foremost as a method. Itis the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the

road to truth and that its method can be developed anddeepened only along the lines laid down by its founders(Lukcs 1971: 1). That critical realists agree with Lukcs on thisissue can be seen by Keat and Urrys enthusiastic acceptance(Keat and Urry op cit.: 11718). It can similarly be observed,albeit implicitly, through Bhaskars revival of theunderlabourerstatus of philosophythe humbleidea thatphilosophy can remove ideas, theories, expectations, and so onwhich tend to distort any new knowledge likely to be producedby science (Bhaskar 1993: 1-2). As he announces: (P)hilosophydistinguishes itself from science by its method, and moregenerally by the kinds of considerations and arguments itdeploys, which are transcendental in Kants sense(Bhaskar opcit.: 14; see also Bhaskar 1978: 24 ff.).

Undoubtedly these methodological prescriptions do providea means to explore the causal powers possessed by variousindividuals, social groups and institutions (see Benton 1981b).

However they also abet an investigation into the real worldwhich loses contact with the sensuous nature of history. Tworesults can follow. First we no longer view reality as a specific

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contradictory form of struggle but as an ahistorical and external

manifestation of something called modernsociety. The tempta-

tion is then to conceive capitalism as being characterised by

technical qualities such as the division of labour rather than by

specific, dynamic social relations (see for example Dickens op cit.and Sayer 1995; for a critique see Gough and Eisenschitz 1997).

Secondly and relatedly the methodological and theoretical excesses

pursued by critical realists certainly indicate that they wish to

understandthe world. What is less certain is their theoretical

commitment to change the world (Fay op cit.: 40).12 Some may

think that this is too harsh a statement. Recent developments

within critical realism suggest that perhaps it is not.

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Table 1: Implicit differences between Marxist materialism andcritical realism

Marxist materialism

monism

internal analysis

labouring activity

exploration of historical

structuringepistemologically sure

reflection theory (for certain)

critical theory of ideology

abstraction (3)

investigation of social forms

determinate capacity

retroactionmethodology situated withintheory and practice

concerned with realappearances

critique of the one-sided natureof empiricism

objective world exists

consciousness is material

Critical realism

dualism

external analysis

human praxis

exploration of real structures

epistemologically vague

correspondence theory (if lucky)

neutral theory of ideology

abstraction (2)

investigation of causalmechanisms

causal powers

retroductionmethodology severed fromtheory and practice

concerned with reality andappearances

critique of the impotent natureof empiricism

objective world exists throughhuman praxis

consciousness is real

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I would like to thank Barbara Adam, Christopher Norris and Ian Welsh at CardiffUniversity for their incisive comments of an earlier draft. The anonymousreferees made some very perceptive and extremely useful and encouragingsuggestions of which I am grateful. Finally I would like to thank the participantsat the Marxism and Critical Realism seminar held at The Second Annual Critical

Realism Conference, Essex University, 1-3 September 1998, at which I presenteda version of this paper. Particular thanks go to Andrew Brown for thecontinuation of discussion over email, for making comments on my paper, forsending me a preliminary draft of his paper dealing with similar issues, and forinforming me of some references which I had missed.

______________________________

1. This paper does not seek to comment upon dialectical critical realism.Bhaskars mighty Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom deserves several papersdevoted to itself. However a critical exploration of that work must be based

upon a prior understanding of critical realism and its faults. I hope that mypaper contributes to this latter task.2. Other theorists who likewise comment in various degrees that Marx and/or

Marxism pursue a critical realist line of thinking are Benton (1977; 1993),Bhaskar (1989), Jessop (1982; 1990), Joseph (1998), Lawson (1997), Manicas(1987), Marsden (1998), Outhwaite (1987), Sayer (1994), D. Sayer (1987) andWoodiwiss (1990).

3. Bhaskar certainly believes that Marx does advocate a form of the TMSA (e.g.Bhaskar 1989: 200, n.34; see also ibid.: 115 ff.).

4. A more recent example of Bentons implicit anti-naturalism can be found

in a response to an attack upon his work which accuses him of engaging inbiological determinism. Benton not only denies the accusation, he goeson to argue that distinctively human capacities are rooted in thefundamental ontological capabilities shared by people the world over. Forinstance, a certain structure of the central nervous system, vocal andauditory organs, in working order, is a necessary condition for speechHowever, continues Benton, the position is not reductionist, in that I do notreduce the ability to speak to its organic conditions (Benton 1997: 87).Benton claims that his approach goes beyond dualism because it reaches outto the various causal connections between psychological abilities andorganic/bodily states and processes. But is Benton justified in his belief?What, for instance, is the difference between his approach and that proposedby social constructionists? For example the social constructionist CharlesValera likewise claims that human agency can be grounded on two levels. Thisrests upon the necessity to assess the power ofa particular rather than a poweranda particular (Valera 1995: 368). In respect to human action, continuesValera, a distinction must be made between the natural and acquired powersof human agency. Any account of distinctively human causal powers mustassign two main sites by which social activity can be said to originate: i.)natural abilities which grant a particular person with the enabling capacityto turn powers into forces; ii.) the social environment which grants a

particular person with the ability to put to work these natural abilities. Thusthe social environment literally enacts the powers so that personal agency isaccomplished socially and never individually (Valera ibid.: 368-369). Valera

Marxism and Critical Realism 45

Acknowledgment

Notes

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is of the opinion that a form of social constructionism and thereby andimplicitly an anti-naturalism is the only realistic way to ground a causal powerstheory. But then it seems to be the case that Benton does as well. However,as Burkett has recently demonstrated, Bentons dualism is also reproducedinto his more recent work on ecological issues. See Burkett (1998).

5. Lawson claims that Bhaskar does not devote much attention to the methodof abstraction (Lawson 1997: 227). However one need only a brief glance atDialecticto see that Bhaskar takes abstraction very seriously even if herarely and explicitly refers to it.

6. Lawson in his recent book devotes a whole chapter to abstraction withoutonce mentioning Marx.

7. I realise that I have said very little about the practice of natural science. Spaceis limited. However I believe that the materialist approach defended can beused to explore, in a non-reductionist manner, how the practice of naturalscience reflect the abstract social relations of a commodity-producing

society. See for example Hadden (1988).8. Marsden (1998) is the latest to assert this.9. I realise that Harr is not a critical realist. However such has been his

influence upon the formation of critical realism that I feel some justificationin including his work on causal powers in this section.

10. Such is the discovery of realism in Marx that even his once admonishedcollaborator, Engels, is today seen to bear the hallmarks of critical realism(Collier 1996; ONeill 1996).

11. Lawson cites the example of Britains relatively slow rate of productivitygrowth over the last hundred years. He traces this phenomenon, for variousreasons, to the underlying generative mechanism of Britains system ofcollective bargaining. However Lawson then takes the next step of explainingthe historical origins of collective bargaining in Britain. Unsurprisingly heconceives collective bargaining statically, essentially as a moment in theprocess of production rather than a moment in specific social relations. Inaddition historical analysis is merely formal and linear rather than dynamicand revolutionary (Lawson op cit.: 255-260).

12. For example Lawson criticises the New Right economist, Hayek, purelyupon methodological grounds. The notion that Hayeks ideas represent areflection and justification of a particular stage in the dominance of capitalis never explored nor commented upon (Lawson op cit.: 134 ff.).

______________________________Albury, R., G. Payne and W. Suchting (1981) Naturalism and the HumanSciences inEconomy and Society 10(3) August: 36779.Arthur, Christopher J. (1997) Against the Logical-Historical Method: Dialectical

Derivation versus Linear Logic in Fred Mosely and Martha Campbell (eds.)Op.cit.: 9-37.

Baert, Patrick (1996) Realist Philosophy of the Social Sciences and Economics:A Critique in Cambridge Journal of Economics 20: 513-522.

Banaji, Jairus (1979) From the Commodity to Capital: Hegels Dialectic inMarxs Capital in Diane Elson (ed.) Value: The Representation of Labour

in Capitalism. CSE Books, London: 14-45.Benton, Ted (1977) Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. Routledge

& Kegan Paul, London.

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