FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM CALLING A STATE A STATE: SOMALILAND AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION INTRODUCTION The Republic of Somaliland declared its independence in 1991, 1 presenting the international community with the question of whether to recognize it as a state. Since then, the nations of the world have consistently answered that question in the negative. 2 Yet, the Republic of Somaliland has survived to become a relatively stable and democratic state. 3 Its endurance continually renews the question of recognition for Somaliland. Today, that question’s answer must be in the affirmative: Somaliland meets the objective criteria of statehood and its separation from Somalia represents the dissolution of a state in conformity with international norms. Moreover, the international community’s refusal to recognize Somaliland threatens the survival of that state, and the modicum of stability and international security it represents—a commodity that the international community cannot afford to treat cheaply in the Horn of Africa. While transitional entity after transitional entity has failed to take hold in rump Somalia, 4 threats to international security have festered in its ungoverned space. For example, pirates based in rump Somalia have so proliferated 5 that, 1 Ian Fisher, An Oasis of Peace in Somalia Seeks Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at A1. 2 Somaliland declared its independence nearly twenty years ago on May 18, 1991. Id. It has not been recognized by any other state. Background Note: Somalia, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.state. gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm#%201/10. In stark contrast, Eritrea was rapidly recognized by many states and admitted into the United Nations after its declaration of independence on May 24, 1993. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. Likewise, though not immediately recognized, Croatia and Slovenia were recognized by other states and admitted into the United Nations just two years after declaring independence. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 3 Since 2000, Somaliland has held a national referendum on independence and a constitution, one parliamentary election, and two presidential elections. See infra text accompanying notes 98–107. 4 The portion of a state left after partition or secession is referred to as the rump state. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1987 (3d ed. 1993) (definition listing c). In this case, rump Somalia refers to the portion of Somalia excluding Somaliland. 5 According to the International Maritime Bureau, Somalia-based pirates were responsible for 20 attacks in 2006, 44 attacks in 2007, 111 attacks in 2008, and 218 attacks in 2009. Int’l Mar. Bureau, Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report, at 5–6 (Jan. 2009); Mark McDonald, For Somali Pirates, 2009 Is a Record Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A9.
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
CALLING A STATE A STATE: SOMALILAND AND
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Somaliland declared its independence in 1991,1 presenting
the international community with the question of whether to recognize it as a
state. Since then, the nations of the world have consistently answered that
question in the negative.2 Yet, the Republic of Somaliland has survived to
become a relatively stable and democratic state.3 Its endurance continually
renews the question of recognition for Somaliland. Today, that question’s
answer must be in the affirmative: Somaliland meets the objective criteria of
statehood and its separation from Somalia represents the dissolution of a state
in conformity with international norms. Moreover, the international
community’s refusal to recognize Somaliland threatens the survival of that
state, and the modicum of stability and international security it represents—a
commodity that the international community cannot afford to treat cheaply in
the Horn of Africa.
While transitional entity after transitional entity has failed to take hold in
rump Somalia,4 threats to international security have festered in its ungoverned
space. For example, pirates based in rump Somalia have so proliferated5 that,
1 Ian Fisher, An Oasis of Peace in Somalia Seeks Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at A1.
2 Somaliland declared its independence nearly twenty years ago on May 18, 1991. Id. It has not been
recognized by any other state. Background Note: Somalia, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm#%201/10. In stark contrast, Eritrea was rapidly recognized by many states and
admitted into the United Nations after its declaration of independence on May 24, 1993. See infra note 198 and
accompanying text. Likewise, though not immediately recognized, Croatia and Slovenia were recognized by
other states and admitted into the United Nations just two years after declaring independence. See infra note
207 and accompanying text.
3 Since 2000, Somaliland has held a national referendum on independence and a constitution, one
parliamentary election, and two presidential elections. See infra text accompanying notes 98–107.
4 The portion of a state left after partition or secession is referred to as the rump state. See WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1987 (3d ed. 1993) (definition listing c). In this case, rump Somalia
refers to the portion of Somalia excluding Somaliland.
5 According to the International Maritime Bureau, Somalia-based pirates were responsible for 20 attacks
in 2006, 44 attacks in 2007, 111 attacks in 2008, and 218 attacks in 2009. Int’l Mar. Bureau, Int’l Chamber of
Commerce, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report, at 5–6 (Jan. 2009); Mark McDonald, For Somali
Pirates, 2009 Is a Record Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A9.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
778 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
in 2002, a multinational naval task force began patrolling the Gulf of Aden.6
Despite this international effort, pirates continue to attack ships and take
hostages. In 2008, there were 111 attacks by Somali pirates.7 In 2009, pirates
based in Somalia were responsible for 218 attacks.8 One ship, the Maersk
Alabama, was attacked and hijacked in April 2009. It was freed later that
month—only to be attacked again in November 2009.9 Pirates are not the only
security threat in rump Somalia, however.
In 2006, Osama bin Laden declared his intent to make the Horn of Africa
the next front in al-Qaeda’s global jihad.10
The al-Qaeda-affiliated group al-
Shabaab now controls south and central Somalia, including most of
Mogadishu.11
On July 11, 2010, al-Shabaab launched its first transnational
terror operation: two suicide bombers killed seventy-six people in Kampala,
Uganda.12
In Somaliland, though, pirates and suspected terrorists do not find
106 William Wallis, Election Victor Takes Power in Somaliland, FIN. TIMES (July 27, 2010, 4:40 PM),
http://www.ft.com.
107 Id.
108 Democratisation and its Discontents, supra note 35, at 6.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
788 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
conflicts without resorting to internal armed conflict.109
In 2003, the
International Crisis Group reported that the government of Somaliland could
boast “basic civil administration across roughly eighty per cent of the
territory.”110
The UN High Commission for Refugees described Somaliland’s
central administration as
maintain[ing] functional control over the national army; the police force and courts maintain public order; customs officials collect taxes at the port; the two houses of the legislature convene and debate bills; and at least some of the ministries are making serious attempts to play a constructive role in their assigned sector.
111
The government of Somaliland also issues currency and passports.112
In stark contrast to Somalia, Somaliland’s central government proactively
confronts both transnational terrorism and piracy. In 2005, Somaliland
interdicted an al-Qaeda cell trying to establish itself in Hargeisa.113
Following
an investigation, the government of Somaliland tried members of that cell:
In December 2006, a major trial ended in Somaliland in which 15 suspects were charged (six in absentia) with conspiracy to commit terror, illegal importation of arms and explosives and the wounding of three policemen in September/October 2005. Most of the suspects were convicted and sentenced to 20 - 25 years in prison. . . .
Surprisingly, both Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Aden Hashi Farah “Ayrow,” an Afghanistan veteran and military commander of al-Shabaab, were acquitted due to a lack of evidence.
114
The government of Somaliland has also embarked on an anti-piracy campaign,
establishing a small coast guard and arresting pirates caught in its waters.115
As part of a concerted effort to garner recognition, Somaliland has
cultivated international relationships, including an agreement with Ethiopia,
109 Id.
110 Id. at 7.
111 KENNETH MENKHAUS, SOMALIA: A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS AND TREND ASSESSMENT 25 (2003),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3f7c235f4.pdf.
112 See Somalia Country Specific Information, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV (Jan. 19, 2010), http://travel.state.gov/
travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1023.html.
113 Trying to Behave Like a Proper State: Breakaway Somaliland Has Impressed the Americans by Hitting
al-Qaeda, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/4466050 [hereinafter Trying to
Behave Like a Proper State].
114 McGregor, supra note 14, at 7, 8.
115 See Sanders, supra note 13.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 789
granting Ethiopia overland access to Somaliland’s port of Berbera.116
That
agreement also formalized trade relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia,
and included an agreement to establish customs offices along Somaliland’s
border with Ethiopia.117
Somaliland has opened liaison offices in Ethiopia,
Djibouti, the United States, and the United Kingdom.118
It has hosted
delegations from states like Pakistan, and from international organizations like
the World Bank and the African Union.119
In 2005, Somaliland submitted its
application for membership to the AU.120
Though the AU has yet to act on
Somaliland’s application for membership, a 2005 AU fact-finding mission
reported favorably on Somaliland, recommending that the AU “find a special
method for dealing with” Somaliland and urging that recognizing Somaliland’s
independence “not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a [P]andora’s box.’”121
Yet, the AU has not found a special method for dealing with Somaliland,
and no other state or non-governmental organization has recognized its
independence. To understand whether Somaliland should be recognized as an
independent state, the legal issues that concern secession must be examined.
II. LEGAL ISSUES GOVERNING SECESSION
Secession, when successful, results in the emergence of a new state
recognized by the international community.122
The legal issues implicated by
the creation of a state through its separation from a preexisting state are
statehood, recognition, secession, and uti possidetis.
116 Trying to Behave Like a Proper State, supra note 113.
117 Dilemma of the Horn: The West Pushes for Somaliland Recognition, 34 DEF. & FOREIGN AFF.
STRATEGIC POL’Y 7 (2006).
118 See, e.g., Hassan Ali, Ethiopia Appoints New Representative to Somaliland, Upgrades Its Office,
[hereinafter Badinter Opinion 1]. See generally Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration
Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 178 (1992).
128 Gerhard Erasmus, Criteria for Determining Statehood: John Dugard’s Recognition and the United
Nations, 4 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 207, 215 (1988). In fact, Crawford considers the capacity to enter into
international relations to be a conflation of the governance and independence criteria. CRAWFORD, supra note
123, at 47–48. Crawford likewise considers effectiveness to embrace both governance and territory—that is,
that a state has territory by exerting government control over it, thereby being effective. Id. at 42. Finally,
Crawford writes:
It is clear that “government” and “independence” are closely related criteria—in fact they may be
regarded as different aspects of the requirement of effective separate control . . . . [G]overnment
is treated as the exercise of authority with respect to persons and property within the territory
claimed; whereas independence is treated as the exercise . . . [of] authority with respect to other
international persons.
Id. at 42 n.54.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 791
and whether its government exerts control over its territory.129
Entities that
have not been in fact independent or entities that do not exercise effective
control over the territory that purportedly constitutes the state have been denied
statehood. For example, the League of Nations refused to recognize
Manchukuo, the entity that the Empire of Japan established in Manchuria after
Japan’s 1931 invasion, because it was a puppet of Japan and not formed
through “a genuine and spontaneous independence movement.”130
On the other hand, failure to satisfy the Montevideo Convention criteria
does not conclusively prevent an entity from achieving statehood. The process
of decolonization in Africa resulted in the emergence of several entities
recognized as states despite their failure to satisfy one or more of the
Montevideo criteria.131
The former Belgian colony, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, provides the best example of a state emerging from colonial
dominion that substantially failed to meet one or more of the Montevideo
criteria.132
For example, at independence, the Congo did not possess an
effective government.133
Instead, the UN and the state’s former colonial power
propped up the new state.134
Despite its inability to govern itself and thus its
failure to satisfy one of the four Montevideo criteria of statehood, the Congo’s
“application for United Nations membership was approved without dissent.”135
Thus, while the statehood criteria, especially the governance and
independence criteria, suggest that effectiveness is the primary determinant of
statehood, effectiveness is not conclusively determinative.136
It is possible that
an ineffective putative state will receive international recognition.137
Moreover,
even effectiveness operates only as a predicate for the creation of a new state.
A putative state must additionally conform to existing international norms of
state creation.138
In the case of a state created by its separation from a prior
existing state, this means that the putative state’s separation must conform to
129 Georges Abi-Saab, Conclusions, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 475 (Marcelo G.
Kohen ed., 2006) (“[For an effective state to exist,] the population and territory must be well-defined and ruled
(or controlled) by a sovereign government that depends on no other.”).
130 Report of Lytton Commission of Enquiry, League of Nations Doc. C.663M.320 1932 VII, at 97 (1932).
131 See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 123, at 42–44.
132 See id. at 42–44.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 44.
135 Id. at 43.
136 Id. at 43–44.
137 See id. at 43.
138 See id. at 42.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
792 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
state practice regarding secession or dissolution, including the principle of uti
possidetis.
B. Recognition
Much of the literature dedicated to the question of statehood focuses on the
legal effect of recognition.139
Traditionally, there are two schools of thought
regarding the legal impact of recognition on a putative state.140
The
constitutive school holds that recognition is a fundamental criterion of
statehood—that an entity only becomes a state once it has been recognized.141
The declaratory school, on the other hand, holds that recognition has no legal
effect; recognition merely announces what is already fact—that the entity in
question is a state.142
However, there is another view—one that regards the traditional
constitutive-declaratory dichotomy as overly simplistic.143
The question from
this perspective is not when a state is a state, but rather to whom is a state a
state. That is, a state may be a state internally but not externally:
Though political communities . . . can without recognition continue to operate as states within the four walls of their domestic (territorial) enclave, they cannot enter into relations with any other state unless that other state expressly, or by putting up with such relations, impliedly recognize[s] that political community as a subject of international law.
144
A state may also be a state vis-à-vis one state but not the international
community generally, as is the case with the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus.145
In some sense, this view treads a middle ground between the
constitutive-declaratory dichotomy.
Regardless of whether a state is a state with international personality absent
recognition, unrecognized states suffer a disability in the modern international
system:
139 See, e.g., JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1987); GRANT, supra note 123; H.
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1948).
140 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 139, at 38–42.
141 Id. at 38–41.
142 Id. at 41–42.
143 See Johan D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 9, 10 (1991).
144 Id. at 99.
145 Id.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 793
[R]ecognition is more than a mere formality in the contemporary international system. Its denial places real constraints on the capacity to function as a modern state, both domestically and internationally. The government has no access to international financial institutions or direct bilateral assistance; trade . . . is handicapped by the lack of recognised regulatory controls; foreign investors—among them banks and insurance companies—are reluctant to invest in a territory that is still legally part of a failed State and a designated war zone.
146
It is little wonder, then, that “virtually every community lacking recognition”
between 1415 CE and 1987 CE lost its independence.147
Moreover, recognition
is particularly important to secessionist entities.148
Recognition has been the
primary pursuit of states newly created through secession.149
Failure to gain
widespread recognition has consigned many secessionist entities—including
both Katanga and Biafra—to failure.150
More than sixty years ago, Lauterpacht argued that recognition is of such
import to states and the international system that there is a legal duty
incumbent upon existing states to recognize qualifying entities:151
[E]xisting States are under the duty to grant recognition. In the absence of an international organ competent to ascertain and authoritatively to declare the presence of the requirements of full international personality, States already established fulfil that function in their capacity as organs of international law. In thus acting they administer the law of nations. This legal rule signifies that in granting or withholding recognition States do not claim and are not entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national policy and convenience regardless of the principles of international law in the matter.
152
Despite the impact that recognition or non-recognition has on a state,
Lauterpacht’s view has not taken hold and recognition remains a political act at
the discretion of existing states: “Third-party states normally do not pronounce
146 Time for A.U. Leadership, supra note 51, at 12.
147 GRANT, supra note 123, at 27 (quoting David Strang, Anomaly and Commonplace in European
Political Expansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts, 45 INT’L ORG. 143, 154–58 (1991)).
148 Radan, supra note 48, at 20; CRAWFORD, supra note 123, at 252.
149 Radan, supra note 48, at 20.
150 Id.
151 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 139, at 6.
152 Id.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
794 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
on the issue [of recognition] until they perceive it in their national interest to
do so, and then their pronouncements are colored by that interest.”153
Nauru recently exemplified the political nature of state recognition. Nauru
is a small, impoverished, island state in the Pacific Ocean.154
On December 15,
2009, Nauru became the fourth state to recognize the independence of
Abkhazia, a breakaway province of the Republic of Georgia.155
Nauru, which
had its national airline’s only Boeing 737 repossessed in 2005,156
received $50
million in aid from Russia in exchange for recognizing Abkhazia.157
Nauru is
an extreme example, but it should not be surprising that states decide to extend
recognition to new states based on considerations of their own interests. The
Cold War is rife with examples of states being recognized by the NATO bloc
only to be denied recognition by the Warsaw Pact countries, or vice versa.158
Even today, the mostly East-West divide over whether to recognize Kosovo as
an independent state is mirrored in the conflict over recognition for
Abkhazia—a principled approach to recognition would likely dictate the same
treatment for both territories.159
More recently, some scholars have argued that existing states have a duty
of non-recognition.160
The duty of non-recognition obliges existing states not
to extend recognition to putative states whose creation violated a peremptory
norm of international law.161
Under this regime, recognition of a would-be
state created in violation of the prohibition on aggression, the prohibition on
the acquisition of territory by means of force, the prohibition of systematic
racial discrimination or suppression of human rights, or the prohibition of the
153 Erasmus, supra note 128, at 216–17; Alfred P. Rubin, Secession and Self-Determination: A Legal,
Moral, and Political Analysis, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 261 (2000).
154 Ellen Barry, Nauru, a Pacific Island Nation, Establishes Relations with Faraway Abkhazia, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A8.
155 Id.
156 Cameron Stewart, Nauru Begs US for Plane, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 20, 2005.
157 Barry, supra note 154.
158 For example, the United States recognized Taiwan as a state until 1979. Gerrit van der Wees, Taiwan
Is as Much a Nation-State as the US, TAIPEI TIMES (June 18, 2007), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
editorials/archives/2007/06/18/2003365794/2.
159 Kosovo has already been recognized by sixty-five states, including the United States. See Nicholas
Kulish & C.J. Chivers, U.S. and Much of Europe Recognize Kosovo, Which Also Draws Expected Rejection,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at A10.
160 See, e.g., JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 99–100 (Lucienne
Walters ed., 3d ed. 2005).
161 Id.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 795
denial of self-determination would be illicit,162
violating the duty of non-
recognition.163
Like the duty of recognition, the duty of non-recognition has
been criticized for treading on what has traditionally been a state’s political
prerogative—it is not yet widely accepted.164
C. Secession
Secession is the “creation of a State by the use or threat of force and
without the consent of the former sovereign.”165
Secession is characterized by
the “separation of part of the territory and population of an existing State.”166
In general, secession results in the creation of one or more new states and the
continued existence of the parent state from which those states seceded.167
Dissolution, like secession, is a non-consensual separation of territory and
population giving rise to new states.168
However, unlike secession generally,
dissolution is characterized by the extinction of the parent state and its
replacement by two or more newly created states.169
Dissolution is also marked
162 Dugard uses Katanga and Rhodesia as examples of states created in violation of the right to self-
determination. Id. at 101. Katanga’s establishment violated the right to self-determination because the “right of
self-determination is to be exercised within existing borders and that the United Nations will oppose the claim
to statehood of an entity that comes into existence in violation of this principle.” DUGARD, supra note 139, at
89–90. Rhodesia offended the principle of self-determination because its regime systematically denied
segments of its population the right to participation in its government. Id. at 97.
163 DUGARD, supra note 160, at 100–01.
164 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 139, at 434.
165 CRAWFORD, supra note 123, at 247. Radan defines secession as “the creation of a new state upon
territory previously forming part of, or being a colonial entity of, an existing state.” Radan, supra note 48, at
18. The original state from or on which the new state is created is referred to as the parent or metropolitan
state. Cf. id. (referring to the originating state as the “host state”).
166 Marcelo G. Kohen, Introduction, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 3 (Marcelo G.
Kohen ed., 2006). Many scholars distinguish secession, the non-consensual creation of a new state, with
devolution, the creation of a new state with metropolitan consent. See id.; CRAWFORD, supra note 123, at 215,
247 (“The crucial distinguishing feature is the presence or absence of metropolitan consent.”). Some scholars
also enlarge the concept of secession to include both consensual and non-consensual separation of territory.
See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, The Right to Self-Determination and Its Enforcement, 10 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 421, 429 (2004). But see LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
97–99 (1978).
167 Kohen, supra note 166, at 3.
168 See id. Contra John Dugard, A Legal Basis for Secession: Relevant Principles and Rules, in SECESSION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 89 (2003) (defining “[s]ecession as the unilateral withdrawal of part of an
existing State from that State without the consent of the government of that State. Secession by agreement is
better described as dissolution of a State”).
169 KOHEN, supra note 129, at 3. For this reason, secession and dissolution are sometimes treated as
distinct concepts. However, because both involve the non-consensual separation of territory and population
from a prior existing state, resulting in the creation of one or more new states, the better view is to treat
dissolution as a subset of secession.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
796 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
by the breaking apart of a composite state along the boundaries of its
constituent units.170
Groups claiming a right to self-determination have frequently pursued
secession, but self-determination and secession are not necessarily
coextensive.171
Even a group that does not qualify as a people, and is therefore
not vested with the right to self-determination, may pursue secession.172
When
a putative secession does not implicate self-determination, however, the critical
criterion of statehood is the “maintenance of a stable and effective
government” to the exclusion of the metropolitan state.173
The secessionist
entity’s independence must also either not be disputed, or it must be
“manifestly indisputable.”174
As a threshold matter then, secessionist entities
must be, in fact, independent and effective.
The international system is a state-centric system.175
As such, it is
“understandable that a community composed of States and a legal system that
purports only to regulate the rights and duties of States would react adversely
to any threat to the present State-centered order.”176
Secession, because it
results in the “dismemberment of a previously unified, independent State,”177
necessarily threatens the state-centered order. It is for this reason that
secessionist entities are usually described as illegitimate when they attempt to
secede.178
However, secession is not prohibited under international law.179
170 Rodoljub Etinski, Has the SFR of Yugoslavia Ceased to Exist as a Subject of International Law?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGED YUGOSLAVIA 32–34 (Ranko Petkovic ed., 1995).
171 See, e.g., van der Vyver, supra note 166, at 427 (“The right to self-determination vests in a people,
while a new State created through secession is essentially territorially defined.”). Often, secession is discussed
in terms of a “right to secession.” Normally, the right to secession vests in a people denied self-determination.
From this conception springs the notion of remedial secession. See generally SECESSION AND SELF-
DETERMINATION (Stephen Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds., 2003).
172 van der Vyver, supra note 166, at 427, 429. Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a good example of secession
occurring outside the context of self-determination. Unlike Croatia or Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a
multiethnic state; its secession from Yugoslavia did not result in the creation of a national-state, and was not in
pursuit of national self-determination. See PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2002) (explaining that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s successful plebiscite on
independence required majority support of two of its ethnic constituencies).
173 CRAWFORD, supra note 123, at 266; RADAN, supra note 172, at 210 (“What is crucial ‘is the notion of
control . . . which concerns the de facto authority exercised by the government over the people.’” (quoting
M.C.R. Craven, The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 333,
367 (1995)).
174 CRAWFORD, supra note 123, at 266.
175 BUCHHEIT, supra note 166, at 13.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See id. at 13–14.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 797
While Lauterpacht wrote that “[s]uccessful secession from the parent State is a
fact not contrary to international law,”180
other scholars have gone further,
arguing that “[s]ecession is . . . sanctioned by international law—not under the
rubric of a right to self-determination but as a permissible political strategy in
its own right.”181
In the eighteenth century, a secessionist entity was regarded as valid only
when the metropolitan state extended recognition to that secessionist entity—
under this regime, extending recognition to a seceding territory before its
parent state recognized it as a state would be illegal or at least premature.182
From the nineteenth century though, secession was successful not when or if
the metropolitan state recognized the secessionist entity, but merely when the
metropolitan state gave up the struggle to retain the territory:
[W]hen a sovereign State, from exhaustion or any other cause, has virtually and substantially abandoned the struggle for supremacy it has no right to complain if a foreign State treat[s] the independence of its former subjects as de facto established; nor can it prolong its sovereignty by a mere paper assertion of right.
183
Recently, secession generally has been described as valid in only two
scenarios—consensual separation of territory (devolution) and the redrawing
of national boundaries through a peace treaty following an armed conflict.184
Restricting secession’s validity to secession through a peace treaty effectively
restricts legitimate secession to instances of metropolitan accession, as was the
case in the eighteenth century.185
Dissolution, however, requires no such
metropolitan accession. The nature of dissolution is such that, unlike secession,
179 Dugard, supra note 168, at 91 (“While international law does not, as Stated by U Thant, prohibit
secession, it does recognize rules which put a brake on secession.”); see Christian Tomuschat, Secession and
Self-Determination, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 129, at 23–25; Jorri
Duursma, Preventing and Solving Wars of Secession, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 352 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002).
180 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 139, at 6.
181 van der Vyver, supra note 166.
182 Mikulas Fabry, Secession and State Recognition in International Relations and Law, in ON THE WAY
TO STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND GLOBALISATION, supra note 48, at 51, 54.
183 CRAWFORD, supra note 123, at 256 (citation omitted).
184 van der Vyver, supra note 166, at 429–30.
185 Mikulas Fabry, Secession and State Recognition in International Relations and Law, in ON THE WAY
TO STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND GLOBALISATION, supra note 48, at 51, 54 (“According to [the eighteenth
century] norm, the dominion of a legitimate monarchy was in principle inalienable. The only valid change of
title to sovereignty or territory was through freely given consent of the affected monarch.”); CRAWFORD, supra
note 123, at 11.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
798 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
the former metropolitan state ceases to exist. Its extinction means that a parent
does not continue to accede to its components’ newfound statehood.186
During the Biafran War, UN Secretary-General U Thant claimed that “the
United Nations attitude is unequivocable [sic] . . . . [T]he United Nations has
never accepted and does not accept . . . the principle of secession of a part of
its Member State.”187
His declaration better reflects the general reluctance of
states to admit secession in the abstract than it reflects actual state practice.188
In fact, since U Thant made that statement, at least forty states created through
secession have become member states of the UN.189
These forty examples of
secession provide a general survey of secession scenarios. They also provide a
good guide to state practice regarding—and therefore the norms governing—
secession. The experiences of Eritrea, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab
Republic are particularly instructive. Whereas Eritrea represents a
straightforward secession, both Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic
underwent dissolution.190
1. Eritrea’s Secession
In the case of Eritrea, an armed movement prosecuted a thirty-year war of
secession against Ethiopia, its metropolitan state. Eritrea was an Italian colony
until the British occupied it during World War II.191
Following World War II,
instead of gaining independence through decolonization,192
Eritrea became
federated with Ethiopia by the United Nations.193
Ethiopia abrogated this UN-
imposed federal arrangement by annexing Eritrea in 1962, extinguishing
186 Radan, supra note 48, at 26.
187 Dugard, supra note 168, at 90 (citation omitted).
188 See Kohen, supra note 166, at 3 (pointing out that states go so far as to refer euphemistically to the
“separation of part of the state” in the 1978 Vienna Convention on State Succession); see also Dugard, supra
note 168, at 91 (describing Thant’s statement on secession as “a gross exaggeration”).
189 Dugard, supra note 168, at 91; Kohen, supra note 166, at 2. Since the end of the Cold War, the
constituent states of Yugoslavia and Eritrea have all successfully seceded and subsequently joined the UN. See
Press Release, Department of Public Information, United Nations Member States, U.N. Press Release
ORG/1469 (July 3, 2006).
190 See, e.g., Badinter Opinion 1, supra note 127, at 166 (determining that “the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution”); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 27th Sess, May 2–July 2,
1972, U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev.1 (1972), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 220, 286–93 (1972); Kohen,
supra note 166, at 2.
191 RUTH IYOB, THE ERITREAN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE: DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, NATIONALISM
1941–1993 61–63 (1995).
192 Id.
193 Id.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 799
Eritrea’s autonomy.194
Ethiopia’s annexation sparked the armed Eritrean
secessionist movement.195
Ultimately, Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia was facilitated both by the
success of its armed struggle and by a revolution within Ethiopia.196
Rather
than continuing the struggle to retain Eritrea, Ethiopia’s revolutionary
government endorsed Eritrean independence.197
Eritrea emerged as an
independent state within its former colonial borders on May 24, 1993,
following a plebiscite conducted with the support of Ethiopia,198
and monitored
by observers from both the UN and the Organization for African Unity
(“OAU”).199
Eritrea was then rapidly recognized by governments around the
world and admitted to the UN.200
Eritrea’s secession was thus legitimated
when its parent state gave up the struggle to retain Eritrea and acceded to its
independence.
2. Yugoslavia’s Dissolution
In the case of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(“SFRY”) began the process of dissolution when two of its constituent
republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared independence in 1991.201
By the end
of 1991, three of the SFRY’s republics had held referendums approving
independence and one had adopted a “sovereignty resolution.”202
The Badinter
Commission emphasized the collapse of Yugoslavia’s federal apparatus in
determining that “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the
process of dissolution.”203
Specifically, the Badinter Commission noted “that
194 Id. at 94–97.
195 Id. at 104–05.
196 See TEKESTE NEGASH, ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA: THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 166–68 (1997).
197 Id. at 168; IYOB, supra note 191, at 138–39.
198 IYOB, supra note 191, at 143. Ethiopia had actually recognized Eritrea as an independent state on May
3, 1993, before Eritrea officially declared its independence. Ethiopia Accepts Eritrea Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May
4, 1993, at A3.
199 IYOB, supra note 191, at 137.
200 For example, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Denmark recognized Eritrea on May 4, 1993. Eritrea is
Recognized by Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Denmark; Applies to Join OAU, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, May 6, 1993, at 4(B). Israel recognized Eritrea on May 6, 1993. Israel Recognised Officially the
Independence of Eritrea on 6th May, BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, May 8, 1993, at 4(B). The United
Kingdom recognized Eritrea on May 19, 1993. Eritrea Recognized, GUARDIAN (London), May 19, 1993, at 8.
The United Nations admitted Eritrea as a member state on May 28, 1993. U.N. Welcomes Monaco, Eritrea,
L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at A12.
201 Badinter Opinion 1, supra note 127.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 166.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
800 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
in the case of a federal-type State . . . the existence of the State implies that the
federal organs represent the components of the Federation and wield effective
power.”204
Putting aside the type of government structure used in Yugoslavia,
it becomes clear that the state’s existence is tied to its ability to “wield
effective power.”205
Therefore, when the SFRY’s constituent units began to
exercise authority over their declared territory to the exclusion of Yugoslavia’s
central government, the state of Yugoslavia began to dissolve. With dissolution
came the emergence of Yugoslavia’s constituent units as independent states.
Importantly, statehood for the component states of Yugoslavia was not
dependent on recognition by the state claiming to be Yugoslavia’s successor.206
The non-Serbian constituent units of Yugoslavia were widely recognized as
states and were even admitted to the UN well before they were recognized by
Serbia.207
For example, Croatia was admitted to the UN on May 22, 1992,208
but it was not recognized by Serbia until 1996.209
Instead of metropolitan—or
purportedly metropolitan—accession, the validity of the secessions of
Yugoslavia’s constituent units turned on their independence, effectiveness, and
satisfaction of the objective criteria of statehood.
3. The United Arab Republic’s Dissolution
The United Arab Republic provides another example of dissolution. In
1958, the “total union of Egypt and Syria into a single state” resulted in the
creation of the United Arab Republic (“UAR”).210
The unification of Egypt
204 Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
205 Craven highlights that the dissolution question turns not on representativeness of government but on
whether the government can exercise control. Craven, supra note 173, at 367.
206 While the Badinter Commission determined Yugoslavia to be in the process of dissolution, Serbia
maintained that it was in fact the successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Oberster
Gerichtshot [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 17, 1996, docket No. 4 Ob 2304/96v (Austria), translated and
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1520 (1997) (determining that the SFRY had dissolved and that it had been succeeded
by five states, and not solely by Serbia as Serbia claimed).
207 Member states of the European Community and Canada recognized Croatia and Slovenia on January
15, 1992, while Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were admitted to the United Nations as member
states on May 22, 1992. ANA S. TRBOVICH, A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION 280–81
(2008). Admission to the United Nations followed a string of negotiations involving Yugoslavia’s component
republics, the European Commission, the Badinter Commission, and various European states, particularly
Germany. Id. at 239–81.
208 Id. at 280–81.
209 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not recognize Croatia until 1996. Yugoslavia-Croatia Ties,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at A4.
210 CLEVELAND, supra note 15, at 314; Eugene Cotran, Some Legal Aspects of the Formation of the
United Arab Republic and the United Arab States, 8 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 346, 347–48 (1959) (“The texts of
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 801
and Syria was voluntary on the part of both states, was approved by the
legislatures of both states,211
and was ratified by plebiscites held in both Egypt
and Syria.212
A single executive branch and a single national assembly
governed the UAR, drawing equal members from both formerly independent
states.213
Additionally, within the UN, one mission singularly representing the
UAR replaced the separate UN member states of Egypt and Syria.214
Similarly,
the United States recognized the UAR and the United States Senate confirmed
an ambassador to the United Arab Republic.215
In September 1961, a coup d’etat in the Syrian region of the UAR, led
Syria to declare its independence.216
The UAR violently resisted Syria’s non-
consensual separation from the unitary state.217
The Syrian coup forces quickly
established their authority at the exclusion of the UAR.218
In doing so, Syria’s
secession dissolved the UAR, leading Gamal Abdel Nasser, the UAR
President, to describe himself as “the captain of a ship which has split in two in
the middle of the sea.”219
Despite Egypt’s persistent use of the label “United
Arab Republic” in the wake of the UAR’s dissolution, Nasser remarked to the
U.S. Ambassador that the dissolution would allow him to focus on Egypt’s
affairs.220
Syria and Egypt resumed their separate representation at the UN and,
by 1962, the Egyptian who held the post before unification in 1958 replaced
the sole Syrian member of the UAR’s delegation.221
[the provisional constitution of the UAR and the unification proclamation] indicate clearly that there is now
one State and one international person where formerly there were two.”).
211 JAMES JANKOWSKI, NASSER’S EGYPT, ARAB NATIONALISM, AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 113
(2002).
212 Cotran, supra note 210, at 347–48.
213 JANKOWSKI, supra note 211.
214 Cotran, supra note 210, at 348; see also ELIE PODEH, THE DECLINE OF ARAB UNITY: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 145–46 (1999).
215 See PIERRE MICHEL EISEMANN & MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, STATE SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED
AGAINST THE FACTS 222 (1996).
216 Richard Young, State of Syria: Old or New, 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 482, 482 (1962).
217 Within twenty-four hours of the coup d’etat, President Nasser launched an abortive armed mission to
preserve the single state. Nasser called off the operation after it became clear that the coup forces had
solidified their control over Syria. PODEH, supra note 214, at 150–51.
218 PODEH, supra note 214, at 150–51. Interestingly, Nasser immediately recognized the ramifications of
Syrian secession, stating on September 28, 1961, as he deployed UAR forces to put down the coup, that it was
not in his power to dissolve a union based on the will of the Arab people. JANKOWSKI, supra note 211, at 169.
219 JANKOWSKI, supra note 211, at 170 (quoting cABD AL-LATIF BAGHDADI, MUDHAKKIRAT cABD AL-
LATIF AL-BAGHDADI 124 (1997)).
220 Id. at 171.
221 L.C. Green, The Dissolution of States and Membership of the United Nations, 32 SASK. L. REV. 93, 109
(1967).
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
802 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
Secession is the creation of a new state through the separation of territory
and population from a parent state.222
Dissolution, though, occurs when
components integral to a state secede, generating new states and extinguishing
the erstwhile metropolis.223
A secessionist entity, like Eritrea, is valid once its
parent state accedes to its independence.224
Products of dissolution, however,
are validly independent not when the metropolis accedes to their
independence—indeed, dissolution means there is no metropolis to accede to
such independence225
—but when those products wield effective authority to
the exclusion of the former metropolitan state and satisfy the criteria of
statehood, so long as they do not violate the limiting principle of uti
possidetis.226
D. Uti Possidetis
Uti possidetis is a principle that governs the international frontiers of a
newly emergent state.227
The principle evolved in the context of decolonization
in South America and Africa.228
In Africa, uti possidetis has meant the
conversion of colonial boundaries into international borders: “[T]he
primary . . . application of uti possidetis was . . . of ‘securing respect for the
territorial boundaries at the moment when [a state’s] independence is
achieved.’”229
Thus, the boundaries that delineated separately administered
territories became international frontiers at the moment of decolonization.
The combination of uti possidetis and the principle of territorial integrity
have worked to preserve Africa’s post-colonial territorial status quo despite
many ethnically heterogeneous states, and tribal groups that straddle borders.
Fears of territorial fragility drove the member states of the Organization for
African Unity to “pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their
achievement of national independence,” because “border problems constitute a
222 See Radan, supra note 48, at 18; supra text accompanying notes 165–67.
223 Radan, supra note 48, at 26 (noting the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the
dissolution of Yugoslavia); see supra text accompanying notes 168–70.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 197–200.
225 Radan, supra note 48, at 26; see supra text accompanying note 186.
226 See infra text accompanying notes 227–36 (addressing the proposition that uti possidetis is a
requirement for secession).
227 RADAN, supra note 172, at 121–22; TRBOVICH, supra note 207, at 269.
228 RADAN, supra note 172, at 121–22.
229 Id. at 123 (quoting Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22)).
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 803
grave and permanent factor of dissention.”230
Yet, the permanence of Africa’s
post-colonial borders has not been absolute. Several states, including the
Republic of Somalia, are amalgamations of former colonial possessions that
achieved independence separately.231
Moreover, in at least two examples, the
African Union has recognized states that, following decolonization, were
amalgamated into larger states only to later re-emerge as independent states
within their boundaries at decolonization.232
In the Frontier Dispute Case, the International Court of Justice elevated the
principle of uti possidetis to a general principle of international law designed
“to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by
fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the
withdrawal of the administering power.”233
Uti possidetis has since evolved
into a limitation on the validity of secession. In its arbitration of the dissolution
of Yugoslavia, the Badinter Commission not only applied uti possidetis in a
European context for the first time, it used the doctrine to define which
territorial units could legitimately emerge as new states through Yugoslavia’s
dissolution.234
In this way, the Badinter Commission explicitly generalized the
principle of uti possidetis from decolonization scenarios to dissolution:
[O]nce the process in the [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] leads to the creation of one or more independent States, the issue of frontiers . . . must be resolved in accordance with the following principles: . . . [T]he former boundaries become frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis, though initially applied in
230 Org. of African Unity [OAU]. Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964, AHG/Res. 16(I) (July 21,
1964).
231 In fact, the word Tanzania is a portmanteau of its two parent states: Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
Tanzania, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Oct. 24, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/
daressalaam/countries/tanzania.htm.
232 Eritrea was fused to Ethiopia in 1952 before it successfully concluded a war of independence in 1993.
Senegal and Gambia were joined as one state from 1982 to 1989. For a discussion on Eritrea’s secession, see
supra text accompanying notes 191–200; for a discussion on Senegal and Gambia, see infra text
accompanying note 344.
233 Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 565.
234 See Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 3, 92 I.L.R. 170 (1993)
[hereinafter Badinter Opinion 3].
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
804 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle.
235
Despite criticism of its approach, the Badinter Commission has been described
as “creat[ing] a precedent by using the uti possidetis juris principle to select the
territorial units that would become eligible for recognition.”236
The Badinter Commission was not alone in its novel application of uti
possidetis juris. A 1992 report on Québécois secession commissioned by the
government of Québéc found that
in the case of secession or dissolution of States, pre-existing administrative boundaries must be maintained to become borders of the new States and cannot be altered by the threat or use of force, be it on the part of the seceding entity or the State from which it breaks off.
237
Scholars and modern state practice, then, suggest that secession is valid so long
as the seceding territory is a distinct, cohesive, and recognizable unit. Support
for this position is also found in the Aaland Islands Case. The Commission of
Rapporteurs determined that Finland, even when subsumed within the Russian
Empire, had retained its territorial integrity: “[P]roperly speaking, from a
geographic point of view, this State had possessed frontiers which were clearly
defined for over a hundred years.”238
Importantly, the Rapporteurs’ opinion
demonstrates that an independent state might disappear into another state only
to reappear at some later date within its historical borders. Ultimately, the
Council of the League of Nations endorsed the Rapporteurs’ position,
recognizing that Finland had seceded from the Russian Empire as a coherent
territorial unit, within its original borders.239
Likewise, Eritrea resumed its distinct and separate character after having
been subsumed within Ethiopia.240
Unlike Finland, however, Eritrea had not
been an independent state before its subsumption within Ethiopia. Instead, it
235 Id.
236 TRBOVICH, supra note 207, at 272.
237 T.M. Franck et al., The Territorial Integrity of Québec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty
(May 8, 1992), reprinted in SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED
241, 273 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000).
238 Report Presented by Comm. of Rapporteurs on the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Doc.
B7.21/68/106, at 24 (1921).
239 See JAMES MINAHAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATELESS NATIONS: ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS
AROUND THE WORLD: S-Z 71 (2002).
240 See supra text accompanying notes 195–96.
FARLEY GALLEYSFINAL 4/6/2011 7:48 AM
2010] CALLING A STATE A STATE 805
had been a separately administered colonial possession.241
Still, because
independent Eritrea emerged within its colonial boundaries, its secession
conformed to the African application of uti possidetis.242
Uti possidetis, therefore, applies not only to decolonization but to secession
and dissolution. In the post-colonial period, uti possidetis has functioned to
deny validity to entities—like Katanga or Biafra—that sought independence
without regard for colonial boundaries.243
In this way, uti possidetis is a
limiting principle that restricts the creation of new states in Africa. A new
African state may only be valid if its territorial extent matches that of a
colonial unit.
III. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND
The Republic of Somaliland is a state. It meets the objective criteria of
statehood and its emergence through the dissolution of the Republic of Somalia
conforms to international norms. Here, the legal concepts described in Part II
are applied to Somaliland.
A. Somaliland and Statehood
Somaliland meets the statehood criteria set out in the Montevideo
Convention. It has a permanent population, defined territory, a government,
and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Somaliland claims a
population of approximately 3.5 million people.244
Since its secession in 1991,
“hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced [Somalilanders]
have returned home.”245
In contrast, persons displaced by ongoing conflict in
rump Somalia have taken refuge in Somaliland’s capital.246
Somaliland has fixed and clearly determined borders, satisfying the
territory criterion of statehood.247
At secession, the Republic of Somaliland
explicitly declared its territory as that comprising the British Protectorate of
241 See supra text accompanying note 191.
242 See RADAN, supra note 172, at 127; supra text accompanying note 198.
243 See supra text accompanying notes 150, 162, 187.
244 Republic of Somaliland: Country Profile, SOMALILAND OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://www.