By Maj Jeff Kassebaum, USAFjfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C4... · By Maj Jeff Kassebaum, USAF "Run for it Marty...it's the Libyans!" Twenty-six years

The Art of SEAD:Lessons from

By Maj Jeff Kassebaum, USAF

"Run for it Marty...it's the Libyans!"Twenty-six years after Doc Brown'swarning in the movie. Back to the Fu-ture, the US and its allies were back inLibya for the first time since OperationEl Dorado Canyon. The aftermath of the2011 Libyan revolution and OperationsOdyssey Dawn and Unified Protector(OUP) gives Suppression of Enemy AirDefenses (SEAD) and EW players an ex-cellent opportunity to debrief.

For the first two months of OUP, Iran NATO's SEAD Cell and the ElectronicWarfare Coordination Cell (EWCC). Theshort nature of OUP offers the luxury todebrief an entire campaign from startto finish, unlike ongoing operations inCENTCOM. The three SEAD/EW debriefthemes of OUP are:

1. Why hasn't Joint SEAD doctrine ef-fectively taught how to rollback andsuppress an Integrated Air DefenseSystem (IADS)?

2. Non-traditional IADS requires non-traditional analysis!

3. How do we break the trend of Les-sons Identified instead of LessonsLearned?

THE DOCTRINE GAPAfter 10 years of working in the Joint

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-

SEAD) world flyingthe EA-6B Prowler andEC-130H Compass Call, and work-ing in five Combined Air and SpaceOperations Centers (CAOC) and five EW-CCs, the first time I ever read theJ-SEAD pub was this past July. Ihad accepted an invitation fromthe LeMay Center for Doctrine to be apart of the J-SEAD working group afterreturning from CAOC-5 for OUP. When theworking group convened, it turned out Iwas not alone in never having used the J-SEAD doctrine publication. The primaryreason is the substantial gap betweendoctrine and combat reality.

The doctrine gap is a direct result ofineffective communication. As J-SEADplayers, we've failed to effectively ar-ticulate how to suppress an IADS. Inlieu of staffing adequately trained, tac-tical SEAD-experienced personnel at thestrategic and operational levels of war-fare, we turned the J-SEAD pub into anunwieldy, catchall encyclopedia of anypossible weapon system that can enactany level of suppression of an IADS.For example, during the Yom KippurWar, Maj Gen Ariel Sharon destructivelysuppressed his enemy's air defenses inOctober 1973 when he took his armor

division across the Suez Canal.He destroyed newly operational SA-6sand enabled the Israeli Air Force (IAF)a permissive environment. However, ar-mor division tactics do not belong in theJ-SEAD just because a suppression effectwas achieved. The goal of effective doc-trine should be specific enough at theoperational level to guide effects-drivendecision-making for apportionment andallocation, yet generic enough to avoidtactical specifics that will trample theflexibility of tactical assets. Based onthis premise, the J-SEAD publicationwas streamlined back to what it was de-signed for: a reference pub that cross-references tactical publications. In all.

the new J-SEAD pub will be 33 percentof its previous size.

Effective doctrine discusses whatshould be done strategically and opera-tionally, not how to do it tactically. Thisis especially true for doctrine publica-tions like J-SEAD, which are updatedonly every seven years - too slow tomaintain relevancy if tactical employ-ment is addressed. An effective refer-ence pub cross-references tactical pubsand directs readers to the latest, mostcurrent information. The new J-SEAD

pub will also reflect combat realitybased on Lessons Learned from

10 years of CENTCOM opera-tions and the latest conflictin Libya.

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The last 10 years ofclose air support (CAS) and electronicattack (EA) in CENTCOM has resulted ina generation of aviators accustomed to apermissive air environment with a mini-mal surface-to-air threat at medium andhigh altitudes. These kinds of permis-sive environments can dangerouslytrend toward complacency and lack ofrespect toward credible surface-to-airthreats. This trend became a reality inLibya, when the strategic and opera-tional game plans opposed tactical forcepackaging from the start of the conflictand lacked a robust plan to locate andsuppress the threat IADS.

Force packaging, which combinesspecialized assets into a single strikeand SEAD package, enables integrated

EGYPT

effects - enhancing strengths andmitigating weaknesses. The benefit ofSEAD force packaging during OUP wasa constant educational process due tothe gap between doctrine and combatreality. One of the fixes is a conciseJ-SEAD pub that outlines broad SEADconcepts and objectives and then di-rects the reader to consult tacticalsubject matter experts for specific,up-to-date information on how to sup-press an IADS. Critically important tosuppressing an IADS is starting DayOne of the war to fully rollback the en-emy's IADS, regardless of suppressiontactic type (sequential or concurrent)employed and size of geographic arearequiring suppression.

Robust planning to fully roll backthe enemy's IADS is another key con-cept often absent as a result of thedoctrine gap. Doctrinally, we train toattack and suppress the threat systemsemployed by the enemy's air defensesystem. While this is academically ac-curate, tactical reality requires thedoctrinal flexibility to modify J-SEADto fully prosecute an IADS rollback. Forexample, consider combat operations

against a dictatorship where the linesbetween military assets and civilianinfrastructure are blurred. In additionto suppressing threat radar, commandand control (C2) and military commu-nications, an effective SEAD plan mustincorporate the inaccurately-termed"civilian" capabilities (such as air traf-fic control radar and modern communi-cation devices) into a targeting plan.Without a robust plan to suppress theIADS from the beginning of a conflict,the longer we are engaged in war, themore difficult it becomes to effectivelyconduct Joint SEAD.

The gap between doctrine and com-bat reality can be breached, but notwithout the understanding that ef-fective SEAD cannot be achieved bya wordy, out-of-date publication thatgathers dust. Effective SEAD is achievedby the strategic and operational levelsof warfare providing executable guid-ance to the tactical level, while allowingtactical flexibility to achieve strategicobjectives. Tactical SEAD players mustrespect credible surface-to-air threats -while ensuring supported strikers alsorespect those threats - and execute a

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full-scale rollback of the threat's IADSfrom day one.

NON-TRAOITIONAL IADS:AN ANALYSIS

At some point, the term "non-tradi-tional" highlights a fundamental mis-understanding of the status quo. Libya'sIADS was non-traditional in the sensethat they strayed away from Cold War-era rigidity in command, control andcommunication (C3) and had the capa-bility to incorporate modern technologyinto their air defense system. Tacticallyrelevant SEAD cannot ignore the tech-nological incorporation of commerciallyavailable, seemingly "non-military," ad-ditions to the threat's IADS. In 1973, thetactical problem Israel had to tackle wasthe highly effective SA-6. The IAF didnot sufficiently analyze the new threatand update their Six Day War tactics inEgypt and Syria (Operations Tagar andDougman 5, respectively) to counter theSA-6. The SA-6 accounted for a signifi-cant portion of the 102 IAF aircraft lostin 11,000 sorties over 21 days.

NATO's tactical problem in Libyawasn't a new type of SAM, it was the ca-pability to use "civilian" infrastructurein an IADS. Libyan IADS' advantage wasthe capability to Find, Fix, Track, Tar-get, Engage and Assess in a largely per-missive electromagnetic environment.Largely permissive due to:• Geographic size (1,100 miles of

coastline, 350 miles from Tripoli toAjdabiya)

• Limited number of SEAD assets for a24hrs/day No Fly Zone

• Amount of radar and communicationsjamming resources required

• Rules of Engagement initially preclud-ing targeting civilian components ofthe air defense systemThe first three items above were

facts of the war; we deal with it andmake it work tactically. The last was astrategic/operational impediment to ef-fectively rolling back the IADS. As weprosecuted OUP for the first three anda half months, Tripoli InternationalAirport operated unfettered (for UN hu-manitarian aid flights) and could buildthe air picture of NATO strike packages.NATO unintentionally aided the LibyanRegime by squawking in accordance

NATO did not attaci( the air traffic control radar at Tripoli Airport until mid-July - four monthsinto the NATO air campaign. (Photo: Mahmud Turkia/Getty Images)

with ICAO (International Civil Avia-tion Organization) protocols. These re-alities highlight ever more clearly thatsuppressing an IADS must not rely ondoctrine focused only on military infra-structure and that suppression is morethan employing anti-radiation missiles.In short, SEAD * HARM.

A suppressed IADS is an effectivelyanalyzed and smartly targeted IADS.We make our SEAD jobs more difficultwithout full analysis of: how the threatoperates, where their command andcontrol nodes are, what communicationmeans they use to coordinate, and howthey share their common operating pic-ture (COP) to sustain the kill chain. Ifwe fail to discern how the C3 nodes arelinked, we will fail to fully suppress thelinks early in their kill chain, and thethreat will eventually seize this avenuefor his advantage. Academically, nonewould disagree. In practice, SEAD andEA advocates must arm decision-mak-

ers with the implications of allowingan IADS access to civilian networks formilitary command and control. Whenwe allow the threat IADS use of "civil-ian" networks:

1. The air picture built at a civilianairport could be disseminated to tacti-cal SAM sites via commercially availablecommunications,

2. Tactical SAMs would not need toturn on their radar to gain situationalawareness, which

3. Significantly complicates the abil-ity of intelligence, surveillance and re-connaissance (ISR) assets to find, fixand track non-cooperative targets, and

4. Results in a threat IADS with acommon operational picture (COP) thatcan choose whether or not to engagestrike aircraft, leaving strike aircraftto "plink" tanks to attrite forces/pro-tect civilians until they are able to findmore lucrative C3 nodes - prolongingthe war.

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LESSONS lOENTIFlEOFool us twice. Operation Unified Pro-

tector is not NATO's first air campaignagainst a second-rate, despotic govern-ment that relies on military hardwaresupplied by the former Soviet Union(FSU). It likely won't be the last, either.Therefore, we must codify and dissemi-nate our Lessons Learned from the sev-en months of OUP so we will avoid themistakes of previous operations.

The difference between the air cam-paigns in OUP and Operation Allied Force(OAF) over Serbia in 1999 had nothing todo with how NATO operated. A signifi-cant difference was that the Serbiansshot back. Just because the Libyans didnot shoot a NATO aircraft does not meanthey were unable to do so. As shownabove, the Libyan Regime had the abil-ity to build their picture and make de-cisions based on that picture and thendisseminate decisions to the field. Wewill continue to re-identify lessons ifwe shrug off OUP because there was noshoot-down to debrief, as in OAF.

This is not the forum for operationaland tactical debrief specifics for OUP;but it is the forum to discuss how webreak our trend item of Lesson Identifi-cation, instead of Lesson Learned. Fouractions will prevent us from re-identify-ing lessons:1. Rapid, widespread dissemination of

debrief items to key players,2. Build collective memory among

warfighting generations,3. Incorporate realistic, modern IADS

into training scenarios for dailyunit-level training, and

4. Frequently re-evaluate the statusquo.Key players rotate in and out of a con-

flict after a few months; therefore de-brief items must be disseminated to keyplayers so that we preserve our LessonsLearned. Dissemination must be rapidand widespread to ensure key playersshare those lessons. Even though OUPonly lasted seven months, interim de-briefs should be considered to capturelessons as a campaign progresses. If wedon't conduct interim debriefs along theway, initial lessons during the hottestpoints in a war will be forgotten.

We build collective memory amongwarfighting "generations" by revisiting

Lessons Learned from previous opera-tions and incorporating those lessonsinto tactical level training. For example,one of the reasons Operation DesertStorm was a success was because thestrategic leadership had fought as tac-tical leadership in Vietnam and appliedtheir Lessons Learned to the liberationof Kuwait. Today's tactical aviators willbe tomorrow's operational planners andstrategic thinkers. Lessons Learned thatare frequently revisited at the tacticallevel will prevent re-identification ofpast Lessons Learned.

We must incorporate realistic IADSrepresentation into training scenariosfor daily squadron-level training. Wehave seen enough of the anticipatedFulda Gap IADS, which effectively pre-pares us for yesterday's threat. An IADSthat incorporates military and commer-cial/civilian infrastructure provides arealistic training environment. Train-ing against a modern IADS will prepareaviators and intelligence officers toanalyze and suppress tomorrow's mostlikely threat IADS.

Lethal tacticians frequently re-evaluate how we fight and suppress thethreat. The status quo ante in a cam-paign must frequently be dissected andevaluated by critical thinkers - inflex-ible adherence to doctrinal rigidity hin-ders critical thinking. If we, as tacticaland operational-level aviators, do notfrequently evaluate the threat's (andour own) decision-making, we guaran-tee an air campaign that lasts longerthan it should.

THE SEAO WAY FORWAROSeven months of enforcing a United

Nations No Fly Zone to protect civil-ians during the Libyan civil war of-fers SEAD and EW players an idealopportunity to stop our trend of Les-son Identification and ensure Les-sons Learned. We deceive ourselvesif we assume tomorrow's threat IADSwill look anything like past IADS. Theskill required of SEAD and EW play-ers to analyze the IADS, however, willapply to any possible type of IADS.When SEAD/EW players effectively usedoctrine as a general guideline only,employ critical thinking to accuratelyanalyze the IADS, and truly learn les-sons from past campaigns, then wewill become skilled tacticians in theArt of SEAD. ^

Maj Jeff "Seed" Kassebaum, USAF,is the weapons officer for the US AirForce's 390th Electronic Combat Squad-ron and is an exchange officer with theUS Navy flying EA-6B Prowlers. He isassigned to the Electronic Attack Weap-ons School at NAS Whidbey Island, WA.Previously, he served as an ElectronicWarfare Officer flying on EC-130H Com-pass Call aircraft for seven years at Da-vis-Monthan AFB, AZ and has fought inOperations Southern Watch, Iraqi Free-dom, Enduring Freedom, New Dawn,Willing Spirit and Unified Protector.Most recently he was the Chief of theSEAD Cell and EWCC for OUP. He can becontacted at [email protected] or (360) 257-10578.

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