7/22/2019 Canon 7-9 Cases http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/canon-7-9-cases 1/39 EN BANC [B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004] IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner, R E S O L U T I O N TINGA, J.: The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event. The antecedents follow. On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries. The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his commun ications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001. Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution2[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
R E S O L U T I O N
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other
has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition1[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners andother people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries
to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications,
as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and
appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution2[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer ,3[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required todisclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing
them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one whichcorresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by
such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under
Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires
the applicant to aver that he or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law,
rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her.” Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not
reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence
of good moral character of the applicant.10[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded
of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even
if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of
his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation “Attorney”, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya ,11[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title “Attorney” by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari’a District in
Marawi City, used the title “Attorney” in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a
contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense that theygive counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12[12]
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by
the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule
notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of
common concern.
Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than
one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one
Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors
shall make an apportionment of Delegates.
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the
House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding
annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the
month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including
the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referredto it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at
least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to
consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered
for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis
of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by
the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter.
The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves
as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.
The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and
until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it
shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.
Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of
Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be
amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out
the purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.
Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who
shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves
or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional
members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.
The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of
their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall
automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from
year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall
prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than
one term.
The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be
required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board,
and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and
employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.
Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall beperformed by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the
President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term
of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the
President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to
hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers
of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is
for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as theBoard of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default
in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement . — A member may terminate his
membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall
immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a
member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be
made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Court.
Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance
procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated
Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from
the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court.
Section 13. Non-political Bar . — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any politicalsubdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
Section 14. Positions honorary . — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme
Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any
compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered
therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.
Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar
and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper
Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper
audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.
Section 16. Journal . — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the
Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.
Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may
hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes
therewith.
Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the
recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.
Section 19. Organizational period . — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local
Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges
throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17,
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to
the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule)1
— in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par.2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll ofAttorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be
known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice
of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of thePhilippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'.
...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers.3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.4 The practice of law being clothed
with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the commongood, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 63975 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate throughPresidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law . To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State
to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment
of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of alicense to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in
a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as
a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument thatthis is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in
CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney
may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ
En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and
January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondent’s signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."13[1] Also
attached was a copy of the order,14[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his
conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification15[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent’s "last payment of
his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership
fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of
notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
comment-memorandum,16[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:17[5]
3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and
1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a
member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant’s basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as aJudge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple
farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe
in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted
upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only
to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even
with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly andfrustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and
honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution18[6] adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,19[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this
case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent’s suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the proper
IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he
has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes,
income taxes as an example."
. . . .
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the
present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent’s
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.
First . Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his
IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court,
he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and
1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years
in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter
shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be aground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana)
against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the
counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged thatUlaso’s deed of sale over
the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an
ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284,
where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where
Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty.Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s
collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders
and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to
continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb),Busmente’s
former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his
signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela
Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case
No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him
since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices
from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated
office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente’s only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his
former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s staff, alleging
Macasieb’s failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD
noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit and that there was no mention
that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD
also noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by theaffidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb
resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied
Busmente’s allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without
his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s allegation
that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to
submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to
submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years.
On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmente’s
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented
herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether
Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able
to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of
Busmente’s staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his
office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were
still sent to Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have
ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December
2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the
preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for
Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb
already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente’s office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the
NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimensignatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that
Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report,
however, showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief
dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana
also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August
2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know
about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmente’s allegation
contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo
Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by
IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-
Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court
records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good
faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her tous (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she
filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not
present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the factsnarrated;