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TheRightToolfortheJob:
AnEvaluationoftheEffectivenessofCounterinsurgencyPrinciplesagainstCriminalInsurgency
MichaelL.Burgoyne1
December1,2011
1SpecialthankstoDr.TammyS.Schultz,Dr.T.X.Hammes,andMAJDustinHeumphreusfortheirinvaluable
assistanceinthedevelopmentofthisstudy.Anyerrorsarethesoleresponsibilityoftheauthor.
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Abstract
Powerfulcriminalgroupsaredevelopingintoseriousthreatstonationstates.Increasinglyintense
violenceinMexicoisofparticularinteresttotheUnitedStates.Comingontheheelsofinsurgency
experiencesinIraqandAfghanistan,theUnitedStatesispredisposedtoapplyitstested
counterinsurgencydoctrinetotheproblem.Thisstudyaddressestheeffectivenessofcounterinsurgency
principlesagainstcriminalinsurgenciesthroughacasestudyanalysisofColombia’sfightagainstthe
MedellinandCaliCartelsandRiodeJaneiro’seffortsagainstfavelagangs.U.S.counterinsurgency
doctrineprovedtobehighlyeffectiveagainstRio’sgangs,however,thecampaignagainsttheMedellin
andCaliCartelsindicatesthatanenemyfocusedapproachmaybemoreappropriateagainstadrug
traffickingorganization.TheresultsofthisstudyshowthatwhilemuchofU.S.counterinsurgency
doctrineisapplicabletocriminalthreats,severaladjustmentstocampaignplanningandthreatanalysis
toolswillberequiredtoensureitseffectivenessagainstemergingcriminalnationalsecuritythreats.
Mexicoiscurrentlyengulfedbyrampantviolencethathastakenover40,000livessince2006.2
SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonreferredtothedrugfueledviolenceasan“insurgency,”whileothers
havecalledita“criminalinsurgency.”3Criminalthreatstostatestabilityarebecomingmorecommon;
JapaneseYakuza,ChineseTriads,Italianmafia,Russianmafia,andColombianBandasCriminalesall
representdangerousevolvingcriminalorganizations.4Theseuniqueapoliticalsecuritythreatsarenota
newphenomenon,buttheyarerapidlydevelopingintooneofthemostdangerouschallengesinthe
globalizedworld.OneofthegreatestnationalsecuritythreatsfacingtheUnitedStatestodayisthe
rapidlydeterioratingsecuritysituationinMexicowhereDrugTraffickingOrganizations(DTO)5and
enforcergangshaveignitedacountrywidewar.6
2BBC,“Mexico’sDrugRelatedViolence,”August26,2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-
10681249.AlsoseeLosAngelesTimes,“MexicoUnderSiegeWebsite”,http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-
war/#/its-a-war.3HillaryClinton,SpeechtoCouncilonForeignRelations,(Washington,DC,September8,2010),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22896/conversation_with_us_secretary_of_state_hillary_rodham_clinton.html;
andJohnP.SullivanandAdamElkus,“StateofSiege:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,2008,
www.swj.com.4MaxManwaring,Gangs,Pseudo-Militaries,andotherModernMercenaries,(Norman:OklahomaUniversityPress,
2010),21-22.5ThetermDrugTraffickingOrganizationofDTOwillbeusedtodenoteorganizationswhohaveaprimarybusiness
modelbasedondrugtrafficking.AlthoughmostDTOsalsoengageinextortion,protection,prostitution,and
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MexicancriminalorganizationshaveevolvedintoexistentialthreatstotheMexicanstateand
arenowgrowingintheUnitedStates.7Initiallytransportationelementssubordinatetothepowerful
Colombiancartels,MexicanDTOscapitalizedoneffectiveinterdictionintheCaribbeanandthedemise
oftheMedellinandCaliCartelstoincreasetheircontrolofthedrugtrade.Thisincreaseincriminal
powercoincidedwithanequallyimportantpoliticalupheavalinMexico.
TheelectionofPresidentVicenteFoxofthePANpartyin2000effectivelyendedtheoneparty
systemthrowinglongstandingarrangementsbetweenPRIleadersandDTOsintochaos.Institutionalized
corruptionandgovernmentcontroloftheilliciteconomycollapsedintoviolenceasDTOswenttowar
witheachotherandthestatetoincreasetheircontrolofterritoryandlucrativedrugroutes.8Following
hiselectionin2006,MexicanPresidentFelipeCalderónembarkeduponacampaignagainstorganized
crimeemployingthe“fullforceofthestateinordertosafeguardthelibertyandsecurityofitscitizens.”9
However,thereremainsnoendtotheviolenceinsight;2010wasthemostviolentyearyetwith15,273
homicides.10Calderon’sstrategyhasbeenapplaudedandcriticizedinbothMexicoandtheUnited
States.Equally,theU.S.responsetothecrisishasbeenthesubjectofintensepolicydebate.Muchofthe
frustrationwiththegovernmentresponsestemsfromconfusionregardingthenatureoftheconflict.
CarlVonClausewitzwarnsthat“thefirst,thesupreme,themostfarreachingactofjudgment
thatthestatesmanandcommanderhavetomakeistoestablish…thekindofwaronwhichtheyare
humantraffickingthisstudywilluseDTOtodifferentiatebetweensmugglingorganizationsandmafiatype
organizations.6RobertJ.Bunker,“ElImperativoEstratégicodeEstadosUnidosDebeCambiardeIrak-AfganistánaMéxico-Las
AméricasylaEstabilizacióndeEuropa,”SmallWarsJournal ,2011.7U.S.DepartmentofJustice,NationalDrugThreatAssessment ,(NationalDrugIntelligenceCenter,August,2011),
8,http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf .8GeorgeGrayson,Mexico:NarcoViolenceandaFailedState? ,(NewBrunswick:Transaction,2010),39-52.9GobiernoFederal,“ModelodeOperaciónEstratégicayTácticaFrentealaDelincuenciaOrganizada,”April30,
2009,http://www.pgr.gob.mx/prensa/documentos.asp.10SaraMillerLlana,“Mexicodrugwardeathtollup60percentin2010.Why?”ChristianScienceMonitor ,January
13,2011.
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embarking;neithermistakingitfor,nortryingtoturnitinto,somethingthatisalientoitsnature.”11
Comingontheheelsofthedevelopmentofarobustcounterinsurgencydoctrine,manyU.S.defenseand
lawenforcementscholarshavedesignatedtheMexicanconflictaninsurgency.12Accordingly,
counterinsurgencymethodologieshavebeenrecommendedastheproperresponse.13Conversely,other
scholarslikeDavidShirkandformerheadoftheDrugEnforcementAdministrationRobertBonnerhave
calledforalawenforcementresponse.14Farmorethanamereacademicsemanticdebate,theterm
insurgencyimpactswhichagenciesandmethodologiesgovernmentforcesemployagainsttheproblem.
Thesetypesof“wickedproblems”aredefinedby“one’sideaforsolvingit.”15Anincorrectdiagnosisof
theproblemanditssolutioncanhavefarreachingrepercussions.
Whateveritsnature,theUnitedStateshasvitalinterestsinMexico.TheUnitedStateshasspent
90billiondollarsonbordersecuritysince200116andspendsover15billiondollarsannuallyondrug
control.17MexicoistheUnitedStates’thirdlargesttradingpartnerwith393billiondollarsintradein
2010.18TheUnitedStatesappropriated1.5billiondollarstosupporttheMéridaInitiative,a
multinationalsecurityagreementthatfocusesonoperationalsupporttolawenforcementand
11CarlVonClausewitz,OnWar ,transMichaelHowardandPeterParet,(Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,
1997),88.12MatthewD.LaPlante,“ArmyofficialsuggestsU.S.troopsmightbeneededinMexico,”SaltLakeTribune,March
22,2011;JohnP.SullivanandAdamElkus,“StateofSiege:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,
2008;SullivanandElkus“Cartelvs.Cartel:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,2009;Sullivanand
RobertBunker,“CartelEvolutionRevisited,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies21,(March23,2010).13BobKillebrewandJenniferBernal, CrimeWars:Gangs,CartelsandU.S.NationalSecurity,(Washington,DC:
CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity,2010).AlsoseeRepresentativeConnieMack,PreparedRemarksbeforeHouse
ForeignAffairsCommittee,“MeridaPartTwo:InsurgencyandTerrorisminMexico,”October4,2011.14WoodrowWilsonCenterMexicoInstitutePresentation,SharedResponsibility ,(Washington,DC,October22,
2010).RobertBonner,“TheNewCocaineCowboys,”ForeignAffairs89,(2010).15HorstW.J.RittelandMelvinM.Webber,“DilemmasinaGeneralTheoryofPlanning,”PolicySciences4,(1973),
161.16MarthaMendoza,“$90bspentonbordersecurity,withmixedresults,” AssociatedPress,June26,2011.
17ExecutiveOfficeofthePresident,OfficeofNationalDrugControlPolicy,NationalDrugControlStrategyFY2011
BudgetSummary ,(Washington,DC:2010).http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-
research/fy11budget.pdf.18U.S.CensusBureau,ForeignTradeStatistics2010,http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1012yr.html,
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institutionalprofessionalization.19GiventheimportanceofMexicototheUnitedStatesandthescopeof
theconflict,itisimperativethattheU.S.strategyfittheproblem.
BeforetheUnitedStatesembarksonanexpensivecounterinsurgencycampaignoradvises
foreigngovernmentsontheirowncampaigns,theefficacyofcounterinsurgencyprinciplesagainst
economicorcriminalgroupsshouldbeevaluated.Criminalinsurgencyisauniquetypeofthreat.This
studyaddressesthequestiontowhatextentcounterinsurgencyprinciples,asoutlinedinFieldManual3-
24Counterinsurgency,areeffectiveagainstcriminalinsurgencies;specifically,inColombia’sfightagainst
theMedellinandCaliCartelsandRiodeJaneiro’seffortsagainstfavelagangs?
Thisstudyarguesthattheanalysisofpowerfulcriminalorganizationsusinganinsurgency
frameworkisusefulandthattheColombiancartelsandRio’sfavelagangscanbeappropriately
describedascriminalinsurgencies.SeveralcounterinsurgencyprincipleslistedinFM3-24wereeffective
inbothcasestudiesincludingunderstandingtheenvironment,intelligencedrivenoperations,longterm
commitment,smallunitempowerment,learningandadapting,andsupportingthehostnation.In
addition,counterinsurgencymethodologies,asfoundinU.S.doctrine,werehighlyeffectiveagainstRio’s
favelagangs.However,themethodologyemployedinthecaseoftheMedellinandCaliCartelsindicates
thatanenemyfocusedapproachcanbeeffectiveagainstaDTO.Furthermore,aDTO’sfinancialcenter
ofgravityseriouslydegradestheeffectivenessofsomeoftheprinciplesfoundinCOINdoctrine.Finally,
severalfactorsandtechniquesnotspecificallyreferencedinCOINdoctrinecanbecriticalinthecaseofa
criminalinsurgency,suchasvettedunits,anticorruptionmeasures,financialtargeting,divideand
conquerapproaches,andsocialandculturalrootcauses.Thisstudywillbrieflyreviewtheevolutionof
theconceptofcriminalinsurgency.ThestudywillthenexaminetheMedellinandCaliCartelsfollowed
byRio’sfavelagangs.Eachcasewillincludeabriefhistoricalsummary,ananalysisusinganinsurgency
19U.S.DepartmentofState,BureauofPublicAffairs,TheMeridaInitiative:ExpandingtheU.S./MexicoPartnership,
March3,2011.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/plrmo/157797.htm,
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lens,andanexaminationofthegovernmentresponsebasedonCOINprinciples.Finally,implicationsfor
securitypolicyandrecommendationswillbeprovided.
Thisstudyis“policy-evaluative”andwillexaminetheimplicittheoreticalassumptionthat
criminalinsurgenciescanbedefeatedbycurrentcounterinsurgencydoctrine.20Giventheimportanceof
thesecuritythreatsinvolved,itisimportanttoask“willthepolicyproducetheresultsthatits
proponentspromise?”21InvestigationssuchasRAND’srecentcounterinsurgencyreport
22andtheFishel-
ManwaringSWORDmodelhavescientificallyevaluatedtheeffectivenessofcounterinsurgency
strategies;however,currentliteraturehasnotadequatelyaddressedtheuseofcounterinsurgency
doctrineagainstcriminalthreats.23
Thisprojectusesastructuredcomparisonofcasestudieswiththegoalofidentifyingthevalue
ofcurrentcounterinsurgencyprinciplesintheuniquecircumstancesofacriminalinsurgency.24Political
scientist,StephenVanEvranotesthatwhenworkingwithpolicyprescriptivestudies,researchersshould
studycaseswhosebackgroundcharacteristicsparallelthecharacteristicsofthecurrentorfuturepolicy
problems.”25Assuch,twocaseswereselectedthatcloselyresemblecurrentsecurityconcernsin
Mexico:theColombiandefeatoftheCaliandMedellinCartelsandtheBrazilianfightagainstfavela
gangs.
Bothofthesecaseswereconsideredgovernmentvictoriesbecausethethreatstonational
securityweredefeated.Thisstudyassumesthatbothofthesecasesaregovernmentvictoriesand
20StephenVanEvra,GuidetoMethodsforStudentsofPoliticalScience,(Ithica:CornellUniversityPress,1997),91.
21Ibid.22ChristopherPaul,ColinP.Clarke,andBethGrill, VictoryhasaThousandFathers,(SantaMonica:RAND,2010).
23JohnT.Fishel,andMaxG.Manwaring,UncomfortableWarsRevisited,(Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,
2006)and“TheSWORDModelofCounterinsurgency:ASummaryandUpdate”SmallWarsJournal,2008also
“InsurgencyandCounter-Insurgency:TowardaNewAnalyticalApproach,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies3,(Winter,
1992),272.24AlexanderL.GeorgeandAndrewBennett,CaseStudiesandTheoryDevelopmentintheSocialSciences,
(Cambridge:MITPress,2005),75.25VanEvra,85.
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focusesonthemethodologiesutilized.InColombia,thepowerfulMedellinandCaliCartelswere
dismantledleavingresidualcriminalgroups.Thisstudydoesnotexpanditstimehorizontoinclude
effortsatcommunitypolicinginColombiaafterthefalloftheMedellinandCaliCartels.Expandingthe
casetoincludetheseinitiativeswouldresultindifficultymanagingthedistinctionbetweencriminal
insurgencyandcrimeaswellasbetweencounterinsurgencyandnormalgovernance.Furthermore,the
securityproblemsinCaliandMedellinafterthefallofthemajorDTOscloselyresemblethe
characteristicsoftheRiocasestudy.
TheRiocasestudy,however,isamoredefinedphenomenonwithlesspossibilityofintervening
variablesarisingfromtraditionalinsurgentgroupsliketheFARC(RevolutionaryArmedForcesof
Colombia)andELN(NationalLiberationArmy)presentinColombia.InRio,gangsthathadsuccessfully
succeededfromgovernmentcontrolweredisplacedandcontrolwasreestablished.26Since2008,the
governmenthasclearedsome25communitiesandreassertedstatecontrolover280,000citizens.27
Tomaintainadisciplinedconfigurativeapproachthecasesareevaluatedusinganinsurgency
analysisframeworkoutlinedbyinsurgencyexpertBardO’Neillandthe13principlesandimperativesof
counterinsurgencyasfoundinFieldManual3-24.Oneofthestrengthsofutilizingacasestudy
methodologyisthatitserves“theheuristicpurposeofinductivelyidentifyingadditionalvariablesand
generatinghypotheses.”28ThedetailedcasestudyapproachallowsthisstudytogobeyondO’Neill’s
frameworkandthe13principlestoidentifyotherfactorsthatareimportanttotheproblem.
TheEvolutionofCriminalInsurgency
26SecurityoperationsinRioareongoing.Thisstudyfocusedonfavelasthathadalreadybeenoccupiedunderthe
UPPprogram.27UPPWebsite.
28GeorgeandBennett,45.
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Thescopeandintensityofcriminalintrastateviolencehasforcedgovernmentstoapplyboth
lawenforcementandmilitaryassetsinthefighttoestablishstability.Whilecriminals,brigands,pirates,
andorganizedcrimearenotnew,thepowerandreachassociatedwiththesegroupshasforcedsecurity
scholarstoreassessthenatureofthesethreats.Duetotheuniquenessoflargescalecriminalviolence,
fivefieldsofsecuritystudiesconvergeintheanalysisofthephenomenon:gangstudies,organizedcrime
studies,terrorismstudies,futurewarfarestudies,andinsurgencystudies.29Insurgencydoctrineand
methodologyhavetakenaleadingroleinthedebatelargelyduetoU.S.counterinsurgencyeffortsin
IraqandAfghanistan.Thecriminalinsurgencyconceptwasderivedfromaquestioningofclassic
insurgencyliterature.VladimirLenin,MaoTse-Tung,andErnestoCheGuevaraestablishedthe
theoreticalfoundationsoftwentiethcenturyinsurgency.However,securityscholarslikeSteveMetz
havechallengedthevalidityoftheclassicalinsurgencymodelinrecentinternalconflicts.Finally,law
enforcementexpertJohnSullivanexpandeduponMetz’sinvestigationtocreatetheconceptofcriminal
insurgency.Eachwillbeexaminedinturn.
TheadventofinternationalcommunismandthewaveofdecolonizationfollowingWorldWarII
ledtoarenaissanceinunconventionalwarfaretheory.Oneofthemostinfluentialthinkerswasthe
leaderoftheRussianRevolution,VladimirLenin.GangandinsurgencyexpertMaxManwaringlabels
Lenin’smethods“political-psychologicalwar”designedto“erodetheeffectivesovereigntyand
legitimacy”ofthestate.30Lenin’suseofrevolutionarycellsandmilitiastowhittleawayatthestate
wouldbemodifiedbyperhapsthemostinfluentialthinkerininsurgencytheory,MaoTse-Tung.Mao’s
methodologydiffersfromLenin’sinthattheprimarytoolistheuseofmilitaryforcethatexpandsfrom
insurgentcontrolledterritories.31Mao’smodelwasreplicatedinseveralcountriesanditsinfluencecan
29RobertJ.Bunker,“TheMexicanCartelDebate:AsViewedThroughFiveDivergentFieldsofSecurityStudies,”
SmallWarsJournal ,(11February2011),www.swj.com,(16March2011).30Manwaring,Gangs,Pseudo-Militaries,andotherModernMercenaries,21-22.
31MaoTse-Tung,OnGuerrillaWarfare,(Champaign:UniversityofIllinoisPress,2000).
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beseenintheCubanRevolutionwhereCheGuevaradevelopedhisownadaptation.Guevara’s foco
methodutilizesasmalldeterminedcadreandreliesinitiallyonamobilemilitarycampaign.Guevaraalso
callsforthe“finalstage”whichincludes“urbanguerrillawarfare.”Thiscombinationofconventional
warfareintheruralareasandurbanviolenceleadstothecollapseofthestate.32
Thesethreeclassicinsurgencytheoristshavesignificantdifferencesintheirrevolutionary
strategies.Theyare,howeverunitedintheirunderstandingofinsurgencyasabattleforpopular
support.Allthreethinkersdependonacommunistideologyandpoliticalvisiontomotivatetheir
followers.Inaddition,theyallrecognizethepopulation’simportanceinprovidinglogisticsand
intelligence.However,Post-ColdWarerascholarshavechallengedtheconceptthatinsurgencyis
organized,unifiedinpurpose,anddependentonpopularsupport.
StevenMetz’s“RethinkingInsurgency”argueseffectivelythatPost-ColdWarinsurgenciesdiffer
fromthoseduringtheColdWarandmorecloselyresemblea“violentandcompetitivemarket.”33Metz
assertsthatColdWarinsurgenciestypicallyincluded“clearanddiscretecombatants”thatenjoyed
outsidesponsors.34Moderninsurgencies,incontrast,lackastatesponsorandareamorecomplexmix
ofnon-statearmedandunarmedforceswithvaryingmotivations.Metzcontendsthatthecomplexityof
moderninsurgenciesleadsactorstopursuea“market”typestrategyinwhichtheytrytoobtainmore
limitedgoalsratherthanfullcontrolofthestate.35Mostimportantlytocriminalinsurgency,Metzdraws
fromtheworkofPaulCollier,36toshowthatoften“profitability”ismoreimportantthanpoliticalgoals.
37
“RethinkingInsurgency”isacornerstoneofthedebateregardinginsurgency’sevolutionandit
establishesanewlensthroughwhichtoviewinternalconflicts.Metzbreaksfreefrompolitically
32Ernesto‘Che’Guevara,GuerrillaWarfare,(Melbourne:OceanPress,2006),89-91.
33StevenMetz,RethinkingInsurgency ,(Carlisle:StrategicStudiesInstitute,2007),v.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.,43.
36PaulCollier,“TheMarketforCivilWar,” ForeignPolicy ,May-June2003.
37Metz,44.
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motivatedcommunistrevolutionarymovementsandexaminesthecomplexinteractionofarmedgroups
inmodernintrastateviolence,therebyopeningthedoorforotherstocreatesubclassesofinsurgencyto
describecurrentconflicts.
Aleadingscholarinthefieldoforganizedcrime,JohnP.Sullivan,hasexpandedupontheideas
expoundedbyMetzbycreatingtheconceptof“criminalinsurgency.”Sullivandefinestheparametersof
criminalinsurgency:
Criminalinsurgencyisdifferentfromclassicterrorismandinsurgencybecausethe
criminalinsurgents’overarchingpoliticalmotiveistogainautonomouseconomic
controloverterritory…notallinsurgenciesconformtotheclassicLeninistorMaoist
models.Notallinsurgentsseektotakeoverthegovernmentorhaveanideologicalfoundation.Someseekafree-rangetodevelopparallelstructuresforprofitandpower.
Nevertheless,theyhaveapoliticaldimension,usingpoliticalmaneuveringand
instrumentalviolencetoaccomplishtheireconomicgoals.Assuchtheyareinsurgents—
albeitofacriminalvariety.38
Sullivan,workingwithotherprominentthinkersinsecuritystudies,likeAdamElkusandRobertBunker,
isleadingthediscussiononcriminalinsurgency.39Inhisbriefarticle“CriminalInsurgencyinthe
Americas,”Sullivanprovideshismostthoroughdefinitionofthephenomenonandgivesseveralbrief
examples:intra-cartelviolenceinMexico,CentralAmericangangs,andBrazilianfavelagangs.
ThemainstrengthofSullivan’sworkishiscreationofatypologywithinMetz’sframeworkthat
canbestudiedandseparatedfromothersubclassesofmoderninsurgencies.Sullivan’suseoftheterm
criminalinsurgencyhasigniteddebatewithinthesecuritystudiescommunityandbroughtconsiderable
academicconsiderationtothephenomenon.Basedonanunderstandingofthethreatdescribedby
Sullivan,otherscholarshaveattemptedtoidentifywaystocounterthephenomenon.
CounterinsurgencyPrinciples
38Sullivan,“CriminalInsurgencyintheAmericas,” SmallWarsJournal ,(2010).
39SullivanandAdamElkus,“StateofSiege:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,(2008);Sullivanand
Elkus“Cartelvs.Cartel:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,(2009);SullivanandRobertBunker,
“CartelEvolutionRevisited,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies21,(March23,2010).
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WhereasMetzandSullivanfocusonidentifyingandclassifyingthechangingnatureof
insurgency,BobKillebrewandJenniferBernaloftheCenterforaNewAmericanSecurity(CNAS)devote
theirenergiestothedevelopmentofpolicysolutionstocriminalinsurgencies.IntheCNASreport, Crime
Wars:Gangs,CartelsandU.S.NationalSecurity ,KillebrewandBernalsuggestthat“theUnitedStates
seetheproblem[criminalviolenceintheWesternHemisphere]forwhatitis–acriminalinsurgency
againstthefoundationsofitsownsocietyandthoseofstateslikeMexico,Colombiaandothersin
between.”40Killebrewfurthermoreassertsthat“Mexicancartels…constituteaclassiccaseof
insurgency…andithastobetreatedlikeaninsurgency.”41Workingfromthebasisofinsurgency,the
CNASreportoffersrecommendationsthatincludethehallmarksofacounterinsurgencyapproachlike
legitimategovernance,directaction,andintelligencedrivenoperations.42
TheCNASreport’sgreatstrengthisthatitgoesbeyondthesimpledescriptionofcriminal
insurgencyandattemptstoprovideactionablesolutions.KillebrewandBernalacceptthecriminal
insurgencyparadigmandapplybothoperationalandstrategiccounterinsurgencymethodologiestothe
problem.TheCNASreportdoesanexcellentjobcreatingdialogueontheimportantsecuritythreats
posedbycriminalinsurgencies.BuildinguponKillebrewandBernal’swork,thisstudyaimstoidentify
nuancesanddifferencesthatmaycomplicatetheuseofcounterinsurgencymethodologiesagainst
criminalinsurgencies.
TheU.S.ArmyandMarineCorpsFieldManual3-24Counterinsurgency providesthebasisfor
U.S.operationalmethodologywhenconfrontinganinsurgency.ThemanualdrawsheavilyfromFrench
armyofficerandveteranofcounterinsurgencyeffortsinIndochinaandAlgeria,DavidGalula.Thecentral40KillebrewandBernal,8.
41PresentationbyForeignPolicyResearchInstitute,TheGeopoliticsofNorthernMexicoandImplicationsforU.S.
Policy ,(Washington,D.C.January11,2011).ThisconcepthasalsobeenpositedbyPhilWilliams,“Illicitmarkets,
weakstatesandviolence:IraqandMexico,”CrimeLawandSocialChange52,(2009),335.“[T]helessonsof
counterinsurgencyinIraqmightactuallyprovideabasisforamoreeffectivestrategyagainstdrugtrafficking
organizationsbytheMexicangovernment.”42KillebrewandBernal,50-60.
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tenantofGalula’sseminalwork,CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice,isthatthepopulation
isthecenterofgravity.43RobertThompson,aBritishveteranoftheBurmaCampaignandtheMalayan
EmergencyaswellastheheadoftheBritishadvisorymissiontoVietnam,isalsohighlyinfluentialinU.S.
doctrine.Inhisbook,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency ,Thompson,likeGalula,recognizestheprimacy
ofthepopulationandpoliticalgoalsascomponentsofanysuccessfulcounterinsurgencystrategy.44
WhenKillebrewstatesthatcriminalinsurgency“hastobetreatedlikeaninsurgency,”theimplicationis
thattheU.S.governmentwillapplythedoctrinefoundinFM3-24totheproblem.45
FM3-24evolvedfromtheU.S.occupationsofIraqandAfghanistanandthemilitary’sstrugglewith
counterinsurgencyoperations.Arguably,followingitsimplementation,FM3-24createdachangein
strategyandmindsetinbothIraqandAfghanistanthatledtoavastimprovementinbothconflicts.The
manualdoesanexcellentjobofcreatingaperspectivethroughwhichtounderstandinsurgencyand
developoperationalmethodologiestodefeatit.TheSWORDmodeldevelopedbyJohnT.FishelandMax
Manwaring46andtheRANDstudyVictoryhasaThousandFathers
47applyscientificrigortoinsurgencies
andbothmodelssupporttheprinciplesfoundinFM3-24.Criticshowever,arguethatFM3-24istoo
heavilybaseduponColdWarinsurgenciesandthatitsfocusonthepopulationhasnotbeenprovento
beeffective.48
43DavidGalula,CounterinsurgencyWarfare,(Westport:PraegerSecurityInternational,2006),75-94.
44RobertThompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency ,(St.Petersburg:HailerPublishing,2005),50-59.
45Infact,BobKillebrew,asaretiredArmySpecialForcesColonel,hasanuancedanddeepunderstanding
counterinsurgencythatgoesbeyondFM3-24.HisowncallforacounterinsurgencystrategyinMexicomaynot
alignperfectlywiththecounterinsurgencydoctrinefoundinthemanual.However,FM3-24isthejointdoctrine
forCounterinsurgencyandwouldprovidetheguidingprinciplesforanyU.S.counterinsurgencysupporttoMexico.46JohnT.Fishel,andMaxG.Manwaring,UncomfortableWarsRevisited,(Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,
2006)and“TheSWORDModelofCounterinsurgency:ASummaryandUpdate”SmallWarsJournal,2008also
“InsurgencyandCounter-Insurgency:TowardaNewAnalyticalApproach,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies3,
(Winter,1992).47ChristopherPaul,ColinP.Clarke,andBethGrill, VictoryhasaThousandFathers,(SantaMonica:RAND,2010).
48GianGentile,“TimefortheDeconstructionofFieldManual3-24” JointForcesQuarterly 58(Washington,DC:July
2010).AlsoGeoffDemarest,“Let’sTaketheFrenchExperienceinAlgeriaoutofU.S.CounterinsurgencyDoctrine,”
MilitaryReview ,(July-August,2010).
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Unlikemuchdoctrine,FM3-24utilizesprinciplesallowingpractitionerstoadaptwithina
counterinsurgencyframework.ContributingauthorJohnNaglarguesthatthemanualisa“catalystin
theprocessofmakingtheArmyandMarineCorpsmoreeffectivelearningorganizationsthatarebetter
abletoadapttotherapidlychangingnatureofmoderncounterinsurgencycampaigns.”49Ifthemanualis
adaptabletocriminalinsurgencies,thesolutionsliewithinits13principlesandimperatives.
1. Legitimacyisthemainobjective
2. Unityofeffortisessential
3. Politicalfactorsareprimary
4. Counterinsurgentsmustunderstandtheenvironment
5. Intelligencedrivesoperations
6. Insurgentsmustbeisolatedfromtheircauseandsupport
7. Securityundertheruleoflawisessential8. Counterinsurgentsmustprepareforalongtermcommitment
9. Manageinformationandexpectations
10. Usetheappropriatelevelofforce11. Learnandadapt12. Empowerthelowestlevels
13. Supportthehostnation 50
ScholarslikeBunkerandSullivanarguethatcriminalinsurgenciesareanemerging“newformof
warfare”thatconstitutesa“modalwarfareshift.”51Giventhegrowingnumberoflargescaleorganized
crimethreats,itisimperativetoascertainifFM3-24isadaptabletoacriminalinsurgencythrough
systematiccasestudyanalysis.
TheMedellinandCaliCartels
HistoricalBackground
Bythe1980s,Colombiahadbeensufferingfrominternalviolenceforoverthirtyyears.Guerrilla
groupsliketheFARCandELNarosefromLaViolencia,atenyearconflictthatleftover200,000dead.
49JohnNaglForwardtoTheU.S.Army/MarineCorpsCounterinsurgencyFieldManual ,(Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress,2007).50DepartmentoftheArmy,FieldManual3-24,Counterinsurgency ,(Washington,DC:USGovernmentPrinting
Office,2006),1-20thru1-26.51Bunker,“TheMexicanCartelDebate:AsViewedThroughFiveDivergentFieldsofSecurityStudies,”4.
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TheColombiangovernment’sbattlewithleftistguerrillaswascomplicatedbyaskyrocketingdemandfor
cocaine.CocawashistoricallyproducedinPeru;however,enterprisinginternationalcriminalsrealized
thatColombia’ssimilarclimateanddearthofgovernmentcontrolmadeitanideallocationforcocaine
production.52Illicitprofitsfloodedthecountryfindingtheirwaytoguerrillas,corruptofficials,andanew
classofcocainebarons.Twopowerfuldrugtraffickingorganizations,theMedellinandCaliCartels,
emergedfromthechaostodominatethedrugtradeandthreatenthestateitself.
TheMedellinCartel,centeredinthecityofMedellininAntioquia,wasledbytheinfamousPablo
Escobar.Escobargrewupsurroundedbyviolenceandbecameanaccomplishedthief,kidnapper,and
murderer.MarkBowden,authorof KillingPablo,notes“crimewasalreadyPablo’selement.Hewas
violentandunprincipled,andadeterminedclimber.Hewasn’tanentrepreneur,andhewasn’tevenan
especiallytalentedbusinessman.Hewasjustruthless.”53EscobarisbelievedtohavekilledFabio
Restrepo,theleadingtraffickerfromMedellinin1975,andappropriatedhisdrugrunningorganization
whichincludedtheOchoabrothers.Escobarconsolidatedhispowerandquicklyadoptedatacticcalled
“plataoplomo,”(bulletorabribe)tocowthelocalauthorities.Escobar’ssuccess,builtuponviolence,
grewalongwithhisownambition.54
Escobar,notcontentwithhisstatusasacriminal,soughttolegitimizehisposition.Hepurchased
hisownnewspaperandusedhiswealthtoprovidehousingandsoccerfieldsforthepoorofMedellin.
EscobarbecameactiveinpoliticsbecauseofhisfearofextraditiontotheUnitedStates.Hewaselected
asanalternatetoCongressin1982;however,hissordidhistoryresultedinhisexpulsionfromtheNew
LiberalPartyandhiswithdrawalfrompoliticstwoyearslater.Escobarputasidehispoliticalambition
andpursuedaterroristcampaignagainsttheColombiangovernmentculminatingwiththeassassination
ofpresidentialcandidateLuisGalánandthebombingofAviancaflight203.TheColombiangovernment
52Authorinterviews,U.S.Embassy,Bogota,August,2009.
53MarkBowden,KillingPablo,(NewYork:PenguinBooks,2001),22.
54Ibid.
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launchedamajorefforttodestroytheMedellincartelaidedbyU.S.governmentsupportandashadowy
vigilantegroupcalledLosPepes(PeoplePersecutedbyPabloEscobar).Intheend,theseelements
dismantledthecartelandeventuallykilledEscobarin1993.55
LocatedintheValledeCauca,theCaliCartel’sdevelopmentandmethodsdifferedfromits
Medellincompetitor.LawenforcementscholarRonChepesuiknotes“neverwerethestylesoftwo
majorcriminalorganizationsoperatinginthesamespacesodifferent.WhiletheMedellinCarteltriedto
bullyandbribethestate,theCaliCartelworkedquietlybehindthescenestocorruptit.”56Thecartel
leadership–JoseSantacruzLondoñoandtheRodriguezOrejuelabrothers,GilbertoandMiguel–
developedtheircartellikeamodernmultinationalcorporationcompletewithafranchisingsystemof
cellsandregionalmanagers.Theyutilizedthelatesttelecommunicationstechnologiestocoordinate
theiroperationsandmanagesophisticatedcounterintelligence.57
Initially,theCaliandMedellinCartelscoexistedandevencooperated,butbythe1990s
competitionbecamefierce.TheCaliCarteliswidelybelievedtohavecoordinatedwiththegovernment
intheirpursuitofEscobar.CalimembersarealsobelievedtohavebeenmembersofLosPepes.After
thedeathofEscobar,theColombiangovernmentturneditssightsontheCaliCartel.Inspiteofintense
corruptionthatreachedeveryleveloftheColombiangovernment,theDrugEnforcement
Administration(DEA)andtheirlocalpartnerswereabletodismantletheCaliCartel,arrestingthemajor
leadersin1995and1996.58
MedellinandCaliasInsurgency
55Ibid.
56RonChepesuik,TheBulletortheBribe,(Westport:Praeger,2003),62.
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
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ChinesestrategistSunTzucounselsthat“onewhoknowstheenemyandknowshimselfwillnot
beendangeredinahundredengagements.”59Similarly,insurgencyscholarBardO’Neillbelievesthat
determiningthenatureofaninsurgencyhas“vitalpracticalimplications.”60O’Neill’sbookInsurgency
andTerrorismprovidesadetailedframeworkforinsurgencyanalysis.O’Neillevaluatessixfactorsthat
makeupthenatureofaninsurgency:thetypeofinsurgency,formsofwarfareadopted,thestrategic
approach,popularsupport,organization,andexternalsupport.61
TheMedellinandCaliCartelsfallunderthe“commercialist”insurgencycategoryinO’Neill’s
framework,althoughamoreexactcategoryiscriminalinsurgency.Theyalsoexhibitthecharacteristics
ofa“reformist”insurgencythatis“non-revolutionary”butseekstoaffectcertainpolicies;inthiscase,
legalcontrolsandextradition.62However,thereformistattributesarebetterunderstoodundertheir
overarchingcriminalmotivations.TheCaliandMedellinCartelscloselyresemblethecriminalinsurgency
conceptasdefinedbySullivan.RensselaerLee’sanalysisofColombianDTOsintheearly1990smirrors
thedefinitionpositedbySullivan:
Unlikeguerrillas,whoseobjectiveisseizingpower,traffickersarenotultimately
interestedindestroyingasocialorderthatnurturesthem…theColombianmafiabasicallyseekstoprospercommerciallywithoutbeingdisturbed…cocainetraffickers
haveboughtintothepoliticalsystemandcansuccessfullymanipulatekey
institutions…maintaindefactocontrolofmajorcitiessuchasMedellinandentire
regions…traffickersdonothesitatetouseviolenceagainstgovernmentofficialsand
otherpublicfigurestopromotelimitedpoliticalobjectives .63
TheMedellinandCaliCartelsfitSullivan’sdefinitionofacriminalinsurgencyandcanbefurther
evaluatedunderO’Neill’sframeworktoimproveunderstandingofthephenomenon.
59SunTzu, ArtofWar ,ed.RalphD.Sawyer,(Boulder:WestviewPress,1994),179.
60BardO’Neill, InsurgencyandTerrorism,(Washington,DC:PotomacBooks,2005),31.
61Ibid.,15-43.
62Ibid.
63RensselaerLee,TheWhiteLabyrinth,(NewBrunswick:Transaction,1991),9-10.
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Thecartelsutilizedvariousformsofwarfaretoachievetheirobjectives.Theymaintained
thousandsofpaidenforcerstodominatetheirempiresthroughviolence.64Inaddition,thecartelswould
backguerrillaorparamilitaryforcesinsupportoftheirgoals.InApril1981,thesisterofMedellin
traffickerJorgeOchoawaskidnapped,leadingEscobar,inconjunctionwithothertraffickersincluding
themainCaliCartelfigures,toformthevigilantegroup“DeathtoKidnappers”(MAS).MASincluded
CarlosCastaño,whowouldlaterleadtheparamilitaryUnitedSelf-defenseForcesofColombia(AUC).
Narcotraffickersbuiltandfundedparamilitaryforcestoprotecttheirsubstantiallandholdingsandcoca
productionfromguerrillaincursionsandtaxation.Notboundbyideology,itiswidelybelievedthat
EscobarsupportedtheNovember1985seizureoftheColombianSupremeCourtbytheleftistinsurgent
groupM-19inwhichthegroupdestroyedcriminalfilesontraffickersthatwouldbeessentialfor
extradition.65TheMedellinCartelmayhavealsoenlistedELN’saidduringtheir1993bombing
campaign.66TheCaliCartelalsocolludedwithstateforcestoformthevigilantegroup LosPepeswhich
systematicallydestroyedtheMedellinCartel.Thisshiftingarrangementofallianceshighlightsthenon-
binaryandambiguousnatureoftheColombiansecuritysituation67andcloselyresemblesthe“marketof
violence”envisionedbyMetz.
68
Althoughthecartelsbuiltormanipulatedlargeparamilitaryandguerrillaformations,their
primaryoperationalmethodologywastheuseofterrorism.Thecartelsutilizedassassinationregularlyto
managetheirbusinessanddiscouragestateinterferencewiththeiroperations.Thecartelssuccessfully
assassinatedjusticeministerRodrigoLaraandnearlykilledintelligenceheadMiguelMaza.Themost
shockingassassinationwasthepublicshootingdeathofpresidentialcandidateCarlosGalán,astrong
opponentofnarcotrafficking.Thecampaignagainstextraditionmarksthemostviolentterroristaction
64PatrickClawsonandRensselaerLee,TheAndeanCocaineIndustry ,(NewYork,St.Martin’sGriffin,1998),196.
65Bowden,53.
66ClawsonandLee,53.
67StathisKalyvas,“TheOntologyof‘PoliticalViolence’:ActionandIdentityinCivilWars,” PerspectivesinPolitics
1:3,(1993).68Metz,v.
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undertakenbythecartelsagainstthestate.Colombiasuffered40carbombingsbetween1989and1993
includingthedestructionoftheDAS(AdministrativeSecurityDepartment)headquartersinBogota.69In
anattemptonthelifeofthencandidateCésarGaviria,Aviancaflight203wasblownoutofthesky
leaving107dead.TheterroristeffortsprovedfruitfulwhentheColombianlegislaturebannedcriminal
extraditioninJuneof1991.70
CriminalinsurgencyinthecaseofthecartelsdoesnoteasilyfitintooneofO’Neill’scategories
ofinsurgentstrategicapproaches.ThecartelstrategybearslittleresemblancetoaMaoistprotracted
popularwarmethodology.71Inmanyways,thecartelsoperatedmorelikeaLeninistconspiracymodelin
whichpoliticians,securityforces,andkeybureaucraticpostsarecapturedbytheinsurgentsthrougha
mixofideology,intimidation,andfocusedviolence.72Inacommunistrebelliontheseeffortsaregeared
tocreatetheconditionsforageneraluprisingorcoup.Incontrast,thecartelsusedthecorruptingforce
of“plataoplomo”tosubvertstatepoweranddevelopaparallelsystemthattoleratedorsupported
theireconomicgoals.
Inadditiontoasystemofcorruption,thecartelsutilizedaformofurbanwarfaredesignedto
forcestatecompliancewiththeirpolicygoals.Thecartelsoperatedfromanurbanenvironmentin
contrastwithruralmodelsliketheMaoistandFocomethods.ThecitiesofCaliandMedellinweresafe-
havensforthecartelleaderswhomanagedanextensivenetworkofinformantsandenforcerstoprotect
them.Althoughcartelviolencecloselyresembledtraditionalurbanguerrillaactivitiesasfoundinthe
workofAbrahamGuillen73andCarlosMarighella,
74itdidnotsupportafinalphaseinwhichrevolution
orruralguerrillawarfarewouldemerge.ThebombingsinBogotaandwidespreadassassinationswere
69ClawsonandLee,52.
70Ibid.
71Mao,OnGuerrillaWar .
72Manwaring,10-31.
73AbrahamGuillen,PhilosophyoftheUrbanGuerrilla,(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1973).
74CarlosMarighella,MinimanualoftheUrbanGuerrilla,(Boulder:Paladin,1985).
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designedtoapplysufficientpressureonthegovernmenttoaltercertainpolicies;theviolencewasnot
designedtooverthrowthegovernment.
Popularsupportisseenasacriticalfactorinmostinsurgencyliteraturebutitwasnotcriticalfor
thecartels.ClassicalCOINtheoristDavidGalularecognizescontrolofthepopulationastheprimary
objectiveinrevolutionarywar75andMaowarns“itisonlyundisciplinedtroopswhomakethepeople
theirenemiesandwho,likethefishoutofitsnativeelement,cannotlive.”76Thecartels,toalimited
extent,didcourtpopularsupport.EscobarandCarlosLehderbothownednewspapersandtheCali
CartelmaintainedapublicrelationssectionheadedbyjournalistAlbertoGiraldo.77Drugtraffickerswere
strongsupportersoflocalandnationalsoccerteams.78
Escobarcreatedthepoliticalmovement Civismo
enMarchaandevenbuiltanentireneighborhoodforthepoorinMedellin.Allofthisactivity,however,
wasaproductofthemassivewealthprovidedbyillicittrafficking.UnlikeMaoistinsurgencies,thecartels
werenotreliantonthepopulationtoachievetheirgoals.
Althoughviewedasmonolithicblocs,infactthecartelswerenetworkedgroupsofindependent
traffickingorganizationsofvarioussizesthatcooperatedtoimproveprofitsandefficiency.InMedellin,
Escobar,throughoppressiveforce,wasabletoestablishhimselfastheundisputedheadofthecartel.
Likewise,Calimaintainedaseniorleadershipsectionbutitmorecloselyresembledamultinational
corporation:“Intermsofstructure,marketing,anddistribution,thedrugmafiahadasmuchincommon
withgiantcompaniesthatmadeFortunemagazine’sannuallistofthetop500companiesasitdidwith
itsrivalsinthedrugtrade.”79TheMedellinandCaliCartelsofferedtwoverydifferentstructuresforthe
governmenttotarget.
75Galula,4.
76Mao,93
77Chepesuik,70.
78JeffandMichaelZimbalist, LosDosEscobares,(AllRiseFilms,2010).
79Chepesuik,110.
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Externalsupport,whichsomescholarsbelieveiscriticaltoinsurgentsuccess,wasvitalforthe
cartels.80However,thecartelsdidnotdrawsupportfromaColdWarpowerorneighboringcountry;
rather,theywerefundedthroughthedrugtrade,primarilywiththeUnitedStates.Ascriminal
organizations,thecartelshadlittleopportunitytodevelopmeaningfulpartnershipswithoutside
powers.EvenPanamanianstrongmanManuelNoriegawasreluctanttoprovidesanctuarytocapos
fleeingextradition.81Inthecaseofthecartels,supportfromfinancialinstitutionsandtheflowofillicit
fundsrepresentedthebeatingheartofthecartels,withoutwhichtheywouldceasetoexist.
ColombianResponseasCounterinsurgency
Afterobservingthecartelsthroughaninsurgencylens,itisnecessarytoanalyzetheColombian
governmentresponsefromaCOINperspective.Thisisaccomplishedmethodicallythroughtheuseof
the13COINprinciplesandimperativesasfoundinFM3-24.Specificmetricsforeachprinciplewere
derivedfromthefieldmanualandappliedtothecase.Abriefexaminationoftheobservationsis
providedforeachprinciplefollowedbyanassessmentandbasicscoring.
GovernmentLegitimacy 82
Ostensibly,theColombiangovernmentofthe1980sand90swasalegitimatelyelected
democraticgovernment;however,itwasnoteffectivelyprovidingsecurityorgovernancetothe
population.In1993,themurderrateinColombiawasanastounding85per100,000citizens
(Washington,DCwas18.5per100,000in2010)andMedellinwasthemurdercapitaloftheworldwith
5,577homicidesin1994.
83
EvenafterthesuccessfuldismantlingoftheMedellinandCaliCartels,60
80JeffreyRecord,“ExternalAssistance:EnablerofInsurgentSuccess,”Parameters,(Autumn,2006).
81Bowden,45.
82Governmentlegitimacyisexaminedbaseduponavailablecrimefiguresandhomiciderates,thepresenceof
electionsandparticipation,thepresenceofcorruption,developmentandeconomicstatistics,andopinionpolls.
FM3-24,1-21thru1-22.83ClawsonandLee,196.
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percentofColombiansweredissatisfiedwiththegovernment.84Criminalviolence,guerrillamovements,
andextralegalparamilitaryunitscreatedaperceptionofanineptorcorruptgovernment.
ScholarsPatrickClawsonandRensselaerLeenotethat“narcocorruption…diminishesthe
legitimacyofgoverninginstitutions”andtraffickers“increasinglydisplacethestateintheperformance
ofkeysocialandpoliticalfunctions.”85CorruptioninColombiawasendemic;in1996,2,260officersfrom
thenationalpoliceweredismissedforcorruption.86AlistfoundduringaraidonMiguelRodriguez’s
apartmentdocumented2,800namesofpoliticians,police,andjournalistsontheCaliCartel’spayroll.87
Corruptionreachedthehighestofficesofthecountry,mostnotablywiththecassettetapescandalthat
rockedthepresidencyofErnestoSamper.RecordedconversationsofakeySamperaidtakingfunds
fromtheCaliCartelshowedthatSamper’s1994presidentialcampaignreceivedacriticalinjectionof
fundsthatmayhaveallowedhimtowintheelection.AlthoughSamperenactedatoughpolicyagainst
DTOs,hislegitimacywaspermanentlystainedbycorruption.88
ColombiawasabletodefeattheMedellinandCaliCartelswithoutachievinggovernment
legitimacy.Colombiadidholdpresidentialandlegislativeelectionsthroughouttheconflictperiod;
however,electionswereunderminedbycorruptionmostnotablytheSamperscandal.
89
Widespread
corruption,negativepollingnumbersdespitesecurityadvancesagainstthecartels,andremarkablyhigh
crimeratesindicatethatthisprincipleofCOINwasnotfollowedorachieved.Colombia’svictory
indicatesthatlegitimacymaynotbenecessarytodefeataDTO.Thereforethisprincipleisscored
negatively.
84Semana,“LaGranEncuestadel97,”February10,1997.
85ClawsonandLee,175.
86Ibid.,195.
87Chepesuik,224.
88Ibid.,187-198.
89PoliticalDatabaseoftheAmericasWebsite,“ResultadosElectorales1990-1998,”
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Col/colombia.html
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UnityofEffort90
Coordinationbetweenmilitary,lawenforcement,andpoliticalelementsdidexistbutwasnota
whole-of-governmentapproachasoutlinedinFM3-24.91Linesofoperationfoundindoctrineinclude
“governance,essentialservices,andeconomicdevelopment.”92Essentialserviceswerenotaddressedas
apartofthecampaignagainstthecartels.Infact,themassiveinfluxofcocaineprofitstransformedboth
MedellinandCaliintothrivingcitiesandgenerouspublicserviceprojectsfundedbytraffickersimproved
manyneighborhoods.93Theeconomicboomfromcocainealsobenefitedtheeliteswhoprofitedfrom
abundantforeigncurrencyflowingintoColombianbanksandconstructionfirms.Itwasestimatedthat
Calireceivedsome600milliondollarsannuallyfromdrugtrafficking.94
In1993,theyearofPablo
Escobar’sdeath,Medellin’slocalgovernmentreceivedlessthantenpercentofitsoperatingbudget
fromthenationalgovernment,providinglittleincentivetoendtheflowofillicitcash.95Acomplete
whole-of-governmentapproachwouldnotappearuntil2003whenmayorsSergioFajardoandAlonso
Salazarenactedpoliciestobringgovernmentservicesandsecuritytothemosttroubledcommunities.96
Nevertheless,unityofeffortwasachievedattheoperationallevelanditwasakeytothe
government’ssuccess.Initially,significantinteragencycompetitionbetweenthenationalpoliceandthe
Armycausedcomplicationswiththecampaign.97Chepesuiknotesthat“thegodfathersfromCalihada
jumpstartonlawenforcement…becauseofrivalries,competition,andturfbattlesthatplaguedthe
investigation…itwasonlywhenlawenforcementbegantocooperateandshareinformationthat
90Unityofeffortisevaluatedbasedupontheorganizationofgovernmentforcesincludingtheintegrationof
governmentagencies.FM3-24,1-22.91FM3-24,Chap.2.92Ibid.,Chapter5.
93Semana,“UnRobinHoodPaisa,”April,1983.
94Semana,“Calicaliente,”December27,1993.
95Semana,“Medellínvive,”March29,1993.
96VandaFelbab-Brown,“ReducingUrbanViolence:LessonsfromMedellin,Colombia,”Brookings,September7,
2011.97AuthorinterviewwithCOL(ret)WilliamSpracherformerdefenseattachétoColombia,Washington,DC,August
15,2011.
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headwaywasmade.”98Duetorampantcorruption,thecreationofColonelHugoMartinez’svetted
SearchBlocwithexpandedauthoritiesandcapacitieswasessential.SearchBlocalsoservedasaplugin
forsubstantialintelligence,lawenforcement,andmilitaryassistancefromtheUnitedStates.
Unityofeffortwasonlypartiallyachievedinthiscase.FM3-24callsfor“liaisonwithleaders
fromawidevarietyofnonmilitaryagencies”includingnon-governmentalorganizations.99The
governmenteffectivelyintegratedintelligence,vettedtacticalunits,andoutsidesupportfromthe
UnitedStates.TheSearchBlocmorecloselyresembledapurecounterterrorismteamthanaCOIN
approachasoutlinedinFM3-24.100Becauseoperationalandtacticalunitywasachievedbutawhole-of-
governmentapproachwasnotpursuedthisprincipleisratedasaneutralresult.Thisindicatesthata
taskorganizationthatresemblesaCTunitcanbeeffectiveagainstaDTO.
PrimacyofPoliticalFactors101
PoliticalfactorsaredifficulttomeasureinthecaseoftheMedellinandCaliCartels.FM3-24
counselsthat“resolvingmostinsurgenciesrequiresapoliticalsolution”andthatrevolutionarywaris
“80percentpolitical.”102However,incontrastwithtypicalinsurgencies,thecartelshadverylimited
politicalagendas.Thecartelshadtwoprimarypoliticalgoals:limitedautonomyfromgovernment
persecutionoftheirbusinessandtheprohibitionofextradition.Therewasnograndpoliticalmaneuver
torelievetensionsliketheBritishtransferofauthoritytotheMalayansduringtheEmergency.103The
cartels’economicorientationmadepoliticalnegotiationdifficult.Atonepoint,theleadersoftheCali
Cartelattemptedtonegotiateanendtococaineproductiononlytofindthattheylackedsufficient
98Chepesuik,261.
99FM3-24,1-22.
100FredKaplan,“CTorCOIN?”Slate,March24,2009.AndrewExum,“OnCOINandCT,”SmallWarsJournal,2009,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf .101Theprimacyofpoliticalfactorsismeasuredbytheparticipationofpoliticalleadersintheplanningofsecurity
actionsandthepresenceofattemptsatnegotiatedsolution.FM3-24,1-22.102FM3-24,1-22.
103JohnNagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2002).
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authorityoversubordinatedrugproducersstillhungrytocreatetheirownfortunes.104Beyonddrug
tradelegalizationonlylimitednegotiationscouldbepursued.
PoliticalcontrolofoperationsremainedfirmlyinthehandsoftheColombianpresidentswho
alternatedbetweenutilizingtheSearchBlocandnegotiations.TheColombiangovernmentsuccessfully
broughtsometwentyleadersoftheMedellinCarteltosurrenderbaseduponreducedsentencesanda
banonextradition.ThemostfamousresultofthesenegotiationswasEscobar’ssurrendertohiscustom-
madepalatialprisonLaCathedral .105ProsecutorGeneralGustavodeGreiffconductedaseriesofclumsy
anduncoordinatednegotiationswiththecartelsandhis“extremelylenientsurrendertermsfordrug
dealersbecameanembarrassmenttotheColombiangovernmentandatargetforU.S.hostility.”106Asa
result,negotiationprovedoflimitedvalueinthecase.
FM3-24statesthat“resolvingmostinsurgenciesrequiresapoliticalsolution;”howeverinthis
case,thegovernmentforcesoptedtodestroytheiropponentsafternegotiatedeffortsfailed.107The
spiritofthepoliticalprimacyprincipleisthatthecounterinsurgentfocusesonrootcausesthatare
drivingtheinsurgency;forexample,lackofaccesstopoliticalrepresentationortheabsenceof
governmentservices.Therootcauseinthiscase,though,wastheeconomicopportunityprovidedby
theproductionandtraffickingofillicitdrugs.IfdrugtraffickinginColombiaistreatedasaninherent
constantinColombiansecurity,thenamorepreciserootcauseoftheconflictwouldbethepresenceof
ultraviolentandexcessivelyempoweredcartelleaderscapableofchallengingthenationalgovernment.
Giventhatcontroloveroperationsremainedincivilianhandsandunsuccessfulnegotiationswere
pursued,thisprinciplewasfollowedbutnotsuccessfullyandisscoredasneutral.
104WilliamC.Rempel, AttheDevil’sTable,(NewYork:RandomHouse,2011),128-129.
105Bowden,98-99.
106ClawsonandLee,117.
107FM3-24,1-22.
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UnderstandingoftheEnvironment108
Governmentforceshadaclearandnuancedunderstandingoftheconflictenvironment.The
membersoftheSearchBlocwereColombianpolicewithanativeknowledgeoftheenvironmentandan
understandingoftheircriminaltargets.TheColombiangovernmenthadbeenengagedinaninternal
conflictfordecadeswhentheDTOsemergedinthe1980s.BythetimeoftheapprehensionofMiguel
Rodriguez,theSearchBlochadbeentrackingdrugtraffickersforfourstraightyears.DEAagentsfrom
theUnitedStateshadastrongbackgroundintheregionandcountry.Veterans,likeDEAAgentJoeToft,
hadadeepunderstandingofColombiaandthethreatposedbyDTOs.
TheColombiangovernmentwasnotattackingtheDTOsinavacuum.Theprimarythreatstothe
statewerepowerfulguerrillagroupsliketheFARCandELN.Cartelleaders,asmajorlandowners,were
keybackersofself-defensegroupsthatperformedcriticalsecurityrolesinruralareaswherethe
governmentwasweak.ItwasonlyaftertheextensiveterrorcampaignlaunchedbyEscobarthatthe
governmentturneditssightsonthecartels.Furthermore,thegovernmentsuccessfullypittedonecartel
againsttheotherthroughtheuseof LosPepes.Operatinginacomplexconflictenvironmentrequired
theColombiangovernmenttoapplyMachiavellianskillbymanagingshiftingalliancestoachieveits
goals.109
Aswithatraditionalinsurgentthreat,understandingtheenvironmentprovedtobeacritical
assetinColombia.Localknowledgeandsignificanttimecounteringthethreatclearlyestablishthis
principleasakeyelementoftheColombiansuccess.Assuch,thisprincipleisscoredpositively.In
addition,formeradministratoroftheDEARobertBonneridentifiedthedivide-and-conquerstrategyasa
108Counterinsurgentunderstandingoftheenvironmentisbasedonthetimespentbyforcesdealingwiththe
problemandtheoriginsofsecurityforces.FM3-24,1-22thru1-23.109AdamElkus,“MexicanCartels:AStrategicApproach,”InfinityJournal ,June27,2011,
http://www.infinityjournal.com/article.php?article=27 .
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keyfactorinthedefeatofthecartels.110FM3-24doesnotspecificallyaddressthesequential
engagementofmultiplethreats,butitprovedessentialinthiscase.
IntelligenceDrivenOperations111
Operationsagainstthecartelswerelargelyintelligencedriven.InthecaseoftheMedellin
Cartel,securityforcesdrewfrombothtechnicalandhumansources.Signalsintelligenceassetswere
abletoeffectivelyinterceptcommunications.FormerEscobarassociatesinLosPepesprovideda
detailedunderstandingofthestructureandweaknessesoftheMedellinCartel.112Theremarkable
intelligenceandcounterintelligenceapparatusoftheCaliCartelfedtheSearchBlocand LosPepeswith
actionableintelligence.113Descriptionsofmissionsindicatethatraidsandoperationshadspecific
objectivesratherthanlargesweepsdiscouragedinFM3-24.114
TheCaliCartelwasdismantledusingsimilarmethods.TheCaliCartel’srelianceon
communicationstechnologymadeitsusceptibletolawenforcementsignalexploitation.Analyzing
criminalnetworksthroughphonecommunicationsishighlyeffectivefordevelopingtargetablelink
diagrams.115InformantslikeGuillermoPallomari,HaroldAckerman,andJorgeSalcedowerecriticalfor
theSearchBlocandtheDEAtodevelopanunderstandingoftheworkingsoftheCaliCartel.116
Theextensiveuseofactionableintelligencewasakeyattributeofthecampaignagainstthe
cartels.Thisstudyscoresthisprincipleaspositive.Theuseofintelligenceinlieuoflargecordonand
110RobertBonner,“TheNewCocaineCowboys,”ForeignAffairs89,(2010).
111Descriptionsofoperationsandtargetsareutilizedtomeasureif“operationsareshapedbytimelyspecificand
reliableintelligence…gatheredandanalyzedatthelowestlevel.”FM3-24,1-23.112Semana,“YofuielcreadordelosPepes,”June27,1994.
113Rempel,53-120.
114Semana,“Labusqueda,metroametro,”November15,1993.Semana,“Laconstanciavence,”January3,1994.
Bowden,KillingPablo.115MangaiNatarajan,“UnderstandingtheStructureofaDrugTraffickingOrganization:AConversationalAnalysis,”
IllegalDrugMarkets,(NewYork:CriminalJusticePress,2000).116Rempel,213-278.
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searchoperationsfallsdirectlyinlinewiththeguidanceinFM3-24.Thisconvergenceindicatesthatthe
developmentofasystematictargetingsystemisessentialagainstDTOsaswellaspoliticalinsurgencies.
IsolationfromPopularSupport/InformationManagement117
TheDASbuildingbombing,Aviancaairlinebombing,andassassinationofGaláneffectively
endedthepopularlyhelddashingdrugbaronimagebutitdidnotresultinfullpublicsupportfor
governmentsecuritypolicy.Pollingatthetimesuggeststhatthegovernmentdidnotconductan
effectiveinformationcampaigntomaintainpublicsupport.Despitethecartelviolence,inone1989poll,
58percentofrespondentsfavorednegotiationswiththecartelsand60percentsupportedamnesty.118
Evenin1997,afterboththeMedellinandCaliCartelsweredefeated,pollresultsshowed71percentof
respondentssaidthatsecurityhadworsenedandPresidentSamperhelda54percentunfavorable
rating.119Despitetheseinformationcampaignfailings,theColombiangovernmentachievedvictorydue
totheuniquesupportstructureofthecartels.
ThecampaignagainstthecartelsturnstheMaoistinsurgentstructureonitsheadinthatthe
cartelssuppliedthepopulationratherthanthepopulationsupplyingthecartels.120InMedellin,Escobar
developedphilanthropicventurestoimprovethelivesofthepoor.TheCaliCartel’sprofits“permeated
theCalieconomyandthenativesbecameaddictedtolaunderedmoneyandconspicuous
consumption.”121Thecartelleadersgainedpersonalrecognitionfromtheirdonationstosocietybutthey
didnotreceiveessentialsupport.Thepowerfulcounterintelligenceandsecurityapparatusdevelopedby
117Determiningthelevelofseparationfrompopularsupportisaccomplishedthroughaccountsofcartelandgang
reactionstofinancialtargetingbysecurityforcesaswellaspollingdata.Informationoperationsareevaluated
throughpollingfigures,accountsofcivilmilitaryoperationsandpublicaffairsactivities.FM3-24,1-23.118Semana,“Lagranencuestadel89,”January22,1990.
119Semana,“lagranencuesta97,”February10,1997.
120DavidKilcullin,“Counter-insurgencyRedux,”Survival 48,(2006),DavidKilcullinnotesthesamephenomenonin
Iraqwherewealthyinsurgentspaidlocalstoconductattacks.121Chepesuik,68.
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bothorganizationswasbasedonmonetarycompensation–notideology.Popularsupportwasnot
essentialtothecartels–cashflowwas.
Identifyingtheenemy’scenterofgravityiscrucialinthedevelopmentofaneffectivestrategy.
Clausewitzdescribesthecenterofgravityas“thehubofallpowerandmovement,onwhicheverything
depends.Thatisthepointagainstwhichallourenergiesshouldbedirected.”122Unlikepolitical
insurgencies,Colombianorganizedcrimegroupslackedanideologytoattractmembersandtheir
politicalgoalsrevolvedaroundincreasingtheirillicitincomes.Sinceillicitincomewasthecenterof
gravityforthecartels,financialtargetingofthecartelsprovedessential.Severalmultinational
operationsledbytheDEAresultedinmillionsofdollarsinseizures,multiplearrests,andthe
identificationofcriticalbankaccounts.123Inaddition,theColombianlawenforcement,ledbyProsecutor
GeneralAlfonsoValdivieso,alsoattackedthecartels’politicalsupportnetwork.Heinvestigated
numerousmembersofthepoliticaleliteincluding12congressmen,andalthoughPresidentSamper
escapedcharges,someofhistopaidesdidnot.124Bysimultaneouslypursuingdirectactionandfinancial
targeting,thegovernmentwasabletotightenanoosearoundthecartelsbyseizingresourcesand
removingtheircommandandcontrol.
TheColombiangovernmentfailedtoconductsuccessfulinformationoperations,whichis
reflectedbypollingresultsatthetime.Thereforethisstudyscoresinformationoperationsnegatively.
FM3-24warnsthat“victoryisgainednotwhenisolationisachieved,butwhenthevictoryis
permanentlymaintainedbyandwiththepeople’sactivesupport.”125TheColombiangovernmentdid
notrequireorobtainpopularsupporttodefeatthecartels,buttheydideffectivelyemployfinancial
targetingandinformantstoisolatethecartelsfromtheirsourcesofsupport.Assuch,isolationfrom
122Clausewitz,596.
123Chepesuik.,103.
124DouglasFarah,“Colombia’sCulpables;DrugCorruptionProbeImplicatesRulingClass,”WashingtonPost ,August
22,1995.125FM3-24,1-23.
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popularsupportisscoredneutralbecausethegovernmentachievedsuccessbutfailedtoachieve
popularsupportasdesignedinFM3-24.
RuleofLaw126
RobertThompsonwarnsthat“thegovernmentmustfunctioninaccordancewiththelaw”and
avoidthe“verystrongtemptation…toactoutsidethelaw.”127Theruleoflawwasnotmaintainedduring
theColombiangovernment’sfightagainstthecartels.ColonelMartinezoftheSearchBlocdescribedhis
effortsagainsttheMedellinCartelas“awar…anarmedconfrontationbetweenthecartelandthe
state.”128Furthermore,theuseofLosPepes,avigilanteorganizationcomposedofparamilitaries,Cali
Cartelmembers,andfrustratedpolicewasadeparturefromColombianlaw.LosPepeslauncheda
murderouscampaignofassassinationsandattacksonthekeyplayersintheMedellinCartel.129Thisis
nottosaythatCOINcannotutilizestronglaws,whichThompsonsaysagovernmentcando.130The
Colombiangovernment,however,didnotestablishtoughrules.Itsimplyignoredtherulesoutof
expediency.131
Theuseofparamilitariesandvigilantes,whileeffective,mustbescorednegativelyinthisstudy.
AlthoughFM3-24warnsthat“illegitimateactionsunderminebothlongandshorttermCOINefforts,”
extrajudicialactivitiesprovedeffectiveinthiscase.132AsDougFarahnotes“theimportanceoftheLos
Pepescannotbeoverestimated.”133Thefindingsherematchwiththedivide-and-conquerstrategy
126Adherencetotheruleoflawismeasurebyavailablenumbersandaccountsofincidentsofexcessiveforce,
unlawfuldetention,torture,andpunishment.FM3-24,1-23thru1-24.127Thompson,52.
128DavidKeane,TheTrueStoryofKillingPablo,(WildEyesProductions,2002).
129Semana,“YofuielcreadordelosPepes,”June27,1994.
130Thompson,53.
131AuthorinterviewwithCOL(ret)WilliamSpracher,formerdefenseattachétoColombia,Washington,DC,August
15,2011.132FM3-24,1-24.
133AuthorinterviewwithDougFarah,Washington,DC,August8,2011.
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identifiedpreviously.Thishighlightstheconceptthattemporaryalliancesmayproveeffectiveagainst
criminalgroupsdespitepotentialdamagetogovernmentlegitimacy.
LongTermCommitment/SupporttheHostNation134
ColombianforceswereconductinginternalCOINwhichmeantthattheyunderstoodthatthey
wouldpursuethecampaignuntilcomplete.ThedeterminationofCol.MartinezoftheSearchBloctakes
onanalmostShakespearianqualitybecauseherealizedthathewasinalifeordeathstrugglewith
Escobar.135Thedevelopmentofthe3,000manSearchBlocwasadirectindicationofColombian’s
seriousness.TheSearchBlocprovedtobeadurableorganizationandcontinuedthroughthedefeatof
theCaliCartelin1996.
U.S.supportwaslimitedbutsustainable,withthecartelsidentifiedasa“threattonational
security”in1986.136The1991NationalDefenseAuthorizationActprovidedtheDepartmentofDefense
with“authoritytoprovidetransportation,reconnaissance,training,intelligence,andbasesupportwhen
requestedbyforeignlawenforcementagenciesforcounternarcoticspurposes.”AverageU.S.aidto
Colombiaduringtheconflictwiththecartelswasamere$63.3millionannually.137Theconstrainedsize
andlevelofU.S.commitmentwasinfluencedbyfreshmemoriesofSomalia,where19servicemenwere
killedinalowintensityoperation.138Thesmallspecialoperationsandlawenforcementfootprint
allowedtheU.S.efforttomaintainasustainablecommitment.Counterintuitively,thelightfootprint
134Longtermcommitmentisobservedthroughthepresenceorabsenceoflastingorganizationsandstructuresas
wellasasustainableoperationstempo.Hostnationfocusistiedtothenumberofforeigntroopsandtheamount
offundingprovided.FM3-24,1-24.135Keane,TheTrueStoryofKillingPablo.
136NationalSecurityDecisionDirective221,April8,1986.
137NinaSerafino,“Colombia:SummaryandTablesonU.S.AssistanceFY1989-FY2004,”CongressionalResearch
Service,May19,2003.138RichardStewart,TheUnitedStatesArmyinSomalia,1992-1994,U.S.ArmyCenterforMilitaryHistory,(2003).
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approachforU.S.expeditionaryCOINisgenerallymoreeffective.139ThesuccessofU.S.effortswasdue
tothefactthatColombiansecurityforcesledtheeffortandnotanoverbearingU.S.assistanceteam.
Thecreationofadedicatedandvettedunitwithfocusedleadershipaswellastheinternal
natureofthecampaignindicatesthatlongtermcommitmentwasadequatelydisplayedbythe
Colombians.U.S.support,whilelimited,provedtobesustainablefinanciallyandpolitically.Assuchboth
longtermcommitmentandhostnationsupportarescoredpositivelyinthisstudy.Asinatraditional
COINeffort,commitmenttothefightisakeycomponent.AlthoughFM3-24islargelydesignedto
describeexpeditionaryCOIN,theColombiacasestudyshowsthatalightfootprintapproachwas
effectiveagainstcriminalgroups.
UseofForce140
TheColombiangovernmenteffortwasenemyfocused,butdrivenbyspecifictargeting.Security
forcesimplementedstrictpopulationcontrolstolimitthemobilityofcartelmembers,however,theuse
ofheavyfirepowerwasnotaseriousissue.Theconflictdidnotresemblethetypeofguerrillawarfare
seeninthewritingsofCheGuevarawhereattacksagainstgovernmentforcesarerequiredtoseize
resourcesandweardownthegovernment.141Thecartelscontinuedtopurchasetheirsuppliesthrough
theirillicittrade.Governmentforcesreliedonsmallarmsandlightweaponsthroughoutthecampaign.
Withoutheavymilitaryunits,theimpactofrulesofengagementandescalationofforcewasminimal.
Theuseofforceprincipleisevaluatedpositivelyinthestudy.Givenpreviousfindingson
informationoperationsandpopularsupport,itisunclearwhattheresultofpoorrulesofengagement
139HyRothstein,“LessisMore:theproblematicfutureofirregularwarfareinaneraofcollapsingstates,”Third
WorldQuarterly 28,(2007).140Theuseofforceisexaminedbythepresenceofrulesofengagementprocedures,useofheavyweapons,and
presenceoflargenumbersofciviliancasualties.FM3-24,1-25.141Guevara,GuerrillaWarfare.
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wouldhavebeen.AswithtraditionalCOIN,theuseofintelligencedrivenoperationsnaturallylimits
problemswiththeuseofforce.142
LearningandAdapting143
TheColombiangovernmentanditsU.S.allieseffectivelyadaptedduringthecampaign.The
initialstrategypursuedbytheColombiangovernmentwastolerantcoexistencewiththecartels.This
allowedtheMedellinandCaliCartelstogrowtoanunacceptablelevelofmilitaryandpoliticalpower.In
1983,PabloEscobarevenattemptedtoassumeofficeasacongressionalalternate.144Aftertheterrorist
campaignunleashedbythecartels,thegovernmentinitiatedanintensecrackdownontheMedellin
CartelthroughtheSearchBloc.Inthemidstofthisresponsethegovernmentattemptedtonegotiatean
agreementandacceptedthesurrenderofEscobar.Whenthisprovedineffective,thegovernment
reestablishedthemoreforcefuleffortsoftheSearchBloc.145WhiletheattackontheMedellincartelwas
extremelylethal,themoveagainsttheCaliCartelmorecloselyresembledapoliceinvestigation.146Once
againthegovernmentwouldutilizereducedpunishmenttopromotesurrenders.Thisconstantly
adjustingandshiftingstrategyindicatesthatthegovernmentwasabletotrydifferentmethodologies
andthenmatchtheiroperationstotheiropponents.
Atthetacticallevel,therewerenumerousinnovationsthatprovedcriticalintheeffort.Theuse
ofsignalsintelligencewashighlyeffectiveinthehuntforEscobar.Theuseoffinancialtrackingatthe
internationallevelasseeninoperationsGREENICEandDINEROwasagroundbreakingtechniquefor
142AuthorobservationsIraq2003and2005.
143COINforceadaptationismeasuredbythepresenceofchangesintacticsandthepresenceofamethodfor
capturinganddisseminatinglessons.FM3-24,1-26.144Bowden,35-41.
145Semana,“Labusqueda,metroametro,”November15,1993.
146AuthorinterviewwithDougFarah,August8,2011.
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attackingtransnationalcrime.147Inaddition,theabilitytoturntheCaliCartel’sadvanced
communicationtechnologiesagainstitwasalsoamajorcoupforgovernmentforces.
TheColombiangovernmentanditsU.S.alliesprovedadaptivethroughouttheconflictwiththe
drugcartelsandthisprincipleisscoredpositively.TraditionalCOINandoperationsagainstorganized
crimeare“wickedproblems”148thatrequireinteractionandadaptationtoachievean“acceptable
steadystate.”149TheColombiangovernment’sabilitytoshapeaneffectivestrategyinafluidand
complexthreatenvironmentwasvital.
SmallUnits150
Theuseofsmallunitswasevidentinthecampaignagainstthecartels.Oneofthemost
importantfactorsthatledtothedemiseofbothcartelswastheuseoftherelativelysmall3,000
memberSearchBloc.WidespreadcorruptionwithintheColombiansecurityforcesmadetheuseof
regularpoliceunitsimpossible.Whenmilitaryforcesweredeployedtheyshowedanabilitytoreduce
commoncrimeintheirimmediatevicinity,butwerevulnerabletocorruptionbyDTOswhentheir
cooperationwasnecessary.151ThevettedandtrustedmembersoftheSearchBlocmadeitdifficultfor
thecartelstocorrupttheorganization.WithinFM3-24,however,thisprincipleisbasedupon
empoweringplatoonsandcompanieswithinlargerformations.Theideabeingthatsmallunitswill
controltheirownterrainandusetheirlocalknowledgetorootoutinsurgentswhileimprovinglocal
147Chepesuik,109-110.GREENICEandDINEROwereinternationalstingsthatincludedtheuseoffakemoney
launderinginstitutionstotrackandseizeillicitfunds.148RittelandWebber,“DilemmasinaGeneralTheoryofPlanning.”
149TXHammes,Presentation,GeorgetownUniversity,Washington,DC,July,2011.
150Smallunitresponsibilityismeasuredbythecontrolofenablersatthelowestlevelandthroughaccountsof
interactionswithhighheadquarters.FM3-24,1-26.151AuthorinterviewwithGeneral(ret)CarlosOspina,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,
August30,2011.
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conditions.ThiswasnotthecaseinColombia;theSearchBlocmorecloselyresembledacounter-terror
unitthanalinecompanyconductingCOIN.152
Althoughthereisaslightdifferenceinthereasoningbehindtheimportanceofsmallunit
empowermentinFM3-24andinthiscase,thisstudyscoresthisprinciplepositively.Thevettedand
dedicatedSearchBlocwasperhapsthesinglemostimportantfactorinthedefeatofthecartels.Without
atrustedandcapableunitwithmobility,training,andfirepower,successinthiscasewouldhavebeen
unlikely.
GovernmentLegitimacy - LongTermCommitment +
UnityofEffort / InformationOperations -
PrimacyofPoliticalFactors / UseofForce /
UnderstandingtheEnvironment + SmallUnits +
IntelligenceDrivenOperations + LearnandAdapt +
IsolationfromPopularSupport / SupporttoHostNation +
RuleofLaw -
Table1
Table1providesanoverviewoftheresultsoftheColombiacasestudy.Sixofthe13principles
wereappliedsuccessfullyasoutlinedinFM3-24.Fouroftheprincipleswereeithernotapplied
accordingtothedoctrineorwerenotentirelysuccessful.Threeprincipleswerescoredasnotappliedor
failed.
Perhapsmostsurprisingly,governmentlegitimacyanditsassociatedprinciplesoftheruleoflaw
andinformationoperationswerenotachievedduringtheconflict.Theidentificationofthefinancial
centerofgravitythatemergedfromtheanalysisoftheDTOsusingO’Neill’sframeworkexplainshow
thisdeparturefromFM3-24’spopulationcentricapproachwaspossible.AgainstaMaoistinsurgencya
152Exum,“OnCOINandCT.”
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failuretoachievegovernmentlegitimacyandapplyawhole-of-governmentapproacharefatalerrors;
however,DTOsdonotdrawtheirstrengthfromthepopulationand,therefore,thecenterofgravity
shifts.Thisalsoaffectedtheimportanceofpoliticalsolutionswhicharelessusefulinthefaceof
incentivesarisingfromanilliciteconomy.
ManyCOINprinciplesprovedaseffectiveagainsttheColombiancartelsastheyareintraditional
COIN.Intelligencedriventargetingwascrucialaswasalongtermcommitment.Importantly,learning
andadaptingwasalsocriticalinthefightagainstthecartels.Theevaluationofsomeprinciplesyielded
valuablenuancesforapplyingCOINtocriminalthreats.TheColombianunderstandingoftheirthreat
environmentallowedthemtopursueadivide-and-conquerstrategy,pittingonesub-stategroupagainst
theother.VettedunitswerealsoessentialduetotheDTO’spowertocorruptusingitsillicitoutside
fundingsources.Furthermore,therelianceonillicittraffickingratherthanpopularsupportmadethe
cartelsmorevulnerabletofinancialtargetingthanatraditionalinsurgency.
CriminalGangsinRiodeJaneiro
HistoricalSummary
Priortotheimplementationofthecurrentpolicestrategy,itwasestimatedthattwomillionof
RiodeJaneiro’stotalpopulationof11millionpeoplewerelivinginsome900slumsknownasfavelas.153
Thefavelasresembleanurbanmazeofrandomlyerectedhomesandbusinessesutilizingvariedbuilding
materials.154ThenamefavelacomesfromMountFavela,wherein1897Braziliantroopsfoughtabrief
internalcampaigncalledtheCanudosWar.ThedecommissionedsoldiersfoundthemselvesinRioafter
theconflictawaitinglandgrantsthatwouldneverbedelivered.Theybuiltmakeshifthousinginvacant
153MariaHelenaMoreiraAlvesandPhilipEvanson,LivingintheCrossfire,(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,
2011),13-15.154AuthorobservationsRocinhaandVillaCanoasfavelas,15January2010.
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spacesaroundRiowhichcametobeknownasfavelas.155Theneighborhoodslatertookonthepoorand
homelessandgrewexponentiallyduringthemassurbanizationbeginninginthe1970s.
Thisenvironmentwasafertilebreedinggroundforcriminalgroupsthatcreatedungoverned
spaces.156ThehomiciderateinRioin2008was31per100,000,orthreetimestheUnitedNation’s
definitionofanepidemicrate.157However,PoliceLieutenantCoronelAntonioCarballobelieves
mortalityratesinRioforyoungmen“arecomparabletothoseofasocietyatwar,”andthatperhaps70
percentofthe3,000to4,000peoplereportedmissingeachyearareactuallyhomicides.158Inaddition,it
wasestimatedthatpoliceinRiokill41citizensforeachofficerthatiskilled;fourtimestheinternational
average.159
Thisisnotsurprisinggiventhatover100policeofficershavebeenkilledinRioeveryyear
since2000.160FormerPresidentofBrazilFernandoHenriqueCardosolamentsthat“fatalviolenceinthe
favelashasreachedanintolerablelevel,”andBrazil’spromiseofdemocracy“hasyettobefulfilled.”161
Rioiscurrentlyplaguedbythreemajorgangs:theRedCommand( ComandoVermelho),the
ThirdCommand(TerceiroComando),andtheFriendsoftheFriends( AmigosdelosAmigos).162Current
gangsinRiocantracetheirlineagetourbanguerrillasfightingagainstthemilitarydictatorshipinBrazil
duringthe1960sand1970s.InsurgentspursuingarebellionbasedonmethodschampionedbyCarlos
MarighellaandAbrahamGuillenrobbedbanksandattackedgovernmentforces.Politicallymotivated
guerrillasandcommoncriminalsfoundthemselvesinthesameprisonsystemandcriminalsbeganto
modeltheiractivitiesaftertheguerrillas.ComandoVermelhowasoriginallyformedintheprisonsto
155JanicePearlman,Favela,(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2010),24-27.
156Ibid.157JulioJacoboWaiselfisz,MapadeViolencia2011,(Brasilia:InstitutoSangariandMinisteriodaJusticia,2011),34,
http://www.cnt.org.br/Imagens%20CNT/Not%C3%ADcias/Fevereiro%20de%202011/2011mapa_Viol%C3%AAncia
%20(1).pdf .158AlvesandEvanson,162.
159Ibid.,118.
160Ibid.,122.
161FernandoHenriqueCardoso,“Foreword,”inPerlman,Favela.
162Garzon,63-67.
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controltheinmatepopulationanddemandbetterconditions.TheComandoVermelho’sorganization
provedinvaluableasitrapidlygrewininfluence.163
Inthe1980s,thearrivalofcocainewasdominatedbytheComandoVermelhowhichwasableto
capturevastquantitiesofmoneyandamassimpressivearsenals.TheComandoVermelhocorrupted
policeandofficialswhiledevelopingheavilyarmedgangstoprotectdrugdistributioncentersinthe
favelas.Thefavelasbecameno-goterrainforpoliceforcesandthegovernment.Thevariousfavelasrun
byindependentleadersoperatingwithintheComandoVermelhonetworkbegancompetingwitheach
otherandeventuallyfracturedintothreegroupsin1997.164
ThegovernmentlargelypursuedapolicyofisolationuntiltheinitiationoftheUPP(Pacifying
PoliceUnit)programin2008.165Controlofthefavelaswascededtodruggangsaslongastheyavoided
causingdisturbancesoutsideoftheirareas.Policeforces,oftentheBOPE(PoliceSpecialOperations
Battalion),wouldconductraidsintothefavelastoseizetargetedindividualsorasreprisalsforgang
activities.WhenRiohostedhighprofileevents,likethevisitbyPopeJohnPaulIIin1997andthePan
AmericanGamesin2007,policeandmilitaryforcestemporarilyoccupiedthefavelastopreventcriminal
disruptions.166
Rio’ssecurityissuesgainedworldwideattentionwhen,justtwoweeksafterbeingawardedthe
venueforthe2016OlympicGames,thecityeruptedintoviolenceandapolicehelicopterwasshot
down.167Motivatedbypreparationsforthe2014WorldCupandtheOlympics,thegovernmenthasnow
adoptedacomprehensiveandenduringstrategytoreassertcontrolofthefavelas.Theplanrevolves
163AlvarodeSouzaPinheiro,IrregularWarfare:Brazil’sFightAgainstCriminalUrbanGuerrillas,(HurlbertField:
JointSpecialOperationsUniversityPress,2009),5-8.164Garzon,63-67.
165UPPWebsite,http://www.upprj.com/en/.
166AlvesandEvenson,123-133.
167TomPhillips,“TwelveDeadandHelicopterDownedasRiodeJaneiroDrugGangsgotoWar,”Guardian,October
17,2009.
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aroundacommunitypolicingconceptledbyspecialpacifyingpoliceunitsanditsphasesclosely
resemblethe“clear-hold-build”methodologyoutlinedinFM3-24.168Since2008,thegovernmenthas
clearedsome25communitiesandreassertedstatecontrolover280,000citizens.169Whilethereare
somecriticsoftheapproach,evidencesuggeststhatthethreeyearoldchangeinmethodologyis
effective.
FavelaGangsasInsurgency
Onceagain,theuseofO’Neill’ssixfactorsisausefulstartingpointfromwhichtodescribea
criminalinsurgencyphenomenon.170Though,criminalgangs,likeDTOs,donoteasilyfitintoO’Neill’s
insurgencytypology.Rio’sgangsbearsomeresemblanceto“secessionist”insurgenciesinthattheyhave
carvedawaysectionsofterritoryfromthestateandareactivelyopposingallstateinfluenceintheir
domains.MaxManwaringbelievesthegangsarea“mutatedformofurbaninsurgency”becauseoftheir
“irrevocableneedtodeposeorcontrolanincumbentgovernmenttoforcearadicalsocio-economic-
politicalrestructuringofthenation-stateanditsgovernance.”171Thegangsalsobehavelikea
commercialistinsurgencyinthattheyfighttocontrollucrativelocaldrugmarketswithinthefavela.172In
essence,thegangsseekfullautonomyfromthestatetoruleovertheirowncriminalkingdoms.
Rio’sgangsutilizeguerrillawarfaretechniquesandterroristattackstoachievetheirgoals.
Operatingincoordinatedsmallunits,thegangspatrolanddefendtheirfavelas.Thefavelasresemble
thesafe-havensincomplexterrainenvisionedbyMao,butthegangslimittheirexpansiontocriminal
raidingoutsideofthefavelaratherthanexportingrevolution.173Thegangsareaformidableurban
guerrillaforce,armedwithassaultrifles,grenades,andheavymachineguns.Theyutilizethemazeof
168FM3-24,5-18thru5-23.
169UPPWebsite.
170O’Neill,15-43.
171Manwaring,StreetGangstheNewUrbanInsurgency ,(Carlisle:SecurityStudiesInstitute,2005),33.
172Ibid.
173Mao,108.
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pathwaysandramshacklebuildingstofightalethaldefenseindepthagainstassaultinggovernment
securityforces.174Thegangsarealsocapableofcoordinatedwidespreadattacksthatcouldbe
consideredterroristactions.OnDecember28,2006,gangstorchedbussesandlaunchedsynchronized
attacksagainst12policestationsleaving18deadinamovetointimidatethenewstategovernor.175In
Novemberof2010,thegangsstruckagainburningbussesandcars,detonatingimprovisedexplosives,
andengagingpolice.Theattacks,whichleftmorethan35dead,weredesignedtocounterthe
pacificationprogramandmayhavebeentailoredtoprovidenegativeimagestotheinternational
media.176Tactically,thereareclearsimilaritiesbetweeninsurgentsandcriminalgangs.
Unfortunately,O’Neill’sframeworkofinsurgentstrategicapproachesdoesnotprovideaclear
pictureofgangstrategiesinRio.ThegangsinRio,liketheCaliandMedellinCartels,relyonextensive
corruptionofthepoliceforces.However,forDTOsliketheCaliCartel,corruptiontakesonanessential
roleandissimilartoaLeninistrevolutionarytechnique.Thegangs,incontrast,bribepoliceandlocal
officialsbuttheirinfluenceisnowherenearthatofpowerfulDTOs.Gangspaycorruptpolicetolimitor
preventincursionsintheirterritory.177Thegangsresembleaprotractedpopularwarstrategyinthat
theydrawsupportfromthepopulation;however,thereisnophasedrevolutionaryapproach.Inmany
waystheilliciteconomyhasreinvigoratedGuevara’s focomethodandintegratedurbanapproaches.178
Thegangsareessentiallysmallbandsofguerrillasutilizingurbanguerrillatechniques.Theirgoals,
however,areextremelylimited:controlofadelineatedfavelaanditseconomicresources,specifically
drugprofits.Becausethegangsareasecessionistmovement,theydonotpursuethegeneral
revolutionarygoalsoutlinedbyMarighellaandGuillen.
174Pinheiro,5-8.
175MichaelAstor,“18deadasRiogangsclashwithpoliceinviolentshowofforce,”Independent ,December29,
2006.176BBC ,“RiodeJaneiroshakenbyfreshgangviolence,”November25,2010.
177AuthorinterviewRafaelSaleis,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,August30,2011.
178DavidSpencer,“PostColdWarCounterinsurgencyinLatinAmerica,”unpublishedwork.
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ThefavelagangsmorecloselyresembleMaoistinsurgenciesthantheMedellinandCaliCartels.
Aswasshownpreviously,aDTO’scenterofgravityisitsprofitsfromillicittrafficking.UnlikeMedellin
andCali,thefavelagangsarecloselytiedtothecommunityforresources.Favelagangsarenotprimarily
traffickingorganizationsbutratherparticipateinthedrugtradeattheretaillevel.Drugprofitscome
fromthelocalpopulationandothersthatenterthefavelatopurchasedrugs.Thegangsreceive
weaponsandfundingfromoutsidethefavelabuttheirprimarysourceofincomeislocaldrugsales.
Additionally,somegangsandespeciallymilitiaschargeataxonresidentstohelpfundoperations.179
Manygangsinitiatepublicworksprojectsandthrowpopularfunkmusicpartiestocreateapositive
image.Gangsalsoprovidearudimentaryjusticesystemforconflictarbitration.Shortdurationraiding
andpolicecorruptionalsoalienatedthepublicfromthegovernmentallowingthegangstomaintain
popularsupport.180PopularsupportisanimportantdifferencebetweenpowerfulDTOsandpowerful
gangs.Thecenterofgravityforfavelagangs,likemanyclassicinsurgencies,isthelocalpopulation.
EachfavelahasahighlyorganizedstructurewhiletheoverarchinggroupsliketheComando
Vermelhofunctionmorelikeanetwork.Atthelocallevel,eachfavelaiscontrolledbyaseniorleaderor
dono.Underthedonoisthegeneralmanagerwhomanagesthegangoperationsincludingdrugsales
andmilitaryactivities.Underthegeneralmanger,therearesub-managersforcocainesales,marijuana
sales,andsecurity.Eachdrugdistributionpoint,calleda bocadefumo,hasamanagerandsecurity
force.Finally,guardsareemployedtoprotecttheperimeterofthefavelafrompoliceorrivalgang
incursions.181
ItissomewhatdifficulttoapplyaninsurgencyframeworktothefavelagangsofRio,buttheydo
sharesomeattributeswiththeirpoliticalinsurgentpredecessorswhofoughtthemilitarydictatorship.
Thegangshaveanextremelylimitedgoaltoachieve–maintainingautonomyoverdistinctterrainin
179AlvesandEvanson,20.
180Ibid.,117.
181Garzon,66.
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ordertomaximizecommercialgainthroughretaildrugsales.Thegangsatthefavelaleveloperatein
organizedunits,employingguerrillatacticstomaintaincontroloftheirterritory.Mostimportantly,their
centerofgravityisthepopulationthatsuppliesthemwithillegaltaxesanddrugprofits.Becausethe
gangs’centerofgravityisthepopulation,thismakesthemvulnerabletomoretraditionalCOIN
methodologies.
TheBrazilianGovernmentResponseasCOIN
Fromthe1980sthrough2008,thegovernmentpursuedapolicyofisolationandraidingagainst
thefavelagangs.However,currentoperationscloselyresembleapopulationcentricCOINmethodology.
Currentcampaignsagainstthefavelasinvolveafourphasedapproach:
1. Intelligencecollection
2. Occupation,usuallyconductedbyBOPEforces
3. InstallationoftheUPPunit
4. Evaluationandcoordinationofgovernmentservicesbetweenpolice,communityleaders,service
providers,andnongovernmentalorganizations182
Rio’sstatesecuritysecretary,JoseMarianoBeltrame,outlinedthegoaloftheoperations:“Wecannot
guaranteethatwewillputanendtodrugtraffickingnordowehavethepretensionofdoingso…[the
ideais]tobreaktheparadigmofterritoriesthatarecontrolledbytraffickerswithweaponsofwar.Our
concreteobjectiveisthatacitizencancomeandgoashepleases,thatpublicandprivateservicescan
getintherewhenevertheywant.”183Unlikepreviousefforts,theUPPprogramisdesignedtolastfora
minimumof25years.184AswithFM3-24,UPPfocusesonthepopulation.“TheUPPisanewmodelof
PublicSecurityandpolicingthatintendstobringpoliceandpopulationclosertogether,aswellas
strengthensocialpoliciesinsidecommunities.Byreestablishingcontroloverareasthatfordecadeswere
182BethMcLoughlin,“WillcrimecrackdowntransformRio’sshantytowns?”BBC ,August20,2011.
183TomPhillips,“RiodeJaneiropoliceoccupyslumsascityfightsbackagainstdruggangs,”Guardian,April12,
2010.184McLoughlin.
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occupiedbytrafficand,recently,alsobymilitias,theUPPsbringpeacetocommunities…Communitarian
Policeisaconceptandastrategybasedonthepartnershipbetweenthepopulationandpublicsecurity
institutions.”185AnanalysisofthesecurityinitiativeshowsthatCOINprinciplesarewellrepresentedin
thecurrentapproach.
GovernmentLegitimacy
Initially,thegovernmentwasnotseenaslegitimate,buteffortssince2008showan
improvementinpublicperceptionofthegovernment.186Widespreadpolicecorruptionandshortterm
raidsonthefavelasleftthefavelaspopulationalienatedfromthepolice.Thesecurityforces’raiding
cultureledtoadehumanizationoffavelaresidents.Oneofficerevencalledthemilitarypolice“thebest
socialinsecticide.”187Notsurprisingly,manycitizenshadmorerespectforthelocalgangsandtheir
rudimentarylawsthanforgovernmentsecurityforces.188Onesurveyindicatedthatfavelaresidents
believedthatthepolicecommittedmoreactsofviolenceagainstthecommunitybyamarginoftwoto
one.189Thelackofsecurityalsopreventedthecitygovernmentfromdeliveringbasicservicestothe
neighborhoodsleavingthepopulationfeelingabandoned.190
TheUPPprogram,however,haschangedthisperception.Oncesecurityforcesandgovernment
officialsestablishedalastingpresenceinthefavelastheyhavegreatlyimprovedpublicperceptions.The
UPPprogramusesspeciallytrainedyoungofficerstopreventpoliceofficersraisedinacultureof
corruptionfrominfluencingtheeffort.UPPresultsarepromising.96percentofrespondentsinDona
MartaandCidadedeDeusthinkUPPshouldbeexpandedtootherareasand93percentapproveofthe
185UPPWebsite,http://www.upprj.com/en/,
186AlexeiBarrionuevo,“Inroughslum,Brazil’spolicetrysofttouch,”NewYorkTimes,October10,2010.
187AlvesandEvanson,209.
188Perlman,167.
189Ibid.,189.
190Authorobservations,RocinhaandVillaCanoasfavelas,15January2010.
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program.191InacomprehensivesurveyofcommunitieswithUPPunits,94percentofrespondents
believedtheircommunitywassecure,80percentsaidthattheimageofthepoliceimproved,morethan
70percentfeltbetterrespectedbyoutsidecommunitiesandsaidtheynowhaveavoiceinthe
government.192Challengesremainforgovernmentlegitimacyincludingtheriskofcorruptioninthe
UPPs193andcontinuingdemandsformoregovernmentservices.
194
Thisstudyscoresgovernmentlegitimacypositivelyasthegovernmentnotonlydevelopeda
programdesignedtogainthesupportofthepopulationbutithasachievedsignificantsuccess.This
findingcontrastswiththeColombiancasestudywheregovernmentlegitimacywasnotpursuedor
achieved.Breakingthecycleofgangviolenceandpoliceraidingallowedthegovernmenttodisplacethe
criminalthreatandestablishcontrol.
UnityofEffort
ThesecurityeffortinRioiscoordinatedatthestatelevel.Allstatelevelactivitiesincludingsocial
andsecurityinitiativesarecontrolledbythegovernor,SergioCabral.TheCivilPoliceandMilitaryPolice
arestateforcesandfallunderstatesecuritysecretaryJoseMarianoBeltrame.UPPSocial,astatelevel
program,coordinatesgovernment,privatesector,andNGOprojectswithinUPPfavelas.195Atthe
tacticallevel,occupationsaretypicallycommandedbytheBOPEandthencontrolisgiventoaUPP
commander.Ostensibly,thecoordinationanddeliveryofservicesiscompletedbyaresidential
191PresentationGovernodoRiodeJaneiro,EstadodoRiodeJaneiroSecretariadeSeguranca.
192InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.193MichaelKerlin,“UPPCorruptionDemandsComplexQuestions,Solutions,”TheRioTimes,September13,2011,
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/opinion-editorial/opinion/upp-corruption-demands-complex-questions-
solutions/#.194InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.195AshleyMorse,“PacifyingandReincorporatingRiodeJaniero’sFavelas,”inTacklingUrbanViolenceinLatin
America,(Washington,DC:WOLA,2011).
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community,butinpracticetheUPPcommanderisseenastheleaderinmostfavelas.196“TheUPP
commanderislikeaking”andeffectivelyreplacestherulinggangleader.197Fortunately,mostfavela
residentsratecooperationbetweentheUPPandthecommunityasgoodorexcellent.198
Thisstudyfindsthatgovernmentforcessuccessfullyachievedunityofcommandintheir
operationsandscoresthisprinciplepositively.Atthestrategiclevelcivilianleadershipisfirmlyin
controlofoperationsandisworkingtointegratesecurityanddevelopmentassets.Atthetacticaland
operationallevels,theBOPE,UPP,andmilitaryunitshaveprovencapableofcoordinatingtheir
actions.199Finally,despiteunclearcommandchains,cooperationbetweencommunityleadersandUPP
commandershasbeeneffective.AswithtraditionalCOINefforts,securityforcesinRiowouldhavehad
tremendousdifficultyoccupyingterrainandcontrollingthepopulationwithoutafunctioningcommand
frameworkthatintegrateddiversegovernmentassets.
PrimacyofPoliticalFactors
AswiththeColombiacasestudy,politicalreconciliationhasplayedalimitedroleinthe
governmentapproach.AlthoughsomeBraziliangangslikethePCC(FirstCapitalCommand)publish
manifestosthatincludepoliticaldemands,mostgangsatthelocallevelaresimplyfocusedon
controllingterrainandprofitingfromdrugsales.200Whilepoliticalinterestsareparamountinaclassic
insurgency,theunderlyingcauseofviolenceinthefavelasisculturalandsocial.Youthareraisedina
cultureofviolenceandlimitedeconomicopportunityleadingtointenseincentivestojoingangs.
SociologistJanicePerlmanobserves:
196InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.197AuthorinterviewRafaelSalies,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,August30,2011.
198InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010199TheEconomist ,“ConqueringComplexodoAlemao,”December2,2010.
200Pinheiro,11-12.
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Theinternalizedlackofself-esteem,inevitableforyouthwhoarenevertreatedas
respectablepeople,isconducivetoteenagersdroppingoutofschool,having
unprotectedsexthatleadstoearlypregnancies,andjoiningdruggangs.Atleastinthe
gang,theadolescentboysfeelimportantandpowerful.Theyarearmed,theyhavecash;
theywearexpensiveshoes,shirts,andjewelry;theymayhaveamotorcycle,andthey
attracttheattentionofthemostdesirableyoungwomen.Itisnothardtoimaginea
teenagerbeingwillingtoriskearlydeathforthechancetoexperiencetherespectand
deferencethatordinarypeopletakeastheirbirthright.201
Thegovernmentisnowattemptingtoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofyouthviolence.Increased
securitybytheUPPhasledtosubstantialdecreasesindrugtrafficking;removingthisoptionforyoung
residents.202Theimpositionofgovernmentauthorityprovidesalternaterolemodelsfortheyouthofthe
favelas.203Increasedliciteconomicopportunitygiveyoungmalesalternateroutestorespectand
personalwealth.
AswiththeColombiacasestudy,itisdifficulttoapplythepoliticalprimacyprincipletofavela
gangs.Ratherthanapoliticalideology,therootcausesoftheconflictinRioareanextensivelocalillicit
economyandacultureofgangviolence.GovernmenteffortsintheRiofavelasinmanywaysmore
closelyresemblesanti-gangstrategiesthatfocuson“socialintervention,theprovisionofopportunities,
andcommunitymobilization”toattackthecausesofgangviolence.204Becausethisfocusoncultural
changeisadistinctdeparturefromthepoliticalfocusfoundinFM3-24,thisstudyratesthepolitical
primacyprincipleasneutral.
UnderstandingoftheEnvironment/IntelligenceDrivenOperations
Thepoliceforcesinvolvedintheclearanceandoccupationofthefavelashaveaclear
understandingoftheiroperationalenvironment.DecadesofoperationsinthefavelashavegivenRio
201Perlman,323.
202InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.203AlexeiBarrionuevo,“Inroughslum,Brazil’spolicetrysofttouch.”
204U.S.DepartmentofJustice,OfficeofJuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPrevention,“ComprehensiveGang
Model,”October2010,https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231200.pdf .
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policeastrongbackgroundinthenatureofthepopulationandthegangs.Infact,manyofthepolicelive
inthefavelasorgrewupinthefavelas.Interestingly,corruptionbecomesadoubleedgedswordforthe
gangsoncemoralpolicingisincentivized.Corruptpolicethatstraightenoutalreadyknowthegang
leadersandtheiroperations,whichallowsforhighlyeffectivetargeting.205Inaddition,securityforces
maximizetheuseofsignalsandhumanintelligenceaspartofthefirstphaseofacampaigntoretakea
favela.206GeneralPinheiro’sreviewoflessonsfromthearmy’sdeploymentintothefavelasin2006
notesthat“intelligencedatacollectionabouttheoppositionforcesisanessentialtask.”207Government
forces’detailedunderstandingofthefavelasandtheirfocusonintelligencepreparationhavebeenkey
elementsintheirsuccess.
Thisstudyscorestheprinciplesofunderstandingtheenvironmentandintelligencedriven
operationspositively.Theseprinciplesareconsistentwiththefieldmanualandweresuccessfully
practicedinbothcasescoveredinthisstudy.ThesetraditionalCOINprinciplesretainedtheirvalueeven
whenappliedagainstacriminalthreat.
IsolationfromPopularSupport
Theinitialgovernmentstrategyoffavelaisolationandraidingengenderedpopularsupportfor
thecriminalgangs.Incontrast,effortsundertheUPPhaverapidlybuiltuplocalsupportforthe
governmentanddismantledsupportforthegangs.208DatafromUPPcontrolledfavelasindicatesthat
drugsalesandusedrasticallydeclineoncegovernmentforcestakecontroloftheneighborhoods.209The
occupationofthefavelaseffectivelyisolatesthegangsfromtheirsourceofmaterialsupport,fundsfrom
localdrugsales.Socialprogramsmayexplainsomeofthedeclineindrugsalesbutitismorelikelythat
205AuthorinterviewRafaelSalies,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,August30,2011.
206BethMcLoughlin,“WillcrimecrackdowntransformRio’sshantytowns?”BBC ,August20,2011.
207Pinheiro,32.
208PresentationGovernodoRiodeJaneiro,EstadodoRiodeJaneiroSecretariadeSeguranca.
209InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.
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increasedsecuritydisplacesusersanddealerstounsecuredfavelas.Thefavelapopulationisgenerally
conservativeandhardworkingandisnotinclinedtosupportthegangsintheabsenceofcoercion.The
limitedpopularsupportenjoyedbythegangsquicklycrumblesoncetheircontroloftheilliciteconomy
andforceisdestroyed.210
Thisstudyscoresisolationfrompopularsupportasstronglypositive.Thegovernmentwasable
toseparatethegangsfromtheirmaterialandpopularsupport.Aswasshownintheanalysisusing
O’Neill’smodel,thegangshavealocalcenterofgravityunlikeaDTOcriminalthreat.Thismeansthat,as
withaMaoisttypeinsurgency,theirresourcesarederivedfromthelocalpopulationandcontrolofthe
populationwillcutofftheirsourcesofsupport.
RuleofLaw/UseofForce
Governmentforceshaveimprovedtheiradherencetotheruleoflaw,buttherearestill
significantissueswithpoliceviolatinglegalrequirements.HumanRightsWatchnotesthat“some
Brazilianpoliceofficersengageinabusivepracticesinsteadofpursuingsoundpolicingpolicies.”211Police
inRiooperatewiththeauthoritytousedeadlyforceagainstcriminalsthat“resist.”Underthislawthe
policehavebroadrulesofengagementwhenoperatinginthefavelas.HumanRightsWatchbelieves
thatasignificantnumberofthehundredsofannualpolicekillingsareillegitimate.212Thegovernment
hastakensomeaction.Undercoverpolicearebeingemployedtocatchpoliceabusesandan
ombudsmanisnowinvestigatingcomplaints.213Thegovernmentefforthas,atleastostensibly,followed
aruleoflawapproachandthegangshavebeenpursuedascriminalsunderthejusticesystemrather
thanenemycombatants.
210AuthorinterviewU.S.ArmyForeignAreaOfficer,JamesWinland,October,2011.
211HumanRightsWatch,CountrySummary:Brazil ,January,2011.
212Ibid.
213TheEconomist ,“ConqueringComplexodoAlemao,”December2,2010.
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Theuseofforcehasbeenlimitedbytheweaponsystemsemployedbythepoliceandmilitary
unitsoperatinginthefavelas.Thepoliceareheavilyarmedwithassaultriflesandutilizearmored
vehiclesbuttheyarenotemployingairstrikes,heavymachineguns,andhighcalibercanonsagainst
theircriminalopponents.PriortotheUPPprogram,theBOPEfollowednotoriouslylooserulesof
engagement.214However,recentpollingoffavelaresidentssuggeststhattheBOPEhasadjustedits
tacticstothenewstrategy.OnlytenpercentofrespondentsfromfavelasdepictedBOPErelationswith
residentsasviolent,41percentdescribedrelationsasfriendlyandprofessional.215
Thisstudyscorestheruleoflawprincipleasneutral.Importantprogresshasbeenmadeto
establishruleoflawbutstudiesbyhumanrightsadvocatesquestionifthatprogresshasbeenentirely
successful.Theuseofforceisscoredpositively.Rulesofengagementhavesubstantiallychangedfrom
theraidingstrategypreviouslyemployed.AswithatraditionalCOINeffort,thesetwoprincipleshave
beenimportantaspectsofthegovernment’sstrategyinRio.Poorrelationsbetweensecurityforcesand
favelaresidentsinpartarisefrompreviousraidingoperationsthatdiscardedtheruleoflawandutilized
openrulesofengagement.Effortstoimproveadherencetotheruleoflawandresponsiblerulesof
engagementhavehelpedthegovernmentdeveloplegitimacy.
LongTermCommitment
Incontrastwithpreviouseffortstogaincontrolofthefavelas,theUPPprogramhasshowna
commitmenttothelongterminclusionofthefavelasundergovernmentcontrol.UPPpoliceunitsare
basedinthefavelasandaredesignedtoworkwiththeneighborhoodsindefinitely.Beltramehas
214ForanoutstandingdramatizationofBOPE’sengagementsinthefavelasseeTropadeElite,directedbyJose
Padiha,ZazenProductions,2007.215InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.
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proclaimedthat“thepolicehavearrivedandthepolicewillremain.”216Investmentintheprogram,
unlikepreviouseffortsatcommunitypolicing,issubstantial.Thecitygovernmentisinvestingeight
milliondollarsonthepoliceacademywiththegoalofincreasingthepoliceforceto60,000officers.217
ThenationalgovernmenthasinitiatedthehalfbilliondollarPRONASCI(NationalProgramforPublic
SecuritywithCitizenship)whichfunnelsmoneythrough94programsaimedatprofessionalizingpolice,
reformingthepenalsystem,preventingyouthviolence,combatingcorruption,andcreatingurban
renewal.218Despitethesenumbers,over60percentoffavelaresidentsstillfearthatonedaycriminals
willretakecontroloftheircommunitiesandthatthecontinuationoftheUPPprogramwilldependon
thewillofthenextgovernment.219Althoughpublicdistrustremains,thegovernmentcampaignhas
achievedbureaucraticmomentumthatwillbedifficulttoreverse.
BasedonthesignificantpoliticalandmaterialinvestmentsmadeintheUPPprogram,thisstudy
evaluateslongtermcommitmentpositivelyinthiscase.Thepreviousidentificationofaculturaland
societalfoundationtotheviolenceindicatesthat,perhapsevenmoresothaninpoliticalCOIN,along
terminvestmentisrequiredtoaddresstheproblem.FM3-24demandsthatthecounterinsurgentforce
havethe“means,ability,stamina,andwilltowin”ifitistosucceed.220Thesequalitieswereequally
importantinthetwocasesofcriminalinsurgenciesdiscussedinthisstudy.ThegovernmentinRiohas
committeditselftoalong-termcampaigntoreassertcontrolofthefavelas.
InformationManagement/SupporttotheHostNation
216TomPhillips,“RiodeJaneiropoliceoccupyslumsascityfightsbackagainstdruggangs,”Guardian,April12,
2010.217UPPwebsite,http://www.upprj.com/en/.
218PRONASCIwebsite,
http://portal.mj.gov.br/pronasci/data/Pages/MJ3444D074ITEMID2C7FC5BAF0D5431AA66A136E434AF6BCPTBRN
N.htm,accessedSeptember7,2011.219InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades
dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010220FM3-24,1-24.
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InformationoperationssincetheinceptionoftheUPPapproachhavebeenimpressive.The
governmentengagesinextensivepublicoutreachprogramsincludingpolicevisitstolocalschools,free
JiuJitsuclassestaughtbypolice,andabroaddisseminationofinformationproductstoswaythepublic
againstthegangs.221Brazilhasgonefurtherbyengagingtheinternationalcommunitytoavoid
complicationsfromhumanrightsgroupswhichmayaffecttheupcomingWorldCupandOlympics.The
UPPwebsitefeaturespositivestoriesandinteractivedisplaysexplainingtheUPPmissionanditsresults
inseverallanguages.222TheBraziliansareself-reliantandagrowingworldpower,henceaccepted
externalsupportfortheUPPprogramisextremelylimited.U.S.supporthasbeenlargelylimitedto
adviceandindirectinferencesfromU.S.doctrineandexperiencesinIraqandAfghanistan.TheBrazilians
deemedinternationalopinionoftheUPPprogramimportantwhiledecliningdirectforeignassistance.
Thisstudyscoresinformationmanagementasextremelypositive.Aswithpopulationcentric
COIN,developingapositivenarrativeandsolidrapportwiththepopulationwasessentialinthiscase.
Hostnationsupportisclearlypositivebecausethereisverylittleoutsidesupport.Brazilhaseffectively
createdaglobalinformationcampaigntoensureforeignsupportforitsactions.Thisisverysimilarto
thecreativemodificationofinsurgencytheorydevelopedbytheSandinistasinwhichworldpublic
opinionwasaprimaryobjective.223Inthiscase,Braziliseffectivelyengagingtheworldcommunityto
preventcriminalgroupsfromgainingsupportfrominternationalnon-governmentalorganizationsand
humanrightsorganizations.
LearningandAdapting
Governmentforcesclearlylearnedandadaptedtheirtacticsandapproachfromtheriseofthe
gangsinthe1970stocurrenteffortstoday.Theoriginalapproachembracedbythegovernmentwasto
221AlexeiBarrionuevo,“Inroughslum,Brazil’spolicetrysofttouch,”NewYorkTimes,October10,2010.
222UPPwebsite.
223TXHammes,TheSlingandtheStone,”(Minneapolis,Zenith,2006),87-88.
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isolatethegangsinthefavelasandpreventtheirinfluenceontherestofthecity.Punitiveoperations,
targetedraids,andshorttermoccupationswereusedtomanagetheproblembutneverresultedin
governmentcontrolofthefavelas.WhenBrazilwasawardedtheWorldCupandtheOlympicsitbecame
imperativetoachievealastingsolutiontothefavelaproblemthatdidnotcedesovereigntyover
hundredsofthousandsofcitizenstocriminalgangs.
Braziliansecurityforcesdrewfromavarietyofexperiencestohonetheirtacticalabilitiesand
operationalplans.TheBrazilianmilitaryhasgainedextensiveexperienceoperatinginHaitiasthelead
nationinMINUSTAH(UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti).Thisexperiencewithexpeditionary
peacekeepinghasbeeninvaluableduringoperationsinthefavelas.224
Previousattemptsatcommunity
policingalsoprovidedkeylessons.TheGPAE(PoliceGroupinSpecialAreas)wasimplementedin2000in
CantagaloandPavao-Pavaozinhobutitssuccesswaslimitedbyitsscopeandfunding.225TheUPP
programbenefitedfromaphasedapproachthatallowedadequatetimefororganizationallearning
betweenoperations.Eachfavelarepresentedauniquebutsimilarproblemset,sothegovernmentwas
abletolearnandadaptitssystemsaftereachfavelawasoccupied.Theoccupationswerealso
sequencedsothatthelargerandmostdangerousfavelascameafterthelessdangerousones.This
enabledgovernmentforcestobuildontheirexperiences.
Learningandadapting,aswiththeColombiancase,ispositivelyevaluatedhere.TheBrazilian
approachresemblesacommonCOINinkblotapproach.However,Rio’sterrainmakesitunique.The
contestedfavelasaresimilartoislandswithinthecitythatcanbephysicallyisolatedandengaged
separately.Asglobalurbanizationtrendscontinuetraditionalinsurgenciesandcriminalvariantswill
increasinglybefoundincities.TheisolateandreduceapproachappliedinRiomayprovideCOIN
practitionerswithanalternativetoinkblotmethods.
224Pinheiro,29.
225AlvesandEvanson,160-161.
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SmallUnits
Theclear-hold-buildmethodologyutilizedbythegovernmentuseslargerobustforcestoinitially
clearafavelaofarmedgangmembersandthenfocusesonsmallUPPunitsthathavecontroloftheir
terrain.TheseUPPelementsareempoweredtocontroltheirzonesandareledbypolicecaptains.As
wasdiscussedpreviously,UPPcommanderslargelyreplacethedominantdrugdealersastherulersof
thefavelas.
ThefocusonsmallunitempowermentisclearlyinlinewiththetenantsofFM3-24andisscored
positivelyinthisstudy.AswiththeColombiancasestudy,corruptionisakeyfactorinRio.TheUPPsare
intentionallyseparatedfromtherestofthepoliceforcetoavoidcorruption.TheUPPsarelargerthan
thevettedSearchBlocinColombiabuttheyaresubjectedtoadifferenttrainingregimenandreceive
additionalpay.
GovernmentLegitimacy + LongTermCommitment +
UnityofEffort + InformationOperations +
PrimacyofPoliticalFactors / UseofForce +
UnderstandingtheEnvironment + SmallUnits +
IntelligenceDrivenOperations + LearnandAdapt +
IsolationfromPopularSupport + SupporttoHostNation +
RuleofLaw /
Table2
Table2showsthatthegovernment’sapproachinRioisagoodmatchwiththepopulation-
centricapproachfoundinFM3-24.ItisalsoevidentthattheproperapplicationoftheCOINprinciples
wascriticalinachievingsuccess.11ofthe13factorswerefollowedandweresuccessful.Twofactors
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werescoredasneutral.Thegovernmenthasrecognizedtheimportanceoftheruleoflawinits
operations,butitisstillundergoingneededreformstomeetitsnewstandardsforpolicework.
ThegovernmentisaddressingrootcausesofthegangsinRiobutthesearesocial,cultural,and
economicratherthanprimarilypoliticalasiscommonlyunderstoodinclassiccounterinsurgency.One
hearteningfindingisthatthecenterofgravityofafavelagangisvulnerable.Wrestinginsurgentsfrom
theirsourceofsupportwasagruelingprocessinVietnamandMalaya.226Gangs,however,lackreal
legitimacyand,withoutamonopolyofforce,quicklyloseaccesstomaterialsupportfromextortionand
localdrugsales.
Thegovernment’suseofasequentialcampaigncreatedahighlyeffectivesystemforlearning
andadapting.ThenatureoftheurbanthreatinRioresemblesislandsofcontestedterritorythatcanbe
isolatedandreduced.Thegovernmenthasattackedtheproblemsequentiallybyaddressingtheleast
dangerousthreatsfirsttobuildabaseofexperiencebeforetacklingthemoredifficultfavelas.Isolating
pocketsandattackingtheminsequencetomaximizeadaptationcouldproveextremelyusefulwhen
dealingwithsimilarthreatslikeMS-13inCentralAmerica.
Brazil’suseofaninternationalinformationcampaigntoisolatethecriminalgroupsfromoutside
supportandmaintainitspositiveimagedespiteamassivesecuritychallengeisfascinating.Brazil’splace
asarisingpowerandthehostoftwomajorsportingeventsmakesitvulnerabletointernational
pressure.Criminalattemptstouseviolentpropagandahavefailedtocreatepressurefromothernations
andinstitutionslikeFIFAandtheOlympicCommittee.Brazil’srecognitionoftheimportanceofglobal
opinionisavaluablelessonfornotonlyactionsagainstcriminalgroupsbutalsoagainsttraditional
insurgencies.
ResultsandPolicyImplications
226JohnNagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife,(Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,2005).
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CO BR CO BR
GovernmentLegitimacy - + LongTermCommitment + +
UnityofEffort / + InformationOperations - +
PrimacyofPoliticalFactors / / UseofForce / +
UnderstandingtheEnvironment + + SmallUnits + +
IntelligenceDrivenOperations + + LearnandAdapt + +
IsolationfromPopularSupport / + SupporttoHostNation + +
RuleofLaw - /
Table3
Thisstudysetouttodeterminetowhatextentarecounterinsurgencyprinciplesasoutlinedin
FieldManual3-24Counterinsurgency effectiveagainstcriminalinsurgencies.InthecaseofColombia’s
cartels,adifferentapproachprovedeffectiveandsomeprinciplesfoundinFM3-24wereineffectiveor
absent.RiodeJaneiro’seffortsagainstfavelagangs,however,showthattheprinciplesinFM3-24are
highlyeffectiveagainstpowerfulgangs.Thestudyshowsthatmanycounterinsurgencyprinciplesare
applicabletocriminalthreats,butthatsignificantadjustmentstocampaignplanningmaybenecessary
basedontheidentificationofthecriminalgroup’scenterofgravity.Counterinsurgentsshouldalsotake
intoaccountthevalueofvettedunits,anticorruptionactivities,financialtargeting,addressingsocialand
culturalnorms,aswellasdivide-and-conquertechniques.Aswithanyinsurgency,onemustunderstand
the“uniqueeconomic,social,andpoliticalconditionsoftheconflictenvironment.” 227
Thisstudyislimitedinscopebecauseitonlyreviewstwocasesandthereissignificantroomfor
furtherinvestigation.TheSicilianMafiainthe1990sisanotherexcellentcasethatintegratesatargeted
227TXHammes,Presentation,GeorgetownUniversity,Washington,DCJuly18,2011.
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approachagainstmafialeadersandadedicatedefforttochangepublicperceptionofthegovernment
andthemafia.228Russia’suniquesolutiontoits“violententrepreneurs”involvingtheprivatizationof
securityisanotherinterestingcasethatholdslessonsforCOINpractitionersfacingcriminalgroups.229
Mostimportantly,nocasewasaddressedherewhereagovernmentpursuedafullyresourcedCOIN
approachagainstaDTO.Assuch,policyrecommendationsaresuggestiveratherthanprescriptive.In
manyways,ongoingeffortsinMexicoreflectafullyresourcedapproachwiththeadditionofa
determinedkingpinstrategyaimedagainstcartelleaders.TheresultsoftheMexicangovernment’s
strategyremaintobeseen;however,manyofthefindingsofthisstudyareapplicabletoMexico.As
RobertBunkernotes,criminalinsurgencyisan“emergentphenomenon”andthehistoricalcases
describedinthisstudycannotfullyexplainthemutationofcriminalgroupsinMexicotoday.230This
studydoes,however,providepractitionerswithvaluableinsightsintotheusefulnessofCOINdoctrine
againstcriminalthreats.
BaseduponthisbriefexaminationoftheColombiancampaignagainstthecartelsandRio’s
effortsagainstfavelagangs,largescaleorganizedcrimecanreachascaleandscopethatmeetsthe
standardsofaninsurgency.FavelagangsandtheMedellinandCaliCartelsareeffectivelydescribed
utilizinginsurgencyliteratureandtheyaremostaccuratelycatalogedascriminalinsurgency.Criminal
insurgency,though,isclearlyverydifferentfromclassicalinsurgency.Furthermore,whileinacademic
debateandinplanningcells,thisterminologyishelpfulandprovidesausefultypologyfordeveloping
policyresponses,itisoftennotusefulinthecountriesitisdescribing.Thehistoricalbaggageassociated
withtheterms“insurgency”and“counterinsurgency”inLatinAmericaisofteninsurmountableandcan
distractfromimplementingsolutions.
228DiegoGambetta,TheSicilianMafia,(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1993).
229VadimVolkov,ViolentEntrepreneurs,(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2002).
230Bunker,“TheMexicanCartelDebate:AsViewedThroughFiveDivergentFieldsofSecurityStudies.”
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Asthisstudyshows,O’Neill’sinsurgencyanalysisframeworkisnotaperfectfitforevaluatinga
powerfulcriminalorganization.Criminalorganizationshaveuniquestrategicapproaches,maynot
requirepopularsupport,relyheavilyoncorruption,andareshapedbytheirsourceofillicitincome.A
traditionalinsurgencyevaluationofacriminalinsurgencymaymisskeyattributesandvulnerabilitiesof
thethreat.Thedevelopmentofamorecomprehensiveanalysisframeworkthatintegratesanalysistools
usedforgangs,organizedcrime,terrorism,andinsurgencywouldbeavaluabletoolforpolicymakers
andpractitioners.231Aninsurgencyanalysisframeworkaloneisinsufficient.Assuch,careshouldbe
takentoproperlyanalyzeeachuniquesecuritysituation.Iftheterm“criminalinsurgency”detractsfrom
internationalcooperationitshouldbeshelved,butinsurgencyandCOINinsightsshouldremainpartof
threatanalysisandcampaigndesign.
Thisstudyfoundseveralcounterinsurgencyprinciplestobeeffectiveinbothcasesindicating
thattheyaretransferabletocriminalthreats.InColombiaandRio,governmentforceshadadetailed
understandingoftheirenvironmentwhichenabledthemtoruneffectiveoperations.Intricate
knowledgeofthethreatenvironmentledtointelligencedrivenoperationsinbothcases.AswithaCOIN
campaign,operationsagainstcriminalorganizationsalsorequiredalongtermcommitment.Inaddition,
bothcasesfollowedFM3-24’scounselthatforeignsupportshouldbefocusedonhostnation
leadership.Assuch,itisrecommendedthatU.S.supportforgovernmentsfightingacriminalinsurgency
beindirect.
Learningandadaptingwasalsoeffectiveinbothcases.SecurityforcesinRioofferanexcellent
exampleofhowtodesignanurbanCOINcampaignagainstacriminalthreat.Theisolationand
sequentialreductionoffavelasmaximizedtheabilitytolearnlessons,adapttactics,andhonesystems.
TheoperationalizingofthelearningprocessisattheheartofFM3-24andithasprovedhighlyvaluable
231Ibid.
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inRio.WhilemanyCOINprinciplesareeffectiveagainstcriminalthreats,othersmayrequiresome
doctrinaladaptationstoattackthefoundationsofthethreat.
Theimportanceoftheidentificationofacriminalorganization’scenterofgravitycannotbe
overstated.AseniorU.S.governmentofficialinvolvedinfinancialtargetingadvisesthat“thefirststepin
targetingistounderstandhowtheorganizationmanagesitsresources.Wheredotheyobtainfunding,
inwhatformdotheystoreit,andwhatisthebestwaytointerdictthatmoney?”232ClassicalCOIN
techniquesthatrevolvearoundpopulationcontrolwilleffectivelyisolateacriminalinsurgentlikea
favelagangfundedbyretaildrugsales.DTOsincontrast,donotdrawtheirstrengthfromthelocal
population;rather,theyarefueledbytransnationaldrugtrafficking.
Theimplicationofthisfindingisthattheuseofanapproachthatplacesasoldierorpoliceman
oneverystreetcornerto“securethepopulation”maybeineffective.Soldiersatthestreetlevelmay
providecitizenswithsomerelieffromcommoncrime;however,theycannotimpactaDTO’smain
sourceofpower.DTOswillcontinuetousetheresourcesgainedthroughtransnationaltraffickingto
operate.Furthermore,governmentforcesmustbeawarethatwhenfacingaDTO,securityforceswillbe
vulnerabletocorruptionuntiltheDTO’scenterofgravityhasbeenaddressed.RetiredColombian
Generalandinsurgencyexpert,CarlosOspinanotesthatwhenfightingacriminalorganization“placing
soldiersinthestreetisapoliticalmessage”andisnoteffective.Thevisualpresenceofsecurityforces
mayprovidetheillusionofsecurity,butitdoeslittletodestroyatraffickingorganization.233
TheColombiacasestudyshowsthatanapproachthattargetscartelleadershipandfundingcan
beeffectiveagainstaDTO.Drugtraffickingrequiresanintricatenetworkofcontactsandmanagersto
moveitsproduct.TheColombiangovernmenteffectivelyengagedkeyleadershipnodesinboththe
MedellinandCaliorganizationstoattacktheirsourceofillicitfunds.KeyleaderssuchasPabloEscobar,
232AuthorinterviewwithU.S.officialinvolvedinfinancialtargeting,Washington,DC,August,11,2011.
233AuthorinterviewwithGeneral(ret)CarlosOspina,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,
August30,2011.
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JoseSantacruzandtheRodriguezbrothers,GilbertoandMiguelwereallcapturedorkilled.Inaddition,
leadersofkeylogisticsnodes,likeGuillermoPallomariandHaroldAckerman,wereturnedintovaluable
informantsresultinginseriousdamagetotheillicitnetwork.Beyondtheindividualleaders,itis
imperativethatfinancialtargetingbeusedtoisolateDTOsfromtheirfinancialcenterofgravity.Douglas
Farah,anexpertinillicitfinance,believesthat“focusingonthemoney”and“goingafterthedirty
moneyinthepoliticalsystem”arekeylessonsfromtheColombianeffortsagainstthecartels.234DTOs
requireatechnicalapproachtofinancialtargetingtodenythemtheirsourceofstrength.
Thecriminalorganization’scenterofgravityhasseriousimplicationsforCOINcampaigndesign
againstcriminalinsurgency.Counterinsurgentsmustdevelopadetailedunderstandingofthetypeof
criminalorganizationbeingengaged.InColombia,thegovernmentwasfacingpowerfulDTOswhose
centerofgravitywasillicitprofitsfromdrugtrafficking.InRio,druggangsalsoarefundedbydrug
traffickingbuttheirprofitsarederivedfromlocalretailsales.Thismakesthecenterofgravityforthe
favelagangsthelocalpopulationthatpurchasesthedrugsorpayslocalillegaltaxes.
FM3-24offers
practitionersanexample
ofaCOINcampaignplan
brokendownintological
linesofoperation(see
figure1).235Thisexample
isausefulstartingpoint
234AuthorinterviewwithDouglasFarah,Washington,DC,August8,2011.
235FM3-24,5-8.Figure1
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forcounterinsurgentsfacingaclassicalpoliticalinsurgencyanditcanalsobeofuseforthoseworking
againstacriminalinsurgencyliketheonefoundinRio.Resultsfromthefavelacasestudyshowthatthe
governmentiseffectivelyusingCOINprinciplestosecurethefavelas.Onemajordifferencebetweenthe
politicalCOINmodelandacriminalinsurgencycampaignplanarethestartingconditionsandendstate.
TherootconditionsinRioaresocialandculturalratherthanpolitical.Thereisverylittlepopularsupport
forviolentyouthgangsandthisquicklyevaporatesoncepoliceforcestakecontrol.Thegovernment’s
focusisbetteraimedatshiftingsocialconditionsandnormsthatcreategangsthanatdeveloping
politicalsupport.ACOINcampaignfacingathreatsimilartoRio’sshouldintegrateanti-gangstrategies
thatfocuson“socialintervention,theprovisionofopportunities,andcommunitymobilization”toattack
thecausesofgangviolence.236Ratherthangovernmentsupport,theend-stateshouldbegeared
towardsupportforacceptablesocialnorms.
Colombia’ssuccessfulcampaignagainstthecartelsisnotadequatelyrepresentedbyFM3-24’s
campaignplanexample.Figure2representsthelogicallinesofoperationthatwereeffectiveagainsta
criminalthreatthatisprimarilyfundedbyinternationalillicittrafficking.TheColombiangovernment
pursuedanenemyfocusedstrategydesignedtodestroythecartelsthathadbecomeathreatto
nationalsecurity.Soldiersandpoliceweredeployedinanefforttoimprovecitizensecuritybutother
linesofoperationlikefinancialtargeting,directaction,countercorruption,andalliancemanagement
resultedinthedesiredstablestate.
236U.S.DepartmentofJustice,OfficeofJuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPrevention,“ComprehensiveGang
Model,”
Figure2
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Thegovernment
didnotsetouttoend
narcotrafficking;rather,it
soughttoeliminatetwo
organizationsthathad
grownsopowerfulthat
theirmilitarypowerand
politicalcorruptionthreatenedthestate.AfterthedestructionoftheMedellinandCaliCartelsthe
governmentachievedamanageablesteadystate,aswellasreducedlevelsofcorruptionandthe
presenceoflesspowerfulcriminalgroupsthatsubmittedtostatedominance.Againstaclassical
insurgency,anenemyfocusedapproachdoesnotachievelastingresults,butDTOsareuniquely
vulnerabletothismethod.AMaoistinsurgencycanrebuildafteranenemy-centriccampaignbecauseit
growsfromadisaffectedpopulation.Apopulation-centricapproachthatbringsgoodgovernanceand
servicestoaregionwithhighcrimeisalongtermapproachtoprovidingcitizensecurity,butthe
ColombiacaseshowsthatitisnotessentialforacampaignagainstaDTOthatdoesnotrelyon
populationsupportinthefirstplace.
Itisalsoimportanttonotethatthegovernmentmaybefacingmultipletypesoforganizationsat
onetime.Infact,oneorganizationcouldbereceivingfundsfrommultiplesources.Forexample,an
organizationcouldoperateprimarilyasaprotectionandextortionorganizationbutalsoengagein
trafficking.OtherorganizationscouldoperateliketraditionalDTOsbutallythemselveswithgangs
similartofavelagangsinRio.Baseduponthefindingsofthisstudy,ahybridthreatrequiresasequential
solution.TheDTOthreatmustbedealtwithbeforegangsandcitizensecuritycanbeaddressed
effectively.ThegovernmentmustdismantletheDTO’straffickingnetworkandfundingfirstinorderto
breakthecriminalpowertocorruptthesecurityapparatus.Althoughlocalizedviolencewillrisewiththe
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disintegrationoflargegroupsintosmallercompetingorganizations,itwillbelesstoxictogovernment
institutions.Atthispoint,awhole-of-governmentapproach,asseeninRio,willbeeffective.Aswithany
insurgency,criminalinsurgencyrequiresatailoredapproachbasedonadetailedanalysisofeachthreat
andparticularsituationineachgeographicarea.
InboththeColombiancaseandtheRiocase,theuseoftrustedunitswasvital.Corruptionisa
criticalcomponentandeffortstominimizeitsimpactshouldbeprioritizedwhendealingwithDTOs.The
SearchBlocledbyColMartinezprovedtobecritical.Theuseofasmallvettedunitcanreducethe
influenceofcorruptionandprotectoperationalsecurity.InRio,thegovernmentisworkingtoreform
thepolicedepartmentasawhole;however,theUPPprogramisspecificallydesignedtocreatetrusted,
speciallytrainedunitsthatarelesssusceptibletocorruption.Becausecorruptionisakeyfactorin
criminalinsurgencyandpolicereformisusuallyaslowandoftengenerationalprocess,theuseofvetted
unitshelpsprovideastopgapbeforethesewiderreformscantakehold.Vettedunitsbreakcriminal
groups’powertocorruptbycapturingandkillingkeymembers,attackingsourcesofillicitincome,and
dismantlingthepoliticalsupportnetwork.Theseeffortscreatetimeforinstitutionalreformstotake
place.Assuch,theUnitedStatesshouldfocusitsaidonsmallvettedunitswhenattackingDTOs,
althoughnotforsakingpolicereformaltogether.Broadbasedmilitarysupportandpolicereformswillbe
lesseffectiveintheshorttermthanfocusedaidtospecializedunits.
AnotherkeycomponentoftheColombiansuccessthatshouldberevisitedinFM3-24istheuse
ofadivide-and-conquertechnique.Itisespeciallyeffectiveagainstrivalcriminalgroupsthatareeager
toremovetheircompetitors.TheColombiangovernmentpurposefullydivideditsopponentsand
defeatedtheminsequence.Thiscanbeparticularlyusefulincaseswherethegovernmentlacksthe
capabilitytopursueafullyresourcedCOINapproach.Adivideandconquerapproachallowsthe
governmenttodefeatitsenemiesinsequence,targetingthemostdangerouscriminalgroupsfirst.
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ThisstudyoftheMedellinandCaliCartelsandRio’sfavelagangsasinsurgencyhighlightsthe
verydistinctdifferencesbetweenclassicalinsurgenciesandcriminalinsurgencies.Colombia’ssuccess
againstthecartelsshowsthatanenemy-centricapproachthatattacksaDTO’snetworkandfinancial
centerofgravityisaneffectivemethodology.Conversely,aCOINapproachasoutlinedinFM3-24has
proveneffectiveinRiodeJaneirowithsomeadjustments.Essentially,theCOINprinciplesfoundinFM3-
24andaninsurgencyframeworkofanalysisareusefulstartingpointsforthedevelopmentofan
effectivecampaignagainstacriminalinsurgency.However,identifyingthecriminalthreat’scenterof
gravitywilldictatehowmuchdeviationisnecessaryfromcurrentdoctrine.
Theviewsexpressedinthisstudyarethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyor
positionoftheDepartmentoftheArmy,DepartmentofDefense,ortheU.S.Government.