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Bollettino di Geofisica Teorica ed Applicata Vol. 55, n. 1, pp.
227-237; March 2014
DOI 10.4430/bgta0116
227
Can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in Italy?
Some considerations following the experiences of 2009 L’Aquila
(Italy) and 2012 Emilia (Italy) earthquakes
S. Grimaz
SPRINT-Lab, Dipartimento di Chimica Fisica Ambiente, Università
di Udine, Italy
(Received: March 27, 2013; accepted: July 8, 2013)
ABSTRACT Theearthquake in JapanonMarch11,2011,provoking
theaccidentat
thenuclearplantofFukushima,highlighted,unequivocally,asstrongseismiceventscanprovokemajor
accidents. On the other hand the damage observed in recent
earthquakes
inItaly(L’Aquila,2009andEmilia,2012)pointedoutthehighseismicvulnerabilityofindustrialplants.Thispaperprovidesananalysisonthepossibilitythatearthquakescantriggerseriousindustrialaccidents(Na-Techrisk),referringinparticulartotheItalianterritory,wheremanySevesoestablishmentsarelocated.Theresultsshowahighriskandsuggest
thaturgentpreventativeactionsareneeded.For
thispurpose,achangeoftheseismicsafetyparadigm,movingfromtheclassicalsectorialandreductionistapproachtotheholisticandinterdisciplinaryone,isrequired.
Key words: L’Aquilaearthquake,centralItaly,Na-Techrisk.
© 2014 – OGS
1. Introduction
TheaccidentatthenuclearplantofFukushimaaftertheMarch11,2011powerfulearthquakein
Japan has clearly shown that the impact of earthquakes on
industrial plants and life-linesmay triggerevents
thatcouldproducerelevanthazardousscenariosorcritical
inoperabilityofsafetyfacilities(GrimazandSlejko,2014).Animportantquestionarisesfromthatexperience:can
an earthquake provoke serious accidents also in Italy?To answer
this question, a
criticalreadingoftheimpactof2009L’Aquila(Italy)and2012Emilia(Italy)earthquakesonindustrialfacilities
and life-lines, as they appeared to the rescue services immediately
after the event,are here presented together with some
considerations in terms of lessons learnt, also
usefulforpreventative
riskmitigationpurposes.Thishasbeenpossiblebecause
fewdaysafterboththoseearthquakes,aresearchteamoftheUniversityofUdine,jointlytoengineersoftheItalianNational
Fire Department (�orpo Nazionale dei �igili del Fuoco: �N��F),
investigated and(�orpo Nazionale dei�igili del Fuoco: �N��F),
investigated and, investigated andanalysed the damage occurred to
industrial facilities and life-lines in order to identify
majorandrecursivecriticismsandderiveuseful“lessonslearnt”forsafetyimprovement(GrimazandMaiolo,2010)andforthedefinitionofshorttermcountermeasures,necessaryformanagingtheemergencyoperationsinsafeconditions(Grimaz,2011).
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Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237 Grimaz
2. The earthquake of L’Aquila, 2009
OnApril6,2009, at3:32a.m. (local time), a6.3Mw
earthquakeoccurred incentral Italy,withepicentre located7kmNWof the
townofL’Aquila,withdepthofapproximately8kmon a normal fault on
theApennine mountains. Even if the 6.3 Mw 2009 L’Aquila
earthquakeisclassifiableasmoderate,L’Aquilaanditssurroundings,
locatedin thenear-fieldareaof
theearthquake,wereaffectedbyalevelofgroundmotioncapableofprovokingsignificantdamagetoindustrialfacilitiesandlife-linespresentinthatarea.PGAhigherthan0.6gwasrecordedinnearfield[foranaccurateanalysisofthedestructivepotentialofl’Aquila2009earthquakesee:Masiet
al.(2011)].
2.1. Damage to industrial facilities and lifelines in the
epicentral areaAfter the earthquake, three industrial zones
(Bazzano-Paganica, Pile and Sassa), located
in the surrounding area of L’Aquila, were inspected and specific
and recursive damage wasobserved(GrimazandMaiolo,2011).
In these areas there are high-tech, pharmaceutical,
construction, mechanical andmanufacturing industries.The most
diffuse typology of building is represented by
precastconcretestructuresusingprecastpanels,reinforcedframeswithconcreteblockwallsandsteelorlightmetalframeswithprecastpanelwalls.
The damage observed was mainly concentrated in non-structural
elements (e.g., partitionsand ceiling tiles) and contents.The
criticisms were related to the connection between
thesecondaryelementsand the structure.The
inadequateanchoragebetween thewallpanels andthe roof and floor
framingmembers in theprecast-concretebuildings resulted in the
collapseof the walls. Some structural damage to beams and columns
was also observed. In this casethe criticisms concerned the
weakness of the joints and, in particular, the unseating
effects(considerable movements of the beam and column corbel
support) were observed.
Otherrecursivelycriticismsregardedthefirststepof“soft-story”behaviourthatcouldleadtobuildingcollapsesincaseofastrongerearthquake.
Furthermore,theequipmentoftheindustrialplantsmovedand/orcollapsed,causingdamageand
major business interruptions, because it was not anchored or
adequately braced to avoidrelativemovementsduringtheearthquake.
AparticularcaseofdamagewasobservedinachemicalfacilitylocatedintheindustrialareaofBazzano-Paganica,
7kmsouth far fromL’Aquila town,where three tall steel silos
storingpolypropylene beads suffered severe damage. The silos
collided with the adjacent
precastwarehouse,partiallycrushingtheconcretewallandleavingtheimprintoftheimpact.Thesilosalsocrumpledattheirbases(Fig.1).
Thedamageobservedonlife-lineshighlights
theprimarycriticismsonthegasdistribution(Espositoet al., 2011).A
lot of gaspipelinesweredamagedor brokenbecause thebuildingswere
heavily damaged. Many R� buildings suffered high deformation caused
by
theplasticizationofthebeam-pillarconnections,andsomeofthem,witha“soft-story”,collapsedcompletely.
Since the majority of flats, houses and apartments were served by
autonomousboilers,a
lotofgaspipelineswereinstalledoutsidethebuildings,ontheperimeterwalls,andmanyofthemwerebrokenordamaged.Thiscausedsignificantreleasesofgas,butfortunately,nofiresstarted.
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Can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in Italy?
Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237
229
Natural gas and electricity supplies were cut-off in the areas
of severe damage, mainly
indowntownofL’Aquila,andseveralusersweredisconnected.
Utilitynetworksforwater,electricityandphoneserviceswereallbrieflyinterruptedbecauseofthedamagecausedbytheearthquake.Thedamagewaslocalizedand,afterminorrepairsandreconfigurations,allserviceswerefullyfunctionalwithinaday.Apipe-breakinthemainwatersupplyoftheareawasthemostimportantdamagetothewatersystem.Ahighpressurewaterpipelinebrokeat
thecrossingof thePaganicafault,due toaco-seismicmovementwithin
themainevent.Therewerealsosomepipebreaksinthedistributionsystem,andalotofthemhadtoberepairedinordertoprovidewatertoemergencysheltersandtemporaryaccommodation.
Phone serviceswere interrupted for a short timebecauseof power
failure.Problemsweresolvedbyputtingemergencygeneratorsintoservice.
Thedamage to transport infrastructurewasminimal.Theonly
collapsed structurewas thebridge over theAterno River, along a
secondary road to Fossa (AQ). Immediately after
theearthquakebothhighwaysA24andA25, connecting
theTyrrhenianandAdriaticcoasts,wereclosedforaninspectionoftheviaducts,butreopenedafewdayslater.
Anumberofregionalandprovincialroadswerepartiallyclosed,mainlybecauseoflandandrockslidesandsettlementsinducedbytheearthquake.Theseinterruptionscausedsometransitdifficultiesfortheemergencyrescueservices.
Fig.1-L’Aquilaearthquake:damageto,andcausedby,silosat�IBA�facilityintheBazzanoindustrialarea,7kmsouthfarfromL’Aquilatown.
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Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237 Grimaz
2.2. Lessons learnt from 2009 L’Aquila earthquakeThe
post-earthquake inspections showed as L’Aquila earthquake, despite
the moderate
magnitude, caused extensive damage to industrial facilities and
life-lines. The industrialbuildings were non-ductile concrete and
new precast constructions that suffered damage
onstructuralandnon-structuralelementsandonequipment.Thistypologyofindustrialbuildings,widelydiffusedinItaly,hasshownsignificantseismicvulnerabilitiesbothinthestructureandtheequipment.ThehighlevelofvulnerabilityofthistypologyofbuildingshasbeenafterwardsunderlinedalsobyTonioloand�olombo(2012).
From thedamageobserved inL’Aquila, it canbe said that
earthquakesof
around6.3Mw,willpossibly,orarelikelytoresultinseriousindustrialaccidents,shoulddangeroussubstancesbestoredinpre-castbuildings.
Furthermore, incomparisonwith thepast,when theuseofgaswas
lessdiffuse,nowadaystheprobabilityofgasreleasesandthepossibilityofsubsequentfiresareincreased.Thissuggeststheneedofintroducingspecificfireprecautionmeasures.
�onsideringthatasimilarsituationcouldoccuralsoinotherareasofthecountryincaseofanearthquake,theItalianNationalFireDepartmentsetupaspecificworkinggroupwiththeaimofdefiningtechnicalguidelinesforreducingseismicvulnerability,inparticular,ofgasfacilitiesandfirepreventionandprotectionsystems(�N��F,2012).
3. Observations and confirmations after the 2012 Emilia
earthquake
OnMay20,2012at04:03(localtime)anearthquakeofMw
5.86struckthePianuraPadanaEmiliana(northernItaly).TheepicentrewaslocalizedbetweenthetownsofMirandola,FinaleEmilia,PoggioRuscoandBondenowithahypocentredepthof6km.OnMay29at9:00(localtime),asecondmainshockofMw5.66occurred,withepicentremovedwestwardsfromthefirstmainshock(closertoMirandola)andproducedverticalandhorizontalPGAupto0.7gand0.3grespectively,intheepicentralarea.
The area, highly industrialized, was heavily damaged.A lot of
roofs of precast buildingscollapsedcausingdeathsand thecomplete
interruptionof theactivities (Fig.2).Thescenarioconfirmed the high
vulnerability of the precast industrial buildings, as evidenced
after
theL’Aquilaearthquake.Infact,themostdiffusestructuraltypologiesare:
a) precast system, in simple or multi-storey buildings, in which
structural elements weremadeofprecastreinforcedconcrete;
b)mix-materialsbuildings,madeofpre-stressedconcretepillars,locatedinthecentralpartofthebuilding,andmasonrywallsalongtheperimeter.
Thepresenceofheavyequipmentorphotovoltaicfacilitiesinstalledontheroofaggravatedthevulnerabilityofthebuildings.ThedamagescenariowasextremelymoreextendedandseverethaninL’Aquila.Alotoflife-lineswentandremainedoutofservice.AdetaileddescriptionofindustrialbuildingdamagecanbefindinMarzoet
al.(2012)andSavoia et al.(2012).
Definitely, all the considerations made after the L’Aquila
earthquake were systematicallyconfirmed and accentuated by the
impact analyses of the Emilia earthquake in 2012, whichshowed,
inparticular,
thehighvulnerabilityoffacilitiesandequipmentandtheriskrelatedtothe
releaseofdangeroussubstances, likegasorchemicals,causedby
rupturesofpipelinesor
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Can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in Italy?
Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237
231
storage tanks. Despite the fact that a lot of facilities and
pipelines broke due to the collapseof industrial buildings in which
they were installed, fortunately, no dangerous events wererecorded.
This was probably because the earthquake occurred at night when
almost nohazardousactivitiestakeplace.
It is worth to observe that few weeks after the second main
shock, the Italian National�ommissionofMajorRisks,
inastatementreleasedbytheItalianPrimeMinister’sOfficeonthesituationinEmilia,said:“Intheeventofaresumptionofseismicactivityintheareaalreadyaffectedbytheearthquakesequenceinprogress,theprobabilityofasegmentactivationbetweenFinaleEmiliaandFerrara,witheventscomparabletothemajoreventsrecordedinthesequence,is
significant”. In thatarea there is thepetrochemicalplantofFerrara;
therefore, thepotentialimpact on a Seveso plant was one of the
major concerns for the emergency management.Fortunately, the event
did not occur, but this fact evidenced that the seismic
vulnerability
offacilitiesandofSevesoestablishmentsaswell,arefundamentalelementstotakeintoaccountinordertodefineadequatecountermeasures.
4. Seismic events and Seveso establishments in Italy
�onsideringtheexperiencesandthelessonslearntfromthelastrecenttwomainearthquakesinItaly(L’AquilaandEmilia),aquestionarises:whatwouldithappenifindustrialorchemicalplantswithahighriskofmajoraccidentwerelocatedintheepicentralareaofanearthquake?This
question should generate concern because most of Italian territory
is seismic and
thistypologyoffacilitiespresentsalotofvulnerabilities.Infact,it is
well known in literature thattiswellknowninliteraturethatindustrial
equipment and systems can suffer structural damage when hit by
earthquakes
andcanprovokeseriousaccidentsasfire,explosionsanddispersionoftoxicsubstances(M�IDAS,M�IDAS,2001;Krausmannet
al.,2011).
Fig.2-Emiliaearthquake:heavydamagetoindustrialbuildingsintheepicentralarea.Generalcollapseofroofofprecastsystemstructuresdestroyedtheinternalfacilities.
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Fig.3-SevesoestablishmentsinItaly.OntheupperpanelthelocationofSevesoestablishments(bluedots)ontheseismichazardmap(GruppodiLavoroMPS,2004)showingvaluesofPGAhaving10%probabilityofexceedencein50years(TR=475years).Tablesshowthenumberofestablishmentsineachregion,thepercentageofestablishmentstypologyatnationallevelandthedistributionofestablishmentsinthedifferentseismiczones[dataelaboratedfromM.S.(2010)andM.A.T.M.A.(2012)].
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Can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in Italy?
Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237
233
InItaly therearemore
than1100Sevesoestablishments(i.e.,establishments where
certainestablishmentswherecertainquantities of dangerous substances
are present, as defined in http://glossary.eea.europe.eu as).
defined in http://glossary.eea.europe.eu
as).http://glossary.eea.europe.eu as)..About 1/3 of them are
located in areas with moderate or high seismic hazard. Fig. 3
showsthedistributionof establishments on the Italian territory,
indicates thepercentageof differenttypologies of establishments and
reports the number and percentage of establishments in
thefourseismiczones.
Themostdiffuseactivitiesarechemicalandpetrochemicalplants,storageofliquefiedgasesandmineraloilstorages.Agreat
number of Seveso establishments are located in areas in
whichgreatnumberof Seveso establishments are located in areas in
whichSevesoestablishmentsarelocatedinareasinwhichthe estimated
level of acceleration on rock (ag) exceeds0.15 g with probability
of exceedingequalto10%in50years.
Inordertoestimatetheexpecteddamageofequipmentcomponentsfollowinganearthquake,severalapproachesarepossible.AcorrelationlinkingtheconditionalprobabilityofthespecificLevelofDamage(LD)toPGAof
theearthquakeisrequired.Intheconventionalapproachofprobabilisticanalysisofdamagecausedbyseismicevents,fragilitycurvesareusedtoassesstheresistanceofastructuretoagivenPGA(O’Rourkeet
al.,2000;Talaslidiset
al.,2004).�owevertheprobitfunctions(Finney,1971)havebeenmorewidelyusedinordertoderivevulnerabilitymodelsforindustrialequipment(Salzano
et al.,2003,2009;Fabbrocino et al.,2005;�ampedelet al., 2008) but
in some cases also for residential buildings (Grimaz, 2009). Probit
analyseswerecarriedoutonthebasisofinformationofseismicdamageobservedondifferentitemsandcollectedindatabases(M�IDAS,2001;Di�eccaandGrimaz,2009).Advantage
and
drawbacksAdvantageanddrawbacksoffittingempiricaldatabyfragilitycurvesandprobitfunctionsarepresentedin
Lallemant andLallemantandKiremidjian(2013).
Morespecifically, theprobitvariableY
representsadose-responserelationshipandgivesaspecificquantal
responseas a functionof the intensityof thevariableV (thedose)
throughalinearcorrelationwiththelogarithmofV:
Y=k1+k2·lnV. (1)
For thecaseof seismicaction, thedose is consideredas the
seismicPGA (g)whereas theeffect is consideredasLD, either as the
structuraldamageor,more appropriately, the
lossofcontainmentorthe“outofservice”ofindustrialequipmenthitbyanearthquake.ThevariableYcanbedirectlycomparedwiththeactualfailureprobabilityp,orthepercentagePoftargetthatsuffersthespecificLD,bymeansofthefollowingequations,respectively(��PS,2000;�ilchezet
al.,2001):
V21
Y–5–––p=––––� (e ) dV (�ilchezet al.,2001) (2)�2π– ∞
2
Y –5|Y –5|P=50[1+––––––er f(––––––)] (��PS,2000). (3)
|Y – 5| �2
For a quantitative estimation of the potential of observing
severe accidents triggered byearthquakesinItaly, it is interesting
to compare probit equations of damage between industrial,it is
interesting to compare probit equations of damage between
industrialitisinterestingtocompareprobitequationsofdamagebetweenindustrial
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Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237 Grimaz
Fig.4 -On the top:graphsofcomparisonamongprobitequations
forvarious industrialequipmentandresidentialmasonry buildings for
two thresholds of damage. On the bottom: the table with the
coefficients of each probit equation.
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Can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in Italy?
Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237
235
equipmentandresidentialhousesproposedintheworksabovementioned(Fig.4).The
graphs in Fig. 4, in particular, evidence that the probability that
an earthquake willFig. 4, in particular, evidence that the
probability that an earthquake will
triggeraseriousaccidentonequipmentinSevesoestablishmentisnotnegligible.A
comparisonAcomparisonofvalueofk1ek2ofFig.4fordifferentitemsgivesdirectandusefulinformationonthegravityoftheaccidentalevent.
In particular, it is worth noting that the probability that an
earthquake will trigger
majordangeroussubstancereleasesfromanchoredandunanchoredatmosphericsteel
tanksishigherthan theprobability that itwill cause significant
structuraldamageonoldmasonrybuildings.For instance, if PGA is equal
to 0.15 g, the probability of observing significant releases
ofdangerous substances from full tanks will be higher than 50% if
unanchored and 15%
ifanchored,while,forthesamevalueofPGA,theprobabilityofobservingseriousdamageinoldandrecentmasonrybuildingswillbe5%and1%respectively.
Theseobservationspermittoappreciatethe importance of the
15heimportanceofthe15th“whereas”ofthe2012/18/EUDirective(SevesoIII):“Inordertodemonstratethatallthatisnecessaryhasbeendonetopreventmajoraccidents,and
toprepareemergencyplansandresponsemeasures, theoperatorshould, in
the case of establishments where dangerous substances are present
in
significantquantities,providethecompetentauthoritywithinformationintheformofasafetyreport.Thatsafetyreportshouldcontaindetailsoftheestablishment,thedangeroussubstancespresent,theinstallationorstoragefacilities,possiblemajoraccidentscenariosandriskanalysis,preventionand
intervention measures and the management systems available, in
order to prevent andreduce the risk of major accidents and to
enable the necessary steps to be taken to limit theconsequences
thereof.The risk of a major accident could be increased by the
probability ofnatural disasters associated with the location of the
establishment.This should be
consideredduringthepreparationofmajor-accidentscenarios.”
Nevertheless,itisworthnotingthatItalianlaws,stillnowadays,donotincludeanyspecificrule
about the necessity of assessing, for those plants, the risk of
major accidents caused byseismicevents.
5. Considerations in term of prevention and conclusions
It is hoped that industrial seismic damage, observed after the
L’Aquila and Emiliaearthquakes, suggests a better integration of
seismic aspects in the laws and codes
forindustrialplantsdesignandreinforcement,inordertoassessandreducepossibleNaTechrisks(technologicalaccidentsinducedbynaturalevents)forsuchfacilities.Furthermore,inordertoavoidseriousaccidentslikefiresorexplosions,theattentiontoNaTechrisksmustbeextendedfromSevesoestablishmentstootherindustrialandresidentialfacilitiesand,inparticular,togasstoragetanks,pipelinesandutilities.
In any case, it is necessary to highlight the low seismic
resistance of the precast-concretebuildings, and the criticisms
related to non-structural elements and equipment.The physicaldamage
related to these vulnerabilities can cause releases of dangerous
substances and
theactivationofaccidents.Morestringentseismicdesignisneededforthesestructuresalsoinorderto
avoiddamageonequipmentor facilities.Other elementof concern is the
reliabilityof thecoolingsystemsof reactors inchemical
industries,particularlywhen theearthquakeprovokes
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Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237 Grimaz
theinterruptionofthemainpipelinesofwaterfurniture.Some
indications in terms of possible provision could be defined:
greater attention must
be paid in designing effective connection between primary and
secondary elements in theprecast concrete buildings and in
controlling the relative deformation of the various parts
ofthebuildingstructures.Specificattentionmustbeaddressed
topipelines
incorrespondencetofaultcrossingpointsandtotheredundancyofsafetysystems.Itisalsonecessarytoimplementmoreprecautionsontheanchorageofequipmentandtoavoiddestructiveinteractionswithothercomponents.
Furthermore, automatic valves triggered by accelerometer should be
installedonthegaspipelinesoutside thebuildings.Thiswill
reducedrastically theriskoffirebecausean immediate blockage of the
gas supply is automatically activated in the case of
strongearthquake.
Finally, taking into account the observations on damage provoked
by the L’Aquila andEmilia earthquakes, it is possible to answer the
question stated in the title of the paper:Yes,unfortunately,
earthquakes could trigger serious accidents also in Italy, not only
in Sevesoestablishments!
Therefore,possiblybefore thenext severe earthquake,greater
attentionmustbe addressedto NaTech problems, both in major risk
assessment processes and seismic codes.Within therisk assessment
and management framework, higher attention must also be addressed
to
theresilienceofaffectedsystemsand,inparticular,totheroleoflife-linesnetworksinsupportingthe
emergency management and in facilitating the response and the
recovery phases afteran earthquake.This requires to take into
account the interdependence between natural andtechnological
hazards in the policies of risk reduction, considering seismic
safety as
aninterdisciplinaryproblemthathastobeassessedandmanagedusingaholisticapproachratherthanthereductionistandsectorialone,nowadays,generallyused.
Acknowledgements. The author of this paper, in both the
emergencies of L’Aquila, 2009 and Emilia,2012, worked jointly with
the Italian National Fire Department (CNVVF) as scientific
coordinator of the specialist unit responsible for damage
assessment and short term countermeasures definition. This
permitted to observe the damage since the first phase after the
main shocks and to recognise and evaluate safety
problemsinducedbytheearthquakeinindustrialfacilities.SincerethanksgotothecolleaguesalloftheCNVVF
and the University of Udine for the effective and profitable work
done together. Special thanks to
thereviewersfortheirusefulsuggestionsthathavehelpedtoimprovethispaper.
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Corresponding author: Stefano Grimaz Dipartimento di Chimica
Fisica e Ambiente, Università degli Studi Via Cotonificio 108,
33100 Udine, Italy Phone: +39 0432 558731; fax: +39 0432 558700;
e-mail: [email protected]