C2 and Force Design For “ All Arms-All Effects” Warfare in Cross Domain Operations The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 10:30 AM, 30 January 2020 A presentation by Colonel (ret) Douglas Macgregor, U.S. Army, PhD EVP, Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC This presentation is unclassified.
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C2 and Force Design For “All Arms-All Effects” Warfare
in Cross Domain Operations The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory10:30 AM, 30 January 2020
A presentation byColonel (ret) Douglas Macgregor, U.S. Army, PhD
EVP, Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC
This presentation is unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Agenda for Discussion
1. What is the US Army doing?
2. Another Way Forward to Cross Domain Warfare;
3. New Operational Architecture;
4. A New Organization for Combat: The Reconnaissance-Strike Group
5. Summary of Main Points
US OperationalConcepts
US Military Strategy
US NationalSecurity Strategy
Strategic
Operational
Acquisition
Tactical
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Ø The paradigm shift in warfare: The impact of long-range precision effects through networked C4ISR capabilities from seabed to space;
Ø “All Arms-All Effects” Warfare is a New Joint Operational Concept: Operations that integrate Service-provided capabilities organized around ISR, STRIKE, MNVR, SUST across Service lines inside a flatter, Integrated, Joint Operational Command Structure;
Ø The goal is cross-domain synergy. The complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others…
JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT (JOAC) VERSION 1.0 17 January 2012
What you should take away:
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
“Existing Divisions and Corps will be tasked with fighting and defeating specific components of the enemy’s system… under MDO, Divisions and Corps headquarters are to return to their historic warfighting roles, in which they employed subordinate units and allocated Corps- and Division-level assets to support subordinate units.”
Unclassified.
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP 18 JAN 1945 (Belgium and Germany)
US ARMY Today w/ 3 corps and similar frontage of 30-40 miles
FIRST ARMY(V, XVIII, VII
Corps)30-40 mile
front)
In WWII a U.S. field army kept 9 divisions on the front and 3 in
reserve—more divisions than exist in today’s
active Army.
5 to 6 salvos from a single 300mm Rocket Artillery BN (18 launchers) could destroy the front. Each Russian or Chinese Brigade would have a Rocket Artillery BN. A single
volley of 5 to 6 Russian or Chinese brigades could seriously disrupt/destroy the front.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Change in Command and Control (C2):
In the 1944-45 advance from Normandy to the Rhine, General Montgomery’s headquarters controlled only two armies, which in turn had only two and three corps respectively, and the corps operated only two to three divisions—sometimes, even, only one. The ratio of headquarters was no more economic in the U.S. Army… The abundance of headquarters was one reason why the advance to victory was so protracted, despite mobile instruments and exhausted opponents.
B. H. Liddell Hart, Defense of the West, 1950, pp. 533-535
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Ø First, ü Whom do we fight?
ü Where do we fight?ü How do we fight?
ü How do we get there?Ø Second, develop an appropriate military strategy
linking strategic ends with operational means.Ø Third, devise a new operational concept suitable
to the new environment; Ø Fourth, assess/develop/appoint new Leadership; Ø Fifth, within fiscal means reorganize and redeploy
the force into the new paradigm.
Another Way Forward:
Strategic Assumptions
New Rule and Mission Set
New Force Design &
Capabilities
New Force Development / Management /
Employment Paradigm
New Operational
Concept
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
ISR Range WW I
ISR Range WW II ISR Range Desert Storm
Area of Influence and
Responsive Action- WW I
Area of Influence and
Responsive Action- WW II
Area of Influence and
Responsive Action- Desert
Storm
Capacity for responsive action and area of influence has not kept pace with ISR since 1945.
Space, Time, Lethality: The ISR Gap 1914-1991
• In 1914, C3 is static and single service. Maneuver limited to local envelopment. Days/weeks, even months needed to act.
• In 1939, C3 is single service, but more dynamic thanks to airpower—EW, ISR expand. Maneuver includes regional envelopment. Months/Days needed for effective action.
• In 1991, C3 below the strategic level is still single service. ISR and envelopment is 3D or global. Action in hours and minutes, but seldom across domains. No JOINT (integrated) C4ISR on the operational level. Unity of Command is weak.
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Evolution of “All Arms-All Effects Warfare “ and Integrated Operations in BTP, TUF, MOV
The U.S. is preeminently a global air and naval power, not necessarily a global land power. In all domains, mass is a liability.
ü Industrial Age inefficiencies and duplications reduce operational impact;
ü Perpetuate unsustainable “cost exchange ratios” with opponents;
ü Optimizing “capability at cost” inside a new Post-Industrial Age structure dramatically increases operational impact of each dollar spent—maintaining/increasing security with reduced budgets.
Current Model Post-Industrial Model
Land Warfare
Sea Warfare
Air Warfare
ISR-STRIKE60%
MNVR plus SUST40%
Operational Impact
Operational Impact
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
RSG
RSG
STR
C4I
SUST
C H E C K B A T T E R Y D A I L Y
O JXF
NLOJXF
Self-Contained Formations inside the ISR-STRIKE-MNVR-SUST Framework
JFC
ü The Operational Framework is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare; ü The Framework is not just about “things.” It’s about integrating existing and future
capabilities within an agile construct guided by human understanding. ü It’s an intellectual construct with technological infrastructure.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Build Flatter, Faster C2:Joint Force Commands
Industrial Age Post-Industrial Age
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Lego-like Force with faster decision cycle.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Strike Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Sustainment
Service capabilities for employment plug in under one star or below.
Joint Force Command structures provide inside a reduced number of regional unified commands ensure that mission-focused force packages act
as a single unified force.
Maneuver
Joint Force C2
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
“The real strength of an army is represented not by gross numbers of men in the service, nor even by the number of trained men, but by the number of fighting formations that it can deploy. Until troops are organized in formations, and these are trained collectively, they cannot operate as an effective force.”
B. H. Liddell Hart, Defense of the West, 1950, p.121.
Formation-based Change:
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Maneuver Echelon:(4) RSG: Reconnaissance Strike Group – (12) CMG: Combat Maneuver Group – (Armored) (6) ICG: Infantry Combat Group – (Motorized) (4) AAG: Airborne-Air Assault Group – (Light)
Strike Echelon: (Aviation/UCAV/GLCM/MLRS), TMD (4) ACG: Aviation Combat Groups (2) STG: Strike Groups (UCAV/MLRS) (4) TMD: Theater Missile Defense Groups
C4I Echelon: [C4, Information, Intelligence, EW, Space](4) C4I Groups
Sustainment Echelon: (See engineer consolidation)(8) CSG: Combat Support Groups (2) ENG: Engineer Groups (construction) (1) CBG: Chemical-Bio Warfare Group • The 8th Army (in Korea) contained 201,000 U.S. Soldiers + 26,000 Marines;• Note that ISR is embedded throughout the force.
Unit Types:Capability-Based Force Packages
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Focus is the RSG
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
RSG: High Lethality-Low Density Formation
Reconnaissance-Strike Group
BG Commands 5,500-6,000
MNVR BN
MNVR BN
MNVR BN
MNVR BN
STRIKE BN
C4ISR BN
SUST BN
ü Maneuver forces must be capable of dispersed, mobile, operations to survive and fight in an integrated, Joint ISR, EW and STRIKE-dominated battle space.
ü The new battle space demands self-contained independent battle groups; formations that operate on land the way the Navy’s ships operate at sea: within the range of their organic ISR and STRIKE capabilities.
ü RSG suppresses or destroys enemy air defense and missile assets-RSG is effective when immediate responsiveness is required, in complex terrain or in poor visibility.
Intelligence functions split, but integrated to support maneuver, strike and ISR
Maneuver(Operations
including PSYOPS)
ISR StrikeCOORD
Sustainment(Personnel +
Logistics)
Communications + EW & Cyber
ColonelChief of Staff
ü Responds Directly to Joint Force CDR
ü Integrates Army, USAF/USN Strike Assets (STRIKECOORD);
ü Collects, Analyzes and Exploits Information.
ü Absorbs additional Battalions or gives up battalions as needed;
ü Additional Staff Functions such as Civil Affairs, SJA can be incorporated as needed.
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
Circles Depict Maneuver
Battalion Kill Zones
60-80 km front w/ 80-100 km zone/sector of operation (terrain dependent)
ISR-Strike Systems
distributed Inside circles
The RSG: How it Fights
Flexible distribution of integrated enablers to MNVR BNs• 10 SkyRanger SHORAD units (25 km
surveillance, 4-6 km engagement)• 5 NASAMS ADA firing units (120 km
surveillance with Sentinel radar, 50 km engagement)
• 4 ARTHUR radar targeting units (60 km weapon locating)
• 8 C3 support units (40-50 km point to point 4G communications)
Core Capabilities in Specialized BNs• Giraffe 4A radar (280 km surveillance,
100 km weapon locating)• 12 MRLS (150 km GLSDB)• 24 TARES Loitering Munition (200 km)• Long range communications to include
satellite commo. (SKYSAPIENCE)
Mobile Armored MNVR BNs• AGS (33 per battalion)• IFV (50 per battalion)• AMOS auto-loading 120mm mortars (12
per battalion)
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
ü JFC uses RSG to close the “ISR-area of responsive action and influence gap.”ü JFC integrates Army and AF capabilities into an operational axis in offensive
operations or into a defensive sector in defensive operations;ü Joint Force connectivity along the operational axis is secure;ü RSG compels opposing STRIKE and IADs to displace or confront destruction; ü When IADS are destroyed/disabled STRIKE weapons achieve maximum effect.
Where are the Joint C4ISR nodes? Is there C4ISR redundancy? When can we see/know and act? How fast can we Move, Reload, Acquire & STRIKE?
Unclassified.
Burke-Macgregor Group LLCSummary:
Construct a 21st-century scalable, “Lego-like” force design; a modular design organized and equipped for dispersed, mobile warfare inside the MNVR-STRIKE-ISR-SUST Framework. RSG points the way:
ü Recognize that Joint, integrated C4ISR is the “hub” of the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework.
ü Single-service command structures are obsolete. U.S. capabilities must be integrated on the strategic and operational levels.
ü Apply the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework
as a methodology for investment planning and programming to enable informed choices as constrained budgets compel force optimization.