-
Country Profile 2007
Bulgaria This Country Profile is a reference work, analysing the
country's history, politics, infrastructure and economy. It is
revised and updated annually. The Economist Intelligence Unit's
Country Reports analyse current trends and provide a two-year
forecast.
The full publishing schedule for Country Profiles is now
available on our website at www.eiu.com/schedule The Economist
Intelligence Unit 26 Red Lion Square London WC1R 4HQ United
Kingdom
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ISSN 1366-4166
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Country Profile 2007 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence
Unit Limited 2007
Comparative economic indicators, 2006
Gross domestic product(US$ bn)
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national
sources.
Gross domestic product(% change, year on year)
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national
sources.
Consumer prices(% change, year on year)
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national
sources.
Gross domestic product per head(US$ '000)
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national
sources.
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 120.0 140.0 160.0
TajikistanKyrgyz Republic
MoldovaMacedonia
ArmeniaTurkmenistan
GeorgiaAlbania
Bosnia and HercegovinaUzbekistan
EstoniaLatvia
AzerbaijanSerbia
LithuaniaBulgaria
BelarusSlovenia
CroatiaSlovakia
KazakhstanUkraine
HungaryRomania
Czech RepublicPolandRussia
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0
Kyrgyz RepublicMacedonia
HungaryMoldova
CroatiaAlbania
SloveniaBosnia and Hercegovina
SerbiaPoland
Czech RepublicTurkmenistan
BulgariaRussia
UkraineTajikistan
UzbekistanLithuania
SlovakiaRomaniaGeorgiaBelarus
KazakhstanEstonia
LatviaArmenia
Azerbaijan
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0
TajikistanUzbekistan
Kyrgyz RepublicMoldova
TurkmenistanGeorgia
ArmeniaUkraine
AzerbaijanAlbania
MacedoniaBosnia and Hercegovina
BelarusSerbia
BulgariaKazakhstan
RomaniaRussiaLatvia
LithuaniaPolandCroatia
SlovakiaHungary
EstoniaCzech Republic
Slovenia
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0
PolandAlbania
SloveniaCzech Republic
ArmeniaCroatia
MacedoniaLithuaniaHungary
EstoniaSlovakia
Kyrgyz RepublicLatvia
RomaniaBelarus
BulgariaBosnia and Hercegovina
UzbekistanAzerbaijan
KazakhstanUkraineGeorgia
RussiaTajikistan
TurkmenistanMoldova
Serbia
978.2
337.3
34.5
18.4
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Bulgaria 1
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
Contents
Bulgaria
3 Basic data
4 Politics 4 Political background 5 Recent political
developments 8 Constitution, institutions and administration 9
Political forces 13 International relations and defence
15 Resources and infrastructure 15 Population 17 Education 17
Health 18 Natural resources and the environment 18 Transport,
communications and the Internet 21 Energy provision
22 The economy 22 Economic structure 24 Economic policy 26
Economic performance 28 Regional trends
29 Economic sectors 29 Agriculture 30 Mining and semi-processing
30 Manufacturing 32 Construction 32 Financial services 34 Other
services
35 The external sector 35 Trade in goods 37 Invisibles and the
current account 38 Capital flows and foreign debt 40 Foreign
reserves and the exchange rate
41 Regional overview 41 Membership of organisations
48 Appendices 48 Sources of information 49 Reference tables 49
Population 49 Labour force and unemployment 49 Freight traffic by
mode of transport 50 Energy production and consumption
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2 Bulgaria
Country Profile 2007 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence
Unit Limited 2007
50 Consolidated budget 50 Money supply 50 Interest rates 51
Gross domestic product 51 Nominal gross domestic product by
expenditure 52 Real gross domestic product by expenditure 52 Prices
and earnings 52 Gross agricultural output 53 Levels of industrial
production by subsector 53 Construction 54 Tourism 54 Retail sales
54 Main trading partners 55 Balance of payments, IMF series 55
Foreign reserves 55 Exchange rates
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Bulgaria 3
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
Bulgaria
Basic data
111,002 sq km, of which 28% is arable land and 33% forest
7.7m (end-2005)
Population in !000 (December 2005)
Sofia (capital) 1,232 Stara Zagora 360 Plovdiv 708 Blagoevgrad
334 Varna 458 Pleven 305 Burgas 419 Pazardzhik 298
Continental
Hottest month, July, average temperature 21°C; coldest month,
January, average temperature -2.3°C; driest month, April, 18 mm
average rainfall; wettest month, June, 91 mm average rainfall
Bulgarian
Metric system
Lev (Lv)=100 stotinki; the plural of lev is leva. In July 1997
the lev was pegged to the D-mark at Lv1,000:DM1; in January 1999 it
was repegged to the euro at Lv1,955.83:"1 and in July 1999 it was
redenominated (at the euro equivalent of parity with the
D-mark#Lv1.95583:"1). Average exchange rates in 2006: Lv1.56:US$1;
Lv1.96:"1. Exchange rates on January 10th 2007: Lv1.51:US$1;
Lv1.96:"1
2 hours ahead of GMT in winter; 3 hours ahead in summer
Calendar year
January 1st, January 2nd (EU membership celebration, only in
2007), March 3rd (national day), Easter Monday (Orthodox calendar:
in 2007, April 9th), May 1st (labour day), May 6th (St George!s
day), May 24th (day of Bulgarian culture and script), September 6th
(St Cyril!s and St Methodius!s day), September 22nd (independence
day), December 24th (from 2pm), December 25th-26th (Christmas)
Public holidays
Climate
Weather in Sofia (altitude 550 metres)
Language
Weights and measures
Currency
Time
Fiscal year
Total area
Population
Main cities
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4 Bulgaria
Country Profile 2007 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence
Unit Limited 2007
Politics
The government consists of a coalition of the former communist
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the Simeon II National Movement
(SNM) and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). The
administration took office after the June 2005 parliamentary
election and is headed by the prime minister, Sergei Stanishev, who
is also leader of the BSP.
Political background
The Bulgarians take their name from the Bulgars, a people of
Central Asian origin who founded the first Bulgarian state in 681
AD. Christianised in the ninth century, this state formed the core
of a powerful regional empire before succumbing to the Ottoman
Turks in 1386. Turkish domination ended in the Russo-Turkish war of
1876-78. The treaty of San Stefano (1877) awarded much of Macedonia
and Thrace to Bulgaria. These territories were promptly reassigned
at the Congress of Berlin (1878), as Europe!s great powers strove
to limit Russian influence. Aspirations to recreate this "Greater
Bulgaria" had a bearing on Bulgaria!s foreign policy for the next
70 years. A German prince became monarch in 1878, under a notably
progressive constitution. However, governments up until 1940
alternated between squabbling civilian administrations and direct
royal rule. Bulgaria allied itself with Germany in both world wars,
although in the second, the popular Tsar Boris III refused to
declare war on Russia or to allow Bulgaria!s Jews to be
deported.
An anti-German coup in September 1944, as Soviet armies entered
Bulgaria, brought to power the broad Fatherland Front coalition, in
which the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) gradually consolidated
its position by eliminating its erstwhile partners. A rigged
referendum in 1946 abolished the monarchy, and the BCP!s political
monopoly was symbolised by the show-trial and execution of the
Agrarian Party leader, Nikola Petkov, in 1948. Collectivisation in
agri-culture and nationalisation in industry were accompanied by
repression that was severe even by the standards of the region at
the time. Changes after the death of Stalin brought Todor Zhivkov
to the fore and he emerged clearly as Bulgaria!s leader in 1956. Mr
Zhivkov stayed in power for 33 years through a combination of
extreme loyalty to the Soviet Union and skill in pre-empting
potential challengers at home.
In November 1989, as other Soviet-bloc regimes tottered,
Politburo colleagues forced Mr Zhivkov to resign. There were
massive street demonstrations and the Union of Democratic Forces
(UDF), an umbrella organisation of anti-regime groupings, was
formed in December. The BCP repealed its constitutional monopoly on
political power, renaming itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party
(BSP). Consultations with the opposition led to a parliamentary
election in June 1990, which the BSP won. However, Petur Mladenov,
who had led the move in the BCP to oust Mr Zhivkov in 1989, was
forced out of the presidency in July 1990 and was replaced by the
UDF leader, Zhelyu Zhelev. Andrei Lukanov then formed a BSP-led
government in September 1990, but proved unable to rule in
The communists take over
Communism is overthrown
The formation of modern Bulgaria
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Bulgaria 5
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
the face of extra-parliamentary pressure from the opposition and
the collapse of the economy.
In mid-December 1990 a "government of experts" emerged, headed
by the non-party judge Dimitur Popov, and including ministers from
the BSP, the UDF and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU).
An election in October 1991 left the UDF short of an outright
majority, and it formed a government with the support of the mainly
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). Filip
Dimitrov became prime minister. Although the government passed a
privatisation law and revamped foreign investment legislation, the
UDF met with dissent both from the MRF and from within its own
ranks. A scandal involving arms exports to Yugoslavia precipitated
a vote of confidence in October 1992, which Mr Dimitrov lost.
Another independent government of experts was formed at the end of
1992, headed by the presidential adviser Lyuben Berov, and
supported by the MRF, the BSP and a breakaway faction of the UDF.
However, by early 1994 this administration too was under fire from
Mr Zhelev, the MRF and the trade unions, and its unpopularity
increased when the lev crashed in March 1994. Having negotiated a
long-awaited settlement with Bulgaria!s commercial creditors in
June 1994, Mr Berov stood down.
The parliamentary election in December 1994 gave the BSP and its
smaller leftist allies an absolute majority. Under Zhan Videnov,
the BSP formed a government that was supported on most issues by
the populist Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB), a new entrant to
parliament. But the economy deteriorated rapidly in 1996. The
international financial institutions, dissatisfied with the slow
pace of structural reform, withheld the support needed to replenish
reserves and called for a currency board to be established. This,
along with the BSP!s defeat in the November 1996 presidential
election, prompted Mr Videnov to resign as prime minister and party
leader. After a brief outbreak of violence around parliament on
January 10th 1997, a wave of peaceful protests, strikes and
blockades of major roads spread around the country. The new BSP
leader, Georgi Purvanov, declined to form a government and a
caretaker government was appointed.
Recent political developments
The UDF mayor of Sofia, Stefan Sofianski, became caretaker prime
minister in February 1997. The government dealt with fuel shortages
and stabilised the lev, which had depreciated sixfold to
Lv3,000:US$1 between end-1996 and early February 1997. In addition,
the cabinet rapidly brought down inflation, came to an agreement
with the IMF, launched a drive against crime and corruption, and
vigorously purged the bureaucracy. The popularity of Mr Sofianski!s
government and of the UDF-backed president, Petur Stoyanov (who had
won favour by brokering the political solution in early February),
boosted that of the UDF. With its other allies in the United
Democratic Forces (UtdDF) alliance, the UDF won a comfortable
majority in the parliamentary election of April 1997.
The UDF leader, Ivan Kostov, formed a UtdDF government in May
1997. A currency board was set up in July (see Economic policy).
The government
A caretaker government takes over after the 1996-97 crisis
First post-communist governments prove unstable
Collapse of the lev leads to fall of BSP government in 1996
Ivan Kostov's UDF government governs for a full four years
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6 Bulgaria
Country Profile 2007 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence
Unit Limited 2007
successfully stabilised the economy, concluded a three-year
agreement with the IMF, privatised much of Bulgarian industry, and,
against the weight of public opinion at the time, backed NATO in
the 1999 Kosovo war. Although the government and Mr Kostov stayed
popular for over two years, popular support began to wane as the
public became concerned about corruption at senior levels in the
government. Poor results in the October 1999 local elections
prompted Mr Kostov to carry out a purge of his cabinet in December
1999. However, allegations of sleaze persisted. As well as
opposition attacks on the government, conflicts within the UDF
multiplied. Although Mr Kostov beat off internal challenges, the
UDF entered the June 2001 parliamentary election campaign with only
a small lead over the BSP in the opinion polls.
The situation was changed by the unexpected appearance on the
political scene in February 2001 of the popular former king, Simeon
Saxe-Coburg. Denied the right to stand in the November 2001
presidential election, Mr Saxe-Coburg formed the Simeon II National
Movement (SNM) in April, winning half the seats in parliament in
the June 2001 poll, on the back of promises to root out corruption,
improve living standards and reform the economy. A coalition
government with the MRF was formed in July 2001, with the
participation as individuals of two BSP members.
Mr Saxe-Coburg!s government completed a full four-year term in
office and was successful in many respects. The government budget
was near balance throughout and recorded large surpluses at the end
of the government!s term. Sustained economic growth led to sharp
falls in unemployment. Foreign investment rose, Bulgaria joined
NATO and progress towards EU membership was as fast as could
reasonably have been expected. On the other hand, some major
privatisations proved much more difficult than anticipated; crime
remained a serious problem; and improvements in living standards
and welfare, although significant, were well below the inflated
expectations set by the 2001 election campaign.
The result was a revival of the BSP!s fortunes. The party!s
position improved sharply in November 2001, when its leader, Mr
Purvanov, won the presidential election against an incumbent backed
by both the UtdDF and the SNM. Mr Purvanov has proved a popular and
assertive president. Opinion polls through much of Mr Saxe-Coburg!s
time in office showed the BSP well ahead of the SNM in the polls,
if usually short of the support that would have assured it of a
majority in parliament. The MRF, often a troublesome coalition
partner for the SNM, was also widely seen as a likely partner for
the BSP after the next parliamentary election. When that election
was held, in June 2005, the outcome was more complicated than had
been expected, partly because of the success of the recently
created extreme nationalist Ataka (Attack) coalition. After almost
two months of bargaining and false starts, a broad coalition
between the BSP, the SNM and the MRF emerged, with BSP leader
Sergei Stanishev as prime minister.
Although potentially an uneasy alliance, the three-party
coalition remains intact almost a year and a half later:
in-fighting has been limited by the task of implementing the
reforms needed to ensure EU accession at the start of 2007 and
Former king's new movement takes office after 2001 election
A tripartite ruling coalition emerges in 2005
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Bulgaria 7
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
subsequently to comply with the EU!s post-accession "screening",
and the ruling parties have reached consensus over tough budgetary
policies. The coalition!s survival has been helped by the
ineffectiveness of the traditional right of politics, although the
rise of the charismatic Sofia mayor Boiko Borisov#informal leader
of the new Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB)
party#could present problems for the coalition in 2007. Ataka, too,
remains relatively popular, with its leader Volen Siderov reaching
the run-off in the presidential election in November 2006. Mr
Purvanov, however, won the second-round run-off by an unprecedented
margin#despite a record low turnout.
Bulgaria is much more politically stable than it was ten years
ago. Two governments in succession have served their full four-year
terms, and a third still enjoys a large majority; transfers of
power have been peaceful and, mostly, smooth; and despite the
strong performance of Ataka in the 2005 parliamentary election (and
of its party leader in the 2006 presidential election) and the
delay in forming the government after the election, there appeared
to be little threat of disorder. The "anti-establishment" nature of
Mr Borisov!s appeal#as well as that of Ataka#could, however, make
politics more turbulent in future.
Important recent events
March 2000
Formal EU accession negotiations begin.
March-June 2004
Bulgaria joins NATO and provisionally closes accession
negotiations on all 31 chapters of the EU!s acquis
communautaire.
April 2005
Bulgaria signs its treaty of accession with the EU, envisaging
membership on January 1st 2007, provided that certain conditions
are fulfilled#and a delay of one year if they are not.
June-August 2005
A parliamentary election in late June fails to confer a majority
on any single party, in a vote characterised by unexpected gains by
the ultra-nationalist Ataka (Attack) coalition. After seven weeks,
a coalition government is formed by the Bulgarian Socialist Party
(BSP), the Simeon II National Movement (SNM) and the Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (MRF), with the BSP!s Sergei Stanishev as prime
minister.
December 2005
Bulgaria!s peacekeeping battalion#committed after the US-led
invasion in 2003#is withdrawn from Iraq.
October-November 2006
In the presidential election, former BSP leader Georgi Purvanov
wins a second five-year term by beating Ataka!s Volen Siderov
resoundingly in a second-round run-off.
December 2006
Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB),
established as a civic association at end-March, becomes a
political party. Sofia mayor Boiko Borisov is its informal but
undisputed leader.
January 2007
Following a favourable European Commission report in September
2006, Bulgaria becomes a full EU member on January 1st 2007.
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8 Bulgaria
Country Profile 2007 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence
Unit Limited 2007
Constitution, institutions and administration
A post-communist constitution was adopted in July 1991,
providing for a multi-party system, free elections on the basis of
a universal adult franchise, and the protection of human and civil
rights. Amendments to the constitution, passed between 2003 and
2006, as part of the requirements of EU accession, have concerned
such topics as the operation of the judiciary, immunity from
prosecution of MPs and members of the judiciary, and foreign
ownership of Bulgarian land.
The government is parliamentary. A regular parliament consists
of the single-chamber, 240-seat National Assembly, directly elected
for a term of four years. Under the current electoral law, parties
and electoral coalitions need 4% of the popular vote to qualify for
seats in parliament. The voting system is based on proportional
representation in multi-member constituencies. An election can be
called before the end of the parliamentary term in specific
circumstances, such as the loss of a vote of confidence, but not
purely at the government!s discretion. Governments are created
according to strict rules: the largest parliamentary group is asked
to form a government, then the next largest, if the first fails,
and only then another group of the president!s choice. A simple
parliamentary majority is required to approve a government and to
pass ordinary legislation. A three-quarters majority is needed to
pass constitutional changes, although, with some delay, a
two-thirds vote can suffice.
The head of state is the president, who is directly elected
every five years for a maximum of two terms. The president!s
political powers include the ability to make certain military and
diplomatic appointments (he is commander-in-chief of the armed
forces); to decree a state of emergency; to appoint a caretaker
government in the run-up to an election; and to return legislation
to the parliament for reconsideration. Much of the president!s work
is diplomatic and ceremonial, but the president can also exercise
considerable influence in the spheres of security and foreign
affairs, and may play a role in defusing political crises and
brokering agreement on new governments. The current incumbent, Mr
Purvanov, has consistently been one of Bulgaria!s most popular
politicians.
Plans to amend the constitution to give local government units
more fiscal powers, including the ability to raise and vary taxes,
are currently at an advanced stage of passage through parliament.
Directly elected councils and mayors exist at town, borough and
village level, although even after the amendments these will remain
heavily dependent on financial support from the central government.
Apart from the capital, Sofia, the country is divided into 28
regions. These regions do not have directly elected institutions,
but instead are run by governors appointed by the central
government.
Foreign observers have long regarded the judiciary as one of
Bulgaria!s major weak points. During EU membership negotiations
with Bulgaria, the European Commission repeatedly stressed that
judicial reform was needed to ensure compliance with the acquis
communautaire (the body of EU law), and important steps were
eventually taken to strengthen the independence of the
A parliamentary republic
Progress in judicial reformbut only after EU pressure
Plans to increase the power of local government
The president has a limited but significant role
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Bulgaria 9
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
judiciary and streamline its operation. However, the EU will
maintain scrutiny of reform progress under a post-accession
"screening" process.
Corruption remains a problem within the state bureaucracy.
Anti-corruption efforts have been an important element in all main
parties! political platforms but progress has been slow. The
privatisation process, which has involved the sale of some of the
state!s major assets, has been perceived as subject to political
influence. Petty corruption is also a problem for foreign companies
operating in Bulgaria. The government remains under pressure from
the EU to demonstrate that its policies are having an effect on
corruption.
Political forces Results of parliamentary elections % of vote
No. of seatsJun 2005 Coalition for Bulgariaa 31.0 82Simeon II
National Movement 19.9 53Movement for Rights and Freedoms 12.8
34Attack coalitionb 8.1 21United Democratic Forces coalitionc 7.7
20Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria 6.4 17Bulgaria's People Union
coalitiond 5.2 13Parties missing the 4% threshold 8.9 0Total 100.0
240Jun 2001 Simeon II National Movement Coalitione 42.7 120United
Democratic Forcesf 18.2 51Coalition for Bulgariaa 17.1 48Movement
for Rights and Freedoms Coalitiong 7.5 21Parties missing the 4%
threshold 14.5 0Total 100.0 240Apr 1997 United Democratic Forcesh
52.3 137Democratic Lefti 22.1 58Alliance for National Salvationj
7.6 19Euroleft 5.5 14Bulgarian Business Bloc 4.9 12Parties missing
the 4% threshold 7.6 0Total 100.0 240
a Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and smaller leftist parties. b
Coalition of four nationalist formations. c Includes United
Democratic Forces, Democratic Party, Bulgarian Agrarian National
Union, National Union-Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, Gergyovden
Movement, Roma Movement for an Egalitarian Social Model. d
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union-People's Union (BANU-PU),
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO), Union of
Free Democrats. e Officially, an electoral coalition established by
the Bulgarian Women's Party and the Oborishte Movement for National
Revival. f Coalition established by the Union of Democratic Forces
(UDF), the People's Unionconsisting of the Democratic Party and the
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union-People's Union (BANU-PU)and the
National Movement for Rights and Freedoms. g The mainly ethnic
Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the Liberal Union,
and a Roma (Gypsy) formation, Euroroma. h The UDF, the People's
Union (the Democratic Party and BANU) and the non-Dertliev faction
of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party. i The BSP with the
Stamboliiski Agrarian Party and Ecoglasnost. j The MRF and a
collection of Greens, monarchists and others.
Source: Press reports.
The BSP is the senior partner in the Coalition for Bulgaria
(CFB), the largest grouping in the current parliament. After 1989
the BSP fared much better than
Corruption in the bureaucracy is still a problem
Bulgarian Socialist Party
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most of its former communist counterparts in the region. Its
social base was diverse, including pensioners, peasants, and some
of the technical intelligentsia, as well as most Bulgarians living
in ethnically mixed areas, who were attracted by its nationalist
stance. The BSP accommodated a wide range of political opinions,
from hardline traditionalist to social democratic.
The BSP!s credibility and support were seriously affected by the
1996-97 economic collapse. In the wake of this crisis, the
initially obscure Mr Purvanov was elected leader as a compromise
candidate. He brought the BSP around to his policy line of economic
reformism and orientation towards western Europe. Mr Purvanov!s
influence was strengthened by his presidential victory and the
election of his preferred successor, Mr Stanishev, as party leader
in December 2001. Although the BSP suffered in 2005 as some of its
supporters shifted their allegiance to the nationalists of Ataka,
the party has since begun to restore its credibility. Nevertheless,
some erosion of the party!s more traditional support is possible
owing to the government!s market-oriented economic and fiscal
policies, and its alliance with the MRF.
The emergence of the SNM in early 2001 altered what had
previously been a broad left-right political divide#although the
SNM has always defined itself as right-of-centre. It came to power
because of disillusionment with the BSP and the UDF. This sentiment
was combined with popular faith in Simeon Saxe-Coburg and his blend
of welfare promises and supply-side market economics. Yet the
SNM-led government!s failure to meet its ambitious policy
benchmarks for economic prosperity led to a fall in the party!s
support and increasing divisions within the SNM. The SNM!s
representation in parliament was more than halved following the
2005 election, falling to 53 seats, compared with 120 seats after
the 2001 election.
Although the SNM still held sufficient support to participate in
the new BSP-led government, polls in late 2006 and early 2007
suggested that the SNM could struggle to secure 20 seats in
parliament if an early election were held. Moreover, Mr Saxe-Coburg
has come to be seen as more of a liability than an asset, and the
party!s right-of-centre credentials have been compromised by its
participation in a government led by the BSP. Although the desire
for political survival creates an incentive for the SNM to hold on
to its place in government for as long as possible, the party seems
destined for fragmentation.
The MRF is the third partner in the current coalition. In
practice, the party represents Bulgaria!s 750,000 ethnic Turks,
although formally there is a constitutional ban on ethnically based
parties, and some ethnic Bulgarians are prominent within the MRF!s
leadership and its parliamentary group. It has been dominated since
its foundation in 1990 by Ahmed Dogan, a former dissident who has
become a highly effective political player. Mr Dogan and the MRF
have generally resisted the demands of ethnic and Islamist
separatists within the Turkish community, instead concentrating on
cultural and religious rights, and the defence of economic
interests. The MRF gained a record 34 MPs in the 2005 election and
occupies a powerful position in the ruling tripartite
coalition.
Movement for Rights and Freedoms
Simeon II National Movement
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The UDF was the dominant force on the political right from its
foundation as a broad anti-communist movement in December 1989
until it lost the June 2001 election. After electoral defeat in
1994, Mr Kostov took over the leadership in and consolidated power
at the centre, while also improving co-operation with other
non-communist groups. The party was rewarded with a successful
presidential campaign in late 1996 (in which it supported Mr
Stoyanov) and a commanding victory in the parliamentary election of
April 1997. However, its support fell sharply from late 1999, and
it was eclipsed in 2001 by the SNM.
Mr Kostov resigned as head of the party shortly after the 2001
election, and Nadezhda Mihailova was elected UDF leader in March
2002. A popular former foreign minister, Ms Mihailova proved less
successful as a party leader, and discontent with her leadership
produced a major split in March 2004, when Mr Kostov and a group of
his supporters left the UDF to found a new party, Democrats for a
Strong Bulgaria (DSB). Ms Mihailova was ousted as party leader in
September 2005 and was replaced by Mr Stoyanov. His leadership has
failed to revive the UDF!s fortunes, and Mr Stoyanov indicated in
late 2006 that he may relinquish the leadership to stand for the
European Parliament.
Mr Kostov and his DSB did better than most expected in the June
2005 election, entering parliament with 17 MPs. Personally dominant
within the DSB, Mr Kostov has proved the political right!s most
effective critic of the current government#as he was of its
predecessor. Yet over-reliance on uncompromising anti-communism may
limit the long-term potential of the DSB, and Mr Kostov!s abrasive
style probably rules out deals with the SNM or the MRF and has most
recently put him at odds with Mr Borisov. Mr Kostov!s credibility
has also been weakened by his insistence on the unsuccessful
presidential candidacy of Nedelcho Beronov in the 2006
election.
As a new party, which was only officially registered in December
2006, Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB) is
not represented in parliament. Mr Borisov and his associates have
been busy creating local structures since the CEDB!s registration
as a "civic association" in late March 2006. Formally, Mr Borisov
is not leader of the party, being debarred from this under the
legislation applicable to his duties as mayor of Sofia. But party
chairman Tsvetan Tsvetanov has previously worked under Mr Borisov
in political roles, and there is little doubt that Mr Borisov will
take over when freed of his mayoral obligations. The CEDB!s policy
platform stresses family values, the need to tackle crime and
corruption, and, in the economic sphere, a policy of low taxes. In
terms of voter support, the CEDB appears almost entirely dependent
on the public approval of Mr Borisov for now.
Mr Borisov insists that an early election be held and his
preferred date now appears to be late 2007, in conjunction with
municipal elections. But he will probably need to secure
co-operation from the SNM to bring this about and, if he succeeds,
Mr Borisov would then need to make strategic alliances in order to
enter government. Although some opinion polls in 2006 suggested
that the CEDB could secure a parliament majority in its own right,
it now appears increasingly likely that being a partner in a future
government is a more realistic aim for the CEDB.
Union of Democratic Forces
Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria
Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria
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The radical nationalist movement Ataka (Attack) unexpectedly
entered parliament after the 2005 election. A coalition of
nationalist groups put together shortly before the election, Ataka
is led by Volen Siderov, a journalist once aligned with the UDF.
Preaching "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians", Mr Siderov has displayed
hostility to the country!s Roma (Gypsies) and its ethnic Turks.
Ethnic themes have been interwoven with a radical defence of
"national interests" that has included opposition to NATO
membership, to planned US bases and to the deployment of Bulgarian
troops abroad. Ataka appears to have genuine appeal among voters
disillusioned with Bulgaria!s mainstream political parties.
However, Mr Siderov!s erratic and authoritarian leadership style
has alienated increasing numbers of his party colleagues, and has
been a factor in the defections that reduced Ataka!s parliamentary
representation to just 12 members by end-2006. Mr Siderov!s
creditable performance in the 2006 presidential election
nevertheless shows that Ataka!s political support#even if much can
be attributed to voting against the mainstream parties#is still
significant.
Main political figures
Sergei Stanishev
Young, fluent in English, and with London and Moscow on his
educational CV, Mr Stanishev was head of the International
Department of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) before succeeding
Georgi Purvanov as party leader in December 2001. Expected by many
at the time to be only a temporary leader, Mr Stanishev has shown
an impressive capacity for survival. He became prime minister in
August 2005 and, so far, has filled the post with more competence
and confidence than some had expected.
Georgi Purvanov
Appointed leader of the BSP in the catastrophic circumstances of
late 1996, he successfully moved the party in a reformist, pro-NATO
direction, and towards rapprochement with other centre-left groups.
His decision to stand as the left!s candidate for the presidency in
2001 proved unexpectedly successful. As is often the case with
presidents in Bulgaria, opinion polls regularly show Mr Purvanov as
one of Bulgaria!s most popular politicians. His re-election in
November 2006 surprised few observers, although his high share of
the vote owed much to the lack of a convincing rightist candidate,
the failure of Boiko Borisov to stand, and a reaction against the
extreme nationalism of Volen Siderov.
Simeon Saxe-Coburg
Exiled as the six-year-old king Simeon II after a
communist-inspired referendum abolished the monarchy in 1946, Mr
Saxe-Coburg spent half a century abroad before revisiting his
homeland in 1996. He established the Simeon II National Movement
(SNM) and won half the seats in the June 2001 parliamentary
election. Mr Saxe-Coburg became prime minister after the election
and served out a full four-year term. Although he holds no office
in the new government, Mr Saxe-Coburg remains SNM leader and, via
the "coalition council", exercises some influence on government
decisions. However, his approval ratings have worsened since the
2005 election.
Ahmed Dogan
Leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) since its
foundation in 1990, Mr Dogan has retained a tight grip on the
party, despite discontent at his authoritarian style and his
failure so far to secure tangible benefits for the impoverished
ethnic Turks whom the party mainly represents. Mr Dogan agreed to a
tripartite government with the BSP and the SNM in 2005, in which
his members have some powerful posts. Hostility from Ivan Kostov
and Mr Siderov is intense, however, and even Mr Borisov#an admirer
of Mr Dogan!s political skills#has called for the exclusion of the
MRF from the next government. Mr Dogan periodically announces his
intention to retire, doing so most recently in December 2006#but
these announcements lack credibility.
Ataka coalition
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Ivan Kostov
A famously austere finance minister in two governments in 1991
and 1992, Mr Kostov became leader of the Union of Democratic Forces
(UDF) in 1994, and was largely responsible for transforming it into
a disciplined party capable of taking power. He led the UDF to
victory in the April 1997 election and was prime minister for four
years. He resigned as leader shortly after the UDF!s defeat in the
2001 election. In 2004 he founded his own party, Democrats for a
Strong Bulgaria (DSB), which performed surprisingly well in the
2005 election. Basing his politics on staunch anti-communism, he
has been an articulate critic of both the Saxe-Coburg and the
Stanishev governments. However, Mr Kostov!s abrasive style will
make it difficult to for him to establish the alliances needed to
return to political power.
Boiko Borisov
After occupying various positions in the Ministry of Internal
Affairs between 1982 and 1990, Boiko Borisov established his own
security firm in the early 1990s. Its success led him first to
responsibility for the security of former communist leader Todor
Zhivkov and then Mr Saxe-Coburg. Shortly after Mr Saxe-Coburg!s SNM
won the 2001 election, he appointed Mr Borisov chief secretary at
the interior ministry, a post Mr Borisov occupied for four years,
gaining great popularity owing to his hands-on political style.
Forsaking Mr Saxe-Coburg!s party after the 2005 election, Mr
Borisov was elected mayor of Sofia as an independent candidate in
late 2005l; his political vehicle#Citizens for the European
Development of Bulgaria (CEDB)#was set up as a "civic association"
in March 2006 and converted into a political party in December
2006. Mr Borisov has set his sights on government and called for an
early election in 2007. Opinion polls consistently show him as one
of Bulgaria!s most popular politicians.
Volen Siderov
A journalist by profession and the editor of the UDF!s daily
newspaper Demokratsiya in the early 1990s, Volen Siderov has
distanced himself from the conventional right in the past decade to
pursue a radical nationalist agenda, directing the blame for many
of Bulgaria!s ills at the Roma and Turkish minorities, and
criticising what he perceives as excessive political indulgence and
special treatment towards them. Shortly before the 2005 election he
organised the Ataka (Attack) coalition, which, unexpectedly, won
over 8% of the popular vote and 21 seats in parliament. A forceful
and intolerant leadership style has lost many colleagues, but Mr
Siderov performed unexpectedly well in the presidential election of
November 2006. His political future, however, is limited by the
emergence of Mr Borisov as a more acceptable and credible leader
playing on the "strong hand" theme.
International relations and defence
Under communism, Bulgaria was unswervingly loyal to the Soviet
Union. However, since 1990 the country!s economic and political
orientation has shifted towards the West and, in particular,
western Europe. In December 1999 Bulgaria was invited to start
membership talks with the EU. These were completed in June 2004 and
a treaty of accession signed in April 2005, with EU entry itself
planned for January 2007. Concerns about progress in certain
areas#notably justice and home affairs#meant that Bulgaria!s treaty
(like that of its neighbour Romania) contained a "safeguard clause"
providing for a one-year delay to accession if reform progress
stalled. However, a European Commission report in September 2006
recommended membership for January 2007, although imposing
post-accession reporting and "screening" requirements on Bulgaria
and Romania. Following the ratification of both countries!
accession treaties in the national parliaments of the then 25
members of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the EU on
January 1st 2007.
Bulgaria was invited to join NATO at the alliance!s Prague
summit in November 2002 and became a member in March 2004. Bulgaria
committed a peace-
Bulgaria joins the EU in January 2007
Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004
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keeping battalion to the Polish-controlled zone in Iraq. This
was an unpopular decision from which the BSP made much domestic
political capital. The unit!s withdrawal in December 2005 did not
damage relations with the US (it was followed by the dispatch of a
smaller contingent to perform guard duties). Bulgaria has also
contributed to the Western presence in post-Taliban Afghanistan. An
agreement was signed in April 2006 on the establishment of US
military bases in Bulgaria, although these plans have not yet been
finalised.
Bulgaria has improved relations with most of its neighbours over
the past eleven years. A long-standing dispute with Greece over use
of the waters of the Mesta river was settled in 1997, and
disagreement with Romania regarding the location of a proposed
second bridge over the Danube was resolved in Bulgaria!s favour in
March 2000. A compromise in early 1999 allowed an easing of
tensions with Macedonia on the question of whether Macedonian was a
Bulgarian dialect or a separate language. Another free-trade
agreement with Turkey, in force since 1999, reflects the
recognition afforded to Bulgaria!s large Turkish minority and the
fact that the two countries are no longer on opposite sides of an
ideological and military divide. The introduction of a moderate
Islamist government in Ankara has made no discernable difference to
bilateral relations, and a dispute over Bulgarian electricity
exports to Turkey is chiefly of a non-political character.
Relations with Russia, which cooled under the 1997-2001
Bulgarian government, improved thereafter. Bulgaria may, however,
prove to be one target of increased assertiveness by the Kremlin.
Bulgaria has been among those former Soviet bloc states pressed to
revise contracts with Russian gas giant Gazprom, which at present
supplies around 90% of Bulgaria!s natural gas. A prolonged dispute
over the terms of payment for transit of Russian gas through
Bulgaria to other south-east European countries was resolved only
in December 2006, and the Bulgarian authorities are increasingly
sensitive to the economic and political consequences of dependence
on Russian energy.
Relations with Serbia and Montenegro were relatively strong
during the BSP!s periods in power. Under Mr Kostov!s government,
open hostility to the administration of Slobodan Milosevic, the
former Yugoslav president, was combined with assurances of no
ill-will towards the Serbian people. Relations with the first
post-Milosevic government in Serbia were constructive, and its
successors appear to have no particular animosity towards Bulgaria.
The success of Bulgarian attempts to act as an "honest broker" on
the Kosovo question, and lately to facilitate final status talks,
has been limited by the problem!s complexity rather than by
problems in Bulgaria!s relations with the authorities in Belgrade
and Pristina.
Bulgaria has a relatively high level of defence spending for a
new NATO member. In 2004 it pledged to keep defence spending at
around 2.6% of GDP, although the level actually planned in the 2006
budget was only 2.44%, and the Ministry of Defence has had to fight
hard to ensure that the 2.6% of GDP promise was fulfilled in the
2007 budget. However, the military remains underfunded owing to the
weak structure of spending. Low pay and poor conditions have
created problems with morale and recruitment. Moreover, the
Relations with most neighbours improve
Defence spending is relatively high, but quality is low
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defence budget is under strain from the expense of foreign
deployments (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) and the costly
procurements involved in the modernisation programmes to which
Bulgaria is committed. The government plans to reduce service
personnel to 36,000 by end-2015, although there is some dispute as
to how these cuts should be distributed over time.
Military forces, 2006 Army 25,000Air force 13,100Navy
4,370Centrally controlled and other 8,530Total active forces
51,000Paramilitary 34,000Reserves Army 250,500Air force 45,000Navy
7,500
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance, 2006.
Resources and infrastructure
Population
Bulgaria!s population has undergone a drastic decline in recent
decades. Having peaked at a little short of 9m in 1988, it had
fallen to 7.9m by the March 2001 census and, according to official
estimates (which exclude the effect of emigration since the 2001
census), stood at 7.7m in December 2005. The decline was partly a
matter of emigration: many ethnic Turks left the country in the
last years of the communist regime and in the early post-communist
period, and net emigration is reckoned to have reduced the
permanent resident population by nearly 200,000 between the 1992
and 2001 censuses. The rate of natural population decrease was
still high in 2005, at 5 per 1,000 people. The size of the cohorts
moving into child-bearing age range is set to fall for the next 15
years, so that the population is expected to continue to decline,
even if net emigration comes to an end. Under some projections, the
population could decrease to 7m or below by 2020.
Bulgaria is a predominantly urban society#with 70% of the
population living in towns at the end of 2005. One-half of the
population lives in the six cities with inhabitants of more than
300,000. Apart from Sofia (with a population of 1.2m), Plovdiv,
Varna, Burgas, Stare Zagora, Blagoevgrad and Pleven have over
300,000 inhabitants.
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Population by age-group and sex, official estimate end-2005
Total Male Female Age group Male Female Urban ('000) ('000) ('000)
(% of total) (% of age group) (% of age group) (% of age
group)Total 7,718.8 3,743.3 3,975.4 100.0 48.5 51.5 70.20-4 337.7
173.8 163.9 4.4 51.5 48.5 72.5
5-9 320.8 164.8 156.0 4.2 51.4 48.6 69.710-14 388.6 199.3 189.3
5.0 51.3 48.7 69.4
15-19 510.8 261.5 249.3 6.6 51.2 48.8 73.420-24 536.5 275.4
261.1 7.0 51.3 48.7 78.025-29 575.1 294.7 280.4 7.5 51.2 48.8
77.0
30-34 566.6 288.3 278.3 7.3 50.9 49.1 76.135-39 536.7 271.7
265.0 7.0 50.6 49.4 74.8
40-44 522.0 261.3 260.7 6.8 50.1 49.9 74.445-49 540.8 267.5
273.3 7.0 49.5 50.5 74.550-54 545.3 264.4 280.9 7.1 48.5 51.5
73.7
55-59 564.0 267.1 296.9 7.3 47.4 52.6 70.460-64 445.6 203.9
241.7 5.8 45.8 54.2 63.0
65-69 395.7 174.4 221.3 5.1 44.1 55.9 57.670-74 385.2 163.6
221.6 5.0 42.5 57.5 54.7
75-79 293.4 118.3 175.1 3.8 40.3 59.7 55.380+ 254.3 93.5 160.8
3.3 36.8 63.2 54.1
Source: National Statistical Institute.
There are three major ethnic groups in Bulgaria (unless one
accepts that there is also a distinct Macedonian minority, a point
of view that is regarded locally as something of a heresy). In
March 2001 ethnic Bulgarians made up 83.9% of the population,
ethnic Turks 9.4% and Roma (Gypsies) 4.7%. Language coincides
closely, but not exactly, with ethnicity: 84.5% of the population
gave Bulgarian as their mother tongue in March 2001, 9.6% Turkish
and 4.1% Roma. The link between ethnicity and religion is slightly
more complicated, as the Roma are divided between Christianity and
Islam, and a small minority of ethnic Bulgarians (known as Pomaks)
are Muslims. Of the total population, 83.7% gave their religion in
the census as Christianity (99% of these being Eastern Orthodox)
and 12.2% as Islam. By Balkan standards, ethnic and religious
problems are mild, and have not been associated with political
violence since the government-inspired assimilation campaign of the
1980s.
Population by ethnic, linguistic and religious group, 1992 and
2001 censusesa 1992 2001 No. ('000) % of total No. ('000) % of
totalEthnic group Bulgarian 7,271.2 85.7 6,655.2 83.9Turkish 800.1
9.4 746.7 9.4Roma 313.4 3.7 370.9 4.7Others 94.2 1.1 69.2
0.9Unknown/undeclaredb 8.5 0.1 86.9 1.1Mother tongue Bulgarian
7,275.7 85.7 6,697.2 84.5Turkish 813.6 9.6 762.5 9.6Romany 310.4
3.7 327.9 4.1Others 79.1 0.9 71.1 0.9Unknown/undeclaredb 8.5 0.1
70.3 0.9
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Population by ethnic, linguistic and religious group, 1992 and
2001 censusesa 1992 2001 No. ('000) % of total No. ('000) % of
totalReligion Christian 7,349.5 86.6 6,638.9 83.7Muslim 1,110.3
13.1 967.0 12.2Others 19.0 0.2 14.9 0.2Unknown/undeclaredb 8.5 0.1
308.1 3.9Total 8,487.3 100.0 7,928.9 100.0
a Censuses were held in December 1992 and March 2001; the 2001
results are now final. b "Unknown" in 1992, presumably reflecting
an unsuccessful interview; "undeclared" in 2001, with refusal to
give an answer to a question a permissible response.
Sources: National Statistical Institute website; Statisticheski
Spravochnik.
Education
The educational system, traditional in style, has generally been
considered a national asset. However, inadequate funding and low
teacher morale in the post-communist period have led to some
erosion in its quality. Furthermore, the shortage of Western-style
business education, particularly in finance and marketing, has
generally been more serious than in the more advanced transition
countries, although this is progressively being corrected. The
country!s elite foreign-language secondary schools, especially the
English-language schools of Sofia and Plovdiv, have produced a
steady supply of fluent and well-educated linguists for foreign
companies and have provided much of the country!s political
elite.
The number of teaching staff has gradually declined, dropping
from 126,048 in the system as a whole in the 2000/01 educational
year to 122,339 in 2005/06. A further drop can be expected:
teachers have been involved in bitter pay disputes with the
Ministry of Education and Science in recent years, and gradual pay
rises are to be accompanied by a restructuring programme. The
number of students in technical colleges and institutions of higher
education rose considerably in the post-communist period, from
183,500 in 1990/91 to 238,301 in 2005/06. The number of university
graduates rose strongly up to 2002, when there were around 45,500
graduates, although this had fallen back to 41,500 in 2005. Private
education at primary and secondary levels, although not significant
in numerical terms, is growing fast: in 2005/06 there were 102
private schools, with 9,912 pupils, more than a twelvefold increase
since 1992/93.
Health
Under communism, poor central budgetary provision meant that
medical personnel also worked semi-legally or illegally by
accepting payments and favours from patients for access to
facilities or adequate service. The system led to inequalities in
access to healthcare services. In the decade after 1989 the core of
this system remained basically unreformed. Although private
practice began to play a role at the margins, serious healthcare
reform, assisted by the World Bank, only really began in 1999. The
first steps towards the development of an insurance-based system
were taken in that year, with the introduction of employee and
employer contributions, each set at 3% of gross salary.
Healthcare system reformbegan in earnest in 1999
Increasing concern about the quality of education
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There is a single health insurance fund#the National Health
Insurance Fund (NHIF)#rather than a number of competing
private-sector funds (private-sector health insurance exists, but
is supplementary in character and so far relatively small in
volume). Local doctors are paid according to the number of patients
registered, rather than on the expensive fee-for-service system.
However, the overall health system still heavily relies on
out-of-pocket payments from users, which is one of the most
regressive forms of financing. Following a focus on privatisation
and decentralisation, many hospitals have run up debts, which have
then had to be paid off from the government budget. The government
that came to power in August 2005 has taken a relatively tough line
on this, with several key hospital directors sacked and the NHIF
playing more of a role in hospital finance since 2006.
Since the collapse of communism, it is hard to distinguish the
impact of the shortcomings of the health service from social and
economic conditions in general, but the overall picture has been
disappointing. Infant mortality rose from 12.4 per 1,000 live
births in 1988 to 17.5 per 1,000 in the crisis year of 1997.
Although it has subsequently fallen to around 10.4 per 1,000 in
2005, it is still much higher than the EU average (4.6 per 1,000 in
2003, according to the latest data available). Male life expectancy
shows signs of recovering from its decline in the mid-1990s: having
fallen to a low of 67.1 years in 1994-97, it climbed back to 69.1
years in 2002-04, although this represents only a return to the
levels of the 1980s. By contrast, female life expectancy has
remained on a gently rising trend, and was 76.2 years in
2002-04.
Natural resources and the environment
Bulgaria!s environmental record is generally poor. However, EU
pressure and funds should bring about gradual progress towards EU
norms and levels of enforcement in the coming years. The Bulgarian
parliament is about to approve the introduction of a regulated
market of "green certificates" to encourage the use of renewable
energy sources. The government has already implemented a
carbon-credit scheme in connection with the Kyoto Protocol in
co-operation with the World Bank, the Prototype Carbon Fund and
other national governments.
Agricultural land accounts for 63,764 sq km, of which 31,282 sq
km are classified as arable. Forests cover 37,158 sq km (one-third
of the land area), with conifers accounting for about one-third of
this. Bounded to the north by the Danube, Bulgaria has no other
rivers that are navigable by sizeable ships. Bulgaria has a wide
range of mineral resources, including commercially exploited
deposits of iron, lead, zinc and copper (see Economic sectors:
Mining and semi-processing).
Transport, communications and the Internet
Bulgaria!s transport infrastructure is reasonably well
developed, but has suffered from low spending and poor maintenance
in the post-communist period. Gradual improvement in communication
routes should result from two factors: first, the development of
European transport corridors (four of which are set to pass through
Bulgaria); and second, investments aided by an influx of
Transport infrastructure needs more funds
A poor environmental record
Death rates are now falling after rising in the 1990s
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Bulgaria 19
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
EU funds ("6bn is to be invested in transport under the
infrastructure programme for 2007-15).
SOFIASOFIASOFIA
BUCHAREST
Ruse
Dobrich
Varna
Burgas
Plovdiv
Stara Zagora
Sliven
Edirne
Pernik
Pleven
Veliko Turnovo
VidinVidinVidin
BULGARIABLACK
SEA
ROMANIA
SERBIA
Proposed transport corridors through Bulgaria
TURKEY
GREECE
MACEDONIA
R. Danu be
Source: Bulgarian Ministry of Transport.
0 km 50 100 150 200
0 miles 50 100
X
VII
VIIIVIII
IV
IV
IV
IV
IX
IX
IX
Rail is still a significant domestic mode of transport for
freight, although road transport now accounts for a larger (and
increasing) share of the total. In 2005 there were 6,025 km of rail
track; 4,154 km of these were main lines (of which, in turn, 69.3%
were electrified). Investment, planned at around "1.2bn in 2007-15,
will focus on the continuing overhaul and repair of existing
infrastructure, on upgrading rolling stock, and on modernisation
work, such as further electrification of track and double tracking.
Both business and railway officials have been vocal about the
system!s problems: in late 2006, around two-thirds of main track
was deemed to be in unsatisfactory condition and the 7,083 rail
cars at the disposal of Bulgaria State Railways (BSR) are reckoned
to be around 1,470 short of the number needed to meet freight needs
in 2007.
Bulgaria has five main ports, of varying degrees of modernity.
The largest are Varna and Burgas, both on the Black Sea; Varna
mainly handling containers, grain and bulk goods, and Burgas crude
oil and some bulk commodities. There are three sizeable ports on
the Danube (Ruse, Lom and Vidin), and 24 smaller sea and river
ports. Of all modes of transport, sea transport has declined the
least since 1989, perhaps because it is the least dependent on the
vagaries of the domestic economy. There has been some modernisation
of ports, but much more needs to be done if the sector is to become
more internationally competitive. Varna has ambitions to rival
Romania!s Constanta, but its plans include a very costly relocation
of Varna East port and the construction of three new terminals; Lom
is seeking to exploit its position on the EU!s north-south Corridor
IV by investing in
Shipping
Railways
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20 Bulgaria
Country Profile 2007 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence
Unit Limited 2007
a "30m upgrade to take container traffic. A system of 25- or
30-year concessions will play an important role in upgrading ports
and terminals, with concessions on a few of the country!s smaller
ports already awarded or in the pipeline. Indecisiveness and
conflicts of interests could slow progress, however.
Air is the least significant mode of freight transport, carrying
just 21,000 tonnes in 2005 (although the total was three times
higher than in 2002). Bulgaria Air (the carrier that emerged from
the sale of national carrier Balkan Airlines) handles most
business. Sofia airport, which handled 1.6m passengers in 2004, has
undergone a "210m upgrade to provide it with the capacity and
modern facilities needed to deal with the expected rise in demand
for international air travel. Bulgaria has two other major
airports, at Varna and Burgas. A "400m investment across both
airports is planned to cope with an expected rise in passengers to
8m in 2040, from 2.7m passengers in 2004. In response to demand for
both cargo and tourist-oriented low-cost passenger transport, the
government recently added Gorna Oryahovitsa (in northern Bulgaria)
and Rousse to its list of airports able to accept international air
traffic.
Bulgaria had 37,300 km of roads in use at end-2001#an increase
of 400 km since end-1994. All but 3,000 km were hard-surfaced, with
motorways accounting for 324 km. The proportion of road surfaces
categorised as "good" decreased significantly in 2004 and 2005, and
at end-2005 only 70.1% of motorways and 34% overall of roads were
rated above Category IV. Development plans focus on upgrading and
on investments#especially in motorways#to integrate the country!s
road system with the international network, although implementation
has so far been slow, owing to policy and legal disputes. An
infrastructure strategy adopted in 2006 envisages the construction
of 717 km of motorways in the 2006-15 period. The government plans
to complete the construction of the Trakia and Martisa motorways by
the end of its term in 2008.
Bulgaria entered the post-communist era with one of the highest
telephone line densities in the former Soviet bloc. Although the
quality of the equipment which used to support the network was less
impressive than its density, it has improved greatly in recent
years. The fixed-line monopoly of the Bulgarian Telecommunications
Company (BTC) ended in 2005, when alternative fixed-line operators
were given access to its network. Over ten alternative operators
had been licensed by late 2006 but their market share is small.
Mobile penetration has risen rapidly in recent years, with
subscriber numbers at over 6.24m at end-2005, compared with 0.7m at
end-2000 and 4.73m at end-2004. The penetration rate was 80% at
end-2005, which was reported to have risen to 91% by October 2006
(the second-highest in central and eastern Europe). Each of the
three mobile operators has a licence for universal mobile
telecom-munications service (UMTS, or "third-generation" mobile),
with two launching their services in 2006, and the third set to do
so in early 2007. Heavyweight foreign firms are playing an
increasing role in Bulgaria!s telecoms sector.
Internet penetration is rising, although it remains low by
general European standards. Of the population aged over 18, as of
October 2005, 27.9% have
Air transport
Roads
Telecommunications
The Internet
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Bulgaria 21
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
access to a computer. Of those aged over 15, in the first half
of 2006 over 25% are reported in the to have used the Internet. The
shift from dial-up connections to high-speed local area networks
(LANs), cable networks, and asymmetric digital subscriber line
(ADSL) connection is supporting higher Internet usage. In the
coming years, increasing digitalisation of the network, better
regulation, increased competition and higher foreign investment
should improve the country!s ability to take advantage of the
Internet.
High levels of literacy and of television and radio ownership
have boosted the influence of the media. Only one state and two
foreign-owned private television channels are at present licensed
as national terrestrial broadcasters. Two state radio channels
broadcast nationally, and the private sector has several national
licensed radio channels. The range of newspapers available is wide
for a market of Bulgaria!s size (none of the papers are
state-owned). At national level these include: 24 Chasa (24 Hours)
and Trud (Labour), the two largest-circulation dailies; Sega, a
popular left-of-centre daily; Duma, a daily, which has a relatively
low circulation and is affiliated to the Bulgarian Socialist Party
(BSP); Standart, which was bought in 2000 by controversial business
interests; Pari, a financial daily; Dnevnik, a financial daily; and
the weekly Capital, which is widely regarded as the most
intellectually serious publication.
Since 1989 senior-level appointments in the state-owned
electronic media have been politicised and subject to various forms
of government pressure, although the cruder forms of control and
censorship have been absent. Privately owned electronic and print
media have not been subject to systematic state control, but
journalistic standards are uneven and self-censorship is perceived
as widespread. The fact that most newspapers are affiliated either
to political parties or to business groupings has been a further
complication; regulatory bodies for the electronic media have
sometimes taken intrusive or eccentric decisions; and the legal
environment is not always conducive to robust expression. Official
interpretations of laws on defamation and on secret surveillance
media, for instance, have sometimes been used to muzzle journalists
rather than for more conventional purposes.
Energy provision
Bulgaria!s energy provision is based on imported oil and gas, as
well as on electricity generated from a combination of domestic
coal, nuclear and, to a much smaller extent, hydroelectric plants.
The Bulgarian economy is still extremely energy-intensive. This is
a legacy of its communist-era industrial structure and of
post-communist policies that, for a long time, gave firms and
households little incentive to economise on energy use. However,
the electricity market is gradually being opened up.
A high proportion of existing thermal generation plant
(installed total around 6,600 mw at end-2005) is approaching the
end of its original service life and is also environmentally
problematic#local lignite is the fuel source for the large plants
of the Maritsa Iztok area. Both concerns are being addressed by
schemes for refurbishment or replacement capacity, involving major
foreign companies,
Bulgaria is heavily reliant on imported oil and gas
The media
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22 Bulgaria
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Unit Limited 2007
which are in place at all three Maritsa Iztok plants. Bulgaria!s
other major thermal power plants (TPPs), all primarily coal-fired,
have either already been privatised or are in the process of being
sold, with new investors committed to refurbish existing generators
(except one or two due for closure).
Kozlodui NPP, on the Danube, is the country!s only nuclear plant
at present. It has produced 40-45% of the country!s electricity in
recent years, but this is set to fall after the closures at
end-2006, which have left only two 1,000-mw reactors operating. The
plant!s four older 440-mw units had been the subject of EU pressure
on safety grounds starting in the early 1990s. Replacement nuclear
capacity will be provided by the completion of a second nuclear
power plant at Belene (also on the Danube), which was abandoned
halfway through construc-tion in the early 1990s. Assuming that
construction starts on time in 2007, the first of two 1,000-mw
reactors at Belene would come on stream in 2013, with the
second#built almost in parallel#beginning to operate in the
following year.
Bulgaria produces most of the coal that it uses, the majority
being lignite extracted from the Maritsa Iztok basin. Some pits
have been closed or privatised, but the Maritsa Iztok Mines (MIM)
remain in state ownership#as does the second-largest mining complex
at Bobov Dol. Oil, mainly imported, is largely used for the giant
Neftochim refinery (7.5m tonnes capacity), in which Russia!s Lukoil
bought a majority stake in October 1999. A second, smaller refinery
at Pleven (capacity 1.2m tonnes), was privatised in 1996, but has
been hampered by long-running financial problems.
Natural gas is the fuel for much heavy industry and is an
important feedstock for synthetic chemicals. It also fuels many of
Bulgaria!s district heating firms. Bulgaria currently consumes
around 3bn cu metres of gas per year, with around 90% imported from
Russia (offshore production, started in 2004, accounts for the
rest). No diversification of supplies is expected until the
proposed Nabucco pipeline comes on stream. Bulgaria also plays an
important role in the transit of Russian gas to Greece, Turkey and
Macedonia. Gas supplies were the subject of a fierce dispute with
Russia in 1998 and of pressure in 2005-06 from Russia!s Gazprom to
revise the terms of the resultant contract in its favour#which
resulted in an agreement until 2030 signed in December 2006.
The economy
Economic structure
Main economic indicators, 2006 Real GDP growth (%)a 6.1Consumer
price inflation (av; %) 7.3Current-account balance (US$ m)a
-4,374Exchange rate (av; Lv:US$) 1.56Population (m)a 7.60External
debt (end-2006, US$ m)a 17,521
a Economist Intelligence Unit estimate.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit CountryData.
Oil and coal
Natural gas
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Bulgaria 23
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
Under communism, Bulgaria!s traditionally strong agricultural
sector was supplemented by the impressive, but to a large extent
artificial, development of industry concentrated on branches#such
as steel, heavy chemicals, electronics, information technology (IT)
and armaments#that turned out to be ill-suited to competition in a
post-communist environment. Along with the loss of protected
markets, and slow and botched agricultural reform, this led to a
steep decline in output in the early and mid-1990s. The recovery
since 1997-98 was initially slow in industry, and has been almost
non-existent in agriculture. However, industrial performance has
improved since 2001, with industrial production rising
strongly.
A rise in the importance of services#services! share of gross
value added (GVA) increased from 29.5% of GVA in 1989 to 60% in
2005#has reflected less a move towards a modern, services-oriented
economy than the decline of industry, with industry!s share down
from 59.4% of GVA in 1989 to 30% in 2005. It should also be noted
that the high share accounted for by services conceals a high
proportion of government services within the total. Nevertheless,
tourism (a strong sector even in the communist era) has shown
healthy growth recently, and real GVA in communications increased
by over 75% between 2001 and 2005.
The share of the private sector in GVA has risen dramatically
since 1989, reaching 79.4% in 2005 as a whole. Outside agriculture,
this is in part the result of an emphasis on the restitution of
small urban properties in the early post-communist years, and in
part the result of more recent progress in privatising
manufacturing and extractive industries. These official figures
ignore a thriving but unrecorded grey economy, which is usually
estimated at between 20% and 30% of recorded GDP.
When GDP per head is measured in terms of purchasing power
parity (PPP), Bulgaria ranks ahead of only Romania among the 27
current members of the EU. However, Bulgaria does have a lower
nominal GDP per head than Romania. Bulgaria!s high inflation and
large current-account imbalance represent significant problems when
compared with other EU members.
Comparative economic indicators, 2006 Bulgaria Romania Slovakia
Turkey Russia
GDP (US$ bn) 31.2a 115.3a 55.0 a 395.4 a 978.2a
GDP per head (US$) 4,090a 5,330a 10,090 a 5,320 a 6,870a
GDP per head (US$ at PPP) 10,040a 9,680a 17,550 a 8,960 a
12,160a
Consumer price inflation (av; %) 7.3 6.6 4.5 9.6 9.7a
Current-account balance (US$ bn) -4.4a -12.6a -4.4 a -32.8 a
95.6a
% of GDP -14.0a -10.9a -8.1 a -8.3 a 9.8a
Exports of goods fob (US$ bn) 15.0a 32.6a 41.7 a 89.9 a
302.3a
Imports of goods fob (US$ bn) 21.2a 47.4a 44.6 a 130.1 a
162.7a
External debt (US$ bn) 17.5a 52.8a 30.4 a 199.6 a 293.1a
Debt-service ratio, paid (%) 13.9a 16.2a 11.2 a 34.9 a 15.8a
a Economist Intelligence Unit estimate.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, CountryData.
Growth in services and the private sector
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24 Bulgaria
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Unit Limited 2007
Economic policy
The development of Bulgaria!s economy in the early
post-communist years was hampered by internal obstacles to reform
and a variety of external shocks, which led to currency crises in
1994 and 1996-97. Strong dependence on trade links with other
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or
Comecon#the communist states! economic bloc) was an initial
handicap after 1989. Economic difficulties were exacerbated by the
government!s declaration in 1990 of a moratorium on servicing
communist-era debt, which cut Bulgaria off from international
financial markets until the debt rescheduling of 1994.
Despite these problems, there were some early attempts at
reform. A wide-ranging liberalisation of prices and a freeing up of
the foreign-exchange market took place in early 1991, and for a
short time the authorities gained something of a reputation for
financial orthodoxy. However, failure to restructure or privatise
loss-making state firms resulted in a growing burden of bad debts
in the banking sector. In early 1996 a wave of bank
failures#aggravated by political in-fighting#led to a loss of
confidence in the banking system and a sharp fall in the currency.
The lev collapsed from Lv71:US$1 (under its pre-1999 denomination)
at the start of April 1996 to Lv3,000:US$1 in February 1997.
Relations with the international financial institutions were
deadlocked for much of this period. A stand-by arrangement was
eventually signed with the IMF and the first US$115m tranche
disbursed in July 1996. The IMF decided to make further
disbursements contingent on the creation of a currency board. After
some delay, the currency board was introduced in July 1997#but only
after the lev had collapsed and the government of the Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP) had been removed.
The centre-right government that took office in 1997 after the
crisis was fully committed to following multilateral
recommendations on stabilising and restructuring the economy.
Although its popularity at home gradually weakened, it received
much support and praise from the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF
agreed to a three-year, SDR628m (US$864m) extended fund facility
(EFF) agreement in September 1998. After some disagreements over
tax policy, the government led by the Simeon II National Movement
(SNM) signed a new, two-year stand-by agreement for US$299m with
the Fund in February 2002. A successor precautionary stand-by
agreement#so that IMF funds would only be drawn if they were
required#was approved in August 2004. Originally for two years,
this is now due to expire in March 2007. It will be Bulgaria!s
final stand-by agreement, as it is agreed that active Fund
involvement will no longer be needed once Bulgaria has joined the
EU.
Under the currency board scheme, foreign-exchange reserves at
the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB, the central bank) must cover at
least 100% of base money. Controls on the money supply and on
credit expansion are therefore tight. Overall, the currency board
has proved successful in stabilising the economy.
External shocks and poor policy have held back growth
IMF pressure led to creation of the currency board
The IMF has supported reform policies since 1997
Lack of financial control led to a crisis in 1996-97
Features of the currency board
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© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007 www.eiu.com
Country Profile 2007
Inflation has come down dramatically, and confidence in the
banking system has been re-established.
Domestic lending has expanded very rapidly since 2003, leading
to worries in the central bank and the IMF that lending growth was
proving excessive. In response, the central bank made several moves
to tighten restrictions on bank lending. By November 2006 the
year-on-year growth of bank lending to the private sector had
slowed to 24% (compared with 48% in November 2004 and 33% in
November 2005). It remains to be seen how lending will react to the
removal of restrictions at the start of 2007. Nonetheless, credit
volumes are still relatively low in relation to GDP.
Although privatisation started in 1992, asset sales before 1997
were generally on a small scale. The 1997-2001 government of the
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) pushed both enterprise
restructuring and privatisation forward decisively, but the quality
of deals varied sharply. Although some first-rate investors were
attracted to larger enterprises, many firms were sold to new owners
of more dubious calibre. However, recent privatisations have
generally been carried out more successfully. A 65% stake in the
Bulgarian Telecommunications Company (BTC), the dominant fixed-line
telecommunications operator, was sold in June 2004. Privatisation
of the larger non-nuclear generating companies has made progress,
with Varna TPP sold in 2006 and a contract for Ruse TPP signed in
January 2007, although the Bobov Dol TPP sale remains under
negotiation.
According to the Privatisation Agency, 60% of state enterprise
assets had been sold by the end of November 2006. This represents
90.8% of the assets that are expected to undergo privatisation. The
remaining assets include some minority stakes and majority stakes
in medium-sized firms but, as of January 2007, the only sizeable
privatisations remaining planned outside of the utility and energy
sectors are those of the tobacco-processor, Bulgartabac; the
national merchant marine, Navibulgar; and certain firms involved in
defence repair and weapons trading.
Under communism, Bulgaria usually had a balanced budget,
although a significant underlying deficit was often masked by means
of various extra-budgetary accounts. Moreover, as a result of the
generous refinancing of the commercial banks by the BNB in this
period, the de facto fiscal deficit was much higher than the
headline budget figures suggested. Both fiscal discipline and tax
collection improved dramatically under the currency board, and the
consolidated budget has shown either a surplus or only a small
deficit since 1997. In addition, the government has a substantial
"fiscal reserve" fund over and above the foreign reserve
requirements of the currency board.
The need to curb the increase in the current-account deficit
prompted the government, under IMF pressure, to achieve a balanced
budget in 2003 and a 1.7%-of-GDP surplus in 2004. This was achieved
without spending cuts, given dramatic revenue
overperformance#prompting criticisms of deliberate underestimation
in the budgeting process. This pattern continued in 2005 and
Quality of privatisations has been mixed
Privatisation programme nears an end
Budget deficits have been low under the currency board
A lending boom emerges
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26 Bulgaria
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Unit Limited 2007
2006, and a similar "contingency plan" is written into the 2007
budget, with a 0.8%-of-GDP budget surplus in law but one of 2% of
GDP being targeted by the government on the basis of anticipated
revenue performance and ministerial spending controls.
Consolidated state budget, Jan-Nov (Lv m)
2005 2006Revenue 16,203 18,019
Expenditure & lending 14,424 15,505Balance 1,779 2,514
Planned full-year budget balance -196 0
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Consolidated tax revenue in 2005 was equivalent to 34.5%, and
total budget revenue to 42.9%, of GDP. Revenue is planned to be
around 41.8% of GDP in 2007, although this includes an increased
influx of EU funds. The most important categories on the revenue
side are social security and health contributions (10.5% of GDP in
2005), value-added tax (VAT; 11.4%), excises and road fees (5.2%),
personal income tax (3%, up from just 1.3% of GDP in 2003) and
corporate profit tax (2.5%). Customs duties and fees are now very
low, as a result of the ongoing process of trade
liberalisation.
VAT is levied at a uniform rate of 20% on almost all goods and
services (with a special rate of 7% for tourist packages sold
abroad). The profit tax rate has been reduced to 10% in 2007 from
15% in 2006. As of 2007, marginal rates of personal income tax
range from 20% to 24% (the top rate had been 38% in 2001), but the
highest rate is applied on all income above the threshold of Lv600
(US$380) per month. Excise duties on alcohol and tobacco were
raised sharply at the beginning of 2006, as the government brought
forward the increases previously planned for 2007 and 2008.
Although still quite high relative to gross wages, compulsory
contributions to state-run social insurance funds have been reduced
in recent years. Increases in health insurance contributions from
the current 6% have been postponed more than once.
Economic performance Gross domestic product (real % change, year
on year)
Jan-Sep 2006 Annual average 2001-05GDP 6.3 4.9
Source: National Statistical Institute.
External shocks, combined with economic mismanagement in the
early post-communist years, led to weak and volatile economic
performance up until 1997. On the official measure, the level of
real GDP in 1997 was just 68% of its level in 1989. This put
Bulgaria on a par with countries in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) in terms of the scale of the post-communist fall in
economic activity. However, the macroeconomic stabilis