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The Scepticism of SextusSextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean
Scepticism by A. BaileyReview by: Charles BrittainThe Classical
Review, New Series, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Oct., 2003), pp.
326-328Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The
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THE CLASSICAL REVIEW THE CLASSICAL REVIEW
a new type of comedy called Maeson (but see the Latin original:
Maeson persona comica appellatur . . ., dici ab inventore eius
Maesone comoedo, ut ait Aristophanes grammaticus). On p. 325, she
seriously misunderstands Sopatros' characterization of the style of
Aelius Aristides: Sopatros says that Aristides 'gives more to
thinking than to wording' (rrjs AEeEcoW rr7TAova MSlovs t-r voEdv),
but for M.-R. this means that Sopatros 'betont dessen Konzentration
auf den Stil'-which is quite the opposite of what Sopatros says. On
p. 491 she wrongly paraphrases the word avaTrrvets (used in Procl.
In Tim. I p. 129.19) as 'in die Form des Mythos gekleidete
Darlegung', whereas it clearly means 'explanation'.
Typographical errors are too frequent to be enumerated here in
detail; in most cases they will not hamper the reader's
understanding, but they indicate hasty revision and proof-reading,
as do some infelicitous phrasings; for example, on p. 105, we read
that Longinus has '18 Biicher Chronik in 228 Olympiaden
zusammengefaBt'; it should be the other way round. On p. 112 M.-R.
produces the sentence 'Ein Zusammenhang ... konnte ...
zusammenhangen'. At the bottom of p. 149, the sentence should read
'... Begebenheit, in der [instead of 'nach welcher'] der Rhetor
Diophanes eine rhetorisch stilisierte [instead of 'mit einer . . .
stilisierten'] Apologie vorgelesen . . . habe'. On p. 279 she
confuses the Alexandrian scholar Lysimachus ('des bereits
erwahnten'-but he has not been mentioned before) with Lycophron
(who indeed is mentioned on the preceding page). More infelicities
of this kind could be added.
The biggest flaw of the book, however, may be its bulk. As I
said, M.-R.'s interpretations are often excellent, providing all
the information a reader might wish for; nevertheless the
paraphrases of the quoted texts might have been more succinct,
insights and results are too often repeated with slight variation,
and the overall structure of the book (see above) encourages
repetitiveness. Some digressions could be missed without great
loss; why, for example, must we get a full history of Palmyra
before Longinus' time, almost four pages long (pp. 115-18)? A few
months (or perhaps only weeks) of additional work on the structure
of this book and more rigorous editing of its contents, shedding,
say, 150-200 pages, might have given us the definitive publication
on Longinus for a long time to come; the book now published
represents only a step-though a major one-in that direction.
Georg-August University, Gittingen HEINZ-GUNTHER NESSELRATH
THE SCEPTICISM OF SEXTUS
A. BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Pp. xvi +
302. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased. ISBN: 0-19-823852-5.
Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism sets out to show that
Pyrrhonism is a form of global scepticism about rationally
justified belief which is consistent and immune to standard
self-refutation arguments. Bailey argues that the Pyrrhonist has
'the view that no claim is ever rationally preferable to its
contradictory' (p. 9); and that the Pyrrhonist can have this view,
and also act in the world, because he has (involuntary) beliefs
about his own impressions, but also about the world, which he does
not consider to be rationally justified (Chapter 11). This seems a
promising variant of a familiar, if controversial, view, and worth
further elaboration than it receives.
The book has three parts: Chapters 1, 6, 10, and 11 sketch B.'s
positive view; Chapters 2-5 give a historical outline of ancient
scepticism; and Chapters 7-9
? The Classical Association, 2003
a new type of comedy called Maeson (but see the Latin original:
Maeson persona comica appellatur . . ., dici ab inventore eius
Maesone comoedo, ut ait Aristophanes grammaticus). On p. 325, she
seriously misunderstands Sopatros' characterization of the style of
Aelius Aristides: Sopatros says that Aristides 'gives more to
thinking than to wording' (rrjs AEeEcoW rr7TAova MSlovs t-r voEdv),
but for M.-R. this means that Sopatros 'betont dessen Konzentration
auf den Stil'-which is quite the opposite of what Sopatros says. On
p. 491 she wrongly paraphrases the word avaTrrvets (used in Procl.
In Tim. I p. 129.19) as 'in die Form des Mythos gekleidete
Darlegung', whereas it clearly means 'explanation'.
Typographical errors are too frequent to be enumerated here in
detail; in most cases they will not hamper the reader's
understanding, but they indicate hasty revision and proof-reading,
as do some infelicitous phrasings; for example, on p. 105, we read
that Longinus has '18 Biicher Chronik in 228 Olympiaden
zusammengefaBt'; it should be the other way round. On p. 112 M.-R.
produces the sentence 'Ein Zusammenhang ... konnte ...
zusammenhangen'. At the bottom of p. 149, the sentence should read
'... Begebenheit, in der [instead of 'nach welcher'] der Rhetor
Diophanes eine rhetorisch stilisierte [instead of 'mit einer . . .
stilisierten'] Apologie vorgelesen . . . habe'. On p. 279 she
confuses the Alexandrian scholar Lysimachus ('des bereits
erwahnten'-but he has not been mentioned before) with Lycophron
(who indeed is mentioned on the preceding page). More infelicities
of this kind could be added.
The biggest flaw of the book, however, may be its bulk. As I
said, M.-R.'s interpretations are often excellent, providing all
the information a reader might wish for; nevertheless the
paraphrases of the quoted texts might have been more succinct,
insights and results are too often repeated with slight variation,
and the overall structure of the book (see above) encourages
repetitiveness. Some digressions could be missed without great
loss; why, for example, must we get a full history of Palmyra
before Longinus' time, almost four pages long (pp. 115-18)? A few
months (or perhaps only weeks) of additional work on the structure
of this book and more rigorous editing of its contents, shedding,
say, 150-200 pages, might have given us the definitive publication
on Longinus for a long time to come; the book now published
represents only a step-though a major one-in that direction.
Georg-August University, Gittingen HEINZ-GUNTHER NESSELRATH
THE SCEPTICISM OF SEXTUS
A. BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Pp. xvi +
302. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased. ISBN: 0-19-823852-5.
Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism sets out to show that
Pyrrhonism is a form of global scepticism about rationally
justified belief which is consistent and immune to standard
self-refutation arguments. Bailey argues that the Pyrrhonist has
'the view that no claim is ever rationally preferable to its
contradictory' (p. 9); and that the Pyrrhonist can have this view,
and also act in the world, because he has (involuntary) beliefs
about his own impressions, but also about the world, which he does
not consider to be rationally justified (Chapter 11). This seems a
promising variant of a familiar, if controversial, view, and worth
further elaboration than it receives.
The book has three parts: Chapters 1, 6, 10, and 11 sketch B.'s
positive view; Chapters 2-5 give a historical outline of ancient
scepticism; and Chapters 7-9
? The Classical Association, 2003
326 326
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THE CLASSICAL REVIEW
challenge three dissenting interpretations of Sextus. The whole
is completed by a 'select bibliography' (pp. 291-6)-which is too
short and dated to be of much use-and a brief index (pp.
297-302).
The historical section (pp. 21-118) sets out the standard modern
view of the evolution of Pyrrhonism, and its relation to Academic
scepticism (Chapters 3-4) and medical Empiricism (Chapter 5.3). The
exposition is vitiated by errors, its reliance on misleading
translations, and a dispiriting lack of generosity to its modern
sources. Minor errors include passages such as those on Philo on p.
32 and Dionysius of Aegae on p. 86, the latter presumably relying
on the mistaken authority cited in p. 87 n. 44 (cf. Deichgraber,
Die Griechische Empirikerschule [Berlin, 1965], p. 336). The
superseded Loeb translation by Bury seems to be responsible for
several confusions about the meaning of Sextus' Greek (see below on
Chapter 7); more depressing is the apparent misreading of an
ellipse in Long & Sedley with the result that B.'s Cyrenaics
'suspend judgement about everything' (p. 42) in Plutarch Adv. Col.
1120c (= The Hellenistic Philosophers [Cambridge, 1987] i.440,
misconstrued). These flaws are perhaps venial; but it is sad to
read, in a section on medical Empiricism which seems to derive
almost entirely from the work of Michael Frede, that 'Even if Frede
is right to claim ... [P], it seems that . . . [Q]' (p. 91), when
Frede argued precisely P & Q ('The Ancient Empiricists', Essays
in Ancient Philosophy [Oxford, 1987], pp. 243-60, at pp. 246-50 and
251-7, respectively).
A more original suggestion is that the Academics' universal
suspension of judgement is compatible with holding views about-i.e.
assenting to-the (phenomenal) content of their own impressions. B.
supports this, without appeal to any relevant evidence, by claiming
that the Stoics must have taken assent to mean having a belief
about something that 'exists in a way that is independent of
anyone's psychological state' (p. 48). But this arbitrary
supposition falsely implies that, according to the Stoics, one
cannot have beliefs about one's own or others' psychological states
(contra Cicero Ac. 2.51-3); and it also contradicts B.'s central
argument in Chapter 7.
The polemical section of the book (pp. 147-255) takes on the
views that the Pyrrhonist has no beliefs (Chapter 7), no
philosophical beliefs but only ordinary beliefs like everyone else
(Chapter 8), and only (rationally justified) beliefs about his own
impressions (Chapter 9). Many of the arguments here are,
understandably, familiar, but some are new and provocative. First
up is the view that the sceptic has no beliefs because the
'appearance statements' to which he assents were not considered to
be true or false in antiquity. B.'s principal counter-argument is
the fact that the Cyrenaics clearly did think that such statements
were susceptible of truth-ascriptions (Chapter 7.4). An interesting
supporting argument to the effect that Sextus is also committed to
this possibility is flawed by B.'s philological methods. His case
depends on two claims: first, plausibly, that such a commitment
might be shown by linguistic practices that imply that there are
facts about appearances; and secondly, that Sextus has such
linguistic practices-because Bury's Loeb translation offers, for
example, 'the fact that' to render the Greek hoti, the marker for
indirect speech (p. 159).
Chapter 8 deals with the position that the sceptic has ordinary
beliefs. B. rightly reiterates inter alia the objection that
Sextus' apparent support for 'ordinary life' is undermined by his
use of 'ordinary views' to support one side of a sceptical
antithesis (leading to the suspension of judgement about the
issue)-for example, on the existence of motion (PH 3.65, discussed
at pp. 200-8). But B.'s focus on the philosophically undeveloped
variants of the 'ordinary belief' view leads him to miss the
difficulties which are most relevant to his own interpretation (see
below).
327
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THE CLASSICAL REVIEW
The third polemical chapter launches a battery of arguments
against the 'proto-phenomenalist' view of Pyrrhonism. B.'s
strongest argument is that Sextus' five modes undermine all claims
to self-evidence, and hence also the alleged self-evidence of one's
own impressions that would rationally justify the phenomenalist
position (Chapter 9.5). This is supported by an argument against
the phenomenalists' reliance on induction to underwrite
expectations about their own future impressions-though B. rather
oddly appeals to Hume's famous argument, as if that warranted
Sextus' primitive versions (Chapter 9.4). The chapter is weakened,
however, by two feeble attempts to show that phenomenalist
interpretations are inconsistent with Sextus' text: first, an
overlong and anachronistic appeal to 'our' linguistic intuitions
about a claim supporters of this position do not endorse (pp.
221-8); and, secondly, the suggestion that Sextus' use of ad
hominem arguments presupposes that he has beliefs about his
opponents' minds. If this works against the phenomenalist view, so
would citing any doxographical passage, e.g. PH 1.1-3.
The principal evidence for B.'s positive interpretation is set
out in the relatively non-controversial Chapters 6, 10, and 11.2:
Sextus allows that the Pyrrhonist is constrained to assent to some
impressions, and thus has 'beliefs' (in some sense) which can guide
his action. Since Sextus' arguments also rule out rational
justification for any beliefs, B. infers that the only consistent
interpretation of Pyrrhonism is one that allows it 'constrained'
beliefs which are explicitly considered not to be rationally
justified. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this view:
Chapter 11.3 merely reiterates his interpretation of Sextus'
anti-rationalist endorsement of 'commemor- ative signs' (cf.
Chapters 6.2, 8.2, and 9.4); Chapter 11.4 just notes that it is
inconsistent with some of Sextus' characterizations of the
Pyrrhonist's appearances (e.g. M 11.8; B. is apparently unaware of
the controversy surrounding these non-epistemic locutions); and the
concluding section merely reaffirms some old errors about
Pyrrhonists-that the Pyrrhonist is not very interested in the
discovery of truths (p. 285) and is 'not a philosopher' (p.
288)-which are patently rejected by Sextus in PH 1.1-10.
Still, B.'s view that the Pyrrhonist accepts (explicitly)
rationally unjustified beliefs about 'matters of objective
fact'-e.g. that other people exist (p. 282)-as well as about his
own impressions, seems promising, because it leaves room to explain
how the sceptic can follow his ancestral customs and laws, and
benefit from the teaching of crafts (PH 1.23-4). But a fuller
explanation of the sceptic's ordinary life, e.g. as an Empiricist
doctor, like Sextus, will have to do more than merely assert that
the sceptic suspends judgement on whether motion or the gods etc.
exist, but non-rationally believes that they do. Most examples of
the doctor's 'rationally unjustified' practical beliefs will be the
products of his medical training and of following established
intellectual procedures in medicine: he will tell people to walk to
the temple's healing sanctuary because that has helped others with
similar symptoms, in his experience. His 'rationally unjustified'
beliefs will therefore look just like anyone else's contextual
knowledge; and one might think that the only sense in which they
are not rationally justified will be that he does not pretend that
they meet contextually irrelevant philosophical criteria.
An elaboration along these lines would align B. with the more
philosophically developed 'ordinary belief' interpretations he
failed to discuss, e.g. Frede's ('The Skeptic's two kinds of assent
and the possibility of knowledge', op. cit., pp. 201-22). At any
rate, an elaboration is needed to supplement the borrowed history
and lengthy polemic of this book.
328
Cornell University CHARLES BRITTAIN
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Article Contentsp.326p.327p.328
Issue Table of ContentsThe Classical Review, New Series, Vol.
53, No. 2 (Oct., 2003), pp. i-xii+275-530Volume Information
[pp.517-529]Front Matter [pp.i-xii]Editorial
[pp.ix-xi]ReviewsPolitics in the "Iliad" [pp.275-276]Revaluing the
Epic Cycle [pp.276-278]Solon's Political Poems [pp.278-279]What Is
Iambic? [pp.279-281]Tragic Voices [pp.281-282]Tragic Space
[pp.282-284]Sophoclean Self-Knowledge [pp.284-285]Hippolytus
[pp.285-286]Euripides' "Cretans" [pp.287-288]Satyr Plays
[pp.288-290]Plutus [pp.290-291]Aristophanic Metatheatre
[pp.292-293]Gorgias [pp.293-295]Herodotus VI [pp.295-296]Plato's
"Alcibiades" [pp.296-298]A More Socratic "Meno"
[pp.299-301]Demosthenes' "Fourth Philippic" [pp.301-302]Didymus the
Brazen-Bowelled [pp.303-304]The "Poetics" [pp.304-305]Aristotle on
Bodies and Motion [pp.305-307]Commentaries on the "Metaphysics"
[pp.307-308]Euhemerus [pp.309-311]Coi Sacra Philitae
[pp.311-312]Hellenistic Poetry and Propaganda
[pp.312-313]Epistolary Functions [pp.313-314]Philo the Academic
[pp.314-316]Strabo VII-IX [pp.316-318]Appian on Africa
[pp.318-319]Appian on the Mithridatic War [pp.319-321]Plutarch's
Moralia [pp.321-323]Longinus the Platonist [pp.323-326]The
Scepticism of Sextus [pp.326-328]A Cambridge View of the Second
Sophistic [pp.329-331]Ancient Technical Literature
[pp.331-334]Diocles of Carystus [pp.334-337]A Neglected Work of
Galen [pp.337-338]Soranos' Gynaecology [pp.338-339]A Medical
Miscellany [pp.339-340]On the Interpretation of Dreams (Etc.)
[pp.341-344]Cicero's Letters Completed [pp.344-346]Cicero and the
Written Word [pp.346-347]De Consolatione [pp.347-348]Philosophia
Togata [pp.349-350]Defining Didactic [pp.350-352]Rethinking Reality
[pp.352-354]Catullan Concatenations [pp.354-355]Poets as Literary
Historians [pp.355-357]History and the Poets [pp.357-358]Influences
on the "Georgics" [pp.359-360]Translating the "ODES"
[pp.360-361]Livian Portraits [pp.361-363]Propertius on Vertumnus
and Actium [pp.363-365]An Ovidian Vade Mecum [pp.365-367]De
Clementia [pp.367-369]The New Loeb of Seneca's Tragedies
[pp.369-370]Bonum Vita Iucundius Ipsa [pp.370-372]Petronius
[pp.372-374]Institutio Oratoria [pp.374-376]Martial VII
[pp.376-377]Suetonius on the Flavians [pp.378-379]Two Books of
Apuleius (I) [pp.379-381]Two Books of Apuleius (II)
[pp.381-383]Fishy? [pp.383-384]Ausonius' Epigrams
[pp.384-385]Terentianus Maurus [pp.385-388]Sermonis Pompa Romani
[pp.388-389]Historiography of the Late Empire [pp.389-391]Ennodius
[pp.391-394]A Byzantine Chronicle in Latin [pp.394-395]A Long
History of Time [pp.396-397]More Equal than Others?
[pp.397-400]Ostracism [pp.400-402]Antidemocratic Ideology in Athens
[pp.402-403]Greek Cavalry [pp.403-405]What Was It to Be Greek?
[pp.405-407]Hellenistic Egypt [pp.407-409]Italian State Formation
[pp.409-411]Umbria [pp.411-412]The Roads of Italy
[pp.412-414]Cinnanum Tempus [pp.414-415]The Army and Roman Society
[pp.416-417]Augustus Re-Examined [pp.417-419]Politics at Pompeii
[pp.419-421]Women and the Law [pp.421-423]Women, Wealth, and Power
[pp.423-424]The Julian Marriage Laws [pp.425-426]Emperor Worship
[pp.426-428]The Synagogue at Ostia [pp.428-429]Military Religion in
the East [pp.429-431]The Army in Syria [pp.431-433]Palmyra
[pp.433-435]Cappadocia [pp.435-436]Iberian Sanctuaries
[pp.436-437]The Libyans [pp.437-438]Mobility in Gaul
[pp.439-440]The Christianization of the Aristocracy [pp.440-442]The
Late Antique Economy [pp.442-444]Towns in Late Antiquity
[pp.444-446]A Century of Minoan Archaeology [pp.446-448]Power in
Minoan Crete [pp.448-449]Athenian Archaeology [pp.449-450]Women in
Athenian Art [pp.450-452]Landscape in Greek Art
[pp.452-454]Eretrian Epigraphy and Early Hellenistic History
[pp.454-458]Samnite Epigraphy [pp.458-460]The Metropolis in the
Mediterranean [pp.460-462]Roman Tomb Decorations [pp.462-463]A
Colloquium on Ancient Music [pp.463-464]Athletics
[pp.464-465]Athletic Vocabulary in Aristophanes [pp.465-467]Eros in
the Gymnasium [pp.467-468]Amor Graecus. Or Romanus?
[pp.468-470]Past Times [pp.470-472]Commenting on Commentaries
[pp.472-474]Sulpicia through the Ages [pp.474-476]The Aqueduct
Hunters [pp.476-478]Classics in America [pp.478-479]The Life of
Mommsen [pp.479-481]The Boston Fake Goddess? [pp.481-482]
Noticesuntitled [pp.483-484]untitled [pp.484-485]untitled
[pp.485-486]untitled [p.486]untitled [pp.486-487]untitled
[pp.487-488]untitled [p.488]untitled [p.489]untitled
[pp.489-490]untitled [p.490]untitled [pp.490-491]untitled
[pp.491-492]untitled [p.492]untitled [pp.492-494]untitled
[p.494]untitled [pp.494-495]untitled [p.495]untitled
[pp.495-496]untitled [p.496]untitled [p.497]untitled
[pp.497-498]untitled [p.498]untitled [pp.498-499]untitled
[pp.499-500]
Books Received [pp.501-515]Back Matter [pp.530-530]