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PEACE RESEARCH AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION*
by Ekkehart Krippendorff
1. Introduction
The beginnings of academic peace research inthe early 1960s
'were characterized by a mixture ofideological voluntarism and
methodological empiricism.A new value orientation, seeking to break
out of thevicious circle of the preponderantly
AngloSaxonpositivistic social sciences that had stagnated,
wasproclaimed and with "peace" as its standard. It was noaccident
that it met with such quick and widespreadapproval. To avoid
premature death by suffocation infundamental theoretical
discussion, which the thus-challenged social sciences sought, peace
researchersavoided commitment to a binding peace concept.
Theyconsciously evaded the question of peace research'sscientific
place in the context of the social scienceswhile battling their way
to respectability, armed withmethodologically strict, almost
incontestableempiricism.
Yet barely ten years were to pass before the dangersof this
double-edged research strategy for the coherenceof the once
"revolutionary" concept of early peaceresearch became clear. As the
axis of internationalpolitics moved from "East-West confrontation"
to a policyof cooperation among industrial nations of
bothcapitalist and communist origin, peace became legitimateforeign
policy (Willy Brandt receives the Nobel PeacePrize). The
provocative change of emphasis of the peaceresearch of the late 50s
and early 60s thus lost itssignificance for a reorientation of the
social sciences- or rather, that standpoint was recognized
andassimilated by the political establishments themselves.Peace
research
* first published as: Peace Research and the Industrial
Revolution. OccasionalPaper no. 3, The Johns Hopkins University,
Bologna Center, 1973; 36 S.
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was henceforth evoked, promoted, and subsidized by
thegovernments. At the same time, as the unavoidableconsequence of
the early evasion of theoreticalclarification and of unreflected
empiricism, many so-cial scientists were now able to latch onto the
newpeace research vogue without contradicting their owntheoretical
and methodological premises: sociologists,political scientists,
"international relationists", andeven (though to a lesser extent)
economists could sellthe old book with a new cover. After all,
everyone isfor peace, and for empiricallybacked research too.
Recently, the topic of imperialism has moved to thecenter of the
peace research debate (as the themes fordiscussion of the
International Peace ResearchAssociationi.n1969 and 1970
demonstrate) in a renewedattempt to draw a dividing line and avoid
the deadlyembrace of those traditional social sciences which
hadjumped onto the bandwagon. However, considering theunclarified
theory problem, it is not difficult topredict the outcome of this
discussion. With the growingconsciousness among the social and
political rulingelites in capitalist and communistic industrial
nationsof the need for hierarchical stabilization of
theinternational system (since the military, economic,
anddiplomatic stabilization of the center or the top ofthe pyramid
seems mainly to have succeeded), the themeof imperialism will
become legitimized. Research whichjustifies the hierarchical
dependence-structures willpass without contradiction under the
aegis of peaceresearch because it promotes stability.
These necessarily rough and polemically pointedgeneralizations,
sketching the brief history of thediscipline, are intended as the
basis for the assertionthat the fundamental discussion on content
and methodin peace research is no luxury to be reserved for
somefuture time. This debate belongs in the center ofdiscussion,
and not on its periphery. We must demand areversal of priorities if
peace research is tb remain trueto its own original program, namely
to be a criticalscience: the formation of a theory of peace
researchand a confirmation of its own substance are its
mostimportant tasks. Method
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ology and empiricism must and can find their meaningonly within
the framework of the former area. They mustderive from the
clarification of substance and theory, notvice versa. As we have
suggested, peace researchconsidered itself to be such a critical
science at thevery beginning. However, it was more a form
ofpolitical-moralistic dissent which could be relativelyeasily
overtaken and rejected given changed politicalconstellations, than
it was a theoretically founded andreflected dissent. But let us
consider the claim tocritical science as a more fundamental one:
namely scienceas the intellectual instrument for overcoming all
forms ofhierarchical societal status quos which
preserveinequalities; science as oriented toward
rationalenlightenment about existing relationships,
towardemancipation from all forms of indigenous dependency,towards
the creation of more and more advanced forms ofequality. If we
accept this definition of critical socialscience, then the question
as to the nature of the presentsocial systems which must be
overcome takes on centralimport,-.nce.
The specific object of peace research is indisputably thepresent
international system: its moral impetus is thesearch for
preconditions for the elimination of thosestructural elements of
the system which engender war andcollective destruction. It is not
an unfairsimplification of the present consensus among
peaceresearchers to reduce it to the following lowest
commondenominator: the recognition that the latent, or
manifest,collectively organized use of force represents a
decisivestructural characteristic of the international system.The
military organization of the international system,armaments, and
the military articulation as well as thesolution, of social
conflicts are not accidents, but ratherthe essence of foreign
policy and international relations.As our point of departure and as
the most importantguideline in peace research, we can take this
consensusabout the international system as a "threat" or
"feudal,system" (Boulding, Galtung), which must be
criticallyovercome and replaced by an egalitarian barter
system.However, a critical science needs more and
qualitativelydifferent material than the knowledge of the
mechanisms andthe techniques of
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This intended confirmation of peace research's actualobject of
study - the international threat or feudalsystem - can be
accomplished only through the seeminglyround-about reconsideration
of the genesis of today'sinternational system. Only if the securing
consensusover the reality of the international system isexpanded
and deepened to a consensus over the structuralgenesis of the
system as well, will peace research be ableto free itself from the
helplessness and paralysis whichpresently condemn it to the
empirically precise aposteriori analysis of one warlike conflict
after another,deducing it from distortions of mutual perceptions
orunfortunate incompatibilities. Then, and only then, aswe will try
to show, can peace research imply a praxis ofqualitative change
instead of mere curing of symptoms.
2. Consequences of the Industrial Revolution
The Industrial Revolution is the one archimedial pointfrom which
we can develop a theory of the presentinternational system with any
chance of success. In thewords of a leading social historian, the
IndustrialRevolution "has been like in effect to Eve's tasting
ofthe fruit of knowledge: the world has never been the
same."(Landes 1969, p. 12.) Or, in another no less inequivocaland
apodictic formulation: "The Industrial Revolutionmarks the most
fundamental transformation of human life inthe history of the world
recorded in written documents."(Hobsbawm 1969, p. 13.) Its
pre-history belongs in thecenter of our analysis as far as is
necessary, its historyproper - the last two centuries - as far as
possible.As history it represents the unfolding structure of
thepresent; and at the same time as an
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power politics, characteristic of our present inter-national
system, to enable the transition from theaggregate condition A to
the aggregate condition B.Above all, it must first ascertain the
logic andfunctionality of those mechanisms and techniques,clarify
their origins and their dependence upon thoseinternational social
structures which condition, produce,and constantly reproduce them.
Otherwise, peaceresearch will only deliver irrelevant utopias or
cure onlythe symptoms.
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as yet uncompleted movement, it holds the history ofour future.
History cannot here be written as therecording of chronological,
identifiable events orprocesses: rather it must uncover the logic
of this break inhuman development unprecedented in world history,
theempirical history of which is external to that logic and thusnot
essential. (Cf.Schmidt 1971, pp. 42 ff.) Just what isthis
qualitative change of world society through the socialrevolution is
the question that must be asked. We canrelatively easily
demonstrate it quantitatively by the fol-lowing random examples
(though surprisingly enough they havenot as yet been thematized for
our problem area)
- The radius of destruction of weapons remained de factoconstant
throughout all of recorded history. It changedonly minimally with
the invention of gunpowder; only withthe invasion of technology
into the military sphere didthe curve leave the horizontal and
shoot to great heights,reaching a maximum today which can hardly be
raised.
- While the number of warlike conflicts seems to havedecreased
since, say, the 13th century (cf. Mushkat 1970,p. 248), the curve
of war-deaths shows a sudden jump in thefirst third of the 19th
century after centuries ofrelative stagnation: from less than 2
million until mid-century to considerably over 40 million a mere
centurylater. (Russett 1965, p. 12 ff.)
- We can chart an exceedingly dramatic and impressivedevelopment
in the growth of world population. With certainfluctuations and
deviations irrelevant here, it firstchanged from a slow and hardly
discernible growth to thatexplosion, that avalanche, which is today
viewed as anatural catastrophe. (See inter alia the graphs
inDesmond 1964, p. 32.)
- Or let us consider the explosive increase. in thespeed of
communication, the "mobiletic revolution"(Russett 1967, p. 23). The
transmission of news,transport of goods, personal travel, and, not
least,military mobility had remained more or less
constantthroughout recorded history. Then, with the inven
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tion of the clipper ship, the steamboat, the rail-road,
automobile, airplane, and telegraph and tele-phone, all distances
were rapidly reduced to thephysically conceivable"minimum.
- While in the centuries prior to the IndustrialRevolution the
production of goods (here calculatedvery roughly) on a world scale
rose barely 0.1 per centper capita, we find in the last one hundred
years anincrease of 2.6 percent per capita per annum. To put
itdifferently and more dramatically, world productionsince the
Industrial Revolution represents more than manhas produced in all
recorded history taken together. (Cf.inter alia Dobb 1963, p. 9
ff.) Thus the economic historiancan correctly assert "the
Englishman of 1750 was closer inmaterial things to Caesar's
legionnaires than to his owngreat-grandchildren. 7"
We could extend such a catalog of quantitative empiricaldata
indefinitely to support our assertion that with theIndustrial
Revolution (set down here withoutdifferentiation, as a kind of
catchword) a qualitativebreak occurred. This was a rupture
unprecedented insocial, economic, and also intellectual history and
thusalso in politics; in relationships between groups,classes, and
peoples; and international relations, whichare of particular
interest to us here. A graphicrepresentation of those aspects and
any number of otherpossible variables (urbanization,
literacy-illiteracy,book production, scientific discoveries, number
ofscientists) would result again in practically identicalcurves
with only some short-term deviations and timelaps: level, only
slightly rising or stagnating untilthe end of the 18th century,
then suddenly jumping,becoming vertical in almost all cases in the
last fiftyyears up till the present.
Let us approach the analysis from that perspectivemost favorable
for examining the problem area of specificinterest here - the
international system. Somehow, theAge of Discovery - the fanning
out of Venetian, Spanish,Portuguese, Dutch, English, and other
adventurers insearch of exotic riches, faster trade routes, and
slaves- lies in causal relation
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ship to the chronologically later manifest explosion ofall
realms of life. This "somehow" must be sought inthe successive
formation of a West European merchantBourgeoisie, the.economic way
of thinking which it exuded,quickly infecting diplomats, royal
houses, and statesmen.The growing need for cash among European
monarchs -who, allying themselves with the bourgeoisie, had put
downthe nobles and were preparing the way for the developmentof
territorially integrated and increasingly rationallyadministrated
states - had as a result "that in the 15thand 16th centuries,
statesmen, secular and ecclesiastical,thought more of economic
factors than they had previouslydone." (Cambridge Economic History,
Vol.IV, p.323.) Herein certain parts of Western Europe in the 15th
and 16thcenturies the symbiosis of political social power
andeconomic productivity demonstrated already in the
ItalianRenaissance though initially.without consequence
begins;economic power becomes synonymous with the development
ofpolitical and military power, and finally power inforeign policy.
Here dynastic group conflicts begin tobe transformed into economic
conflicts significantin.principle to the entire society. At the end
of the16th century, for example, we find the first attempt (onthe
part of Spain) to incite the population of another country(England)
to overthrow their government through embargo -the prerequisite for
such strategy being, of course, thatElizabethan England was already
socially vulnerable dueto its dependence on international trade.
With colonialdiscovery, takeover, and plundering to the benefit
ofthe militarily partially superior (and in many
respectsadministratively more disciplined and certainly
moreunscrupulous) European invaders and those who sent them,.wefind
the beginnings of world unity and global penetrationwhich was to
reach completion by the end of the 19th.century.
For the first time, the conflicts among an extremelysmall group
of politically organized units, the newEuropean states, began to be
world wars. And so theysince remained. Speaking of the Dutch wars
ofindependence (1598-1669), which the Dutch bourgeoisielogically
extended to the Hapsburg resources in theircolonies and along the
trade routes,2 a historian haspointed out: "Since the Iberian
posses-
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lions were scattered around the world, the ensuingstruggle was
waged on four continents and' on. seven seas;and this seventeenth
century contest deserves to be calledthe First World War rather
than the holocaust of 1914-18which is commonly awarded that dubious
honour" (C. R.Boxer, 1969, p. 106).
At this time the development of the modern rationalbureaucratic
state also begins, a modern European creation.(Weber 1956, p. 823
ff.) The genesis of this state is notonly closely linked to the
rise of the early bourgeoisie.3
At its cradle stood not only the "military-industrial-complex",
which has falsely been discovered onlyrecently;4 this state also
developed in the context of therapidly growing administrative
expenses and richesaccumulated during colonization.. This modern
state -without which no theory of international relationsthinks it
could exist and which later gave us nationalism,the world wars, and
today's pathological threat system -is both product and promotor of
the early release of produc-tive forces and their expansive
dynamics. Yet it is byno means a timeless, indigenous olitical form
existingbeyond history or even recenf history.5
With the West European expansion in the 15th,16th, and 17th
centuries, world society also begins to growapart, divided into
"poor" and "wealthy" nations, aprocess which has only recently been
recognized in its fullsignificance. At that time the prerequisites
werecreated for the development of underdevelopment in Asia,Africa,
and Latin America, as well as for the rapid takeoffof today's
developed nations themselves. Even though WestEurope as a whole was
probably always a wealthier continentthan Africa or Latin America
even before the IndustrialRevolution, we must point out that in the
17th century, say,the order of magnitude was still comparable.
Today'sdramatic gap between developed and underdevelopedcountries
remained relatively insignificant into the 19thcentury; the
difference in niveau in culture, the military,political
organization, and in economics was actually firstcreated in the
course of colonialism, mercantilism, andimperialism and represents
the price paid for theestablishment of world unity which was
determined in itssubstance by the
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expansive West European bourgeoisie. The disruption ofAfrican
and South American political cultures is just asmuch a part of this
process as, for example, thedestruction of flourishing textile
industries in Indiaby weaker English competition.6 As late as 1819
a Frenchscholar could write: "in manufacturing, art, andindustry,
China and Indostan, though inferior, seem to benot much inferior to
any part of Europe" (CambridgeEconomic History Vol. VI/I,.p. 4). It
would be false tolink the process of original accumulation -
theprerequisite for the later breakthrough of thecapitalistic mode
of production - exclusively or evenprimarily to the riches wrung
out of the conquered colonialterritory, although they were
quantitatively quitesignificant.7 It would also be false to place
slave tradeand plantation economy at the basis of West
Europeancapital accumulation, although this important aspect must
notbe overlooked. (Williams 1966.) It is simply indisputablethat
the capital resulting from plunder, exploitation andunequal trade,
even if considered marginal to theeconomic rise of Western Europe,
an the whole meantincomparably more to the victims of European
expansion:namely, the total destruction of all development
potentialthrough decimation of their resources as well as
throughthe much more momentous destruction of their own culturesand
socio-cultural infrastructures. (Polanyi 1957, p.159 f.)
Therefore, historical reconsideration of the entireproblem of
development is of pressing importance. Onlyby taking the trouble to
backtrack can we avoid themisleading path down which much of the
literature aboutdeveloping nations and development economy would
leadus: the victory of the bourgeoisie and of thecapitalistic mode
of production provided a prerequisitefor Europe's meteroic rise to
master of the world. Europe'srise, however, was equally dependent
on an international"vacuum" or the creation of such a vacuum,
dependent uponan environment in which it could do as it
pleasedmilitarily, economically, and politically. Europe'scapital
accumula tion was one of trade capital; this wasbased not, or
minimally, on inter-European trade, butrather on world trade. The
great empires of the 16thcentury provided the decisive
preconditions for thetransfor-
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mation of money into capital through the new capital-istic mode
of production which lives from export-man-ufacture. (Marx 1953, p.
410. )
For the moment let us set aside the question ofwhy the
qualitative breakthrough to the IndustrialRevolution in the
narrower sense took place in England,8
for this belongs to the field of comparative Europeansocial
history. The irrevocable prerequisite for thissudden change toward
self-sustaining economic growth -the most important characteristic
of the IndustrialRevolution - was undoubtedly a worldwide foreign
trade,within a formal or informal politically controlledempire.
(Fischer 1968, p. 9.) "An increased dependenceon the rest of the
world seems to be a condition ofeconomic growth for the e-,
conomics based on privateenterprise" (Cambridge Economic History,
Vol. VI/I,p.52). Since these preconditions no longer exist for
the"Third World" countries, which were bowled over by thebeginnings
of this development two to three hundredyears ago, it goes without
saying not only that thedevelopment model of private enterprise
offered ordictated to them with either real or assumed naivenessis
excluded, but that economic growth in an alreadyoccupied, satiated
world economy becomes a near hopelesstask under present
conditions.
The re-examination of th_t historic structures of theIndustrial
Revolution in its international context isnecessary to the
definition of what Johan Galtung, the mostprominent contemporary
peace researcher, has called"structural violence": that veiled
violence latent inall societal structures based on inequality.
(Galtung1969.) This structural violence must be sought not onlyin
the genesis of the modern state, i.e.
inner-societally_(Krippendorff 1971), but equally much inglobal
societal context since the beginning of thepresent era. Thus Karl
Marx, who left no doubt as to theworld historical revolutionary
character of the middleclass (cf. above all the Communist
Manifesto),characterized the worldwide genesis of the
capitalistmode of production as "dripping blood from all poresfrom
head to toe". (Marx 1962, p. 788.) To some, this mayseem a
politically agitatory, unscientific distortion ofthe
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truth, yet it is unfortunately all too true. Onlythe visible
calculable figures are known, as for ex-ample the extermination of
the whole indigenous popu-lation in the Caribbean from the arrival
of Columbus in1492, (300,000) until when some 50 years later,
only500 were left (Cambridge Economic History, Vol. IV, p.319); the
number of unnatural deaths due to dislocation,slave transport,
hunger, exploitation, and"pacification" crusades are inestimü,_ble.
At the originsof this world unity, which was the product of
economiccalculation and which became the vehicle of economicgrowth
and the Industrial Revolution, stood overt andmanifest violence
that sublimated itself to latentstructural violence only after
having fulfilled itshelping role. Yet it can still be called up
again andemployed to preserve the structures of dependence.
Since peace research has received such a crucialimpetus from the
counter-productive poss_bility of awarlike solution to
socio-economic and political con-flict, it is obvious that war in
its narrowest senseshould be included in this analysis. This
phenomenon"war" should also support the assertion that a
quali-tative leap took place in global societal developmentat the
time of the Industrial Revolution. Complementingthe logic of the
thesis developed here (thoughnecessarily rudimentary in its
details), we find thatthe word "war" has by no means defined the
samephenomenon under all historical circumstances: war atthe
present stage of history is qualitatively differentfrom and thus
incomparable to war in ancient China, inpre-colonial India, in the
old imperial states, or inthe Middle Ages. The decisive
turning-point from pre-industrial warfare to modern warfare can be
set at thebreak-through of technology when the military sector took
onhistorically unprecedented significance for economicgrowth; and,
vice versa, when scientific-technicalinventions began to be used
for warlike disputes betweenstates, inventions which themselves
must be understood as.unctiorally dependent upon the socio-economic
take-oEfof the West European societies. This symbiosis of
tech-nology and armaments is most clearly demonstrated intoday's
potential for total destruction. However, weusually overlook the
fact that this symbiosis is a
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recent phenomenon first made possible by the appearanceof a
revolutionary middle class in history, the modernstate, and the use
of armaments as an instrument ofcapitalistic economic growth. (Cf.
Nef 1963; Kidron1970.) Those who study war as a historical continum
andsearch for highly problematical biological andanthropological
roots (which does not exclude a subjectiveyet objectively helpless
condemnation of war), areespecially apt to overlook this fact.9
This qualitativechange in war from a subordinate component of
politicalinteractions in the pre-industrial era to the
centralelement, the rational operative core of foreign policy
andinternational relations (the deterrence system), in
theindustrial age found its concrete expression in the
changedconduct of war. Friedrich Engels, one of the mostimportant
military scholars of his day, had alreadypointed out the inner
connection between middle classemancipation and modern warfare.
(Engels 1958, p. 218.) Itis no accident that this new form of
warfare begins withthe French Revolution, the first bourgeois
revolutionarystate, and finds its first culmination in the strategy
ofbattles such as practiced at Magenta and Solferino
(1859),Königgrätz (1866), and Sedan (1870) which concentratedall
socio-economic resources on the "decisive battle."
"In Western Europe until the first part of the 17thcentury,
warfare was a way of life for considerablesections of society, its
termination was for them acatastrophe, and its prolongation,
official orunofficial, was the legitimate objective of everyman of
spirit. Even in the 17th and 18th centuries,war, elaborate and
formal as it had become, was anaccepted, almost indispensable part
of the patternof society, and it was curtailed and intermittentonly
because of its mounting expense. If warcould be made to pay, as it
did for the Dutchmerchants in the 17th century and the English
inthe 18th, then its declaration was as welcome asits terminati'on
was deplored. (Howard 1971, p.204.)
From this indigenous propensity of the modernstate for war and
for self-realization through war10
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emerged not only the strategy of the "decisive battle",but also
its ultimate atrophy as manifested in theFirst and Second World
Wars (Wallach 1967).
...although military developments over the past100 years had
established the principle, indeed thedogma of the "decisive battle"
as the focus of allmilitary (and civil) activity, parallel
politicaland social development had been making itincreasingly
difficult to achieve this kind of"decision" ...And once war became
a matter ofcompeting economic resources, social stability
andpopular morale, it became too serious a businessto be left to
the generals. Operations againbecame only one factor out of many
ininternational struggle... (Howard 1971, p. 188ff.)
The symbiosis of politics, economy, and social orderwith war as
the omnipresent possibility and ultima ratiofor conflict
resolutions characterizes, no matter whatthe concrete
metamorphosis, national systems and theinternational system o our
nearly 200 year old presentepoch.
In order to produce relevant findings that will helptransform
the system, peace research must penetrate theseinterconnections.
These are, both in specific casesand in the general historical
structural context, by nomeans simple but rather highly
contradictory and complex.
Let us summarize the argument thus far: we haveassumed that
peace research reflects a contemporary"crisis-consciousness" and
attempts to define thisconsciousness in scientific terms. Peace
research thusrightly concentrates on the question of the
transformationof the present international system and those
elementssupporting it insofar as they involve use of the threatof
organized military violence as a solution to social
andinternational conflicts. In more closely defining
thecrisis-character of the international system, weasserted and
illustrated selectively that it is acontemporary phenomenon, the
beginning of recenthistory in this context being set at the
IndustrialRevolution; and
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that the latter marks a "qualitative break" with pre-vious
history. The character of conflict specific tothe present cannot be
understood with the aid of sup-posedly timelessly valid scientific
laws, nor in termsof political categories which originated under
pre-industrial conditions. Rather, it must be developed suigeneris
from the genesis and structural logic of thatrevolutionary break
itself. Thus, beginning peaceresearch with the social history of
this IndustrialRevolution, with. the prehistory and evolution
ofcolonialism and.imperialism, with the creation of themodern state
in the context of a qualitatively new system ofproduction, with the
intimate intermeshing of moderntechnological destructive potential
with skyrocketingeconomic development (its prerequisite and at the
same timeits function) is only seemingly a detour.
3. Defining the Industrial Revolution
Having reached this point, we must develop a moreconcrete
definition of the substance of the IndustrialRevolution. Until now,
we have only referred to itsconsequences for the system of
international.relations.We must add that any definition must
necessarily remaina limited one, developed for the purposes of our
specificsubject matter only - a definition projected andconceived
in terms of the subject of study, theinternational system.
A more or less orthodox chronological history wouldbegin the
Industrial Revolution in England in the finalthird of the 18th
century, pointing out staggered phasesof several decades each in
the course of its expansion toFrance, Germany, Italy, and in its
own specific way tothe United States. Such a history would
differentiate, toa certain extent with good reason, between
revolutionarysocial changes in the 16th and 17th centuries, the
rise ofthe bourgeoisie as a revolutionary class, the appearance
ofan occasionally also religiously motivated economicattitude,
etc., on the one hand, and the substitution ofmachines for humans
in production, of manufacture andindustry for hand craftsmanship,
of mechanical energy foranimal power on the other (the latter being
the truecharacteristics of the Indus
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3
1
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trial Revolution). This kind of differentiation would,and will,
become relevant for us only in dealing withthe concrete analysis of
the history of the internationalsystem, and in proving how its
sociopolitical and militaryconflicts have depended on the
inequalities andcontradictions developing at an international level
inthis process.
For our purposes, it will be necessary to stress theunity and
inner logic of these two different streamswithin one process, which
manifested itself as colonialexpansion, the formation of the modern
state, the rise of amiddle class which broke through the static
system ofEuropean feudalism, as an economic way of thinking,
andfinally as the revolutionary liberation of the forces
ofproduction. (Cf. inter alia Nef 1967; Kulischer 1928;Haussherr
1955.) It will not be necessary to go intothe "actual causes" of
these upheavals in this connection,or why they occurred in Western
Europe and not in Asia, forexamplell - questions which in the final
analysis canonly be answered hypothetically and with
(legitimate)speculation. In order to understand truly the
essence,to get at the roots of the driving forces behind
thedevelopment of the international system, we must stressthe
dialectical relationship between territorialdiscoveries outside
Europe and the European bourgeoisie,between world trade and the
accumulation of capital amongcompanies doing trade, between
colonialism and theformation of the modern state, between the
control ofmarkets outside Europe and growth in European
production,between the global policy (Weltpolitik) of
individualEuropean countries and the Industrial Revolution.Neither
the Industrial Revolution in its narrower sensenor the birth of the
revolutionary middle class in thewidest sense are conceivable
without their intercontext,the opening up and potential conquest of
othercontinents.
The Industrial Revolution as a part of the bourgeoisrevolution
tends, therefore, to become identical with thecapitalist
revolution. Our historical present is acreation of capitalism;.its
various manifestations, notleast on the level of international or
world politics arefunctions of the capitalist mode of production.
Thiscapitalist mode of produc
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tion is in turn dialectically intermeshed with a newideological
orientation, "the economic way of thinking",which is in turn the
product of this innovative mode ofproduction and finds its specific
expression in theprinciple of maximization of profits as the
orientationpoint in social behavior. There is no doubt that
atvarious moments in history under the most varyingsocial
circumstances - e.g. in classical' Rome - therehave been enormous
concentrations of wealth, ofcapital. However, wealth in the
capitalist system, asdistinguished from all other forms of wealth,
is not anend in and of itself, accumulated for purposes ofluxury,
splendor, and consumption: it is surplus valuegenerating surplus
value in the early stages ofaccumulation, indeed, admonishing
renunciation of allsuch indulgences. "Accumulate, accumulate,
accumulate!That is Moses and the Prophets", as Karl Marx put
it.(1962, p. 621.) Bourgeois wealth - based on trade,colonial
exploitation, or revolutionary forms ofagricultural production - is
invested that it mayproductively multiply. 'It was the Industrial
Revolutionin its narrow sense, i.e. the introduction of capital
intomanufacture and then industrial production itself, whichmade
first England, then Europe, the "workshop of theworld" and thus
initiated the divergent development ofworld society into the rich
and the poor nations.Profit maximization was the motive - by no
meansunconscious - of those who financed the adventurer-discoverers
of the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries, thosewho founded colonies,
who created race problems in allcorners of the world with their
slave trade, who sought anddefended more direct trade routes, who
built fleets,created nation-states and nationalism, who
calculatedwith wars and world wars to secure and increase whathad
been accomplished and could even earn money on thepreparations,
through armaments industry. Profitmaximization was and is the
vehicle of progress in thecapitalist mode of production. Its
concrete man-ifestations present themselves to us among other
me-diated forms as world or international politics and asindustrial
revolution.
In the meantime, in the course of the last 200 years,these and
other manifestations or forms of capitalism haveasserted their
independence. An ana
16
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lytical effort, as always laborious, is necessary tocomprehend
them as still being a function of the basiclaws of the
bourgeois-capitalist revolution. This isespecially true of the
histroically unprecedentedskyrocketing rise of economic growth
which was causallylinked to the liberation of the productive
forces. Tohave made the quantitative increase of Gross
NationalProduct the axiomatic criterion of success among almostall
contemporary political classes and elites -regardless of their
different ideological orientationsas nationalist, "communist",
"democratic", or "unallied"- demonstrates more than anything else
the universalsuccess of capitalism. A sluggish or stagnating GNP
isinterpreted in East and West, North and South as apolitical
failure, as proof of an unhealthy society - oras a criterion of
progress and cultural standards. Theattempt by the People's
Republic of China in the courseof its Cultural Revolution (which
was withouthistorical precedent and therefore dramatic and
moving,nonetheless most likely condemned to failure, given
thepresent international context) to question quality andthe social
relevance of increased production has largelybeen either completely
misunderstood or condescended toas naive Utopianism. A statement
like the following oneby President Nyerere need not sound "false",
i.e.utopian, just because it openly contradicts therealities of
foreign determinations of the Tanzanianeconomy and the physical
proximity of a Portuguesecolony, or, more important, because it
goes against theonce specifically capitalistic, now universalized
dogmaof economic growth as the natural goal of every
policy,especially the policy of an "underdeveloped" country:
Inherent in the Arusha Declaration, therefore, isthe rejection
of the concept of national grandeuras distinct from the well-being
of its citizens,and a rejection too, of material wealth for itsown
sake. It is a commitment to the belief thatthere are more important
things in -life than theamassing of riches and that if the' pursuit
ofwealth clashes with things like human dignity andsocial equality,
then the latter will be givenpriority... With our present level of
economicactivity, and our present
17
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poverty, this may seem to be an academic point; butin reality it
is very fundamental. So it meansthat there are certain things which
we shallrefuse to do or accept, whether as individuals oras a
nation, even if the result of them would givea surge forward in our
economic development.(Nyerere quoted in Jenkins 1970, p. 41.)
In the last few years, for the first time, we havetaken the
first cautious steps towards developing a newconsciousness of the
problems posed by a furtherdimension of the capitalist-initiated
dogma of growthwhich takes the form of ecological threats to
indus-trial societies (cf. Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1970; Foster1971),
and the consequences for the future of the in-ternational system,
for poverty, underdevelopment, andT;rarlike conflict, the outlines
of which are only nowbecoming visible. The probability that the
world'sphysical resources are simply not sufficient to raisethe
poor societies to even approximately the materiallevel of today's
industrial nations means that theextreme discrepancy between North
and South will remaina permanent fixture of the international
system, even ifthe wealthy - above all the capitalist -
industrialsocieties should today declare an economic policy
ofzero-growth - which is of course completely out of
thequestion.
The fourth of the essential characteristics of theIndustrial
Revolution, expounded here for the purposeof our discussion, is the
internationalism which hasbeen referred to repeatedly.
Internationalism wasessential in more than one sense: First, one
has torecognize the inner connection between the capitalistsocial
revolution and the existence of a global, non-capitalist "vacuum"
which represented the prerequisitefor its full development.
Precisely this vacuum wasmissing for geographic (Cipolla 1969) or
perhaps politicalreasons in the premature forerunners of capitalism
in theItalian city-states as compared to the Spanish-Portuguese,
Dutch, and the English world empires. Second,it is the capitalist
mode of production itself,oriented toward profit maximization, by
definitionexpansive, which is and must be internationalist;
it"thustranscends the state and the na
18
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tion, although it must on the other hand assert itselfas a
nationality to the outside world and at home mustorganize itself as
a state." (Marx & Engels 1953, p. 33.)National encapsulation
and internationalistic self-realization - the basic contradiction
which above all ledto the two great-World Wars of this century -
arestructurally connected through the concentration ofeconomic,
military and organized political violence inthe metropolises. The
history of the world becomes thehistory of Europe (including the
US); the history of Europebecomes world history of the bourgeoisie,
or in-otherwords: "this bourgeois society, the true hearth and
publicsquare of history". (Marx & Engels 1953, p. 33.) It is
the In-dustrial Revolution (in the narrow sense of the word)
whichcreates the technical, physical prerequisites
foruniversalization of the capitalist mode of production
andthus,globalizes its inherent self-contradictions
-internationalist dynamics and national politicalorganization,
accumulation of capital and wealth in thehands of a few, and
world-wide social poverty. (Polyani1957, pp..76, 130.) Economic
crises while by no meansalways the direct cause of international
political conflict(cf. inter alia Böhme 1968, p. 20 ff.),
nonethelessconstitute the basic structural framework for national
andforeign policy oriented toward avoiding such.crises.This, again
is a specifically modern phenomenon: "Criseshave occurred in the
true sense of the word only with theevent of industrialization and
market expansion that havecharacterized the capitalist countries in
the last 150years." (Flamant & Singer-Kerel 1970, p. 7.)
Attempts, typical of the 20th century, to rationalizethe
international system through international law, tolegitimize the
sovereign natior.-states as the subject ofa binding universal code
of law, including attempts tocreate a world organization based on
parliamentaryprinciples (League of Nations, United Nations) -
allderive from the bourgeois-capitalist conception oforder.
Having reached this point in the outline of an
analyticalframework for peace research, we might now
meaningfullybegin again at the beginning - i.e. undertake a
detailedqualified historical analysis of
19
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the structure of the international system as it de-veloped in a
multitude of phases, self-contradictory andyet coherent. We would
again trace the rise of themiddle class and the development of the
capitalist modeof production in Western Europe as they
manifestthemselves in foreign policy and the internationalsystem;
but this time we would place special emphasison the inequalities
and staggered developmental phaseswhich generated conflict. We
would then not merelydistinguish between the various phases - the
age ofdiscovery, early colonialism, mercantilism, informalfree
trade empire, imperialistic colonialism,imperialistic
anti-colonialism, etc. The Europeanconflicts at the turn of the
19th century, the "hundredyears' peace" (1815-1914), and the two
World Wars wouldnot be written off as the "same old world
conflict", butinterpreted more specifically and exactly as they
existin direct connection with the sporadic and unequaldevelopment
of capitalist industrialization in England onthe one hand, and on
the continent and in the US on the oth-er. We could try to
demonstrate that the social ten-sion and the upheavals which
manifested themselves inthe various frustrated revolutions in
Europe, each withits own reverberations outside Europe (e.g.
LatinAmerica independence) can be traced directly back to
theattempt of the elites and ruling classes - which werepartially
feudal, partially already bourgeois, partiallybureaucratic - to
catch up with the English. It wasGreat Britain which had
established a tremendous lead inthe race for economic power; and by
imitating them, thecompetitors introduced a
capitalist-industrialrevolution from above - with particularly
spectularsuccess in Germany and Japan.
The collapse of Czarist Russia should also be in-terpreted in
this context of world capitalism. Aboveall, however, the rise of
the socialist Soviet Union andits survival as an organized
contradiction to theimperialist international system would be seen
as theresult of the failure of socialist. revolutions in
thecapitalist metropolises themselves. Thus its existenceto this
day would be viewed as an indirect manifestationof the only
half-broken vitality of capitalism on aworld scale.
20
-
We would have to show that the dramatic post-warperiod of
decolonization, US leadership, and the rise ofThird World nations
to subjects of the internationalsystem demonstrate the flexibility
and adaptability ofthe capitalist industrial states to changed
conditions.But at the same time, a new expression of
organizedcontradiction of the capitalist world system in the formof
revolutionary China has entered the scene and thusimpeded its
political manageability.
In short: we could try to isolate the various formsof the
international system from its spontaneous, naivebeginnings to the
structured, manipulated "UN formation"(the previously-mentioned
"feudal" or "threat-system")without losing sight of its historical
structural unityas the evolution, development, and self-realization
ofcapitalism amidst all these differentiations andconverging
contradictions.
4. Concrete Applications
This line of analysis will be developed at a later time.Here we
shall conclude by mentioning examples ofpreliminary interpretations
of three problems ofparticular interest to peace researchers. These
shoulddemonstrate why they, like a multitude of other subjects
forstudy. and topical conflicts, can be deciphered only in
theframework of the concert of the system outlined here.This
approach implies the analytical preparation of
thecounter-strategies and practical solutions tailored forpolitical
practice - which defines, indeed, the scientificidentity and the
credentials to praxiS of peace research,about which all peace
researchers agree in principle.
As the first problem area, I have chosen militaryarmaments and
the international arms race. This is aphenomenon which has, after
all, provided the moralistic,naive impetus for peace research and
the peace movementitself in the past. As the second problem area, I
shallchoose the developing countries, or rather therelationship
between underdevelopment, poverty, and theuse of force. This is a
subject which has only recently,and therefore all the more
intensely, come to the attentionof peace research.
21
-
As a third area, I shall isolate a specific case whichfor years
has been unsolved ans will remain so formany years to come, and
which harbors to a particulardegree the potential of a world war:
the Arab-Israeliconflict. One could, of course, have chosen
Vietnam,Bangla Desh, 3iafra, or South Africa just as well.
1) Armaments and the arms race appear to be as old aspolitical
history: the cliche "si vis pacem para bellum"has become a
permanent fixture of so-called commonsense., Should the historical
critical approach of peaceresearch require further substantiation,
it would lie inthe following assertion: only a careful review
ofhistory will cure us of the false consciousness and theparalysis
in political action which is fixated in suchstereotype beliefs.
We have already mentioned the specifically new rolewhich
military organization and armament played instimulating the
development of capitalism,-at least incontinental Europe. The
tl=esis that the modern bourgeoisstate bore the scar of the
militaryindustrial complex atbirth will have to be critically
examined anddifferentiated, but should nonetheless lead to a
moreconcrete and more operational understanding of therelationship
between states, class dominance, economy,and technology in the
capitalist system. Thanks in greatpart to the revolutionary studies
of Richardson, webegan to know much about the quantitative course
of armsraces, as well as the perceptual aspects of arms races
whichcan lead to ever-intensifying hostile attitudes andeventually
to war.12 We also know about the (US)armaments sector and its
inner-social and economicintermeshing, due not least to the alarm
signalled byliberal economists since the 1960s. What by contrastare
almost completely lacking are analyses of the socialprocesses
through which armaments stabilize and supportthemselves
domestically, and analyses of the function ofarmaments for
"progress" as it was inaugurate and laterdefined by the capitalist
revolution.
Last but not least, we lack analyses of the sociallystabilizing
function of armaments and the mili
22
-
tary apparatus in those countries - like the FederalRepublic of
Germany - where the military-industrialcomplcx plays no
quantitatively important role.l4 Thisfoundation would enable us to
grasp military autism,i.e. armament as removed from its original
socio-economicbasis and following its own inner logic.
On the one hand, there is no doubt that armament hasa different
function in a system with a centrally-plannedeconomy (like the
Soviet Union) than in the capitalistsystem. On the other hand,
there is no doubt that withregard to the growing militarization of
the internationalsystem, including arms trade with the Third World
(cf.SIPRI 1971), such "socialist" armament scarcelydistinguished
itself functionally or technologicallyfrom capitalist armament.
Doubt does exist, however, asto whether such "socialist armament"
is or has become justas inherent to the socialist system as
capitalist armamentis to the capitalist system. The hypothetical
answerwithin the interpretational framework developed herewould run
as follows: technologically intensive armament inthe Soviet Union,
linked to industrial potential andpotential for growth, is a
function of the threat to thisfirst non-capitalist system, a threat
which has existedfrom the moment the USSR/Russia broke away from
thecapitalist world system. This kind of armament was forcedupon
the USSR, and has in the meantime gained a degree ofindependence
which has not yet been satisfactorilyanalysed. In the capitalist
system, on the contrary,armament and economic growth, armament and
thetechnological development have determined one anotherab initio;
they are dialectically linked, even where thisleads to potentially
self-destructive autism.Accordingly, one should compare the
beginnings ofarmament and the formation of the modern state, of
thearms race as motivated by domestic and power politics inthe
capitalist system on the one hand,15 with thebeginnings of Soviet
and now Chinese strategic armament onthe other hand - or the
obviously externally-inducedarms race of,the nations of the Third
World.
To be sure, one could at first sight present con-vincing reasons
as to why one should let "history re-main history", and in view of
the acute threat
23
-
through A, B, and C weapons, why peace research
shouldconcentrate its efforts an developing mechanisms toprevent
the outbreak of warlike conflicts, channellingthem through
armaments control mechanisms. However, onecould object - and I feel
one must object - that suchpreventive measures have already been
practiced andbeen-institutionalized more or less competently, more
orless successfully by a technologically schooled andqualified
group of expert-diplomats; and they willcontinue to be perfected
without ever being able to getat the roots of the problem. Such a
practice-orientedpeace research would at best have servicing
functions;more likely still, it would not even equal
theintellectual qualification of the practitioners, of
theinternational threat system, but merely follow in
theirfootsteps. If critical peace research is to overcome thesystem
itself, it must begin farther back in order to reachthe more
ambitious goal. It must start earlier inorder to go farther.
2) The same is true in principle of the problem
ofunderdevelopment (the growing gap between rich and poorsocieties
in general) and true of the increase inviolent conflict in poor
countries in particular.McNamara, while still in his capacity as US
DefenseMinister and thus perhaps as the first authority,
assertedthat such a connection exists between the increase
ofviolent conflict and poverty in the nations of theThird World
(McNamara in Newsweek, 18 May 1966). Takinga broad scope and with a
different cognition interest,Istvan Kende implied that a Third
World War had alreadybroken out. (Kende 1971.) However, as Galtung
has pointedout, peace research can claim the Third World
problemarea as its own, not only because of the topicality ofactual
outbreaks of violence: it must try to get to theirroots in social
inequality whether or not suchinequalities lead to violent conflict
in any givencase. In this sense, the development of
underdevelopmentin the context of the international system
represents acentral theme for peace research. (Galtung 1969.)
Two aspects in particular must be analyzed here:First, this
historically unique phenomenon, underde-velopment, must be
interpreted in the context of the
24
-
development of the capitalist world system itself andnot as some
regrettable backwardness amongst the peo-ples of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, as compared tothe technological breakthroughs in
Europe and America.Export of know-how - technical, administrative,
as wellas political and economic organizational imitation - isonly
feasible between structurally similar societies.This we have seen
from the relationship betweenEngland, where the Industrial
Revolution (in the narrowsense of the word) took place, and the
Europeancontinent and the United States. The development ofthese
European societies and the English "breakthrough"in particular are,
however, themselves intimatelyintermeshed with the subordination of
nonEuropeansocieties. More important, or rather more concretely,the
capitalist model of development, examined in itshistorical origins,
itself demonstrates the necessityfor open territories for expansion
as the preconditionfor the possibility of a "take-off". From a
historicalviewpoint, these relationships have today been
clarifiedto a great extent; the consequences, however,
remainunclarified. This would not only prohibit thestructural
transferal of this capitalist model ofdevelopment, which as a rule
is abstracted from theinternational context and reduced solely to
allegedinternal processes of accumulation, to the rise of
abourgeoisie of trade and industry as a stimulus todevelopment, to
the accumulation of capital through asurplus-value (Mehrwert)
producing working class, etc.Also, it would logically mean that the
capitalist worldsystem qua capitalist system is structurally
incapableof bringing the developing countries up to the level
ofproductivity of the capitalist metropolises and theirstandard of
living. Until now, peace research hasscarcely concerned itself with
this global economicanalysis; even where it has begun to focus upon
imperialismas a socio-political structural problem, it remains
es-sentially static, socio-economically void of substance.(Galtung
1971b, p. 81 ff.) The preconditions for removingviolent conflicts
between Third World societies, can besought through orly roundabout
analysis of the reproductionmechanisms of the capitalist world
system, and byovercoming this system at its centers.
25
-
If, however, the as yet unsatisfactorily-foundedconjectures
shou--d prove true, namely that the world'sexisting ~jhysical
resources are insufficient toguarantee those living today (not to
mention theexpected increased world population) even
approximatelythe standard of living of the developed
industrialnations, then the demands for far-reaching change ofthe
capitalist mode of production (which, mentionedearlier, has
subjugated even the non-capitalist SovietUnion, etc., to its
pressure for uncritically forcedeconomic growth), will not be
sufficient. This implies,moreover, the - likewise historically
unprecendented -necessity to transfer production capacity away from
thedeveloped centers. Indeed, it implies for them anegative
economic growth.
Second, underdevelopment and the political conflictswhich it
produces will necessitate in peace research areflection over the
problem of violence, a reflectionwhich instead of merely covering
up the problem withwell-meaning pacifism, can differentiate
betweenprogressive and repressive violence in this concretecase.
The clearer it becomes that underdevelopment andthe capitalistic
system, and thus violent conflicts inthe Third World and the
capitalist world system, arecausally related, historically as well
as structurally,the more unavoidable such reflection will become.
Such adifferentiated reflection on the legitimacy of the useof
force in any given case as a solution to socialconflict must get to
the roots of the previous identityof peace research itself.
3) Finally, I would like to sketch the interpre-tational
framework developed here for the example ofthe Arab-Israeli
conflict. Here I shall be orientingmy remarks to the so far (with
reservations) mostproductive attempt of conflict or peace research
tosubdivide this conflict into operational parts, and tomove an to
synthesizing conclusions as to possiblesolutions - Galtung's
article "Middle East and thetheory of conflict" (Galtung
1971a).
Galtung rightfully assumes that the founding of theIsraeli state
an Palestinian territory "can only
26
-
be understood against a background of century-longtraditions of
Western colonialism (and that) Zionismwould have been powerless if
it could not operatewithin this. tradition. The establishment of
Israelshould be seen as a consequence of Western imperialism,
notonly as an instrument for continued imperialism" (p. 175).The
principal weakness of the analysis which thenfollows -.unlike most
others, clear and coherent - is thatthe historical opening remains
purely rhetorical and isnot developed as the cardinal, archimedial
point of theconflict. As Galtung himself says: "Now the question to
beasked is not whether what happened in the past was a 'mistake'or
not that is now an .academic question - but whatcan be done in the
future to rectify the situation." (p.176.) This is precisely not an
academic question. Thefounding of Israel must be traced back to
thetransformation__of the Arab societies under the impact
ofcapitalist expansion. One would have to go at least asfar back as
the prevention of indigenous modernization,above all in Egypt,
which in the 1830s under Mohammed Ali(Hobsbawm 1962) and again in
the 1870s (Mommsen 1961)showed signs of developing into a kind of
"Arab Japan".In the greater context of the systematic weakening
oreven destruction of indigenous industrialization, theannexation
of the Arab states into the economic strategicnetwork of the
imperialist societies of Western Europe,of the playing-off of the
first anti-colonialist nationalmovements against each other during
World War I -against this background, the Balfour Declaration with
allits consequences appears as but one pebble in an immensemosaic.
The antagonism, which in the meantime crys-tallized around states -
with Israel as a bridgehead -is, correspondingly, still
functionally derived from theexpansive interests in domination and
control on the partof the leading capitalist countries, in recent
years aboveall of the US.
That this policy proved counter-productive, since itopened the
gate to the Soviet Union in the Middle East,complicates the
situation and points out the constantpossibility that conflicts can
take on a tacticalindependence of their own - without, however,
touchingin substance upon the strategic perspective. Eventhose Arab
states still militarily
27
-
linked with the Soviet Union, above all Egypt, are"condemned"
qua nation-state development to evolve abureaucratically organized
national bourgeois socialorder and to develop economies which must
muster con-siderable resources for a socially unproductive,
parasiticmilitary apparatus. On the basis of this developmentmodel,
they will necessarily have to remain underdevelopedas
socio-politicc,l appendices of the capitalist worldsystem (Tibi
1969), independently of temporary militaryalliances. (El Rabadi
1970-71.)
At the level of organization, or rather confrontation ofstates
as outsiders have dictated it to the Arab people inthis specific
form (the historical as well as futurealternative, Arab unity, has
been perverted to become akind of sentimental, manipulable hope),
there is no solutionto the conflict worthy of the name "solution",
as Galtungrightly and with great precision in the language
ofconflict resolution has pointed out.
This approach evades, it does not grasp, and indeedis not able
to grasp the level of social conflict, theclass analysis which
enables us to see Egypt not as Egypt,Jordan not as Jordan, or
Israel not as Israel, but rather asinternally divided social groups
which are held togethermore (Jordan) or less (Israel) painstakingly
as stableentities. To be sure, the loyalties of these groups
andclasses appear predominantly nation-state oriented. Butit would
be historically shortsighted and thustheoretically false, as well
as politically self-defeating, for a peace research oriented toward
long-termsolutions not to insist on the historical analysis,
andhence on the strategic strengthening'of non-state,inter-social
loyalties. "We can and we must restorethe class struggle to its old
dignity", as IsaakDeutscher has put it.16
The history of our present shows that bourgeoisinternationalism
has always established itself throughthe state and hence must
always bear theconsequences,of its own potential for military
con-flict. In contrast, non-bourgeois,
non-capitalistinternationalism contains the preconditions for
o-vercoming the nation-state and the conflicts inher
28
-
ent in that system.
The example of the Soviet Union, or that of the Sino-Soviet
conflict, demonstrates that such internationalismcannot move beyond
preliminary stages, as long as itremains a process on the periphery
of the internationalsystem. Thus, the solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflictwill in the long run not be found in the Middle East.There
it will at best and most probably end in an imposedpeace in the
context of fragmentation andunderdevelopment. Rather, such a
solution can be achievedonly through change in the historic and
current center of thecapitalist world system.
5. Final Remarks
I would like to break off this train of thought atthis point. Of
course, this analysis is in great needof expansion, deepening,
differentiation, and betterfactual proof and naturally of
correction, in itsconcrete execution on all points. Nor shall
theimplicit conclusions for peace research as a
criticalpractice-oriented science be explained beyond what
hasalready been presented.
In view of the lack of theory in peace researchemphasized in the
beginning of this article, togetherwith the overemphasis on
empiricism and "value-free"methodology, and in view of subjectively
well-meaninguncritical pluralism of approaches amongst peace
researchersthemselves, it seemed to me both necessary and timely
toredefine the scope of peace research and thussimultaneously to
expand it and to narrow it down. Thereseems to me no doubt or
question as to the quantitativegrowth of peace research in the
foreseeable future.However, without such a limited expansion and
expandedlimitation, its qualitative growth is highly dubious.
29
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Ideologie.Berlin.
Mommsen, W. 1961: Imperialismus in Aegypten. Munich
&Vienna.
Mushkat, M. 1970: The small states and research intoaspects of
war and peace. IPRA Proceedings, 3rdGeneral Conference, Vol. I. Van
Gorcum, Assen
Nef, J. U. 1963: War and human progress. W. W.Norton, New
York.
Nef, J. U. 1967: The conquest of the material world.Meridian,
Cleveland & New York.
Polyani, K. 1957: The great transformation. BeaconPress,
Boston.
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Russett, B. M. 1967: Trends in world politics.Macmillan, New
York & London.
Schmidt, A. 1971: Geschichte und Struktur. Munich.
Sombart, W. 1913: Krieg und Kapitalismus. Munich
&Leipzig.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Thearms trade
with the Third World. Stockholm, NewYork, London.
Tibi, B. 1969: Die arabische Linke. Frankfurt/Main.
Wallach, J. L. 1967: Das Dogma der Vernichtungs-schlacht.
Frankfurt/Main.
Weber, M. 1956: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2.Halbband.
Tübingen.
Williams, E. 1966: Capitalism and slavery. CapricornBooks, New
York.
Wittfogel, K. A. 1924: Geschichte der bürgerlichenGesellschaft.
Berlin.
Wittfogel, K. A. 1932: Die natürlichen Ursachen
derWirtschaftsgeschichte, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaftund
Sozialpolitik 67. Tübingen.
Wright, Q. 1964: A study of war. University ofChicago Press.
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NOTES
1. Landes 1969, p. 5. Or one could take the calcu-lations of
Leith 1931 (p. 4) which show that moreminerals have been consumed
since 1900 than in theentire history prior to 1900; that world
goldproduction from 1910 to 1930 was just as great asin the 400
years since the European discovery ofAmerica; that world copper
production in 1929 wasdouble the entire world copper production of
allof history up to the 19th cen= tury, etc.
2. Hakluyt's advice to the Hapsburg's enemies: "Strikehim in the
Indies, you strike him in the apple ofhis eye."
3. Illustrated by Horkheimer using the example ofItaly and
Machiavelli (Horkheimer 1967).
4. Compare for example Sombart 1913.
5. Compare Krippendorff 1970. As a useful anthology,Eisenstadt
1971.
6. The level of socio-,cultural development of non-European
societies was thoroughly equatable orsimilar to that of the West
European societies upuntil the threshold of the Industrial
Revolution.This was worked out as a universal historicalprocess for
the first time by Wittfogel 1924.
7. Compare the summary of the literature and somedata in Mandel
1967, p. 76 ff.
8. Compare Hobsbawm 1969. In my opinion, he ismost comprehensive
on this topic.
9. As, despite impressive research efforts, doesWright 1964.
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10. Compare also the heroization of war as somethingspecifically
modern: Nef 1963, p. 307 ff.
11. In my opinion, still the most convincing attempt:Wittfogel
1932, p. 466 ff.
12. The literature an this topic is so abundant andso well-known
that specific references aresuperfluous.
13. Nef is still the only example.
14. Brandt 1966 is still the only analysis of itskind. Cf SIPRI
1971.
15. Since Kehr 1930, it is well-known that the con-struction of
the German navy - decisive for theoutbreak of World War I - was not
undertaken be-cause of a foreign threat to Germany, but
ratherbecause of domestic, social-political reasons.Lately, compare
Berghahn 1970, p. 34 ff.
16. At a teach-in at the University of California, .Berkeley,
1967. In Horowitz 1969.
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SUMMARY
Having quantitatively grown so fast, peace researchurgently
needs to clarify its research object and todissociate itself from
other approaches. A discussionof theory is not luxury. The
international system, withits threat of total or partial
destruction which providesthe general framework of peace research,
must be recognizedas a phenomenon of recent history. It is the
product ofthe Industrial Revolution and the capitalist mode
ofproduction. Retracing this system to its historicgenesis enables
us to expose the roots from which thedecisive conflict potential of
modern times - the modernstate, the arms race, the discrepancy
between rich and poorcountries, non-capitalist countries as
components of thecapitalist world system - have developed.
Unless we reduce historically conflicts of the momentto their
recent contemporary structure rooted in thecapitalist revolution,
peace research will only be ableto cure symptoms. Today we are
historically still in theepoch of the capitalist revolution of the
(European) 17thand 18th centuries. It must be transcended,
overcome, ifwe are to create conditions for the possibilities
ofcircumstances in which conflicts are no longer warlike,i.e.
mediated by states but rather articulated and carriedout as social
conflicts by the agents directly concerned.
36