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The Enclosure of Consciousness: Theory of Representation in Literature
Author(s): Marcus BullockSource: MLN, Vol. 94, No. 5, Comparative Literature (Dec., 1979), pp. 931-955Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2906561 .
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The
Enclosure
f
Consciousness:
Theory
f
Representation
n
Literature
Marcus
Bullock
"Was fur
eine
Philosophie
man
wdhle,hangt sonach
davon ab, was
furein
Mensch
man
sei;
denn ein
philosophischesystemstnicht in
todter
Hausrath,
den
man ablegen
oder annehmen
konnte,
wie es
uns
beliebte
. ."
Johann
Gottlieb
ichte'
The usual
procedure
in undertaking
n
analysis
of representation
in art is to consider it as defined,before all else, by its polar re-
lationship
with
abstraction.
This
polarity s
made possible
in its
common or
uncritical form,
however, only
by a particular
metaphysics.
he simple opposition
of these two
depends
on the
presence
of a
world
which is manifest
n a
modality
considered
external
to
the system f
representation,
nd
on the
notion of
a
mode of perception
which s independent
of systems
f reference
altogether.
The
alternative iew s to set
the
concept'world'
more
philosophically
within he
systems
n which t is
expressed.
Particular ystemsmay thenbe discussed accordingto the way
that
concept figures
n
them,from
bstract
rders
of
signification,
where
it is not
a
determinant
of
meaning,
to
pre-critical
ife-
situation
usages
which
assume
reference
o a
transcendent
eality.
Artistic
epresentation
oes
not
correspond
to either
of
these,
and
therefore
nderstanding
t
correctly
equires
thatwe examine
this
MLN
Vol.94 Pp.931-955
0026-7910/79/0945-093101.00
?
1979byThe Johns opkins niversityress
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932
MARCUSBULLOCK
foundation. One will of course begin such an enterprise from
the benchmark
of Jacques
Derrida's
critique
of metaphysics
with
regard
to the
theory f signs,
ince, despite
tssometimes
novelter-
minology,
t offers he
mostrapid and
direct
access to certain
nec-
essarypremises
more specifically,
hose concerning
the assimila-
tion
of ontology
to semiotics).
Nevertheless,
this procedure
will
open
up the field of
signification
o a new
series of possibilities
which curtail
at least
some of Derrida's
claims.
This approach
overcomes
a primary
roblem
for thequestion
of
representation n literaturepresentedby the differing rders of
sign
n
visual and literary
worksof
art. As
long
as we retain
the dea
thatthe world
we experience
is
a
"natural presence,"
that
s,
final
rather
han relative, here
will
be a difficultyn
bringing
hemedia
which
can
imitate
ppearances
intoconformity
ith
the
principles
governing
our grasp
of those which
refer to
them-
ia
arbitrary
codes.
If, on
the
other
hand, particular
deas
of the world
and
experience
are determinedor
constituted
ythe systems
f
refer-
ence
in
which
they ccur,
the differing
elationships o
meanings
n
"natural" and "arbitrary" ignification,nd the perceptionsthey
guarantee,2
may
be reconciled within
a
superordinated
body
of
principles
describing
he formation
nd
statusof
those ideas.
Mimesis,
n its uncritical
form, s
the secondary
imitation f a
"true"
order
of phenomena,
is the
"natural signification"
f
a "nat-
ural
presence."
That is to say,
t
contrasts
with
the
"arbitrary
ig-
nifier"
f language
in
bearing
a real resemblance
to its
object.This
resemblance
s incorrectlyosited
as
a relationship etween
objects,
however,
for
tstandsonly between
perceptions.
The
Taj Mahal
is
as absentfrom hand-sizedphotographof tas it s from he sound
of its
name. The association
is made
only
in
the
perceiving
con-
sciousness.Yet
there s
a
connection
there which,
within
hese re-
strictions,
merits
the
provisional
designation
"real." The consis-
tency between
them is called
in gestalt
theory a
"structural
isomorphism,"
nd because
it
implies
no more than
we wish
to
claim
for
t
here,we
shall
adopt
thisterminology
n
our subsequent
argument.
Wittgenstein's
duck-rabbit"3 emonstrates
that this
isomorph-
ism is not a unique, specificsignifying roperty,but a range of
permittedpossibilities
nd the exclusion
of
others.
Recognition
of
the
two-dimensional
hotographic
mage
as
signifying
he
monu-
ment
n
Agra
means
ascribing privilege
to
thatcorrespondance
rather than any other,
or to none
at all.
One
simply
makes
the
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M L
N
933
reasonable
udgement that this s the
best candidate among those
objects which
could theoretically
ave produced
the same image.
Among other depletions,
as is easily
understood,the loss of
the
thirddimension means the loss of
definite cale
or orientation, o
that withoutother clues
one cannot,
for example, distinguish
be-
tween an
ellipse viewedfrontally,nd
a circle shown
obliquely.For
this reason,
the accretionof possible
meanings
for a visual image
depends
on actual or
theoreticalperceptionswhich
can conform
with
t.These are not instituted rbitrarily,
ut
"discovered."The
existence of interpretants or a pictorial mage among isomorphic
objects i.e.,
isomorphic
perceptionsof object and
image) is itself
resistance
to the arbitrarymultiplication
f its
meanings. The ac-
creted,or
in Derrida's term "sedimented," meaningsof a lexical
item would
appear to arise in a wholly
different
way, yet there is
nonetheless
a sense in which it, too,
is involved
in "discovering"
interpretants
ut of a ground of possibilities
whichconditions
nd
limits
ts
meaning.
Just
as one
can very rapidlyteach someone
familiarwith
such
signsand contexts hattheduck is also a rabbit, r make a drawing
in
Westernperspective
and lighting
omprehensibleto
a
subject
familiar
with
alternative onventions
n
somewhatmore time,
one
cannot, for
the
very
same reasons,
make the diagram visible
s
a
pyramidever. The structural
ifference
between the two percep-
tions is so great
that
if
it were broken down,
there
would
be no
possiblemeaning
n
seeing
at
all,
so
far as
recognition
f
figures
s
concerned. Furthermore,
this
resistance
to
the
expansion
of
meanings
s not relatedto cultural
determinants, ut stands
priori
as the possibility f visual consciousnessaltogether.
Similarly, ne cannot
nvent
word
for
a
colour
whichcannot
be
seen, nor for
a sensation that cannot be felt.
R.
G.
Collingwood
notes that differentanguages
are not related to
one and the
same
set
of feelings
ike his different uitsof clothesto one
and
the same
man.
If
there s no such
thingas an unexpressed
feeling,
here
s
no way of expressing the
same feeling
n
twodifferent
media....
An
Englishman
who
can
talk
French,
if
he reflectson
his own
experience,
knows
very
well that he feelsdifferently
hen
he
talks
a different ongue.... To be multilinguals to be a chameleon of
the
emotions.
Still
moreclearly
s it
true
that he emotions
whichwe
express
n
music can never be
expressed
in
speech
and vice
versa."4
Yet the
fact that we can learn and
use correctly
ther languages
without the loss of a
coherent personality, nd
that, despite
its
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934
MARCUS
BULLOCK
notorious hortcomings, ood
translation
s
possible,
ndicatesthat
a
language
does
not
generate
meanings
out of
itself s an
enclosed,
self-sufficient
ystem,
but
'chooses' out
of a
common
ground
of
potentialities.
his
'ground'
is what
Collingwood
calls the "psychi-
cal
level" of
the organism.
t is
anterior
to consciousness, nd
ex-
teriorto language.
The formationof language, by
which is also
meant conscious
expression
of
all
kinds,
s the
process
n
which
"thatwhich
s raised
from the psychical
evel to the conscious level is converted
by the
work of consciousness from impressionto idea, from object of
sensation to object
of imagination" The Principles f
Art, p. 247).
When
a word is learned or
created,
the choice' takes the formof
a
discovery, or
admission nto consciousness
s
gained
only withthe
presence of a signifying oken or
"trace"
in
Derrida's usage).
Ac-
cording to
the preceding ideas,
then, a meaning of any
kind
re-
quires
a
radical addition to
the
semiological
view of
a
structure
r
difference
within system f reference.Whether
t
s the sense of
a
word or
a visual
image,
it must
have the
power
to establish con-
sistency r coherence in the priorpsychicrealm,thebeing of the
organism beyond
its
consciousness.
This leads
to
the
important
conclusion
that the
limit
f
signification
n
general
is the demarca-
tionof a fundamental
iscontinuityetweenall that s
or
can be the
object
of consciousnessfor
given
cultural ondition
of the
subject,
and
a mode of being which
s absolutely xternal to
all conscious
knowledge, xperience or imagination.
It
will be noted
that
in
settingout this position
in the area of
tensionbetween
Derrida and
Collingwood,
t
s
impossible
to avoid
thecharge of "metaphysics f presence" in some form.We accept
this
here because,
while Derrida's critiquehas incontestable
orce
n
the
question of
signification, e leaves
the question of conscious-
ness without dequate consideration.
For this reason
he has to re-
sort to
an
extraordinarymeans to
account for the phenomena
of
concrete
human
arts
and
languages, namely the prophecy
of the
end of
this
"epoch."
On
the otherhand, Collingwoodgoes
much
further
n
claiming specificprior
identity nd accessibility
or en-
tities
t the
"psychical
evel"
than
may
be
tenable. That
is, however,
in no way necessaryfor the formulationpursued here in this at-
temptto clarify epresentation
nd a congruent theoryof
art.
Although
his
conception of
authenticitys subjectto some
dif-
ficulties s
we understand
t,
the mportance f having
such criteria
does appear verygreat. His procedure
in considering
conscious-
ness
as the function
f
an
organism
permits n associated
idea of
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M
L N
935
dysfunction,
ermed corruptions f consciousness,"which
re
"the
malperformance
f the
act whichconverts
what
is merelypsychic
(impression) nto
what
is conscious (idea)"
(The Principles
fArt,p.
283).
For
Derrida,
such a
possibility isappears
within
free
play,"
for without
concept of "truth,"
he question
of admissable
and
inadmissable
meaningsretreats
from the
orb of the "real"-given
the
minimaldefinition
here of that
which s external
to, but
limits,
systems f signification-remaining
nly
n thatof the institution.
Shiftingvaliditywholly
nto
thatenclosure allows
a castrationof
language which leaves it withoutthe force to restrain"corrup-
tions."
There
is a certain ense
of liberation
nvolved n relieving
t
of
this
power
and
responsibility,
ut
from
Collingwood'spoint of
view,
facing the enormous
contemporary
corruptions
of con-
sciousness
presented
byEuropean
fascism,
hiswould be
regarded
as a pure loss
and
great
danger.
Though no
pretence can be
made to resolve
these issues,
or
propose
an adequate
theoryof consciousness,
t is appropriate
to
recognize
what large
questions
cast their shadow
over
the small
area we attempt o illuminatehere. Nevertheless,we lean on the
authority f Collingwood
to sustain
the idea of
that fundamental
discontinuity
etween consciousness
and
non-consciousness,
nd
it
will be subsequently ontended
in
this paper,
moreover,
hat art
is
the
history f
the movementof
this frontier,
nd that artistic
ep-
resentation pecifically
s the locus
of changes
in the "world"
con-
sidered
as
appearances.
In
the light
of this,
t is possible also to
reconsider
the division
betweenabstraction
nd representation
n art, positing
them
now
as reflecting hat between self-consciousness f the subject and
consciousness
of
the
other
as
object-a polarity
without
which
consciousness
s
notconceivable.
Abstraction
n
art s
the
recognition
and
clarificationf specific
lements
f theactivity
f consciousness5
in
its self-reflecting
hase before
it manifests
r touches
on 'the
world.' Artistic epresentation,
ringing
n
the
appearance
of the
world, concerns
what
is constituted s
'other,'
but
in
doing so,
it
makes theworld planetary
to
the solar position
of
the individual
subjectivity.
t
reveals or
reflects
heactivity f the
subject
n
creat-
ing it. Art, therefore,genericallypresents itselfas involved in
abstraction
n
that
t
is
not produced
as resting n
the
fixed objec-
tive truth
f
transcendent
eing,but as
relative,
perception
ndi-
visible
from
the subject.
An artistic mage
will always reveal
the
active
character or "emotions,"
o use Collingwood's
word)
of
the
subject.
Only
when the image
is removed from
the
domain of
art
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936
MARCUS
BULLOCK
altogether, s wholly
informative'
ather
han aesthetic,s
itcaught
in the
fixity f
absolute
being and
a transcendent
world.
And it
should be noted
thatwhat s informative
an include
the
category
of fictive,' or
a
paradigmatic
fiction,
roposing
a
generalized
(or
'abstract'
n
the
alternative
ense)
udgement
of
the intersubjective
world,
need not figure
s
'art.'
II
The relationshiptermed structural somorphism'establishesa
particular
ituationformimetic
ignification,
or t
holds
between
signifier
nd
signifier
s well
as
signifier
nd
signified.
All repre-
sentations
of
a
given
visual
object
and the object
itself
re
com-
prised
within
certainform
of
unity.Also,
if
the
object is
an ar-
tifact, hough
usually
a void
and disregarded
point,
none
has
a
logical,
but only
a historical
priority
over
any other since,
for
example,
there
may
be no
certain basis for
deciding whether
a
drawingwas the
architect's
esign,
or
a pictureof
the completed
building.This is a pointof radical contrastwith the situationbe-
tween
meaning
and a word or synonyms
n
a
particular
anguage,
or
equivalents
n
different
anguages.
Such an element
of
realism'
in
meanings
s
consequently
zone
of resistance
o
the nominalism'
ofsemiology.
t
is
also
a
potential
bstacle
to
the territorial
laimsof
deconstructionism.
he isomorphic
lement,
we willendeavour
to
show,
s the
possibility
f
an alternative
tructure
f
signification
o
that f
the "instituted
race"
as determined
by
JacquesDerrida,
and
of "difference
within
a
structure
of
reference
where
difference
appears as such and thus permitsa certain libertyof variations
among
the
full terms."6
The alternative
tructure
foreseen here
does
not
reverse
he
expansionof
readings
n
virtue
f
this certain
liberty
fvariations
mong
the full erms,"
y
reinstituting
tighter
rule
of
law, butrather
delegates
thevariability
o a separate
sphere,
or
perhaps
it
would
be more descriptive
of
the situation
to
say
establish
separate
spherefor
the
mode
of signification
or
art we
wish
to
identifywithinrepresentation.
So-called
'natural signs,'
including the
iconographic,
set
a
theoretical imitto semiology,as Derrida notes: "We must then
conclude
that
only
the
signs
called natural,
hose
that Hegel
and
Saussure
call "symbols,"
scape
semiology
as grammatology.
But
they
fall a fortiori utside
the fieldof
linguistics s
the
region of
general
semiology" Of
Grammatology,.
45).
The
trace,
however,
s
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M L
N
937
not restricted
n thesame way,
for these
oppositionshavemeaning
onlyafter he possibilityfthe trace" OfGrammatology,. 47). But
what we
questionhere is whether
meaning
n themimetic ignifier
in art answers
to theDerridean
formula
of "The absence of another
here and now, of another
transcendental
resent, f
another origin
of
the
world appearing
as such, presenting tself
as irreducible
absence
within hepresenceof the
trace
. ."
(p. 47).
That is
to
say,
we questionthe
idea that tsignifies
transcendental
bject.
If
we
accept the
positionthatthe world
s not a
manifestation f
its noumenal beingpresentto us as transcendentality,ut rathera
product
of signifyingtructures
romwhich t s not
separable, then
the question
of
how these structures ame
into existence offers
considerabledifficulties.
his
is an old objectionto the
semiological
viewoflanguage which
we revive
now, ookingback
in
particular
o
Benedetto Croce,
who argued
that anguage should
be conceived
not as a
sign,but"an image which
s significant,"
ecause "the sign,
wherewithman agrees
withman, presupposes language;
and when
it persists
n explaining language
by signs,
it is obliged to
have
recourseto God, as giver of the first igns-that is, to presuppose
language
in
another
way, by
consigning t to the unknowable."7
We
adopt
the view
thateven
thoughrepresentational
rt
such as
portraituremay
appear
to refer to
an
object,
it is
precisely
the
object
to which similarwork
which
was not art would be
referring
that the
work of art
occludes.
It
introduces
an element
that
does
not yetbelong to
what, within
he metaphysics f
presence, is
re-
garded
as the transcendentalworld,
or
the
world
as constituted
y
pre-existent
tructures by
which man
agrees with man."
That
which s represented n artwas not in the worldpriorto it; itwas
neither
an object,nor was
it even
in
the
knowledgeof the artist.
There
was nothing
knowablepreceding t
beyond
the activity fthe
artist
by
which
t
came into being.
It
can, however,
become
a ref-
erence to
an
intersubjective
orld conceived
as transcendent
f t
s
re-read we will
argue 'mis-read')as informative.
hat
is to say if,
for
xample,
the conventions
f
a
painting
re
interpreted
s
giving
the correct'version
of the way
the transcendent
world
manifests
itself
s presence to the eye,
it
will no
longer simply
occlude
the
object,but install tsmeaningin the role of object.Though itmay
producea change
in
the consistency
withwhich
we see
the
world,
t
will have become
a
transparent
eference,
hat
s,
an informative
representation
of it, restoringpriority
to
the
apparent object.
Then, and
only then,does it fall
ecurely
nto the demesne of
what
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938
MARCUSBULLOCK
Derrida says of
the trace, the tokenby which
an entitys thought:
"The trace mustbe thoughtbeforethe entity. ut the movement f
the trace is necessarily
occulted,
it
produces
itself as self-
occultation" p. 47).
This leads very simply o the suggestion
that
what
deconstruction
econstructs
s not
the work of
art,
but
only
the informative
ext. n otherswords,
we are
arguing
that the
rep-
resentational orce
of a work of artas such is not towards
a trans-
cendental
object.
III
A
distinction
etween these two,
the informative nd aesthetic
artifact,which
s not ill-founded n
vulgar metaphysics, ut offers
genuine power
in
determining eadings-that is,
a
text-immanent
distinction-has hitherto proved
elusive. The argument of this
paper
is
that
the
deconstructive nalysis
of
textuality
as
in fact
brought uch
a concept to bay,even though
t remains tself aught
inthe negativedialecticof metaphysicsnd signifyingystems, nd
is therefore unable
to proceed
to the kill. While
it
is an ac-
ceptable though
not
a
novel
idea,
and
certainly lwaystimely,
hat
the notionsofworld
and
experience
are produced to
us by signifi-
cation,
t
s also true thatthe conception of
the trace as
propagated
in
deconstructive
riticism s neither
a revelationnor a discovery,
but a
veil
conjuring
up
the
effect
f simplicity eforethe complex-
ity f the activity
thides. That contemporaryriticism
hould make
a
pause
on the apparently afe ground
of this
simplicity
s natural
and understandable as a refugefromthe chaos and frustration f
past failures.
But it is
only pause,
a
hesitation,
refuge.
Before the complexities
f different
exts nd different inds of
texts, he contractedprocedure of
deconstructive eading reveals
itself s impotence.
t has made the
philosophicalexchangeof pur-
ity
n
place of power, remaining n
a condition of suspension
("In
the
deconstruction
f
the
arche,
one
does not
make a choice"
[Of
Grammatology,
.
62]),
in
order to
withdraw
rom he
self-deception
of
presence,
the fall
nto
metaphysics.
his fearful
paralysis
s not
necessaryfor therigorous clarity econstruction akesfor ts goal.
There seems tobe everyprobability
hatthere s a rich
armatureof
criteria
which
will
provide adequacy
in
criticalreading
without
passage through
the banned fieldsof metaphysics.
And
whether
t
is so
or
not,
the
necessity
hat
such
quarry should
be pursued is
absolutelyundeniable.
It
is intolerable
hat iterary oncernshould
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M L N
939
maintainthisretreat, urrendering
he forceto determine a
good
workfrom great or a mediocreone, or among interpretationsell
a wise from foolishversion,
or distinguish
dmissiblefrom
nad-
missible riteria.
What is urged here is the
idea that such divisions
lie
in
characteristics
f the systems
f signification,may be
iden-
tified
n
their
specificfunctions nd evaluated according
to
them,
and thatsuch a position follows
directly rom
the correct udge-
ments f deconstructionism.
f the notion of
world s produced
out
of
signification,
nd not viceversa, this lso entails
the quite simple
possibility hat other modalities,
previously
defined against
the
naive idea ofworld, uch as fictiveness nd representation,re also
produced as
such out of language,
and this can be made determi-
nate by extending
and differentiating
he initialDerridean
argu-
ment.
That
being so,
the disastrous failuresof previous
critical
theories may
be circumvented.
Starting rom
the
primitive
osition of the
separationof
the
in-
formativefrom the artistic ext
as
practised
by vulgar parlance
within
ulgar
metaphysics,raditional pproaches
to
criticism
ave
proved astonishinglynconclusive
when supporting
theoretically
the generallypositivevalorization of art and literatureto which
they subscribe,
and which is held to
in
most
cultures.
That
the
problems are
implicit
n
this treacherous starting
point
can be
shown
by
examining hreefamiliar ariations
which
termhere the
sacred,
the
subtractive,
nd the
additive.
A
good
illustration f the
first s offeredbyPaul
Valery.
Delim-
iting non-poetic
discourse in "Au sujet du Cimetiere
Marin,"
he
writes: "L'essence de
la
prose
est
de
perir-c'est
'a
dire d'etre
'comprise'-c'est 'a dire, d'etre
dissoute, detruite
sans retour,
en-
tierement emplacee par l'image ou par l'impulsion
qu'elle signifie
selon
la conventiondu
langage.
Car la
prose
sous-entendtoujours
l'univers de l'experience
et
des actes-univers dans lequel-ou
grace auquel-nos
perceptions
et nos actionsou emotions doivent
finalement
se correspondre ou se repondre
d'une seule
maniere-uniformement.
L'univers pratique
se
reduit
a un ensem-
ble de buts."8The complement
of this is the non-paraphrasable,
non-transparent
se of language as an artistic
medium: "Les
pen-
sees enoncees ou suggereespar un textede poeme ne sontpas du
tout
l'objet
unique
et
capital
du discours-mais
les
moyens
qui
concourent egalementvec les sons,
les cadences,
le nombre et
les
ornements,
provoquer,
a soutenir
une certainetension
ou exalta-
tion,
engendrer
en nous
un monde-ou
une
mode
'existence-tout
harmonique."9
This presents iterature s a sort
of divine ntoxicant
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940
MARCUS
BULLOCK
withvirtually o
intersubjective
imension
at all: "Mes
vers
ont le
sens qu'on leur prete.Celui que je leur donne ne s'ajuste qu'a' moi,
et n'est opposable
'a personne."'10
The second
view,the subtractive,
s particularly
well
exemplified
byErich Auerbach,
whose conception
of literature s
as a form
of
discourse
whose
singular
attainment
s to advance
closer
to the
qualities
of reality
than ordinarylanguage.
He comments
on
a
passage
fromMadame
Bovary,
This ordering
of
the psychological
situationdoes not,to
be sure,
derive
from
tandards
fromwithout,
but
from
within
he materialof
the situation
tself. t
is the
type
of
orderingwhich must be employed if the situation tself s to be
translated
nto language
without
admixture."1
Such a quality
of
writing,
what
he calls
"objective
seriousness,"
makes
the
fictive
more
real,more
true,
than thediscourse
of
everyday
ontingency
by
its abilityto purge
itselfof subjective
ntrusions.
The
theory
posits
an
adequacy,
whose
origin
is not
thematized,between
lan-
guage
and "world"
which
theartist
trives o quicken,
exploring
the
resources
of grammar
to substantiate
n ideal
transparency,
n-
closing
and manifesting eality
without
dmixture."
Althoughtheformer fthese approaches does setart outsidethe
naive
presence of
the world,
t does so
in
a waywhich
rests
on
a
purenegativity.
t attempts o
cast no light
n the
"univers
de
buts,"
norconsider
the extent
to which
commonground
in
the language
used
forexpression
interrelates
he two
spheres.
Such
a
theory
s
clearly not
applicable to
a
representational
function
for
art.
The
Auerbachviewdoes
not separate
such a
function rom
he
ordinary
referential
se of
language, and
this notonly
restson
an uncritical
concept of the real,'but leaves untouched
the
question
of how
that
is to re-appear
in the expressive
medium.The
difficulty,
hat s to
say,
lies
in
the veryword
'mimesis,'for
if
there
is
to
be any
true
consistency
n
its applicationto
visual
and literary
rt
forms,
here
has to be
some gesture
towards
explaining
how
a
painting
and
a
novel
are both performances
f the same
process.
The thirdtheory,
he
additive,depends
on the relationship
of
form
o content.
t
claims,
n
plain
terms, hat
there
are qualities
n
thefeatures
f particular
iterary
enres
whichbring
a 'plus'
to the
paraphrasablesense.A commonvariant aught o schoolchildren s
thatcharacters f
form,balance,
harmony,
tress, ension
and
res-
olution elevate or develop
'literal' meanings-the
old
idea of
rhetorical
dornmentand
enhancement.
This
has a
tendencyto
gravitate
owards
the opinion
of Valery.
A more interesting
nd
radical version
is propounded
by Ms.
Barbara
Herrnstein
Smith
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M L N
941
who,
in
her
book
Poetic
Closure, oes
make a
real attempt
o con-
front he issue of representation nd mimesis.
Accepting
that language
cannot
resemble
the seen world
as
a
painting
may, she
restricts
iterary
anguage to
the imitation
of
what
it does resemble,
namely
"ordinary"
anguage.
Her thesis
s
that iterature
onsists f
"a-historical"
tterances
whichendeavour
to
represent
"historical"
ones,
i.e. those conditioned
(at
least
hypothetically)
y the
time and circumstances
f a
real context.
Though
this reduction
has the contemporary ppeal
of resolute
pessimism,
he
problems
it
seeks
to evade reassertthemselves
l-
most tonce. She says, Language, inpoetry,s used mimetically.t
is
used
moreoverin a
characteristic
imetic
manner to suggest
as
vividly s
possible or
necessary)
hatvery
historical
ontextwhich
t
does
not
n
factpossess.
That
is,the poem
represents
..
a total
ct
of speech."
2
Which
is to
say
that literature s visualized
here
as
being articulated
across
two stages of
signification,
ne
repre-
sentational,
and
the other
referential.
The poem
proper,
then,
considered
as a
sign,
s to efface
tselfbefore
a double
absence
in
order
to
recover
a
meaning
in
full
presence.
Moreover,
the poetic
function
i.e. mimetic)
s restricted
olely
to the recovery
of the
absentcontext,
which the poem
must
arry.
.
on
itsown
back"
p.
18).
The passages
which
attempt
o illustrate
his
n Ms. Herrnstein
Smith'sbook are evidently
misargued,
for she
claims
that Herrick's
"Upon a
child that dyed,"
and Shakespeare's
sonnet
129 ("Th'ex-
pense
of
spirit
n a waste of shameis lust/in ction . .")
respectively
"represent"
n epitaph
and a sermon.
That is,they
make recover-
able those originaltextsas theywould have appeared in context.
Since both genres
may
occuras historical
iscourse
n
written orm,
a
hypothetical
riginal
would surely
be more
recoverable
if
re-
ported
ntact ather
han transmuted
nto
poetry.
The
latter s not
a
sermon whose identity
s secured by being
recast
n
sonnet form,
but
rather the reverse,
a
sonnet
in
which
certain features
of
a
sermon
(or
similaradmonitory
discourse) appear
in
a
condition
alienated from
hat
context.
And
it
s worth
dding
that he
herself
notes
thisalienating
effect
f form
when
she saysthat
"one
of the
most ignificantffects fmeter or,morebroadly, fprinciples f
formal
structure)
s
simply
to inform
the
reader
that he is
being
confrontedby
poetry
and not by
something lse
. . . the constant
presence
of
meter
n
the poem
continues
to
maintain
a
clear
dis-
tinction
etweenpoetic
and non-poetic
discourse"
p. 24).
As
long
as she remainsfocussed
on
the signified
object
in
this
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942
MARCUS
BULLOCK
way,
her
reasoning
also
failson a
further
ount.
In
common
with
mostthinking ased on speech-act heory, he leavesliteraturewith
purely
secondary
status,
dependent on
the natural
illocutionary
utterance and
unable to
exceed
it in
meaning.
Even
if
formal
structure
did
open
up
a full
transparency
nd
make
a
historical
utterance
recoverable
"with ts contexton
its
back,"
that
would not
be
an
adequate
function
for a
literary
work.
We
do not
ask
that
a
van
Gogh
painting
f a
field
n
Provence
should
render
theplace
so
that
t
is
"just like
being there."
Whateverwe do ask
of
it,
we de-
mand
no less
froma
literary
ext.
Auerbach points out that the world described by Flaubert is
banal
and
worthless,
"charged
with
misunderstanding,
vanity,
futility,
alsehood, nd
stupid
hatred"
Mimesis, .
489). Yet
there s
value and
fascination n
its
representation. But
what the
world
would
reallybe,
the
world
of the
intelligent,'
laubert
never
tells
us;
in
his book
the
world
consists
of
pure
stupiditywhich com-
pletely
missestrue
reality, o
thatthe
latter
hould
properly
not be
discovered
n
it
at all;
yet
t
is
there;
it
is
in
the author's
language
which
unmasks
the
stupidity
y pure
statement;
anguage
thenhas
criteriaforstupiditynd thusalso has a partof thatreality f the
'intelligent'which
otherwise
never
appears
in
the
book"
(p.
489).
Objections
have
already
been
raised
to terms like
"pure
state-
ment,"
"true
reality"and
the
implied
reality
and
finality f
the
"world
of the
intelligent,'
but
within
his
s
a
correct
perception,
for
t
s indeed
not
the
presence
of
the
transmitted
eality
whichthe
work
of
art
produces,
but
"a
world
viewed"13
n
its
character
of
view, of
act, not
of
object.
That is to
say,
as
indissolublefrom
the
consciousnesswhichcreates t. Itsmeaning,therefore, as no part
of a
hypothesized
transcendentality
waiting
perception,
but
the
work, he
visible
ext, s the
manifest
ortion
ofan
act
of
conscious-
nesswhose
content s
accessible, n
a
quite
characteristic
ense,by ts
recognition
s
such, or
its
"re-enactment,"n
Collingwood'sterm,
by another
consciousness.
The
division
between
an
informative
nd
artistic
ext
now be-
comes
the
distinction
between the
mode
in
which a
purported
transcendent
presence
"by which
man
agrees with
man" is
mediated, nd that nwhichconsciousnessmediates tself. hat this
should
be
so
can,
congruent
with
he
preceding
arguments,
nly
be
rendered as
the
function f
the
medium, and
as
immanent
to the
characteristics
f
expression in
it.
In
examining the
nature
and
tenure of
this
demarcation
against
the
phenomena of
signification
in
all
systems,
he
role
and
portent of
literature
relative
to
lan-
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M L N
943
guage, and
the
conditionof
the
possibilityf
each,
willnecessarily
undergo a completereconsideration.
IV
In our progress
around
this ssue,
we
now come upon our
own
tracks,
or we
returnto the
question,adumbrated
at the
outset,
of
the way n which
mimesis
s set apart
from
bothartistic
epresenta-
tionand
reference
within
n arbitrary
ode.
Certainly, t
is indis-
putable that
not all that s
mimetic s
art. There
is a mimetic
le-
ment in informative illustrations, architectural and technical
drawings,maps
and
diagrams,which
varies
from
predominant
to
partial
n
the
signification
f
the objects,
but they
are generically
exterior to art.
What differentiates
map
from an aerial
photo-
graphshowing
he same
place
at the same
scale
is theadmixture
of
arbitrary
nd schematic
omponents
to
increase
the degree
of
in-
formation.
The
photograph,
though
more mimetic,
s not
neces-
sarily loser to
art
by
thattoken.
n thecase
of maps
and technical
drawingswe can identify rammars f referencebywhichthe sig-
nificance
f what
s
seen depends
on a
separate code.
Yet even
in
the
most
uncurtailedoptical
correlation,
he most
thoroughgoing
of 'natural'
signs,
we findthat
as long as
we
are
presented
with
n informative
bject,
therule
governing
tsmeaning
is
transparency,
nd
the principle
on
which
it
is
constructed
s
equivalent
to
a
'grammar.'
In
his
essayon the
Renaissance
development
of linear
perspec-
tive,
On
the
Rationalization
f
ight,William
M. IvinsJr.
ndicates
hat
the establishmentfa purelyopticalrelationship etweena picture
and its
object
has
had
a historical
igificance
n
fields
far removed
from
rt.
"From
being an
avenue of sensuous
awareness
for
what
people,
lacking adequate
symbols
and adequate grammars
and
techniques
for
theiruse,
regarded
as
'secondary
qualities,'
ight
has
today
become
the
principle
venue of
the sensual
awareness
upon
which
our
systematic
hought
about
nature
is based." 4
Scientific
description
nd
classification,
s well as
technology,
equired
"sym-
bols,
repeatable
in
invariant
form,
for representation
of visual
awarenesses, nd a grammarof perspectivewhichmade itpossible
to
establish ogical
relations
not only
within
he
system
f
symbols,
but
between
the
system
nd
the
forms
nd locations
of
the
objects
that
t
symbolizes"
Rationalization
f ight,
. 13). Opticality,
hough
rooted
firmly
n
what
we
consider
nature,'
becomes
a
grammatical
principle
when
it
opens
itselfup
to use
as something
wherewith
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944
MARCUSBULLOCK
man
agrees
with
man"
in
the
universe of
purposes.
Its referent
s
placed
in the intersubjective ealm,effacing tself s a relation to
what
theworld really
ooks like,' to what
it really s.' (And there-
fore,becoming
transparent,
t "is necessarily
cculted, t
produces
itself
s self-occultation"
Of
Grammatology,
. 47]).
This
absolute or
invariable
logical
relation
is only an
artificial
construct,
art
of Western
culture, however. It guarantees
"itera-
bility," public
anguage
in
which
mages
are
made
and
interpreted
and repeated.
For a number
of reasons,
such as the exclusion
of
movement nd the technical mpossibilityf reproducingnatural
light-value
ratios, t can
never
be a complete equivalent
to what
even
a theoretical ye sees,
a "mechanical copy of
a retinal mage,"
while
in
reality ny
act of vision
is accompanied
by
the appurte-
nance
of a full ndividual
subjectivity.
o the extent
that painting
frees
itselfof
non-opticalsemiological
elements,and extends
in
significance
eyond
the terableopticality
f a grammatical
elation
to
itsobject,we
can say t represents
n 'act of seeing.'
If t makes no
claimto iterability,o
intersubjectivity,
o
invalidate
divergentrep-
resentations,oaver a form f correctness, privilege nrelation o
the object,
but only to
bear appropriateness
to
an act of
vision of
the author,
then clearly
t
does not signify
transcendental
bject
in
the
same way
a grammatical
epresentation
oes.
What
then
is
the
structure
f
the
work
of art'srelationship
with
the
portrayed
bject?Rudolf Arnheim,
n his
work pplying
gestalt
theory
othis opic
n
painting,
escribes
t
as
arisingby
a
process
n
which the artist
reads
off"
a
configuration
f
lines, spaces,
tones,
forces, ensities,
nd tensionsfrom heperceptual
object,
nd
finds
an "isomorphic" onfigurationnhis workingmedium.The factors
determining
heconfiguration
n eithercase will
not ordinarily e
pure
opticality, or
the plastic
imitations f the
physicalmedium
used. Cezanne
interpreted
heperceptual
object
n terms f simple
three-dimensional
geometric
solids,
whereas
van Gogh
saw
dynamic
ines
and curves,for
example. This demanded
in each
case a differentway of
handling
paint and the brush.
Arnheim tates
hat the
form
lement,which
s
so prominent
n
highly
bstract rt,
s indispensableand
exactly f
the same kind
n
anynaturalistic epresentation hat deservesthe name of art. On
the other
hand
... perceptual
observation
contributes
even to
highly
stylizedwork.
When a
South Sea islander
paints the sea
movedby
the
wind as a rectangle triped
with
blique
parallel ines,
essentials
of
the model's
visual structure
are
rendered
in
a
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M L
N
945
simplified,but entirelyun '-symbolic'manner. Albrecht Direr's
highlynaturalistic tudies of a hand, a face, a bird's wing are works
of
art
only
because the
innumerable trokes
nd
shapes formwell-
organized,
even
though complex, patterns, thus presenting an
abstraction
that
interprets he subject. The two types of repre-
sentation re nothingbut the extremeends of a scale that llows all
possible stylesof
art
to
be
arranged
in a
sequence leading from
pure geometricalform through all degrees of abstractness o ex-
treme realism."115But we note a distinctionwhich he does not
specify, amely hat he SouthSea islanderdoes notneed to make an
observationof
his
own for his formalized representation.He re-
peats a formula,
n
observationmade at the beginningof the artis-
tic
period
in
which he works. For that particular act he is a
craftsman16
nd
notan artist er e. At thesame time,many aspects
of
Direr's
work
may
be identifiable s schematic
epetitions,
rawn
from earned traditionor derived from others' innovations, nd
therefore raft lements by the same criterion.
Art,when trueto itsessence, is 'original'
in
that
t establishes a
relationshipbetween medium and meaning which is not prefig-
ured
in
any code. On
the
other
hand it
alwaysfunctions
n
relation
to
a
code
which
t
both
exceeds and then extends. ts
place
is at the
fringeof
a
grammar, a public, learned
and
repeatable systemof
referencewhich makes perceptionspossible within he uniformity
of
purposes.
As we
noted,
a
painting by
an
artist
opens up pos-
sibilities
or derivativework
which s
not art,
but
craft,
he
applica-
tion of principlesof reference to which
the
unique
and
original
interpretation f artistic ensory awarenesses is constantly ssimi-
lated. The symbiosisbetween artist and grammar is a necessary
part
of
both.
The artist
annot function
n
a
vacuum,
but
only
from
the basis of
firmly onstitutedground,
a
genre,
a
tradition,
cul-
ture. And every element of these, in turn, originated with
the
assimilation f
an
act
by
which the inchoate
darkness
of
raw sense-
affects s transmuted nto the
light of meaning,
of
patterns,
on-
stants
nd structures.
A
work
of
art, then,
stands
n
relation
to
ordinary'
or
grammat-
ical reference
s
potential o
act. The latter
s
therefore ependent
on thepriorestablishment fthispotential, nd itfollows n conse-
quence
that he
charge
of
"parasitism"
made
against iterary
ses
of
language
which
affronted
Derrida
in his
paper
on
Austin
"Signa-
ture, Event, Context," Glyph [1977], 172-97) may be made still
more dubious than in his misunderstanding f it. Our argument
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946
MARCUS
BULLOCK
here implies that
the situation s in
fact reversed.
The history
f
language, or any grammaticality,s a code, proceeds by its con-
tinuousexpansion
in potential, nd
the events of
this
history,
n-
cludingthe theoretical
rigin
as the firsthistorical
vent,
all bear
the
structure fworks of
art.17
The
interest nd importance
attached
to artof all
kinds has no
primary
elation
to the significance
f the portrayed
bject-is
not
informativer communicative-but
only to the
expansion
itbrings
to our capacityto
perceive
and make meaning
n
the world,
which
is to say,
to create
or expand the world
altogether
s an entity
or
human consciousness.
V
The determination
f an
artistic tterance
s opposed
to a 'nat-
ural'
one,
or the distinction
etween
an aesthetic
nd an informa-
tive
text,
can be expressed with
regard to the
use
of
language
by
separating
ts
function
nto the phases
of medium'
and
'code.'
To
workfromthisposition,we say that a mediumis definedhere as
that
by
which
experience
is manifest
o
us as subjects,
nd a
code
is
defined
as
thatby whichwe perceive
t as members
ofa community
of competent
users.
Where
this
touches on representation,
he
former
xperience
is called
appearances,
the
latter
s the
world.
A
code
is the
system
by
virtue
of
which a term
s a sign;
a medium
providesthe ocus
foran
image which s significant.
he terms
n a
code
are
instituted,
heir force
s their
comprehension
within
he
body
of thesystem,
which must distinguish
more or less
absolutely
between its membershipand alien entities.A medium is always
explicitly
ecoming,
and exclusion
is
only
a 'not
yet'-a
task
out-
standing
ratherthan a violation.
That an immanentl8
heoryof
reading is possible on
this basis
now
stands
very
close to demonstration.
The characteristic
move-
mentof literature
which
s to be identified nd
rendered
open to
public
discourse
n
criticism
s the
broachingof that code/medium
perimeter.
The
reader must observe the way
that
language,
in
order
to become the medium of
representation,
dequate
to the
contentof experienced subjectivity,must move across the line,
alienating
tself
from
transcendentality.
nd
the
first
tep
in
pro-
ducing
a critical heory ut of thiscriterion
s to show
that
n
a
full
work of
art
this
negative
s
accompanied by
a
positive,
realign-
ment
n
a
positive
mode
where characteristic
meanings
arise with
sufficient
tability
nd
accessibility
o
ustify
use of the word.
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M L N 947
The question of alienationof language
by the particular orms f
literaturehas already been raised by the quotation from Barbara
HerrnsteinSmith. The base-line of this dea is set out clearly for
examination by the exercise, repeated
in
several recent critical
works, ftaking n 'ordinary'prose passage and printing
t
with
he
typographic conventions of poetry. Examples occur
in
E. D.
Hirsch's Validity n
Interpretation,'9
ean Cohen,20 and in Ms.
Herrnstein mith'sown book On theMargins fDiscourse.2'We cite
one
fromthe last
in
full:
AlbertMolesworth,
Eighty-sevenears ld,
Owner
f
thenation's argest
And most rosperous otato
arm,
Died yesterday
At
his home
n
Idaho.
He left
no
survivors.
There should be general agreement,
albeit grudging n certain
quarters,
thatthere s
a surplus
of
portent
which thistext
acquires
that
t
would not have
had
in
its
ntended
place
and function s a
minornewspaper tem.Nor is this imply
question of extra care in
reading.
A
newspaper reader anxious to glean any
hint of infor-
mation about the market n arable land
or potatoes mightweigh
each word
minutely.Nor,
in
all
probability,
s
it
simply
that
one
'reads into'
the
text
hings
thatare not
there' because
one is
duped
about the nature of the writing. f it appeared withoutfurther
indication
n
a volume of verse
by
a
well
known
poet,
this
might
be
arguable.
But
armed with
full
knowledge
that
t is
'only'
an
indif-
ferent
ewspaper article, ven
if
one attempts
o
resist,
discernible
resonance or atmosphereasserts tself
which t would
be
pointless
to
disregard.
t would be
prudent
to
defer
the ntrusion
f the term
'meaning,' however.
We would
suggest
that the
kind
of features
o
which
we tend to
refer
n
order
to
account for this
tmosphere
are
in
factthe
points
wherethispassage falls hortofmeaningand falls hortofbecom-
ing poetry.One
notes
sequences
of sounds which have
a
rhythmic
identity,
certaincoherence
in
the
repetitions
f
vowels
or conso-
nants, he
poignant
solation
of
the
final hree lines,' or
the mutual
reflection f
the
name
"Molesworth"
nd
the
image
of
potatoes
as
undergroundwealth, tc. etc.
Yet
the
temptation o exaggerate
the
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948
MARCUS BULLOCK
significance
of
these
phenomena
should be resisted. These
are
qualities
f the words,but not meanings.
As Valery
indicates
in
his account
of prose,
qualitieswhich lie
outside
the
intention
re made invisible
n
the
comprehension
of
ordinary language.
The rule-governed process
by
which
the
meaning s construed
determines hatthe presence
of the
arbitrary
sign be repressed as
negligible.
In
the disruption
of
standard
linearity
bove, that
process s arrested.The installation
f
a factor
without rammatical
ontent
verthrows hehierarchy
f the code,
and the ban fades which held the language user spellbound and
blind
to the medium's
full haracteristic.
ll thathas been achieved
in
the cited
example, however,
is that the repressive
activity f
public,
rule-governed
anguage use has been
suspended,
and
the
arbitrary
nd
extraneous
features
of that text now
obtrude. But
they
re only rbitrary nd extraneous.
They
have not been
drawn
into
thecoherencewhich a perceptual
act
alone can give them.
Meaning is to
be
distinguished
from pleasing
uniformities
nd
correspondences
such
as
may
occur
by
chance,
or
by principles
of
simplecausality n a naturalobject. It lies outside the Kantian no-
tion
of beauty
as
Zweckmdfligkeit
hne
Zweck.
But at the same time,
we are
interested
n
a
dimension which
goes beyond
intention
n
the prosaic sense.
Wittgenstein,
n
his obsession
with fixing
an-
guage
as a rule-governed ctivity,
rites
nterestingly
n this
point:
Suppose
someone
aid: every amiliar ord,
n
a book
for
xample
actually
arries
n
atmosphere
ith
t
n our
minds,
'corona'
f
ightly
indicated
ses.-Just
s
if
ach figure
n
a painting
ere
urroundedy
delicate
hadowy
rawings
fscenes, s
it
were
n
another
imension,
andinthemwesawthefiguresndifferentontexts.-Onlyetus take
this
ssumptioneriously -Then
we see that t
s not adequate
to ex-
plain
intention.
For
f t
s like his,
f
hepossible
sesof a word
do float efore s
in
half-shades
s we
say
or hear
t-this
simply oes
for
us.
But
we com-
municate
with
therpeople without nowing
f
they
have this
xperi-
ence
too.
(Investigations,
p. 181e)
But the question of
what we everknow about
other people's
expe-
rience
is
always present
in
language,
as
Wittgenstein
ecognizes.
What we observeifa person uses thewords red' and 'green' cor-
rectly,
s thathe knowsthe rules of
that anguage
game, whereasa
colour-blind
person
apparently
does not. We do
not
know
what the
experience
of each
is,
only that,
n
the
former
ase,
it
agrees
with
our own to
a
degree
functionally
dequate
forthe
contingencies
f
the
ordinary public
sphere.
Yet there are uses of colour
not re-
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M
L N
949
stricted or determined
in
this way. Consider for example the
opening of Nietzsche's poem Venedig:
Ander Brucke tand
Jungst
ch n
brauner
Nacht.22
We
do
not
udge
fromthis that all
competent
users
of the
Ger-
man language would have arrivedat the same word for that night,
as
theymightfor a particularwooden table top. On
the
contrary,
one
suspects
that
Nietzsche
was
the only one. The poet,
it
seems,
has exceeded the grammarof that word, and broken the rule. Yet
there s no doubt thathe has made a meaning available. The night
is not simply
n absence of
daylight, egistered
n
black' or
'dark,'
but responded to as a particularconjuration of inner feeling. ts
visible uality s not appealed to as such. "Braun" is not used
in
the
capacity
of
colour nearlyso much as for that special dimension
Wittgensteinmistrusts,
he
"corona"
of inner
evocations.
The
im-
portance
it
has for the whole
poem
can
be seen as
the text con-
tinues:
Fernher amGesang:
goldner ropfen uoll's
fberdie zitternde lache
weg.
Gondeln, ichter,
Musik-
trunken chwamm's
n
die Dammerung inaus...
MeineSeele,ein Saitenspiel,
sang sich,
nsichtbar
eruhrt,
heimlich in Gondellied azu,
zitternd orbunter eligkeit.
-Horte jemand
hr
u?23
The objective situationdescribed, though a littlemore interest-
ing perhaps than the passing of Albert Molesworth, s not equiva-
lent to
the
meaning of
this
poem.
The
lights,
water
and
music of
Venice
are communicated
grammatically
s
part
of the intersub-
jective
realm.
So is the
nformation
hat the
speaker
was
there, ang
along silentlynd trembledwithdelight.Any romantically-minded
tourist
ould write
verse
to his
fiancee
on the back of
a
postcard
saying
much the
same
about himself.
But
at the centre
of it is a
perceptionmade byNietzschewhich sunique tohim and the act of
writing
t.
This is
only
there
historically,owever,
not as
any
kind of
intrinsic
resence
n
the verbal artefact.
t is
not iterable
nor acces-
sible
n
full o
anyone, ncluding
he author
at a
separate
time.
And
although
t
s said to
be
the
core
or
origin
of the
poem historically,
t
is
not
the
meaning either.
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950
MARCUS
BULLOCK
The concept
of meaningcan only
mply
ccess, butwe must
ask
what is made accessible by combining the words "braun" and
"Nacht,"
or by associating
that
combinationwith the
remaining
configuration
f the text.
What we do not
claim for
that is the
interior
tateof
FriedrichNietzsche,
but the
expansion of our
own
interiority.
he originalperception
whichconstituted
he writing
of
the
poem
has
drawn on the
capacities
latent n the signifying
system
o realize itself
for the
poet
in
his verbal
structure.What
each reading
does
is to
construe
complementarynterior
vent
from
it, and each of
these events,
ven for the same
reader on separate
occasions,mustbe theoretically nique. At the same time, his nfi-
nitely
xtended
family f readings
engendered
by a single text
s
not haphazard.
There is
a characteristicrocedure
ofgeneration
t
its heart.
VI
A
word
is not mimetic
ike a picture,which
hares
n
the
percep-
tual characterofits subjectmatter exhibits 'structuralsomorph-
ism'with t).
It is the
signal
of
homologous perceptions,
nd the
signal
alone.
A
painting
of a brown table will most typically
se
brown
pigment,whereas
the word brown'
used to describe
it
has
no colour.
It is simply he
token or
markofa resemblance
between
the
optical sensation
and all others we have
learned
to
enclose
in
thatform f unity.
But the domination
of
the
sensationby
the code
is
not
complete.
t
is
alive
in
the subjective
onsciousness
nasmuch
as
it is
capable
of
registering
orrespondences
which
lie outside
those prefigured n the rulesof thegame. The pointsof excess are
what
we call
metaphors. That
is to
say,
true
metaphors
s
opposed
to the
ossified condition
into which it
may
settlethrough
the
in-
stitution
f an
agreed
function
for t in the system
f differences
defined by grammar.)
But
there
s also
an
equally
vital moment
n
the functioning
f
a
word
whose force s systematically
kinto that
of
metaphor but does
not detach
itselffrom the code
by
direct
controversion.
t lies
logically
within
he bounds
of 'conventional'
meaning,but
this does
not exhaust it
in the configuration
f
the
text. t is to be read pastthat point,past the limitations f thesign
as pure difference
whose significance
s
determinedas
a
logical
function
n
the
word-game
of
grammar.
This is the procedure
which yieldsthe
meaning
of Nietzsche's
imagery
even where
it
is
not metaphoric
in
the
same sense
as
"braune
Nacht," .e.,
a
unique presentation,
ut either drawing
on
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M
L N
951
the common
coin of romantic
phrases (e.g.,
"meine
Seele, ein
Saitenspiel") or completelyconformable to conventional usage
("uiber
die zitternde
Flache weg"). The instances
of
conventional
poetic
formulae re interesting
n this
regard
because they
have
to
be brought
back
from he moribund state
towardswhich
they
tend
with continued
use,
for they cannot
be thrown
against
familiar
expectation
the
way
"braun"
is. The commonplaces
"goldene
Tropfen"
and "trunken
schwamm's"
describingthe
song are so
close
to
public
property
thatreturning heir meaning
to a
valid
poetic
impactdemands
a strategywhere
the reader
is induced
to
break away fromthe conventional ead-traceto whichhe is har-
nessed, ust
as much
as withordinary
usages.
This strategy,
nd the
degree of determinate
meaningrecover-
able
in
the
resulting
text may be set
out as the principles
of
an
alternateword-game,
he operations
of writing
nd reading
n what
we
defined
as
language
in its
modality
f
medium.
The old
structuralist
radition
of arbitrariness
f
the sign,and
meaningas
difference
within
pure system f
differences
s radi-
cally excluded
here.
Words
are revealed
in
this phase
of
their
working
s essences. The creationof expressionslike Nietzsche's
"braune Nacht" necessarily
enders
an available meaning,
ecause
they
reflect
perceptual
connections
n the
quality
of words as
es-
sences.
The
word
n this
modality,
o
quote
Benedetto Croce again,
figures
as
an image which
is significant-that
s, a
sign
in
itself,
and therefore oloured,
sounding, singing,
articulate"
Essence
f
Aesthetic,.
52). Like
the
forms,tones and
textures
used by
the
painter,
they may
be
combined
according
to their
mmanent
po-
tentialto realize correspondanceswhichdo not,as Wittgenstein's
objection
would suggest, go
only
for
us,'
but in
principle
for all
users
of the
language.
A
combination
not made by an
act of
perception n
the
linguistic
medium,
e.g., arrived
at by chance or
a failed
attempt t expres-
sion,
does not
qualify
nd is
in
theory istinguishable
rom ne that
does.
At
the same time
a failure
of reading
is possible
in
each
situation-a
meaning
may
be claimed
where
only
its absence
has
been
found
a
corruption
f consciousness),
r
an
activeconnection
not realized. The statusof these failures s precisely quivalentto
those
n
other
art-forms.
ying
priori
utside ogic,they
annot
be
overcome
logically,
ny
more
than failure
to
recognize
the duck-
rabbit mage
in
one or
both of its references.
The task
of criticism
consists
n
the
same process
as that
by which
one would
secure
reading
of that mage-the
enumeration
of contributing
eatures
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952
MARCUS BULLOCK
and
the introduction
f
context.
But the criterion
f truth n the
completedact,as in the actofthe work's nception, s in its nterior-
ity. old based on value-the
value implicitn the being
of interior-
ity tself,
which is
to
pursue,
maintain,and expand
its own
exis-
tence.
The object
of this alternative
anguage-game s
ultimately ot
to
produce agreement,but
to navigate
course betweentwo dangers.
On
the one side is the Scylla
of
ordinaryusage,
the realm of
dead
and
shipwrecked
metaphors like
'black mood' and
'sweet sound'
which
have been drawn nto the
code,
given ogical standing.These
meaningsare now public,part of theworld, alienated from their
historical
rigin, where they were subjective
and
unique. On the
other side is the Charybdis
of private
and inaccessibleassociation,
knowableonly to the speaker,
and veiled
even to him outside the
momentof its utterance.
This would
be the conditionof H6lder-
lin's ate poetry,when the
continuity
f his experiencesand identity
had collapsed.
The special
situationof breakdown
is obviously
highly omplex,
but one
can venturea general udgement
in this
sense
on a
poem
such
as "Hdhere Menschheit":
Den Menschenstder Sinn
ns nneregegeben,
DaB sie als anerkannt
as BeBrewdhlen,
Es gilt
lsZiel, s istdas wahreLeben,
Von
dem sich
geistiger
es Lebens
Jahre
dhlen.24
Although,
n
the context
of the
poet's
other work,
this s
by
no
means without
nterest,
ne is also aware that he
nner condition
of
theutterance, he
full dimension of
interiority,s not expressed
in
the
linguistic
tructure.
ts aura ofmelancholy
s
that
of
the verbal
husk of an illumination.The condition ofmadness itself s explicit
here,
because one would
not
n
principle
doubt that
there was such
a
companion
to
the writing.
Yet it was not realized
as
a
full
con-
scious
entity
n
the
expressive
medium,
and
that
failure
s the fail-
ure
of consciousness
tself,
he
incapacity
o build a
continuity
f
inner
experience
which constitutes he personality
of the
indi-
vidual. The writer
ccordingly igns
his
work "Scardanelli"
during
this
period
and
dates
it
apparently
at random across several cen-
turies, nto the past and the future. t proceeds from a stranger,
lost
n
obscurity,
nto
whom
Holderlin himself an gain
no
insight.
The
madness
of
Hdlderlin
s
the darkness
of an interiority hich
cannot
reach
itself,
even from
moment
to
moment. The
com-
prehension
of literature
s
the
light
of culture
and
history,
he
continuity
which fills
out
temporality.
t
prepares
the
possibilities
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M L N 953
of interiority
laborated
in
the enclosure
of one
mind and time,
and guaranteed as illumination f another.
Universityf
Oregon Eugene)
NOTES
1
Johann Gottlieb
Fichte,Sdmmtliche erke, .
G. Fichte,ed. (Berlin: Verlag von
Veit und Comp, 1845), Bd. I, p. 434.
"What
kind
of
a
philosophy
man will choose depends, therefore,
n what
kind
of
a person he is, for a philosophical
system s not a lifelesshousehold
object
which one can put
down or take up just as we please...."
2 Closing
the discussion
ppended
to his
"Structure, ign,
and
Play,"
n The Struc-
turalist ontroversy,
d. R. Macksey & E.
Donato (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins
University ress, 1975),
Derrida says: "Now
I don't knowwhat perception s
and
I don't believethat anything
ike perception
xists. A] perception
s
precisely
concept,
a
concept
of an intuition r of a
givenoriginating
rom he
thing tself,
present
tself n its meaning,
ndependentlyfrom anguage,
from
he
system
f
reference....
whatever trikes
t the metaphysicsf which
have spoken strikes
also at the very onceptof perception" p. 272).
3 Ludwig
Wittgenstein,
hilosophischentersuchungen/Philosophical
nvestigations.
English text
ranslatedby
G. E. M.
Anscombe
New York:
Macmillan
Company,
1953), p.
194.
4 R. G.
Collingwood,
The Principles f Art, London:
Oxford UniversityPress,
1938), p.
245.
5 The questionssurrounding
bstractionwould
be reasonablyregarded as more
complexand extensive
han
representation,
nd therefore
re avoided here.
At
the same
time,
we
recognize
that
an
understanding
of
representationmust
necessarily
e incomplete
without hisdimension.The relationship
uggested s
far
from
unusual
in
art
theory, orexample Rudolf Arnheim
ays: "Two oppo-
site pointsof departure are needed; on the one side the stimulusmaterialof the
object,
and on the
other,form,
he
indispensable
precondition
f visual
under-
standing.
Perceiving s well as representing
thingmeans finding
form
n
its
structure.
The patterns
of 'nonobjective'art,
if
considered from
the
point
of
view of the world of natural
things, re extremely
bstract.They
reduce the
representation
f realityto a visual equivalent
of the universal physical
and
psychological
orces
hat underlie nature
and
life
and of their
nterplay.
n
this
way they
xpress harmony nd disharmony,
ominance and
coordination, on-
trast
nd
similarity,movement
nd rest, quilibrium
nd
disequilibrium
nd
so
forth. rom the
opposite point
of
view,
however,
hat
s,
from
he
point
of view
of
form,
the basic
nonobjective
patterns
are not
abstract.
They
are the
very
elements
of visual
comprehension,
the
building-stones
f
the
composition
the
artistcreates in order to representthe structure f the world in the way his
temperament
makes
him
see
it."
Towards
PsychologyfArt, Berkeley:
Univer-
sity f California Press, 1966),
p. 39.
6
Jacques Derrida, Of
Grammatology,
rans.
GayatriChakravortySpivak (Balti-
more:
Johns
Hopkins University ress, 1977),
pp. 46-47.
7 Benedetto Croce, The Essence
of Aesthetic,
rans. Douglas Ainslie (London:
Heinemann, 1921), pp. 52-53.
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954
MARCUSBULLOCK
8
Paul Valery,
Varieti
II, (Paris: Gallimard,
1936),
p. 61. "The essence of prose
is
to perish-that
is to
say, be 'comprehended'-that
is to
say, to
be dissolved,
destroyedbeyondrecall,entirely eplaced by the image or the motivewhich t
signifies ccording
to linguistic
onvention.
For
prose always
impliesthe
uni-
verse of
experience
and acts-the
universe in which,
or thanks o
which-our
perceptions nd
our actions
or emotions
must
ultimatelyorrespond
to or reflect
one another
n the same
way-uniformly.
The practicaluniverse
an be
reduced
to a collection
of purposes."
9 "Au sujet
du
Cimetikre
Marin," op.
cit. p. 63.
"The thoughtsexpressed
or
suggested by a
poetictext re
in no
way thesole and
pre-eminent
bjects
of
its
discourse-but
means
which
merge equally
with hesounds,
cadences,
metre nd
ornaments
o stimulate
nd sustain certain
ension
or
exaltation,
o elicit n us
a
world-or
mode f existence-which
s
completely
harmonious."
10 "Commentairede Charmes,"op. cit.,p. 74. "My poems have the meaningwhich
is
ascribed
to them.
That which
I give them
is appropriate
only
for
me, and
cannot
be used
to
contradict nyone
else."
11
Erich Auerbach,
Mimesis,
rans.Willard
R. Trask (Princeton:
Princeton
Univer-
sity
Press, 1955),
p. 485.
12
Barbara Herrnstein
mith,
oeticClosureChicago: University
f
Chicago
Press,
1968),
p. 17.
13
Stanley
Cavell
discusses
cinema
as an art form
n
the
ight
f
this dea
inhisbook
The World
ViewedNew
York:
Viking,1971).
14
William
M. Ivins
Jr.,On the
Rationalizationf Sight,
2nd
ed. (1928), (rpt.
New
York:
Da
Capo
Press, 1973),
p. 13.
15 Rudolf Arnheim,Toward PsychologyfArt Berkeley:University f California
Press,
1966), p.
39.
16
This indicates raft
n
the sense
defined
by
R. G.
Collingwood
n his
Principlesf
Art.
17 It would appear
that there are
several historiesof
a language
in addition to
expansion
directly
raceable
to literary
ntroductions,
rom major
shifts f
the
"Grimm's Law" type, to
refinements
f logical
significance
by philosophical
critique,
r
coinages
made to name new developments
n
the
materialor
institu-
tional
fields.Nevertheless,
t s
altogetherpossible
that
'literary'
spect could be
found to play
a role even here, though
this
would
involve
some considerable
discussion to
establish
clearly.
18 See Of Grammatology,. 160:
.. .
transcendenteading ... that search for the
signified
which
we here
put
in
question,
not to annul
it,
but to understand
it
within
system
o which such
a
reading
is
blind."
19
E. D. Hirsch,
Validity
n nterpretation
New
Haven:
Yale University
ress, 1967),
p.
95.
20
Jean
Cohen,
Structure
u
langagepoitique
Paris:
Flammarion,1966), p.
76.
21
Barbara
Herrnstein
Smith,
On
the
Marginsof
Discourse
Chicago:
University
f
Chicago
Press, 1978),
p.
67.
22
Nietzsche'sWerke
d.
VIII
(Leipzig:
Alfred
Kroner, 1919), p.
360.
"On thebridge
I
stood
Just a brieftime past in a brown night.
23
From
far off came
singing:
In
golden
drops
it
welled
Across
the
trembling
urface.
Gondolas, lights,
music-
Drunkenly
t swam
out
into the dusk ...
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M L N
955
My
soul,
a lyre,
Invisiblymoved,sang itself
In secrecy
n
accompanying
gondolier
tune,
Trembling
n the
full
colours
of bliss.
-Was there anyone
who listened?"
24
Friedrich
Hdlderlin,Sdmtliche
erke,
d.
II
(Stuttgart:
W. Kohlhammer:
1951),
p.
290:
"Higher
Humanity"
Meaning
to men
is inwardly
given,
That they
hould
know
and
choose the
best,
It is the
goal, it is
true
living,
In which
themindful
ount life's
years.