Building a Nation A Framework for Reconstruction and ...siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTIMORLESTE/Resources/Governance.pdf · A Framework for Reconstruction and Development JOINT

EAST TIMOR

Building a NationA Framework for Reconstruction and

Development

JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION

GOVERNANCEBACKGROUND PAPER(Including Civil Service, Justice,and Community Empowerment)

November, 1999

This background paper is the product of the joint assessment mission of specialists fromEast Timor, bilateral donor countries, UN agencies, the Asian Development Bank and theWorld Bank. The contents do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank orother participating agencies. Furthermore, the figures contained herein may or may notreflect subsequent World Bank figures or estimates. This is merely an informativedocument to aid in understanding the situation in East Timor.

East Timor Joint Assessment Mission - Governance Background Paper 1

I. CIVIL SERVICE

1. Pre-Conflict and Current Situation – Human Capital. The majority of civilservants working for Indonesian de-concentrated structures were Indonesians, while themajority of the public employees working at the Governor and the ‘Bupati’s (Mayor’s)Offices were Timorese. Indonesians filled top echelons in both vertical and provincialadministration. Very few Timorese held positions within the vertical structures, and thehighest placed Timorese in Provincial administration started at the third level of thehierarchy. If the ratio of Indonesian staff (25.5%) present in the provincial administrationin Dili (see Box) were applicable throughout the territory, this means that 7,000 civilservants are likely to have left the territory, particularly in the senior grades.

2. Physical Infrastructure. It is estimated that 75 % of administrative buildings and 80% of social infrastructure (schools and clinics) were completely or partially destroyedduring the violence after the ballot. All equipment and materials in administrativebuildings was destroyed, removed or looted.

3. Institutional Capital. Government archives were removed or left strewn on thegrounds of public buildings at the mercy of the elements. The Mission found critical publicrecords rotting in the burned out shells of public buildings. A priceless stock of knowledgehas therefore been lost to the public service, and will in most cases need to be reconstitutedfrom scratch.

A. Duplication of Structure, Fragmentation of Functions and Overstaffing

4. The total size of the pre-ballot civil service in East Timor is estimated1 to have been28,000. This constitutes 3.2% of the population, high in comparison to the Asian averageof 2.6%. 10,458 worked for de-concentrated structures located in Dili but answered to thecentral government. 18,269 civil servants worked in decentralized structures accountableto provincial governments. Many of those personnel were not fulfilling substantive

1 Based on Wage Payments from the National Treasury and Cash Office, Dili, March 1999 (Laporan JumlahPegawai dan Pembayaran Gaji Pegawai Megeri Sipil Pusat Dari Kantor Perbendaharaan Dan Kas NegaraDili, Maret 1999).

Participation in Civil Service

Although 74.6% of the civil service was East Timorese and 25.4%Indonesian, in a breakdown according to grades1 a different pictureemerges. In the lower level (Grade I) of Provincial administration therelation was 93% Timorese to 7% Indonesians, in Grade II therelation was 77% to 23%, in Grade III was 51% to 49% and in GradeIV the majority were Indonesians 58% to 42% Timorese. Only twoout of 13 District administrators were East Timorese.


functions. For example, the governor’s office and provincial services employed 2,791 civilservants, of which 34.5% were non-line advisors, or administrative and support staff.

5. The previous civil service structure included four levels of administrativegovernment: province, district (Kabupatan), sub-district (Kecamatan) and village (Desa),duplicated and fragmented into many units at different places and levels. There were 12sectoral Departments (Kanwil) controlled from Jakarta and these were referred to asvertical Departments. In most cases, these were also decentralized departments at thedistrict level (Dinas Tk II), answerable to the district administrator. This dual structureduplicated some functions and fragmented others, leading to inefficiencies. There were 13districts, 62 sub-districts and 422 villages.

6. The previous civil service was therefore characterized by (i) overstaffing; (ii) toomany layers of bureaucracy for a small area, fostering inefficient decision making andopportunities for graft; (iii) duplication or fragmentation of functions between lineministries and decentralized departments; (iv) a top down organizational culture; (v)exceptionally low pay levels, encouraging the establishment of legal and illegal fringebenefits; and (vi) marginalization of traditional community decision-making structures.

7. Parallel to civilian administration, from the Governor downwards, there was amilitary presence (when a civilian was the head, a military officer was deputy).

B. Transitional Governance and Policy Recommendations

8. Establishment of a Lean but Capable Civil Service. During the transitional period, akey objective is to create a lean but capable civil service, which provides an effectiveinstrument at the point of delivery. The overall strategy is to keep staffing levels small butadequate, to move towards payment of competitive salaries and wages, and to create amotivating work environment through non-monetary incentives. The Mission recommendsthat the size of the East Timor civil service need not exceed 12,203 (of which 6,750 areteachers, and 3,173 are health staff). The effectiveness of this lean civil service willdepend on merit recruitment, adequate compensation, and intensive staff training anddevelopment.

9. To reduce expenditures, it may be advisable to locate senior staff at four convenientand suitable administrative centers from which they can fan out to the countryside. It isimportant to emphasize that these are not administrative regions: the 13 administrativedistricts will be maintained in the transitional period, but with technical staff concentratedin 4 districts. This allows flexibility for the future government of independent East Timorto either retain or rationalize the historic district structures. The proposed centers areBaucau for the Northeast, Dili for the National and Dili District, Same for the South, andMaliana for the border regions. This would optimize the deployment of expensive seniorstaff at District level. Moreover, duplication can be avoided by removing coexistence ofcentral government Departments in Dili and a separate duplicative Dili DistrictAdministration.


10. Recruitment Strategy and Policies. The Joint Assessment Mission recommends thatas a matter of recruitment policy whenever Timorese are available with the rightqualifications, competencies and experiences for civil services jobs, they should bepreferred candidates for hire before considering external recruitment. Since the objective isto create a lean but capable civil service derived from the strong performance of highlycompetent professionals and technicians, the basis of recruitment (the criteria) should bemerit, as determined through open, competitive selection and appointment. Gender balanceshould also be considered. The need for mass recruitment to the civil service is a majorchallenge and calls for appropriate recruitment strategies and institutions.

11. A strategy to cope with the large volume of work involved with mass recruitment(specifying jobs and candidate profiles, advertising, interviewing, and selecting) couldbegin with recruiting heads of units, who in turn can recruit staff at the lower levels. Thismethod calls for the establishment of specialized sector taskforces, which would workwithin the framework of an established autonomous civil service commission.

12. Staff Classification, Grading and the Interim Compensation Structure and Termsof Service. In this assessment, staff have been classified in 4 categories (grades): Senior,Medium, Junior, and Junior Support Staff. It is recommended that a more elaboratedgrading and compensation system is developed out of this as soon as possible. Thecompensation levels of the grades have been computed on the basis of the current(Indonesian) salaries and wage structure plus monetization of benefits and incentives. It isrecommended that all benefits and incentives be monetized for the new civil service. Sincethe proposed civil service is to be lean, capable and highly paid, and since the current wagecompression ratio is very low, the proposed compensation levels have been adjusted toincrease the compression ratio and to make the senior grades more attractive. The annualwage levels considered for the grades (see basic assumptions) are: Senior *$ 1,962,Medium $ 1,708, and Junior/Support Staff $ 1,086.

Staff WagesAnnual Salaries (US$)

Senior C. Servants 1st 2nd 3rd

(Average) Year Year YearBasic Assumptions 1,962 12,174.2 15,793.8 19,158.3+ 50% in all Civil Servants 2,943 18,261.3 23,690.8 28,737.5+ 100% in all Civil Servants 3,924 24,348.4 31,587.7 38,316.7+ 100% in Senior C. Servants 3,924 12,743.4 16,518.1 20,012.7+ 200% in Senior C. Servants 5,887 13,312.7 17,242.3 20,867.0+ 300% in Senior C. Servants 7,849 13,881.9 17,966.6 21,721.3

13. It is recommended that all civil servants be recru ited on fixed term rolling renewablecontracts. For top grades the civil service commission would set the appropriate terms and

* All dollar figures are in United states dollars unless otherwise indicated.


conditions. It is very important for the new civil service to start its life on a clean slate.The former civil servants who are now redundant de jure and de facto should not expect tobe recruited automatically or as a right. But they may participate and compete with otherswhen the jobs are advertised. Former East Timor civil servants should, with the help ofUNTAET, claim their pensions and terminal benefits from the previous governments thatrecruited them (Portugal and Indonesia). A redeployment program should be initiated toabsorb them in small scale and intermediate enterprises.

14. Total civil service employment levels (size). Employment levels can be kept smallby clustering hitherto fragmented units, by removing vertical and parallel coexisting units,by reducing deployed staff at too many tiers (tending to geometrically multiply staff), andby concentrating senior staff at a few coordinating geographical centers to take advantageof short distances across the country while at the same time maintaining effective outreach.The emerging proposed staffing levels are 7,737 at the end of the first year, 10,039 at theend of the second year, and 12,171 at the end of the third year.

Civil Service Staff at the End ofBy Function: 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd YearForeign Affairs 6 15 29Internal Affairs 268 379 474Finance & Economic Dev. 129 259 354Social Development 6,440 8,631 10,788Reconstruction 959 807 557TOTAL 7,802 10,091 12,203

Staff at the End ofBy Location: 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd YearCentral 7,335 9,482 11,517District 343 460 530Sub-District 124 149 155TOTAL 7,802 10,091 12,203

Staff at the End ofBy Level: 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd YearSenior 290 369 435Medium 5,543 7,254 8,882Junior 1,969 2,468 2,885TOTAL 7,802 10,091 12,203

15. The need to establish an autonomous Civil Service Commission. It isrecommended that UNTAET as soon as possible establish an autonomous East Timor CivilService Commission (ETCSC) charged with the mission of promoting merit andcompetence as the basis of recruitment into the East Timor civil service. The ETCSC willhave three major tasks: determining personnel policies, technical processing of recruitment,


and making the actual selection and appointment decisions. It is proposed that thetechnical processing of recruitment should be subcontracted to an independent and neutralrecruitment agency (private/international), IRA. The IRA agency would, in its advisorycapacity to the ETCSC, process job and candidate specifications, advertising, andinterviewing. The IRA would then furnish lists of graded and ranked candidates forsubmission to the ETCSC, which would make the final selection and appointment decision.The Mission recommends that the size of the ETCSC should be a maximum of sevenmembers. Preferably, the Chairperson should be an eminent personality who isindependent, non-partisan, neutral and objective. A small commission of seven memberswould be appropriate, with a maximum of two international experts.

16. Human Resources Development, Training and Deployment Strategy. The need fortraining and skills development is massive. All new civil servants will need managementtraining appropriate to their sectors. Some of the training may be undertaken abroad, butthe bulk of the training will have to done at the Timor management-training center andother technical and vocational training institutions. It is recommended that the training besubcontracted to suitable external management training institutions, and that a technicalassistance program be designed to mobilize resources to meet the challenge of this massivetraining need.

C. Short Term Reconstruction Targets and Priority Interventions

17. Short Term Projects. The following projects need to be undertaken in the shortterm:

(i) rehabilitation and re-equipment of public buildings

(ii) technical assistance for the development of interim personnel policies, functions,and jobs descriptions, including the sub-contracting of recruitment processing to apartner institution

(iii) technical assistance for the development of administrative legislation andregulations

(iv) inventory of East Timorese human resources inside the territory and in the diaspora

(v) design and delivery of management and financial training, study abroad and workexchanges

(vi) design and development of simple manual and automated administrative recordssystems, including training

D. Financial Requirements

18. Budget Estimates. The table below is presents the total employment figures for budgetcalculations. The assumptions behind the estimate are contained in Annex 3. The annual


cost at the end of the first year is $16,130.80, at the end of the second year $20,137.1 and atthe end of the third year $23,947.9.

Annual Cost (US$000) at the End of1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year

Personnel 12,174.2 15,793.8 19,158.3Travel 608.7 789.7 957.9Consumables 608.7 789.7 957.9Training 1,826.1 1,579.4 1,436.9Subcontracting 913.1 1,184.5 1,436.9Maintenance 5% of reconstruction and equipment costsRecurrent Budget 16,130.8 20,137.1 23,947.9

E. Medium Term Strategic Options

19. Medium Term Projects. Some civil service development activities need to beinitiated now, even if their implementation may lie beyond the transitional period. Theseactivities will enhance the construction of administrative structures and systems oforganization, increase participation in public action, and boost civil service performance:

• Management training programs throughout the first three years• Re-evaluation of the roles and missions of the state, including public and private

service provision (in year 3)• Study potentially leading to reform of geographic divisions of government (in year 3)• Review potentially leading to reform of hierarchical layers of government, divisions of

competencies, and intergovernmental transfers (in year 3)• Elaborate job descriptions, classifications, and evaluations potentially leading to new

compensation system

II. JUDICIARY

20. Assessment of the Current Situation. Social harmony and sustainable economicdevelopment in East Timor depend on the establishment of accessible, fair and effectivejudicial institutions and processes for the resolution of disputes. A functioning legalsystem does not currently exist. Steps to establish the rule of law must address thefollowing specific challenges: (i) an extremely limited number of legally trained and otherpersons skilled in carrying out functions within the legal system: (ii) the extensivedestruction of court documentation; (iii) widespread and severe damage to infrastructurerelated to the justice system; and (iv) the lack of mechanisms to develop effective newlegislation and reform existing laws.

21. Personnel. Within the Indonesian administration of justice, the East Timorese werecompletely excluded from holding responsible positions. The departure of judges,prosecutors, and court clerks left behind a limited number of legally trained professionals


in East Timor and a dearth of legal knowledge and skills. There are no judges and almostno prosecutors in East Timor. Before the post-consultation violence, there wereapproximately 100 lawyers who had completed their legal education in Indonesia. It isunknown how many of these lawyers as well as former court clerks and prison officials willreturn to the territory. Presently, only five lawyers are licensed to practice law and havepassed the qualifying examination administered by the High Court. There is only onesenior police officer remaining, and 150 officers of lower ranks. Among the six local non-governmental organizations that are primarily concerned with human rights, there is someexpertise in offering legal representation to individuals in court cases.

22. Infrastructure. Damage to the judicial infrastructure (i.e., courthouses, prosecutors’offices, police stations and facilities for detention and imprisonment) is extensive,mirroring the situation in other sectors. The damage includes destruction of court formsand records. Luckily, this damage does not extend to records kept by churches (i.e.,registration of births, baptisms, and marriages). Under Indonesian administration publicbuildings frequently were constructed on a scale that exceeded demand. The prison inGleno-Ermera stands out as an example in this regard. New institutional and physicalstructures should conform more closely to the expected demand.

23. Legal Framework. After Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975 Indonesianlaw was applied in the territory. Traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution arewidespread, especially in the rural areas, and their applicability is generally accepted.Security Council Resolution 1672 to establish the transitional administration (UNTAET)provides for the continuation of Indonesian law that is not in violation of internationallyaccepted standards.

24. Procedural Language. The procedural language to date has been bahassa indonesia,and all existing legislation, forms, documents and registers are in bahassa.

A. Short Term Reconstruction Objectives and Priority Measures

25. Legal Development. The relevance of existing laws to the social development andpressing economic needs of East Timor has to be examined against internationallyrecognized standards and the new situation in East Timor during the transition toindependence. The need for legal development encompasses a regulatory foundation forcommercial activities, including laws governing land ownership, conflict resolution,investment, business transactions, and commercial arbitration as well as civil and criminallaws. A rights-based approach that introduces the notions of entitlement of the citizensshould guide the relations between individuals and the state. The TransitionalAdministration is already taking the initiative to adapt current laws to the principles of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights and to the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, as well as to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights. The setting up of a Law Commission, composed of East Timorese andinternational jurists, to assess existing laws and advise the Transitional Administrator onnew laws to be adopted as well as strategies for implementation is under activeconsideration (see Annex 9.3).


26. Judiciary Infrastructure. Due to the different degrees of destruction in East Timor,the short-term reconstruction needs of the judicial infrastructure vary considerably. Thereis a pressing need to resume the operations of the judiciary immediately. Public buildingsthat could be used in the near future have been identified (see Annexes 10 and 17). It isurgent to establish basic, effective court services to adjudicate disputes in both civil andcriminal cases. To begin, a Court should be established in Dili, with jurisdiction for theentire Territory and civil, administrative and criminal law in its entirety. A Court ofAppeal should be established within six months and de minimis rules designed for theappeals procedure. It will be important to build investigative capacity for criminal lawproceedings, and the office of a prosecutor needs to be established. The extension of thejudicial network should be based on evolving legal needs to ensure gradual judicialcoverage and access to justice by the population. The establishment of two additionalcourts, one in Los Palos (eastern tip), the other in Maliana (occidental border) - thestructure and composition of which are detailed in Annexes 9.2.2 and 9.2.3 – might beconsidered as needs arise.

27. Selection and Appointment of Magistrates and Judicial Agents. A quick anddiscriminating selection of its main agents is decisive for the operation of the judicialstructure. A Judicial Selection Commission (JSC), composed of five East Timorese andtwo foreign experts, is being established to take charge of this process. The JSC wouldalso serve as the highest body of the judicial system (see Annex 9.1).

28. Establishment of a Land and Property Commission. The establishment of a Landand Property Commission (LPC) should be considered. It would encompass two typicaljudicial functions: (i) response to inquiries and claims; and (ii) land and propertyregistration. An LPC would have sole responsibility in deciding these matters. Otherfunctions, such as the launching of training programs and research, could be incorporatedinto the community recovery program (see Annex 9.4 for a proposed model).

29. Resort to Community Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution. The population hasrapidly put in place more or less institutionalized prevention and conflict resolutionstructures adapted from traditional forms of social organization (for a concrete example,see Annex 15). “Justice Councils” are currently functioning in various parts of theTerritory with a certain degree of efficiency and have, in the absence of courts, ensured theresolution of disputes. Bearing in mind the situation on the ground, the "Justice Councils"should be maintained as consensus-seeking community bodies in cases of minor socialdispute, and as a part of traditional law. The “Justice Councils” will also assume theresponsibility, on a temporary basis, for collecting evidence until the police are able to doso throughout the Territory. The Church is also expected to continue its role in disputemediation and conciliation.

30. Creation of a Criminal Investigation Unit. This Unit would initially be composedof 10 members, whose function would be to carry out the investigation of criminal cases.Members should receive intensive training to be able to carry out its functions.

31. Rehabilitation of Penitentiary Facilities. To establish a place of detention andimprisonment that meets the relevant international standards, the Dili prison could beupgraded. It is in reasonable condition and its construction layout is acceptable, so that the


renovation of the building will not require extensive resources and can be completedquickly. Dili prison would also serve as an interim facility. The existing low level ofcrime does not justify one large prison for the country in the future. Smaller facilities indifferent parts of East Timor are preferable to attain the fundamental objective of socialreintegration of prisoners. Proximity to the place of origin has proved to be a key elementfor re-socialization.

32. Provision of Legal Assistance. Until qualified lawyers are available, it will benecessary to provide for transitional solutions. For the time being, the holders of lawdegrees should be permitted to represent clients before courts on an exceptional basis. Tothis end, they would need to apply and register according to terms to be stipulated by theJSC. In addition, to guarantee that persons before the courts have legal representationregardless of their financial status, lawyers should be selected for placement in the courtsby the JSC.

33. Establishment of a Legal Training Center. A Legal Training Center (LTC) shouldbe established as soon as possible to train magistrates, judicial personnel and lawyers. AnEast Timorese jurist advised by two foreign consultants (see Annex 9.5) would head theLTC.

34. An Independent Human Rights Institution. Based on Security Council Resolution1672, an independent human rights institution will be assisted by UNTAET. It willpromote the respect of human rights through education programs and the monitoring ofstate authorities. In the first year UNTAET plans to train the East Timorese staff recruitedto the institution and strengthen the secretariat by providing core staff. This institute willevolve into the National Committee for Human Rights as part of a national conference tobe convened as soon as practically possible in the year 2000, with the participation ofinterested national and international groups.


35. Policy Approach. The approach recommended for the establishment of judicialinstitutions is to create a justice system, at first with fewer than 170 personnel, which canbe gradually expanded according to the demonstrated demand for justice services. Basedon previous experience, demand is not expected to be high in criminal matters. Thepolicies to be applied by the new judicial institutions should be based on internationalhuman rights and criminal justice standards. As an example, courts could operateaccording to the principles of equal access to justice based on, among other standards, theConvention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and provide ajuvenile justice system in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As well,correctional policy could be situated within broader community development and crimeprevention programming, focusing on alternatives to imprisonment (non-custodialmeasures), re-socialization and rehabilitation of offenders. Laws are to be developedwithin the Law Commission, with necessary technical assistance. Participation of EastTimorese will ensure that the legal framework that emerges during the transitional periodwill be relevant and acceptable to the East Timorese after independence.


36. Language in the Administration of Justice. Options should be considered byUNTAET and care should be taken that no one should be denied fair and equitable processon the grounds of language proficiency.

37. Training of Legal Professionals. The training of East Timorese legal professionalswho take up positions within the transitional administration of justice should take twoforms: (i) intensive emergency (as opposed to remedial or permanent) courses onsubstantive law and overarching issues such as international human rights, independenceand ethics; and (ii) on job training by mentors who advise judges, lawyers and prosecutorson a day-to-day basis. An international specialist in these fields would train Courtadministrators and legal researchers in Dili. Police would also be exposed to these formsof training through the Civilian Police component (CivPol) of UNTAET. Prison managersand officials would receive training by an international team specialized in prisonmanagement and practice.

38. Agreements for Access to Official Documents. The speedy negotiation and signingof an agreement between UNTAET and the Republic of Indonesia, through whichIndonesia would provide the documentation the East Timorese might need to produce, ishighly recommended (commercial licenses, academic records, bank statements, etc.).

C. Medium Term Strategic Options

39. Strengthening the Independence of the Judiciary. In the medium term, a JudicialCouncil should be considered to supervise the professional conduct of judges and decide onand offer continuing judicial education, based on successful methods used in othercountries. International judicial exchanges and participation in international conferencesshould be encouraged.

40. Establishment of a Bar Association. Just as the Judicial Council for judges, a BarAssociation would help to certify lawyers, establish admission criteria, regulateprofessional conduct, and offer continuing education.

41. Definition of a System of Registers and Land-Mapping. The urgent need for acoherent and centralized register and land-mapping system will become more evident withtime. In the medium-term, however, the differentiation between private and publicproperty, and the respective regimes will make it necessary to conduct an exhaustivemapping survey. The adoption of rules relative to the registers of real estate, businessesand civil registry is also important.

42. Development of a Human Rights Culture. During the de facto Indonesianadministration, several NGOs played an important role in the defense of the victims ofhuman rights violations. As representatives of a broad spectrum of Timorese civil society,their role should be recognized and stimulated beyond their traditional mission of humanrights monitoring, provision of assistance to victims, and co-operation with internationalinvestigation instruments such as the UN Human Rights Commission. It is important toencourage the continued and active participation of these NGOs in human rights education,


in co-ordination with existing public structures (schools, universities, judicial systempersonnel, police services, immigration, and prison personnel).

III. COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT

43. Current Situation. The people of East Timor are currently returning to homes,belongings and livelihoods that have been destroyed, and essential services that have beeneither dismantled or are in disarray. Recovery for the majority will depend on support lifelinesprovided by the international community until the economy is functional again and newadministrative and institutional structures can be re-established. Rapid community recoverywill however, involve the challenging task of restoring a social infrastructure that can underpinthe nation’s development.

44. Civil society under Indonesian rule was severely constrained and the small number ofNGOs that emerged over the last two years have yet to expand their capacity. The traditionaladat system headed by the Liurais remains a positive force in much of the country but itspower and influence has been substantially eroded over the last 24 years.

45. The two key indigenous institutions supporting the community have been the CNRT,with its widespread networks, and the Catholic Church which has had its capacity severelyreduced as a result of the recent turmoil (a number of nuns and priests were killed and manymore forced to flee). East Timor’s newly won freedom has, however, produced a groundswellof positive energy and expectation which is now being translated into such community actionsas clean up campaigns and the reopening of schools by volunteer staff.

46. Recent events have has left many serious socia l legacies including a large number ofwidows (female headed households are estimated at around ten percent) and many, especiallywomen, have been traumatized by rape and other horrors. Long term tensions may emergebecause of language differences between a younger generation speaking Bahasa Indonesia andan older generation speaking Portuguese. Differences in outlook and expectations between thelong term FALINTIL fighters, the youth and the returning diaspora are also likely.

47. Reconciliation between pro and anti-independence forces will be a long term socialissue particularly in the western border regions where pro-autonomy support was stronger.Because of the conciliatory position adopted by both the Church and CNRT however, it isgenerally agreed that the only returnees who need fear punishment are those who have beenactively associated with militia crimes. It is highly unlikely that the minority who voted forautonomy will face social sanctions. In general, the greatest contribution to reconciliation islikely be the rapid involvement of the population in positive rehabilitation and re-constructionoperations. However, as emphasized by church leaders and others, reconciliation will beseverely hampered unless serious attempts are made to bring to justice those responsible forthe massive violation of human rights reported.

48. Predictably, the current focus of community concern is the availability of food andshelter and the reunification of families. Despite these pre-occupations, however, it is alreadyapparent that communities are also determined to recreate a society in which freedom andinitiative is encouraged and human rights respected. Similarly, communities look forward to a


system of governance in which the government exists to serve, rather than to control thepeople, and where their voices will now be heard. Ironically, the current strong spirit ofindependence and self reliance could easily be undermined by the international humanitarianresponse, which because of its huge resources and expatriate dominance has the potential todisempower and marginalize local communities.

49. The destruction of almost all vestiges of the previous administration at and belowdistrict level is both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is to channel and expandthe present high level of social capital so as to create a totally new community-basedinfrastructure that avoids the distortion and inefficiency of the past. The challenge relates tothe need for immediate action in order to fill the existing vacuum and ensure that communitieshave an effective vehicle for participating in and guiding the rebuilding of their nation.

A. Short Term Reconstruction Priorities

50. As described above, the immediate priority for community welfare is the meeting ofbasic needs. Emergency needs are now largely being met by UN agencies and NGOs and it isassumed that this support will continue until all families are resettled and food and shelterneeds secured. Similarly, the rapid re-establishment of health and education services, asdescribed elsewhere, will be essential for community restoration. Because of the currentadministrative vacuum at and below district level, steps should be taken as soon as possible toestablish representative, community-based institutions in order to ensure greater efficiency andcommunity participation in the emergency phase. Immediately beyond the emergency phase,it will be essential to rapidly expand these institutions into a system of local governance that isboth comprehensive and appropriate as discussed below. Accordingly, the major short termtargets proposed are;• Establishment of interim Village, Subdistrict and District Councils in all resettled areas by

April 2000,• Provision of rehabilitation support and establishment of safety nets for vulnerable groups

through the above Councils.


51. The central proposal for community recovery is based on widespread agreement thatsimply re-installing the previous community infrastructure would be a denial of the veryprinciples for which the Timorese people have long struggled. What is required instead is asystem that harnesses the current wave of optimistic energy and empowers the community.The proposed response is therefore to systematically strengthen communities in a manner thatwill create democratic, grass roots institutions and thus provide the foundations for a reformedsystem of governance and a more efficient, effective and responsive public administration.

52. As demonstrated throughout the region, successful development depends on goodgovernance. Accordingly, the reconstruction of East Timor will require a framework ofpolitical processes and institutions that are transparent, participatory, and responsive topeople’s needs. Effective local governance must also provide connections to the higher levels


of national government and other service providers so that needs which cannot be satisfiedlocally can still be met. Finally, democratic local governments should also have their ownfinancial base, so that local and external resources can be mobilized in order that village-levelprograms decided upon by the communities can be carried out without having to endure longapproval processes.

53. Developing this new form of community government will be demanding. Much of theold system was artificial, inefficient, and was created by the needs of a top-down controlapparatus. There was little connection to people’s own organizations, a great deal of secrecy,and little need for the governance system to respond to community needs. Simply removingthe artificial shell of kecamatans (subdistricts) and desas (villages) will not ensure thatrepresentative, effective local institutions will automatically replace them. Twenty-four yearsof top-down government mean that a new vision of rights and accountability is now required.The previous combination of handouts and external control must be quickly replaced by asystem that encourages self-help and supports local initiative. Community strengths varytremendously across East Timor. The adequacy and capacity of traditional leadership as wellas the strength of CNRT and church-based organizations also varies. To be effective, anyproposed community empowerment process must be sufficiently flexible to take into accountthis variability and to provide sustained, long term capacity building for new community-basedinstitutions.

54. The proposed vehicle to achieve the above ambitious goals is a CommunityEmpowerment and Governance Program (CEGP, see Annex 22 for details). Under thisproposal a team of some 800 community facilitators2 would be progressively trained anddeployment across the country. These facilitators would provide the sustained supportnecessary to help communities develop the confidence, awareness and skills to establisheffective, community-controlled institutions. At the core of this program would be the earlycreation of elected councils constituted at village, subdistrict and district level. Onceestablished, these councils would become the channel for providing resources directly to thecommunity rather than through traditional government agencies.

55. In the short term, the councils would focus on the coordination and support of relief andrehabilitation efforts and the management of support for vulnerable groups and specialreconciliation programs in areas where these are considered desirable. Their effectiveness willhinge on the capacity of the community councils and this in turn, on the quality of community-level facilitation. In this process, the JAM envisages a strong supportive role to be played byNGOs, church groups, and other voluntary organizations that operate at the community level.Over time, the best of these programs could evolve into community managed safety nets.

56. In the longer term, the councils would have five key functions:

(i) preparing and executing village development plans that address local needs inagriculture, healthcare, education, communications, etc;

(ii) producing village codes of conduct and resolving disputes;

2 One male and one female facilitator for every village in the country.


(iii) managing village funds;

(iv) relaying to subdistricts and districts the priority development needs that cannot be metthrough local efforts;

(iv) strengthening participation and democratic practices.

57. Village civil codes must not contradict national law. At the same time, the emergingnational codes must provide a great deal of juridical space for local management of localaffairs and, where appropriate, strengthen the role played by traditional leaders. NGOs andother development organizations working in the villages would work in partnership with thevillage councils, particularly through the provision of technical support. In the interests oftransparency, all village records would be open to village members, and key financialinformation would be posted in public places.

58. Development of community institutions would be undertaken in two stages. The firststage responds to the need to have functioning community governments up and runningquickly. Thus, rather than awaiting a sustained awareness raising and participation programsprior to formal elections, the JAM team recommends a facilitated process of communityconsultation to agree upon an interim council made up of equal numbers of men and women.The interim council’s term would end as communities undertake the general election describedbelow, with a maximum term of one year.

59. For the full, formal, village election, each hamlet would elect two representatives (toensure equal participation, one man plus one woman are proposed) to a village council.Members would serve for one or two years. Council members would not be paid civilservants, but each village would receive a small budget to cover operating costs and a small,fixed honorarium for its members. Councils could then opt to select a subgroup of theirmembers to act as day to day administrators, or the council could handle village affairscollectively.

60. Each village council would elect two members (one man, one woman) to sit on asubdistrict council. Terms would again be for one or two years, with a similar one-yearinterim arrangement developed by consensus among the interim village councils. The councilwould appoint a full-time subgroup that has an executive officer supported by a secretary and atreasurer. Subdistrict Councils would be responsible for allocating community developmentfunds, keeping civil records, and adjudicating most local civil disputes. Subdistricts wouldform working committees together with the church, CNRT and other local bodies, includingNGOs providing development services in the area.

61. At the next level, each subdistrict council would elect two representatives (one man, onewoman) to sit in the district council meetings on local affairs. The subdistrict councils wouldbe under the administrative jurisdiction of the UNTAET District Administration. High qualitycivic education and public administration programs would be provided to local governmentofficials. Details of the most appropriate interface between the district councils and UNTAETcan only be developed after the incoming UNTAET administration has had sufficientopportunity to consider the options available. At the subdistrict level, it may be possible forthe planned UN Volunteers to provide technical support to the subdistrict council by


facilitating relations with the district administration, and identifying special capacitydevelopment programs needed by subdistricts and villages.

62. The key output of the CEPG would be the generation of proposals for spendingunallocated block grants provided to the subdistricts. The first of these grants would be smalland would be focused on priority rehabilitation or emergency village needs. Subsequentgrants would address priority community projects in areas of health, education, infrastructure,and/or income generation. Grants would be awarded to member villages based on opendiscussion in the subdistrict council. Initially the program would cover about half of thesubdistricts, but it would be scaled up to cover the entire country within about a one-yearperiod, as capacity develops. Over time it would become an on-budget regular grant,supplemented by community taxes, fines, and other local sources of revenue. Grants would bein the range of US $50,000-$75,000 per subdistrict, though there would be variation accordingto capacity, performance and population.

63. In order to empower the proposed councils it will be necessary to introduce appropriatelegislation recognizing them as legal entities with powers to perform all of the tasks described,including revenue collection and expenditure. A further essential element of communityrecovery, especially in rural areas, will be the creation of an appropriate microfinancialarchitecture. Proposals for this development are described in Annex 4. As the first step indeveloping a national socioeconomic monitoring capacity and appropriate safety-net strategies,it is also proposed to commence a basic monitoring survey as part of the CEGP.

C. Policy Options

64. Any options for local administration should reflect the principles described above,however, a variety of institutional possibilities exist for achieving these objectives: Theseinclude restoring/building upon the pre-existing system, creating entirely new structures oflocal government, or hybrid options that combine the old and the new. An important issue willbe the degree of responsibility that will be undertaken by the community in the managementand resourcing of essential services, particularly health and education. Because of the widevariability in capacity it is proposed that facilitators assist communities to identify a realisticinitial role which can be progressively expanded over time.

D. Budgets (See Annex 21 For Details)

65. The Community Empowerment and Governance Program would involve recurrent andcapital costs of $29.9m. Within this amount, block grants provided to the councils wouldamount to $5.5m in the first year declining to a base $3.5m in the third year. During therehabilitation process, special programs for the most vulnerable groups and for reconciliationwork will also be channeled through the councils (rather than through centralized programs).Estimated cost of these programs is $2.0m. Socioeconomic surveys are budgeted at $1.0m.Overall the heavy sunk cost in capacity building and empowerment is justified on the basis thata well functioning village council would take responsibility for much of the former line agencybudget allocations for village level health, education and other programs. The separate costsof relevant programs included in the UN Consolidated Appeal are listed in Annex 24.


E. Next Steps

66. In view of the urgency described above, it wil l be necessary to secure agreement to theabove approach from UNTAET and other key stakeholders as soon as possible. To initiate thecouncil election process, a small team of around thirty facilitators needs to be trained anddeployed by the end of 1999 so that interim councils would be in place in most parts of thecountry by April 2000.


Annex 1Repatriation and Reintegration of East Timorese Refugees and

Internally Displaced Persons

Introduction and BackgroundDuring the period leading up to and immediately following the referendum on the 3rd ofAugust 1999, more than 500,000 East Timorese left their homes to seek security in andoutside East Timor. Some 300,000 persons were estimated to be internally displaced inEast Timor and more than 200,000 went to West Timor. A minority of these had soughtrefuge outside East Timor voluntarily, to stay in quieter parts of Indonesia with friends andfamilies, after serious incidents in the East as early as April 1999. The large majority,however, were moved to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia forcibly by the antiindependence militias supported by the Indonesian military. In the following period most ofthe displaced were prevented from returning across the land border. After a meetingbetween UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata with former IndonesianPresident B.J.Habibie on 18 September, organized returns did start on 8 October, mainlyfrom Kupang. Repatriation of the large majority of that still in West Timor continues to behampered by militia intimidation.. The majority of those who were displaced inside EastTimor moved to shelter in the hardly accessible hills in central East Timor. While many ofthem have since returned to their towns and villages of habitual residence, others stillremain in the hills out of fear for militia retribution, particularly in the Ambino enclave.Since the arrival of INTERFET UNHCR has been participating in a UN campaign toreassure those still in the hills that it is safe to return.

Before the referendum on the future of East Timor UNHCR had already begun to assistsome 35 to 50 000 internally displaced persons in need. A UNHCR Office was establishedfor this purpose in Dili in April. After the referendum UNHCR expanded its presence inEast Timor and opened offices in West Timor to assist the displaced persons.

UNHCR Activities in East Timor: Promotion of Voluntary RepatriationSince the re-establishment of public order in East Timor UNHCR’s main task has been topromote and organize voluntary returns in conditions of safety and dignity, of thedisplaced persons and offer them a comprehensive package of material emergencyassistance. As of 9 November 50,950 of the externally displaced and refugees had returnedto East Timor: 12,376 were repatriated by air, 20,532 by barge from Atapupu and Kupangand some 17,766 crossed the land borders at Batuga and Maliana. A first land convoy fromAtambua brought home 276 persons. Another 50 to 100,000 people are expected to returnby land before the end of the year. Back in East Timor UNHCR and its partners, inparticular IOM, ensure onward transportation of the displaced persons to their finaldestination.

It is expected that most of the externally displaced will ultimately return to East Timor. Aconsiderable percentage, however, of the ‘trans-migrated’ Indonesians are likely to remainin Indonesia. Also senior Indonesian civil servants are most unlikely to return. Finally,many of the East Timorese involved in the anti independence militia may not return. On theother hand it is quite likely that many of the East Timorese ‘diaspora’ will return in thecoming months and years and partially offset the definitive departures.


Annex 1 Page 2

Possible Links between United Nations, NGO and World Bank Assistance Programs.The multiple tasks of relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation in East Timor are addressedin the U.N. Consolidated Appeal for the East Timor Crisis for the period October 99 – June2000, issued end October 1999. Different UN Agencies have been given specificresponsibility for various aspects of relief, reconstruction and repatriation and reintegrationactivities. General co-ordination has been entrusted to the Office for the Co-ordination ofHumanitarian Aid (OCHA). OCHA will hand over this authority to the UN TransitionalAuthority for East Timor (UNTAET).Under the Appeal various UN Agencies have been designated as lead or co-ordinatingagency as follows:

Apart from being the mandated agency for repatriation, UNHCR has been designated leadagency for all shelter activities in the programme.

The World Food Programme (WFP) co-ordinates food aid and food security. WHO hasbeen given technical responsibility for the health sector, and UNICEF for the co-ordinationof the implementation of health programmes. Infrastructure and economic recovery will becoordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNICEF is alsocoordinator for education and community action, and for activities to ensure thathumanitarian principles are adhered to. Finally WFP will be responsible for logisticalarrangements.

The World Bank led Joint Assessment Mission, with participants from the Bank, the ADB,the IMF, bilateral donors and numerous UN Agencies 3 has had intensive and detaileddiscussions with UN, NGO, and bilateral actors already at work in East Timor to ensurethat activities proposed by the JAM are consistent with ongoing and planned activities bythe former.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Details on UNHCR Activities in Shelter, Reintegration and Development.

Shelter: Link with the Infrastructure SectorConsidering the massive destruction of housing and community infrastructure UNHCR willconcentrate its assistance in East Timor in this area. An amount of US $ 11,3 million isincluded in the UN Consolidated Appeal for the period October 1999 - June 2000 both foremergency shelter and for more durable housing. UNHCR estimates that up to 65,000housing units, representing the dwellings of some 325,000 persons, have been destroyedpartially or wholly. The amount foreseen in the UN appeal will only cover part of theneeds. Two measures are taken: In the first phase UNHCR will distribute plastic sheets tosome 70,000 families to serve as roofing material for emergency shelter. These will behanded to both internally and externally displaced and refugees upon return to their townsand villages of origin, in accordance with the needs and taking into considerationconditions there, such as rainfall and the availability or not of local roofing materials. In thesecond phase UNHCR will procure part of the materials necessary to construct or repair up 3 UNICEF,UNHCR,UNFPA, WHO, UNAMET; Australia, UK, EU, Japan and Portugal


Annex 1 Page 3

to 65,000 housing units, estimated to cost US $ 300 per unit. These materials comprisetimber and sheet iron for roofing, as well as nails, clamps and tools. Cement will beprovided to effect repairs to damaged walls. In addition UNHCR will encourage itspartners to procure presses to make building blocks where complete new houses arenecessary. To implement this programme UNHCR will co-operate closely with villagecouncils and will designate one NGO per district. The first order for such materials hasbeen placed. Follow-up orders will placed in accordance with the availability of fundsreceived in response to the Consolidated UN Appeal. UNHCR will seek to link its shelteractivities to activities of other agencies (IGO and NGO) which will assist in thereconstruction of community infrastructure. This programme of simple repairs andconstruction in the coming eight months could and should be followed by a longer termhousing scheme financed by the Bank providing more modern, comfortable livingconditions, linking up to comprehensive rehabilitation and development plans ofneighborhoods. In the phase leading up to the implementation of the Word Bankprogramme of rehabilitation UNHCR will provide information to the Bank on the status ofimplementation of its activities, and will help the bank in setting priorities in the sheltersector.

Community Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Development: Link with theCommunity Recovery and Empowerment Sector.A second important area where UNHCR intends to play an important role, together withUNDP and IOM is in a joint Community Recovery Programme, focusing on returnee areas.Under the Infrastructure and Economic Recovery Sector of the Consolidated Appeal UNDPhas been designated as lead agency in this area. A budget of US $ 6,2 million has beenproposed to donors. Activities will comprise communal reconciliation, job creation andrehabilitation of local services and facilities. UNHCR, UNDP and IOM intend to set upRegional Programme Offices in all district capitals to establish with the beneficiarypopulation the needs, to set priorities and do detailed planning of all programme activities.This concept has been applied successfully in earlier situations, inter alia in Mozambiqueand Rwanda. A similar process was set in place in Burundi where the World Banksubsequently took over financing of activities set in motion and initially financed byUNHCR.


Annex 2Civil Service

Short Term Reconstruction Targets And Priority Interventions

General GuidelinesActivities below should be undertaken in conformity with the model adopted during thecurrent Mission, e.g. participation of Timorese in all phases of the process. It is proposedthat a Joint Working Group for Public Administration including UNTAET and Timorese beset up.

The Working Group supervises the whole process and evaluates expert’s proposals to besubmitted to relevant authorities. The Civil Service Commission will supersede theWorking Group once this institution is established.

The total cost of all activities detailed below is $ 2,162,375.

I. Technical assistance for the detailed design and establishment of structures andsystems, further referred to as Transitional Public Service (TPS) and process ofrecruitment of Timorese civil servants for the TPS, including possible specialinitiatives for the return of skilled personnel from the Diaspora.

1. Organisational design of Transitional Public Servicea) Departmentsb) Staff listc) Job qualification and job description (including issue of languages spoken)d) Pay scalee) Model of contractf) Rules of service to be observed by contracted personnelg) Schedule of appointmentsh) Drafting of Terms of Reference of the Tender for Contracting of a Consulting Firm toshort list candidatesi) Decision on the tender by the Civil Service CommissionEstimate: USD $ 78,500

2. Organisational design and legislation establishing the Civil Service Commissiona) Functionsb) Membersc) Mechanism of appointmentd) Duration of functions, security of tenure, other guarantees of stabilitye) Remunerationf) PowersEstimate: USD $ 18,750

3. Contracting of Personnela)Contracting of a Consulting Firm to short list candidatesb) Advertisement of Jobs open to all Timorese according to agreed schedule


Annex 2 Page 2

c) Evaluation and short-listing of candidatesd) Decision on recruitment by the Civil Service CommissionEstimate: USD $200,000

4. Manual and automated system of human resource and financial management for all civilservants, incl. trainingEstimate: USD $150,000

5. Inventory of East Timorese Human resources (incl. From the Diaspora)Estimate: USD $ 27,500

6. Feasibility of a Special Program for the Return of Skilled Talent from the Diasporaa) List of skilled Timorese in the Diasporab) Assessment of availability to return and requirementsc) Drafting of a Special Support Program for ReturneesEstimate: USD $23,125

7. Study of policies concerning former civil servants not integrated in the TransitionalPublic servicea) Census of former civil servants once the process of repatriation is concluded.b) Assessment of capacities on an individual basisc) Negotiation about pension schemes with the Indonesian pensions systemd) Design or integration in projects for employment generation and small scale

enterprises, namely enterprises providing outsourced services for the publicadministration.

e) Other responsibilities of the transitional administration towards former civil servants.Estimate: USD $ 80,500

II. Technical Assistance for the development of policy and legislative instruments

1. Collect all available legislation and regulations related to public administration.Setting up of National Archives(Note: The mission initiated a project for the retrieval of all documentation from publicbuildings. Portugal and Portuguese speaking countries will be asked to contribute withmaterials relating to East Timor from their archives [e.g. Technical studies, GovernmentGazette]. Indonesian sources should be approached for the same purpose.)a) Retrieval and systematization of Indonesian legislation and regulation.b) Creation of National Archives.Estimate: USD $ 179,500

2. Assessment and evaluation of adequacy of administrative legislation and proposalsfor changea) Translation of most relevant documents (see list attached)b) Setting up of an experts commission (including Timorese) under the auspices of

UNTAET


Annex 2 Page 3

c) Submission of proposals (changes or new proposals) to relevant bodiesEstimate: USD $ 109,500

3. Public Policya) Setting up of a working group for policy formulationc) Workshops/Forums

(i)Role of the State - Target groups: Political leaders, Top civil servants, CivicAssociations, NGO’ s

(ii)Sectoral Policies - Target groups: Same as above relevant for the sectoral areaconcerned

Priorities:Social Affairs (education, health, poverty, safety nets), Economy, CommunityDevelopment, Public Administration, Macroeconomic Policies

d) Drafting of proposals for policies for the transitional phase and beyonde) Approval of policies for the transitional phasef) Evaluation of policies on a six-month basis.Estimate: USD $ 353,500

III. Rehabilitation of public buildings

Reconstruction rehabilitation

(Assessment and costing performed by infrastructure team).

IV. Provision of equipment and consumable materials

(Being performed by infrastructure team)

V. Capacity building and training initiatives for the transitional authority, includingbut not restricted to capacity-building for the department responsible for personnelmanagement and organisational development

1. Organisation of National Training Institute for Public AdministrationEstimate: USD $ 271,500

2. Training of Civil Service Commissiona) Workshop on the role of the CommissionEstimate: USD $ 20,000


Annex 2 Page 4

3. Short term modular courses(to be organised in Timor with co-operation from similar institutions and participation incourses in other institutions)Subjects:a) General - Leadership and facilitation skills (including decision-making processes),Strategic Planning for Development, Management skills, Public Finance, Human andMaterial Resource Management, Information Technology for Public organisationsTarget groups: Political leaders, Top civil servants, Civic Associations, NGOs

b) Sectoral ManagementTraining for multidisciplinary management for each of the following sectoral areas:Economy, Social Affairs (Education, Health, Poverty, Social Networks, CommunityDevelopment), Internal AffairsTarget groups: Political leaders, Top civil servants, Civic Associations, NGOs

c) Training for territorial managers for the following territorial levels: District,Administrative Post (Kacamatan)Target groups: Political leaders, Top civil servants, Civic Associations, NGOsFrom the levels of district and posto (kecamatan)

Total : 1,000 candidates @ average $ 500 per personEstimate: USD $ 500,000

4. Study abroadTarget groups: Political leaders, Top and local civil servants, Civic Associations, NGOsEstimate: USD $ 100,000

VI. Support Systems for Public Administration1. Filing SystemEstimate: USD $ 50.000

GRAND TOTAL: US$ 2,162,375.00


Annex 2 Page 5

Building Reconstruction Costs (US$m)Public Administration Sector Summary

I. Level of Damage TotalLevel 1 Level 2 Level 3

ConstructionCentral Admin $1.23 $0.00 $0.00 $1.23District Admin $0.00 $3.42 $0.00 $3.42Sub District Community Centers $0.00 $0.00 $1.46 $1.46Village Community Centers $0.00 $0.00 $6.63 $6.63Sub Total Construction $1.23 $3.42 $8.09 $12.74

EquipmentCentral Admin Cars $0.00 $0.00 $0.20 $0.20Central Admin Computers $0.00 $0.00 $10.04 $10.04District Admin Cars $0.00 $0.00 $0.96 $0.96District Admin Computers $0.00 $0.00 $0.80 $0.80Sub Total Equipment $0.00 $0.00 $12.00 $12.00

Base Costs $1.23 $3.42 $20.09 $24.74

Physical Contingencies $0.18 $0.51 $1.21 $1.91

Total Costs $1.42 $3.93 $21.31 $26.65


Annex 3Civil Service – Budget Proposal

Methodology and Main ResultsBudget estimates on the financial consequences of Civil Service proposals – addressed atthe restoration of a permanent Public Administration in East Timor - are based on thefollowing methodological considerations:a) It was assumed in these estimations that administrative organization in East Timor is

based on a two tier system, which distinguishes Central and Local Government; EastTimorese Local Government knows two levels: Districts and Sub-Districts.

b) Administrative functions were classified according to three level clusters: the firstcluster considers six groups of functions: Security, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs,Finance and Economic Development, Social Development and Reconstruction; thisclassification in clusters does not preclude any specific organization of government,being flexible sufficiently flexible to accommodate alternatives.

c) Civil Servants qualifications were classified in three groups: Senior, Medium andJunior.

d) Estimations on human resources needs were prepared by the different teams forreferred tiers and levels of government, clusters of administrative functions and civilservants qualification groups; specific managerial needs were estimated by civil serviceteam.

e) The required number of civil servants was combined with a timetable implementation(in the four quarters of the first year and for the first three years).

f) Final results of personnel estimations are, at the end of each period, the following: 1st

Year – 7 802; 2nd Year - 10 091; 3rd Year - 12 203.g) Staff estimations for the first year are, at the end of each quarter: 1st Q. - 1 962; 2nd Q. -

3 925; 3rd Q. - 5 883; and, in the last quarter, 7 802.h) Sensitivity analysis on personnel estimations is included.i) Financial personnel costs estimations were made, taking into account the average wage

levels formally practiced by Indonesian administration (incorporating benefits);respective results and sensitivity analysis are presented.

j) Annual estimated personnel costs in Civil Service (end of period, thousand $, constantprices) are: 1st Year – 12 174.2; 2nd Year - 15 793.8; 3rd Year - 19 158.3.

k) Estimation on recurrent budget also took into account other financial items: travel costs,consumables, maintenance, training and subcontracting.

RationaleUnlike the period of Indonesia occupation, the future State of East Timor can not count ondependence on foreign financial resources, with its population living either on a subsistenceeconomic basis or within an overcrowded and inefficient civil service, and with anadministrative organization highly authoritative and centralized.

The global reorganization of East Timor – that, in the present situation, closely approachesits construction from scratch – knows, obviously, several relevant dimensions.


Annex 3 Page 2

One of these dimensions deals with the new Civil Service which, assuming the centralgoals of performing a significant role in the economic and social development process andof contributing to modernize Timorese society, must be shaped according to the followingmajor orientations: democratic, efficient, competent, responsive, accountable, participativeand decentralized.

As a consequence, the new Civil Service of East Timor must face radical changes from itsprevious situation in several aspects:a) It can no longer be overstaffed, being on the contrary necessary that its design and,

mainly, its implementation observes a severe discipline, ensuring that it shall beeffectively slim and efficient.

b) Staffing process can no longer be based on subjectivity, being necessary to ensureobjective and independent procedures of recruitment.

c) Transparency of personnel selection methods and the concern on the small dimensionof Civil Service must correspond to relatively high salary levels - taking neverthelessinto account East Timor financial capacity and the priority of its sustainability –together with the implementation of intensive and diversified training of Timoresehuman resources.

d) Functions undertaken by Civil Service can no longer replace and annihilate privateinitiative and its specific capabilities, rendering necessary to concentrate publicresources on responsibilities that can only be undertaken by the State, among whichregulation functions and actively promoting outsourcing solutions.

e) Previous exaggerated concentration of power on central governmental can no longer beaccepted, demanding namely the progressive sharing of responsibilities with localgovernment and, also, its interaction with community civic organizations.

East Timor is now governed by the United Nations transitional administration.

Assuming in a clear way that it is not our responsibility to examine or discusscorresponding administrative arrangements approved by the Secretary General, weconcentrated on the construction of a Civil Service model addressed at the futurepermanent and independent administration of East Timor State.

We expect, nevertheless, that our proposals may be of some use in the implementation ofUN transitional administration and on the current debate on the transfer of responsibilities.

Detailed PresentationCivil Service budget estimates were based on the referred background considerations,which should have the following clarifications:a) The creation of the new independent State of East Timor obviously overrules its

traditional (and still frequently used) nomination as Province – used by Portuguese andIndonesian administrations.


Annex 3 Page 3

Accordingly, all different levels of administration should be levered; nevertheless,mainly because it would create unnecessary confusions, we kept in this budgetingexercise the existing Districts and Sub-Districts. This option must not be understood asa standing position in what regards two emerging relevant debates: on the eventual needfor a new administrative “regional” level and on the geographical reorganization ofexisting administrative units – which, in both cases, should be adequately studied.

b) Administrative functions were classified, as already mentioned, in three level clusters.These clusters include:

ClusterLevel 1 Level 2 Level 3

Internal & External Internal & External Internal SecuritySecurity Security External SecurityForeign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign AffairsInternal Affairs Justice Affairs Justice

Electoral OperationsRegistryNotary PublicHuman Rights

Public Management Public AdministrationInformation & StatisticsNational Commissions

Finance & Economic Finance Money & FinanceDevelopment Revenues

BudgetTreasury

Economic Development PlanningInvestmentEmploymentAgriculture , Forestry &FisheriesCommerce, Industry &TradeTourism

Social Development Social Services EducationHealthCultureSports

Human Development Humanitarian AssistanceCommunityDevelopment


Annex 3 Page 4

Reconstruction Public Works Transport InfrastructuresPublic Utilities Water

PowerSanitation

Outsourcing & Regulation Transport ServicesTelecom & PostsFood Supply andDistributionLand Use & TownPlanningEnvironment

It should be noted that the consideration and systematization of these administrativefunctions does not preclude the future organization of government.

c) We understand as a basic priority the urgent implementation of all adequate forms ofoutsourcing East Timor administrative responsibilities which, being traditionallyundertaken by public bodies, can and should be managed by private organizations.This approach is, in our understanding, the most effective way to reach a modern andefficient Civil Service in East Timor and, also, to ensure a good delivery of services tothe population and the best environmental conditions for sustained economicdevelopment. It is quite obvious, nevertheless, that such an approach is moredemanding towards public administration, requiring specific professional andorganizational capabilities namely in what regards regulation functions.

d) Construction of a lean and effective Civil Service must also take into consideration boththe relevant activities actually undertaken in East Timor by private organizations –namely NGOs – and, also, the desired reinforcement of community organization atvillage and hamlets levels. An effective coordination between formal Civil Service andthese organizations shall prove to be of enormous impact in the reconstruction anddevelopment of East Timor.

e) Civil Servants were classified, for present budgeting purposes, in three main groups –Senior, Medium and Junior -, according to their respective qualification, which equallyapplies to all administrative tiers and levels. This obvious simplification must, in duetime and after in depth study, be replaced by a detailed categorization of civil servants.

f) Estimations on the adequate number of civil servants by administrative tiers and levels,by functions and by qualification groups are presented on Tables 1 to 10 (not attachedhereto). The different teams prepared these estimations. Most relevant results of theseestimations are, in the end of the first three years:i) Estimated global staff needs amount to 12 203 at the end of the 3rd Year; out of

these, 8 253 in Education and 3 173 in Health;ii) Distribution of civil servants by administrative tiers attributes 11 517 to Central

Government and 685 to Local Authorities;iii) In what regards Local Government, we estimate that 530 civil servants shall

operate in the Districts and 155 in the Sub-Districts;


Annex 3 Page 5

iv) Staff distribution by level 1 qualification clusters (regardless of administrative tiersand levels) is the following: Foreign Affairs – 29; Internal Affairs – 474; Financeand Economic Development – 354; Social Development – 10 788; Reconstruction- 557;

v) Results of the distribution of civil servants according to qualification groups(regardless of administrative tiers and levels) are the following: Senior - 435;Medium - 8 882; Junior - 2 885.

g) Referred estimations on the Civil Service staff requirements took into account atimetable for implementation intensity:

1st YearEnd of 1stQuarter

End of 2ndQuarter

End of 3rdQuarter

End of4th

Quarter

ForeignAffairs

Foreign Affairs 0% 5% 10% 20%

Internal Justice Affairs 10% 20% 40% 60%Affairs Public

Management10% 20% 40% 50%

Finance &Economic

Finance 10% 20% 40% 50%

Development EconomicDevelopment

5% 10% 20% 30%

Social Social Services 15% 30% 45% 60%Development Human

Development10% 20% 30% 40%

Reconstruction

Public Works 30% 60% 80% 100%

Public Utilities 30% 60% 80% 100%Outsourcing &Regulation

10% 20% 40% 50%


Annex 3 Page 6

It is important to take into account that East Timorese needs – especially inEducation and Health, as well as in what regards public utilities – are urgent.

Considered timetable for implementation intensity in Civil Service supposes thatsuch immediate needs shall be answered by transitional UN administration andNGOs, being progressively assumed by permanent Public Administration.

Tables 11 to 14 (not attached) present detailed information on the consequences ofreferred timetable on civil servants quantification – which, summarized byadministrative levels, are the following:

1st Y 2nd Y 3rd Y1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q

Central Civil Serv. 1 843 3 687 5 521 7 335 9 482 11 517District Civil Serv. 85 169 265 343 460 530Sub-District Civil Serv. 34 68 96 124 149 155TOTAL 1 962 3 925 5 883 7 802 10 091 12 203

1st Three YearsEnd of 1st

YearEnd of 2nd

YearEnd of 3rd

Year

ForeignAffairs

Foreign Affairs 20% 50% 100%

Internal Justice Affairs 60% 80% 100%Affairs Public

Management50% 80% 100%

Finance &Economic

Finance 50% 80% 100%

Development EconomicDevelopment

30% 70% 100%

Social Social Services 60% 80% 100%Development Human

Development40% 80% 100%

Reconstruction

Public Works 100% 80% 60%

Public Utilities 100% 80% 50%Outsourcing &Regulation

50% 70% 90%


Annex 3 Page 7

h) Sensitivity tests were made on the effects of percent increases of staff byqualification levels. Most significant results are the following:

Staff Number1st Y 2nd Y 3rd Y

Basic Assumptions 7 802 10 091 12 203+ 20% in Senior Civil Servants 7 860 10 165 12 290+ 20% in Medium Civil Servants 8 910 11 542 13 979+ 20% in Junior Civil Servants 8 195 10 584 12 780

5. Financial consequences of civil servants estimations must take into account wagelevels.

Formal average salaries used by the Indonesian administration4 - possibly the onlyobjective reference in the present situation - were the following (calculated taking intoaccount average wages practiced in 1999, incorporating in the salaries all benefits):

US$/month US$/yearSenior 164 1 962Medium 142 1 708Junior 91 1 086

Table 16 (not attached) presents detailed personnel costs – which are summarized in thenext table, according to administrative levels (thousand US$, constant prices, annual cost atthe end of period):

Staff Number1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year

Central Civil Service 11 495.9 14 899.8 18 144.5District Civil Service 505.0 670.7 768.4Sub-District Civil Service 173.2 223.3 245.5TOTAL 12 174.2 15 793.8 19 158.3

Consideration of Indonesian pay levels is, nevertheless, unlike to contribute in a positiveway to major goals assumed, namely the creation of conditions for attracting highlyprepared and motivated human resources in Civil Service.

Such wages, which were in fact “compensated” by high levels of corruption, also presentdifficulties in what concerns competition from other organizations, namely NGOs (withwhich it would be relevant to establish a voluntary code of conduct in these matters).

4 Source of information: Laporan Jumlah Pegawai dan Pembayaran Gaji Pegawai Megeri Sipil Pusat DariKantor Perbendaharaan Dan Kas Negara Dili, Maret 1999.


Annex 3 Page 8

We understand, along with these considerations, that competitive salary levels should beused for objectively special situations and, also, that East Timor administration shoulddefine high medium term objectives for salary levels, together with guidelines for itsprogressive reach.On the other hand, staff and salary growth in Civil Service must be attentively monitored,namely evaluated against performance and taking into consideration financial sustainabilityand affordability.

Sensitivity tests on salary levels were made; most relevant results on the impact of percentincrease in Civil Servants wages (thousand US$, constant prices, annual cost at the end ofperiod) are:

Staff WagesAnnual Salary

Senior C.Servants 1st 2nd 3rd

(Average) Year Year YearBasic Assumptions 1 962 12 174.2 15 793.8 19 158.3+ 50% in all Civil Servants 2 943 18 261,3 23 690,8 28 737,5+ 100% in all Civil Servants 3 924 24 348,4 31 587,7 38 316,7+ 100% in Senior C.Servants 3 924 12 743,4 16 518,1 20 012,7+ 200% in Senior C.Servants 5 887 13 312,7 17 242,3 20 867,0+ 300% in Senior C.Servants 7 849 13 881,9 17 966,6 21 721,3

6. Other additional requirements necessary to reach global budget previsions on CivilService are detailed in Table 17, together with corresponding estimations, (thousand US$,constant prices); major findings are:

Annual Cost at theEnd of End of End of1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year

Personnel 12,174.2 15,793.8 19,158.3Travel 608.7 789.7 957.9Consumables 608.7 789.7 957.9Training 1,826.1 1,579.4 1,436.9Subcontracting 913.1 1,184.5 1,436.9Maintenance 5% of reconstruction and equipment costs

Recurrent Budget 16,130.8 20,137.1 23,947.9

It is relevant to take into account that additional recurrent costs are high when comparedwith international standards, especially due to the need of implementing intensive trainingprograms.


Annex 3 Page 9

7. For budget purposes it shall be necessary to consider, additionally to Civil Serviceestimations, the costs directly incurred by members of government, their specific staff, aswell as building requirements – which should be made after objective indications ongovernment organization.


Annex 4Administrative Division of East Timor

District – Concelho –Kabupaten

Sub-District – Posto Administrativo -Kecamatan

Village- Suco - Desa

1. Aileu 1. Aileu

2. Lekidoe

3. Laulara

4. Remexio

1. Aisirimau2. Fatubossa3. Lahao4. Saboria5. Fahiria6. Lausi7. Suku Liurai8. Band / Dato9. Halolau10. Seloi

1. Berelau2. Namo Loso3. Asubilitoho4. Betu Lau5. Nano Kassa6. Fahisoi7. Hautrilau

1. Kota Lau2. Talitu3. Mada Bono4. Silio Kraik5. Fua Mota6. Fatisi

1. Mau Mota2. Tula Takou3. Fatu rasa4. Aou Mau5. Hau Toho6. Fada Bloko7. Suku Liurai8. Fahisoi

2. Ainaro 1. Hatudu

2. Ainaro

3. Hatu Builiku

4. Maubissi

1. Leo Lima2. Boi Kala

1. Ainaro2. Manutasi3. Soro4. Mau Ulo5. Soro Kraik6. Kassa7. Mau Muno

1. Nunu Mogo2. Mulo3. Mauxiga

1. Aitutu2. Edi3. Fatu Bossi4. Horai Kiik5. Liurai6. Mano Lobas7. Manotu8. Maubissi9. Maulau


Annex 4 Page 2

3. Baucau 1. Baucau

2. Laga

3. Venilale

4. Quelicai

5. Baguia

6. Vemasse

1. Tirilolo2. Bahu3. Kaibada4. Buruma5. Seisal6. Buibau7. Samalari8. Gariway9. Bukoli10. Wailale11. Triloka

1. Soba2. Nunira3. Libagua4. Samalari5. Sagadate6. Atelari7. Tekinomata8. Mulia

1. Watohako2. Wailaha3. Badu-ho’o4. Bahamori5. Wai Oli6. Watulia7. Uma Anaulu8. Uma Anaiku

1. Baguia2. Lakuliu3. Letemumu4. Makalaku5. Waitame6. Gurusa7. Builale8. Mauluru9. Abo10. Lelalai11. Lai atas12. Lai bawah13. Abafala14. Namanei

1. Afaloikai2. Osso Nunu3. Wai Koni4. Alawa Bawah5. Samalari6. Lawateri7. Defawasi8. Lawa atas9. Larisula10. Wakala

1. Vemasse2. Kaikua3. Ostiku4. Loilubu5. Watulari6. Ossoala7. Waigae


Annex 4 Page 3

4. Bobonaro 1. Maliana

2. Balibo

3. Lolotoi / Lebos

4. Atabae

5. Kailako

6. Bobonaro

1. Lahomea2. Raifun3. Ritabou4. Odomau5. Holsa6. Tapo7. Saboria

1. Balibo2. Loohito3. Loilima4. Kowa5. Batugade6. Sanirin7. Atara Balibo

1. Opa2. Lupal3. Daudet4. Guda5. Gildopil6. Lontas

1. Aidapalete2. Rai Robo3. Hatas4. Atabae

1. Raiheu2. Atadaru3. Gou Lolo4. Gemulai5. Meligo6. Manapa7. Doudo8. Furugua

1. Bobonaro2. Mali Lait3. Lourba4. Sailoko5. Atubae6. Ilat Laur7. Mali Ubel8. Kali Mau9. Tebe Bui10. Karabau11. Kota Boat12. Ai Assa13. Oeleu14. Tapo15. Lebor16. Si Bumi17. Malop18. Lour


Annex 4 Page 4

5. Kovalima 1. Suai

2. Fatululik

3. Fohorem

4. Tilomar

5. Fatumean

6. Mape/Zumalae

1. Debos2. Suai Loro3. Kamanassa4. Labarai5. Belekassak6. Holpilat7. Ogoos8. Matai9. Boko

1. Fatululik2. Taroman

1. Fohorem2. Datorua3. Laktos4. Dato Tolu

1. Lalawa2. Foho Lulik3. Maudomo

1. Fatumean2. Nanu3. Belulik Leten

1. Raimea2. Zulo3. Fatu leto4. Loor5. Lepo6. Mapo7. Ukukai8. Bako

6. Ambino 1. Pante Makassar

2. Oesilo

3. Passabe

4. Nitibe

1. Costa2. Larissuk3. Cunha4. Nai Moka5. Bobokassa6. Nipane7. Lifau8. Taibako

1. Bobometo2. Usi Tassae3. Usi Takeno

1. Abeni2. Malelai

1. Bane Upe2. Sune Upo3. Use Tako4. Lela Upo5. Banafi


Annex 4 Page 5

7. Dili 1. Dili Barat

2. Dili Timur

3. Metinaro

4. Atauro

1. Dare2. Lahane Barat3. Maskarenhas4. Kaikoli5. Kolmera6. Motael7. Vila Verde8. Bairro Pite9. Alor10. Fatuhada11. Komoro

1. Akadiruhum2. Bairro central3. Bairro dos Grilos4. Bairro Formosa5. Bidau Lesidere6. Bidau santana7. Metiaut8. Bekora9. Balibar10. Kulu-hun11. Hera12. Santa Kruz13. Kamea14. Lahane Timur

1. Biboki2. Duyung

1. Vila2. Makili3. Beloli4. Makadade5. Bikoli


Annex 4 Page 6

8. Ermera 1. Ermera

2. Atsabe

3. Hatolia

4. Letefoho

5. Railako

1. Poetete2. Penilala3. Mikutu4. Likuimea5. Riheu6. Talimoro7. Lauala8. Estado9. Raimerhei10. Humbai

1. Atara2. Boboi Leten3. Bobi Kraik4. Batu Manu5. Lasaun6. Leimean Leten7. Laklo8. Laiboro9. Malako10. Abulo11. Trilelo12. Parmin

1. Hatolia Kota2. Manusal3. Samara4. Ailelo5. Lisapata6. Leimea Kraik7. Kokate Leotolu8. Batu Boli9. Urahou10. Mau Obo11. Asalau / Sare12. Leimea Sorin Balu13. Fatubessi

1. Letefoho2. Hatugou3. Dokurai4. Goulolo5. Era Ulo6. Katrai Kraik7. KatraiLeten8. Leuana

1. Raiheu2. Matata3. Toko Lulik4. Fatu Koro5. Railako Kraik6. Railako Leten7. Sama leten8. Deleso9. Taraso


Annex 4 Page 7

9. Lautem 1. Los Palos

2. Lautem

3. Tutuala

4. Iliomar

5. Luro

1. Fuiloro2. Rasa3. Bauro4. Homo5. Sauro6. Lauro7. Kakanve8. Maupitino9. Lore I10. Lore II

1. Parlamento2. Com3. Pairara4. Maina I5. Baduro6. Maina II7. Sorolau8. Daudere9. Ililai10. Eukisi

6. Tutuala7. Mehara

1. Iliomar I2. Iliomar II3. Sili Bere4. Fuat5. Kailui6. Tirilolo

1. Kota Muto2. Afo Budo3. Lakawa4. Barikafa5. Luro6. Waikoro

10. Liquica 8. Liquica

9. Maubara

3. Bazartete

1. Dato2. Hato Kuisi3. Loi Dahar4. Luku Lai5. Lautela6. Daru Leto7. Asumanu

1. Vivikuinia2. Lisa Sila3. Guk Liur4. Mabara Lisa5. Vatu Vou6. Guico7. Vatu Boro

1. Fatumasi2. Mota Gou3. Loo Roma4. Lau Hata5. Mau Mota6. Mota Ulun7. Ulmora8. Tibar9. Fahi Lebo


Annex 4 Page 8

11. Manatuto 1. Manatuto

2. Laklubar

3. Laklo

4. Laleia

5. Barique

6. Soibada

1. Aiteas2. Ailili3. Sau4. Ma’abat5. Iliheu6. Kribas

1. Batara2. Manelima3. Orlalan4. Funar5. Hatu Makerek6. Samanai

1. Lago Masak2. Uma Naruk3. Uma Kaduak4. Hohorai

1. Lifau2. Hatu Laran3. Kairui

1. Uma Boko2. Au Been3. Fatuwaki4. Manohat5. Kribas

1. Samoro2. Loohat3. Maun Fahi4. Manlala5. Fatu Makerek

12. Manufahi 1. Same

2. Alas

3. Fatuberlihu

4. Turiscai

1. Letefoho2. Babulu3. Daisua4. Grutu5. Holarua6. Rotutu7. Tutu Loru8. Betano

1. Tai Taduak2. Maha Kidan3. Aituha4. Dotik5. Uma Bere Lulik

1. Klakuk2. Fatu Kahi3. Kaikassa4. Bubu Susu5. Fahi Nehan

1. Foho Lau2. Beremana3. Orana4. Mindolo5. Aitemua6. Manumera7. Kai Mauk8. Liurai9. Motaro10. Fatu kalo11. Lesu Ata


Annex 4 Page 9

13. Viqueque 1. Viqueque

2. Ossu

3. Watukarbau

4. Watulari

5. Lakluta

1. Balai Uma Wain2. Luka3. Carau Balu4. Beasu5. Bibileo6. Wai Mori7. Uma Wain Kraik8. Uma Kiik9. Uma Wain Leten

1. Ossu De Cima2. Loihunu3. Builale4. Liaruka5. Waguia6. Wabubu7. Ossoroa8. Nahareka9. Waibobo

1. Afaloikai2. Irabina Hooli3. Irabina Letarai4. Wani-Uma5. Lai Ulo6. Baha-tata

1. Wesoro2. Babulo3. Afaloikai4. Makadiki5. Waitame6. Matahoi

1. Lalini2. Uma Tolu3. Dilor4. Ahik

Total number of:

- Districts : … … … .. 13- Sub-Districts … … … . 62- Villages … … … … … .. 442


Annex 5Public Administration -- Basic Structure5

Portuguese:

O Governo da Indonesia esta estruturado em duas categorias principais: o Governo Centrale o governo regional.

O Presidente, eleito pela Assembleia Consultiva do Povo, constitui o Governo, nomeia osMinistros e os Governadores das Provincias e promulga as leis.

O governo regional esta organizado em quatro niveis: (i) Provincias, (ii) Concelhos (rurais)e Municipios (urbanos), (iii) Postos Administrativos e (iv) Sucos (rurais) e Aldeias(urbanas).

Os Governadores das Provincias sao nomeados pelo Presidente, a partir de listasapresentadas pelas Assembleias Provinviais.

Os Administradores dos Concelhos e dos Municipios sao nomeados pelos Governadores apartir das Assembleias Regionais correspondentes.

As actividades sectoriais nas Provincias e nos Concelhos / Municipios sao exercidas porservicos sectoriais, directamente responsaveis perante o responsavel administrativoregional.

O Governo Central possui servicos sectoriais (verticais) nas Provincias e, nalguns casos,nos Concelhos / Municipios – directamente responsaveis a nivel nacional, perante oMinistro competente.

English:

The Indonesia Government is structured in two broad categories: central government andregional governments.

The President, who is elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly, forms the Cabinet,appoints Ministers and Provincial Governors and promulgates laws.

Regional government is organized in four levels: (i) Provinces, (ii) Districts (rural) andMunicipalities (urban), (iii) Sub-Districts and (iv) Villages (rural) and Urban Villages(urban).

Provincial Governors are appointed by the President from lists submitted by the ProvincialAssemblies.

Mayors are appointed by Governors from lists submitted by respective RegionalAssemblies.

Sectoral responsibilities in Provinces and Districts / Municipalities are undertaken bysectoral offices, directly responsible to the regional administrative head.

Central Government maintains sectoral (vertical) offices at Provinces and, sometimes,District level – directly responsible to the national Minister concerned.

5 From Introduction to Government, Administration, Planning and Budgeting in Indonesia – AustralianInternational Development Assistance Bureau, 1991


Annex 6Administrative Structure

BROAD ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA CNRTGOVERNO CENTRAL

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Provincia GovernadorProvince GovernorPropinsi Gubernur

RegiaoRegion

Concelho Administrador de Concelho Sub-RegiaoDistrict Mayor Sub-Region

Kabupaten Bupati

Posto Administrativo Administrador de Posto ZonaSub-District Sub-District Head ZoneKecamatan Camat

Suco Chefe de Suco (Liurai) NUREPVillage Village HeadDesa Kepala Desa

Povoacao Chefe de PovoacaoHamlet Hamlet HeadDusun Kepala Dusun


Annex 7Indonesia Public Administration Glossary

BAHASA ENGLISH PORTUGUESAsisten Assistant Assistente

Bappeda Regional DevelopmentPlanning Board (Provincesor Districts)

Conselho de Planeamentodo DesenvolvimentoRegional (Provincias ouConcelhos)

Bupati Mayor Administrador deConcelho

Camat Sub-District Head Administrador de PostoAdministrativo

Departmen Autonomi Autonomous Services Servicos Autonomos

Desa Village Suco

Dusun Hamlet Povoacao

Gubernur Governor Governador

Kabupaten District Concelho

Kecamatan Sub-District Posto Administrativo

Kepala Bagian Staff Offices Head –District

Chefe de Servicos Centrais– Concelho

Kepala Biro Staff Offices Head -Province

Chefe de Servicos Centrais– Provincia

Kepala Desa Village Head Chefe de Suco – Liurai

Kepala Dinas Line Offices Head Chefe de ServicosHorizontais

Kepala Dusun Hamlet Head Chefe de Povoacao

Kepala Kantor Wilayah Central GovernmentOffices Head – Province

Chefe de ServicosVerticais – Provincia

Kepala Kantor Departmen Central GovernmentOffices Head – District

Chefe de ServicosVerticais – Concelho

Kepala Urusan Sub-District Offices Head Chefe de Seccao do PostoAdministrativo

Pemerintah Pusat Central Government Governo Central

Propinsi Province Provincia


Annex 7 Page 2

Sekwilcam Sub-District Secretary Secretario do PostoAdministrativo

Sekwilda Province or DistrictSecretary

Secretario Provincial ou doConcelho)

Tk. I – Tingkat I 1st level – Province Primeiro Nivel – Provincia

Tk. II – Tingkat II 2nd level – District Segundo Nivel – Concelho

Wakil Gubernur Vice Governor Vice Governador


Annex 8Places Visited By The Civil Service Team

The Civil Service Team participated in a number of meetings in Dili, established variouscontacts with civil servants, and made visits to the remaining of public buildings.

The team also had the opportunity to make some visits and contacts at District, Sub-District, Village and Hamlet levels; the most relevant were:

29 October 1999

- Visi t to Dili civil service buildings

30 October 1999

- Interviews with former civil servants

Jose Quintao Sarmento, Assistant of Administration, District of DiliTeotonio de Assis, Head of Section of Finance, District of DiliFrancisco Tilman de Sa Benevides, in cherge of Agricultural ServicesJose Lourenco Mestre, Head Urban Sanitation (Refuse) Municipal Council of DiliAnanias da Costa, Head of Provincial Financial Services

31 October 1999

- In Ostico, in the District of Baucau, the Team interviewed Rodolfo Boavida, the Headof the Village on the organization, role and responsibilities of traditionaladministration;

- In Viqueque the Team had meetings with some of the community leaders and CNRTrepresentatives (namely Miguel Soares Pinto, Bernardo Quintao, Antonio Gregorio,Daniel Sarmento Soares, Antonio Vicente), between 4.30 and 7.30 PM.

1 November 1999

- The Team visited Kleren Mutin village (the village of widowers) in Viqueque;- In Dilor the Team met Father Antonio, Viqueque’s Parish Priest.

2 November 1999

- In Baucau, between 08.30-10.00 AM, the Team met Mr. Xanana Gusmao;- Between 10.45 AM to 11.30 part of team met with Mr. Miguel dos Santos Estaves,

Head of Finance and Accounting in Baucau District Administration- Part of the Team discussed issues related to education with the Students Solidarity

Council (Baucau Branch): Jose Dionisio Ximene, Policarpo Omar, Hipolito da CostaGama, Domingos da Silva

- Between 4.30PM to 6.00 PM, the Team met Sr. Antonio Amado Guterres a PrimarySchool principal in Laclo a sub-sub-district of Manatuto.


Annex 8 Page 2

3 November 1999

- Three members of the Team visited Suai, Maliana and Ambino.- In Suai they interviewed a former local Public Servant who did not want to be

identified;- In Maliana, the Team interviewed Sr. Francisco Martins, a former Public Servant who

became later a member of the teaching staff at the Faculty of Education and Training ofteachers at the University of East Timor, in Dili;

- In Ambino, the Team interviewed Sr. Joao, a member of CNRT in Oecusse.

5 November 1999

- Three members of the Team visited Liquica, meeting Mr. Amadeu Dias A. dos Santos,– Secretary of Internal Front (Resistance) in this area - discussing especially politicaland administrative structures at the local level.

General:

The team undertook an EMERGENCY PROJECT for the retrieval of data/documents relating to public administration

Objectives:Locate and collect all data/documentation lying in public buildingsClassify documents according to ServicesList data/documentsPack in boxesPrint listIn a later stage the data/documents will be reorganised by National Archives


Annex 9Courts and Judicial Institutions

9.1. Judicial Selection Commission (JSC)Composition: 5 East Timorese, 2 foreign expertsEstablishment: within a monthNomination: Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)

Areas of competence:a) Selection and recruitment of the judicial system agents (judges, prosecutors, court clerksand lawyers)

Suggested method: public notices for the recruiting of agents for the different judiciarypostings to be filled. The candidates would have to rate the four above-mentionedfunctions by order of preference. Selection criteria would be set by the SRSG inconsultation with the JSC and take into consideration the academic training, professionalexperience and integrity of the candidates.

b) To operate in practice as the higher judiciary instance in consultation with the SRSG

Suggestion: establishment of regulation; elaboration of a proposal for the geographiclocalisation and repartition of the courts.

c) Registration, accreditation and supervision of the law degree holder who will work inadvocacy

d) Analysis of the Legal Training Centre's annual report.

9.2. Courts

9.2.1. Dili

I. Tribunal de Dili

A. Secção Cível do Tribunal de Dili

1 juízo (1x3) Fase I (prazo de um mês)2º juízo (1x3) Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

Total: 3-6 juízes (3 mais 3)

B. Secção Penal do Tribunal de Dili

1 juízo (1x3) Fase I (prazo de um mês)2º juízo (1x3) Fase II (prazo de seis meses)


Annex 9 Page 2

C. Tribunal Superior de Dili

3 juízes Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

II. Juízo de Instrução

2 juízes de instrução Fase I (prazo de um mês)Câmara de Recurso Interlocutório (1 juiz) Fase I (prazo de um mês)

III. Delegação de Procuradoria

1 Procurador Fase I (prazo de um mês)1 Procurador Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

9.2.2. Los Palos

I. Tribunal de Los Palos (tribunal comum de competência geral)1 juízo (1x3) Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

Total: 3 juízes


1 juiz de instrução Fase II (prazo de seis meses)Câmara de Recurso Interlocutório (1 juiz) Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

III. Delegação da Procuradoria

1 Procurador Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

9.2.3. Maliana

I. Tribunal de Maliana (tribunal comum de competência geral)

1 juízo (1x3) Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

Total: 3 juízes


1 juiz de instrução Fase II (prazo de seis meses)Câmara de Recurso Interlocutório (1 juiz) Fase II (prazo de seis meses)


Annex 9 Page 3

III. Delegação da Procuradoria

1 Procurador Fase II (prazo de seis meses)

9.3. Law Commission

Composition: 3 East Timorese jurists, one of which is to be the Head of the Commission.Composition of the working groups: 1 member of the Commission (presiding), plus twoEast Timorese, plus two foreign experts.Set up: one month.Nomination: SRSG

The mandate of the LC would be the following:

- Define the initial priorities in terms of revision and adaptation of current legislation,bearing in mind the constant orientations, particularly of the 4 October 1999 UN SecretaryGeneral's report and SC resol. 1672;- And to this end, establish three specialised working groups according to the above-mentioned priorities, each presided by one member of the LC (such as in the areas ofcriminal justice, civil claims and commercial transactions). These groups would have threeto four months - from the date of their assuming their function - to submit concrete legalrevision and adaptation proposals;- Systematically reviews and updates laws according to prevailing economic and socialconditions.

9.4. Land and Property Commission

Headquarters: DiliComposition and nature: arbitration structure, composed of nine referees (who wouldthemselves choose one of the nine as President). Internal division: three Chambers, eachwith three referees who will designate a reporter. The LPC would also have a land andproperty registration function, which could also include arrangements for the recognition ofexisting land tenure and of customary system of land use and ownership (collective andcommunitarian). It could also work as a Land Bank (see, for a precedent, the experience ofGuatemala).Nomination: SRSGOrientating principles for the re-establishment of property law: to be priory defined as theywill constitute the concrete regulations to be applied by the Commission. Bearing in mindthe exceptional circumstances in the Territory, different ways of proving ownership willhave to be accepted, meaning in practice that anterior titles can prevail over posterior titles(even if these are substantiated by written documents or property registration) regardless ofthe nature of the proof presented.


Annex 9 Page 4

Specific regulations that could lead to solutions different from those that would be reachedby strictly applying civil law – in particular where proof is concerned.

By nature, the vocation of the Commission is not to settle cases other than those brieflydescribed above. Issues involving the responsibilities of States will arise between theIndonesian Republic and the future State of East Timor; specific problems resulting fromthe Indonesian de facto administration, but also from the birth of a new State will have tobe solved. In addition, the settlement of some questions to do with property ownership isrelated to other processes, some of which go beyond the Territory itself and can implyinvestigation of criminal activities - the investigation of the property of the Suharto familyundertaken by the Indonesian authorities, for instance.

The Commission's Chambers will operate in a manner similar to that of "mobile courts", inso far as the referees of each Chamber would travel periodically and according to a pre-established calendar to locations where a decision needs to be made. The claims lodged andinstructed by the collaborating local structures would thus be examined.

It is suggested that one of the Chambers be based in Dili while the other two exercise theirfunctions in the rest of the Territory, one in the western part, the other in the eastern part ofEast Timor.

These Chambers would be assisted on the ground by structures similar to the "JusticeCouncil" described above in the case of Ermera. These structures would have a consultativerole and contribute to the gathering of evidence in the cases brought before the Chambers.

9.5. Legal Training Centre (LTC)

Establishment: by the SRSGDirection: an East Timorese Jurist designated by the SRSG assisted by two foreignconsultantsMain goals: training of judges, public prosecutors, court clerks and lawyers

Areas of competence:

I. Short term

Up to two months after start of operation: selection of a number to be determined of EastTimorese jurists and law students to receive short and medium term scholarships to studyabroad. Other possibilities will later be determined: possible immediate hiring, possiblehiring at the conclusion of the training, possible hypothesis of hiring at the conclusion ofthe training.

The issue of language will take into the considerations in the attribution of the scholarshipfor training abroad. Some degree of fluency in Portuguese and English will be required.


Annex 9 Page 5

Up to six months after start of operation: establishment of a documentation centre andlibrary; definition of priorities; launch of the first short term, specific training sessions(matters considered urgent), resorting, if need be to foreign experts (intensive courses, inthe Territory, over a period of two weeks to a month).

Examples: disputes, appeals, human rights training (in cooperation with the NGOs whoshould be given a fundamental role in this area), etc.

These sessions, as well as the benefits to be derived from them will constitute criteria forpromotion (an evaluation system will have to be established).

II. Medium term (two – three years)

Up to the end of the transitional period: contribute in a general sense to the creation of aculture of law and order in the Territory; gradually build up the content of the trainingsessions; negotiation, under supervision of the SRSG, of agreements with foreignuniversities and institutions aiming at the development of a broader programme, inaccordance with the annual plan established in consultation with the judiciary services ofthe SRSG.


Annex 10Reconstruction of Buildings and

Temporary Accommodation

10.1. Judicial Selection Commission

§ The offices for the Judicial Selection Commission will be located in the court in Dili.

10.2. Courts

§ Re-construct former district court in Dili as first instance and appeal courts withoffices for prosecutors, lawyers, clerks, administration and research staff, secretaries,with 3 separate washroom facilities for judges, lawyers and prosecutors, and the publicrespectively, two holding cells, and a room for lawyers to confer with clients (1500square meters (“sq.m”))

§ Reconstruct buildings for courts in Los Palos and Maliana (210 sq. m) [in the secondsix months]. Locations for the courts have been selected to maximize geographicalcoverage and to take into account the sites of other public service offices, to takeadvantage of the economies of scale.


§ Reconstruct an existing building (assuming it has walls but no roof*) as the premisesfor the Land and Property Commission with offices and 2 hearing rooms of 50 sq.m.each. (300 sq.m.) [in year 2]

§ The Property Registry Offices will be located in public services premises in Dili andthe districts. [in year 3]

§ Similarly, the Mediation Committees of the Land Centers in districts would be locatedin the public service premises/complex.

10.4. Law Commission

§ Reconstruct an existing building* for the Law Commission (300 sq.m.) [in year 2]

10.5. Legal Training Center

§ Reconstruct an existing building* as the Legal Training Center with offices and 2classrooms (300 sq.m.) [in year 3]

10.6. Correctional facilities

§ Rebuild prison on the outskirts of Dili (4.500 sq.m) [in year 1]§ Build smaller prisons in two districts [years 2 and 3]


Annex 10 Page 2

10.7. Law Enforcement

§ Rebuild existing central police station in Dili as Police Headquarters (600 sq.m.) [inyear 1]

§ Construct police stations in 12 districts outside Dili, each with a holding cell (300sq.m.) [middle of year 2 through first half of year 3]

§ Construct the Police Training Academy in Dili with capacity for 350 trainees (___ sq.m.) [second half of year 2-first half of year 3]

§ Construct 50-person residential building for the Rapid Reaction Police with gym (750sq.m.) [in year 2]

Suggestions for temporary premises whilethe (re-)construction above takes place

§ Requisitions to use these buildings would be prepared by UNTAET.§ A wing of the large, former Governor’s Palace, which will be used in its entirety for the

Central Administration Offices (CAO), could be used for court proceedings in Dilipending reconstruction of the court building.53 staff

§ Existing buildings, possible prosecutor’s offices, could be used as temporary locationsfor the courts in Los Palos and Maliana court in the second six months of the first year.

§ The Land and Property Commission could initially operate out of the CAO, as couldthe Legal Training Center pending construction of buildings.24 staff plus 11 staff

§ This would mean that 110 judicial personnel would be initially be working out of theCAO.

§ CivPol offices could be used while the Police Headquarters in Dili and the 12 DistrictPolice Stations are rebuilt.

§ Training for police could take place in CivPol quarters pending the construction of thePolice Training Academy.

§ Rebuilding costs for premises of the public service are included in the public servicesector budget.

§ The timing of construction will be according to the relative degree of need within andbetween sectors and absorptive capacities.

The timing of construction is indicated in square brackets above.


Annex 11Furniture, Equipment And Vehicles

11.1. Judicial Selection Commission

§ Furniture for the Judicial Selection Commission located in the court building @ $USD200 per person

§ 2 computers

11.2. Courts

11.2.1. Court in Dili

§ 12 computers @ 5,000§ 2 cars @ 20,000§ basic library @3,000

11.2.2. and 11.2.3. Courts in Los Palos and Maliana

§ Furniture§ 1 car (for each of these courts)

11.2.4. to 11.2.9. Courts in Baucau, Ermera, Same, Suai and Viqueque

§ Furniture§ 1 car (for each of these courts)


§ 5 computers§ 2 cars§ specialized library on land issues @ 2000§ digital cameras to photograph plots of land @ 2,000


§ training equipment including overhead projectors and furniture @5,000


§ Furniture§ 6 computers


Annex 11 Page 2

11.6. Correctional Facilities

§ Furniture including 50 beds @ 40 for the prison in Dili§ 2 computers§ carpentry and gardening tools for vocational training§ 2 vans/vehicles

As above prorated for smaller prisons in two districts [years 2 and 3]


Furniture for Police Headquarters, Police Training Academy, and police stations in 12districts

§ microscope§ morgue refrigerator for forensic police§ handcuffs§ 10 cars and 20 motorcycles§ 5 boats @ 100,000 for Marine Police to be moored at Dili (2), Ambino, Baucau, and

Suai Rapid Response Police gear§ Hand-held and car radios§ 5 Landcruisers§ 2 helicopters

NB: The offices above will require supplies and materials


Annex 11 Page 3

Building Reconstruction Costs (US$m)Judicial Sector Summary

II. Level of Damage TotalLevel 1 Level 2 Level 3

ConstructionCourts $0.24 $0.82 $0.00 $1.06Law Commission $0.00 $0.17 $0.00 $0.17Land & Property Commission $0.00 $0.24 $0.00 $0.24Legal Training Center $0.00 $0.17 $0.00 $0.17Prisons $0.10 $0.00 $0.00 $0.10Sub Total Construction $0.34 $1.39 $0.00 $1.73

EquipmentCourt Equipment (inc. Computers) $0.08 $0.14 $0.00 $0.21Court Cars $0.04 $0.14 $0.00 $0.18LC Equipment (inc. Computers) $0.00 $0.03 $0.00 $0.03LC Cars $0.00 $0.06 $0.00 $0.06LPC Equipment (inc. Computers) $0.00 $0.03 $0.00 $0.03LPC Cars $0.00 $0.04 $0.00 $0.04LTC Equipment (inc. Computers) $0.00 $0.01 $0.00 $0.01Prison Equipment $0.02 $0.00 $0.00 $0.02Prison Vehicles $0.04 $0.00 $0.00 $0.04Sub Total Equipment $0.17 $0.44 $0.00 $0.61

Base Costs $0.51 $1.84 $0.00 $2.35


TOTAL COSTS (US$ millions) $0.56 $2.05 $0.00 $2.61


Annex 11 Page 4

Building Reconstruction Costs (US$m)Law Enforcement Sector Summary

III. Level of Damage TotalLevel 1 Level 2 Level 3

ConstructionPolice Stations $0.00 $2.35 $0.00 $2.35Rapid Response Team $0.00 $0.00 $0.60 $0.60Police Training Academy $0.00 $0.00 $0.72 $0.72Sub Total Construction $0.00 $2.35 $1.32 $3.67

EquipmentPolice Cars $0.00 $0.00 $3.20 $3.20Police Motor Bikes $0.00 $0.00 $0.64 $0.64Police Boats $0.00 $0.00 $25.00 $25.00RRT Helicopters $0.00 $0.00 $15.00 $15.00RRT Vehicles $0.00 $0.00 $0.15 $0.15PTA Equipment $0.00 $0.00 $0.04 $0.04Sub Total Equipment $0.00 $0.00 $44.03 $44.03

Base Costs $0.00 $2.35 $45.35 $47.70


TOTAL COSTS (US$ millions) $0.00 $2.70 $45.54 $48.25


Annex 12Basis for Budget Calculations - Personnel

Levels are indicated as follows:I = senior (average $105/month);II = medium (average $92/month);III = junior (average $58/month);Int. = International consultant, whose function will beassumed by East Timorese during the transitionalperiodInt. Ment. = International consultant, who will bephased out during the transitional period

12.1. Judicial Selection Committee

§ 5 national members (all for I year) : 5-I§ 2 international members (both for 1 year): 2-I§ 2 administrative assistants: 2-III

Total of 9 staff12.2. Courts

12.2.1. Dili

§ 12 national judges (3 civil & 3 criminal for one year; 3 civil & 3 criminal for 6months): 12-I

§ 3 appeal court judges (general jurisdiction - both civil and criminal - for 6 months): 3-I§ 3 investigating judges (for 1 year): 3-I§ 2 prosecutors (1 for 6 months, 1 for 1 year): 2-I§ 4 legal counsel (3 for 1 year, 1 for 6 months): 4-I§ 4 international mentors: 2 for judges, 1 for prosecutors, 1 for lawyers for 1 year who

would contribute to the emergency training organized by the training team: 4-Int. Ment.§ 3 international trainers, who collectively have expertise in training methodology,

substantive law, and management of a training institute (1 year): 3-I§ 6 East Timorese members of the training team (1 year) to assume responsibility for the

Legal Training Institute after one year and, possible the Judicial Training Institute and aBar Association training program subsequently: 3-I; 3-II

§ 2 national legal research and court administration staff: 2-II§ 1 international technical advisor on legal research and court admin. (1 year): 1-Int.§ 5 court clerks (3 for 1 year, 2 for 6 months): 3-II; 2-III§ 5 administrative assistants (3 for 1 year, 2 for 6 months): 5-III§ 3 court officials (to serve court documents, etc.) (2 for 1 year, 1 for 6 months): 3-III§ 2 interpreters (between Bahassa, Portuguese and Tetum): 2-II§ 2 national staff to offer language training: 2-II

Total of 57 court staff (professional and administrative), minus 4 in Dili in year 3 and 2in Maliana and in Los Palos in year 4, for a recurrent 53


Annex 12 Page 2

§ 2 drivers (for one year, or transportation to be contracted out )§ 1 cleaning staff (for one year, or maintenance to be contracted out)

12.2.2. and 12.2.3. Los Palos and MalianaEach require the following staff (all for 6 months of year 1) (X 2)

§ 3 national judges (both civil & criminal jurisdiction): 3-I§ 1 investigating judge: 1-I§ 1 prosecutor: 1-I§ 2 legal counsel: 2-I§ 2 clerk: 2-II§ 1 court official: 1-II§ 2 administrative assistants: 2-III§ 2 interpreters: 2-II

Total of 28 staff

§ 1 international mentor§ 1 driver§ 1 cleaning staff

12.3. Law and Property Commission

§ 9 national members/arbitrators: 9-I§ 6 national legal counsel to represent parties appearing before the Commission: 6-I§ 6 international legal advisors: 3-I§ 3 interpreters: 3-II§ 3 administrative assistants: 3-III

Total of 27 staff

§ 2 drivers§ 1 cleaning staff


§ 6 national staff: 3-I; 3-II§ 2 administrative assistants: 2-III§ 3 international technical advisors with collective expertise in substantive law, training

methodology, and management: 3-I

Total of 11 staff

§ 1 driver§ 1 cleaning staff


Annex 12 Page 3


§ 9 national members/lawyers: 9-I§ 3 administrative assistants: 6-III§ 6 international specialized legal advisors (consultants) assigned to each working group,

for example on commercial law; other civil law; and criminal law for one year: 3-I

Total of 22 staff

§ 3 drivers§ 1 cleaning staff

12.6. Correctional Facilities

12.6.1. Dili

§ 15 national prison officials, including (a) 1 Director, (b) one Deputy Director, (c) 1Administrator, (d) 2 vocational trainers (e.g., on agriculture and carpentry) (10 for 1year; 5 for 6 months): 2-I; 3-II; 10-III

§ 1 national administrative assistant support (to maintain register of inmates, etc.) (1year); 1-III

§ 2 international trainers for prison management and officials (1 year): 2-I

Total of 18 staff

§ 1 driver§ 2 cleaning staff

12.6.2. Two Additional Districts

§ 10 national corrections officials in each, including 1 Director, 1 Deputy Director, 1vocational trainer, and 7 officials: 2-I, 1-II, 7-III x 2

Total of 20 staff in 2 districts

Total in judicial institutions in first 6 months:161 (133 in Dili and 28 in districts, increasing in the districts in years 2 and 3)


- police officers


Annex 12 Page 4

12.8. TravelInternational consultants

Include amounts for international consultants as follows:

2 - Judicial Selection Committee4 - mentors. Add 2 in 2nd six months and 5 in years 2 and 33 - trainers1 - Law and Property Rights Commission1 - court administration & legal research6 - Law Commission2 - trainers for prison management and officials


Annex 13Required Legislation and Directions

Legislative action must be taken before the institutions described in the main text can beginto function. Generally, UNTAET will operate on the premise that the existing law of EastTimor (whether Portuguese or Indonesian) will continue to apply to the extent that it iscompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of UNTAET and internationallyrecognized standards of human rights. It may be that the existing law deals with aspects ofthe institutions that are recommended above. However, a detailed assessment of theexisting law would be time consuming. A practical solution would be for the TransitionalAdministrator to develop clear and concise direction on the functioning of the new judicialinstitutions on two levels:

• Laws to establish institutions and set out their mandate and powers.• More specific rules of procedure, guidelines or protocols for each institution.

To enhance implementation, the judges and lawyers within each institution would ideallyplay a role in developing the internal rules, guidelines or protocols that would apply to therespective institutions. These rules would be intended to provide practical and constructiveguidance on the way legal professionals would carry out their responsibilities. Similarly,frameworks will be required for the other sectors addressed in this report.

The legal framework and direction below is required as a basis for the judicial institutionsrecommended.

• Legislation that sets out the jurisdiction of the courts, including the appeal court,according to international fair trial and related guarantees.

• Rules of procedure for both levels of court that reinforce the independence andimpartiality of the courts.

• Legislation that sets out the mandate, composition and powers of the Law Commission.• Rules of procedure for the Law Commission.• Legislation that empowers the Land and Property Rights Commission to consider

evidence, decide disputes regarding the ownership of property, authorise theregistration of land according to the available evidence, and recommend a plan for landusage (e.g., agricultural, forestry, and residential allocations) to the TransitionalAdministrator.

• Legislation that governs the aims and use of detention and imprisonment.• Policy and operational guidelines or protocols for prison officials that are consistent

with international human rights standards.• Legislation that stipulates the powers of law enforcement officials consistent with

international human rights standards.• Policy and operational guidelines for police.

It will also be necessary to clarify the content of the law that judges are to apply. At ageneral level, the Transitional Administrator could adopt an initial law which wouldincorporate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on


Annex 13 Page 2

Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights into domestic law so that they can be applied directly by the courts. Toavoid a legal vacuum, the law could also state that UNTAET will operate on the premisethat the existing law of East Timor (whether Portuguese or Indonesian) will continue toapply to the extent that it is compatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of UNTAETand internationally recognised standards of human rights. In the same law, the security andanti-terrorism regulations derived from Indonesia could be expressly repealed.


Annex 14Options in the area of Economic and Commercial Law

In the short-term, the emphasis will have to be placed on the resolution of issues related tosubstantive legislation.To this end and has a preliminary step, the civil registry has to be reconstituted, inquiringwith both Portugal and Indonesia on the possibility of their providing the relevantinformation in their possession.

1. Reconstitution of the civil registry. – Cooperation between the CNRT, other politicalmovements, the Church (the members of which could carry out the data collectionnecessary for the civil registry) is particularly important in this case. Moreover, theChurch keep a number of registers (marriages, births, baptisms, etc… ) as the team wasable to verify in Baucau or Manatuto for instance.It is thus suggested forms to be handed out to the population so as to gather theinformation that would permit a prompt recuperation of the lost elements beimmediately elaborated. These forms should collect the following data: a) name; b) sex,c) parents, d) date and place of birth, e) marital status, f) identification documents orwitnesses. The data should be computerised.

2. Reconstitution of the registry of immovable goods (rural and urban buildings). –Such operation presents the advantage of prevent or control speculation in the sector. Inpractice, various forms of proof of ownership will have to be recognised (witnesses,documents, bills, photos, etc.); which would contribute to the progressive setting up ofplanning in the use of property, and to the establishment of regulations in the areas ofpublic health and urban planning – both of crucial importance given the fact that manyplaces have been completely destroyed, by preventing "savage" reconstruction.

3. Registration process. – Cases of undisputed ownership will be recorded by UNTAET(transition register).Investigation and verification mechanisms will have to be put in place to solve disputes.This matter was examined in Annex 1.4. The Land and Property Commission willadvise the informal investigation structures already in place in the Territory ("JusticeCouncils") on this matter. UNTAET will have to be informed of the final decisionreached on any dispute for registration purposes.In both cases, a certificate of temporary ownership will have to be issued and will serveto establish the permanent register. The data should therefore be computerised.Complex cases will not be settled by this instance given its temporary nature. Cases ofillegal appropriations of large sections of the Territory achieved in the name "publicinterest" when they were in fact aimed at benefiting private interests come under thiscategory.

4. Compensation and reparation of owner of immovable goods occupied orrequisitioned during the transitional phase. – The absence of sufficient immovableproperty/goods that can be used by international agencies and NGOs has made theoccupation or requisition of private property necessary. In certain cases, this occupationwas unknown to the respective owners; in others, the owner has knowledge of the


Annex 14 Page 2

5. requisition – and can have agreed to it – but no measure has been taken to proceed toany reparation. This problem should receive the immediate and careful attention of theTransitional Administration for the social implications it has.

6. Reconstitution of the Business Register. – A form should be prepared to this effect,similar to the civil register form above-mentioned. Access to the computerised datakept by the Indonesian banks being impossible, other means of proving ownership willhave to be accepted.

7. Reviving of the insurance sector. – The urgent establishment of insurance companieswill have to be one of the Transitional Administration's priorities for the fundamentalimportance they will have in covering risks inherent to the reconstruction ofinfrastructures and recovery of equipment in the Territory. In addition, the cover ofprivate risk (construction, automotive sector, labour and commercial activity, etc.) willbe an important contribution to secure judicial relations, and economic development.


Annex 15Informal Justice Process

(Ermera, from March 1999)(Portuguese)

I. Comissão de Justiça (10 membros)

Constituída por chefes tradicionais (liurais) e pessoas experientes e respeitadas nacomunidade. Estrutura vocacionada para a composição e resolução de conflitos. Decidesegundo um processo que, ainda que informal, se assemelha ao de um tribunal: audiênciadas partes, respeito pelo princípio do contraditório, etc.

II. Comissão de Investigação (8 membros)

Constituída por elementos com diferentes lógicas de representação: juventude, mulheres,aparelho do CNRT, etc. Actua na esfera da Comissão de Justiça, e tem como tarefafundamental proceder à averiguação de factos controvertidos entre as partes, ou, como nocaso de acusações de crimes praticados recentemente no Território, investigar e ouvirtestemunhas quanto a casos concretos.


Annex 16List of Persons in East Timor with Experience in the Judiciary Sector

(Dili, 4.11.1999)(Portuguese)

1) Pedro de Jesus (desde 1978) Administração da Procuradoria (PB)2) António Matos do Rego Dactilógrafo (B)3) António Mascarenhas da Costa Contabilidade (PB)4) Mário Sousa Lay Dactilógrafo (B), no sector da administração dos

funcionários (além disso, frequência do 3º ano de Direitoem Jakarta)

5) António Manuel Soares Auxiliar no sector do correio (PB)6) Francisco de Jesus Nunes Escriturário, no sector da administração dos funcionários

(PB). Reside nas traseiras do edifício da ProcuradoriaSuperior

7) Mário Soares Auxiliar no sector do correio (PB)8) Francisco de Fátima Auxiliar (B)9) Carlos do Rego Dactilógrafo (B)10) Celestino de Jesus Auxiliar (B)11) Geraldo da Costa Escriturário (PB)12) Inês da Silva Araújo Matos Escriturária (PB)13) Bartolomeu da Costa Auxiliar (B)14) Sebastião do Rego Auxiliar (B)15) Francisco Alves Auxiliar (B)16) José Gomes Computadores (B)17) Francisca Mansa Computadores (B)18) Adriano Soares Escriturário (B)19) João Henriques Procurador. Licenciado em Direito. Reside em Comoro,

perto da Igreja, na Casa dos funcionários (B)20) Pedro Henriques Secretário (B)21) Armando Soares Auxiliar (B)22) Angelino Barreto Secretário (PB)23) Norberto Auxiliar de Secretaria (B)24) Honório Trindade Auxiliar de Secretaria (B)25) Benedita Tilman Escriturária (B)26) Maria Mendes Escriturária (PB)27) Maria Odete Lumena Auxiliar de Secretaria (PB)28) DomiNGO’s da Costa Rosário Auxiliar (B)29) Sebastião da Costa Auxiliar (B)

B – Bahassa indonésioPB – Português e Bahassa indonésio


Annex 17Description of Judiciary Buildings in Dili

(Portuguese)

A) Edifício do Tribunal Distrital de DiliEdifício de dois pisos, com aproximadamente 1600 m2 (mais ou menos 40x45m) - solo,composto por um edifício principal, em forma de M, contando ainda com um anexo. Oestado de destruição é quase total, restando ainda, em parte, os muros. No anexoencontravam-se muitos documentos, em relativamente bom estado, a maior parte delesainda na colocação nas estantes, e, pelo que foi dado ver, começavam em 1983 e vinhamaté mais de meados dos anos 90. Seria urgente a sua recuperação e conservação, ainda quese tenha solicitado ao vigilante que lá se encontrava (visita: dia 4 de Novembro de 1999)de, por ora, velar pela sua salvaguarda.

Descrição mais detalhada: 1 gabinete para a defesa; 1 gabinete para o Procurador; 1Secretaria da Secção Cível, com um gabinete para o escrivão respectivo; 1 Secretaria daSecção Penal, com um gabinete para o escrivão respectivo; 1 sala de audiências para aSecção Cível, outra para a Secção Criminal, mais uma sala grande de audiências; 2 celascontíguas, uma das quais com WC, 2 salas para arquivo, uma Secretaria-Geral, umaContadoria, 2 salas para serviços administrativos, 1 gabinete do Juiz Presidente, 1 gabinetedo vice-Presidente, gabinete para mais quatro juízes, 1 biblioteca.Destruição do mobiliário, das instalações sanitárias, de água e electricidade.

B) Edifício do Tribunal Provincial de Dili (actualmente ocupado pela INTERFET)Estado: razoável, edifício com tecto, infiltrações prováveis de águas. Não tem portas oujanelas, nem mobiliário. Composto, no total, por 16 divisões, além de uma sala deaudiências grande. Destruição do mobiliário, das instalações sanitárias, de água eelectricidade.

C) Procuradoria Distrital de DiliEdifício em forma de L com, aproximadamente, 1000 m2 (solo). Destruição por fogo quasecompleta. Sem telhado, ou telhado em grande parte destruído. Materiais e acabamentosinexistentes ou destruídos. Destruição do mobiliário, das instalações sanitárias, de água eelectricidade.

D) Procuradoria Provincial de DiliEdifício de dois pisos em forma de F deitado, com aproximadamente, 1600 m2 (solo).Estava distribuído, grosso modo, da seguinte forma: a ala direita, delinquência criminalgeral; a ala esquerda, delinquência criminal especial (corrupção e terrorismo), assim comouma parte reservada aos serviços de inteligência política; a extremidade esquerda,reservada às chefias; a ala central (aprox. 700 m2 solo), à administração. Destruição porfogo quase completa. Sem telhado, ou telhado em grande parte destruído. Materiais eacabamentos inexistentes ou destruídos. Destruição do mobiliário, das instalaçõessanitárias, de água e electricidade.


Annex 18Selected East Timorese Students Studying Portuguese

(“Curso de Português do Grupo de Sto. Inácio de Loyola – Lahane, Dili”)

Nome Faculdade

1. Abílio Emanuel A. Barros Telecomunicações2. Abrão Lopes do Rosário3. Adélia Paulo M. M. Branco4. Adelina Andrade de Jesus Economia/Contabilidade5. Adelino da Ressureição6. Adérito L. C. A. de Araújo7. Agostinho Cabral8. Agostinho Emiliano dos Santos9. Agostinho Lelan10. Agostinho Pinto11. Agostinho Soares G. Amaral Veterinária12. Alberto Saldanha13. Alcino Pinto14. Amaro Freitas Soares15. Amelia do Rosário Electrónica16. Ancelmo da Silva17. Angélica de Amaral Quintão18. Arlindo Maia dos Reis19. Armindo do Rosário Ximenes20. Augusta M. Sarmento Lopes Agricultura21. Belchior Maria A. B. Guterres Informática22. Bernardino da Silva23. Boavida Ribeiro24. Camílio Ximenes Almeida25. Carlito Pereira26. Célia D. M. M. Gusmao Farmácia27. César M. de J. R. Mesquita28. César Wilson B. Barbosa29. Clementino da Silva30. Cristina Ximenes31. Diamantino de Araújo32. DomiNGO’s da Silva33. Dorteia da Silva Soares34. Dulcemeia de F. B. Barbosa35. Dulcia Angélica da Costa36. Édia da Costa37. Egas Quintão38. Ércio de Jesus Nunes39. Estêvão da Silva40. Feliciano Adriano41. Felisberto Brito Engenharia Agrónoma42. Felismina Martins43. Filomeno de Jesus44. Floreano da Silva Alves45. Florinda Pascolea B. Barbosa46. Francisco Nicolau B. Barbosa47. Gastão Soares Freitas48. Geovaldo Carvalho Soares49. Guilhermina Barbosa IPI (Inst. de Relig. e Moral)50. Hermenegildo Abílio51. Hugo Áureo Filipe Alves52. Imaculada M. da Costa53. Jacinto Amaral54. Jaime Camacho55. Joanico Amaral


Annex 18 Page 2

56. João da Costa Barreto57. João dos Santos Construção Civil58. João Evangelista Freita59. João Freitas da Silva60. Joaquim Amaral Ciência Politica61. Joaquim da C. Guterres62. Joaquina da Costa Língua Inglesa63. Joaquina Fernandes64. Joaquina Ximenes IPI (Inst. de Relig. e Moral)65. Joel Paulo M. M. Branco66. José Celestino Nuno67. José da Costa Oliveira Estudos Politécnicos68. José da Ressureição Veterinária69. José M. Assis Gonçalves Ciência Política (4º Ano)70. José Manuel Soares71. José Pinto72. Jucelina C. R. Barros Economia73. Júlia Onorina A. de Jesus Telecomunicações74. Julieta X. Dias75. Júlio Lopes76. Justina Pinto77. Juvenal Francisco Lemos78. Juvêncio Maria Fernandes79. Letízia de A. Smith80. Lino de Jesus da Silva81. Lino do Rosário82. Lourença Guterres da Silva83. Lourenço Martins84. Lourenço Saldanha Neves85. Luciana Pereira da C. Mendonça86. Luis da Silva87. Luis da Silva88. Luis G. Andrade89. Madalena da Silva IPI (Inst. de Relig. e Moral)90. Marcelino Soares Estudos de lingua indonesia91. Marcos Soares Pacheco92. Maria Aquelina F. Soares93. Maria Joana B. Barbosa94. Maria José Menezes95. Maria Sarmento Aleixo96. Mário Frederico97. Martinho Amaral98. Mateus do Rosário99. Nuno Valentim F. Alves100. Oldegar Paulo M. M. Branco101. Paulino Almeida102. Pedro António B. Barbosa103. Pedro de Jesus104. Pionelson Pereira da Silva105. Ricardo Ximenes Letras106. Roberto Gonçalves da Costa107. Rogério Carvalho Direito108. Romana da Costa Borges109. Sebastião da Silva110. Sérgio da Silva de Jesus111. Severina Soares de Araújo112. Teresa Jacinta113. Venâncio Fernandes Agricultura114. Vitorina M. da Costa115. Zeca Amaral


Annex 19 Selected List of Meetings of Judiciary Sector Team

1) Liquiçá: CivPol agent

2) Baucau: Bishop Basílio Nascimento; CivPol agent; CNRT (Manuel da Costa Pinto)

3) Dili: Lt.-Col. Paulo Martins (East Timor Police); Mr. Simeon Antoulas (Head of

Mission, ICRC, Dili); Mr. Rodney Hatfield (UNICEF); Col. Ian Westwood (advocate,

INTERFET); Ms. Sophie Khan (Carter Centre); Mr. Daniel Ravindran (Secretary,

International Investigation Commission, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human

Rights); M. Andrew Ladley (Legal Advisor, UNAMET-UNTAET); Commissioner Alan

Mills (UNTAET, CivPol Component)

4) Manatuto: INTERFET agent; church responsible

5) Gleno and Ermera: CNRT (Victor Maia, Eduardo Deus Barreto); OMT (D. Liberata

Barreto, D. Aquilina Maria Guterres); FALINTIL (Com. Ular)

6) Suai: CNRT (Manuel Gomes de Araujo, Francisco dos Reis Magno)

7) Ambino: CNRT (José António Ote)


Annex 20List Of Acronyms

CivPol Civilian Police Component of UNTAET

JSC Judicial Selection Commission

LC Law Commission

LPC Land and Property Commission

LTC Legal Training Center

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General


Annex 21Reconciliation, Psycho-Social Trauma, Resettlement

1, Reconciliation

All societies require social mechanisms to overcome the divisions and complex legaciescaused by recent major conflict. In the East Timor context, several different approaches arefavoured. Since the second half of 1998, for example, the Catholic Church initiated a seriesof reconciliation and dialogue meetings in order to bring together Timorese of all politicalpersuasions. These became known as the Dare meetings, the last of which Dare II held inJune 1999 in East Timor and in Jakarta. These meetings focussed specifically on promotingdialogue and conciliation between those favouring autonomy and those favouringindependence. Immediately after the most recent conflict and the departure of Indonesianforces, communities in the Bacau diocese were encouraged to perform plays to re-enactmany of the traumatic events they had experienced.

The CNRT through its president, Xanana Gusmao had consistently advocated a policy ofreconciliation although this has undergone some hardening in light of the recentdevastation. Amnesties and collective responsibility were central components of thereconciliation policy. The current slightly hardened attitude involves a call for justice andthe recovery of truth, a demand echoed by the Bishops and the Church.

It is generally accepted that the pro integration movement responsible for much of theviolence, killing and destruction of the past were not a homogenous group and responsesmust be graded accordingly. Among the militia themselves there are varying degrees ofresponsibility and culpability. Some of the militia leaders and members were directlyengaged in and responsible for very serious criminal activities. Others were coerced andeven these can be divided between those who did not participate in extreme actions butnevertheless exploited opportunities such as looting and those who attempted to minimizedestruction or help victims. Even the civilians who supported the autonomy option mightbe divided into activists and simple followers.

To address this range of concerns, reconciliation today is therefore perceived as needing tocontain the following elements:

a. HealingDeveloping and establishing a mechanism for the discovery of truth and reconstruction ofhistorical memory, allowing people to tell their stories and developing mechanisms toallow for catharsis.

b. Truth recoveryDevelop a mechanism to allow those responsible to confess what they have done / explainreasons for their actions and recognise their past mistakes.Rehabilitation programs for members of militia involved in petty crimes.

c. National justiceProsecuting and trying political leaders, militia commanders and militia membersresponsible for killing and serious crimes such as rape and torture.


Annex 21 Page 2

d. International Criminal TribunalProsecuting and trying military personnel responsible for war crimes.

2. Psycho-social trauma

The widespread trauma experienced during the last 24 years of military occupation wasfurther compounded by the last months of violence and killing. Generally, these wereintense, albeit short, periods of extreme forms of state sponsored terrorism although insome districts such as Liquica and Kovalima the violence and intimidation spanned half ayear. Within the last twenty four years, most Timorese people have experienced a range oftraumatic events. Specialised services established to deal with psycho-social rehabilitationmust therefore encompass and be designed to address the nation’s history of trauma.Trauma counselling is an important aspect of psycho-social rehabilitation but often needsto form part of an integrated mental health program that includes a referral service wherepsychotherapy and other types of intervention are available.

Specific recommendations in this area are contained in the health section of the JAMReport, however, detailed response strategies may not be possible until more reliabletrauma assessment data becomes available. One aspect that may be explored andconsidered in terms of promoting catharsis would be a project of recovery of historicalmemory and retelling of and recording of individual experiences through the help ofappropriately trained facilitators. World experience with such programs has expandedconsiderably in recent years and the JAM supports efforts to make this informationavailable to the Timorese community through a tailored program of learning and exchange.

3. Resettlement

Much focus is being place on the problems arising from the recent mass displacementwhich saw around two thirds of the population displaced as a result of the violence thatfollowed the announcement of the results of the August 30th ballot. This massivedisplacement however should not be seen in isolation from earlier resettlement experiencewhen developing a response for the resettlement of the internally displaced and refugees.

From the late ’seventies to the early ’eighties, a large section of the rural populationexperienced forced resettlement during the course of the military occupation. Wholevillages were frequently uprooted during military crackdowns and forced into controlledareas (guided villages) to curtail rebellion and resistance. The area of Lalerek Mutinvisited by the JAM mission provides a case study of the nature and dimensions of theseforced resettlements.


Annex 21 Page 3

Lalerek Mutin became infamous as the village of widows because of the drastically reducedmale population that followed the sustained targeting of adult males. Of Lalerek Mutin’s anoriginal population of 2,700 people, 700 surviving women and children were forced intotwo concentration-type camps (SP1 and SP2). These survivors lived there under strictlyenforced rules. They were prevented from travelling further than a 2 kms radius beyond thevillage boundaries (including the land that they were able to cultivate). The people werealso subjected to a highly controlled administration system. The villagers regarded theadministration as blatantly corrupt and recounted instances where the chiefs of the hamletswere forced to write fictitious reports for the village head confirming receipt ofdevelopment funds that had never reached them.

When asked whether they wished to return to their original Kraras village, some people ofLalerek Mutin stated that the question needed to be asked of all the people concerned.Some thought that the conditions in Kraras were not conducive to their economic survivaland therefore preferred to stay in Lalerek Mutin where the land was more fertile.

Recommendations

In the course of short term resettlement and rehabilitation programs, those affected need beconsulted on whether they want to return to their original dwelling place.

Development of programs to adjudicate disputes that are likely to arise when communitiesseek to return to lands that have since been occupied by others. Of particular relevance willbe the proposed civil administration program of UNTAET.

Programed opportunities to redraw administrative boundaries according to communitypreference and resource availability.


Annex 22Gender and Vulnerable Groups

1. Gender

Under most Timorese traditional systems, the role of women is system was severelylimited e.g. they could be chosen as members of the council of elders eg. as in the Imbei ofLaklo and fulfil a respected social function, however, the system was, and is, largelydiscriminatory towards women. Men dominate decision making power and leadership roleswithin the village such as head of the village (Chefes de Suco) and Lian Nain ( who play anarbitrator role in resolving disputes).

In situations where a man has raped, fathered a child out of wedlock or wishes to divorcehis wife, the system of Kaso Sala (compensation) is widely practised. Complaints are takento the Lian Nain who sets an amount to be paid as compensation. Such compensation isassumed to restore the dignity and honour of the woman and her family. In the villages andremote areas where kaso sala is practised the victim must be satisfied with this system asthere is no other recourse.

Men and women’s role in society has changed substantially as a result of the major socialdisruption of the last 24 years. The struggle for liberation has seen women participating inall aspects of the clandestine front and even in the armed resistance as armed Falintilguerillas. For the sake of survival, past nurturing roles of housewives and mothers havebeen drastically extended to embrace traditional male income generation roles. Men havealso seen their roles change drastically and have had to accept new roles within the home incircumstances where women have slowly gained new skills and responsibilities at timesplacing them in higher positions than men. With the arrival of political freedom, womenare concerned that society will respect the new acquired roles of women and will not forcea return to traditional roles.

Recommendations

Provision of gender training and capacity building (via Gender Equity Commission,Timorese Women’s Organisation (OMT), Timorese Women’s Popular Organisation,Transitional Council, Research and Planning Commission, National Political Council )Civic and human rights education programsInstitution building and capitalisation of women’s organisationsFacilitating access to micro credit, social fund programs to women

2. Vulnerable Groups

East Timor’s liberation struggle has produced a number of vulnerable groups requiringparticular attention. These include widows and orphans, ex-prisoners and those whoabandoned careers and studies to join the clandestine front or armed forces and.


Annex 22 Page 2

a. Widows

As with the example of the killings in Kraras, the 24 years of occupation has left a largepopulation of widowed women. These include widows of Falintil fighters and politicalactivists and women widowed due to the widespread military crackdowns in the late 70sand early to mid 80s. As a result many widows have had to single handedly raise theirfamilies and take on other responsibilities and duties previously exercised by theirhusbands. The recent physical and economic destruction has made the position of many ofthese women extremely vulnerable. Unfortunately, reliable statistics are not available.Although most recent Indonesian figures suggest that nine percent of households wereheaded by women, anecdotal evidence suggest the figure may be substantially higher.

b. Orphans and Children of War

As in the case of widows, recent events have further worsened and already serioussituation. The church and the religious orders have played a major role in providing homes,support and schooling to the orphans. Some orphans are taken in by the extended familysystem, whilst others who have no immediate family members are taken in by neighboursor other families. In some cases, general economic stress has seen orphans treated more asdomestic servant than as family member.

Some Timorese women have been raped and forced to bear the children of militarypersonnel. There have been occasions where the same woman has borne several children,all of different fathers. These have been dubbed children of war and although largelyaccepted by the mothers, the mother, child and sometimes family carry the stigma of theirbirth with them. Although there is general social concern about the use of children workers,orphans and children of war are the most likely group to be forced to work to supplementfamily income and/or support their schooling.

Recommendations

Conduct as soon as practical, survey and needs assessment of vulnerable groupsDevelop programs in consultation with village councils to facilitate reintegration intosociety by ensuring access to education, health, social welfare and employment programs.

c. Ex-political Prisoners

The majority of political prisoners were men. Some served lengthy prison sentences whilstothers were arrested, imprisoned released, rearrested and imprisoned a number of times. Allhave experienced some form of interrogation and beating if not been subjected to moreserious forms of torture.

Upon release, married prisoners in particular returned home to changes in the family.Whilst in the past the wife may have assumed a passive and dependent role, she likelywould have had to develop new skills in caring alone for her family during the


Annex 22 Page 3

imprisonment of her husband. The family therefore needs to adjust and learn to livetogether again. Often this is done successfully, however, less successful reintegrationfrequently leads to gambling, alcohol abuse and violence within the family.

The major changes experienced during 1999 and the new era of nation building have leftmany people in this vulnerable group without a clear direction, hesitant and sometimesfearful of the future. Many felt left behind by the developments happening whilst they wereimprisoned and now feel inadequate beside countrymen who were not incarcerated andwho have had better opportunities.

Recommendations

Support Programs should be introduced for:Addressing the traumatisation of imprisonment and the loss of skills by the prisoners.Assisting victims adjust to changed roles within the family and reintegration as fullyfunctioning and respected members of society.

d. The Lost Generation

The resistance structures such as the clandestine and armed fronts, reached across allstrands of the Timorese social spectrum. It included professionals, public servants, highschool and tertiary students, housewives, the elderly, the clergy and the illiterate. All wereregarded by Indonesia as the Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK) - “destroyers ofstability groups”. Participation in the struggle left a range of legacies but for some theimpact has been one of ongoing vulnerability.

Bishop Ximenes Belo has referred to the lost generation of youth as one such grouprequiring particular attention. The lost generation includes youth who were integrated intothe struggle and as a consequence either dropped out of school or had their schoolingfrequently interrupted because of their activism. These young people are today unskilledand lack direction. Others are young people caught in a cycle of violence who have lostparents or family members in violent circumstances, have experienced violence within thehome and who also lack direction, confidence and skills. Some have become furthermarginalised and are involved in gambling and disruptive behaviour.

e. FALINTIL

FALINTIL fighters include men and women who joined the armed struggle under a varietyof circumstances and at various times over the last twenty four years. Some were originallymembers of the Portuguese army who moved to FRETILIN in the mid 70s and were driveninto the hills after the invasion. Others joined FALINTIL later after being persecuted,imprisoned, raped and or having witnessed their family members being killed.


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Recommendations

Programs should be developed as soon as possible to assist the reintegration of Falintilfighters into civil society. These programs must take careful account of the individualcircumstances and wishes of Falintil members and their families.


Annex 23Social Development Fund

Situation assessment

In many war-torn societies, social capital has been destroyed during violent conflict. Inthese situations, the rebuilding of social capital is among the most challenging tasks ofpost-conflict reconstruction. In East Timor, however, the end of Indonesian rule broughtwith it the departure of most transmigrants, leaving behind a fairly homogenous society ofTimorese. Rather than being a liability because of its absence, social capital is strong andhence among the key assets to guide post-conflict reconstruction.

Objectives

The objective of this component would be to help communities utilize their social capital inorder to realize its full potential both for building a new nation and to assist the only groupwith severe problems of social integration, i.e. those Timorese who have in one way oranother supported the pro-autonomy militia movement.

Priority interventions

The more information there is, the less people are prone to rumors. Communicating directlyand transparently also helps to overcome fear and find a common purpose. The socialdevelopment fund would, thus, aim at bringing together diverse population groups in arange of social activities, thus including all walks of life in the building of the new nation.The fund would include activities at the national and local levels in order to raise awarenesswithin the communities about the economic, social and political challenges of post-conflictreconstruction. At the national level, activities of social communication are proposed. At thelocal level, the fund would support community social activities.

National level: social communication

The fund would support three distinct means of social communication: (i) radio and video,(ii) print media (weekly), and (iii) popular folk media. Jointly, they would offer differentways to provide people with information, knowledge, ideas and the introduction ofattitudes and ways of doing things together in harmony. They would help build culturalidentity and national coherence, raise political awareness and participation, and offerchannels for formal and informal education. For instance, popular folk media, in particularsocial drama, would present the many facets of national reconstruction in a manner thateffectively catches and retains the interest of the audience. The shows would be shown inall parts of the country and would also be recorded on video to facilitate a cost-effective,broader and more frequent circulation of the ideas and messages in the communities.

Local level: community social activities

The fund would support activities that build on and strengthen community cohesion andsocial capital, such as adult education programs, civic and peace education, workshops anddiscussion groups, creating meeting places, music and sports groups, documentation of oral


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history, traditional cleansing and reconciliation ceremonies, and the creation orrevitalization of church and community centers. A particular effort would be made toexchange experiences between communities. The various activities would be identified andimplemented by community groups (traditional leaders, women, youth, etc.), churchgroups, schools, and specialized NGOs. These activities would accompany communityefforts aimed at physical reconstruction and together would empower people to makechoices and find a common ground to work together harmoniously.

Implementation arrangements

Being an integral component of the community recovery project, the social developmentfund would follow its provisions for implementation, financial management, monitoring,and evaluation. More specifically, at the national level, the central project coordination unitwould be responsible for contracting the various activities to local groups and NGOs. Atthe kecamatan level, each community committee would receive $ 3,000 per year over threeyears and would be responsible for managing these funds. The identification and appraisalprocedures for each proposed project would also follow the guidelines of the communityrecovery project.

Budget estimate

The total budget of this component is estimated at US$ 1.3 million (of which $ 0.6 millionfor 2000) and is composed as follows:

3 years 1 year

150,000 150,000 radio equipment 10,000 10,000 video equipment 25,000 25,000 print media equipment 30,000 30,000 drama equipment 50,000 50,000 other equipment vehicles, etc.

265,000 265,000 total equipment 135,000 45,000 radio and video staff 5 staff, 750 $ p.m., 3 years

81,000 27,000 print media staff 3 staff, 750 $ p.m., 3 years 216,000 72,000 total staff 108,000 36,000 radio and video operating costs 3,000 $ p.m., 3 years 108,000 36,000 print media operating costs 3,000 $ p.m., 3 years

45,000 15,000 drama recurrent 15,000 $ p.a., 3 years 261,000 87,000 total recurrent 742,000 424,000 total social communication 387,000 129,000 43 project kecamatans 3,000 $ p.a., 3 years 387,000 129,000 total community social activities 180,000 60,000 administration and contingencies

US$ 1,309,000 613,000 total social development fund


Annex 24Special Assistance to War-Affected Vulnerable Groups

Situation analysis

During the fight for independence, many people have risked their lives and lost theirlivelihoods for the better of the entire Timorese population. These may include women whohave lost their husbands in armed struggle, children who have lost their fathers in this way,and veteran fighters who have lost a limb. In many instances, because of living under harshconditions, they have not been able to establish an economic base of their own. The needsof these groups have also not been addressed before.

Objective

The objective of this component would be to provide special assistance to those vulnerablehouseholds who are most affected by the armed struggle for independence. Such assistancewould address short-term needs of immediate subsistence as well as longer-term needs ofestablishing sustainable livelihoods.

Priority interventions

The provision of a transitional safety net in the form of a basket of basic goods wouldaddress the short-term needs of immediate subsistence of the most war-affected vulnerablehouseholds. This basket would be commensurate with the assistance received by returningrefugees and IDPs and include consumption goods (rice, oil, salt) and investment goods(clothing, household utensils, shelter). The consumption component would cover theconsumption needs for a period of about six months. The investment component would bea one-time support and could be provided in cash and/or in kind. For shelter, the provisionof GCI sheets, nails, timber, and tools would be envisaged.

A variety of instruments would be used to address the longer-term needs of sustainablelivelihoods. These instruments would include support to agricultural production(distribution of tools and seeds), livestock, formal and non-formal education, vocationaltraining and apprenticeships, formal and informal sector employment, and micro-enterprisedevelopment. It would be the decision of the household which member would benefit fromwhich activity. Each household would benefit only once.

Implementation arrangements

Communities would be allocated a certain amount of funds, depending on the number ofwar-affected vulnerable groups in the community, with the amount per vulnerablehousehold reaching approximately $ 900. The community committees would beresponsible for identifying and registering the specially vulnerable households and wouldmanage the funds for both activities independently.

Procedures for the provision of the transitional safety net could follow the principlesestablished by relevant agencies for the return of refugees and IDPs. The central projectunit may assist the communities in the procurement of goods in order to achieve economies


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of scale through bulk orders. The procedures for sustainable livelihoods projects wouldfollow the provisions of the community recovery project (KDP), including financialmanagement, contracting, micro-project appraisal, and monitoring and evaluation.

Budget estimate

The total budget of this component is estimated at US$ 1.5 million (all of which for 2000)and is composed as follows:

1,500 households 300 house ($) 300 consumption and other investment goods ($) 300 support for sustainable livelihoods ($) 900 total assistance per household ($)

1,350,000 total support cost ($) 150,000 administration

1,500,000 total cost ($)


Annex 25Youth Development Project

1. Situation assessment

During the fight for independence, many youth groups have been formed to support thecause of the resistance. Fifteen of these groups later formed the Presidio Juventude LorecoAsuai to coordinate their efforts. With the onset of independence, these groups are insearch of their role in a new nation. They also have a desire to be recognized as members ofcivil society. The Presidio is, thus, planning a national conference, to be held later this year,to refocus the efforts of youth on facilitating and supporting reconstruction anddevelopment in East Timor.

Many young people – uneducated, unoccupied, unemployed and excluded – became willfulfollowers of the pro-autonomy militia and perpetrated violent acts and war crimes. Theemployment situation in East Timor’s private sector has never been very encouraging andis even worse now due to the systematic destruction of the economic base. Youth andadults alike are very much aware that continued unemployment and exclusion of youth maylead to their further militarization, forcing them to adopt violence as a coping strategy topost-conflict misery.

At the same time, it is this same youth who carries tremendous potential for overcomingthe effects of conflict. Unleashed, this potential can carry physical reconstruction (throughparticipation in the labor force) and sow the seeds for lasting peace (through investments inhuman and social capital). It is, therefore, of utmost importance to include youth in thereconstruction process as equal partners. Three interrelated types of inclusion can therebybe distinguished: economic, social and political.

2. Priority interventions

Economic inclusion

Strategies of economic inclusion aim at achieving sustainable livelihoods by making youthproductive members of society. Key elements include formal education, vocational trainingand apprenticeships, employment and self-employment. Support can take various formssuch as scholarships for secondary or technical education, literacy training, foreignlanguage training, informal sector subsidies for on-the-job training, labor-intensive publicworks programs, wage subsidies for formal sector employers (in particular in the privatesector), and financial assistance for micro-projects designed by and for youth groups. Thesetypes of support generally form part and parcel of post-conflict reconstruction assistanceand only need to be enhanced by a particular focus on youth.

In order to better target assistance, a socio-economic profile of youth would be developed.Using qualitative and/or quantitative methods, their demographic characteristics, needs andaspirations would be identified. Employment opportunities would also be identified in allsectors of the economy, in particular agriculture, the rural economy in general, and theurban informal economy. Furthermore, labor market opportunities (including public worksand other employment programs) and training capacity (including apprenticeships) would


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be assessed for matching the supply and demand sides of the labor market for youtheffectively.

Social inclusion

Social inclusion may pose the most difficult challenge as it does not depend on externalproject interventions but on internal acceptance by community members. Such acceptanceis a particular challenge for militarized youth who in the course of the recent conflict mayhave committed violent acts in the midst of their own communities. At the same time,social inclusion may be the most important form of inclusion as further purposefulexclusion of youth by community members may sow the seeds of yet another conflict.Youth can also actively foster inclusion through collaboration with traditional and modernauthorities and the church, through mobilizing the people around the ideals of peace andreconciliation, mediation in local conflicts, and helping to prevent further conflicts.

Support in this area can thus be indirect, aiming at the re-socialization of youth through, forinstance, the organization of community sports and cultural events, the provision ofcounseling services, the strengthening of traditional authorities, and the nurturing oftraditional norms and values fostering non-violence and peaceful coexistence. It can alsodirectly support activities by youth, for instance through increasing mobility, impartingpeople’s skills, and strengthening their organizational capacity.

Political inclusion

Political inclusion has been the most neglected form of inclusion for youth. Yet thedecision by youth to actively participate in violence and conflict often stems from a senseof alienation and marginalization that their concerns as youth are not being properlyaddressed in the family or in the community or by the authorities. Exclusion of youth frompolitical decision-making is a matter of even greater concern as it is the youth of today whowill be the leaders of tomorrow. It is, therefore, essential to increase the political sensitivityand awareness of youth and to increase their capacity to articulate and pursue theirconcerns peacefully.

Support may include adaptations in the curriculum, the organization of youth forums, theelection of youth representatives at the local and/or central level, enabling youth to monitorgovernment policies, and forming groups to explain concepts of democracy and humanrights to the population. As the political structures for an independent East Timor are yet tobe worked out, there is an ideal opportunity to include youth in this process in the short-term with a view to include their concerns into these structures for the longer-term.

3. Implementation arrangements

In designing strategies for youth inclusion, youth should not only be consulted; youthshould be the driving force throughout the process and receive appropriate facilitationassistance. Youth groups would, thus, be responsible for managing the project withtechnical assistance where required. Regarding economic inclusion, employment and


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training providers would be contracted to hire and train youth. Referral and co-financingwould be used to include youth in public works and other reconstruction programs.Regarding social and political inclusion, youth would identify and implement pertinentactivities, ensuring that such activities do not lead to politicization or polarization. It wouldalso be important to monitor that all youth benefit from all types of assistance irrespectiveof whether or not they belong to one of the youth groups.

4. Budget estimate

The total budget of this project is estimated at US$ 5.2 million (of which $ 2.2 million for2000) and is composed as follows:

3 years 1 year

39,000 39,000 motorbikes 1,500 $ per piece, 2 per district 10,000 10,000 office equipment Dili 30,000 30,000 office equipment 2,500 $ per district, 12 districts 50,000 50,000 other goods vehicles, etc.

129,000 129,000 total equipment

135,000 45,000 staff 5 in Dili, 750 $ p.m., 3 years 468,000 156,000 facilitators 2 per district, $ 500 p.m., 3 years

54,000 18,000 recurrent costs Dili 1,500 $ p.m., 3 years 216,000 72,000 recurrent costs districts 500 $ p.m., 3 years 216,000 72,000 technical assistance (FMS, mgt.) 2 in Dili, $ 3,000 p.m., 3 years

15,000 15,000 studies 3 studies @ 5,000 1,104,000 378,000 total recurrent

500,000 500,000 international scholarships 10 @ 50,000 $ 450,000 150,000 local scholarships 500 p.a. @ 300 $, 3 years 450,000 150,000 wage subsidies 500 p.a. @ 300 $, 3 years

1,500,000 500,000 micro-projects 100 p.a. @ 5,000 $, 3 years 234,000 78,000 social activities 500 $ p.m. per district, 3 years 234,000 78,000 political activities 500 $ p.m. per district, 3 years

3,368,000 1,456,000 total support

600,000 200,000 administration and contingencies

5,201,000 2,163,000 total youth development


Annex 26Microfinance - Employment & Income Generation

Beyond the immediate priority of ensuring basic food and shelter requirements, the majorrequirement for community recovery will the re-establishment of a fully functioningeconomy. For those three quarters of the workforce who work in the agriculture sector,there will be only limited employment opportunity arising from the inevitable constructionboom and, as discussed in the Agriculture Section of the JAM report, it will be important torestore the full range of agricultural activities as soon as possible. As in other areas,however, even full restoration will be far from satisfactory as it will simply restore a barelysubsistence income level. It is therefore important during the rehabilitation process to beginto address some of the fundamental weaknesses that inhibit employment and incomeopportunities for the rural poor.

Typical of the region, increasing agricultural productivity and income is a dauntingchallenge for many smallholders. In response to this problem there is an inevitable trendtowards pursuing off-farm income as a means of supplementing and stabilising farmincome. In the East Timor context, no figures are available to gauge the value of off-farmincome, however, it is almost certain that the figure would have been lower than incomparable countries because of the low level of entrepreneurial development and theabsence of accessible financial services. Savings and credit access was limited mainly tourban populations and even then remained at a low level. A total of 18 bank branchesserved an average population of 47,000 and average outstanding credit level was US$22per capita. For rural communities virtually no facilities existed except via a small networkof credit unions initiated by ETADEP in four districts using support from USAID. As inmost other areas even this basic financial system has now been effectively destroyed orwithdrawn to Indonesia. In the case of the credit unions, it is hoped that the Rp. one billionsavings that have been lost will be covered by insurance, however, records, premises andall other assets have been lost and some key leaders killed.

The former dominance of trading by non-Timorese and the low level of entrepreneurialactivity in the subsistence economy means that demand for financial services may belimited initially. Unless the first steps are take to build a microfinancial infrastructure,however, the chances of development and diversification for rural smallholders will remainbleak. The overall recovery strategy proposed by the JAM includes several measures whichwill actually require the availability of small credit facilities (see agriculture sector report)while the proposed local councils and block grants contained in the community recoveryrecommendations provide both a vehicle. and an opportunity, for launching a basicmicrofinancial system. Absence of such a system will also encourage development of ahandout mentality if donors provide private (and some public) assets on a purely grantbasis rather than seeking an appropriate level of cost recovery. The latter is highly likely inthat absence of facilities for handling cost recovery and fund re-cycling programs.

Recommendations

1. Consideration be give in all support programs whether for individual or public, toseeking the maximum affordable cost recovery. Recovery of such funds should be handledby local councils wherever established provided trained facilitators are in place to ensure


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correct procedures are followed (all councils will have been provided with a safe under theproposed CEGP).

2. Pending the introduction of more sustainable institutional arrangements, all villagecouncils be trained in the management of basic revolving funds (both in cash and kind).

3. In order to accelerate the creation of a diversified microfinance architecture, a challengefund 1 of US$1 million be established to solicit bids from international agencies interestedin developing comprehensive microfinance networks in East Timor. In order to cover arange of rural clientele, the challenge fund should cover a minimum of three modes ofmicrofinance; Grameen Bank replication (very low income, women), Village banks (lowincome, general) and credit unions/cooperatives (wage earners, cash croppers).

1 Challenge funds as operated by DFID and others, provides cash incentives for established financial serviceproviders to establish or expand activities into unserviced or unknown areas. The incentives may be used forsuch covering establishment costs or underwriting initial risks, etc.


Annex 27Summary of U.N. Consolidated AppealRelating to Community Empowerment

Area Name Organization US$ ID#

Community Action Psychosocial support for Traumatized Women UNFPA 470,000 TIM-E/N36Mental Health and trauma service UNDP/WHO 300,000 TIM-E/N37Affected Villages Program UNDP 250,000 TIM-W/N62

HumanitarianPrinciples

Humanitarian Principles Project UNICEF 483,000 TIM-E/N40

Institutional Capacity Building UNICEF 777,000 TIM-EN41Strengthening the peace-buildingcapacity of Local NGOs

CRS 200,000 TIM-EN/43

UNDP East Timor Community andSmall Enterprise Development Project

UNDP 6,000,000

Microenterprise development 2,300,000NGO support fund 440,000

Total Flash appeal programs/redevelopment US$ 10,780,000