Burden sharing and fairness principles in international climate policy

Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles inInternational Climate Policy

LASSE RINGIUS1, ASBJØRN TORVANGER2, * and ARILD UNDERDAL2

1

UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and Environment, Risø National Laboratory, P.O. Box 49, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark; 2 CICERO, P.O. Box 1129 Blindern, N-0318 Oslo,Norway (*Author for correspondence, e-mail: [email protected])

Accepted 10 October 2001

Abstract. One of the major challenges facing participants in the global climate change negotia-tions is to find a scheme of burden sharing that can be accepted as “fair” by all or at least mostgovernments. In this article we first explore which basic principles of fairness seem to be suffi-ciently widely recognized to serve as a normative basis for such a scheme. We then examine a setof proposals for differentiating obligations that have been submitted by governments in the negoti-ations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol to see which principles have been honored. In the concludingsection we discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of more specific burden sharingrules.

Key words: burden sharing, climate agreements, fairness principles

Abbreviations: GDP = Gross Domestic Product; CO2 = Carbon dioxide; LRTAP = UN EconomicCommission for Europe Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution; RIVM = NationalInstitute of Public Health and the Environment, the Netherlands; AGBM = Ad Hoc Group on theBerlin Mandate; G-77/China = Group of 77 and China (developing countries)

1. Introduction

Beginning in the late 1980s, a series of global negotiations has been conductedwith the explicit objective of preventing a negative change in the global climatesystem due to increasing emissions of greenhouse gases from anthropogenic sourcesto the Earth’s atmosphere. These on-going global negotiations are aimed at pro-viding an international public or collective good namely protection of the globalclimate system by means of voluntary international cooperation. In the case ofclimate change, there is no single predominant actor who can and will providethe good through unilateral measures, and no institutional mechanisms areavailable for supranational governance. In such a situation, one of the majorchallenges facing the negotiators is to find some scheme of burden sharing thatcan be generally accepted as “fair” by all or at least most governments.1

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2: 1–22, 2002. 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

This article makes a first attempt to identify a set of fairness principles thatare widely accepted by governments and therefore may serve as a basis fordistributing the costs of emission control measures among countries.2 We focusin particular on three different but complementary notions of distributive fairness:equality, equity, and exemption (for parties who lack the capacity to contribute).These notions or principles could create a normative platform upon which a fairburden sharing agreement could be fleshed out. Moving from theory to practice,the article also presents a summary analysis of schemes for burden differentia-tion suggested by governments in the course of the negotiations leading up tothe Kyoto Protocol. The article ends with a brief summary and a discussion ofimplications for the design of more specific burden sharing rules.

2. Fairness Principles

2.1. PRINCIPLES, FORMULAS, AND INDICATORS

When examining issues of justice and fairness in burden sharing, it is importantthat the key concepts are defined and used in a consistent and systematic manner.We distinguish between three different levels of analysis: (i) general principlesof fairness, (ii) burden sharing formulas or rules, and (iii) criteria or operationalindicators developed with specific reference to the particular problem at hand.These distinctions are based on different levels of normative content, levels ofgenerality or specificity, and degree of formalization and operationalization.

By “principles of fairness” we mean generally acknowledged norms of fairnessthat have traditionally been seen as valid across a wide range of issue areas andat different levels – from interpersonal to international relations. When trans-lated into more specific burden sharing rules or formulas, these general principlescan be brought to bear on particular policy problems, such as global climate change.Burden sharing formulas or rules are explicitly specified functions that generatea specific scheme of obligations when fed with appropriate input data. In thiscontext, such formulas will most often be used to determine “national emissionsentitlements, or changes from the status quo” (Parson and Zeckhauser 1995: 99).3

Burden sharing formulas and rules therefore reflect, more or less explicitly, oneor more fairness principles. In addition, they identify one or more operationalindicators.

Operational criteria or indicators specify precisely what kind of “hard” dataare to be used to estimate costs (obligations) in a given context. CO2 emissionsper capita and GDP per capita are two of the most frequently used indicators inconnection with rules in the climate policy issue area.

2 LASSE RINGIUS ET AL.

2.2. THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

The analysis in this section focuses on two main questions. First, can we identifya set of fairness principles that are widely shared in international society, and, ifso, what are they? Second, could these principles serve as useful keys to distrib-uting commitments among parties in future climate policy negotiations?

Scholarly interest in the relationship of fairness principles to burden sharingformulas is based on two basic assumptions. One assumption is that the negoti-ating behavior of at least some of the parties is to some degree based on normativeconsiderations concerning distributive fairness. In other words, it is assumed thatsome parties attempt to achieve what they feel is an ethically correct solution.In its weakest form this seems to be a safe assumption; a quick look at thearguments exchanged in international negotiations would strongly indicate thatat least some actors pay some attention to norms of fairness, at the very least asrhetorical devices. To conclude that such norms provide important clues to under-standing behavior we must, however, demonstrate not only that they are sometimesinvoked but also that they are recognized as important decision premises for acritical mass of significant actors even when their implications are not in theirfavor, or that they at least serve to boost the morale or strengthen the bargainingposition of parties who invoke them. To make an assertion of this sort is a non-trivial and much stronger claim.

Negotiation theory most often assumes that actor behavior is motivated primarilyby self-interest, and that general principles of fairness are invoked only to promoteor defend one’s own interests. In this study we take a more moderate position.More precisely, we assume that actor behavior is based primarily, but not exclu-sively, on self-interest. Considerations of fairness will, we believe, serve as (a) asource of motivational strength for actors who consider themselves as being“treated unfairly”; (b) a framework of soft constraints on the pursuit of self-interest;and (c) decision premises in situations where self-interest provides no clearguidance. This is certainly far from claiming that actors behave exclusively or evenprimarily according to “the logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989).What we do assume is only that notions of distributive fairness are sufficientlysalient in the minds of a sufficiently large number of decision-makers to warrantsystematic analysis as criteria that parties use to evaluate alternative policy options.

For burden sharing formulas to serve as premises of international agreements,it is not sufficient for a critical mass of actors to recognize the validity of suchnorms. Norms of fairness can be a source of conflict as well as a platform foragreement. Notions of fairness can provide a basis for an international regime onlyif there is a certain minimum of consensus among its members about what isfair and what is unfair; a critical mass of actors must, in other words, subscribeto the same norms. For global regimes, meeting this latter requirement can be atall order indeed. Again, we take an intermediate position. Studying internationalnegotiations we can observe that there are at least some rather general norms

FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 3

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that are frequently invoked and very rarely disputed – at least on principledgrounds. We assume that these do indeed constitute a soft core of widely, thoughperhaps not universally, accepted ideas about distributive fairness. This is certainlynot meant to suggest that international diplomacy has come up with anythingeven remotely resembling a precise consensual formula for distributing costs andgains; at best we are talking about a rather loose and elastic framework. Moreover,in most cases more than one principle can legitimately be invoked, and quiteoften the implications of the most salient principles will diverge. These types ofconflict can be resolved either through differentiating the domains within whicheach principle will dominate, or through assigning relative weights to the variousprinciples. Although frequently used, neither of these approaches has been devel-oped into a precise and generally applicable formula. As a consequence, therewill in most cases be ample scope for (interest-based) bargaining within a ratherwide zone of legitimate arguments. It also follows that normative clout will begenerated particularly where salient principles converge. Our first priority shouldtherefore be to search for burden sharing rules located at the intersection betweentwo or more salient principles.

Assuming that norms of distributive fairness matter and that a soft core of widelyaccepted principles exists, the next question becomes, which principles belongto this core? Unfortunately, there is limited systematic empirical researchaddressing this question explicitly. What follows below should therefore be readas a tentative interpretation of the scant evidence available to us at this stage.

2.3. PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS

Some studies have identified a fairly large number of distributive fairness prin-ciples and rules for the distribution of costs of measures to control emissions ofgreenhouse gases. Table I gives some prominent examples.4 Some analysts (see,e.g., Rose et al. 1998) also distinguish among three different types of principles:principles concerned primarily with the initial allocation of behavioral obliga-tions (allocation-based criteria); principles concerned primarily with the ultimatecosts of measures (outcome-based criteria); and principles primarily concernedwith the fairness of the process of, or institutional arrangement for, allocation assuch (process-based criteria). Since some of these typologies seem to operate atdifferent levels of generality, the overall picture can be somewhat confusing.

In this section we will adopt a different approach. Rather than attempting tocreate another exhaustive inventory of principles or criteria for burden sharing,we will limit our attention to a few that seem to constitute the core on whichmost of the discussion is focused. Each of these basic principles raises a set ofsub-questions. Answers to these sub-questions provide a basis for formulating morespecific rules or criteria. Although we will indicate how some of the basic prin-ciples can spawn multiple specific criteria, our principal objective in this sectionis limited to identifying the main general principles from which such formulas


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are derived. Our focus will be limited to substantive (as distinguished fromprocedural) principles. Moreover, we will make no attempt to examine the legalstatus of various principles or rules; our question is simply whether and to whatextent they can serve as consensual premises for international agreements onclimate policy measures.

A review of the available evidence indicates that the principles of distributivefairness that actors relate to in international negotiations constitute a rather complexframework. We have nevertheless been able to identify a core set of principlesthat combines at least three different but complementary notions of distributefairness: equality, equity and exemption. Let us first try to specify each of thesenotions and then explore how they are combined.

Equality

The default option in international negotiations seems to be the principle that allparties should have equal obligations. In saying that this is the default option wedo not imply that it is the one most frequently used. Rather, what we suggest isthat this is where negotiations will normally start, and that the burden of prooftends to rest with anyone who wants to argue for a differentiated different approach.Furthermore, equality can arguably be supported by reference to the sovereigntyprinciple, which in the context of international law states that since all states are


Table I. Selected fairness principles and related burden sharing rules invoked in internationalclimate negotiations.

Fairness principle Interpretation Example of implied burden sharing rule

Egalitarian Every individual has an equal right Allow or reduce emissions in to pollute or to be protected from proportion to populationpollution

Sovereignty All nations have an equal right to Allow or reduce emissions pollute or to be protected from proportionally across all countries topollution; current level of emissions maintain relative emission levelsconstitutes a status quo right between them

Horizontal Countries with similar economic Equalize net welfare change across circumstances have similar emission countries (net cost of abatement as rights and burden sharing a proportion of GDP is equal for eachresponsibilities country)

Vertical The greater the ability to pay, the Net cost of abatement is directly greater the economic burden correlated with per capita GDP

Polluter pays The economic burden is proportional Share abatement costs across to emissions (eventually including countries in proportion to emission historical emissions) levels

equal they should have equal rights and duties (see Table I). The principle ofequal obligations is open to different interpretations. One important question iswhether obligations should be defined in absolute or relative terms. Given the rangeof variance in size and capabilities among countries, the former is hardly a seriousoption in negotiations on global regimes – except for procedural obligations andsome commitments to ban completely the release of “non-essential” substances.Attention therefore tends to focus on obligations defined in terms of relativecontributions. In the context of pollution control this typically translates intostandardized regulations of the format “all parties shall reduce emissions of sub-stance s by x percent relative to a given baseline (emissions level at time t).”The first LRTAP regulations dealing with acid rain are good examples.5 In theclimate change negotiations many governments initially argued in favor of applyingsuch a flat-rate or across-the-board approach to all industrialized countries.6

The principle of equal obligations has a firm normative basis if all partiesinvolved are equal in all relevant respects. This condition is, however, never metin global negotiations. Even in a more narrow regional setting we will often finda substantial range of variance along important dimensions. When the range ofvariance exceeds a certain threshold (and the issue is not one of taking inexpen-sive measures or establishing a complete ban on certain activities), parties mostoften shift from the principle of equal obligations to some notion of equity.

Equity

The common denominator for equity principles is that costs and/or benefits bedistributed in (rough) proportion to actor scores on some dimension consideredto be important.7 A fairly large number of such dimensions can be identified,but in international negotiations attention seems to focus primarily on two dimen-sions. One is the role of each party in creating a problem or providing a good.If some parties have played a significantly or disproportionally larger role thanothers have in causing a problem – e.g., through large emissions – it seems fairthat they should also take a correspondingly greater responsibility for “cleaningup the mess.” Similarly, if some parties have contributed more to a particular good,it seems fair that they get a correspondingly larger share of the benefits (or havepast contributions subtracted from future obligations), everything else held constant.The other dimension refers to the consequences that a particular obligation orproject would have for the various parties. A common notion of fairness requiresthat burdens be shared in some proportion to capacity and that benefits be dis-tributed in proportion to needs. This gives us a matrix with four key principles,summarized in Table II.

Clearly, burden sharing is a matter of distributing costs. However, criteria fordistributing costs can be derived indirectly also from principles pertaining to thedistribution of benefits. We therefore need to examine both columns.

The principle of responsibility says, in essence, that the costs of solving or


alleviating a problem should be distributed in proportion to a party’s share ofresponsibility for causing that problem. This principle finds substantial supportin previous conventions. For instance, in a somewhat different form it was oneof the cornerstones of the agreement concluded at the first UN-sponsored globalconference on the environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. It is also the backboneof the Polluter Pays Principle.8 Applied to the climate change issue, the prin-ciple of responsibility would imply that countries with the largest emissions percapita would have to make the largest cutbacks (other things being equal). Thisrequires that the relevant emission time period be defined, for instance as green-house gas emissions from 1900 to today. In the climate change negotiations, thedeveloping countries have based much of their argumentation upon this principle(see, e.g., the Brazil and Brazil-RIVM proposals discussed in Section 3.2).

The principle of capacity requires that costs be distributed in proportion to“ability to pay.” The conventional yardstick for determining capacity would bewealth measured in terms of GDP per capita.

Pollution control measures are supposed to bring benefits, at least in the formof reduced environmental damage costs. If these benefits vary substantially, it mightappear reasonable to include them in the equation. The general rule would bethat costs be distributed in proportion to (expected) benefits. Applied to problemsof global environmental change, however, this notion would tend to run againstother salient principles. More specifically, it would often lead us to impose theheaviest costs upon the most vulnerable countries. These would often be impov-erished “victims” of pollution emitted by richer and more fortunate countries.We therefore expect the idea of distributing abatement costs in proportion tobenefits – although often referred to in everyday life – to be overruled by otherprinciples in this particular context. We have bracketed this principle in Table IIto indicate that we expect it to be subordinate to the others.

The corresponding equity principles for distributing benefits would be theprinciples of contribution and need, respectively. In the climate change context,the principle of need is the more salient and interesting of the two. It can betranslated into somewhat different burden sharing rules, but a minimal requirement


Table II. Key principles of equity.

Object to be distributed

Focus on Costs (obligations) Benefits

Cause of current Responsibility (for causing Contribution (to solving the state of problem the problem) problem or providing the good)

Consequences for Capacity (ability to pay) Needactors [Benefit derived from project]

is that all human beings be granted the “pollution permits” needed to securebasic human needs, including a decent standard of living. The most simple andprimitive version would require that all individuals be given equal emissions“permits” (allowing for some period of adjustment). More sophisticated rules wouldtake into account the fact that even though all human beings may have equal rightsto the benefits of the global commons, differences in living conditions relatedto, e.g., climate and natural resource endowments may well justify differentia-tion of allowances. The principle of need allows, and even requires, suchdifferentiation if it is based on differences in (basic) human needs. The latterinterpretation says that emissions needed to secure a decent standard of livingare permitted, while emissions stemming from the production or consumption ofluxury goods should be subject to restrictive measures if total emissions exceeda certain threshold.9 The principle that emissions allowances be based on needhas been invoked not only by developing countries; in somewhat different inter-pretations it is also the basic principle behind the early French proposal and theEU Triptique approach discussed in Section 3.2.10

Norms requiring that the distribution of costs or benefits be related to the rolethat actors have played in causing a problem or creating a common good areconditional in the sense that they are considered compelling only when certain con-ditions are fulfilled. Consider, for example, the principle of responsibility. Tworecurring questions are whether “responsibility” presumes intent or at least knowl-edge about the harmful consequences of one’s behavior. In the context ofinternational environmental diplomacy, the consensual answers seem to be thatan actor may be considered “responsible” without (proof of) malicious intent,but not if he/she could not have known – on the basis of the state of (scientific)knowledge at the time – that his/her behavior was causing (substantial) damage.11

Moreover, for responsibility to serve as the key to burden sharing, it wouldnormally be required that an actor have the capacity needed to fulfill the obliga-tions derived from the principle; it would not be fair to demand of someonesomething he/she cannot deliver (without intolerable sacrifice). The upshot ofall this is that responsibility becomes a relevant notion only for regulating behaviorthat is not inextricably linked to the fulfillment of basic human needs.

The same questions about intent and knowledge can be raised with respect tothe principle of contribution. Can, for example, a country claim credit for emis-sions reductions obtained as an unintended side effect of measures undertakenfor purposes that have nothing whatsoever to do with climate change? There isno consensual answer to the latter kind of questions, but the prevailing mood seemsinclined to require at least some element of positive intent. In this respect, theprinciple of contribution seems to be subject to stricter requirements than theprinciple of responsibility.

In moving from the level of general principles to burden sharing formulas, ahost of other questions will have to be answered. One of these pertains to thespecification of the notion of proportionality – a defining characteristic of equity.


A strict interpretation would require a linear relationship between a party’s scoreon the criterion in question and its obligation to contribute. But this is not the inter-pretation we would expect to find in international environmental negotiations.Instead of continuous differentiation, we would expect parties to be sorted into asmall set of discrete categories (such as industrialized vs. developing countries).Principles of equity would then be applied to differentiate obligations between cat-egories, while the principle of equality would apply within each category.Furthermore, instead of cardinal scale linearity we would expect differentiationto be made in terms of a crude – and perhaps not entirely consistent – ordinal scale.Even a cursory glance at the reports from the climate change negotiations wouldsuffice to indicate that we are dealing with such modified interpretations of pro-portionality.

A second question deals with time horizons. Any application of notions suchas “responsibility” or “contribution” requires that we specify at what time or forwhat period these variables are to be measured. Does responsibility accumulate,and if so for how long? Can credit for past achievements be claimed only for acertain time period? Similarly, how do we balance present needs against futureneeds? If regulations require substantial and costly behavioral changes, how muchtime should be allowed for adjustments? These are the kinds of questions for whichthe general principles themselves provide no clear answers. Since the actual dis-tribution of obligations and abatement costs may depend significantly on thetime horizon adopted, we can easily understand why these questions often becomesubject to hard interest-based bargaining. As the climate change negotiations clearlyindicate, consensus at the level of general principles is no guarantee that partieswill also reach agreement on specific formulas.12

A related, but analytically different, question is whether to frame regulationsas static or dynamic instruments.13 A dynamic regime includes provisions forreassessment at specified intervals, whereas a static regime does not. In this sensethe Kyoto Protocol could be seen as a dynamic treaty since parties are to commencenegotiations on commitments for the second commitment/budget period(2013–2017) by 2005. In practice, the difference may not be all that great. Noregime is designed for eternity, and at some point reassessment will occur whetherexplicitly provided for or not. The distinction nonetheless tends to be important;quite often at least some actors – particularly those subject to the most demandingobligations – would like to obtain an explicit promise from their partners thatthe distribution will be reconsidered and changed if scores on the critical vari-ables change. In the climate change negotiations this concern has been expressedprimarily in a demand – most strongly articulated by the United States – thatalso developing countries undertake a commitment to contribute, at least at somefuture point when they presumably will enjoy a higher level of prosperity (and thushave acquired greater capacity) and contribute more to world emissions (respon-sibility). So far, no agreement has been reached on criteria for future participationby the developing countries.


Exemption

Particularly in a global setting, the range of variance in terms of dimensionssuch as “responsibility” or “capacity” is usually so great that even the notion ofsoft proportionality would lead to unfair burdens upon the poorest “victims.” Whenthe latter threshold is reached, attention tends to shift from principles of equityto the simple principle of “exemption”; more precisely, exemption from anysubstantive obligation for which a party is not (fully) compensated.14 We see thispattern clearly in the global climate change negotiations. Even those who arguethat developing countries should make a commitment to contribute, at least inthe future, accept that (temporary) exemptions are required for the poorestcountries. Any pressure upon these countries to sign would at this stage have totake the form of a request for moral support rather than material contributionsinvolving net costs.

Combining Principles

In the analysis above we have assumed that the three basic notions of fairness havedifferent domains. The principle of equality applies within groups or subsets thatare considered sufficiently homogenous in important respects. The principle ofequity applies where the critical differences exceed that threshold – except forthe most disadvantaged parties, from whom no material contribution will berequired so that they are exempted. The general structure of this framework is sum-marized in Table III.

In multilateral negotiations this specification of domains could easily lead toinconsistent prescriptions with the “solution” depending on exactly which com-parisons are made. This problem is most often resolved by defining a more orless arbitrary baseline that can be used as a general standard of reference, and/orby defining a small set of groups (e.g., developed vs. developing countries) andthen applying the principle of equal obligations within each group and one ofthe other principles to differentiate between groups.

It remains, then, to determine the critical thresholds (indicated by “x” and “y”in Table III). International diplomacy has produced no general and precise guide-lines, leaving again a considerable scope for hard bargaining. Even so, we suggestthat in order to qualify as “fair,” a burden sharing formula will have to corre-


Table III. Domains of different principles of fairness.

Principle Domain

Equality Relevant differences ≤ x

Equity x < relevant differences ≤ y (assumption: x < y)

Exemption Relevant differences > y

spond to this general format. Moreover, within the domain of equity, it will haveto differentiate obligations according to the principles outlined above – notnecessarily responding to all, but at the very least to one. What gives theseprinciples clout in the climate change context is the fact that their implicationsto a large extent converge. In particular, the principles of responsibility, capacity,and need all place the bulk of responsibility for mitigation measures squarelywith the wealthy industrialized countries, at least in the short run.

2.4. NOTIONS OF “RIGHTS”

In discussions about the distribution of costs, reference is sometimes made to“rights”. In legal discourse, a right usually refers to a claim that can be justifiedby law (and upheld in court). In international negotiations it seems that claimsare often framed in terms of rights in order to bolster their moral status; while aprinciple has to be justified, a right speaks largely for itself and translates moreimmediately into a corresponding duty. In practice, however, this broader notionof rights becomes hard to distinguish from that of fairness principles.

There seems to be three basic notions of rights that are often invoked ininternational environmental negotiations. One refers to what might be calledbasic human rights, including the right to a decent standard of living and to ahealthy environment. The notion of basic human rights is rarely, if ever, explic-itly challenged. On the other hand, there is no general consensus on precisespecifications. This kind of right is clearly relevant to the global climate changenegotiations. It often serves as a pillar of the principles of need and exemptionfor the most disadvantaged parties.

A related notion of rights is based on the idea of the atmosphere as a globalcommons, providing vital life-support services for planet Earth. The argument isthat all human beings have the right to enjoy these services, and that behaviorthat threatens this right must be modified.15

The third category may be referred to as acquired rights. Such notions play aprominent role in negotiations on resource management. For example, in inter-national fisheries management, “historic catch” is often considered an importantcriterion for distributing quotas. Within OPEC, “historic production volume” servesa similar function (see, e.g., Gault et al. 1999). In the climate change negotia-tions, the so-called grandfathering principle considers current emissions as aclaim justified by established usage and custom. Bartsch and Müller (2000)combine grandfathering with equal per capita emissions (invoking the need prin-ciple) in a burden sharing formula applied to a global climate policy agreement.Again, the basic idea behind acquired rights seems to be broadly accepted, butin this case it is subject to certain conditions about the legitimacy of the behaviorin question, and to how a particular position was acquired. Most importantly,only legitimate behavior can serve as a basis for claiming rights. In the contextof climate change, past emissions will probably not be accepted as a legitimate


basis for claiming rights to continue polluting since it collides head on with theprinciple of responsibility. Records of past emissions would, however, probably beaccepted as a relevant parameter when it comes to determining time for adjust-ment. Moreover, a country’s current emission level is an important determinantof abatement costs.

2.5. INCLUSION OF DAMAGE COSTS IN BURDEN SHARING RULES

In the analysis above, we have – with one exception – considered principles ofburden sharing without considering the distribution of damage costs. This has beena deliberate choice, made for two main reasons. One reason is that as long aswe focus only on the costs of controlling emissions of greenhouse gases, theonly direct link between principles of burden sharing and distribution of damagecost would be a rule suggesting that abatement costs be distributed in proportionto (expected) benefits (i.e. climate damages avoided). However, as those who standto gain the most from abatement measures are likely to be poor developingcountries, this rule would – if it were applied to the climate change problem –run counter to the principles of responsibility, capacity, and need. In such a clash,it seems clear that the latter would prevail. The other reason is that even if thegeneral rule of distributing costs in proportion to benefits were to be applied,the present state of knowledge about who will be affected by human-inducedclimate change, when and to what degree, is much too poor to serve as a con-sensual basis for negotiations about distributive schemes. This situation is not likelyto change substantially over the next 5 to 10 years.

Damage costs would, however, be highly relevant to schemes of compensa-tion (for damage that cannot be prevented) or adaptation assistance. The notionof compensation is intimately linked to the notion of damage or harm. A fairscheme would therefore have to differentiate on the basis of harm. With regardto the distribution of costs, however, the principles that we have analyzed abovewould apply also if the concept of burdens is extended to include also the costsof compensation.

2.6. SUMMARY

This brief overview indicates that decision-makers have a real menu for choice.No single principle stands out as the clue to distributive fairness. We can there-fore expect at least most of these, and perhaps others as well, to be invoked withsome legitimacy in particular contexts. We now turn to the climate changenegotiations and climate agreements in order to see which principles and specificburden sharing rules governments have in fact suggested and accepted.


3. Equity in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol

3.1. THE UNFCCC

The UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) signedin Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 repeatedly stresses equity and fair burden sharingamong countries. The agreement distinguishes explicitly between developed anddeveloping countries and Article 3.2 in particular underlines that full considera-tion should be given to “the specific needs and special circumstances” of thelatter group of countries. It is also stressed in the same article that full consider-ation should be given to “those Parties, especially developing country Partiesthat would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under theConvention.”

The UNFCCC refers to several equity principles and more general fairnessnorms that should guide global cooperation. Article 3.1 states: “The Parties shouldprotect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations ofhumankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common butdifferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” Thus, countries shalltake into account intergenerational equity. Moreover, and more concretely, becauseof obvious dissimilarities and asymmetries across countries with respect to theresponsibility for climate change, as well as the capacity to deal with it, thesignatory countries have agreed in the same article that “the developed countryParties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effectsthereof.” As discussed already, the norms of responsibility and capacity implythat developed countries should bear the brunt of the burden of climate protec-tion.

The Berlin Mandate adopted by the first conference of the parties (COP-1) tothe UNFCCC in the spring of 1995, which initiated the series of intergovernmentalnegotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, underlines similarly in Article 2(a) thatindividual circumstances of developed countries and differences in starting points,“as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of theseParties to the global effort,” should be taken into account when strengtheningcommitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, the Berlin Mandateimplicitly accepts the principle of horizontal equity. Those national circumstancesthat should be taken into consideration are not specified, however, and it is unclearif this should be done in the form of specific burden sharing rules.

3.2. REVIEW OF BURDEN SHARING PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE AGBM

In this section, we examine seventeen different government-proposed burdensharing arrangements submitted by country delegations to the Ad Hoc Group onthe Berlin Mandate (AGBM), the negotiation group established by COP-1 in thespring of 1995. This negotiation process led to agreement on the Kyoto Protocol


in December 1997. The survey also includes the European Community’s TriptiqueApproach to burden sharing among the EU member states.16 Proposals advo-cating flat-rate emission reductions (i.e., where parties should reduce emissionsby the same percentage) are not included.

First, Table IV compares eight different types of proposals based on theircommon features. However, because the proposals seldom make an explicit


Table IV. Types of burden sharing proposals submitted during the Ad Hoc Group on the BerlinMandate (AGBM) process.

Type Main feature(s) of proposal(s) Proposed by

Convergence Convergence of per capita emissions over time. Countries Francewith comparatively high 1990 per capita emissions must Switzerlandreduce their emissions relatively more than those EUcountries with comparatively low 1990 per capita emissions so that at some future point all countries would reach an identical per capita emission level.

Historical Emphasis on historical responsibility for global warming Brazilresponsibility conceived of in terms of countries’ accumulated Brazil-RIVM

contributions to radiative forcing or temperature increase in the atmosphere since the industrial revolution.

Multi-criteria Multi-criteria rules with indicators for ability to pay Norwayformula (GDP per capita), the “egalitarian” principle (emissions Iceland

per capita), and “energy efficiency” (emissions per unit of GDP). Deviations above or below the average value of the group of countries for one or more of the indicators results in a burden above or below the average percentage emission reduction required by the group members.

Fossil fuel Focus on dependency of income on fossil fuel exports. Australiadependency Both proposals also take into account economic growth Iran

and population growth.

Menu approach A menu-approach whereby a country may choose one Japan Iof two or three abatement strategies. The proposals also Japan IIimply a well-defined upper constraint on commitments.

Sectoral A bottom-up approach, referred to as the “EU Triptique The Netherlandsapproach Approach”, which divides the national economy into in internal EU-

three sectors. negotiations

Ability to pay Focus on GDP per capita as an indicator for distribution Poland et al.of commitments. GDP per capita can be interpreted as a Estoniaproxy variable for ability to pay. In addition, some but Poland and not all of these proposals make reference to emissions Russiaper capita and/or contribution to global emissions. South Korea

Cost-effectiveness Emphasis on cost-effectiveness. Commitments are New Zealanddistributed so as to equalize marginal abatement costs across countries.

reference to specific fairness principles, it did not prove possible to associateone particular principle – or even one group of principles – with each type ofproposal. Thus Table V uses the individual proposals as a point of departure andmakes some conjectures as to what the underlying principles might be for each.(A more detailed overview over the seventeen government proposals, includingtheir operational indicators, is shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix.) It shouldbe stressed that the delegation proposals in some cases are compatible with morethan one principle of fairness. In particular, it is often difficult to distinguishneed-based arguments from arguments invoking (basic) rights. Moreover, it isfrequently hard to determine whether proposals in favor of convergence towardsa common level of emissions per capita is based (only) on the notion of need or(also) on considerations of capacity. Tables IV and V should be read with thiscaveat in mind. Having said that, we take some comfort in the fact that, whensuch ambiguity occurs, the principles in question will pull largely in the same direc-tion, meaning that they can be expressed in similar (perhaps even identical)operational rules. For example, Norway’s multi-criteria formula is roughly con-sistent with the principles of need, capacity, and responsibility.

Table V shows that at least ten of the seventeen proposals refer to the prin-ciple of responsibility (Polluter Pays), at least seven proposals build on the principle


Table V. Overview of proposals for burden sharing methods made by parties in the Ad Hoc Groupon the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) negotiations.

Proposal Fairness principle Type

France Need (rights) (undifferentiated) ConvergenceSwitzerland Need (rights) (+ equal obligations) ConvergenceEU Need (rights) ConvergenceBrazil Responsibility (polluter pays) Historical responsibilityBrazil-RIVM Responsibility (polluter pays) Historical responsibilityNorway Need, responsibility, and capacity Multi-criteria formulaIceland Need, responsibility, and capacity Multi-criteria formulaAustralia Need (rights), capacity, and responsibility Fossil-fuel dependencyIran Mixture: need + acquired rights Fossil-fuel dependencyJapan I Equal obligations Menu approachJapan II Equal obligations, modified by responsibility Menu approachThe Netherlands Need, on a sector-specific basis Sector approachPoland et al. Responsibility and capacity Ability to payEstonia Responsibility and capacity Ability to payPoland and the

Russian Fed. Capacity and responsibility Ability to paySouth Korea Responsibility and capacity Ability to payNew Zealand Not specified Cost-effectiveness

Note: “Polluter pays” refers to sharing abatement costs across countries in proportion to emissionlevels. “Equal obligations” refers to reducing emissions proportionally across all countries.

of capacity, and at least eight refer to the concept of need (or, in an alternativeinterpretation, some notion of “rights”). Moreover, at least seven out of the tenproposals invoking the principle of responsibility also include the notion ofcapacity. At the level of basic principles, this indicates a fairly high degree ofconsensus, at least when we take into account that we are concerned with nego-tiations with global participation.

It is worth stressing that different operational rules are in some cases “derived”from the same principle. For example, the principle of responsibility is some-times related to emissions per capita, sometimes to emissions per unit of GDP,and in one proposal to emissions per unit of territory. Moreover, the pattern ofdivergence is not coincidental. For instance, it is hardly accidental that Japan refersto emissions per capita and per unit of GDP, while Russia finds the notion ofemissions per unit of territory a more attractive option. This suggests that it willbe primarily at the level of specific burden sharing rules that most of the reallyhard bargaining will occur.

3.3. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The Kyoto Protocol concluded in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, refers to severalequity principles and more general fairness norms that should guide global coop-eration. It also distinguishes explicitly between developed and developing countries.It should be stressed that the Kyoto Protocol also emphasizes fair burden sharingamong developed countries. It makes reference to UNFCCC Article 4.8(h), whichdraws attention to possible negative effects of implementation of climate policieson “countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated fromthe production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels andassociated energy-intensive products.”

The Kyoto Protocol differentiates the obligations of the developed countries andthose of countries with former centrally planned economies. Iceland may increaseits emissions by 10 percent, Australia may increase emissions by 8 percent, andNorway by 1 percent, but Japan must reduce its emissions by 6 percent, theUnited States must reduce by 7 percent, and the EU and a number of EasternEuropean countries by 8 percent by 2008–2012, compared to 1990 emission levels.Developing countries are under no obligation to control greenhouse gas emis-sions under the Kyoto Protocol. This differentiation of targets evidences the needfor fairness and justice in global climate policy, although it also reflectsdifferences in bargaining power.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

Let us now try to summarize this analysis by addressing a key question: whatare the basic principles of fairness that a burden sharing rule will have to satisfyin order to serve as a basis for a global agreement?


The answer to this question can be summarized as follows: First, no burdensharing rule that is incompatible with all three main principles of equity relevantto this particular case – the principles of responsibility, capacity, and need – willbe acceptable. More precisely, a burden sharing rule must be consistent with thegeneral pattern of differentiation outlined in Table II, and with at least one ofthe three main equity principles – probably with more than one. Second, no rulethat is clearly incompatible with the core of the principle of need – referring tobasic human needs – will be politically feasible. Softer interpretations of needare less compelling. Beyond this, it is hard to establish – on ethical grounds – aclear hierarchical order of fairness principles. Moreover, as we have seen, allthree are invoked in actual proposals and supported by important groups of actors.Third, in the absence of one unique “trump,” a burden sharing rule should somehowcombine at least two and preferably all three of the main equity principles and alsoallow for exemptions. No rule deriving the distribution of obligations from onesingle principle is likely to be adopted. We should, in other words, be lookingfor a more complex formula. Fourth, all rules that are dominated by some otherrule may be eliminated.17

Taken together, these propositions provide some guidance. However, eventhough the range of politically feasible burden sharing rules is reduced, we are stillleft with an uncomfortably large set of options. In the particular case of climatechange, we are in the fortunate situation that all three equity principles to a largeextent point in the same general direction. This means that different formulasmay well yield similar substantive implications. To the extent that differentformulas lead to similar conclusions, one may argue that, insofar as actors areconcerned with material consequences rather than the principles themselves, itmatters little which one of the formulas in question is adopted. This observationsuggests that as we move on to develop specific burden sharing rules, we shouldlook first at rules that can be supported by two or more of the fairness princi-ples that we have described above.

Finally, in this article we have assumed that actor behavior will be motivatedprimarily by self-interest, with considerations of fairness acting as motivationalsources, soft constraints and/or clues in situations where interests provide noclear guidance. The basic implication of this assumption is that no burden sharingrule that runs counter to the vital interests of pivotal parties or coalition of partiescan be adopted. Admittedly, this formulation raises as many questions as it answers.What exactly is meant by “run counter to vital interests”? Who are the “pivotal”actors in the climate change negotiations (i.e. actors without whom other partieswould not be willing or able to undertake a particular project or course of action)?18

These are questions we cannot pursue here. But merely raising them serves toremind us that even though a core of widely accepted principles of fairness seemsto exist and in fact also may serve as a basis for specific proposals, there is stillample space for interest- and power-based bargaining.



Acknowledgements

This article has been written in the context of the joint Center for InternationalClimate and Environmental Research, Oslo (CICERO) and Netherlands EnergyResearch Foundation (ECN) project “Rules for Burden Differentiation ofGreenhouse Gas Reduction.” Funding from the Research Council of theNetherlands is gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Lynn P. Nygaard forexcellent substantive and language editing. We are grateful to our ECN partnersRemko Ybema, Jaap Jansen, and Frank Ormel, and to Benito Müller, for usefulcomments and suggestions. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for valuablecomments and suggestions.

Notes

01. In this report we use the concepts “burden differentiation” and “burden sharing” interchangeably.In most contexts these concepts overlap to the extent that either one could be used.

02. Climate policy raises several other distributive issues as well, one of the most important beingthat of intergenerational equity. In political terms, these issues differ in important respects,and in this article we will deal only with the issue of distributing costs among countries.

03. An alternative approach to equity, applied by the International Court of Justice, is to decideeach individual case on its own basis or “merits.”

04. The survey and assessment builds on contributions from recent academic literature. In relationto the assessment of fairness principles, some useful literature references are Ringius et al. (1998),Rose et al. (1998), Torvanger et al. (1996), Rose (1992), and Barrett (1992). A number ofpapers and reports have focused on methods for initial distribution of tradable quotas (e.g.grandfathering).

05. LRTAP is an acronym for the UN/ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.06. Note, though, that the proponents of flat-rate reductions did not necessarily argue that this

principle would yield the fairest distribution of costs. For at least some parties, considerationsof political feasibility seem to have been at least as important – one main argument being thatbargaining over differentiated obligations would prove intractable and lead to prolonged deadlock.On the advantages and disadvantages of symmetrical and differentiated environmental agree-ments, see Ringius (1999: 135–138).

07. Note that also the principle of equity implies equal obligations in cases where actor scores onthese dimensions are equal or close to equal.

08. The ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ was developed by the OECD in the 1970s, see OECD 1974 and1979. The principle was initially applied to international environmental problems primarily asa policy tool for enhancing efficiency, although it includes a normative notion that those who“use” a resource should pay compensation to the “owners” – that is, the public.

09. One obvious difficulty of such an approach would be to define the boundary between “a decentstandard of living” and “luxury” consumption given the large variation in resource endow-ments and standard of living across and within nations.

10. In the Triptique approach, however, the concept of need is given a rather liberal interpretation,extending far beyond basic human needs, including also what is considered necessary to sustainmajor economic activities on “reasonably equal” terms.

11. Subjective ignorance or “good faith” does not necessarily qualify for acquittal; the critical questionis whether the objective state of knowledge at the time warranted serious concern. Note thateven when objective ignorance can justify past behavior that is now considered harmful, it


does not (necessarily) justify the continuation of that behavior beyond the period of ignorance.New knowledge may well imply new obligations.

12. At the same time, it is not clear that a prior explicit agreement on specific principles is a nec-essary precondition for agreeing on a burden-sharing scheme. For further discussion, see Zartmanet al. (1996: 83–84).

13. Some treaties can be adjusted to reflect minor changes – e.g. in terms of scientific knowledgeor countries involved – without it becoming necessary to amend the entire treaty text. For theexample of black and grey lists, see Ringius (2001: 92–95).

14. Exemption could have been subsumed under the notion of equity. We nonetheless treat exemp-tion as a distinct principle since it may be hard to reconcile with the idea of proportionality, whichconstitutes the core of the equity principle.

15. This notion is often referred to as all individuals having the same entitlement to releasegreenhouse gases to the atmosphere.

16. For more detailed analysis of the 17 proposals, see Torvanger and Godal (2000). The mainUNFCCC sources are included in the list of references. See also Berk and Elzen (1998), and Bloket al. (1997).

17. An option dominates another if, and only if, it is superior according to at least one of thecriteria applied and at the same time not inferior with respect to any other criterion (principle)in that set. For each “dominated” rule at least one alternative exists that is unambiguously superior.

18. For a more thorough analysis, see Underdal (1998).

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FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 21A

ppen

dix

Tab

le A

.1.

Sum

mar

y of

pro

posa

ls f

or b

urde

n-sh

arin

g m

etho

ds m

ade

by p

arti

es i

n th

e A

d H

oc G

roup

on

the

Ber

lin

Man

date

(A

GB

M)

nego

tiat

ions

.

Pro

posa

lW

hen

Fai

rnes

s pr

inci

ple

Mai

n fe

atur

esIn

dica

tors

prop

osed

CD

EC

DE

/C

DE

/G

DP

/∑

CD

EC

DE

exp/

dPop

/E

XP

/C

DE

/O

ther

Pop

GD

PP

opC

DE

tot

dtF

Fkm

2

Fra

nce

Dec

. 96

Nee

d (r

ight

s)

Pro

gres

sive

X

(und

iffe

rent

iate

d)

burd

ens

com

pare

d to

em

issi

ons.

C

onve

rgen

ce

Sw

itze

rlan

dD

ec.

96N

eed

(rig

hts)

(+

equ

al

Pro

gres

sive

X

(X)

obli

gati

ons

for

part

ies

burd

ens

com

pare

d w

ith

sim

ilar

per

to

em

issi

ons.

ca

pita

em

issi

ons)

C

onve

rgen

ce

EU

Mar

. 97

Nee

d (r

ight

s)C

onve

rgen

ceX

X

Bra

zil

May

97

Res

pons

ibil

ity

Bur

dens

X

(pol

lute

r pa

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corr

espo

nd t

o cu

mul

ativ

e em

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zil-

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ov.

98R

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nsib

ilit

y B

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ns

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ter

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rres

pond

to

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ive

emis

sion

s

Nor

way

Nov

. 96

Nee

d, r

espo

nsib

ilit

y M

ulti

-cri

teri

aX

XX

and

capa

city

form

ula

Icel

and

Jan.

97

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d, r

espo

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ulti

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a X

XX

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/TE

and

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form

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tral

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n. 9

7N

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(rig

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, ca

paci

ty,

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eigh

ted

set

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X

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d re

spon

sibi

lity

of 5

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icat

ors

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roj.)

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Mar

. 97

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ture

: ne

ed +

U

nwei

ghte

d se

t X

XM

orea

acqu

ired

rig

hts

of 8

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icat

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22 LASSE RINGIUS ET AL.T

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. (

Con

tinu

ed).

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ple

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tot

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n I

Dec

. 96

Equ

al o

blig

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nsP

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es c

an c

hoos

e X

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of 2

ind

icat

ors

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n II

Oct

. 97

Equ

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blig

atio

ns,

Par

ties

can

cho

ose

XX

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odif

ied

by

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ndic

ator

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spon

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lity

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19

97N

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on

a se

ctor

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ulti

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herl

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sp

ecif

ic b

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indi

cato

rs

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and

et a

l.M

ar.

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espo

nsib

ilit

y an

d U

nwei

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d se

t X

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paci

tyof

4 i

ndic

ator

s

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onia

Mar

. 96

Res

pons

ibil

ity

and

Tw

o po

ssib

le

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)ca

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tyin

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tors

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and

and

the

Aug

. 95

Cap

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y an

d U

nwei

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d se

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eb

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.re

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of 7

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th K

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. 97

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pons

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ity

and

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ted

set

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land

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. 96

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cifi

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loba

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ndus

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ctor

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lati

ve t

o to

tal

nati

onal

em

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/dt:

pop

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ion

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th; E

XP

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: fos

sil f

uel i

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of

expo

rt; C

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per

squa

re k

ilom

eter

of

a co

untr

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enew

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tot

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nsum

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the

cou

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; (P

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: pr

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ted;

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: su

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to

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(x)

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Burden sharing and fairness principles in international climate policy

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