CAMBODIAN YOUTH IN CREATING MORE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

CAMBODIAN YOUTH IN CREATING

MORE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

A thesis is submitted in partial completion of the requirements

for the Degree of Master of International Law and Politics

Chandara Khun

University of Canterbury

School of Language, Social and Political Sciences

Department of Political Science

2014

i

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was made possible through New Zealand ASEAN Scholars Awards (NZAS). I am

very grateful for the assistance and support of the New Zealand‘s Government, which permits

me to pursue my postgraduate study of internationally accredited standards at the University

of Canterbury, and to improve my capacity to make more contribution to the development of

my home country, Cambodia. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Associate Professor

James Ockey, for helping me to build a confidence in my research interests and supporting me

from the beginning until this thesis is completed. Thanks are also due to Dr. Jeremy Moses

and Professor Karen Scott, who gave me warm welcome and friendly support at the beginning

of my academic life, making me feel like being at home. The staff at the Department of

Political Science, the Leaning Skill Centre and the Central Library have been very supportive

throughout my academic years. Also, I would like to thank my family for their ongoing

support and pride in my achievement. Lastly, this thesis is dedicated to all of Cambodian

youth.

Chandara Khun

March 2014.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... ii

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... iv

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... v

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. vi

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

TRADITIONAL BARRIERS AND PAST TRENDS .................................................... 2

BREAKTHROUGHS OF TRADITIONAL BARRIERS BY NEW TRENDS ............. 7

THESIS OUTLINE ........................................................................................................ 9

CHAPTER 2 - THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS OF RESEARCH ......................... 11

2.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 11

POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND INSTABILITY .................................................... 12

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION .................................................................................. 14

2.2 WHY IS YOUTH IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION

FOR OUR COMTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY? ...................................................... 15

PERSONAL FACTORS OF YOUTH .......................................................................... 16

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS OF YOUTH ............................................................ 19

2.3 SCOPES OF THE PAST AND CURRENT RESEARCHES ...................................... 22

EMERGING YOUTH ACTIVISM IN POLITICS ...................................................... 22

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND EXISTING POLITICAL ORDER .......... 25

SECTORS OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION ................................................................ 27

MEANS OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION .................................................................... 29

2.4 KEY THEMES OF THE LITERATURE ..................................................................... 31

2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF RESEARCH .................................................. 33

iii

DRAMATIC SHIFTS IN YOUNG DEMOGRAPHICS AND CHANGES IN

STRUCTURES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS ............................................................. 34

BETTER EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ................................ 38

PUBLIC SPACE: MEANS OF REDUCING GENERATIONAL CONFRONTATION

AND AVOIDING SEVERE FORMS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE ..................... 41

SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF RESEARCH ............. 46

2.6 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 48

CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ........................................... 52

A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN YOUNG CAMBODIAN DEMOGRAPHICS FROM THE

MINORITY TO THE MAJORITY GROUP OF THE TOTAL POPULATION

LEADS TO NECESSARY CHANGES IN STRUCTURES OF POLITICAL

INSTITUTIONS ........................................................................................................... 53

YOUNG CAMBODIANS HAVE BETTER EDUCATION, SO THEY ARE NOT

ONLY MORE LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICS BUT ALSO MORE

CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING PEERS AND OTHERS FOR POLITICAL

ENGAGEMENT ........................................................................................................... 65

IF THEY ARE PROVIDED AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FORMAL POLITICAL

STRUCTURES FOR GETTING INVOLVED IN DECISION MAKING

PROCESSES, THEN A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT

AND THE YOUNG IS REDUCED TO MINIMUM AND A SEVERE FORM OF

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE CAN BE AVOIDED ...................................................... 78

SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 99

CHAPTER 4 - CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 102

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 108

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1 Model for Hypothesis 1 .......................................................................................... 38

Figure 2-2 Model for Hypothesis 2 .......................................................................................... 41

Figure 2-3 Model for Hypothesis 3 .......................................................................................... 45

Figure 2-4 Summary Diagram of Theoretical Frameworks of Research ................................. 47

Figure 3-1 Demographic Growths by Age Groups in 2008 and 2013 ..................................... 54

Figure 3-2 Total Registered Voters in 2012 by Age Groups .................................................... 54

Figure 3-3 Cambodia‘s GDP 2005-2014 .................................................................................. 56

Figure 3-4 Senators in the 3rd Mandate by Age Groups .......................................................... 60

Figure 3-5 Senators by Parties and Age Groups in the 3rd Mandate ....................................... 60

Figure 3-6 Number of Land Disputes from 2008 to 2010 ........................................................ 62

Figure 3-7 Comparison of Literacy Ratio by Age Groups 2010-2012 ..................................... 68

Figure 3-8 Number of High School Examinees and Graduates 2008-2013 ............................. 70

Figure 3-9 Growth of High School Graduates 2009-2013 by Percentages .............................. 70

Figure 3-10 Voter Turnout 2003-2008 and Promising Voter Turnout 2013 ............................ 72

Figure 3-11 Dependency Ratio in 24 City and Provinces in 2008 ........................................... 73

Figure 3-12 Better Education, Family and Friends in Defining a Preferred Party ................... 76

Figure 3-14 Growing Number of Labour Strikes 2003-2013 ................................................... 81

Figure 3-15 Broadcasting Power Shared by the 3 Biggest TV Stations over the 24 City and

Province ................................................................................................................ 95

Figure 3-16 Broadcasting Power Shared by the 3 Biggest Radio Stations over the 24 City and

Provinces .............................................................................................................. 95

Figure 3-17 The (Almost) Everyday Access to TV, Internet and Radio ................................. 97

Figure 3-18 Percentages of Households Possessing TV, Radio and Personal Computer ........ 97

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3-1 National Assembly (NA) Seats by Age Groups in 3rd and 5th Mandates .............. 58

Table 3-2 Shares of NA Members by Parties and Age Groups in 3rd and 5th Mandates ........ 59

Table 3-3 Chronology of Cambodia‘s Education and National Curriculum Development ..... 66

Table 3-4 General Picture of Human Development in Cambodia............................................ 67

Table 3-5 Enrollment at Secondary Education 2010-2013 Academic Years ........................... 69

Table 3-6 Number of Protests 1998 & 2013 in Comparison .................................................... 79

Table 3-7 Development of Approved Minimum Wages in Garment Industries ...................... 82

Table 3-8 Minimum Wages in Textile, Garment and Shoe Industries 2014-2018 .................. 83

Table 3-9 Summary of the Main Missions for Some Programs and NGOs ............................. 89

vi

ABSTRACT

The focus of this thesis is to study close relations between dramatic shifts in young

demographics and growing youth activism in Cambodia, which recently led to increasing

confrontations and sometimes deadly clashes between the government and youth. This thesis

develops theoretical frameworks that are applied to address three hypotheses to see whether a

transformation of Cambodian youth from the minority to the majority group of the population

necessitates reorganization of the state institutions, Cambodian youth of better education are

more likely to participate in politics and capable of mobilizing others for political

engagement, and generational confrontations and collective violence between the government

of the elderly political leaders and Cambodian youth are resulted from their loss of trust in the

institutions and the absence of the public space as an alternative to the state institutions for

them, are correct or not. This research found that Cambodia has already become a country of

young population since 2008 and, unlike their parents, most young Cambodians are literate;

but both the National Assembly and the Senate are dominated by elderly political leaders.

Also, civil society organizations have no regular and persistent platforms for Cambodian

youth to work out their demands with the government while traditional media is dominantly

controlled by the state and the government-allied private companies, and the social media is

carefully censored. These situations very likely justify the above three hypotheses, so youth

integration into the state institutions and more public space in variable forms are suggested as

mechanisms to resolve and prevent crises of this phenomenon. Though this thesis may have

its constraints in areas of its theoretical frameworks due to an early assumption of the

literature and a quantitative method regarding data collection on the internet, its findings

produce very fruitful inputs for the government‘s and non-governmental organizations‘ work

and policy as well as the field of research alike since the theme of research is new.

1

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

―When leaders fail to lead, people take charge and leaders then have to follow1.‖

-Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General and Nobel laureate

In the past, talking about politics rarely happened in public. Cambodians hardly discussed the

government‘s policy and performance, and rarely expressed their ideas with acquaintances

besides their families and friends. Their passive behaviours towards politics may have a close

relationship with both socio-cultural and eco-political barriers preventing them from political

engagement. However, recently, more Cambodians, especially youth, have involved in

politics of their country, for they felt freer than ever to express their ideas and less worried

about oppression2. This emerging trend may be a result of growing young demographics of

better education and skillful information communications technology (ICT) in the kingdom.

Thus, a question on whether a liberal democracy is suitable for Cambodia is no longer a

concern but, rather, popular demands for more liberal democracy and a stable political

community may place at the corner of the country‘s contemporary problems.

This section briefly explains chronological development of Khmer‘s ideologies that may be

an obstacle to their participation in politics. It seems that traditional ideologies and legacy of

the Cambodian People Party towards Cambodian people gradually loss their essence in the

heart of Cambodians, especially the young, because of, perhaps, time, levels of literacy and a

decline of the public‘s trust in the regime and its leadership. Changes in Cambodians‘ political

behaviours and attitude clearly happen in a coincidence of growing young demographics,

making Cambodia a country of young population. This turning point necessitates a study in

depth, which is subjected of discussion in the following sections.

1 This sentence is quoted from an exclusive interview between Kofi Annan and Subhabrata Guha of the Time of

India, which was published in the Time of India on February 6, 2014. See "If leaders fail, people will lead," The

Elders, accessed March 2, 2014, www.theelders.org/article/if-leaders-fail-people-will-lead 2 "IRI Cambodia Survey: Declining Optimism on Country‘s Direction; Strong Support for Democratic Reforms,"

The International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 3, 2014, http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-

center/news/iri-cambodia-survey-declining-optimism-countrypercentE2percent80percent99s-direction-strong-

supp

2

TRADITIONAL BARRIERS AND PAST TRENDS

Politics care-free behaviours and attitudes of Cambodians may have relations with ideologies

of the ―Great‖ and ―Little‖ traditions, ―patron-client‖ system and illiteracy levels of the

population. Throughout the modern history in Cambodia, these traditional ideologies

appeared to be fad in time gradually and to become less bold in influencing Cambodian

people in the present day. They likely remain refrained from engaging in politics by fear,

perhaps of civil wars and violence, and by easily affordable satisfaction due to their illiteracy.

Thus, societal experiences of tragedy and levels of illiteracy may be the main push-and-pull

factors keeping Cambodia‘s democracy in a trap of the long-serving regime, the Cambodian

People Party.

Passive Citizenship: From Traditional Ideologies to Fear

Traditional ideologies might be an obstacle to the political participation in Cambodia. Though

the ideologies appeared to have eroded with time, recent past throughout the history prove its

existence as a result of unsuccessful revolutions. Nightmares of civil wars such as hunger,

massacres, breakup of families continue to scare older people. Thus, it might be reasonable to

argue that many failures of the revolts in our recent past revitalized Khmer ideologies of

dependency but lately changed in nature from their pure submission to the authority to fears

of oppression and violence.

The ―Great” and “Little” traditions were originated of the Sanskrit writing system brought

from India since the early centuries. According to David P. Chandler, the Cambodian society

was practically divided into ―those who understood Sanskrit and those who only understood

Khmer‖ 3

. This social classification was also promoted through the Hindu ritual ceremony of

the ―god king‖ or ―king of the gods‖ (devaraja in Sanskrit) in the 9th

century by the King

Jayavarman II who wished to link the monarch with Siva for his supreme leadership of a

‗universal monarch‘ and the unity of Cambodia4. With this ideology, only the King and the

senior officials in the palace could communicate with Gods and praise for the prosperity of

the nation while ordinary peoples could only have a conversation and ask for protection from

3 David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (United States: Westview Press, 1983), 21.

4 Ibid., 32-33.

3

‗wild spirits‘ (‗nak ta‘ in Khmer) and their ancestors5. Hence, in this ideological system,

people depended on the King and senior officials without contention.

However, an influence of this cult system appears to gradually lose its strength among

ordinary people even before the collapse of Angkor era. These traditional ideologies were no

longer widely acceptable since believes and practices of Hindu were partly integrated and

replaced by Buddhism. The Mahayana Buddhism was promoted by Jayavarman VII but the

ordinary people lately converted their practices and believe from Mahayana to Theravada in

the 13th

century6. Buddhism ideologies have matched well with the indigenous traditions, for

it promoted an increasingly equal status between the rich and the poor or the powerful and the

weak.

Another ideological aspect, the ―patron-client‖ concepts like the ―Great‖ and ―Little‖

traditions may also influence Khmer‘s contemporary ideology. The ‗patron-client‘ system of

dyadic relationships was identified as the ―backbone of the traditional [Cambodian] political

structure‖7 upon which the ordinary peoples sacrifice their freedom and liberty to the

authority in exchange for various forms of protection and assistance but the later uses their

submission and available resources to create their strong patronage networks for grasping

power8.This ideology may remain deeply rooted in the Cambodian society where the power is

decisive and less likely to be subverted by a reaction of the grassroots.

However, discussions on ideological systems of dependency remain controversial. Some

scholars claimed that ideological systems greatly influence Cambodians‘ daily lives whereas

many argued it gradually loses its spiritual forces among Cambodian people in the present

day. In his Ph.D. dissertation, David P. Chandler asserted that a hierarchical system of

―patrons/governors‖ and ―clients/governed‖ has been nurtured with the peoples since their

birth and continued to spiritually influence them9. This claim may be justified by some

existing evidence of Khmer proverbs and literatures showing their helplessness against the

powerful such as ―eggs cannot hit a rock‖. However, Serge Thion observed that Chandler‘s

arguments appear unlikely to reflect the whole picture of the pre- and the post-independence

5 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 21.

6 Ibid., 66-67.

7 Serge Thion, "The Cambodian Idea of Revolution," in Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight

Essays, ed. David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (U.S.A: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983), 11. 8 Grant Curtin, Cambodia Reborn?: The Transition to Democracy and Development (Geneva: The United

Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1998), 111-112. 9 David P. Chandler, "Cambodia before the French: Politics in a Tributary Kingdom 1794-1848" (Ph.D. diss.,

University of Michigan, 1973), 39; cited in Thion, 12.

4

eras during which revolutions took place successively in Cambodia10

. The ideas of ‗French

Revolution‘ greatly inspired many well-educated and the then Cambodian revolutionaries

from both elite and poor families through the introduction of the French educational system

by the colonial administration11

. Since then, many revolutions consecutively broke out one

after another such as a replacement of the absolute monarchy by an introduction of the

constitutional monarchy in 1947, the 1970 coup by General Marshal Lon Nol, the 1975

revolution by Khmer Rouge and finally the 1979 counter-revolution by the People Republic

of Kampuchea.

Yet, the past revolutions had not yet produced any result admired by poor Cambodians at the

countryside and other marginalized groups at the time but made them scare of politics. They

likely continue to fear of politics and feel pessimistic of revolutions, for the latter makes them

hard to imagine of any new attempt to breakdown chains of patronage dependency. Their

reluctance in political activities may have a relationship with their trauma and fear during

Khmer Rouge campaigns of purification12

. During the purification movement led by the

Khmer Rouge, people spoke cautiously and controlled their own behaviours strictly towards

others outside their groups because they prevented making themselves suspicious and so

becoming ‗targets‘ for hard labors or execution.

Moreover, illiteracy may also disinterest old people in politics and traps them in a cycle of

making their end meet. With an enormous amount of the national budget invested in

education between 1953 and 196613

, Cambodia‘s educational system comprised of 5,275

primary schools, 146 secondary schools and 9 higher education institutes by the year 196914

.

Though the country was facing political instability in the capital and continuous fights over

the borders in the 1970-1975 periods, the number of student enrollments at universities

remained relatively high15

. Unfortunately, both physical and institutional infrastructures of

education nearly were completely destroyed by Khmer Rouge in the mid-1970s. As a result,

by 1979, while nearly all schools, books, equipment and facilities for teaching had been

10

Thion, 14. 11

Benedict R. O‘G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism

(London/New York: Verso, 1983), 142. 12

Thion, 29-30. 13

Lee C. Fergusson and Gildas Le Masson. "A Culture under Siege: Post-Colonial Higher Education and

Teacher Education in Cambodia from 1953 to 1979," History of Education 26:1 (1997): 100. 14

Thomas Clayton, "Building the New Cambodia: Educational Destruction and Construction under the Khmer

Rouge, 1975-1979," History of Education Quarterly 38:1 (1998): 5. 15

Sam Rany, "Cambodia's Higher Education Development in Historical Perspectives (1863-2012),"

International Journal of Learning and Development 2:2 (2012): 228-229.

5

destroyed, ―there were no more than 300 qualified persons of all disciplines left in the

country‖ whereas 67 percent of primary and secondary teachers lost their lives and nearly 80

percent of higher education students fled the country during the regime16

.

Regime’s Slogans, Magic Tricks, in Decline of Popularity

The main principles of liberal democracy including fundamental human rights and freedom

were brought by the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements and lately integrated into the domestic

laws. However, these international norms may contradict the social and political values of

national norms. Cambodia‘s government led by the long lasting ruling party, the Cambodian

People‘s Party (CPP), sometimes justifies its authoritarian rule with political stability and

peace at the expense of individual freedoms and human rights, by explaining necessary

conditions for economic development. The Prime Minister Hun Sen claimed that only the

CPP has the ability to ensure a socio-political stability and to prevent a return of civil wars17

.

Hence, freedom of speech, press18

, assembly and associations19

is tightly controlled by the

government and threatened by criminal charges.

In the last decades, Cambodia has experienced a rapid and constant economy growth. Since

2000s, in overall, the Cambodia‘s government has performed its duties well by achieving the

annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth at around 7 percent. Referring to data provided

by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Cambodia experienced a rapid and sharp growth of

GDP at more than 10 percent between 2005 and 2008 but this figure fluctuated between 6

percent and 7.6 percent from 2010 to 2013 with exception of an economic downturn in 2009

when GDP plummeted to only 0.1percent20

. Therefore, with this achievement and its

16

Fergusson and Masson, 111. Also, the Ministry of Education in the State of Cambodia reported even greater

figures of human resources‘ loss by putting the teaching staff at 75 percent, tertiary students at 96 percent as well

as elementary and secondary students at 67 percent. Thomas Clayton, "Building the New Cambodia: Educational

Destruction and Construction under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979," History of Education Quarterly 38:1 (1998):

7-8. 17

Rachel Vandenbrink, "Hun Sen Warns of 'War' If He Loses Election," Radio Free Asia (English), April 19,

2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/hun-sen-04192013173854.html 18

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Cambodia 2012 Human Rights Report (United States:

Department of State, 2012), 11-12. 19

Sean Teehan, "Fears SL Strike Could Get Ugly," The Phnom Penh Post, November 4, 2013, http://www.

phnompenhpost.com/national/fears-sl-strike-could-get-ugly 20

"Cambodia's Real GDP Growth Rate," the Ministry of Economy and Finance, accessed January 15, 2014,

http://www.mef.gov.kh/

6

ambition, the government has recently set Cambodia to reach lower Middle Income Country

in the next five to ten years21

.

However, a growing socio-economic disparity remains a persistent concern despite the

constant economic growth. Cambodia was among the 40 countries in the South that have had

greater gains in Human Development Index (HDI) between 1990 and 2012 but its 2012 HDI

of 0.543 remained below the average of 0.683 and 0.64 for countries in East Asian and the

Pacific and the Medium HDI human development groups respectively22

. In its report 2013,

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) claimed that Cambodia could perform

its HDI well if it has improved better access to maternity, education and fair redistribution

since Cambodia‘s HDI average lost to inequality in life expectancy at birth (28.8percent),

education (28.8percent) and income (20.3percent)23

. Also, the income inequality appears to

gradually worsen from year on year. The Gini coefficient rose from 0.35 in 1993/94 to 0.40 in

2004 and 0.43 in 200724

though the poverty rate was significantly reduced from 47percent in

1993 to 26percent in 201025

.

The economic disparity may have relations with a concentration of employment in urban

areas and a loss of productive and residential lands by most of farmers due to economic and

mineral land concessions26

. By mid-2013, around 70percent of 558 factories were located in

cities while nearly 20 percent was allocated to surrounding provinces27

. Also, it is worthwhile

to notice that most of Cambodians is farmers whose livelihood and sustenance depend on

lands, therefore a loss of lands means a loss of productivity and labor in agriculture for many

households, the main source of their income. Consequently, family livelihood puts hard on

young workers in the cities, children of landless men. According to the NGO Forum on

21

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Cambodia Annual Report 2011 (Phnom Penh: UNDP,

2011), 4. 22

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2013 Human Development Report: Rise of the South and

Analysis on Cambodia (Phnom Penh: UNDP, 2013), 2. 23

Ibid. 24

Chandarany Ouch, Chanhang Saing and Dalis Phann, "Assessing China's Impact on Poverty Reduction in the

Greater Mekong Sub-Region: The Case of Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: CDRI, June 2011), 10. 25

Serey Sok,"Asia Development Bank Predicted Cambodia's GDP Growth," Radio Free Asia (Khmer),

September 4, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/social-economy/cambodian-economic-growth-

04092013044538.html. 26

According to the Cambodia Centre for Human Rights report, more than 8 million hectares of land concessions

have been granted to 368 companies between 1994 and 2012. Titthara May, "China reaps concession windfalls,"

The Phnom Penh Post, April 4, 2012, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/ national/china-reaps-concession-

windfalls. 27

"Garment Factories and Supply Chains", sithi.org, accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.sithi.org/

temp.php?url=bhr/bhr_list.php&lg=.

7

Cambodia, 173 cases in 200828

, 236 cases in 200929

and 282 cases in 201030

were reported as

unsolved and partly solved land disputes31

. As a result, a share of agricultural labour dropped

substantially from 51.4percent in 1992 to 29.6percent in 200932

.

BREAKTHROUGHS OF TRADITIONAL BARRIERS BY NEW TRENDS

Recent social changes in areas of young demographics, new education and ICT bring

optimism for the future of liberal democracy in the kingdom. These factors appear very likely

to provide new opportunities for young Cambodians to expand their liberty and freedom

spaces that are needed for demanding a more responsible government and an increasingly

egalitarian society. While they are by nature dynamic, progressive and optimistic of the

future, Cambodian youth are a new generation of better education and the ICT, making them

distinct from their parents, the old generation.

Cambodia is a country of young population. The National Institute of Statistics reported 70.4

percent of the total population in 2008 was younger than 35 years old33

. By 2013, the CIA

also estimated the country‘s old population of over 55 years old would stand at only around

8.8 percent34

. These demographic trends show undoubtedly the pre-Khmer Rouge and the

Khmer Rouge generations gradually move to a margin of the society‘s structure and are

slowly replaced by the post-Khmer Rouge baby boom, a dominant group of the young

generation. These young Cambodians in the new generation have never personally shared

experiences of the same societal events with the elderly people in the previous generation,

making them innocent and less fearful of the past tragedies left by civil wars.

Restoration and rejuvenation of the national education system amplify an emergence of young

Cambodians as the majority group of the total population more meaningful. Immediately after

28

Land Information Centre (LIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occurring in Cambodia 2008 (Phnom

Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2008), 1-2. 29

Land Information Centre (LIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occurring in Cambodia 2009 (Phnom

Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2009), 3. 30

Research and Information Centre (RIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Dispute Occurring in Cambodia 2010

(Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2010), 2. 31

The data provided by NGO Forum on Cambodian was not clear whether land disputes in the previous year

were recounted in the following year or not but it seemed that cases in each year were new. Also, it is not least to

notice that NGO Forum on Cambodia‘s reports did not represent the total land disputes in the kingdom, form

many cases were suspected to be unreported. 32

Ouch Chandarany et al, Assessing China's Impact on Poverty Reduction in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region:

The Case of Cambodia (Phnom Penh: CDRI, June 2011), 1. 33

"Population Census 2008," National Institute of Statistics (NIS), accessed April 01, 2013,

http://celade.cepal.org/khmnis/census/khm2008/. 34

Ibid.

8

the liberation of Phnom Penh in 1979, over 5,000 primary schools were reopened, more than

60 percent of school-aged children enrolled and around 21,000 teachers were recruited35

. By

1982, the number of students and teachers rose greatly up to 1,503,000 and 37,000

respectively36

. Until 1996, the quality of education became a priority for the Ministry of

Education, Youth and Sports, so the national curriculum was standardized by increasing a

length of general education from 10 years to 12 years37

. As a result, this educational reform

has been fruitful to the young generation of the post Khmer Rouge baby boom. That means

every young population born after 1979 has been benefiting this new education system.

Finally, a growing presence of the ICT takes place at the same time with a reversal of the

demographic trends and the development of the national educational system. Computer

desktops, laptops, notebooks, tablets and smart phones gradually gain their popularity among

young students and workers, so do various types of social networking sites such as Facebook,

YouTube, Twitter and blogs. Among these social networking sites, Facebook is the most

popular in Cambodia with a total of between 500,000 and 750,00038

users. This figure is

expected to grow rapidly, especially among young people, since a growing internet market

and its competitive price make the services more accessible and convenient. In 2012, the total

number of internet users stood at around 2.7 million while 27 Internet Service Providers (ISP)

got licenses for their nationwide operation39

. A rate for an unlimited package of high speed

internet (2 Mbps) decreased to as low as US$ 10 per month while a monthly fee for internet

users having access through smart mobiles and modem subscriptions spent US$5 per 2

gigabytes40

, an expense amounting to approximately 5.86 percent of the 2013 GDP per

capita41

.

To sum up, the socio-cultural and eco-political barriers become less influential in preventing

Cambodians from participating in politics. As mirrored from Cambodia‘s modern history,

chains of dependency reinforced by Khmer ideologies have already been broken whereas the

35

Stephen J. Duggan, "Education, Teacher Training and Prospects for Economic Recovery in Cambodia,"

Comparative Education 32:3 (November 1996): 366. 36

Ibid, 367. 37

Royal decree No. NS-RKT 0796-52 dated on 26 July1996 on the General Educational System of 12 Years. 38

"Asia Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population Statistics and Facebook Information," Internet World

Stats, accessed November 11, 2013, http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm#kh 39

The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication, The 2012 Annual Report (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Posts and

Telecommunication, 2013), 30. 40

"Internet: ADSL, Mobile Internet and USB," Metfone, accessed June 2, 2013,

http://www.metfone.com.kh/en/Services/Internet.4.aspx 41

The Economic Institute of Cambodia estimated a growth of the GDP per capita from US$ 945 in 2012 to US$

1,024 in 2013. "Key Economic Indicator," Economic Institute of Cambodia, accessed November 11, 2013,

http://www.eicambodia.org/

9

current regime‘s slogans of legitimacy such as political stability and economic development

appeared unlikely to successfully buy a loyalty and deference of Cambodian people and

disengage them from politics. As can be seen below, all of the emerging factors may have had

a close relationship with growing interests of politics and more political participation in recent

years. Young and old, or rural and urban Cambodians showed their face to cast their ballots

during the national election 2013 whereby the result of the election proved a turning point of

the political landscape in the country. In the aftermath of the election result‘s announcement,

demonstrations and strikes spread from the capital city, Phnom Penh, to other provinces. The

streets have become tense than ever whereas social media such as Facebook, Twitter,

YouTube and blogs has been much busier than usual.

THESIS OUTLINE

This section introduces the 3 remaining chapters of the thesis. Chapter 2, ‗Theories and

Frameworks of Research‘, summarizes the key pieces of literature and theories upon which

this thesis is based, and ends up with a proposition of the theoretical frameworks of the

research in order to contextualize the theories with the fact. Based mainly on theories

proposed by Benedict R. O.‘ G. Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Samuel P. Huntington, Ted Robert

Gurr, Benjamin Barber and Karl Mannheim as well as relevant case studies conducted by

Halim I. Barakat (Kuwait and Jordan), Emma C. Murphy (Arab World), Denis J. Sullivan,

Nadine Sika (Egypt), Ahmed Jdey (Tunisia), Asef Bayat (Iran), Johan Largerkvist (China),

youth integration into the political institutions and increasing more public space are suggested

as mechanisms to protect the public interest, to assure the stability of the political community

and, in turn, to expand liberal democracy in Cambodia. This research paper bases on a

quantitative method. A wide range of sources are extracted from the government, non-

governmental organizations, international organizations‘ reports, policies, strategies and

statistics. Also, most of the necessary information for analyses of the research is greatly based

on local newspapers and media that are published in both Khmer and English. Most of the

sources are accessible on the concerned websites.

Chapter 3, ‗Research Findings and Analysis‘, analyses each of proposed three hypotheses

individually with the suggested models of the theoretical frameworks and describes findings

based on data that is accessible on the internet. Three hypotheses are tested with the available

sources of information whether they are correct or not, and to find out if there is any flawless

with the theories and the proposed models of the theoretical frameworks. The findings show a

10

result of the applied theories into the phenomena that happened in Cambodia such as a

measurement of the social issues with the theories, predictable consequences and potential

mechanism for solving and preventing the problems. Some flawless theories are also

evaluated based on the provided context of issues in Cambodia while the result of these

findings also adds some reflection on the previous studies.

Chapter 4, ‗Conclusion‘, summarizes findings, evaluation of the literature and contributions

of the thesis to the development of Cambodia and a field of research. Final comments are also

made in regards to constraints of the research including matters of a quantitative method and

secondary data. Also, other issues occurring during the research such as the government‘s

willingness in integrating youth at local rather than national levels and initiators of collective

violence are suggested for further studies. Thus following researchers on the same theme may

use both quantitative and qualitative methods as well as some primary data deemed to be

necessary for better and increasingly convincible results.

11

CHAPTER 2 - THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS OF RESEARCH

The public interest, one of the cornerstones assuring a stability of the political community,

may be threatened either by malfunction of the political institutions or by changes in nature in

relations between the institutions and popular forces. In other words, this can be simplified in

three questions, who is the majority group of the population, what do they want and how do

they work their demands with the state. Therefore, dramatic shifts in young demographics and

a growing rate of literacy, the two main variables embedded throughout the literature, are

believed to have impacts on a reversal of the current political order. In turn, this new order

necessitates changes in structures of the political institutions to reduce generational gaps and

differences in ideologies, so the interest of the majority, if not the public interest, is likely to

be insured. Also, an alternative to the state institutions is necessary to be provided and

expanded in order to minimize generational confrontation and to avoid severe forms of

collective violence.

In this chapter, I summarize the major theories regarding young demographics and

implication of their emergence as the major social forces on the existing political institutions

and the political community as a whole. By assessing theories and some case studies in

Indonesia, Tunisia and Egypt, another half of this chapter ends up with a proposition of the

testing theoretical frameworks and a description of the methodology of the research on how

these frameworks are tested in Cambodia‘s case study, Chapter 3.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This introductory section briefs basic theories explaining why a stability of the political

community is threatened and why this instability sometimes leads to collective violence. The

public interest, one of the main pillars assuring a stable political community, is hard to be

maintained without adaptability and autonomy of the political institutions. Consequently, its

failure to represent the public interest sometimes contributes to growing political

participation, either active or passive, through informal political structures while a

discriminatory treatment of any particular group by the public institutions and a prolonged

silent of passive contention may lead to severe forms of collective violence.

12

POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND INSTABILITY

Country refers to a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people

on the legitimacy of the political system42

. In this sense, it might function smoothly without

disruption in case within which leaders and citizens share a vision of public interests and

traditions and principles as bases of the political community. Hence, the legitimacy of the

political system is sustained and the political community becomes stable. Yet, the legitimacy

of the political system usually does not last long unless, claimed Rousseau, rulers transform

―strength into right and obedience into duty‖43

. In other words, the legitimacy of the regime is

maintained by interdependent relations of rights and duties between rulers and their subjects.

While some scholars believed state‘s legitimacy may depend on either democracy or state

performance, others seemed to perceive that the latter sometimes prevails over the former.

This means that, while democracy appears merely to give a presumption of the regime

legitimacy at the first glance, only the state performance appears to prove the reality because

the inability of the rulers to ―make democracy deliver‖ still possibly weakens the legitimacy

of the democratic government44

. Fukuyama argued that the authoritarian regimes still can buy

loyalty of its citizens and, in turn, maintains its legitimacy if it is apparently able to provide

precisely ―shared growth and broadly available public goods‖ to its people45

.

How can the government‘s performance be measured?

The government‘s performance may be measured by achievement of either ―programmatic

policies‖ or ―promises of direct benefits‖. Either of them might be used as exchangeable bases

for evaluating the quality of the state bureaucracy depending on their achievement and

circumstances, for it is a priority of voters that matters and only the latter may decide whether

their urgently necessary needs or long-term perspectives are prioritized on the top political

agendas of a newly elected government. On the contrary, political parties might not be free to

choose whatever they want because their ability to keep their promises with voters costs their

supports and legitimacy as the ruling party of the government.

42

Samuel P. Huntington, Political order in changing societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1. 43

Huntington, 9. 44

Francis Fukuyama, "Democracy and the Quality of the State," Journal of Democracy 24:4 (October 2013): 5. 45

Fukuyama, 6.

13

Yet, Fukuyama noticed less visible long-term outputs of the policies and an unfair access to

state resources as challenges of both political parties and voters46

. On one hand,

―programmatic policies‖ appear likely to be an abstract ideology making its achievement less

visible and convincible to voters, therefore ―promises of direct benefits‖ like job, foods and

medical care are more easily to mobilize voters47

. On the other hand, some political parties

might be unable to keep their promises with their supporters if they have not won elections, so

unfair access to state resources such as recruitments and promotion of civil servants based on

political connections rather than merit needs to be avoided during elections and a

government‘s mandate to ensure a fair play for all parties48

.

However, Samuel P. Huntington argued the stability of the political community depends not

only upon the ―scope of support‖ by the social forces but also its ―level of institutionalization‖

whereby adaptability and autonomy are greatly important49

. Generational gaps are one out of

three suggested measures Huntington uses to evaluate the adaptability of the political

organization and procedures. According to Huntington, chronological gap and generational

gap become less apparent in the later days of founders‘ careers rather than in early days of

their organization foundation, therefore this situation produces tension between the first

leaders of the organization and the next generation immediately behind them because both of

them shared significantly different organizational ―experiences‖50

. Yet, his argument appears

to solve contemporary problems of the generational gaps in some countries only partly, for the

generational gaps may exist not only among the different generations in the political parties

and the government but also between either the regime or the ruler and the subjects as well. In

addition, the autonomy, argued Huntington, involves in the relations between social forces

and political institutions whereby the political organizations and procedures do not just

represent interests of any particular group but also assure any branch of political institutions

independent of other branches and other social groupings51

. For instance, the judiciary must

be independent of the legislature and the executive as well as of any particular group in the

society, businessmen or peasants.

46

Fukuyama, 11. 47

Ibid. 48

Fukuyama, 12. 49

Huntington, 12. 50

Huntington, 14-15. 51

Huntington, 20.

14

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation commonly concerns demands of voters and supplies of the government

as well as their wish to fulfillment of citizen rights and duties. According to the ―dual

motivation theory‖ by Cambell, despite their wish to fulfill citizens‘ right to vote, voters also

admire to influence the national policy adapted from various political agendas of highly

competitive parties by casting their ballots52

. Yet, when people know their participation in

politics in any form including voting may hardly change anything in any significant way and

may indeed face repression from the authoritarian rule, their passive contention against the

government‘s performance such as low voter turnout, argued Sika, is also an alternative form

of participation in politics by voters53

; but a prolonged silent of any particular marginalized

group occasionally leads to a silent revolt. ―[I]t means that accepting everything, following

everything, enduring everything in silence for months and years, to finally dare to pick

oneself up and stand tall‖, cautioned Simone Weil54

.

Bayat argued ―most‖ of the new urban poor such as unemployed and other marginalized

groups struggle for a direct response to their ―immediate concerns‖, ―many‖ poor people live

on the ―dream of a better future‖55

. Yet, during a time of crises, Both Ronald Aminzade and

Asef Bayat appeared to echo some invariable basic needs such as employment and means of

subsistence demanded in the mass social movements in the mid-19th

century in France and the

late 20th

century in Iran. In this sense, subjects of the demands in informal political structures

remained generally unchanged. Nevertheless, Amizade and Bayat limited their scope of

studies to merely certain groups of people and neither of them specified what circumstances

socially, economically and politically defined might have an influence on people‘s choice

between immediate concerns and their long-term expectation. Given that most Asian people

including young and old whose socio-cultural believes and values belong to ―collectivism‖56

,

52

Nadine Sika, "Youth Political Engagement in Egypt: From Abstention to Uprising," British Journal of Middle

Eastern Studies 39:2 (2012): 182. 53

Sika, 181. 54

Simone Weil, La condition ouvrière (Paris: Gallimard, 2002); cited in Ahmed Jdey, "A History of Tunisia,

January 14, 2012: The End of a Dictator and the Beginning of Democratic Construction," Boundary 39:1 (spring

2012): 70. 55

Asef Bayat, Street Politics, Poor People's Movements in Iran (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997),

159. 56

Many countries in African, Asia and Latin America are identified as having attributes associated with a culture

of ―collectivism‖ whereas individuals, who have believes and attitude inspired by this culture, are called

―collectivists‖. To number a few of attributes of collectivism, collectivists pay much attention to ―ingroup‖ than

―outgroup‖ members, think of ―groups‖ as the basic unit of analysis of society, and greatly concern about what

happens in the ―ingroup‖ and to ―ingroup‖ members, and much emphasize on hierarchy within ―ingroup‖

members. All of the above mentioned attributes well fit with Asian cultures where family members, the so-called

15

they share the same sort of long-term perspectives in time of peace and stability, the future.

Thus, young people think of their potential works after schools whereas parents mostly worry

of their children‘s future.

When demands for fair distribution of wealth are usually not met by supplies of the

government, popular participation in politics may not necessary happen through institutional

frameworks of the state since they lose their trust towards the institutions in representing the

public interest, or the interest of the majority. Citizens struggle with their representatives,

politicians, for expanding and protecting spaces for liberty and equality since the latter help

them to claim their essential humanity and to promote an increasingly egalitarian society. P.

Bourdieu strongly believed this elite minority in the globalization era cover themselves with

democracy to legitimize their special interests at the expense of the public interests, for they

lost their ―moral courage‖ and ―social vision‖57

. Likewise, Benjamin Barber called the

representative democracy ―thin‖ and likened it to ―politics as zookeeping‖, in the sense that

citizens are comparable to ―animals in a zoo waiting for their keepers to decide their lives‖58

.

Ronald Aminzade argued that protests and other sorts of informal self-help groups by the new

urban poor take place when the public institutions were not any kind of help for solving their

problems59

. Thus, public space is not only an alternative besides the state institutions but also

the last final ground any marginalized group is eager to protect and take control for a

protection and promotion of their interests.

2.2 WHY IS YOUTH IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AN ATTRACTIVE

OPTION FOR OUR COMTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY?

A growing activism of youth catches attention of both scholars and policy makers since the

latter perceive their presence in politics may accompany with them changes. Some scholars

believed that the main reason behind this optimism seems that youth are distinguishable from

their previous generation by their personality traits such as dynamism and progressivism.

―ingroup‖ members, mutually depend on each other socially and economically. In other words, parents invest

their hardly earned income into their education not only because of love but also because of their perceived

dependencies in their later lives, especially after their retirement. Harry C. Triandis, Christoper McCusker and C.

Harry Hui,"Multimethod Probes of Individualism and Collectivism," Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology 59:5 (November 1990): 1006-08. 57

P. Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); cited in Frederick Powel, The Politics of

Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left? (Great Britain: University of Bristol, 2007), 23. 58

Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participator Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, California: University of

California Press, 1984); cited in Frederick Powel, The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left?

(Great Britain: University of Bristol, 2007), 16. 59

Ronald Aminzade, "Breaking the Chains of Dependency: From Patronage to Class Politics, Toulouse, France,

1830-1872," Journal of Urban History 3 (August 1977):505.

16

However, many scholars also noticed social, economic and political conditions within which

youth are influenced may be a better subject of studies rather merely understanding youth in

terms of age gaps. Yet, one might claim both personal and environmental factors of youth

make them who they are and distinguish them from ―others‖.

PERSONAL FACTORS OF YOUTH

Personal factors of youth mainly refer to traits that personally characterize youth either

physically or psychologically. Remarkable characteristics of their personality traits might not

only shed a light on our doubt why distinctive features make them different from ―others‖ in

terms of their dynamic activism and their aspiration and why some scholars conceive youth

are more willing to participate in politics than their counterparts, the elderly. All answers

might lie in what approaches are used to understand youth. Thus, it might be logical to begin

with analyses of pure personality traits of youth and its interaction with socio-economic and

political conditions.

Youth may be identified in terms of both their physical and psychological development. As an

anthropologist, Benedict R. O‘ G. Anderson understood youth as a transitional phase of life-

arc from childhood to mature adulthood60

and noticed their attitude and behaviours of

―dynamism, progress, self-sacrificing idealism and revolutionary will‖61

. Though he agreed

with Anderson, G. Standley Hall cautiously noticed ―inner‖ formation of adolescents‘ volatile

identity because this volatility might inevitably trouble themselves and a wider society62

.

However, other scholars examined adolescents‘ changes in attitudes and behaviour by putting

their biological and psychological development under economic, social and political

constraints. ―It is not the relations between ages which explain the changes or stability in

society‖, argued Sheila Allen63

, ―but changes in societies which explains the relations

between ages‖. By referring to Allen‘s claim, Bill Osbergy strongly agreed distinguishable

features of youth from other life stages were mainly sharped by ―wider social, economic and

political structures‖64

. In this regard, Navtej Dhillion and Tarik Yousef perceived youth as

60

Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca and

London: Cornell University Press, 1972), 3. 61

Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 109. 62

G. Standley Hall, Adolescence: It’s Psychology and Its Relation to Physiology, Anthology, Sociology, Sex,

Crime and Education (1904); cited in Bill Osgerby, Youth Media (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 7. 63

Sheila Allen, "Some Theoretical Problems in the Study of Youth," Sociological Review 16:3 (1968):321; cited

in Osbergy, p.8. 64

Ibid.

17

being in a state of ―waiting‖ to be mainly shaped by the three interdependent institutions,

―education, employment and family formation‖65

. For instance, state is responsible to provide

them educational skills necessary to prepare them for meaningful employment, so they can

earn income for their independent lives, purchase homes and eventually get marriages, which

is a key milestone in the transition from youth to ―fully mature‖ adulthood.

Anderson called youth in colonies the ―first‖ generation of a European education, ―marking

them off linguistically and culturally from their parents‘ generation‖66

. Some of them were

exposed to both a modern educational system and culture of the West while they were also

bilinguists. Thus, both modern education and their bilingual capacity provide them precious

means to absorb ―learnable-from‖ experience through studies of the West and World

histories67

and, in turn, help them well understand a ―prime cause‖ of difficulties through

which some members of a society are passing from diverse cultural dimensions68

.

It is worth to notice that Anderson seemed to be optimistic that youth break traditional chains

of dependencies in the patron-client system by mainly basing his argument on education. In

this sense, an increasing number of the literate young and their growing knowledge mark not

only a generational gap of political tendency between the older generation (parents and old

politicians) and the younger generation (children and young population) but also inspire them

to participate even more in politics than their previous generation. However, in order to avoid

generalization of Anderson‘s argument, two experiments are considered to understand

children-parents political socialization whereby their levels of education differ really matter

their political behaviours and attitudes, and whether political education at schools

significantly inspire pupils to actively participate in political affairs of their country.

Some Western scholars generally considered family‘s political socialization as one of many

factors inspiring political behaviours and attitude of children. The1965 study by the Survey

Research Centre of the University of Michigan on a national sample of American high school

seniors appeared very likely to be affirmative with the general presumption. According to the

findings, when both parents had the same party preference, 76% of students agreed with their

65

Navtej Dhillion and Tarik Yousef, Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the

Middle East (Washington, DC: Brooking Institute Press, 2009); cited in Emma C. Murphy, "Problematizing

Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," Mediterranean Politics 17:1 (2012):9. 66

Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 109. 67

Ibid. 68

Albert Breton and Raymond Breton, "An Economic Theory of Social Movements," The American Economic

Review 59:2 (May, 1969):203.

18

parents; but, when both parents divided their preference between Republican and Democratic

parties, 39 % of the students agreed with their mother, 37% with their father and 24% with

neither69

. Though this figure did not show a significant force of mothers in establishing a

child‘s party identification, the result was decisive in both cases of Democrat and Republic

mothers. Similar studies conducted in French, Swedish and Norwegian societies reported

similar results of ―high intergenerational agreement‖ between children and parents towards

the same party though the highest frequency was found in the United States, followed by

Sweden and Norway, then France70

.

Yet, following researches found the early assumption is malleable because the result may

change if other circumstances such as levels of education from both parents and children are

considered. At the American University of Beirut in 1969 and 1970, Halim I. Barakat

conducted a survey on Kuwaiti and Jordanian students, who came from different family

backgrounds in terms of their family education and incomes, to find out how parents influence

their children‘s political behaviours and attitudes. It is not least to notice that Kuwait started

suddenly to experience much more rapid social changes in the last few decades and a great

majority (88 percent) of Kuwaiti parents had less than some secondary education whereas

social changes in Jordan earlier took place but at a comparatively slower pace and a great

majority of Jordanian parents had secondary and university education71

.

The result of this study convincingly found that generational gap in different levels of

education between parents and children render parents less influential in transmitting their

political behaviours and attitudes to their offspring72

. In overall, 62.5% of Kuwaiti students

from both sexes politically deviated from their parents whereas merely 42.5 % of girl and boy

Jordanian students politically identified themselves to neither of their parents73

. Yet, as this

study has not covered a reciprocal inspiration of political socialization between parents and

children, one might reasonably ask whether their children may inspire their parents‘ political

behaviours and attitude, supposed their parents have less influence on their children because

of their lower level of education and that children-parents ratio of dependency remains high in

an extended family.

69

Halim I. Barakat, "Generational Gap and Family Political Socialization in Three Arab Societies," in Political

Youth, Traditional Schools: National and International Perspectives, ed. Byron G. Massialas (New Jersey:

Prentice Hall, 1972), 218. 70

Ibid. 71

Ibid, 216, 224. 72

Ibid, 215. 73

Ibid, 218-219.

19

Moreover, another separate study conducted in 1968 and 1969 founded formal political

education at schools only fostered and maintained a cognitive development of students but has

not directly and simultaneously contributed to their political participation. Russell F. Farnen

and Dan B. German conducted their study on students aged between 9 and 20 years old in five

countries including West Germany, the United States, England, Sweden and Italy and used

three scale of measurement such as political legitimacy, dissident/opposition and sense of

efficacy in order to find out a close relationship of the political socialization at schools with

students‘ behaviours and attitudes74

. Students were asked to indicate whether they were

studying or studied one or more courses of political science in terms of ―like civics,

international relations, constitutions and government, etc.‖75

. The findings shown the political

education curriculum at schools has no significant impacts on students‘ behaviours and

attitudes76

. Indeed, the political courses have an impact on their cognitive development and, in

turn, ―may or may not‖ have a ―latent‖ effect on their behaviours and attitudes in due

course77

.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS OF YOUTH

Environmental factors of youth refer to socio-economic and political situations that have the

impact on their perception and behaviours towards political participation. It can be a result of

pure influence of the situations or of its interactions with personality traits of youth. Beside

education, some scholars particularly paid attention to mobilization and socialization, the

most important motors facilitating the processes of interaction, which are supported by

availability of new locus and new tools of communication. All of these factors may not just

have effects on youth‘s values and taste through ―peer cultures‖ but also inspire theirs much

higher when the environmental and the personal factors of youth interact mutually.

Migration may give the young a chance to have more socialization among their peers and

sometimes with others in higher classes contributing to their high level of aspiration. Asef

Bayat appears to go further than Anderson whose claims particularly focus on education, for

he thinks youth are distinguished from their parents, who live in traditional life course, not

only by their education but also, more particularly, by their more mobilization that inspires

74

Russell F. Farnen and Dan B. German, "Youth, Politics and Education," in Political Youth, Traditional

Schools, ed. Byron G. Massialas (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 161. 75

Ibid, 170. 76

Ibid, 171. 77

Ibid, 172.

20

their aspiration and fascination of having more like ―others‖ 78

. In his work titled Street

Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran in 1997, Bayat studied a case of Iranian youth

within which they migrated from their villages to the cities where they witnessed the modern-

class lifestyle and, in turn, desired to be part of it79

.

However, Ted Robert Gurr shown that a mere exposure to a better way of life is unlikely to

bring people‘s discontent with what they already had unless they think they have

opportunities to attain it80

. In this regard, W. G. Runciman illustrated that these chances can

be perceived by a period of prosperity that breaks the circle between the poverty and

conservatism making people aware of that possibility81

while Daniel Lerner noticed that, in

order to gain more popularity in a popular period of time, ―unattainable hopes‖ given by

political leaders to their people is enough to buy their believes of attainment82

. Though he did

not mention clearly which side he would take, Gurr‘s arguments could be implied that both

Runciman and Lerner had reasons, and their claims provided a very probability of people‘s

believes in attainment, which is a source of discontent, making Bayat‘s argument become less

perfect in explaining how increasing aspiration and people‘s discontents have a close

relationship with mobilization and socialization of different social classes.

Ernest Gellner and Ted Robert Gurr agreed that ―increasing aspiration‖, a source of

discontents, would lead to violence when people felt their shares in social revenues were

unfairly distributed and so their tensions became intolerable. Unlike Gurr, Gellner felt

pessimistic of society of perpetual growth where these ―intolerable tensions‖ normally took

place due to increasing human mobilization and communication unless its ―economic

development proceeded‖ constantly83

; but he cautioned of discriminatory treatments between

the ―privileged‖ and the ―underprivileged‖ as ―so acute‖ when their living are too far from

other people in terms of the average growth, when compared to the differences between

―starvation and sufficiency‖ and then the ―sufficiency with more [,] or with fewer‖84

.

Like Bayat, Aminzade tends to be affirmative to an inspiring notion of ―peer cultures‖. In

France, at the city of Toulouse, in the late 19th

century when aristocrats and clergy‘s power

78

Bayat, 56. 79

Ibid. 80

Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 102. 81

W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966),

23-24; cited in Gurr, 105. 82

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958), 330-331, 335ff; cited in

Gurr, 94. 83

Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford; Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 24. 84

Gellner, 109.

21

was in decline due to their unwillingness and inability to provide basic services to working-

class groups, a growing number of public spaces such as cafés, pubs, social clubs, mutual

benefit societies and labor associations made room for entertainment, friendship and self-help

groups85

. Such new public spaces became the centres of regularized patterns of interaction

and were used as areas of respite from the struggle for survival. Such a new locus and their

changing patterns of behaviours and attitudes towards traditional institutions were believed to

significantly contribute to a break of dependency chains between the clientele and their elite

patrons86

.

Beside the above new locus, new media appears to be an exclusively sole tool for young

people. From a psychological perspective, concepts of young and new technologies in our

contemporary society, argued Julian Sefton-Green, share ―similar teleological assumptions

about growth, progression and development‖87

. Their enthusiasm for curiosity, challenges,

competition and progress matches together with new technologies that are used for realization

of consumer industries‘ ambition, especially greater profits at a rocket speed. From socio-

economic perspective, an inseparable nature of youth and new technologies have already been

nurtured by consumer industries since the latter has targeted them as potentially sizeable

segment of markets since the early 19th

century88

. It is not least to notice that, while working

youngsters profoundly dominated the markets during the ―jackpot‖ years of the 1950s-60s

period and remained the largest group of a hard-earnings disposal in the 1970s and 1980s89

,

new media along with a development of new technologies and Internet appeared in a period of

the 1980s-1990s for market expansion shortly following a declining confidence in local

markets including the United States of America and Great Britain90

.

New media occasionally becomes a new tool for ―peer cultures‖. It may offer youth another

new type of ―interactive‖ locus in the age of online societies. With facilitation of new

technologies such as computers and mobile phones supported by digital codes and the

Internet, both youth and early adults may socialize and enjoy their individual leisure through

various software applications and new formats that are compatible for a wider range of

85

Aminzade, 503. 86

Ibid, 502. 87

Julian Sefton-Green, "Introduction: Being Young in the Digital Age," in Digital Diversion: Youth Culture in

the Age of Multimedia, ed. Julian Sefton-Green (London: UCL Press, 1998), 1-20; cited in Osgerby, 193. 88

Osgerby, 6-7. 89

Ibid, 9, 16-20, 26-31. 90

Ibid, 35, 194.

22

delivery and storage platforms91

. In addition, while some scholars seem to be more optimistic

than others, Jon Katz believed that the digital world not only helps young people connect one

another in becoming the citizens of the ―Digital Nation‖ but also provides them a new sense

of ―political self‖92

. Also, Murphy argued their interaction among peers through online

communication by using new media to supplement the existing traditional networks leads to

an emerging of ―patchwork identities‖ whereby young people have ―unique identities by

mixing different styles and values drawn from the supermarket of opinions presented by

increasingly diverse information and communication technologies‖93

.

However, neither personal nor environmental factors of youth may perfectly explain why their

behaviours and attitudes lead to a presumption of a new generational class separated from

others and how their emerging accompanies changes, often perceived as positive, when youth

is not yet appropriately identified. Indeed, those elements might not cover complete

characteristics of youth and, in turn, remain less effective in understanding exactly who else is

better classified into ―youth‖. Karl Mannheim argued, as each phase of life arc is gradually

continuous and the same changes shared by intergenerational groups keep going on, young

people are possibly classified into a generational unit of youth in accordance to their socially,

economically and politically shared experiences94

. Indeed, wider groups of variable ages may

feel they are still young because of the limits to their lives‘ opportunities that the government

has never provided them, and of shared benefits of new media, internet, modern education and

the same authoritarian rule.

2.3 SCOPES OF THE PAST AND CURRENT RESEARCHES

EMERGING YOUTH ACTIVISM IN POLITICS

Social movements in our recent history have been marked by an emerging of young activists

though origins of their appearance and their goals may be variable. Youth activism we may

have never seen in the history has been fueled either by culture and personality traits of youth

like in Indonesia or by socio-economic and political changes like in Tunisia and Egypt as we

will see during the course of discussion in this section. Also, based on these ―learnable-from‖

91

Ibid, 193-196. 92

Jon Katz, "The Rights of Kids in the Digital Age," Wired 4:7 (July, 1996):123; cited in Osgerby, 202. 93

Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 12; Osgerby, 204. 94

Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of generations," in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London: RKP,

1928), 288-290; cited in Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure,"

15.

23

experiences, those young people share their common desires to fulfill themselves with means

of subsistence, to be freed from oppression and to challenge their leaders for the right

direction of their country as it can be seen in the following.

Indonesian ―peduma‖ (youth) play a significant role in the Indonesian independence.

According to Anderson, the main reasons behind emergence of those Javanese young activists

are explained perfectly by understanding a traditional classification of life arc among them

into ―childhood, youth, maturity and old age‖ and Javanese traditions of ―hormat‖ referring,

which refer to their respect to older people or anyone in higher social status95

. Javanese male

children of 6 years old at least traditionally pass out of their childhood to youth by a ceremony

of circumcision; since then, their dependency is no longer submitted to their fathers but a

―guru‖ who prepares them for their full integration into a society96

. By understanding such a

tradition, Japan succeeded in mobilizing young Indonesians nationwide by recruiting the

respectful elderly teaching the young for their physical and spiritual strength to fight against

Dutch and British allies but these ideology projects have, in turn, awakened Indonesian young

nationalists, pressing Japan to grant Indonesia‘s independence97

. It is not least to notice that

youth movements for Indonesian independence would have not happened without initiatives

and leadership of small groups of well-educated and highly privileged ―peduma‖ in organized

ways, clear plans and active networks98

.

Tunisia‘s revolution has impressed the world by a dynamic activism of youth as a result of

changes in socio-economic and political conditions. By 2010, over 55 percent of the national

population was below the age of 30 years99

. The country‘s economy appeared to undergo an

unparalleled trend with demographics and to harm some marginalized groups of the society

more severely than others due to unfair distribution of economic growth. While an

unemployment rate of the general population in 2010 varied between 14 percent and 17

percent for the official estimate and 24 percent for the unofficial one, highly skilled young

individuals aged between 15 and 19 years were seriously hit by 44 percent100

.

95

Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 3. 96

Ibid, 3-5. 97

Ibid, 1-2, 26-27, 44, 50-51. 98

Ibid, 17-18. 99

Emma C. Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy," Mediterranean Politics

16:2 (2011): 302. 100

Ahmed Jdey,"A History of Tunisia, January 14, 2011: The End of a Dictator and the Beginning of

Democratic Construction," boundary2 39:1 (2012): 78; Monica Marks, "Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism:

Understanding the Jihadi Current," Mediterranean Politics 18:1 (2013): 110.

24

Moreover, youth‘s hardship may have close relations with economic inequality among

different classes and varying geographical locations, which were affected disproportionally.

Between 1973 and 1981, 83.2 percent of the industrial investments in Tunisia were poured

into the coastal areas whereas the remains of 16.8% were spread over the central-west, the

northwestern and the southwestern regions where many social movements broke out and later

spread across the country101

. Also, while the richest 10 percent of Tunisians received a third

of the gross domestic product (GDP), the poorest 30 percent got merely less than 10 percent

and the remaining 60 percent of the population, mostly the middle class, gradually began

suffering as well102

. Thus, poor people, in particular the young unemployed, in those three

regions were not beneficiaries of thousands of new factory and industrial centre projects but

subservient to the people living in the coastal areas at the eastern part of Tunisia103

. They were

even excluded from access to vital areas such as drinking water, electricity, health care,

infrastructure and economic opportunities104

.

Finally, Egypt‘s uprising was originated from sharp changes in socio-economic and political

conditions, especially an unprecedented growing rate of the young population. The number of

young Egyptians, who were aged between 15 and 35 years, stood at 44 percent of the total

population in 2004105

. By 2012, Egypt‘s young population under 30 years jumped to between

65 percent and 70 percent of the total106

. According to the UNDP, Egypt was already among

the countries in the region hit by a wave of new labour market entrants and growing youth

unemployment varying between 16 percent and 39 percent by 2009107

. This country was also

trapped in its fragile economy with slow economic growth and wide fluctuation between 4.3

percent and 8.4 percent in the 1960s-1980s periods108

, yet this situation appeared likely to

prolong in the following decades, leading to a necessity of severe repressive measures of the

government to silent the public outcry. The Egypt‘s authoritarian regime was also well-known

for its neoliberalism and corruption, for some government senior officers had conflicting of

interests between their private businesses and the national economic reforms, especially in the

101

Jdey, 84. 102

Jdey, 77. 103

Ibid, 81. 104

Ibid, 76, 78. 105

Sika, 185. 106

Kate Nevens, "The Youth Are Revolting," Harvard International Review 34: 2 (2012): 45. 107

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "The UNDP 2009 Report on Arab Human

Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries"; cited in Murphy,

"Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 9. 108

Denis J. Sullivan, "The Political Economy of Reform in Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies

22: 3 (August, 1990): 317.

25

agriculture109

. In the absence of effective solutions, the Egypt‘s uprising on January 25, 2011

was unavoidable.

In brief, youth movements in Indonesia, Tunisia and Egypt show that either personality traits

or socio-economic and political situations more or less have a close relationship with growing

youth activism though this phenomenon may be greatly attributed to either of them

disproportionally depending on situations in a definite place and time. While Indonesian

―peduma‖ was awakened by nationalism and ideology, an abrupt outcry of both Tunisian and

Egyptian youth was mainly spurred by unmatched trends among dramatic shifts in young

demographics, unhealthy economic growth and economic disparity. Unlike Egypt, a

negligence of Tunisian youth in the inner regions in the west likely put Tunisia in very serious

and irreparable situations economically, socially and politically. Also, when compared to

Tunisia and Egypt, Indonesia‘s youth movements were more organized and active while

youth movements in these two Arab countries were likely more passive and less organized at

its early stages because of, perhaps, their passive contention against the authoritarian rules and

repressive measures of the government. Yet, all the three cases of the youth movements share

some common trends such as solidarity of youth within cross-cutting sectors and without

geographical barriers while informal political structures seemed to be their preferred mode of

political participation in the pre- and the post-independence and revolution periods.

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND EXISTING POLITICAL ORDER

After uprisings, youth movements continue and streets remain tense. Most scholars including

Mark, Jdey, Murphy, and Nevens seemed likely have a consensus on the reasons why protests

remained present when an old regime (ancient régime) was already replaced by an interim

government or a newly elected government. They appeared to agree that youth movements

remain persistent because of the absence of trust between the new government and youth,

different ideologies between the youth and their elderly political leaders as well as a

centralized hierarchy of the state institutions.

Either an interim or a newly elected government necessarily needs to build trust with the

public including youth to affirm that the new regime in place is different from the previous

one and does not represent interests of any particular group. In both Tunisia and Egypt, Ben

Ali and Gamal Mubarak were thrown out of power and fled their countries. Yet, most core

109

Sullivan, 319-320.

26

members of the old regime and parties remained unchanged. It appears that the old generation

was not yet ready to give ways to the younger generation, who has not yet experienced how

tasty power is, by pretending they were still young while the young, perhaps, conceived those

old politicians as ignorant and incompetent.

For example, soon after Ben Ali fled the country, Mohammed Ghannouchi, Ben Ali‘s Prime

Minister, and Fouad Mebazaa, the speaker of the parliament, competed for the interim

President110

. Yet, both of them were either core members of Ben Ali‘s government and of the

former ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD). Consequently,

in order to response to protests‘ demands and to show a sincerity to the revolutionaries, they

resigned from the RCD to put clear water between themselves and the former structure of

power while some senior officers close to Ben Ali including the head of presidential security,

General Ali Seriati, and the interior minister, Rafik Belhaj Kacen, were arrested and a

committee for investigation into corruption and asset-collecting of the former President and

his family was also set up111

. Despite their attempted separation from the previous regime,

most of political elites in the old regime (ancient régime) and bourgeoisie in most coastal

areas of Tunisia including Tunis, Sfax, Sahel, Jerba, Nabeul and Hammamet remained in

power to defend their interests and businesses while the revolutionaries, mostly made up of

youth, were excluded from decision-making bodies and processes112

.

Another noticeable reason behind perpetual youth movements may be differences in

ideologies between the young population and their elderly leaders. Murphy claimed these

differences pose on both conflicting interests and perception113

. In other words, both in

Tunisia and Egypt, youth continued to precede their demands for employment and fair

economic growth since they were underrepresented and so their needs became unmet. In

Egypt, while these young revolutionaries were indeed replaced by the elderly to fulfill

positions in the decision-making bodies and processes in the government and opposing

parties, some of them were discredited and kicked off by the military114

. Also, both

Indonesian and Tunisian politics still reflect well-known figures of an early generation.

110

Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy," 302. 111

Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy," 303. 112

Jdey, 85. 113

Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 11, 18. 114

Neven, 46-47.

27

Sukarno and Hatta were already active in Indonesia‘s politics in the 1930s115

while Maya Jribi

and Beji Caid Essebi were politically active in Tunisia‘s politics in the 1980s116

.

Finally, participation through the formal political structures seems not to reflect political

perception and action of youth. According to Murphy, young and old generations are not only

different in what they think but also in how they work, especially how the state institutions

interact with their people in terms of policy feedback117

. In the wake of the 1944 Koiso

Declaration, the Gerakan Rakjat Baru was found under leadership of Sukarno, Hatta and other

old service members, while young Indonesians thought this institution was less effective and

slowly moved towards Indonesia‘s independence; therefore they tried to promote youth

movements nationwide and eventually their informal political group, the Angkatan Baru

(―New Generation‖), was established to challenge and lobby the formal political structure of

their older generation118

. Also, Tunisian youth preferred some looser forms of ―youth-friendly

civil society networks‖ like i-WATCH and Doustourma (―Our Constitutions‖)119

whereas

some young Egyptians chose to work out their demands through semi-formal political

structures such as non-governmental organizations and associations to lobby the national

policy120

. To them, these semi-formal and informal political structures appeared to be more

flexible and approachable compared to the state institutions.

In short, generational detachment of youth from the public institutions keeps a distance

between the elderly elite politicians and their young population. In Indonesia, Tunisia and

Egypt, young people were not incorporated into decision-making bodies and processes of the

state institutions while a prolonged situation of their marginalization from a wider society

appeared to gradually increase intergenerational tension and sometimes political violence.

Thus, unless the elderly politicians build up trust among their young population and ensure

their interests are included, a cycle of political struggles in our recent past may repeat again.

SECTORS OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION

When slow economic growth and unfair distribution of wealth prolong for years, social

outrages may break out from any particular geographical location and then gradually spread

115

Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 56-57. 116

Marks, 110. 117

Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 11, 18. 118

Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 44, 50-51, 56-57. 119

Marks, 111. 120

Neven, 47.

28

nationwide unless the government satisfies people‘ demands. During this difficult time, it

seems likely people share their needs in common. While Fukuyama concerned political

parties are not easy to decide whether ―programmatic policies‖ or ―promises of direct

benefits‖ are better prioritized in their political agendas or the government policy121

, Bayat

argued, during such a time including economic crises, ―most‖ of (new urban) poor like the

urban unemployed and other marginalized groups struggle for a direct response to ―their

immediate concerns‖ but merely ―many‖ poor people live on their ―dream of better future‖122

.

Yet, Bayat has not yet covered the details on what circumstances people are more likely to ask

for long-term outcomes than the short-term ones. It seems that people most often prioritize

foods and other means of subsistence for themselves and their family before their dreams of

freedom, liberty and also, perhaps, the future of their children during time of crises but they

are more likely to expect of sustainable and long-term development rather than merely foods

in time of peace and stability. Yet, this generalization may be unsuitable with youth‘s

personal factors because the young appear to have higher aspiration and expect even more

needs than the elderly.

During a time of crises or transition, people in Tunisia and Egypt appeared to share their

common desires notwithstanding their income levels and their generational gaps though they

may have different interpretation of their needs. Both Egyptian youth and adults across all

sectors and classes fought for the same goals under a commonly shared slogan ―food, freedom

and human dignity‖123

. In Tunisia, the poor needed breads and drinking water while the

middle class and the rich begun to feel suffering from economic slowdown, inflation and

repression of the government on their rights and freedom124

. Also, unemployed fresh

graduates and worker unions demanded for employment whereas teachers, lecturers, lawyers,

doctors and businessmen no longer traded political stability for dubious economic growth but

freedom, liberty and dignity125

.

However, problems regarding a protection of the majority interest sometimes cannot be

solved due to a conflict of interests with the elite minority. Though the Egyptian government

has committed to economic reforms since the late 1980s, its pace was really slow, if not

failed, by leaving the country‘s economy in fragile and unstable conditions due to a lack of

121

Fukuyama, "Democracy and the Quality of the State," 11. 122

Bayat, 159. 123

Sika, 186, 189-190. 124

Jdey, 83-84; Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy," 301. 125

Ibid

29

political wills and a strong leadership126

. Some senior government officers had conflicting

interests between the national economic reforms and their private businesses, and many

ministries including the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Industry and Ministry of

Economy and Finance competed with each other to grasp their power over a fix of price and

export quota for most of the agricultural products whereas Mubarak, the Egypt‘s President at

the time, had no willingness to solve the problems for autonomy and stability of the state

institutions127

. Like Egypt, while political elites and bourgeoisies mostly in the coastal areas

of Tunisia took care of both decision-making bodies and procedures, the young

revolutionaries were excluded and, in turn, had no influence on their country‘s future

direction, for the ruling classes were fierce in defending their acquired powers and personal

interests128

. Therefore, the interests of both Tunisian and Egyptian youth were not only

threatened by the politicians but also by businessmen.

MEANS OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION

Some scholars like Barber, Murphy, Aminzade and Bayat agreed public space provides an

alternative platform outside the state institutions. Some informal groups emerge from a

growing presence of a new locus such as cafés, bars, pubs and other entertainment places

where group members build up their trust among themselves easily and, in turn, discuss

openly a wide range of topics among their peers by basing on a mutual trust129

. For example,

during the later years of the Dutch era in the late 1920s, a very small number of Indonesian

elite students from the Law Faculty and the Technical Institute in Djakarta and Bandung

established informal groups among them in order to discuss about current political situations

and their country‘s future130

. Since their plan was not only for students in the universities and

other higher education institutes, educated young Indonesians gradually propagated their

messages and information to other young Indonesian groups and the general population in

mobile and remote areas of Indonesia noticeably in the 1930s and 1940s131

.

Moreover, Internet appears to be a modern tool that can be used to promote political

engagement and to mobilize people for support of any particular political action. Maden,

Macgill and Smith argued more teens treat internet as a ―venue for social interaction‖ where

126

Sullivan, 317. 127

Sullivan, 323-328. 128

Jdey, 85. 129

Aminzade, 503. 130

Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 17-18. 131

Ibid, 26-27.

30

they share their creations such as photos, videos and information, and interact each other

regularly132

. Wellman also claimed this socialization spurs ―networked individualism‖133

through what Jon Katz called the ―peer culture‖134

.

Some social networking sites such as Facebook and blogs greatly play significant roles in

sharing information and rallying youngsters for changes. Facebook and blogs may be used for

different purposes and produce different shapes of consequences. For instance, Facebook was

particularly used to mobilize popular forces from all across sectors and throughout the

country, leading ultimately to Tunisia‘s revolution on January 14, 2011 followed by Egypt‘s

uprising of January 25, 2011135

, but the uprisings would not happen without supports of face-

to-face based networks among group members. However, it does not necessarily mean blogs

are less useful than Facebook. The blogs likely appeal to the general public and shape the

public opinion by its particular contents written by bloggers. In other words, it may depend on

purposes of usage whether Facebook or blogs appear to be more effective and fruitful for a

particular action such as in a case of China where blogs are the most popular means for

gradual reforms.

In China, blogs seem to effectively represent social norms and shape state norms by its

particular focus on socio-political oriented issues. Out of 231 million bloggers in 2010,

equivalent to 55 percent of China's total internet population136

, merely a small segment of the

blogosphere, which was made up of the intelligentsia and the grassroots in the scenes, defined

their writing about political and social affairs and made the fruits of their works known to a

wider audience137

. On the contrary, most of young bloggers, very often students at college and

middle schools, had their blog content responded to their peers‘ attention such as love

relations and lifestyles whereas middle-life people, who were aged between 30 and 50 years,

made a majority of "checking out from the Internet"138

. In other words, only a small number

of bloggers, most of them is very likely at their fully mature adults , has a greater influence on

the public opinion in China and, in turn, the social norms against the state norms while youth,

132

Meredith Conroy, Jessica T. Feezell and Mario Guerrero, "Facebook and Political Engagement: A Study of

Online Political Group Membership and Offline Political Engagement," Computers in Human Behavior 28

(2012): 1535. 133

Ibid. 134

Osgerby, 202. 135

Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy," 300; Sika, 186. 136

Johan Largerkvist, "The rise of online public opinion in China," China: An International Journal

3:1(2005):119-130; cited in Johan Largerkvist, After the Internet before Democracy (Bern: Peter Lang AG,

Internaitonal Academic Publishers, 2010), 67, 70-71. 137

Largerkvist, After the Internet before Democracy, 72-73. 138

Ibid, 71, 73-74.

31

late adults and elderly people tend to be receivers rather than delivers but, perhaps, active

audience. China‘s case shows no matter how small the number of activists and what ages they

are, youth, early adults and late adults possibly share the same generational unit and work

together to shape the government‘s policy from various dimensions.

However, either Facebook or blogs per se may not mobilize people en masse to engage in

political activities without support of face-to-face networks. Yet, the on-the-scene witness and

investigation play important roles in making uses of the social media more effective in

challenging and changing the state norms. While some academia and intelligentsia use blogs

to share their research to the public in general, ordinary people, mostly the middle-class

urbans, combine uses of blogs with concepts of citizen journalism to mirror many sensitive

issues existing in the Chinese society but uncovered by traditional media. Hence, when either

Facebook or blogs are exploited in combination with citizen journalism, perhaps as a result of

loss of trust in state-controlled media or less investigative coverage of traditional media,

netizens become more mobile than ever and any individual can shape either social norms or

state norms to a large extent. In this sense, any local citizen journalist, who is really fond into

a particular topic of sensitive issues including corruption, environment and other issues of

social injustice, or who witnesses an incident on a scene, may report this event in a real time

from different angels with or without investigation in depth.

2.4 KEY THEMES OF THE LITERATURE

Most prominent scholars such as Fukuyama and Barber agreed with Rousseau that either

democratic or authoritarian governments can buy a loyalty of its citizens with the public

interest. Notwithstanding it is a matter of weak institutionalization or declining supports of the

social forces, a failure of the state institutions to guarantee at least the majority interest leads

to instability of the political community and sometimes collective violence due to a loss of the

public‘s trust in the state institutions and, in turn, their swap to informal structures for self-

satisfactory justice. Huntington identified inadaptability and absence of the autonomy of the

institutions as the main reasons behind a malaise of the society and political violence but

either of them shares the same route cause, generational gaps between elderly political leaders

and their young population.

Generational gaps have impact not only on a smooth functioning of the state institutions but

also regular relations between the state institutions and the social forces. Anderson‘s and

32

Gellner‘s arguments provide an insight into how dramatic shifts in young demographics and

the growing number of literacy cause generational gaps and sometimes intolerable tensions

between the included old generation in and the excluded young generation from both decision

making bodies and processes of the institutions. They share different ideologies, ways of

works and interests, so all of these situations eventually lead to a loss of trust of the young

people and their decision to swap the political institutions for public space as their alternative

means of protecting their interests. Yet, in some cases, their option for informal structures

may be voluntary due to its flexibility and approachable platforms.

Distinctive characteristics of youth such as different societal experiences, personality traits

and better education make the existing political order for the old generation inapplicable for

the young generation. According to the theory of the ―generational unit‖ by Karl Mannheim,

people can be classified into different generations due to their separate societal experiences, in

the sense that the past social experiences of the old generation is unlikely to affect political

behaviours and attitudes of the young generation. Youth are characterized by enthusiasms,

dynamism and progressivism, claimed Anderson, while conservatism is shared among elderly

people. Also, they are exposed to a new curriculum of modern education including ICT and

foreign languages, and sometimes have higher levels of education when compared to the

previous generation. These factors not only demarcate the young from the elderly but also

give them more opportunities to inspire their elderly parents and friends to get involved in

politics according to the theory of ―peer cultures‖, which were emphasized by Eisenstadt,

Katz and Murphy, and also affirmed by Barakat in his recent studies.

Behind modern education and personality traits of youth, mobilization and socialization

sometimes become influential motors fueling higher aspiration of young people. More

migration and a growing presence of the ICT contribute to ―increasing aspiration‖ and

facilitate political mobilization. Based on a variable of higher levels of education, these young

people not only influence the old generation, especially their parents, in terms of political

behaviours and attitudes but also mobilize their friends for political engagement. As a

consequence, a generational detachment from political institutions and limited public space

for recourses may provide more room for prolonged passive discontents and silent revolts

while its scale may sometimes be unprecedented.

Across the literature, case studies in Indonesia, Tunisia, Egypt and China shed a light into

how problems of generational gaps can be solved effectively for a stable society. Youth

33

integration into decision making bodies of the state institutions and more public space are the

main scenarios that can be learnt from the above case studies. Their integration into the state

institutions help reduce generational gaps and differences in ideologies between the elderly

political leaders and their young population, for these institutions become approachable to

hands of the young people and popular confidence on its roles in representing the public

interest is assured. Also, more public space sometimes provides an alternative outside the

hierarchically-centralized state structures, since civil society, social media and protests give a

more flexible means to any marginalized group in challenging and changing state norms.

On the top of that, Johan Largerkvist shares an insightful impression that social media can

become a future and persistent platform of public space even in authoritarian countries like

China. Conciliation between the state norms and the social norms, and a favorable

environment for businesses and investment are the main reasons making a complete

censorship on the internet by the Chinese Communist Party impossible. Yet, like China‘s

case, many experiences in Tunisia and Egypt told that a virtual community alone cannot work

to challenge the state without any interaction with a real community. A matter of trust on

Facebook necessitated young Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries to mobilize their

supporters through face-to-face based networks while blogs run by intelligentsia and the

grassroots in China would not work and have impacts on the state norms without reports of

on-the-scene witness and investigative journalism on the hot spots. It is worthwhile to notice

that China is not the only country that has been facing this new challenge of the globalization

but also other authoritarian countries that step their food into modernization and free market

economy for maintaining the perpetual economy growth, a base of any authoritarian

government‘s legitimacy.

2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF RESEARCH

Cambodia‘s young population makes more than a majority of the total139

. Therefore, a study

into this new phenomenon is very useful to predict and measure what consequences will be

accompanied, to find out what solutions are better suitable and effective and how they are

implemented. Based on the above mentioned theories and case studies, this research

hypothesizes:

139

"2008 National Census," the National Institute of Statistics; "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), accessed November 11, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/cb.html

34

1-A dramatic shift in young Cambodian demographics from the minority to the majority

group of the total population leads to necessary changes in structures of political institutions;

2-Young Cambodians have better education, so they are not only more likely to participate in

politics but also more capable of mobilizing peers and others for political engagement;

3-If they are provided an alternative to the formal political structures for getting involved in

decision making processes, then a confrontation between the government and the young is

reduced to minimum and a severe form of collective violence can be avoided.

These hypotheses are theoretically framed and explained in diagrams as following.

DRAMATIC SHIFTS IN YOUNG DEMOGRAPHICS AND CHANGES IN

STRUCTURES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS

The first hypothesis to be tested is that a dramatic shift in young demographics from the

minority to the majority group of the population causes political institutions malfunction.

Changes in the young demographics particularly bring an emergence of another population

class, the so-called youth. This hypothesis is modeled mainly from theories made by

Huntington, Anderson and Gellner. They believed that generational gaps and differences in

ideologies contribute to the inadaptability and the absence of the autonomy of the public

institutions, and, in turn, the generational confrontation in relations between the institutions

and the young population. Thus, necessary changes in the organization of the political

institutions help to overcome the malfunction of the institutions and maintain a stability of the

political community, for the young are underrepresented and feel that their interests are

neither protected nor promoted.

Youth, as defined in the above section, refer to people of various ages who have similar

personality traits and who share the same societal experiences. Benedict Anderson140

, Ernest

Gellner141

, Ronald Aminzade142

, Asef Bayat143

believed that personal factors such as

progressivism, optimism and better education, and environmental factors including

mobilization and socialization all contribute to their ―higher level of aspiration‖. Also, a

140

Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 109. 141

Gellner, 24. 142

Ronald Aminzade, "Breaking the Chains of Dependency: From Patronage to Class Politics, Toulouse, France,

1830-1872" Journal of Urban History 3 (August 1977):502-503. 143

Bayat, 56.

35

variable of societal experiences was used by Karl Mannheim144

to elaborate his arguments on

the ―generational unit‖ or a generation of youth. Hence, all of these factors not only

distinguish them from the older generation, who appear to be less ambitious and to live in a

more conservative life course due to their past experiences in civil wars, but also necessitate

the political institutions to changes their structures, which were once used with the old

generation. In other words, types and amount of their needs as well as means and ways of

their demands are all different.

Besides their dynamism, progressivism and optimism, young Cambodians in the 1980s and

thereafter remain the one who benefits from the educational standardization in 1996 and 2005,

and who continues to share the contemporary authoritarian rule and social injustice in the

country. Consequently, even late adults in the generations of the post-Khmer Rouge baby

boom still perceive themselves as youth since they may feel their live opportunities have not

been provided by the government yet. In this regard, a dramatic shift in young demographics

means that Cambodia is a country of young population since more than a majority of the total

population is under 35 years145

. It will be more convincible with this hypothesis in the case

whereby youth, a group of young Cambodians aged from 15 to 34 years, make up of a half or

more of the total population.

Evidence from Tunisia and Egypt prove growing young demographics challenge existing

structures of the political institutions. Egyptian youth numbered 70 percent of the total

population in 2012146

whereas Tunisian youth were recorded at over 55 % of the total

population in 2010147

. Yet, both of Tunisian and Egyptian youth were excluded from the

government and the Parliament while elderly political leaders thought of their personal and

partisan interests rather the interests of the young and the public148

. Consequently, what the

disintegration of youth in those cases left were intergenerational struggles and collective

violence, the ―Arab Spring‖.

Youth integration into the state institutions is necessary to insure the stability of the political

community. This integration not only puts the institutions much closer and more approachable

144

Mannheim, 288-290; cited in Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic

Failure," 15. 145

"Population Census 2008," National Institute of Statistics (NIS), accessed April 01, 2013,

http://celade.cepal.org/khmnis/census/khm2008/. 146

Nevens, 45. 147

Emma C. Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy," Mediterranean Politics

16:2 (2011): 302. 148

Marks, 111; Neven, 46-47.

36

to the people but also helps the institutions to represent the interests of the majority, if not the

public interest. This claim is modeled from Huntington‘s argument that generational gaps,

which cause inadaptability and the absence of the autonomy of the political institutions, can

contribute to malfunction of the institutions but he particularly emphasized significant

differences in organizational experiences between the first leaders of the organization and the

next generation149

. Yet, Murphy demonstrated the differences in ideologies also exist between

the young population and their elderly political leaders, and, sometimes, lead to

intergenerational struggles due to a conflict of interests between the elderly politicians of the

minority and the young of the majority150

.

Due to their different perceptions and ways of work, intergenerational struggles take place

among old and young political leaders, and, in particular, between elderly leaders and the

younger population. The latter case is subjected of a study in details for this paper. Elderly

political leaders in Egypt and Tunisia preferred to protect their personal151

and partisan152

interests rather than the public interests, especially the interest of the young people. Also, the

young people in these two Arab countries were not only excluded from decision making

bodies153

but also were marginalized from getting access to employment154

and subsistence155

.

Yet, though Egyptian youth were not seriously neglected like young Tunisians but this young

group of 15 and 34 years old had already an enormous proportion of the total population by

standing at more 70 percent while the young Tunisians from birth to 30 years merely stood at

55 percent. It seems that severe forms of the collective violence such as uprisings are not only

attributed to a discriminatory treatment of the state institutions, which was argued by

149

Huntington, 12, 14-15. 150

Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 11, 18. 151

Some Egyptian political leaders had a conflict of interests between their functions as senior officers of the

government and their private businesses, causing the government policy of agriculture fail to be implemented

effectively. Sullivan, 319-320. 152

Tunisian politicians had more interests in protecting investors at the expense of the poor people, especially the

young unemployed, in some geographical areas, leading to disproportional distribution of welfare. Jdey, 77, 84. 153

In the aftermath of the revolutions, some young Tunisians and Egyptians were discouraged to be part of the

formal political structures while many was forcefully excluded from the decision making bodies, for many

positions in the government and the Parliament were mainly kept for the older political leaders, mostly of the old

regime. Marks, 111; Neven, 46-47; Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy,"

302; 154

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "The UNDP 2009 Report on Arab Human Development

Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries;" cited in Murphy, "Problematizing Arab

Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 9; Jdey, 78; Marks, 110. 155

Sika, 186, 189-190; Jdey, 83-84; Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy,"

301.

37

Gellner156

, but also a prolonged marginalization of any particular group and an overwhelming

proportion of this group in the total population.

However, it is of importance to notice that ability of the political institutions to represent the

public interest is the most important goal of this integration. In other words, the institutions do

not favor any particular social grouping157

. Huntington‘s concern is a real challenge in

practice, for it does not necessarily mean that the integrated youth represent the public interest

instead of individual or partisan interests. This case already happened in Egypt. In the late

2000s, when the National Democratic Party (NDP) and its leaders became more concerned

with youth issues and created strategies to integrate them into the party leadership, the NDP

youth were more interested in advancing their careers and getting access to state resources

through the ruling NDP158

. Hence, their political participation did not contribute much to the

political reforms and the general interest, so youth concerns remained unsolved and political

instability prolonged.

In short, dramatic shifts in the young demographics make the existing political institutions

inapplicable for the emerging class of the population, youth. Generational gaps and

differences in ideologies between old political leaders and their young population have

negative effects on both adaptability and autonomy of the institutions, for they have different

values, principles and ways of work. Thus, these differences sometimes lead to a generational

detachment from formal to informal political structures, a potential source of political

violence. Indeed, the overwhelming number of the old politician representatives in decision

making bodies of the public institutions results in an infringement of the majority‘s interests,

the young. Yet, youth integration into the state institutions does not always lead to a

protection of the majority‘s interests, or the public interests, but rather strengthens the fake

quality of the representative democracy. This first hypothesis is briefly summarized in the

figure 2-1 as following.

156

Gellner, 109. 157

Huntington, 20. 158

Sika, 185-187.

38

BETTER EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The second hypothesis to be tested is that better education has an impact on the likeliness of

the political participation and capacity of political mobilization. The importance of focusing

on better education is particularly based upon Ernest Gellner‘s and Benedict R. O‘ G.

Anderson‘s arguments. Gellner stated that advanced societies are unable to abandon education

as long as their utmost goals are to maintain ―perpetual growth‖ while the sustainability of the

advanced societies is assured by processes of communication and socialization159

. Based on a

variable of education, Anderson argued young generation of modern education has different

behaviours and attitudes from the older generation including their parents since they are

exposed to the outside world through their history, language and culture studies, and so better

understand a ―prime cause‖ of hardship from variable angles160

. Breton and Raymond Breton

agreed with Anderson that understanding origins of problems gives more opportunities to

these young people to get involved in politics161

.

The variable of better education has three consequences. First, this variable accentuates the

theory of the generational unit. While they have never been exposed to the same societal

experiences as the old generation, they even better understand socio-political issues due to

their higher levels of education. In this case, the past societal experiences that are believed as

the main obstacle to the political participation of the old people have no implication on young

people‘s political behaviours and attitudes. Second, higher levels of education are also a

159

Gellner, 23-24, 31-32, 34-37. 160

Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 109. 161

Breton, 203.

Figure 2-1 Model for Hypothesis 1

39

decisive factor of the political identity through the political socialization among family

members and friends. People of higher education are believed to have an influence over the

political behaviours and attitudes of the people of the lower education. Third, different levels

of education also define various forms of the political participation and measures of their

actions. Young people of higher education sometimes tend to choose a less confronting form

of political engagement with the government where both old and young people of lower

education appear likely to prefer some forms of direct confrontation and coercive measures.

In a study conducted in 1972, Halim I. Barakat used levels of education as a variable to test

whether political behaviours and attitudes are transferred among family members through

political socialization. As a result, his study found that parents‘ lower levels of education

render them less influential in transmitting their political behaviours and attitudes to their

children but other effects are not subjected of his survey162

. Therefore, this hypothesis is made

on the assumption that the different levels of education within families have reciprocal effects

among family members, in the sense that children with higher levels of education not only

perceive and behave differently from their parents but also the latter appear likely to be

influenced by the former.

Moreover, Anderson‘s and Aminzade‘s studies in Java, Indonesia, and Toulouse, France,

gave an insight into how the theory of the ―peer cultures‖ proposed by S.N. Eisenstad really

worked. Yet, since the concept of the peer cultures was introduced even before the

development of the information communications technology (ICT), it was mainly referred to

face-to-face based networks among friends. Eventually, the ICT‘s implication on education is

changes in the ways of learning, so schools are no longer the only places where children‘

political behaviours and attitudes are shaped. Jon Katz believed that internet-based

socialization provides a new means for exploring and shaping one‘s political identity163

through information and knowledge they gather from their peers. Also, Murphy agreed with

Katz that the political identity becomes less different from one another but the types of

networking can be either internet or face-to-face based. Therefore, you people in the

generation of better education appear very likely to have more influence over the political

identity of their parents and friends through either traditional or modern modes of

socialization.

162

Barakat, 215. 163

Katz, 123; cited in Osgerby, 202.

40

Furthermore, political participation takes place in various forms depending on either available

options or acknowledge of possible consequences from a particular action. Sika believed

passive contention is a reaction to restrictive measures of the government on people‘s social

and political discourses outside the traditional political structures164

. As the hypothesis

contends that young people have access to better education disproportionally or do feel that

some forms of participation are more effective than others in some circumstances, some of

them chose to work out their demands with the government through direct confrontation such

as protests while many prefer the least risky means such as civil society and social media. In

other words, availability of a public space and the government‘s measures are the decisive

factors in a selection of a particular form of political participation, and in turn, in scopes of the

consequences such as political violence.

In summary, a variable of better education gives an insight into why political behaviours and

attitudes of the young people are less likely to be under an influence of familial socialization.

Yet, they are more likely to mobilize old and young people of lower education alike for

purposes of political engagement. This new generation is separated from the older generation,

for the former has higher levels of education and, in turn, the greater number of literacy

notwithstanding their differently shared societal experiences. Also, their means of political

participation are not stuck to the traditional political structures but sometimes informal

structures with variable forms depending on its availability at a particular time and place.

Therefore, it is a misunderstanding of the elderly political leaders to judge this young

generation of better education as the old generation living in a closed life course and

frightening past, and also to presume their means of interaction with the government as the

old means used by the previous generation. This second hypothesis is briefly summarized in

the figure 2-2 below.

164

Sika, 181-182.

41

PUBLIC SPACE: MEANS OF REDUCING GENERATIONAL CONFRONTATION

AND AVOIDING SEVERE FORMS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

The third hypothesis to be tested is that public space, an alternative to the state institutions,

helps reducing generational confrontation between old political leaders and their young

population to minimum, and to avoiding severe forms of collective violence. This hypothesis

is modeled from arguments by Huntington, Gellner, Gurr and Barber that the public space is

an indispensable supplementary in society of perpetual growth due to an ―increasing

aspirations‖, and becomes an alternative when people lose a confidence on the public

institutions in representing their interest. These arguments fit well with the situations of the

young people, in the sense they come into struggles with elderly political leaders because of

their higher aspiration fueled by their mobilization and effective means of communication,

and hardly have trust in the elderly political leaders who dominate the decision making bodies

of the state.

Instability of the political community happens when the public interest is threatened.

According to Gellner and Huntington, the ―scope of support‖ by social forces is in decline

when people are unfairly treated and, in turn, the political community becomes unstable165

.

Yet, unfair economic treatment appears to be more prone to serious forms of collective

violence than weak institutionalization, for its characters are hard to separate and difficult to

notice. Indeed, the latter seems likely to be concerned with organizational problems of the

state institutions like the generational confrontation while the former concerns its functioning

165

Huntington, 12.

Figure 2-2 Model for Hypothesis 2

42

problems such as an unfair access to economic progress, a source of collective violence.

Gellner warned of the discriminatory treatment by the state institutions between the

―privileged‖ and the ―underprivileged‖ as a source of severe forms of collective violence

when economic conditions of the persons concerned are far more comparable with average

levels of the economic growth and other people in general166

.

However, either confrontation between the government and its young population or severe

forms of collective violence can be solved by keeping public space open as either a

supplementary or an alternative to the state institutions. The public space is perceived as an

alternative to the state institutions when the majority of the population, the young, loses their

trust in the institutions. Some scholars, such as Benjamin Barber, argued that a failure of

representative democracy to protect the interests of the majority contributes to a demand for

more public space167

in variable forms. Some popular forms of public space include civil

society, media and protests. Each form defines coercive levels of individual and collective

actions whereas its selection may partly be relative to a matter of targeted consequences of

actions and reactions.

Generational confrontation partly refers to struggles between elderly political leaders and their

young population. This confrontation may be a result of generational gaps in relations

between the elderly leaders and their young population due to a failure of the state institutions

in representing the majority interest, the young, if not the public interest. Whether it is a

matter of inadaptability or of absence of its autonomy, various forms of the public space

outside the state institutions are the alternative of any marginalized group, especially the

young population, to work out their demands with the government.

A choice of the public space as an alternative may be explained by exclusion of the young

people from the state institutions, and a growing presence of various forms the public space

itself. In the case of Indonesia, political leaders of the young generation decided to establish

an informal political group, the so-called Angkatan Baru (―New Generation‖), in order to

pursue their dream of immediate independence of Indonesia by lobbying and challenging the

political institutions of the old generation and the colonial administration of Japan168

. In

166

Gellner, 109. 167

Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participator Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, California: University

of California Press, 1984), XVii; cited in Frederick Powel, The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social

Left? (Great Britain: University of Bristol, 2007), 16. 168

Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 44, 50-51, 56-57.

43

addition, while some young Tunisians169

and Egyptians170

were excluded from decision

making bodies by elderly political leaders of the old regimes, others chose youth-friendly civil

society organizations such as i-WATCH and Doustourma (―Our Constitutions‖) for

challenging and changing the national policy in their favor. These informal and semi-formal

groups commonly communicated their members through either face-to-face networks by

Indonesian youth in the late 1920s171

or internet-based networks by Egyptian and Tunisian

youth in the 2010s172

.

Collective violence seems very likely to have close relations with functional rather than

organizational malaise of the political institutions. In other words, a loss of the public trust in

the institutions to represent the public interest is more likely to contribute to the collective

violence. Gellner173

and Gurr174

agreed collective violence is inevitable since the ―increasing

aspiration‖ is unavoidable in society of perpetual growth, which depends greatly on human

mobilization and communication, but Gellner emphasized that different levels of the

collective violence are defined by unfair and discriminatory treatments of the public

institutions175

. This increasing aspiration usually happens after a period of shape economic

growth making people aware of breaking their traditional life circles176

. In this sense, people

must believe in their possible attainment to a better way of life even though their belief is

impossible in reality177

.

Egypt‘s and Tunisia‘s uprisings provide good examples of unfair and discriminatory

treatments. The treatments of the government in these two countries may likely have a close

relationship with severe forms of the collective violence. Young Egyptians178

were

marginalized and unfairly treated since their problems of unemployment and an improvement

of their basic living were not tackled and the national economy remained fragile for decades

due to conflicting interests of some senior government officers with the state reforms179

. Even

worse, Tunisian youth were not only unfairly marginalized but also neglected. Many young

169

Marks, 111. 170

Neven, 47. 171

Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 17-18. 172

Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy," 300; Sika, 186. 173

Gellner, 24. 174

Gurr, 93, 102, 105. 175

Gellner, 109. 176

Ridker, 1-2, 8; Runciman, 23-24; cited in Gurr,105. 177

Gurr, 102; Lerner, 330-331, 335ff; cited in Gurr, 94. 178

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP). "The UNDP 2009 Report on Arab Human Development

Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries." cited in Murphy, "Problematizing Arab

Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 9; Sullivan, 319-320. 179

Sullivan, 323-328.

44

Tunisians, mostly poor and unemployed180

, were unintentionally discriminated by elderly

political leaders and investors according to their geographical locations of residence at the

central-west, northwestern and southern regions since nearly all of the investment projects

were poured into coastal regions in the east and so other regions hardly benefited from

economic progress of the country181

. Though they were not severely maltreated like Tunisian

youth, Egyptian youth noticeably made up nearly most of the total population at the time,

causing the crises in Egypt and Tunisia seriously alike.

Social media appears to be a preferable means of youth‘s engagement in politics while the

internet seems to be an untouchable part of the globalization assuring the perpetual growth of

―advanced societies‖. When they are excluded from political institutions or intentionally

choose less centralized-state structures, social media becomes a suitable alternative for them

since it responds not only to the character of the young generation themselves but also a social

setting invented by consumer industries. Julian Sefton-Green argued technologies and young

people are a suitable pair, for the concepts of youth and the ICT share the same characters of

dynamism, progressivism and competitiveness182

. Also, since young people became a sizeable

segment of markets, new media and internet have been at the center of innovation and market

expansion strategies. Indeed, it appears unlikely that governments give up business and take

over complete censorship of cyberspace, therefore social media provides room for regular and

persistent platforms of interactions not only among citizens but also between elderly political

leaders and their young voters.

China provides a good example on how the Chinese Communist Party leaves room for social

media as a compensatory mechanism to a restriction of the political participation through the

state institutions. While political leaders are not directly elected by Chinese people and many

forms of public space such as protests and civil society organizations are tightly restricted,

blogs remain a popular means for either individual-to-individual or individual-to-state

interactions. By 2010, bloggers alone numbered 231 million, or equivalent to 55 percent of

China‘s total internet population183

, and most of them were young184

. These young Chinese

netizens use blogs and other forms of social media in combination with citizen journalism and

investigative journalism to challenge and change the state norms in some areas of

180

Jdey, 78; Marks, 110. 181

Jdey, 76, 78, 81, 84. 182

Sefton-Green, 1-20; cited in Osgerby, 193. 183

Largerkvist, "The rise of online public opinion in China," 119-130; cited in Largerkvist, After the Internet

before Democracy, 67, 70-71. 184

Largerkvist, After the Internet before Democracy, 71, 73-74.

45

environment, corruption and sex scandals. Nowadays, the ―human flesh search engine‖, or a

phenomenon of online crowds gathering and sharing information via the internet, appears to

have great impact on behaviours and attitudes of the Chinese bureaucrats involved in

corruption and sexual scandals185

. This mirrors suitable means provided by social media in

reducing the confrontation and avoiding the collective violence through a gradual compromise

of state norms and social norms, which can be reused as a model in other countries.

To conclude, a loss of the public trust in the state institutions makes the public space become

an indispensable alternative to the institutions. Young people are excluded from the decision

making bodies of the state institutions by the elderly political leaders due to their generational

gaps and differences in ideologies. As a consequence, these young people may feel their

interests are unrepresented, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the elderly leaders may

promote their vested interests at the expense of the majority‘s interest, the young. Thus, more

public space is needed for any particular marginalized group exercising their liberty and

freedom for a more egalitarian society. Though opening more public space sometimes

provides room for violence, severe forms of collective can be avoided since reforms have

been done gradually. This third hypothesis is briefly summarized in the figure 2-3 below.

185

Celia Hatton, "China‘s internet vigilantes and the ‗human flesh search engine‘," BBC News, January 28, 2014,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25913472 .

Figure 2-3 Model for Hypothesis 3

46

SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF RESEARCH

Dramatic shifts in young demographics may result in malfunction of the political institutions

and a decline in support of social forces. The existing polity in use with the former majority

group of the population, the old generation, is no longer applicable with youth, the current

majority group of the total population, due to their different personality traits, societal

experiences and their new education. As a result, the state institutions malfunction because of

generational gaps and differences in ideologies between the elderly political leaders and their

young population. Thus, youth integration into the state institutions and more public space are

necessary to be done in order to provide more room for their political participation. When the

majority of the population, the young, losses their trust in the state institutions such as the

parliament, the government, and the courts, the public space becomes an indispensable

alternative to the state institutions. If more public space is not provided, generational

confrontations may likely happen and gradually change from being peaceful to violent in

nature, threatening a stability of the political community (PC). However, the included youth

do not always represent the interests of the excluded youth whereas civil society organizations

do not necessarily mean apolitical organs that freely work outside political realm and other

forms of public space such as protests and social media sometimes may also leave room for

violence. Therefore, only participatory young citizens bring optimism for the liberal

democracy by ensuring an increasingly egalitarian society through their political engagement;

but it happens only when platforms of both formal and informal political structures are

available for their accessibility. When neither is available, struggles between the government

of the elderly political leaders and their young population take place and, eventually,

collective violence becomes unavoidable. The general picture of the theoretical frameworks

of the research is briefly explained in the figure 2-4 below.

47

Figure 2-4 Summary Diagram of Theoretical Frameworks of Research

48

2.6 METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The overall purposes of this paper are to explore a new potential of social forces, youth, in

expanding liberal democracy in Cambodia. With growing young demographics as the

majority group of the total population, it is important to analyze how the youth generation has

been challenging and changing the state norms and institutions in the context of liberal

democracy. This new phenomenon likely contributes to necessary changes in the organization

of the state institutions as a reflection to a reversal of a demographic order and growing

demands for more public space in various forms, which are required to reduce generational

confrontations and to avoid collective violence between the elderly political leaders and their

young population.

Cambodian youth are distinct from the old generation. Besides their personality traits and

distinct societal experiences, they have higher levels of education, unusual mobility, higher

capability to use information communications technology and social media, and, in turn,

higher aspiration and more needs. Hence, this younger generation greatly plays an important

role in breaking chains of dependencies that are patron-client in nature through either their

political participation or their capability in mobilizing their peers and others including their

parents to get involved in politics as well. They are the generation that brings changes to a

political landscape of democracy in the kingdom.

Yet, youth‘s behaviours and attitudes are sometimes characterized by their passive contention.

This may be resulted from their higher levels of education and ―peer culture‖. As a result,

youth‘ reactions to the government‘s policy and measures are projected in forms of silent

dissents and, in turn, seem to be less apparent to catch eyes of the policy makers and

politicians. In this sense, an abrupt of youth protests may appear at any stage and, perhaps,

occasionally in an unprecedented scale. Therefore, this paper ends up with recommendations

within which the government should have a clear national policy representing their interests

and incorporating them into the state institutions while more public space is supplementary to

imperfection of the state administration. They should also have more public spaces as an

alternative when they lose trust in the state institutions for expressing their concerns and

working out their demands with the government, so generational confrontations are reduced to

minimum and severe forms of collective violence can be avoided.

49

Methodological approach

The current thesis is conducted for a partial completion in fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Master of International Law and Politics. As this qualification is partly

coursework-based and partly research-based, the methodological approach for this paper is

quantitative due to a short timeframe of 1 year in total for full-time students to graduate from

this program. Though the timeframe for this minor-thesis has begun since March 2013,

research work actually commenced at the end of the second semester in November 2013 and

would be finished by mid-March 2014, the last deadline of submission.

However, constraints of time limit and a quantitative method unlikely impede the

achievement and the quality of this research paper. Until the present, a very few of researches

has been conducted by experts on growing activism of Cambodian youth in expanding liberal

democracy in the country but most often it has been done in forms of reports and short

commentary articles. This topic came to my attention in 2012 in the aftermath of a wide

spread information on the ―Arab Spring‖. Also, a short period and a quantitative method for

this minor thesis are suitable to elaborate tested models of research and provide an insight into

this new theme for further researches and inputs to the world of knowledge from an insider‘s

perspectives.

Cambodian youth activism has come to the attention of local and international media since

mid-2012. This timeframe appears to have a coincidence with a widespread of the well-

known political crises in the Arab world, the so-called ―Arab Spring‖, beginning in Tunisia

and Egypt. In late 2012, local media and analysts discussed a possibility of the so-called

―Cambodian Spring‖ but their responses were controversial. Some observers such as Thomas

Mann Miller, a former Phnom Penh Post reporter, were pessimistic of its likeliness because of

the general inefficacy of the opposition party Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and many such as

Faine Greenwood, a reporter for the Cambodian Daily and a blogger, felt optimistic of its

possibility due to growing demographics of young population and their increasing activism on

the internet186

. Even until recently, this topic remains at the centre of both national and

international analysts‘ discussions. In early February 2014, Virak Ou, the president of the

Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR), one of the most prominent human rights

organizations in the kingdom, and an U.S.-educated intelligent, was invited by the Sanford

186

Nash Jenkins, "‗Cambodia Spring‘ Unlikely, Political Observers Say," Voice of America (Khmer), August 1,

2012, www.voacambodia.com/content/cambodia-spring-unlikely-political-observers-say/1452460.html .

50

Center for East Asian Studies to join a special seminar and to give a speech on ―Will

Cambodia See a ‗Spring‘?‖187

. Yet, it is still hard to see a couple of researches that embed on

how growing youth activism has impacts on the existing political order and institutions, and

what solutions are suitable for some predictable consequences of the changes in the political

landscape in Cambodia.

This thesis is mainly a kind of the report research. Based on textbooks, journal articles and

class materials, most of the relevant literatures on the topic of the thesis have been reviewed.

Across the literature, many prominent theories have been framed to build theoretical

frameworks of the research and three hypotheses have been modeled from the relevant

theories to be tested with many recent events that happened in Cambodia. Though primary

qualitative data is not required for this thesis and impossible to be done in a short time of the

current program, a wide range of newspapers, magazines, reports from non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs), policies and statistics from the

government are mostly available and accessible on the Internet. Some data from the

government such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Education, the

Ministry of Planning (National Institute of Statistics), the National Election Committee,

NGOs and IOs such as the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL),

the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC), the

International Republican Institute (IRI) and Centre for Intelligent Agency (CIA), private

companies including the Metfone and the Mobitel, mobile operating companies and internet

service providers, and newspapers such as the Phnom Penh Post, the Cambodia Daily, Radio

Free Asia and Voice of America all can be accessed by their websites.

The proposed hypotheses are tested by most of the sources that are accessible on the internet.

Those sources are written in both English and Khmer. Some of these sources have already

been recorded since the beginning of the academic year in early 2013 while many have been

lately followed for up-to-date news in Cambodia. A large proportion of the information in use

for analyses is extracted from the Phnom Penh Post, the Cambodia Daily, Radio Free Asia

(RFA) and Voice of America (VOA), Khmer- and English-language media but foreign owed

companies. These sources cover most of sensitive issues that are rarely reported by local

media and newspapers. Yet, both RFA and VOA have been criticized of being biased towards

the opposition and the U.S. government, and recently been described by the Council of

187

"Will Cambodia See a ‗Spring‘?," The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, accessed

February 25, 2014, www.cddrl.stanford.edu/events/will_cambodia_see_a_spring/ .

51

Ministers as becoming even ―worst‖188

. Most importantly, they provide online news for free,

easy online accessibility and periodical archives of the past issues dated back as early as the

1990s.

The paper will shed a light on this new theme from perspectives of a political analyst. Its

findings will improve an understanding of the roles of youth in creating more liberal

democracy in Cambodia, and are expected to have an influence on behaviours and attitudes of

the government, political parties, civil society and youth themselves. Also, it shows directions

for the further researches in the country, for more accurate and primary sources are in need to

be collected for testing the hypotheses in order to build convincible tested models on the

theme and finding a more consistent result. Some hypotheses in this thesis also require further

researches to use a qualitative method to determine very probable opinions, values and

attitudes of youth, parents and elderly political leaders in questions. Yet, the current work is

optimistically believed to provide a floor that can be used as a model for either Cambodia or

other countries that have been walking through the same paths of development.

188

Kevin Ponniah, "RFA, VOA agency fires back," The Phnom Penh Post, February 3, 2014,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/rfa-voa-agency-fires-back .

52

CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter is an overview of the findings that this research produces. Each of three

hypotheses is analyzed individually using data from the government, civil society

organizations and print and online media. Most of the data from media is mainly run by

foreign-owned broadcasters and printers, for they cover nearly all of important local issues

including the sensitive ones and are widely available online for free access.

From the theory and data analyses, it will be seen whether any or all of these three hypotheses

are correct or incorrect. It is noted that some primary data is also necessary in order to

produce more consistent findings but it is hardly possible to do so because of time constraints

and a scope of this paper. However, the data used in this sample produce many interesting

findings. It provides room for analyses while findings of the analyses can be used to measure

potential consequences of the growing young demographics in expanding the liberal

democracy in Cambodia, to explore causes and effects of the growing youth activism, to

define close relations between recent increasing generational confrontations and the absence

of the regular and persistent platforms for youth in both the state institutions and the public

space according to the theories, and to suggest potential mechanisms that can be used to solve

and prevent problems of violence.

Three hypotheses are analyzed in combination between theories and recent events that

happened in Cambodia as following.

53

A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN YOUNG CAMBODIAN DEMOGRAPHICS FROM THE

MINORITY TO THE MAJORITY GROUP OF THE TOTAL POPULATION LEADS

TO NECESSARY CHANGES IN STRUCTURES OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Young Cambodians have emerged as the majority group of the total population and nearly

make up a half of the total registered voters. They are distinct from the old generation in terms

of societal experiences and personality traits. In this sense, the existing political order that has

been applied with the old generation becomes inapplicable with the young. Consequently, all

of these distinct features necessitate reorganization of the political institutions to make sure

these young people have their representatives in decision making bodies, so their interests are

ensured.

The demographics of the post-Khmer Rouge baby boom illustrates this generation takes up

more than two thirds of the total population and becomes a dominant group of voters in the

national elections. This emerging trend reverses the previous trends of the demographics in

Cambodia, which used to preserves the political landscape and orders in the country. Young

Cambodians under 35 years were recorded at 70.4 percent in 2008189

. This number was

expected to grow up to 73.9 percent while older peoples at their mid-50s and over were

estimated at 8.8 percent in the next five-year time190

. By 2013, the number of Cambodian

youth, the group of 15-to-34 years old, would grow to 41percent of the total population, and

continue to grow steadily in the next decade at least (Figure 3-1). Also, these young people

are believed to have a great influence on the country‘s direction, for they become or will

become the majority group of voters who decide which party would lead the government and

the National Assembly. According to the National Election Committee (NEC), around 3.5

million out of the total 9.5 million registered voters in 2012 were between 18 and 30 years, or

36 percent of the total, while some 1.5 million were first-time voters191

(Figure 3-2). As a

result of the increasing demographics of the post-Khmer Rouge baby boom, this number is

also expected to increase significantly in the next general elections.

189

"Population Census 2008," National Institute of Statistics (NIS), accessed April 01, 2013,

http://celade.cepal.org/khmnis/census/khm2008/. 190

"The World Factbook: Cambodia‘s Age Structure," Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), accessed January 28,

2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html 191

Theara Khoun, "Youth Showing More Political Engagement as Election Approaches," Voice of America, July

10, 2013, http://www.voacambodia.com/content/youth-showing-more-political-engagement-as-election-

approaches/1698262.html .

54

Source: Population Census 2008192

by NIS & Cambodia‘s Age Structure in 2013193

by CIA

Source: National Election Committee‘s Report cited by Voice of America194

(VOA)

Cambodian youth are distinguished from their parents by their different societal experiences.

These young people were born in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime, so they do not

own their deference to the revolutionary legacy of the Cambodian People Party (CPP), and

192

"Population Census 2008," National Institute of Statistics (NIS), accessed April 01, 2013,

http://celade.cepal.org/khmnis/census/khm2008/. 193

"The World Factbook: Cambodia‘s Age Structure," Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), accessed January 28,

2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html 194

Theara Khoun, "Youth Showing More Political Engagement as Election Approaches," Voice of America, July

10, 2013, http://www.voacambodia.com/content/youth-showing-more-political-engagement-as-election-

approaches/1698262.html .

0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00% 45.00%

2008

201355-over

35-up

15-34

0-14

Age Group 18-30

Age Group Over 30

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Total Registered Voters

Figure 3-1 Demographic Growths by Age Groups in 2008 and 2013

Figure 3-2 Total Registered Voters in 2012 by Age Groups

55

have never been personally exposed to civil wars. Thus, neither the regime nor senior political

leaders of the CPP are likely to propagate their long-lasting revolutionary ideologies with

these young people successfully, rather the political party‘s performance and its achievement

of economic development are decisive. According to the International Republican Institute

(IRI) Public Opinion in November 2013, ‗good economic development‘ and the ‗party‘s

record of accomplishments‘ were ranked on the top with support of respondents 41percent

and 39 percent respectively but merely 22 percent of respondents chose their preferred party

by ‗past performance‘195

. These figures show convincingly that the government‘s present

performance rather than a revolutionary legend of the CPP conserved its legitimacy.

Moreover, these young people have higher aspiration compared to elderly people. Their high

aspiration may be linked to their dynamic mobilization, exposure to a ―better way of life‖ and

their belief in a possibility of having more than what they have in the present, argued Geller196

and Gurr197

. Cambodia has experienced GDP growth at 7 percent on average from 2005 until

the present198

(Figure 3-3). Though the national economy was hit by the global economic

repression in 2009 as shown in the figure, it recovered immediately making people feel more

optimistic of their welfare according to Runciman199

. Also, a few months before the 2008

national election, the government made a false promise of a land speculation to mobilize

support for the ruling party200

. Hence, their personality traits of higher aspiration were fueled

by societal situations such as a decade-long GDP growth and the government‘s unattainable

promise.

Also, Cambodian youth have different needs from their elderly political leaders, making the

latter hard to predict what the former really want. Some political campaign programs and

events such as land titling volunteer schemes and entertainment strategies were also used to

195

The International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: October 28-November 10,

2013 (IRI: Phnom Penh, 2014), 15. See "IRI Cambodia Survey: Declining Optimism on Country‘s Direction;

Strong Support for Democratic Reforms," The International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 3,

2014, http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-cambodia-survey-declining-optimism-

countrypercentE2percent80percent99s-direction-strong-supp. 196

Gellner,24. 197

Gurr,102. 198

"Cambodia‘s Real GDP Growth Rate," The Ministry of Economy and Finance, accessed February 12, 2014,

www.mef.gov.kh 199

Runciman, 23-24; cited in Gurr, 105. 200

Denise Hruby and Hul Reaksmey, "Unlike Past Elections, Property Investors Remain Buoyant," The

Cambodia Daily, June 28, 2013, www.cambodiadaily.com/elections/unlike-past-elections-property-investors-

remain-buoyant-32542

56

mobilize youth support for the 2013election201

. Thousands of young people, mostly university

students and fresh graduates, were recruited for six months with pay and promised

employment in state institutions. Also, some Cambodian celebrities such as actress, singers,

comedians and even K-pop singers were exploited to attract young people and promote the

party‘s popularity. Yet, the election result turned out to be unexpected and appeared to show a

turning point of the liberal democracy in the kingdom. A failure of the ruling party in buying

loyalty of its young voters may have close relations with their higher levels of education and

the growing number of literacy in the kingdom as well as their expectation of a more

promising political agenda by each political party.

Figure 3-3 Cambodia‘s GDP 2005-2014

Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, updated on July 30, 2013202

The result of the 28 July election gave a very slim victory to the Cambodian People Party

(CPP) and more gains to the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), the opposition party,

with 68 seats and 55 seats respectively, shocking top leaders and senior members of the ruling

party. This was perhaps due to high aspiration of the youth and differences in ideologies

between these young voters and elderly political leaders. The CPP underestimated these

newly emerged voters and incorrectly identified their needs. In a public opinion survey, only

7 percent of the respondents believed that there was ―less poverty‖ whereas merely 5 percent

believed the government shared the social revenues widely to the poor even though more than

a majority of the respondents aged 18 years and over agreed the country was generally headed

201

Kevin Ponniah, "Political eyes on youth vote," The Phnom Penh Post, July 9, 2013,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/political-eyes-youth-vote ; also, Bennett Murray and Sokha Cheang,

"The ties that bind: when popstars meet politicians," The Phnom Penh Post, July 19, 2013,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/7days/ties-bind-when-popstars-meet-politicians . 202

"Cambodia‘s Real GDP Growth Rate," The Ministry of Economy and Finance, accessed February 12, 2014,

www.mef.gov.kh

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

12.00%

14.00%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Cambodia's Real GDPGrowth Rate

57

in the right direction203

. Also, 94 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the

government in creating more jobs and 95 percent were concerned about ‗low wages/salaries‘

though the overwhelming number of them felt really satisfied with the public investment in

infrastructures204

.

It appears that a decline in popularity and legitimacy of the government and the regime

largely results from generational gaps and differences in ideologies between the elderly

political leaders and young population. However, these factors appear merely to be scratches

on the surface of the problems, since the cornerstone of Cambodia‘s contemporary issues is

that elderly political leaders mainly take care of their personal and partisan interests at the

expense of the majority interest205

. Their hunger for personal enrichment very likely explains

the reasons why nearly all positions in decision making bodies of the powerful state

institutions such as the National Assembly and the Senate are held by founders and long

serving senior members of the ruling party. In this sense, conflicts of the interests between

their positions and their business are hard to avoid, so national policy that infringes on their

vested interests takes too long to be realized in reality, and sometimes cannot be implemented

effectively, just as what Huntington argued regarding the absence of the autonomy of the state

institutions.

The National Assembly is directed by elderly members in their 60s and 70s (Table 3-1). The

number of the young members has been seriously low since the third mandate 2003-2008 and

worsened in the fifth mandate 2013-2018 while the percentage of the middle-aged members

slightly improved lately. Members of the National Assembly under 35 years accounted for

4.88 percent of the total 123 seats in the third mandate206

while the 50-years-and-over groups

noticeably grown to 83.74 percent in the fourth mandate 2008-2013, up from 79.67 percent

in the third mandate207

. Yet, the youngest group under 35 years halved in number in the fifth

mandate to merely 2.44percent, if compared to the third mandate, whereas the deputies in

203

The International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: October 28-November 10,

2013 (IRI: Phnom Penh, 2014), 4, 6. 204

Ibid, 6. 205

The Voice of America (Khmer) reported that there were at least 100 senior government officers, police and

military forces as well as tycoons involving in illegal loggings in Cambodia. In a press conference, Mr. Chan

Soveth, deputy head of the investigation unit at the ADHOC, the human rights non-governmental organization,

told reporters that those people are identifiable but further investigation is needed before submitting the

documents to the courts for corruption‘s cases. Sothanrith Kong, "Civil Society: Government Senior Officers and

Tycoons Are Involved in Illegal Logging," Voice of America (Khmer), November 26, 2013,

http://khmer.voanews.com/content/new-report-shows-cambodian-forests-in-jeopardy/1797555.html 206

COMFREL and NICFEC work team, Directory of the Third National Assembly of the Kingdom of Cambodia

2003-2008 (Phnom Penh, July 2005), 35-157. 207

Ibid, 32; COMFREL, 1st Annual Report of 4

th Legislature, 2008-2009 (Phnom Penh, March 2010), 7.

58

their 50s and over amounted to 74.80 percent208

. In this sense, though the number of the

deputies at the 50s and over slightly decreased in the fifth mandate, this oldest group

continued to dominate the leadership of the National Assembly while the youngest group of

the National Assembly members remained scarce. Also, this change contributed to a slight

gain of the 40s-aged group.

Table 3-1 National Assembly (NA) Seats by Age Groups in 3rd and 5th Mandates

Source: Population Census 2008 by NIS, Cambodia‘s Age Structure in 2013 by CIA209

, Directory of the

National Assembly 2003-2008 by COMFREL210

, and NEC Decisions in 2013211

The dominance of the elderly members in the National Assembly can be explained by the

decision making of the political parties concerned and an increasing competition between

them from one mandate to another (Table 3-2). Generally, opposition parties, the Sam Rainsy

Party (SRP) and the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), have a higher percentage of

young members in the National Assembly whereas the ruling party, the Cambodian People

Party (CPP), has an overwhelming number of elderly members, which is, perhaps, relative to

a duration of the parties‘ foundation and their compositions. The opposition parties in

Cambodia are quite young when compared to the ruling party, which was created in the mid-

1950s. However, though a composition of the political parties, especially of their standing

committees, is more likely to be partly responsible for the exclusion of the Cambodian youth

208

Letter No.420 on the Name List of the Members of the National Assembly in the 5th

Mandate Having

Decided Validity of the Mandate issued by the National Assembly on 23 September 2013. 209

"The World Factbook: Cambodia‘s Age Structure in 2013, " The Central Intelligence Agency, accessed

January 28, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html 210

COMFREL and NICFEC, 35-157. 211

Decisions no. 467/13 and no. 468/13 dated on September 18, 2013, issued by National Election Committee.

NA Seats & Age Groups Years 2003-2008 Years 2013-2018

Total Population 13,395,682 15,205,539

Population under 35 70.40 percent 73.90 percent

NA Members under 35 4.88 percent 2.44 percent

Population Over 55 3.80 percent 8.80 percent

NA Members over 55 83.74 percent 74.80 percent

59

from becoming members of the National Assembly, a growing competition also appears to

put more pressure on each party in selecting candidates. This clearly happened during the

2013 election with both the ruling party and the opposition party though the former seems less

likely to have a confidence on the young candidates as in the below table.

Table 3-2 Shares of NA Members by Parties and Age Groups in 3rd and 5th Mandates

Source: Directory of the National Assembly 2003-2008 by COMFREL212

and NEC Decisions in 2013213

The Senate has more old members than the National Assembly. While members of the

National Assembly have to be 25 years at least, no members of the Senate can be under 40

years old according to the 1993 Constitution214

. Yet, on average, the percentage of the

senators under 55 years remains higher than that of the National Assembly. Among the total

61 members in the third mandate (2012-2018), approximately 11.50 percent is between 40

and 54 years while 88.50 percent is over 55 years (Figure 3-4). This means that, though a

proportion of young members in the Senate are significantly higher than that of the National

Assembly, Cambodian youth are also excluded from the Senate.

212

COMFREL and NICFEC, 35-157. 213

Decisions no. 467/13 and no. 468/13 dated on September 18, 2013, issued by National Election Committee. 214

Article 76 and article 99 new of the 1993 Constitution. See "Basic texts: Constitution," the Constitutional

Council of Cambodia, accessed February 26, 2014, www.ccc.gov.kh/english/CONSTITUTIONEnglish.pdf

Third Mandate: 2003-2008

55 Years and Over UNDER

CPP=73 members 60percent (44) 40percent (29)

SR=24 members 17percent (4) 83percent (20)

Fifth Mandate: 2013-2018

CPP=68 91percent (62) 9percent (6)

CNRP=55 40percent (22) 60percent (33)

60

Source: The Senate of Cambodia: Senators in the 3rd

Mandate215

Of 61 senators, the CPP took up to 77 percent of the total while the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP)

only accounted for 18 percent of the total (Figure 3-4). The SRP gave a large proportion of its

shares in the Senate to younger members, a complete contradiction of trends to the CPP:

95.80 percent of the CPP shares were allocated for senators over 55 years while merely 4.2

percent was conceded to younger senators (Figure 3-5). Unlike the CPP, the SRP prioritized

both young and old senators with 45.5 percent and 54.5 percent respectively (Figure 3-5).

Figure 3-5 Senators by Parties and Age Groups in the 3rd Mandate

Source: The Senate of Cambodia: Senators in the 3rd

Mandate216

215

"The Senate of Cambodia: Senators in the 3rd Mandate," The Senate, accessed February 12, 2014,

www.senate.gov.kh

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

CPP SRP

Over 55

UNDER

40-54 years

55 years-over

Figure 3-4 Senators in the 3rd Mandate by Age Groups

61

Over-representation of the elderly political leaders in the main decision making bodies of the

legislature appears to be partly responsible for a failure of both the parliament itself and also

other state institutions including the government and the courts in implementing the national

policy, especially regarding land reforms217

. The Parliament, the government and the courts

fail to represent the public interest at the expense of personal and partisan interests of their

members218

. In some cases, though members of the parliament and the government do not

directly intervene in the land disputes but their spouses, relatives and allies are involved219

.

Given that is the case, members of any decision making body in the state institutions have

conflicts of interests with their functions, so any national policy for the public interest that is

detrimental to their personal, partisan and familial interests are impossible to be implemented

effectively while the autonomy of subunits or branches of the Government also might be

under influence of some old political leaders in senior positions such as members of the

National Assembly and the Senate.

According to the NGO Forum on Cambodia, 173 cases in 2008220

, 236 cases in 2009221

and

282 cases in 2010222

were reported as unsolved and partly solved land disputes (Figure 3-6).

Some senior government officers and close allies to the Prime Minister Hun Sen are suspected

of being involved and responsible for a failure of either the government or the courts in

bringing an end to the decade-long crises of land disputes. For instance, the two most recent

216

" The Senate of Cambodia: Senators in the 3rd Mandate," The Senate, accessed February 12, 2014,

www.senate.gov.kh 217

Article 96 of the 1993 Constitution gives power to members of the National Assembly to raise questions to

the Royal Government of Cambodia and its members while the article 98 new authorizes the National Assembly

to dismiss any member of the government and to remove the government by voting a motion of censure. The

Senate reviews and can propose any amendment to either draft laws or proposed laws approved by the National

Assembly according to article 113 new. According to the article 133 new and the article 134 new, magistrates

are responsible before the Supreme Council of Magistracy indirectly, which is controlled by the Minister of

Justice and indirectly influenced by the government. See "Basic texts: Constitution," the Constitutional Council

of Cambodia, accessed February 26, 2014, www.ccc.gov.kh/english/CONSTITUTIONEnglish.pdf 218

Kong Sothanrith, "Civil Society: Government Senior Officers and Tycoons Are Involved in Illegal Logging,"

Voice of America (Khmer), November 26, 2013, http://khmer.voanews.com/content/new-report-shows-

cambodian-forests-in-jeopardy/1797555.html 219

To name a few, two examples involved wives of the Commerce Minister and the Minister of Industry, Mines

and Energy, so it shown that the conflicts of the interests with the functions of the government senior officers

may sometimes be at stake by either direct involvement or indirect influence. See Erik Wasson and Kimsong

Kay, "Little-Known NGOs Defend Minister‘s Wife," The Cambodia Daily, May 6, 2005,

http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archive/little-known-ngos-defend-ministers-wife-47559/ ; also Sovuthy Khy,

"Land Dispute Case Involving Minister‘s Wife Is Heard," The Cambodia Daily, May 1, 2013,

http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archive/land-dispute-case-involving-ministers-wife-is-heard-20836/ . 220

Land Information Centre (LIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occurring in Cambodia 2008 (Phnom

Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2008), 1-2. 221

Land Information Centre (LIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occurring in Cambodia 2009 (Phnom

Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2009), 3. 222

Research and Information Centre (RIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Dispute Occurring in Cambodia 2010

(Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2010), 2.

62

and famous out of hundreds of land disputes, Boeung Kak Lake223

and Borei Keila224

communities, were involved with a tycoon senator from the CPP and a close ally to the Prime

Minister225

, having shares in Shukaku Inc., and the owner of the Phanimex226

, a close ally of

the Prime Minister. As a consequence of their powerful positions, local authorities might be

hard to make a reconciliation between parties in disputes while many cases before the courts

were on waiting lists for trials for years and sometimes justice might not be fairly laid down

for both parties, perhaps, due to the absence of the courts‘ impartiality, making protests

happen more often as an ultimate alternative of the poor and the weak.

Source: NGO Forum on Cambodia–Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes in Cambodia 2008-2010227

At the same time, it is unclear whether the integrated Cambodian youth in the parliament will

protect the interest of their generation. But this integration may rather provide a

complementary mechanism since the public space remains indispensable for an increasingly

egalitarian society, according to Barber228

. It is worthwhile to notice that, in terms of their

223

Laura Rena Murray, "Target Cambodia", World Policy Journal (2012):80. 224

Odom Sok, "Borei Keila Families Mark Anniversary of Eviction," The Cambodia Daily, January 4, 2014,

http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/borei-keila-families-mark-anniversary-of-eviction-50070/; see also,

Titthara May and Rachana Veng, "Phanimex owner summoned," The Phnom Penh Post, August 27, 2010,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/phanimex-owner-summoned . 225

"The Senate of Cambodia: Senators in the 3rd Mandate," The Senate, accessed January 16, 2014,

http://www.senate.gov.kh/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1718&Itemid=12&lang=km 226

"Clash of Hun Xen‘s cronies: Suy Sophan (aka Yeay Phan) vs CPP Tycoon-Senator Sy Kong Triv", KI-

Media, accessed January 16, 2014, http://ki-media.blogspot.co.nz/2009/09/clash-of-hun-xens-cronies-suy-

sophan.html . 227

Land Information Centre (LIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occurring in Cambodia 2008 (Phnom

Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2008), 1-2; Land Information Centre (LIC), Statistical Analysis on Land

Disputes Occurring in Cambodia 2009 (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2009), 3; Research and

Information Centre (RIC), Statistical Analysis on Land Dispute Occurring in Cambodia 2010 (Phnom Penh:

NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2010), 2. 228

Barber, XVii; cited in Powel, 16.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Reported Land Disputes

2008

2009

2010

Figure 3-6 Number of Land Disputes from 2008 to 2010

63

demands and needs, Cambodian youth are better understood from both Anderson‘s and

Mannheim‘s perspectives, the 15-24 and the 25-34 groups, but, when it comes to means of

collective actions, they are better referred to a group of the young generation whose ages vary

from 15 to 34 years, which will be embedded in the following hypotheses. Hence, though the

generation of Cambodian youth shares the same adversaries, elderly political leaders and the

long-serving regime, they may have different wants because the adolescents appear to focus

on their leisure and comfort whereas the adults are in a rush to prepare for families, which

was emphasized by Anderson, Dhillion and Yousef.

Using all the above information, it can be concluded that Samuel P. Huntington, Benedict R.

O‘G. Anderson, Karl Mannheim and Emma C. Murphy made reasonable claims on the points

that dramatic shifts in young demographics could have domino effects on a stability of the

country by failing the state institutions to make shares of social revenues broadly available for

the public, and so the compositions of both the National Assembly and the Senate need to

reflect the demographic trend. On one hand, Bourdieu and Barber made the points that

political leaders appear to lose social vision and morality to work for the public but rather

perceive politics as business and do it for personal enrichment. On the other hand, Huntington

also noticed that it sometimes happens because the old and the young share different values

and principles, so the outputs of the policy held by the old do not really fit with what the

young need. Thus, whether the failure to represent the public interest is intentional or

unintentional, reorganizations of these public institutions are necessary for their effective

roles as guardians of the public interest and, in turn, for the stability of the political

community.

In this case, the problems of underrepresented Cambodian youth in the parliament are

unlikely to be solved by the ruling party in the short term. This pessimism is due to the fact

that the ruling party is under pressure from elderly senior members and founding members

while there is no available mechanism in place for their replacement yet. Thus,

underrepresentation of Cambodian youth in the National Assembly and the Senate eventually

leads to a decline in the support of these young people towards the political leaders and the

regime, on one hand, and, on the other hand, a swap from working within the state institutions

such the parliament, the government and the courts to protests and other means of informal

participation as an alternative, providing more room for political and collective violence

because of the absence of trust and prolonged passive discontent. In this sense, severe forms

of collective violence may not be just a result of a discriminatory treatment by any particular

64

branch of the government towards any social grouping, especially new urban young

Cambodians studying and working in the capital city and its neighboring provinces, which

was argued by Gellner, but also prolonged passive contention against the government and the

absence of an alternative beside the state institutions to create an increasingly egalitarian

society according to Ted Robert Gurr, Nadine Sika and Simone Weil. Such cases of land

disputes are just a few examples to prove that recent surges in protests have had a close

relationship with growing tensions and a decline of trust by social forces in the state

institutions including the parliament, the government and the courts in guaranteeing and

protecting the public interest.

Unlike the ruling party, the opposition party has less pressure from elderly senior members

and founding members so that a majority of its members at the parliament are from young and

middle-aged groups. Hence, the growing support of the opposition party likely results from its

policy of direct responses to immediate concerns and wants of the young, such as

employment and minimum wages for garment workers. This success may be partly a result of

less generational gaps and differences in ideologies between political leaders within the

opposition and Cambodian youth. As can been seen from the third to the fifth mandate of the

National Assembly, young members of the opposition party generally makes up a majority of

its total members in the Assembly. Yet, the increasing number of the elderly members in the

fifth mandate of the National Assembly by the opposition party shown the party moved a step

backward in terms of its policy for young candidates and so would become a concern in the

future making the opposition less different from the ruling party, in the sense that the public

trust in the state institutions becomes narrower.

65

YOUNG CAMBODIANS HAVE BETTER EDUCATION, SO THEY ARE NOT ONLY

MORE LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICS BUT ALSO MORE CAPABLE OF

MOBILIZING PEERS AND OTHERS FOR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Cambodia is dominated by a generation of post-Khmer Rouge baby boom. Young

Cambodians in this generation are clearly distinguishable from the older generation including

their parents not only by societal experiences but also by better education, making them

perceive and behave towards politics differently229

. In other words, they are the generation of

better education in terms of higher standards and higher levels of education. Hence, young

Cambodians are not only more likely to participate in politics but also more capable of

mobilizing their peers and others for political engagement through both traditional and

modern means of networks as can be seen in the following discussions.

After nearly two decades of dedication to a restoration of the national education system, in

1996, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports moved to another phase, standardization of

the national education (Table 3-3). On July 26, 1996, the national education system was

standardized by the national curriculum policy by increasing school years of general

education from 10 to 12 years in total composing primary education (6 grades) and secondary

education (the lower secondary education=3grades and the upper secondary education=3

grades)230

. Eventually, this curriculum was lately revised and improved in 2005231

. As a

result, modern world history, political science courses including Cambodia‘s system of

government and the rule of law, and foreign languages such English232

and French have

become compulsory for students at both lower and higher secondary levels of education233

.

Since then, information communications technology (ICT) has also become an important

major for students at senior high schools and been used in combination with other courses in

foreign languages, social science and math as well234

. At universities, many ICT qualifications

and courses are available whereas the uses of ICT in teaching and learning processes are

229

Forum Syd, Youth in Cambodia: Organizations, Activities and Policies (Phnom Penh: Forum Syd, 2002), 7. 230

Royal decree No. NS-RKT 0796-52 dated on 26 July1996 on the General Educational System of 12 Years. 231

The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Policy for Curriculum Development 2005-2009 ( Phnom Penh:

MoEYS, December 2004). 232

English is the main instruction language for students and dominate other languages including French at higher

education. Also, it is a mean to approach job markets in the kingdom. Thus, most of young Cambodians appear

very likely to know very basic English. Caroline Vernaillen, "Parlez-vous Anglais," Southeast Asia Globe, May

23, 2013, http://sea-globe.com/english-education-cambodia/ . 233

The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), Policy for Curriculum Development 2005-2009 (

Phnom Penh: MoEYS, December 2004), article 2.1, 2.4, 3.13, 8.3, 12.5. 234

The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), Policy and Strategies on Information and

Communication in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: MoEYS, December 2004), 14.

66

encouraged and facilitated by the government under various schemes including

standardization of Khmer codes and digitalization of some sources in Khmer and international

foreign languages235

.

Table 3-3 Chronology of Cambodia‘s Education and National Curriculum Development

Years Education and National Curriculum Development

1979 Reopen schools for school-aged children, encourage more students enrollment and recruit

more teachers;

1996 Increase school years from 10 to 12 years (6 years at the primary education and 6 years at

the secondary education);

2005 Revise and improve the national curriculum by integrating world history, systems of

government, rule of law, foreign languages and ICT.

Source: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports236

.

Recently, Cambodia was classified among other countries in a group of ―Medium Human

Development‖ and ranked at 138th

, above Laos and Bhutan and immediately below India in

the same group237

. In the Human Development Report 2013 titled ―The Rise of the South:

Human Progress in a Diverse World‖ issued on March 14, 2013238

by the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), 77.60 percent of Cambodian adults over 14 years were

literate and 15.70 percent of the adults over 24 years had at least secondary education while

the enrollment ratio had grown at 46 percent annually for secondary education and 7.80

percent for tertiary education239

(Table 3-4). The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports

also reiterated that Cambodia had already achieved its goal of a 6-year basic education for all

235

Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Policy and Strategies on Information and Communication in

Cambodia (Phnom Penh: MoEYS, December 2004), 16. 236

Royal decree no. NS-RKT 0796-52 dated on 26 July1996 on the General Educational System of 12 Years;

Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Policy for Curriculum Development 2005-2009 (Phnom Penh:

MoEYS, December 2004); Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Policy and Strategies on Information and

Communication in Cambodia, (Phnom Penh: MoEYS, December 2004). 237

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2013 Human Development Report, The Rise of the

South: Human Progress in a Diverse World (New York: UNDP, 2013), 172. See "2013 Human Development

Report, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World," The United Nations Development

Programme, accessed February 16, 2014, www.hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report . 238

Ha Cheat Vor, "UNDP: Education and Labour in Cambodia Have a Good Classification," Radio Free Asia

(Khmer), March 13, 2013, www.rfa.org/khmer/news/social-economy/Cambodia-education-and-employment-

03172013075439.html? 239

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2013 Human Development Report, The Rise of the

South: Human Progress in a Diverse World (New York: UNDP, 2013), 172. See "2013 Human Development

Report, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World," The United Nations Development

Programme, accessed February 16, 2014, www.hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report .

67

in 1997 and planned to achieve a 9-year basic education for all by 2030240

. Yet, the gaps of

education levels between the pre- and the post-Khmer Rouge generations do exist widely.

Table 3-4 General Picture of Human Development in Cambodia

Gross Enrollment Ratio

Educational Attainment

Primary

(2002-2011)

Secondary

(2002-2011)

Tertiary

(2002-2011)

Adult literacy rate

ages 15years-up

(2005-2010)

Population with

at least secondary education

Ages 25 years-up (2010)

127%

46%

7.80%

77.60%

15.70%

Source: The United Nations Development Programme–Human Development Report 2013241

The older generation has lower levels of education when compared to the younger generation.

The older Cambodians are, the lower the rate of literacy. Among the pre-Khmer Rouge baby

boom generations, especially during the 1950s and the 1980s, the 1950s generation has the

lowest rate of literacy and a far lower rate compared to the 1980s generation and thereafter242

.

According to the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) by the National Institute of

Statistics (NIS), the literacy rate of 65-years-and-over group was recorded at 42.90 percent in

2010, 45.20 percent in 2011 and 46.30 percent in 2012 whereas the literacy rate of youth was

reported at 84.50 percent, 88.05 percent and 87.35 percent in the same time frame

240

Kolab, "In 2030, Every Cambodian has at least a 9-year basic education," Cambodia Express News (CEN),

November 29, 2013, http://www.cen.com.kh/localnews/show_detail/24?token= ZGUxYTQ0MG 241

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2013 Human Development Report, The Rise of the

South: Human Progress in a Diverse World (New York: UNDP, 2013), 172. See "2013 Human Development

Report, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World," The United Nations Development

Programme, accessed February 16, 2014, www.hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report . 242

"Social Statistics: Cambodia Socio-Economics Survey (CSES)," The National Institute of Statistics, accessed

January 16, 2014, http://www.nis.gov.kh/nis/CSES/Data/CSES_Education.html

68

respectively243

(Figure 3-7). This means that more than a majority of the Cambodian elderly

aged 65 years and over was illiterate while nearly all Cambodian youth were literate.

Figure 3-7 Comparison of Literacy Ratio by Age Groups 2010-2012

Source: Cambodia Socio-Economics Survey (CSES) by NIS244

However, the government appears to have been unsuccessful at facilitating the growing high

literacy of Cambodian youth at the secondary education level, since the percentage of student

enrollment annually declined in the last three years. From 2010 to 2013, the total enrolment of

students at the secondary education stood at an average of 860,000 per year but the number of

the annual enrolment declined by 4 percent and 2 percent from 2010-2011 to 2011-2012, and

from 2011-2012 to 2012-2013 academic years respectively245

(Table 3-5). Given that the total

population increased by 2 million from 13 million in 2008 up to 15 million in 2013, the

annual growth of the population within this timeframe was around 2.5 percent on average. In

other words, the declining trends of enrolment at the secondary education level clearly

243

"Social Statistics: Cambodia Socio-Economics Survey (CSES)," the National Institute of Statistics, accessed

January 16, 2014, http://www.nis.gov.kh/nis/CSES/Data/CSES_Education.html 244

"Social Statistics: Cambodia Socio-Economics Survey (CSES)," the National Institute of Statistics, accessed

January 16, 2014, http://www.nis.gov.kh/nis/CSES/Data/CSES_Education.html 245

Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), Education Statistics & Indicators 2012/2013 (Phnom

Penh: EMIS Office, Department of Planning, May 2013), 1. See "Education Statistics 2012-2013," The Ministry

of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), accessed February 14, 2014, www.moeys.gov.kh/en/stastic-and-

indicator/eims/emis-2012-2013.html#.Uv2NHH8aySM; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS),

Education Statistics & Indicators 2011/2012 (Phnom Penh: EMIS Office, Department of Planning, February

2012), 2. See "Education Statistics 2011-2012," The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS),

accessed February 14, 2014, www.moeys.gov.kh/en/stastic-and-indicator/eims/emis-2011-

2012.html#.Uv2RF38aySM ; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), Education Statistics &

Indicators 2010/2011 (Phnom Penh: EMIS Office, Department of Planning, March 2011), 2. See "Education

Statistics 2010-2011," The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), accessed February 14, 2014,

www.moeys.gov.kh/en/stastic-and-indicator/eims/emis-2010-2011.html#.Uv2SUX8aySM .

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

2010 2011 2012

65years-Up

Youth

69

contracted the increasing speeds of the population growth in the kingdom. In addition, from

2008 to 2013, around 98,000 senior high school students took the national exam annually and

about 82 percent of them on average passed the exam (Figure 3-8 and Figure 3-9). Assuming

the average population within the 2008-2013 timeframe numbered at 14 million, then the

annual rate of students graduating from high schools was merely equivalent to 0.57 percent of

the total population. In this sense, the annual growth rate of high school graduates was at least

3 times slower than the annual rate of the population growth.

Table 3-5 Enrollment at Secondary Education 2010-2013 Academic Years

Enrollment at Secondary Education

Academic

Years

Upper Secondary Education

(grade10-12)

Lower Secondary Education

(grade7-9)

Total

2013-2012 288,789 534,710 823,499

2012-2011 318,165 541,147 859,312

2011-2010 334,734 560,868 895,602

Source: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports: Education Statistics and Indicators 2010-2013246

246

Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), Education Statistics & Indicators 2012/2013 (Phnom

Penh: EMIS Office, Department of Planning, May 2013), 1. See "Education Statistics 2012-2013," The Ministry

of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), accessed February 14, 2014, www.moeys.gov.kh/en/stastic-and-

indicator/eims/emis-2012-2013.html#.Uv2NHH8aySM; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS),

Education Statistics & Indicators 2011/2012 (Phnom Penh: EMIS Office, Department of Planning, February

2012), 2. See "Education Statistics 2011-2012," The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS),

accessed February 14, 2014, www.moeys.gov.kh/en/stastic-and-indicator/eims/emis-2011-

2012.html#.Uv2RF38aySM ; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), Education Statistics &

Indicators 2010/2011 (Phnom Penh: EMIS Office, Department of Planning, March 2011), 2. See "Education

Statistics 2010-2011," The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), accessed February 14, 2014,

www.moeys.gov.kh/en/stastic-and-indicator/eims/emis-2010-2011.html#.Uv2SUX8aySM .

70

Figure 3-8 Number of High School Examinees and Graduates 2008-2013

Source: Radio Free Asia (Khmer)247

Figure 3-9 Growth of High School Graduates 2009-2013 by Percentages

Source: Radio Free Asia (Khmer)248

247

Sochea Meta Yang, "BacII Students in Phnom Penh Spent More than US$700,000 to Bribe Proctors," Radio

Free Asia (Khmer), August 31, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/social-economy/Students-in-PP-spent-

over-half-a-million-dollar-for-bribery-during-bac-II-exam-08312013011541.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring

=%E1%9E%94%E1%9F%92%E1%9E%9A%E1%9E%A1%E1%9E%84%E2%80%8B%E1%9E%94%E1%9E

%B6%E1%9E%80%E1%9F%8B%E2%80%8B%E1%9E%8C%E1%9E%BB%E1%9E%94%E2%80%8B ; Sok

Norng Kher, "More than 82% passed high school exam in 2011," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), August 20, 2011,

www.rfa.org/khmer/indepth/ over_82percent_passed_bacII_exam-08202011054437.html? ; Ayuthya Den,

"Teacher Association: Education in Cambodia is at alarming time," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), September 25,

2010, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/indepth/cam-education-system-critcized-09252010050606.html?searchterm:utf8

:ustring=%E1%9E%94%E1%9F%92%E1%9E%9A%E1%9E%A1%E1%9E%84%E2%80%8B%E1%9E%94%

E1%9E%B6%E1%9E%80%E1%9F%8B%E2%80%8B%E1%9E%8C%E1%9E%BB%E1%9E%94%E2%80%8

B ; Pech Meta Keo, "Situations of the High School Exam Nationwide" Radio Free Asia (Khmer), July 29, 2009,

http://www.rfa.org/khmer/indepth/situation-of-high-school-exam-2009-07292009043840.html ; Pech Meta Keo,

"High School Exam Starts Nationwide between 4-6 August," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), August 5, 2008,

www.rfa.org/khmer/indepth/high-school-exams-start-08052008051829.html?

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000

2008

2009

2010

2011

2013

Graduate Numbers

Examinee Numbers

72.00%

74.00%

76.00%

78.00%

80.00%

82.00%

84.00%

86.00%

88.00%

2009 2010 2011 2013

High School Graduates

71

The young generation of better education is not only more likely to participate in politics but

also more capable of mobilizing their parents and friends for political engagement. On one

hand, based on their modern standards and higher levels of education, political behaviours and

attitudes of Cambodian youth are less likely to be influenced by their parents according to

Barakat‘s findings, and so are more likely to participate in politics than their parents and other

old people in the previous generation. The IRI survey in November 2013 found that 71

percent of the total 2,000 respondents, who were randomly selected from 24 city and

provinces, felt freer to speak about politics and two third of this percentage said they were less

worried about their expression of political ideas249

.

Moreover, their political participation can be clearly seen through their growing interests in

the July 2013 election, if compared to the previous elections, and a growing presence of youth

in protests. In the IRI survey conducted between January and February 2013, shortly before

the July 2013 election, 88 percent of respondents replied they would ―very likely‖ go to vote

for their desired political parties to lead the National Assembly and the government while

only 9 percent responded ―somewhat likely‖250

. This data shows the highest probable voter

turnout in the last 10 years since 2003251

(Figure 3-10). Also, during the election and in the

post-election period, most of the election observers252

, the participants in demonstrations

248

Sochea Meta Yang, "BacII Students in Phnom Penh Spent More than US$700,000 to Bribe Proctors," Radio

Free Asia (Khmer), August 31, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/social-economy/Students-in-PP-spent-

over-half-a-million-dollar-for-bribery-during-bac-II-exam-08312013011541.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=

%E1%9E%94%E1%9F%92%E1%9E%9A%E1%9E%A1%E1%9E%84%E2%80%8B%E1%9E%94%E1%9E%

B6%E1%9E%80%E1%9F%8B%E2%80%8B%E1%9E%8C%E1%9E%BB%E1%9E%94%E2%80%8B; Sok

Norng Kher, "More than 82% passed high school exam in 2011," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), August 20, 2011,

www.rfa.org/khmer/indepth/ over_82percent_passed_bacII_exam-08202011054437.html?; Ayuthya Den,

"Teacher Association: Education in Cambodia is at alarming time," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), September 25,

2010, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/indepth/cam-education-system-critcized-09252010050606.html?searchterm

:utf8: ustring=%E1%9E%94%E1%9F%92%E1%9E%9A%E1%9E%A1%E1%9E%84%E2%80%8B%E1%

9E%94%E1%9E%B6%E1%9E%80%E1%9F%8B%E2%80%8B%E1%9E%8C%E1%9E%BB%E1%9E%94%E

2%80%8B ; Pech Meta Keo, "Situations of the High School Exam Nationwide," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), July

29, 2009, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/indepth/situation-of-high-school-exam-2009-07292009043840.html . 249

"IRI Cambodia Survey: Declining Optimism on Country‘s Direction; Strong Support for Democratic

Reforms," The International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 3, 2014, http://www.iri.org/news-

events-press-center/news/iri-cambodia-survey-declining-optimism-countrypercentE2percent80percent99s-

direction-strong-supp 250

The International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: January 12-February 2,

2013 (IRI: Phnom Penh, 2013), 22. See "IRI Cambodia Survey Finds High Interest in National Elections," The

International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 13, 2014, www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/

news/iri-cambodia-survey-finds-high-interest-national-elections . 251

COMFREL, Final Assessment and Report on 2008 National Assembly Elections (Phnom Penh: COMFREL,

2008), 72. 252

Youth are generally interested in election observation. In the 2007 Commune/Sangkat Council Election, more

than a majority of election observers recruited by COMFREL and NICFEC were young. COMFREL,

"Participation of Youth in Elections," Neak Kloam Meul 73 (July 2007): 2.

72

against the 2013 election result253

and the strikers asking for US$ 160 minimum wages per

month254

were youth.

Figure 3-10 Voter Turnout 2003-2008 and Promising Voter Turnout 2013

Source: IRI255

and COMFREL256

On the other hand, elderly parents and young people appear likely to be inspired by their

young children and their peers orderly. Cambodian youth may have roles in transmitting their

political behaviours and attitudes to their older parents because of their better education. This

kind of political socialization and mobilization has been facilitated by a high rate of

dependency within Cambodian households. According to the General Population Census of

Cambodia in 2008, the dependency ratio was significantly high in most parts of the country

varying from 57 percent up to 76.6 percent with a low in the capital city at only 34percent257

(Figure 3-11). While young political activists have shown their discontent with the

government‘s performance in areas of education, employment258

and minimum wages259

,

253

Sonorng Kher, "Youth in Volunteer Works at Democracy Square," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), October 25,

2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/politics/youth-join-social-work-in-cnrp-demonstration-102520130818

47.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=youth+in+demonstration 254

Savyuth Hang, "Civil Society and Citizens Seek Perpetrators in Shooting Garment Workers to be Sent to the

Courts," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), January 14, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/ news/law/ngos-and-people-

want-govt-to-bring-gunman-who-killed-workers-to-court-01142014072208.html 255

The International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: January 12-February 2,

2013 (IRI: Phnom Penh, 2013), 22. See "IRI Cambodia Survey Finds High Interest in National Elections," The

International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 13, 2014, www.iri.org/news-events-press-

center/news/iri-cambodia-survey-finds-high-interest-national-elections . 256

COMFREL, "Final Assessment and Report on 2008 National Assembly Elections, " (Phnom Penh:

COMFREL, 2008), 72. 257

"Census Info: Dependency ration – Percentage, 2008," The National Institute of Statistics, accessed January

22, 2014, http://data.nis.gov.kh/censusinfo/libraries/aspx/dataview.aspx . 258

In the 2008 COMFEBA survey, more than half of the high school students were more concerned with job

creation and necessary skills and vocational trainings for employability whereas more than the majority of

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

2003 2007 2008 2013

Voter Turnout

Promising Voter Turnout

73

most elderly demonstrators explained their participation with the opposition party in terms of

a better future for their children and grandchildren‘ better welfare260

.

Figure 3-11 Dependency Ratio in 24 City and Provinces in 2008

Source: General Population Census of Cambodia 2008 by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS)261

However, it is not yet clear whether this factor of better education dominates others socio-

cultural factors including the culture of collectivism and socio-economic dependency of

university students looked pessimistic at a size of job markets. Ratana Norng and Tola Hem, "Youth and

Employment: Bridging the Gap," (Phnom Penh: CAMFEBA, June 2008), 30, 36, 38 and 40. 259

A total number of garment workers is in between 400,000 and 500,000. These young workers, who generally

aged between 18 years old and 30s, consider a matter of minimum wages as the urgent prioritized issue,

followed by working conditions. In recent nationwide strikes, which lead to deadly clashes, they all asked for an

increase of minimum wages in the sector by US$ 160 as a result of recently high inflation in the country.

Khunthear Mom, "Cambodia‘s Free Trade Union offers minimum wage plan," The Phnom Penh Post, January 4,

2013, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/cambodias-free-trade-union-offers-minimum-wage-plan. Also

teachers attempt to demand a minimum wage of at least 1 million Riel, or about US$ 250, while their current

salaries are about a half of the demanded minimum wages. Mony Say, "Avoid Corruption in the Education

Sector Is the Key Reform," Voice of America (Khmer), October 24, 2013, http://khmer.voanews.com/content/

anti-corruption-in-education-key-to-reform-cambodia-khmer/1775751.html 260

Ms. Kea, 70 years old, is one of participants in the CNRP national demonstration. She reasoned her presence

in the demonstration and her dedication of time and money with the better future of young people and the next

generation. Kasariya Tin, "Many Reasons behind Participation in the National Demonstration by the Cambodia

National Rescue Party," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), October 29, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/politics/

reasons-demonstrators-joint-cnrp-demonstration-10292013035222.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=CNRP

+demonstration 261

"Census Info: Dependency ration – Percentage, 2008," the National Institute of Statistics, accessed January

22, 2014, http://data.nis.gov.kh/censusinfo/libraries/aspx/dataview.aspx .

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

Dependency Ratio

74

family members. While both old and young Cambodians think of family rather their

individuals, children are morally responsible for their elderly parents and the living of latter is

economically dependent on their children‘s earnings at least at their later ages or after their

retirement262

. Also, most young Cambodians generally stay under the same roof with their

parents until they get married and can afford to buy a house, as can be seen by the dependency

ratio published by the National Institute of Statistics in 2008263

.

Furthermore, political discussions, argued Conroy Meredith et al, happen only among close

friends but sometimes possibly among acquaintances through social networking sites264

. Like-

minded people and hidden identities are the main reasons for a closed grouping and necessary

support through social media265

. In Cambodia, youth manage their informal groups among

peers either by direct contact or through a virtual community. Internet cafes and social

networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter become their new means of socialization and,

perhaps, political participation and mobilization.

The economic growth in the last decade has improved people‘s living, businesses and

lifestyles. The internet cafe has become a new locus of socialization for young Cambodians

and middle-income people while its businesses have blossomed throughout the country. In the

capital city of Phnom Penh alone, more than 300 internet cafes were recorded in 2013266

.

―Politikoffee‖, one of the well-known informal groups, was initiated by young Cambodians in

their 20s to have a regular discussion at the BBC café among friends from various disciplines

and crossing fields of works such as political science graduates, teachers and entertainment

reporters267

. This group uses Facebook to arrange their discussions of a dozen regular

members and to share information of their meeting results on various topics from current

affairs of domestic politics to the future of their country among hundreds of their page fans.

262

Harry C. Triandis, Christoper McCusker and C. Harry Hui,"Multimethod Probes of Individualism and

Collectivism," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59:5 (November 1990): 1006-08. 263

"Census Info: Dependency ration – Percentage, 2008," the National Institute of Statistics, accessed January

22, 2014, http://data.nis.gov.kh/censusinfo/libraries/aspx/dataview.aspx . 264

Meredith Conroy, Jessica T. Feezell and Mario Guerrero, "Facebook and Political Engagement: A Study of

Online Political Group Membership and Offline Political Engagement," Computers in Human Behavior 28

(2012): 1536. 265

Ibid, 1537. 266

Suy Heimkhemra, "Cheap Data, Better Tech Putting More Cambodians Online," Voice of America (VOA),

March 25, 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/cheap-data-better-tech-putting-more-cambodians-

online/1628531.html 267

Kevin Ponniah, "Political eyes on youth vote," The Phnom Penh Post, July 9, 2013, www.phnompenhpost.

com/national/political-eyes-youth-vote .

75

Other informal groups and individuals use Facebook to mobilize youth for political support.

The ―I Love Cambodia Hot News‖, which has approximately 300,000 fans including oversea

Cambodian youth, is believed to be a CNRP affiliated Facebook page and used to promote the

popularity of the opposition, especially during the 2013 national election and the post-election

demonstrations268

. This page becomes a tool for spreading information and a new locus for

sharing views and criticizing the government. Another Facebook page, ―Thy Sovantha‖, is run

by a 19-year pro-CNRP activist and has around 220,000 fans269

. This page is used to spread

information of social injustice, especially during violent crackdowns by the authorities on

demonstrators who demanded election investigations and reelections, and to provide a

platform whereby its fans share their grievance against the government. Yet, it is not least to

notice that both ―I Love Cambodia Hot News‖ and ―Thy Sovantha‖ pages have a large

disproportion between the number of their fans and the number of likes and comments, in the

sense they have never surpassed 40,000 and 30,000 likes or comments respectively. Thus,

these pages are suspected of buying credits through Facebook ―Boost Post‖ for their self-

advertisement.

Yet, political socialization through peer networks remains less influential when compared to

familial socialization. The main reason may be less open and less widespread discussions

about politics among friends in the absence of trust, and a high ratio of family dependency in

the kingdom. Thus, political discussions appear to happen often and to be freer among family

members than among friends. According to the IRI survey on Cambodian Public Opinion in

January-February 2013, only 12 percent of respondents agreed that their friends inspired their

decisions to vote for a particular political party during the July 2013 election while 29 percent

believed their decisions were under the influence of their parents‘ preferred parties. Yet,

political socialization either within families or among peers remained less influential when

these factors were compared to the political-self of the young voters based on their better

education, standing at no less than 40 percent270

(Figure 3-12). In other words, this data shows

that the higher knowledge of youth is a more decisive factor while the familial environment

268

I Love Cambodia Hot News Facebook page, accessed February 14, 2014, www.facebook.com/ilovecambodia

hotnews.real?ref=ts&fref=ts 269

Thy Sovantha‘s Facebook page, accessed February 14, 2014, www.facebook.com/khmer.samakiknea?ref=

ts&fref=ts 270

The International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: October 28-November 10,

2013 (IRI: Phnom Penh, 2013), 15. See "IRI Cambodia Survey: Declining Optimism on Country‘s Direction;

Strong Support for Democratic Reforms," The International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 13,

2014, www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20January%2023%20Survey%20of%20Cambodia

%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20October%2028-November%2010%2C%202013.pdf

76

continues to be significant and amicable socialization is also considerable in transmitting

political behaviours and attitudes among family members and friends271

.

Figure 3-12 Better Education, Family and Friends in Defining a Preferred Party

Source: Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: January 12-February 2, 2013 by the IRI272

In brief, the human resource development in Cambodia is far better than 30 years ago. Most

Cambodian youth are literate and the vast majority of young children annually enroll at

schools. This great development in the national education system shows a clear generational

gap within this sector, especially between the pre- and post-Khmer Rouge generations. While

more than a majority of elderly people in the previous generation are illiterate, almost all

young Cambodians in the next generation are literate and a significant proportion of them

have at least secondary education. These phenomena have two consequences for not only the

Cambodian elderly and youth but also among youth themselves. Cambodian youth are very

likely to participate in politics compared to their parents and other elderly people in the

previous generation. Also, they are believed to inspire their parents and their friends in terms

of political behaviours and attitudes. In this regard, it is important to notice that the familial

environment and political socialization appear to have a greater impact on the political

identity of both old and young Cambodians than peer cultures. Therefore, this variable of

better education is strongly believed to reinforce the dramatic shifts in young demographics in

Cambodia, making changes in structures of the political institutions necessary. If the

271

More than 70 percent of respondents were from rural areas, so the findings would have been changed if the

proportion of respondents from both areas was considered. Ibid, 45. 272

The International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: January 12-February 2,

2013 (IRI: Phnom Penh, 2013), 15. See "IRI Cambodia Survey Finds High Interest in National Elections," The

International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 13, 2014, www.iri.org/news-events-press-

center/news/iri-cambodia-survey-finds-high-interest-national-elections .

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Better Education Family Friends

Decisive Factors

77

reorganization of the political institutions proceeds slowly because of the political will or

pressures of the regime‘s elderly senior members in power, the state institutions need to

provide Cambodian people, especially the young, more public space as an alternative, which

is discussed and analyzed in the following section.

78

IF THEY ARE PROVIDED AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FORMAL POLITICAL

STRUCTURES FOR GETTING INVOLVED IN DECISION MAKING PROCESSES,

THEN A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE YOUNG

IS REDUCED TO MINIMUM AND A SEVERE FORM OF COLLECTIVE

VIOLENCE CAN BE AVOIDED

The year 2013 was marked by an increasing number of protests regarding land disputes,

election irregularities, and a growing activism of youth in politics through social media.

Rather than taking actions before the competent state institutions, young Cambodians sought

recourses through informal structures. Consequently, a confrontation between elderly political

leaders and their young citizens sometimes led to physical harm and deadly clashes. An

emergence of this generational confrontation and severe forms of collective violence may be a

result of a decline in the public trust towards the state institutions in representing their

interests and a limited public space for exercising their freedom and liberty to demand from

the government an increasingly egalitarian society. In this sense, if Cambodian people,

especially the young, are provided an alternative to the state institutions for getting involved

in decision making processes, then a confrontation between the government and the young is

reduced to a minimum and severe forms of collective violence can be avoided as can be seen

in the following discussions.

Land disputes spread throughout the country and, then, protests happen regularly. Since

2000s, a smooth function of the state institutions in Cambodia has been threatened due to the

absence of any effective policy for curing this social disease (Figure 3-6). This social calamity

appears unlikely to be alleviated. According to the Cambodian Human Rights and

Development Association (ADHOC), in 2011 alone, 60,000 people were forcefully

evacuated273

while the worse year of land disputes was reported in 2012 due to the

multiplying number of struggles between authorities and people274

. In January 2014, people

protested against the local authorities in Banteay Meanchey province in regards to a

controversial distribution of land plots for implementing the government policy of economic

land concessions, so nearly 200 families occupied the land in disputes to prevent the private

273

"Ee Sarom," Civil Rights Defenders, accessed February 18, 2014,

www.civilrightsdefenders.org/uncategorized/human-rights-defender-of-the-month-ee-sarom/ . 274

"Report: A Turning Point? Land, Housing and Natural Resources Rights in Cambodia in 2012,"ADHHOC,

accessed February 17, 2014, www.adhoc-cambodia.rog/?p=2849 .

79

companies and the local authorities from doing their surveying275

. In February 2014, local

authorities in Pursat province forcefully evacuated people by burning down their homes and

leaving more than 100 families homeless. This led to protests demanding fair compensation

and a release of their representative from a criminal charge276

.

In the aftermath of the announcement of the election result, a number of mass demonstrations

led by the opposition party occurred throughout the country, especially in the capital city of

Phnom Penh, demanding investigations into election irregularities. The CNRP was

discontented with decisions of the National Election Committee and the Constitutional

Council, both were accused of being biased towards the ruling party, leading to month-long

mass demonstrations. With the support of garment workers, on December 7, 2013, the

number of participants in the mass demonstrations was estimated at around 20,000277

. Yet, on

December 21, 2013, this figure jumped up to at least 100,000, though the opposition leader,

Sam Rainsy, claimed a figure of up to 500,000278

. It was the first time in history that

discontented Cambodians had demonstrated in such a large number against the government

and the ruling party, far more than what happened in 1998 (Table 3-6)279

.

Table 3-6 Number of Protests 1998 & 2013 in Comparison

Source: The Phnom Penh Post280

275

Sophorl Mony Sourn, "Nearly 200 Families Push Company Machines from the Land in Disputes," Radio

Free Asia (Khmer), January 20, 2014, www.rfa.org/khmer/news/land/banteaymeanchey-01202014052959.html . 276

Rotha Chin, "People in Pursat Province Continues to Protest Demanding a Release of a Women and a Stop of

Home Evacuation," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), February 14, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/land/

villagers-in-pursat-continues-protest-02142014043302.html . 277

Alex Pettiford and George Nickels, "Demonstrating restraint," The Southeast Asia Globe, September 7, 2013,

http://sea-globe.com/cnrp-demonstration-phnom-penh/ . 278

Sokchea Meas and Daniel Pye, "CNRP‘s Sunday ‗tsunami‘," The Phnom Penh Post, December 22, 2013,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/cnrps-sunday-tsunami ; Bannett Murray and Khouth Sophak Chakrya,

"Size me up: calculating crowds at Cambodia‘s demonstrations," The Phnom Penh Post, January 3, 2014,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/7days/size-me-calculating-crowds-cambodia%E2%80%99s-demonstrations . 279

James Eckardt and Sotheacheath Chea, "Diary of a Demonstration," The Phnom Penh Post, September 4,

1998, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/diary-demonstration . 280

James Eckardt and Chea Sotheacheath, "Diary of a Demonstration," The Phnom Penh Post, September 4,

1998, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/diary-demonstration ; Sokchea Meas and Daniel Pye, "CNRP‘s

Sunday ‗tsunami‘," The Phnom Penh Post, December 22, 2013, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/

Estimated Largest Number of Protesters 1998 2013

By Reporters and Authorities 15,000 100,000

By the Opposition 35,000 500,000

80

Yet, the mass demonstrations in 1998 and 2013 had less violence and no casualties though it

had a very large scale of participants when compared to the demonstration in 1997. On March

30, 1997, while the Khmer National Party, the then Sam Rainsy Party, gathered a crowd of

around 170 people and was demonstrating before the National Assembly to call for judicial

reforms281

, four grenades were thrown into a crowd listening to Sam Rainsy leaving at 19

death and 150 injuries282

. This event was underlined by two surrounding situations. First, the

demonstration took place in a tense political situation, just four months earlier before the coup

of 6-7 July. Second, during the demonstration, military forces from the bodyguard unit of the

Second Prime Minister were deployed to control the situation while police had a light

presence at the time283

. Until the present, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and

the domestic courts have not identified perpetrators yet.

Labour strikes are the most common form of protests used by trade unions to demand better

pay and work conditions. This form of protests has grown in number since 2003 while its

nature has recently changed from peaceful to violent strikes since last year. The Garment

Manufacturers Association in Cambodia (GMAC) reported a total of 817 strikes from 2003 to

2013 but the year 2012 was known as the worst year with a skyrocketing number of 121

cases, up from 34 cases in 2011, equivalent to a jump of 255.9 percent284

(Figure 3-13). In

early 2013, during a labour strike in Prey Veng province, three garment workers were badly

injured by a gun shot and an ex-Bavet town governor was lately found guilty of

―unintentional violence‖ with an imprisonment of 18 months, yet he remained free until the

present285

. On January 3, 2014, during labour strikes for minimum wages of US$ 160 per

month on the Ven Sreng road, peaceful protests have turned into violent when situations of

confrontation between garment workers and military police became tense, leaving at least 4

national/cnrps-sunday-tsunami ; Bannett Murray and Sophak Chakrya Khouth, "Size me up: calculating crowds

at Cambodia‘s demonstrations," The Phnom Penh Post, January 3, 2014, www.phnompenhpost.com/7days/size-

me-calculating-crowds-cambodia‘s-demonstrations . 281

Sokha Cheang and Liam Cochrane, "Grenade victim‘s painful years of justice denied," The Phnom Penh

Post, April 9, 2004, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/grenade-victims-painful-years-justice-denied . 282

Peter Sainsbury, "FBI grenade investigation continues," The Phnom Penh Post, October 15, 1999,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/fbi-grenade-investigation-continues . 283

FBI Report, "FBI report on Rainsy rally bombing," The Phnom Penh Post, October 15, 1999,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/fbis-report-rainsy-rally-bombing . 284

"Strike Report," Garment Manufacturer Association in Cambodia (GMAC), accessed January 20, 2014,

http://gmac-cambodia.org/strike/ . 285

Titthara May and Stuart White, "A year after trial, still free," The Phnom Penh Post, February 27, 2014,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/year-after-trial-still-free .

81

people killed, 1 missing and 38 injured286

, following the event of a deadly gun shot on Kbal

Thnol Sky Bridge.

Figure 3-13 Growing Number of Labour Strikes 2003-2013

Source: Garment Manufacturer Association in Cambodia (GMAC)287

Like the situations in the 1997 demonstration, the labour strike of January 2013 took place in

the nearly same situations. The strike was held immediately following the successive

demonstrations in December 2013 by the opposition party, the CNRP, calling for

investigation into election irregularities. That means it happened under a tense situation when

the CNRP demonstration had more than 100,000 participants and the CPP won a very slight

victory in the 2013 national election, which clearly threatened the ruling party‘s legitimacy

and may have led to a removal of the ruling party from power if the labour strikes were not

under control. Also, unlike the demonstrations in December 2013, during the strikes in

January 2014, military forces were dispatched instead of police while their presence may have

led to a deadly clash with garment workers and most of the strikers on the scene were young.

Growing problems of the labour strikes really test the ability of the government on how

effectively it intervenes in solving complaints of the garment workers. Yet, the government

seems to be ineffective in solving and preventing further labour disputes. The government‘s

failure in representing the worker‘s interest may have a relationship with the absence of its

286

"Summary Paper When Freedom Meets Oppression: Timeline of Recent Events, January 31, 2014,"

LICADHO, accessed February 17, 2014, www.licadho-cambodia.org/reports/files/192LICADHOTimeline

LethalViolence2014-English.pdf . 287

"Strike Report," the Garment Manufacturer Association in Cambodia (GMAC), accessed January 20, 2014,

http://gmac-cambodia.org/strike/ .

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Garment strikes

82

clear policy and autonomy in treating parties in disputes fairly based on the principles of the

rule of law. In regards to the problems of the minimum wage, the Labour Advisory

Committee288

has no willingness to review it annually in a response to economic growth,

increasing gains of the manufacturers and high inflation289

. When the nationwide strikes broke

out everywhere in 2013, the committee decided to increase minimum wages per month for the

garment sectors from US$ 75 to $US 95 within only less than a year290

while an increase of

US$ 16 needed 10 years from 2000 to 2010 (Table 3-7). Yet, the latest agreed minimum wage

remained far lower than the minimum livable wage for the garment factory workers of

between $US 157 and $US 177 in a study by the ministry itself291

(Table 3-8).

Table 3-7 Development of Approved Minimum Wages in Garment Industries

2000 2007 2010 March 2013 December 2013

US$ 45 US$ 50 US$ 61 US$ 75 US$ 95

Source: The Phnom Penh Post292

288

The Labour Advisory Committee is composed of representatives from the Ministry of Labor and Vocational

Training, the Garment Manufacturer Association in Cambodia (GMAC) and trade unions including the

Federation of Trade Unions. 289

In a letter signed by representatives of the undersigned associations representing the U.S. and Canada retail

and fashion factories on January 15, 2014, they asked for a regular-scheduled wage review mechanism. See

GMAC‘s Facebook page, accessed January 20, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/gmacpage 290

Kunthear Mom and Teehan Sean, "Extra $5 ‗won‘t woo workers‘," The Phnom Penh Post, January 1, 2014,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/extra-5-percentE2percent80percent

98wonpercentE2percent80percent99t-woo-workerspercentE2percent80percent99 . 291

Pheap Aun and Matt Blomberg, "Labor Ministry Ignored Its Own Research on Minimum Wage," The

Cambodia Daily, February 12, 2014, www.cambodiadaily.com/news/labor-ministry-ignored-its-own-research-

on-minimum-wage-51977/ 292

Shane Worrell and Kunthear Mom, "Wage increase sewn up," The Phnom Penh Post, March 22, 2013,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/wage-increase-sewn; Kunthear Mom, "Minimum wage ruling set to spark

garment protests," The Phnom Penh Post, July 9, 2010, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/minimum-wage-

ruling-set-spark-garment-protests; Kunthear Mom and Shane Worrel, "Further wage increases eyed," The Phnom

Penh Post, August 26, 2013, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/further-wage-increases-eyed ; Kunthear Mom

and Teehan Sean, "Extra $5 ‗won‘t woo workers‘," The Phnom Penh Post, January 1, 2014,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/extra-5-%E2%80%98won%E2%80%99t-woo-workers%E2%80%99

83

Source: The Statement of the Labour Advisory Committee dated on December 24, 2013293

The ineffective intervention by the government gradually led to a loss of confidence among

the parties in disputes, the trade unions and the manufacturers. While the trade unions

perceived that the government tends to be more protective of the garment employers by

prioritizing a protection of industry in the sector, the GMAC, the representative of the 400

garment and footwear factories, alleged that the government politicizes labour disputes by

being ―too patient‖ towards violent and unlawful strikers294

. As a consequence, some garment

factories such as the SL refused to implement the order issued by the ministry in November

2013, which required the employer to reinstate 19 fired union representatives to work in order

to end a three-month-long strike295

, eventually resulting in an outburst of collective violence.

Besides protests, social media has recently become an emerging platform where Cambodian

youth actively got involved in politics. While various types of social media such as Facebook,

293

"Statement of Labour Advisory Committee 2014," Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia

(GMAC), accessed February 19, 2014, www.gmac-cambodia.org 294

"Statement of GMAC On: Violent and Non-Procedural Strike at Apple Apparel," the Garment Manufacturer

Association in Cambodia (GMAC), accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.gmac-cambodia.org/ . 295

VOA, "The SL Factory Denies to Accept Representatives of the Trade Union Required by the Government,"

Voice of America (Khmer), November 23, 2013, http://khmer.voanews.com/content/cambodia-factory-refuse-to-

hire-back-workers-as-ordered-khmer/1794331.html ; Dara Mech, "SL Factory Refuses to Reinstate Fired Union

Representatives," The Cambodia Daily, November 26, 2013, www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/sl-factory-

refuses-to-reinstate-fired-union-representatives-47912/ .

Table 3-8 Minimum Wages in Textile, Garment and Shoe Industries 2014-2018

84

Twitter, YouTube, and blogs have become popular in Cambodia, Facebook is the most

popular with a total number of around 1 million users296

. Recently, Cambodian youth

complained the government about its intervention into minimum fees of phone calls297

and the

negligence of the municipality in auditing private concessionary businesses, who have

exclusive rights over parking fees of bicycles, motorcycles and cars in all markets in the

capital city298

, leading to the government‘s immediate and positive reactions to their

complaints. In mid-February 2014, Prak Sovannary, a wife of a human rights activist and the

president of the Independent Democracy of Informal Economy Association (IDEA), Von Pov,

posted on her Facebook account Pov‘s letter encouraging his supporters to continue to fight

for their freedom299

. Also, blogs are used by communities that are victims of forceful

evacuation, with most of the activists in their 20s and 30s. The ―Save Boeung Kak300

‖ was

created in 2007 by some Boeung Kak families, who were victims of forceful evacuation, in

order to update news regarding their campaigns and activities301

, and to mobilize support from

key aid donors such as the World Bank302

and the Asian Development Bank303

in putting

pressures on the government.

The recent social disorders can be partly explained by youth exclusion from decision making

bodies of the state institutions and a failure of the institutions in representing the interest of

the majority, if not the public interest, and partly by a very limited public space for the public

296

Various sources provided different data but the total number of Facebook users was estimated at around 1

million by 2013. The Internet World Stats recorded Facebook users in Cambodia at around 750,000, Voice of

America (Khmer) reported the total number at approximately 1 million, and Radio France International

numbered Facebook users at just above 1 million. "Asia Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population

Statistics and Facebook Information," Internet World Stats, accessed November 11, 2013,

http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm#kh ; Sophat Seung, "Social Networking Sites Help Politicians and

Voters Come Much Closer," Voice of America (Khmer), July 27, 2013, http://khmer.voanews.com/content/

social-media-brings-voters-and-parties-closer-cambodia-khmer/1710960.html ; Sophak Srey, "Facebook

Changes Society and Khmers‘ Attitude," Radio France International (Khmer), January 11, 2014,

www.khmer.rfi.fr/facebook-contribue-changement-societe-et-attitude . 297

Sakhon Gneum, "Youth Push the Government to Stop Invention into a Fix of Minimum Fees for Mobile

Phones," Voice of Democracy (VOD), December 14, 2013, http://vodhotnews.com/17898 . 298

Zakarya Tin, "City Hall Announced Revision of Documents Determining Deposit Fees for Bicycles,

Motorcycles and Cars," Radio Free Asia (Khmer), November 29, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/khmer/news/social-

economy/overcharge-of-moto-cycle-at-market-11292013071949.html 299

Teehan Sean and Channyda Chhay,"Detainee speaks out online," The Phnom Penh Post, February 17, 2014,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/detainee-speaks-out-online 300

"Save Boeung Kak Campaign: Join Us!"Boeung Kak (blog). Accessed January 19, 2014,

http://saveboeungkak.wordpress.com/

"Save Boeung Kak Campaign: Join Us!," Boeung Kak Victims, accessed January 19, 2014,

http://saveboeungkak.wordpress.com/ . 301

Post Staff, "2007 Year in Review," the Phnom Penh Post, December 28, 2007,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/2007-year-review . 302

Sean Teehan and Khouth Sophak Chakrya, "US House passes B Kak bill," The Phnom Penh Post, January 17,

2014, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/us-house-passes-b-kak-bill . 303

Alex Devine, "Loans to Keep Pace With Reform, ADB Says," The Cambodia Daily, February 28, 2001,

http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archive/loans-to-keep-pace-with-reform-adb-says-20103/

85

to make demands to the government for an increasingly egalitarian society. Young

Cambodians, the majority group of the total population, are seriously marginalized in the

main decision making bodies of the state institutions such as the National Assembly (Table 3-

1 and Table 3-2) and the Senate (Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5). In addition, they have a very

limited public space that cannot be widely used as regular and persistent platforms to work

out their demands with the state. Thus, the public space including civil society organizations,

protests and social media appears very likely to become the final ground upon which young

Cambodians fight with the state to take control for demanding an egalitarian society.

Civil Society Organizations: Absence of Platforms for Cambodian Youth

In aftermath of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, the non-governmental organizations

experienced an exponential growth in the number. The number of civil society organizations

(CSOs) registered at the Ministry of Interior has grown from 1 in 1991 to 2,675 at the end of

2010 while, of this number, 316 were international NGOs304

. These organizations have

different tasks that include development and advocacy but the government tends to be more

favorable to the former than the latter. The advocacy NGOs are subjected to the government‘s

close watch so that it has had many attempts to have a stronger legal framework controlling

them such as an NGOs draft law305

. Yet, a careful attention of the government to the NGOs

does not always necessarily lead to a general conclusion that low participation of young

Cambodians in the non-government organizations has resulted from the government‘s strict

censorship to their freedom of associations and political rights. As we see below, the absence

of persistent and regular platforms for youth, and the political will to integrate youth into

society are the main arguments explaining why Cambodian youth have no more alternatives

beside the state institutions to challenge and change the state norms for a fair distribution of

the economic progress.

Some programs in Cambodia are run by local and international NGOs to target young people

whereas many local NGOs include their names with the term youth. Pilot programs and civil

society organizations exclusively working with youth neither integrate them successively into

society or provide them platforms for participatory democratic processes. In other words,

neither provides effective means for this majority group to achieve their demands but rather

304

Cooperation Committee for Cambodia, NGO Forum and MEDiCAM (2010), Coventry, L. (ed) Moving from

Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness; cited in Monika Nowaczyk, Democratic Ownership in

Cambodia: Progress and Challenges (Phnom Penh: Alliance 2015, March 2011), 2. 305

Ibid, 4-5.

86

improves their awareness and cognitive development, so it seems they have very narrow

alternatives beside the state institutions. Young people can rarely find the organizations that

are available to bridge the gaps between them and the state institutions, as can be seen below.

Some NGOs programs target potential young leaders and engage them in political affairs of

their neighborhood. For example, in the 2007 Commune Council election, 6,397 young

election observers, or 67 percent of the total observers, were employed by the Committee for

Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) while young observers from the Neutral

and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC) numbered

4,125, or 75 percent of the total306

. Yet, their political participation seems to be limited to

election observation during the election days. Also, they are engaged in this kind of

participatory democracy that happens only every five years.

Besides election observation, other pilot programs have been initiated to promote

participation of young people in democratization processes of the country. Two out of many

successful programs have been promoted and supported by the International Republican

Institute (IRI), the US-based organization, in the area of youth empowerment. The ―Next

Generation307

‖ (or ―Nek Bantor Ven‖ in Khmer) is a weekly contest program broadcasted on

MyTV and Vayo FM and usually joined by young people under 25 years from both youth

organizations and political parties. They debate some challenging issues Cambodia faces

today and recommend some useful solutions. Also, the ―Advanced Democracy Seminar308

‖

provides 4 week training on democracy, community improvement and fundraising for young

people in communities by expecting them to help their communities through their initiatives

of small development projects at the end of the program.

Two other famous programs are managed by the Transparency International (TI) Cambodia in

order to involve youth in building a more transparent and accountable society. The ―Youth

Empowerment for Transparency and Integrity‖ (YETI), an annual youth camp, brings young

Cambodians from across the country together to share knowledge and experiences of

corruption for better understanding social transparency and accountability, and provides them

306

COMFREL, "Participation of Youth in Elections," Neak Kloam Meul 73 (July 2007): 2. 307

"Cambodian Youth are Voices for Change Through ‗Next Generation‘ Show," The International Republican

Institute (IRI), accessed January 05, 2014, http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/cambodian-youth-

are-voices-change-through-percentE2percent80percent9Cnext-generationpercentE2percent80percent9D-show 308

"Cambodian Youth Have an Impact in Their Communities," The International Republican Institute (IRI),

accessed January 05, 2014, http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/cambodian-youth-have-impact-

their-communities

87

more opportunities for group networking309

. Also, the ―Youth Forum‖ provides opportunities

for youth from various countries across the region to share experiences on how they

participate in building a corruption-free society and make an equitable society by holding

leaders responsible for their wrong doing310

.

Moreover, many local non-governmental organizations appear to specifically dedicate their

missions and goals to youth development and integration. Yet, most of them limit their

activities merely to develop youth‘s awareness in civic and political engagement (Table 3-9).

They are unable to provide more regular and persistent platforms for young Cambodians to

work out their demands as well as to challenge and change the state norms for an increasingly

egalitarian society311

. Only a very few of them support youth with stable and nationwide

structures but attempt to mobilize them for political purposes.

Out of at least a dozen youth organizations, the ruling party‘s Union of Youth Federations of

Cambodia (UYFC) has the largest horizontal and vertical organization structures for

achieving its missions312

. The UYFC commits itself ―to mobilizing local and oversea youth

for development of Cambodia towards independence, peace, liberty, democracy and

prosperity, to protecting youth‘s interests and to building a good relation and cooperation with

other local and international youth associations and organizations‖313

. The union has its

formal branches at the capital, provinces, cities and district for territorial administration314

and

informal branches at ministries of the government as well as public and private universities

309

"3rd

Youth Camp, Youth Empowerment for Transparency and Integrity (YETI)," Transparency International

Cambodia, accessed January 05, 2014, http://ticambodia.org/index.php/whatwedo/event/percent203rd-youth-

camp-youth-empowerment-for-transparency-and-integrity-yeti. 310

"Over 600 Gather at a ‗Youth Forum‘ to Promote Integrity, Learn about the Impact of Corruption on Their

Life," Transparency International Cambodia, accessed January 05, 2014,

http://ticambodia.org/index.php/whatwedo/event/youth-forum-involving-young-people-in-the-fight-against-

corruption 311

Local non-governmental organizations working in areas of youth are more than dozen such as Youth for

Peace, Youth Star, Khmer Youth Association, Youth Council of Cambodia, Cambodia Indigenous Youth

Association, Child and Youth Education Organization, Khmer Youth Association and Union of Youth

Federation of Cambodia. 312

According to the article 2, paragraph 1 of the Status of the Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia, the

UYFC succeeds its missions from the Association of Cambodian Youth and the Association of Cambodian

Youth‘s Solidarity Front, which was established on December 2nd

, 1978. The 2nd

December Day is the day of the

CPP‘s revolutionary force establishment to fight against the Khmer Rouge and becomes the national holiday in

Cambodia for commemorating a sacrifice of the forces during the war. "About the UYFC: the Status of the

UYFC," Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia (UYFC), accessed January 11, 2014,

http://www.uyfc.org/about-us/. 313

Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Status of the Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia. "About the UYFC: the

Status of the UYFC," the UYFC, accessed January 11, 2014, http://www.uyfc.org/about-us/. 314

Article 9 of the Status of the Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia. "About the UYFC: the Status of the

UYFC," the UYFC, accessed January 11, 2014, http://www.uyfc.org/about-us/.

88

for national administration315

. It is also worth to note that the organization and functioning of

the UYFC are suspected of causing the 2011 National Policy on Cambodia Youth

Development to be unenforceable316

due to its competition with the organization of the

Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports.

However, it appears very likely that the UYFC mobilizes young Cambodians nationwide

behind itself and rallies them to support the Cambodian People Party (CPP) instead of

integrating them into society and providing them means for having impact on the national

policy of development317

. Its activities particularly concern cultural events like Khmer New

Year (Angkor Sang Kran) and other volunteer work during international events such as

Summit of World Heritage Committee. Sometimes, it is involved with commemorative

activities of the ruling party such as 2nd

December Day (the establishment of the revolutionary

military forces against the Khmer Rouge) and 7th

January Day (the victory day of the

revolutionary army forces over the Khmer Rouge). Recently, according to the information

announcement dated July30, 2013318

, the UYFC supported the 2013 election result while

315

The organizational structures of the UYFC are actively engaged through Facebook such as the Union of

Youth Federation of Cambodia, UYFC Phnom Penh (Uyfc Phnom Penh), UYFC Koh Kong (Uyfc Koh Kong

Province), UYFC Kampong Chnang (Uyfc Kampong Chhnang), UYFC Kandal, UYFC Banteay Meanchey

(សហភាពសហព័ន្ធយុវជន្កម្ពុជា ខេត្តបន្ទា យមាន្ជ័យ), UYFC Kampong Thom (Uyfc Kg-Th), UYFC

Battambang (Uyfc Battambang), UYFC Ministry of Interior, UYFC Ministry of Environment (សហភាពសហព័ន្ធយុវជន្កម្ពុជា ក្កសួងបរសិ្ថា ន្), and UYFC University of Puthisastra (UP-UYFC). It is just a few examples

to name the existing formal and informal networking groups of the UYFC in Cambodia. 316

According to the National Policy on Cambodia Youth Development endorsed by the Council of Ministers

during the Plenary Session on 24th

June 2011, the NYDC is required to establish a secretariat general and

subcommittees to administer its works of making, implementing and evaluating the youth national policy at both

horizontal and vertical levels such as Ministerial Youth Development Councils (MYDCs), Municipal and

Provincial Youth Development Councils (M/PYDCs) as well as City and District Youth Development Councils

(C/DYDCs). Until today, the national organ does not function yet. A failure of this national policy is suspected

to have a relation with strong control of the UYFC in both the state administration and territorial administration.

"The National Policy on Cambodia Youth Development," the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, accessed

February 23, 2014, http://www.moeys.gov.kh/kh/policies-and-strategies.html . 317

The President of the Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia is Hun Many, a member of the National

Assembly from the CPP and the youngest son of the Prime Minister Hun Sen, the longest-serving Prime Minister

in the region. Also, its alliance with the Cambodian People‘s Party is specified in the Status of the UYFC

disposed at the Minister of Interior for its registration and legal recognition as an NGO. According to the article

2, paragraph 1 of the Status of the Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia, the UYFC succeeds its missions

from the Association of Cambodian Youth and the Association of Cambodian Youth‘s Solidarity Front, which

was established on 2 December 1978. "About the UYFC: the Status of the UYFC," the UYFC, accessed January

11, 2014, http://www.uyfc.org/about-us/. 318

"Public Announcement on the Organization of the National Election of the National Assembly in the 5th

Mandate," Union of Youth Federation of Cambodia (UYFC), accessed January 11, 2014,

https://www.facebook.com/pages/percentE1percent9Epercent9FpercentE1percent9EpercentA0percentE1percent

9Epercent97percentE1percent9EpercentB6percentE1percent9Epercent96percentE1percent9Epercent9FpercentE

1percent9EpercentA0percentE1percent9Epercent96percentE1percent9Fpercent90percentE1percent9Epercent93p

ercentE1percent9Fpercent92percentE1percent9Epercent92percentE1percent9Epercent99percentE1percent9Eper

centBBpercentE1percent9Epercent9CpercentE1percent9Epercent87percentE1percent9Epercent93percentE1perc

ent9Epercent80percentE1percent9Epercent98percentE1percent9Fpercent92percentE1percent9Epercent96percent

89

other local319

and international320

NGOs working in election monitoring reported many

election irregularities and frauds, and the international community321

also raised concerns

over the election irregularities and the legitimacy of the newly established single-party

parliament in according to the constitutional values of liberal multi-party democracy.

Source: Data from NGOs websites as presented earlier.

E1percent9EpercentBBpercentE1percent9Epercent87percentE1percent9EpercentB6-Union-of-Youth-

Federations-of-Cambodia/570451822970578; 319

Zakariya Tin, "Cambodian NGOs Reveal Poll Fraud," Radio Free Asia (English), November 27, 2013,

www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/report-11272013162936.html 320

"Cambodia: Ruling Party Orchestrated Vote Fraud," Human Rights Watch, accessed February 19, 2014,

www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/31/cambodia-ruling-party-orchestrated-vote-fraud . 321

Lauren Crothers, "Australian Senate Calls For Election Investigation," The Cambodia Daily, February 15,

2014, www.cambodiadaily.com/news/australian-senate-calls-for-election-investigation-52316/ ; Stuart White,

"Foreign envoys turn out in force," The Phnom Penh Post, September 24, 2013, www.phnompenhpost.com/

national/foreign-envoys-turn-out-force

Table 3-9 Summary of the Main Missions for Some Programs and NGOs

90

Protests: Restricted Freedom of Association and Assembly

A protest is another option for public space. It can be done in forms of either demonstrations

or strikes. Differences in levels of education, living standard among the young population and

their parents‘ past experience may be the main factors explaining why they prefer protests

than other forms of the public space including civil society and media. Some social and

political analysts such as Dr. Kem Ley and journalists such as Kevin Ponniah noticed there

are gaps between rural and urban youth in terms of education, knowledge of the information

communications technology and their accessibility to the internet, so they behave towards and

perceive politics differently, especially their means of involvement322

. Yet, it is also important

to notice in the public opinion survey that parents remain influential over a preferred party of

their young children during the 2013 national election, and their frightening experiences of

civil wars are likely transferred to their children as well323

. Thus, most of the young with

lower education and in the working class prefer protests rather than civil society and social

media whereas a few of them under an influence of their parents‘ story during the Khmer

Rouge and their counterpart, the well-educated young in the middle-income class, are more

likely active in campaigns on social media and use it to support protests.

In Cambodia, labour strikes happen very often when compared to demonstrations (Figure

3.13). The demonstrations are tightly controlled by the government in terms of authorization

rather than the notification, the limited number of the participants and specified location

without marching while physical injuries and deadly clashes may sometimes happen, perhaps,

due to violent crackdowns by the authorities. During the protests against the 2013 election

result, the mass demonstrations of the opposition party were subjected to approvals of either

the Minister of Interior or city hall in Phnom Penh, and conditioned with a definite place,

Democracy Square, a defined date and time, and limited participants of no more than 10,

000324

. Unlike demonstrations, labour strikes appear to be less restrictive, for neither

322

Kevin Ponniah, "Political eyes on youth vote," The Phnom Penh Post, July 9, 2013,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/political-eyes-youth-vote . 323

The International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: October 28-November 10,

2013 (IRI: Phnom Penh, 2013), 15. See "IRI Cambodia Survey: Declining Optimism on Country‘s Direction;

Strong Support for Democratic Reforms," The International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 13,

2014, www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20January%2023%20Survey%20of%20Cambodia

%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20October%2028-November%2010%2C%202013.pdf 324

Notification letter No. 1943 dated on December 13, 2013, issued by the Ministry of Interior on the

Notification on the Peaceful Demonstrations on Every Sunday from December 15, 2013 by the CNRP. See

"Legal Documents: Notifications," The Ministry of Interior, accessed February 17, 2014,

www.interior.gov.kh/en/2011-05-10--03-18-12/2011-11-08-04-03-40/980-2013-12-13-09-21-39 . Also, the letter

No.645 dated on September 5, 2013, issued by the city hall Phnom Penh on the Peaceful Demonstrations at the

91

authorization nor notification is required and the strikes are usually, but not always, perceived

as less disposed to violence compared to demonstrations.

Labour strikes are normally used by trade unions to demand the government and factories

provide better paid and better work conditions. Workers participating in these labour strikes

are generally young, yet not every young worker is a member of the trade unions. This means

that some of them have no representatives for their legal interests. According to the Cambodia

Labour Force and Child Labour Survey 2012: Labour Report, 29.1 percent of the total labour

force, or equivalent to 2,153,152, were aged from 15 to 24 years while workers in the industry

and garment sector took up to 37.5 percent of the 319,042 employees who were members of

the trade unions325

. However, the number of union members in the garment sector remains

smaller than the real number of the garment workers standing in between 400,000 and

500,000326

. In other words, more than 25 percent of the reported garment workers nationwide

have no means of protection for their legal interests.

However, freedom to assemble has been recently restricted and labour strikes have changed

from peaceful to violent in nature. During nationwide strikes demanding for minimum wages

of $US 160 per month, the government took coercive measures by using lethal forces on

protesters, leaving at least 4 people died, 1 missing and more than 30 injured327

. Thereafter,

the government issued a decision limiting freedom of assembly by banning gatherings of 10

people or more, leading the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association

(ADHOC) to criticize the government for allowing of ―no space for freedom of assembly‖328

.

During the assessment of the human rights‘ record in Cambodia by the U.N. Human Rights

Council in Geneva, some member states such as Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, the Czech

Republic, the U.K., the U.S. and Germany were among those who asked Cambodia about its

Democracy Square on September 7, 2013 by the CNRP. See "The City Hall Approved the CNRP‘s Request on

the Peaceful Mass Demonstration at the Democracy Square," The City Hall Phnom Penh, accessed February 17,

2014, www.phnompenh.gov.kh/kh/news---4389.html . 325

NIS and ILO, Cambodia Labour Force and Child Labour Survey 2012: Labour Force Report (NIS: Phnom

Penh/ILO: Geneva, November 2013), 52, 89. "Cambodia Labour Force and Child Labour Survey 2012: Labour

Force Report," International Labour Organization, accessed January 19, 2014, http://www.ilo.org/asia/WCMS

_230721/lang--en/index.htm 326

Daniel de Carteret and Hor Kimsay,"Garment workers call in to hotline to ask questions," The Phnom Penh

Post, October 31, 2013, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/garment-workers-call-hotline-ask-questions . 327

"List of the dead and missing men from January 3, 2014 demonstration," The LICADHO, accessed February

17, 2014, www.licadho-cambodia.org/reports/files/190LICADHODoc-BiographyDeaths+Missing-English.pdf 328

"ADHOC Statement: No Space for Freedom of Assembly in ‗Freedom‘ Park," ADHOC, accessed February

17, 2014, www.adhoc-cambodia.org/?p=4299

92

ban on freedom of assembly and the use of lethal force by the government on protesters on

January 3, 2014; they called for a restoration of the freedom to assemble in the kingdom329

.

The fierce crackdowns by the authorities and the ban on the freedom of assembly are unlikely

to prevent renewals of strikes in the country rather more severe forms of collective violence

are the concern. In a letter issued by 18 trade unions and associations on February 13, 2014,

the government and factories were asked to solve the problem of the $US160 minimum wage

with a threat of renewed national strikes330

. Though garment workers have different reactions

to requests for renewed strikes for minimum wages, their increasing aspiration and a belief of

attainment are the main factors making renewed strikes possible. Ms. Pheaktra, a pregnant

garment worker, said that “[As] a worker, you come here from the provinces, and you see

everyone living-off in the city, with their children getting a good education, and you start

saving with some hope...But for me, at best, I might be able just to keep my child in school.‖.

Also, Cheat Sethikar, a supervisor at a shoe factory, strongly believed ―[The] government can

fix this [lowering taxation of import tariffs]‖, so inflation would be reduced and the monthly

minimum wage of $US 130 would be sufficient for the costs of living of the workers331

.

Social Media: Partly-Free and Supplementary Media

Another alternative to the political institutions is social media. Social media refers to a public

space where individuals can create, share and exchange information in the forms of pictures,

images, sounds, symbols and words within virtual communities through a set of internet-

based applications332

. Unlike traditional media and new media, it is initiated by any individual

having access to the internet by making information spontaneously available. The most

important part of its process is feedback or comments, so some scholars call it ―interactive

media‖. All of these underlined functions lead some scholars such as S. Coleman333

and Sonia

Livingstone334

to feel optimistic of social media in making democracy deliver its utmost

329

Lauren Crothers, "Restore Free Assembly, UN Rights Council Says," The Cambodia Daily, January 29, 2014,

www.cambodiadaily.com/news/restore-free-assembly-un-rights-council-says-51097/ 330

Sourng Sopheary, "18 Trade Unions and Associations Asked Workers to Renew Strikes in Any Form," The

Radio France International (Khmer), February 17, 2014, www.khmer.rfi.fr/18-unions-plan-to-have-

demonstration 331

Mech Dara and Alex Willemyns, "Garment Workders See Renewed Appeal in Strike," The Cambodia Daily,

February 17, 2014, www.cambodiadaily.com/news/garment-workers-see-renewed-appeal-in-strike-52327/ 332

Deborah Gambs, "Occupying Social Media," Socialism and Democracy 26:2 (June 2012): 55. 333

S. Coleman, "The new media and democratic politics," New Media and Society 1:1 (1999): 67-73; cited in

Sonia Livingstone, "Interactivity and Participation on the Internet: Young People's Response to the Civic

Sphere," in Young Citizens and New Media, ed. Peter Dahlgren (New York: Routledge, 2007), 104. 334

Sonia Livingstone, "Interactivity and Participation on the Internet: Young People's Response to the Civic

Sphere," in Young Citizens and New Media, ed. Peter Dahlgren (New York: Routledge, 2007), 104.

93

values and persuading young people, who are disengaged from traditional forms of political

participation, to return back to political activity. The most popular types of social media in use

in Cambodia are blogs, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.

There appears to be a loss of trust by Cambodian youth not only with state institutions but

also with traditional media. Only non-censored and interactive media are their preferable

means. A growing popularity of social media may result from an absence of independent

media335

. During the 2013 national election, social media, especially Facebook, provided a

more pluralistic political environment where users shared information and exchanged political

viewpoints, and may have had an impact on youth political behaviours and attitudes336

. While

the ruling party was believed to have the edge in youth campaigns through its dominant

control over classical structures such as traditional media, state institutions, universities and

youth associations, Facebook and informal networks were considered as the ―the biggest

factor‖ mobilizing the support of young voters for the opposition party337

.

Cambodia‘s press freedom was ranked at 143rd338

out of 179 countries in 2013 by Reporters

Without Borders, worse than in 2011-2012 at 117th339

. According to the 2012 COMFREL

report, all 11 television stations and more than 100 radio stations were owned by the

government, senior members of the Cambodian People Party (CPP), allied tycoons and family

members of the government and the CPP; but no more than four radio stations were

considered ―independent‖ of the government340

. In other words, Cambodian people have no

choice regarding their sources of information on television programs while very limited

sources for Khmer-language radio programs run by foreign broadcasters are kept open.

335

Press freedom in Cambodia was classified as "not free" by Freedom House in 2011 and ranked 128th out of

178 countries in 2012 Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, "New Media and the Promotion of Human Rights in

Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: CCHR, July 2012), 6. 336

Soeung Sophat, "Social Media's Growing Influence on Cambodian Politics," Asia Pacific Bulletin 222 (July

23, 2013):2. 337

Kevin Ponniah, "Political eyes on youth vote," The Phnom Penh Post, July 9, 2013,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/political-eyes-youth-vote . 338

"2013 World Press Freedom Index: Dashed Hopes After Spring," The Reporters Without Borders, accessed

February 20, 2014, www.en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html 339

" Press Freedom Index 2011-2012," The Reporters Without Borders, accessed February 20, 2014,

https://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html 340

COMFREL, "Final Assessment and Report on 2012 Commune Council Elections," (Phnom Penh:

COMFREL, October 2012), 30; cited in Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, Repression of Expression: The

state of free speech in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: CCHR, September 2013), 16.

94

The private sector dominated both television and radio broadcasts whereas the government

appeared to concentrate on radio rather than television broadcasting services. The Bayon341

Radio and Television broadcasting services are run by a daughter of the Prime Minister, and

the Cambodian Television Network342

(CTN) is owed by an advisor to the Prime Minister.

The Ministry of Information operates the National TV of Kampuchea (TVK) and the Radio

National of Kampuchea (RNK)343

.

In the domain of television broadcasting, Bayon television‘s coverage accounted for 54.20

percent of the territory in the kingdom in mid-2011, which was followed by CTN at 41.70%

and TVK at 33.35 percent344

(Figure 3-14). By mid-2012, the broadcasting coverage by

Bayon television expanded to 75 percent while the coverage by CTN was reduced by around

4 percent and TVK remained unchanged345

. It was not different for radio stations (Figure 3-

15). Bayon radio had coverage over 62.50 percent of the total territory in mid-2011 whereas

the state-run radio RNK and the private-run radio KCS came in second and third at 58.35

percent and 54.17 percent respectively346

. By mid-2012, Bayon radio expanded its

broadcasting capacity up to 75 percent of the territory while the other two radio stations, the

RNK and the KCS, remained unchanged347

. The real broadcasting capacity of each television

and radio stations may actually cover a larger territory than the prescribed data since some

stations may broadcast services to neighboring provinces.

341

Bayon television and radio broadcasting services belong to Hun Mana, the director general and a daughter of

the Prime Minister Hun Sen. Vong Sokheng, "Prime Minister Hun Sen disowns adopted daughter," The Phnom

Penh Post, November 1, 2007, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/prime-minister-hun-sen-disowns-adopted-

daughter 342

The CTN belongs to Kith Meng, the Chairman and an advisor to the Prime Minister Hun Sen. "Kit Meng:

‗Mr Rough Stuff‘," Cambodia Watch-Australia, July 28, 2011, www.camwatchblogs.blogspot.co.nz/2011/07/kit-

meng-mr-rough-stuff.html 343

"Ministry of Information: National TV of Kampuchea and National Radio of Kampuchea," the Ministry of

Information, accessed February 27, 2014, www.information.gov.kh/english.html . 344

"Statistics of Radio-Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia in the First Semester 2011," The

Ministry of Information, accessed February 20, 2014, www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/

Visuallist2011/ Radio_TV.pdf 345

"Statistics of Radio-Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia by Mid-2012," The Ministry of

Information, accessed February 20, 2014, www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/Visuallist

2011/2012/ Radio_TV2012.pdf . 346

"Statistics of Radio-Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia in the First Semester 2011," The

Ministry of Information, accessed February 20, 2014, www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/

Visuallist2011/ Radio_TV.pdf 347

"Statistics of Radio-Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia by Mid-2012," The Ministry of

Information, accessed February 20, 2014, www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/Visuallist

2011/2012/ Radio_TV2012.pdf .

95

Figure 3-14 Broadcasting Power Shared by the 3 Biggest TV Stations over the 24 City and Province348

Source: Ministry of Information349

Figure 3-15 Broadcasting Power Shared by the 3 Biggest Radio Stations over the 24 City and Provinces350

Source: Ministry of Information351

348

Bayon television broadcasting services expand over 13 city and provinces out of the 24 followed by CTN at

10 and Kampuchea TV at 8. By mid-2012, the coverage of the Bayon TV expanded until 18 city and provinces

while CTN broadcasting coverage was reduced to 9 city and provinces and the TVK remained the same. 349

"Statistics of Radio-Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia in the First Semester 2011," The

Ministry of Information, accessed February 20, 2014,

www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/Visuallist2011/ Radio_TV.pdf ; "Statistics of Radio-

Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia by Mid-2012," The Ministry of Information, accessed

February 20, 2014, www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/Visuallist2011/2012/

Radio_TV2012.pdf . 350

In mid-2011, Bayon radio broadcasting services extend over 15 city and provinces followed by FM National

at 14 and KCS at 13. By mid-2012, Bayon radio broadcast expanded its coverage over 18 city and provinces

while other two radio stations, FM National and KCS, remained unchanged in its capacity of coverage.

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

TV Broadcasting Power by mid-2011 TV Broadcasting Power by mid-2012

Bayon

CTN

TVK

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

Radio Broadcasting Power by mid-2011 Radio Broadcasting Power by mid-2012

Bayon

RNK

KCS

96

Social media seems to supplement rather than to replace the roles of the traditional media

while the latter remains the most common means of getting information in Cambodia. While

the accessibility of the internet remains limited in terms of demographical proportion and

geography, traditional media such as television and radio are still the primary sources of

information and news. Bayon, CTN, TVK and RNK may have greater roles in controlling

information and producing footage of both the government and the ruling party. However,

Cambodian people still have four radio stations that are recognized as "independent352

". The

two most popular foreign-run radio programs broadcast in Khmer, the Voice of America

(Khmer) and Radio Free Asia (Khmer), buy broadcasting time from the above four neutral

radio stations and cover sometimes sensitive issues criticizing the government and threatening

the special interests of ruling party members, which are normally uncovered by almost all of

the other television and radio stations353

.

According to a 2011 survey conducted on 209 university students by the Department of

Media and Communication (DMC), the Royal University of Phnom Penh, television was the

most popular and the most often used means of getting access to information and news. The

survey found that 72 percent of the respondents watched television and 66 percent accessed

the internet ―(almost) every day‖ while only 22 percent listened to radios354

(Figure 3-16).

However, 58.41 percent of the households nationwide in 2008 owned at least a television set,

but only 3.65 percent of the total households owned a personal computer and only 320

internet cafés operated throughout the country355

(Figure 3-17). Yet, 40.81 percent of total

351

"Statistics of Radio-Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia in the First Semester 2011," The

Ministry of Information, accessed February 20, 2014,

www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/Visuallist2011/ Radio_TV.pdf ; "Statistics of Radio-

Television Operating in the Kingdom of Cambodia by Mid-2012," The Ministry of Information, accessed

February 20, 2014, www.information.gov.kh/khmer/visuallist/txt_khmer/Visuallist2011/2012/

Radio_TV2012.pdf . 352

COMFREL, Final Assessment and Report on 2012 Commune Council Elections (Phnom Penh: COMFREL,

October 2012), 30; cited in Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, Repression of Expression: The state of free

speech in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: CCHR, September 2013), 16; "Freedom of the Press 2013: Cambodia," The

Freedom House, accessed February 20, 2014, www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-

press/2013/cambodia#.UwYo-H8aySO . 353

Both Voice of America and Radio Free Asia were recently accused by Cambodia‘s government of being pro-

opposition and backed by the foreign government, specifically inferred the United States, because of their

coverage on sensitive issues, which are normally not covered in state and private television news programs, radio

programs and newspapers. Kevin Ponniah, "RFA, VOA accused of ‗serving‘ opposition," The Phnom Penh Post,

January 30, 2014, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/rfa-voa-accused-percentE2percent80percent98

servingpercentE2percent80percent99-opposition . 354

Peou Chivoin and Chea Lyda, "Lack of Rights-Conscious Citizenship or Civic Identity in Transition? Civic

Engagement and Attitude of University Students," Cambodian Communication Review 2011 (December 2011),

20. See "Publications: Cambodian Communication Review 2011," The Department of Media and

Communication, accessed February 20, 2014, www.dmc-cci.edu.kh/publication-2/ 355

Department of Media & Communication, "Cambodian Media Snapshot 2011," Cambodian Communication

Review 2011 (December 2011), 5-7.

97

households had at least a radio set356

. The findings from this survey show interesting results.

That means that both television and radio remain common means that are used for getting

information and entertainment notwithstanding the audience‘s ages and education where the

internet is a popular and emerging tool used by educated young Cambodians for

communication. However, getting access to information through the internet is constrained by

the limited availability of the internet itself and information technology devices.

Figure 3-16 The (Almost) Everyday Access to TV, Internet and Radio

Source: The 2011 Survey by the DMC357

Figure 3-17 Percentages of Households Possessing TV, Radio and Personal Computer

Source: The 2008 National Census of the NIS cited by the DMC358

356

Ibid, 5. 357

Peou Chivoin and Chea Lyda, "Lack of Rights-Conscious Citizenship or Civic Identity in Transition? Civic

Engagement and Attitude of University Students," Cambodian Communication Review 2011 (December 2011),

20. See "Publications: Cambodian Communication Review 2011," The Department of Media and

Communication, accessed February 20, 2014, www.dmc-cci.edu.kh/publication-2/ 358

Department of Media & Communication, "Cambodian Media Snapshot 2011," Cambodian Communication

Review 2011 (December 2011), 5-7.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

(Almost) Everyday Access

TV

Internet

Radio

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

Possession of Households at Least a

Set in 2008

TV

Radio

Personal Computer

98

Moreover, the internet in the kingdom is not totally free though its growth has caught the

attention of many analysts. According to a recent report by Freedom House, the US-based

watchdog on freedom worldwide, the situation of the internet in Cambodia in 2013 was

classified as ―partly free‖ due to the closing of at least three blogs and some internet cafes359

.

Also, the government‘s censorship on both the content and comments of social media such as

blogs and Facebook are the major concerns, for the website operators sometimes are subjected

to blocks while bloggers and internet users may be charged with criminal and civil offenses

alike.

Mostly oversea blogs are carefully censored by the government. ―Reahu‖ is a blog created by

a Khmer-American artist. In 2009, access to ―reahu.org‖ was blocked under an order made by

the Minister of Post and Telecommunication after a post of bare-breasted Apsara (angels

scripted on Angkor and other temple walls) was criticized and allegedly accused by the

Ministry of Women‘s Affairs and the public of undermining Khmer culture and morality360

.

―KI-Media‖ is an anti-government blog, especially against the ruling party and the

Cambodian-Vietnamese friendship. In early 2011, while KI-Media was blocked and the

government denied its involvement361

, some senior government officials were cited in regard

to the government‘s attempts to close this website362

.

Sharing information and comments on the social media sometimes makes internet users fear

of incitement and defamation charges. Both civil and criminal offenses are possible in

Cambodia though the cyber-law draft is still in process. In December 2010, soon after his

distribution of anti-government information by KI-Media to his colleagues, Seng Kunnaka, a

security guard employed by the United Nations World Food Programme, was charged with

359

Sok Khemara, "Cambodia‘s Internet Only ‗Partly Free‘, US Watchdog Says," The Voice of America

(English), October 16, 2013, www.voacambodia.com/content/cambodia-internet-only-partly-free-us-watchdog-

says/1770244.html . 360

Brendan Brady, "Government moves raise censorship fears," The Phnom Penh Post, March 3, 2009,

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/govt-moves-raise-censorship-fears 361

Summer Walker, "ISP denies blocking blog site," The Phnom Penh Post, January 20, 2011,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/isp-denies-blocking-blog-site . 362

During the meeting with ISP, the speech of the Minister of Post and Telecommunication, So Khun, in the

minutes was cited and reported for having requested ISP such as Oneline, Wicam, Metfone and Ezecom for

cooperation and reports with the ministry. The government‘s attempts to block this webpage was not new but

dated back to the late 2010. In a conversation dated on December 16, 2010, the Radio Free Asia was told by H.E.

Var Kim Hong, the Chairman of Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Border Commission,that ―the government would shut

down KI-Media by December 31st, 2010‖. Thomas Miller, "Ministry denies blocking website," The Phnom

Penh Post, February 15, 2011, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/ministry-denies-blocking-website ;

"LICADHO Condemns Censorship of Web Sites Critical of Government," The LICADHO, accessed February

21, 2014, www.licadho-cambodia.org/pressrelease.php?perm=238 .

99

incitement and imprisoned for 6 months363

. Very recently, in early February 2014, Ms.

Dourng Zorida, a famous actress and an anchor, was put on trial before the municipal court of

Phnom Penh after she made a comment on her Facebook account, and was ordered to pay Ms.

Tan Theara in compensation364

. These above examples show clearly that both criminal and

civil charges are made if grounds for offenses are justified.

In short, recent confrontations and collective violence between the government and its young

population appear very likely to have a close relationship with the very narrow public space

for exercising freedom and liberty in seeking a more egalitarian society. Land dispute

protests, election irregularity demonstrations and a growing activism of youth on social media

threaten a stability of the political community and sometimes lead to severe forms of

collective violence. These social phenomena show Cambodian youth have very few

alternatives to the state institutions for challenging and changing the national policy despite

being the majority group of the population. Therefore, this very limited public space makes

the bad situations of the state institutions‘ failure in representing the public interest worse and,

in turn, leaves more room for either generational confrontations or collective violence. Thus,

regular and persistent platforms for youth involvement in decision making processes are

better built by the civil society organizations including trade unions and youth non-

governmental organizations for bridging the gaps between them and the state institutions such

as the parliament and the government. Also, more free space is needed for improvement of

both traditional media and social media whereby conciliation between state norms and social

norms can interact and challenge reciprocally for effective national policy.

SUMMARY

Having analyzed the data for each of the three hypotheses, it was found that most of the

results supported the hypothesis statements though very few of the results were not really

convincing the third hypothesis. The first hypothesis that a dramatic shift in young

Cambodians demographics from the minority to the majority group of the total population

leads to necessary changes in structures of political institutions is very likely to be

convincible. This research found that there is a positive correlation between compositions of

the legislative organs and a failure of the state institutions to represent the interest of the

363

Summer Walker, "ISP denies blocking blog site," The Phnom Penh Post, January 20, 2011,

www.phnompenhpost.com/national/isp-denies-blocking-blog-site . 364

Neary Khmer, "Trial on Actress Dourng Zorida for Public Defamation," The Free Press Magazine and Radio,

February 1, 2014, http://www.fpmonline.net/article/50737

100

majority, young Cambodians. From this result, it was found that the old political leaders, who

represent a minority group of the old population, mainly focus on their personal and familial

enrichment at the expense of others, especially youth, and sometimes are unable to implement

their roles as representatives of the interest of the majority due to their conflict of interests.

Consequently, changes in the structures of the National Assembly and the Senate become

necessary to build the public trust on the state institutions.

The second hypothesis that young Cambodians are more likely to participate in politics and

more capable of mobilizing old people including their parents and peers for political

engagement due to their better education was found to be conclusive. The data shown there

were a clear cut of the generational gaps in terms of education, emphasizing a variable of

differently shared societal experiences and, in turn, making a possibility of the political

participation very likely not only for themselves but also their parents, friends and other

people. It is concluded with closely positive relations among the higher levels of education,

the growing number of literacy and an increasing political engagement of Cambodian youth.

Finally, the results from testing the hypothesis that a confrontation between the government

and Cambodian youth is reduced, and a severe form of collective violence can be avoided if

they are provided an alternative to the formal structures for getting involved in decision

making processes were partly unclear but decisive. The Findings affirmed closely positive

relations between recent social disability and collective violence, and a very limited public

space though further more data on the majority of the NGOs working with youth was

necessary for more convincing results. However, the presented data was just enough to

convince the correctness of the proposed hypothesis.

During the analyses of the three hypotheses along with the proposed theoretical frameworks

that set the bases for this research, several issues arose from the findings. Though the

proposed theoretical frameworks generally worked well with the case of emerging young

demographics in Cambodia, Gellner‘s theory on severe forms of collective violence appeared

to not suit well whereas a gap in Barakat‘s case study was filled in by the findings of this

research. Severe forms of the collective violence may happen in cases of either discriminatory

treatment of a particular group by the state institutions or a prolonged economic disparity of

any neglected majority social grouping and very narrow means for the majority social

grouping to improve their more egalitarian status in the society. Also, higher levels of

education and the higher number of literacy of the Cambodian youth are the convincing

101

variables for a growing political participation in both formal and informal political structures

in the Kingdom. This finding fills in the Barakat‘s survey on the fact that young pupils of

better education has roles in transmitting their political behaviours and attitudes to not only

their parents but also their friends.

102

CHAPTER 4 - CONCLUSION

This Thesis is set out to establish whether an emerging of youth class as the majority group of

the total population would lead to an expansion of the liberal democracy in Cambodia, to

measure what consequences of their emergence and to find out what mechanisms can be used

to ensure both participatory democracy and an increasingly egalitarian society without

harming the stability of the country. From the analyses of the proposed theories in the

provided context, the conclusion that dramatic shifts in young Cambodian demographics from

the minority to the majority of the population necessitate the reorganization of the state

institutions such as the National Assembly and the Senate, Cambodian youth of better

education are more likely to participate in politics and more capable of mobilizing others for

political engagement, and an alternative to the state institutions in case of the loss of trust by

the public is necessary to reduce the generational confrontation and to avoid severe forms of

collective violence, is generally supported and justified. However, some theories by Anderson

and Mannheim cannot separately be applied in practice due to its imperfection while others by

Huntington, Barakat and Gellner likely respond to the problems partly.

A transformation of Cambodia from a country of old population to that of the young

population certainly has impacts on the organization of the state institutions, which is

adaptable with the former majority group, the then old generation. Cambodia has already

become a country of the young population since 2008 when Cambodians under 35 years old

made up around 70 percent of the total population but only the year 2013 shown a change in

the political landscape of the liberal democracy in the kingdom. This may be explained by an

emergence of Cambodian youth as not only the majority group of the population but also a

dominant group of the total voters in the 2013 election. Generational gaps and differences in

ideologies between elderly political leaders and Cambodian youth were the two main reasons

explaining why the CPP lost its popularity among young voters while the CNRP got big gains

from them. Also, these young voters unlikely owned their deference to the CPP because of its

revolutionary legend but rather its current performance, especially a fair and widespread

distribution of social revenues. During the third and fifth mandates, most of the CPP members

in both the National Assembly and the Senate were at their late 50s and over while the

opposition parties, the SRP and the CNRP, were in a contradictory trend. Therefore, the

political agendas of the opposition parties such as employment and minimum wages directly

addressed the problems of the young voters whereas the ruling party laid down the national

policy such as road constructions, school building and state reforms that unlikely responded to

103

immediate concerns of young voters, on one hand, and, on the other hand, were uneasily

noticed.

Cambodian youth emerge as the young generation of new education. Thus, unlike their

parents, these young people are more likely to engage in politics, for their better

understanding of prime causes of hardship and social issues. They are not only never exposed

to civil wars like their parents and unlikely to be influenced by their parents due to their

higher levels of education. Rejuvenation and standardization of the national education system

in the post-Khmer Rouge regime, especially in 1996, put a clear cut between the pre- and the

post-Khmer Rouge generations. Yet, political behaviours and attitudes of both parents and

friends of lower education may be inspired by Cambodian youth of higher education through

either face-to-face or internet-based networks. These factors likely had a close relationship

with a growing youth activism in the pre- and the post-national election in 2013 with support

of elderly people. In the aftermath of the 2013 election result, streets in the capital city,

Phnom Pen, were full of Cambodian youth while Facebook was loaded with a plenty of

pictures, videos and caption by young netizens.

However, though a growing youth activism may reinforce a picture of the liberal democracy,

it does not automatically lead to a just and stable society. The year 2012 was recorded as the

worst year of human rights violation including land rights and worker rights since the number

of land disputes was multiplied and the number of labour strikes skyrocketed. Also, in 2013,

protests increased in number and scales of participants. Most importantly, natures of protests

changed from peaceful to violent, leaving more than hundreds died and injured. Until now,

situations of confrontations between the government of the elderly political cadres and young

protesters remain tense, and are still prone to severe forms of collective violence. By

analyzing the past events in accordance with the proposed theories, integration of Cambodian

youth into the state institutions such as the National Assembly and the Senate, and a provision

of more public space through regular and persistent platforms of civil society, social media

and protests are very potential solutions for contemporary problems in Cambodia, for both

traditional structures of the state institutions are dominated by the elderly political cadres, and

the public space is left with a very narrow room for an exercise of liberty and freedom by

youth to work out their demands with the government. Unless an alternative is provided, their

loss of trust in the state institutions leads to a swap of their means of demands from the state

institutions to the public space such as protests, so there is still more room for both

104

generational confrontations and collective violence, eventually threatening the stability of the

country.

Moreover, the proposed theories that are used to build theoretical frameworks of the research

generally respond well to the real issues. Yet, some theories would not perfectly suit the

problems if it was applied separately. First, theories proposed by both Anderson365

and

Mannheim366

appear to be supplementary to each other rather exclusively right in a case of

Cambodian youth. If Cambodian youth were defined in accordance to Anderson‘s claim, then

they would be young Cambodians who are aged from 15 to 24 years old. Cambodian young

voters in this age rank were the least likely group to vote in the 2013 election when compared

to older voters in their late 20s and their 30s due to their studies and work, their disinterest

and a lack of documents367

. Thus, the theory of the generational unit by Mannheim perfectly

added Anderson‘s, so the Cambodian youth of the 15-34-years group made a turning point of

the political landscape in 2013.

Second, Hungtinton368

‘s argument mainly focuses on generational confrontation within

leadership of the state institutions while Barakat369

limited a scope of his study only to the

transmission of the political behaviours and attitudes by the parents of higher education to

their children. Yet, in Cambodia‘s case, this generational confrontation also exists between

the elderly political leaders, who exclusively dominate both the state institutions and so

control the public space, and their young people. Also, Cambodian youth have higher levels

of education, and most of them are literate, so it appears likely that they have an influence

over political behaviours and attitudes on not only their parents but also their friends.

Third, Gellner370

attributes severe forms of collective violence to a discriminatory treatment

of the state institutions. Yet, his argument appears only address the case of Tunisia but not

Egypt. Though Egyptian youth were not seriously ignored like Tunisian youth, they made up

most of the total population at the time, and their marginalization happened for decades with

365

Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 3. 366

Mannheim, 288-290; cited in Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic

Failure," 15. 367

The International Republican Institute, Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion: January 12-February 2, 2013

(IRI: Phnom Penh, 2013), 23, 25. See "IRI Cambodia Survey Finds High Interest in National Elections," The

International Republican Institute (IRI), accessed February 13, 2014, www.iri.org/news-events-press-

center/news/iri-cambodia-survey-finds-high-interest-national-elections 368

Huntington, 14-15. 369

Barakat, 215. 370

Gellner, 109.

105

the fragile economy of Egypt371

. Even worse, Egyptian youth were silent by oppressive

measures of the government, making their discontents passive. These two examples show

clearly Gellner‘s theory only partly solves the problems. Thus, it can be learnt that, thought

Cambodian youth have never been seriously neglected, their prolonged passive discontents

and the absence of an alternative to the state institutions still provide room for severe forms of

collective violence such as recent deadly clashes between the authority and the labour strikers.

This research is expected to produce outcomes having impacts on behaviours and attitudes of

the government, civil society and youth. The topic of the thesis itself is new, in the sense that

there is not any scientific study using a measurement of the proposed theoretical frameworks

and the fact. It provides a clear picture of how youth generation may likely have impacts on

Cambodia‘s democracy through the public space, especially protests and social media, and, in

turn, may push their integration into the state institutions. The result of these findings helps all

social stakeholders to see Cambodia‘s contemporary problems from a dimension of youth

rather than a very limited dimension such as gender. Indeed, gender issues should be looked

from a dimension of youth‘s issues rather than only a quota of women integration into the

state institutions. Given that most women who interest in becoming civil servants are old and

illiterate whereas most young women prefer to work in a private sector for better income, then

the policy on women quota in the state administration agreed by the government and the non-

governmental organizations does not work and solve the real problems of inequality.

Demands for women in leadership positions may not meet the real supplies, on one hand, and

on the other hand, problems of generational gaps do still exist even among women

themselves.

Also, potential solutions are suggested in response to the problems of generational gaps and

its relations with recent confrontations between the government of the elderly political leaders

and their young citizens. The solutions are based on theoretical analyses in parallel with a

growing youth activism in the country, which already led to serious collective violence. As

potential mechanisms, youth integration into the National Assembly and the Senate, and a

provision of more public space as an alternative to the state institutions, given that these

young people lost their trust, may help the national policy of the government work effectively

for the benefits of this new majority class, reduce generational confrontations to minimum

and avoid severe forms of collective violence. Regarding the Senate, this legislative body

371

Nevens 45; Murphy, "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systematic Failure," 9;

Sullivan, 317.

106

better changes its functions as a real Upper House of Parliament rather than a consultation

body if the ages of its members are kept for 40 years old and older.

For the public space, social media such as Facebook, blog, Twitter and YouTube may provide

an alternative to the state institutions and other forms of the public space through its regular

and persistent platforms since young Cambodians likely loss their trust in the institutions, and

freedom of assembly, association and press is carefully censored. Take China as an example,

whereby there is a very strong censorship on the public space and no direct representative

democracy. Yet, due to social media, matters of corruption372

and sex scandals373

challenge

the regime and some senior party members alike. This new form of media probably provides

an effective alternative for young netizens to challenge and changes not only the state norms

but also behaviours and attitude of bureaucrats. However, the initiatives of the non-

governmental organizations are indispensable in giving regular and persistent platforms for

these young citizens to get involved in the decision making processes such as citizen

journalism trainings, blogs or websites where young Cambodians can either share information

or complaint about a failure of the national policy and the government‘s performance and

networks of civil society organizations working in the same field for having a greater

bargaining power with the government.

Though findings of this research generally show fruitful inputs into work and policy of the

government and non-governmental organizations, many constrains may have impacts on the

consistent result of these findings and so prevent the paper from producing its full result.

Firstly, the thesis‘s findings base on the already-set frameworks and a quantitative method.

That means the result of the findings may be predictable and set in advance, so it sometimes

may not perfectly respond to the problems yet. As this topic is new, further research may

build on these three hypotheses but need to use a qualitative method to find out opinions and

feeling of Cambodian youth, their parents and elderly political leaders of both the ruling and

opposition parties. The qualitative method may be used as a reference either to reset the

theoretical framework of research or to support the theoretical frameworks and hypotheses.

Secondly, during the research, other research questions such as the integration of Cambodian

youth at the local level and initiators of the recent collective violence came up, so the

372

David Wertime, "Party Foul," The Foreign Policy, January 9, 2014, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014

/01/09/party_foul_chinas_corruption_crackdown_survey 373

Liz Carter, "Not Safe for (Government) Work," The Foreign Policy, January 17, 2014, www.foreignpolicy.

com/articles/2014/01/17/not_safe_for_government_work_chinese_naked_officials

107

following researchers may consider these issues as well. Unlike the National Assembly and

the Senate, the Commune Council had a gradual increase of young councilors between its

second and third mandates. The number of young councilors stood at 1.43 percent in 2007374

and significantly went up to approximately 5 percent in 2012375

. It seems like the government

prefers youth integration into the local administration through its policy of decentralization376

and deconcentration377

than the national administration. Also, both quantitative and qualitative

methods may be useful to find out who normally initiate collective violence, especially in

recent deadly clashes between the authority and protesters, and what circumstances result in

an outbreak of the violence. Answers to these questions lead to better understanding whether

youth integration into the state institutions at both the national and local levels helps reduce

generational confrontations and whether more public space as an alternative platform beside s

the state institutions can prevent the future collective violence.

If the combined methodologies were used and primary data was collected for analyses, the

research would have produced more convincible and persistent findings. Thus, it could

provide effective inputs into the national policy for the development and the political stability

of the country. Therefore, this new social phenomenon demands for more research

immediately since the current problems remain manageable.

374

COMFREL, "Participation of Youth in Elections," Neak Kloam Meul 73 (July 2007): 2. 375

COMFREL, Summary Findings on Commune Council Election 2012 (Phnom Penh, July 2012), 9. 376

In 2001, the National Assembly adopted the Law on Commune Council Election, which was promulgated by

the Royal Decree (Kram) No. NS/RKM/0301/04 dated on March 19, 2001. See "Legal Documents: Law on

Commune/Sangkat Council Election," The National Election Committee, accessed March 3, 2014,

http://necelect.org.kh/nec_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=186&Itemid=208 377

In 2008, the National Assembly adopted the Law on the Elections of the Capital, Provincial, Municipal and

District Councils, which was promulgated by the Royal Decree (Kram) No. NS/RKM/0508/018 dated on May

24, 2008. See "Legal Documents: Law on the Election of Capital/Provincial, Municipal/District/Khan Councils,"

The National Election Committee, accessed March 3, 2014, http://necelect.org.kh/nec_english/index.php?option

=com_content&view=article&id=186&Itemid=208

108

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