British Views OnTurkish National Movement 2002

British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22Author(s): A. L. MacFieSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 27-46Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284241 .Accessed: 24/04/2011 01:37

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British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22

A.L. MACFIE

British views of the Turkish national movement in Anatolia differed according to the point of view adopted. Whereas British officials on the spot, in Constantinople (Istanbul, occupied by the Entente Powers, Britain, France and Italy, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War) and Anatolia tended to view the movement as the product of a conspiracy, organized by elements within the Ottoman government, in particular the Ministry of War, the intelligence services, particularly those operating in Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, tended to view it as pa t of an international conspiracy, organized by outside forces (CUP in exile, German right wing, Bolshevik), centred in Berlin and Moscow. This discrepancy was never fully resolved, but as events developed in Anatolia, in the period of Turkish national struggle, the view put forward by the men on the spot gained increasing acceptance.

The view expressed by most of the British officials serving in Constantinople and Anatolia (General Milne, Commander of the Army of the Black Sea, Admiral Calthorpe, British High Commissioner in Constantinople, Admiral de Robeck, also a British High Commissioner, Commander Heathcote-Smith, RNVR, Captain Hurst, an officer in the Levant Consular Service, Captain Perring, a relief officer, and many others) found its clearest expression in a History of the National Movement, printed by the War Office in the autumn of 1919. Until the end of May, the History of the National Movement noted, all the Turkish corps commanders continued to dispatch armaments to Constantinople, as they were required to do by the Armistice of Mudros (30 October 1918). But the occupation of south-western Anatolia by the Italians, in March 1919, and the occupation of Smyrna (Izmir) by the Greeks in May entirely changed the situation. By the end of May the country was flooded with accounts of what had occurred. These accounts, which 'naturally' were exaggerated, came as a great shock to the Turks, and had a unifying effect on the various factions into which the country at that time was divided.

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.38, No.3, July 2002, pp.27-46 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

28 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

About that time - so the History continues - the surrender of armaments from central and eastern Anatolia ceased. During June the creation of two different organizations was reported:

a) The first was an unofficial organization, kept very secret, and headed by Raouf Bey, a sailor, lately Minister of Marine. This organization was engaged in sending men and money into the area near Smyrna.

b) The second organization was the creation of General Shevket Turgut Pasha, Minister of War, in consultation with the Minister of the Interior. He mapped out Asia Minor into Northern and Southern Inspectorates, and allotted to each a distinguished General Staff. The first two appointments were General Mustafa Kemal to the Northern Inspectorate and General 'Kutchuk' Djemal to the Southern Inspectorate. So far as one can ascertain this official organization at its inception seems to have been intended to ensure the peace of Turkish Anatolia during a period of intense strain.

Unfortunately the method adopted by Mustafa Kemal had the opposite effect. He and his officers did everything in their power to stir up the people, by condemning the action of the Allies with regard to the events occurring in the Smyrna district. This agitation became so serious that it was necessary to order the return of Mustafa Kemal to Constantinople, but he refused to obey. Instead, early in July he went to Erzerum, and about the same time was joined there by Raouf Bey from Aydin. The first step taken was the summoning of the Congress of Erzerum, with delegates from what were known as the six eastern provinces. This was the first important meeting at which the nationalist programme was discussed. There appeared to have been a good deal of disagreement at the congress, but in the end a declaration was agreed on. The underlying principle of the declaration was the 'defence of national rights'. As a result of the defeat of the Ottoman army by the British forces the leaders of the movement were prepared to accept the loss of Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine and Syria, but they were determined to defend, if need be by force, the remainder of Turkey, which 'represented the home of the race'. On no account would they accept the division of parts of Anatolia between the Greeks and Armenians. Nor would they accept the granting of any form of mandate, which would 'result in the Ottoman Empire losing its independence to the Powers'. The 'real' programme of the nationalists was, therefore, the report concluded:

a) To organize the villages as best they could without taking men from their homes;

b) To maintain complete order in Anatolia, and to refrain from any aggression across the pre-war frontier;

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 29

c) To get rid of the government of Ferid Pasha, and to substitute a government which would furnish a delegation to the Peace Conference capable of making a dignified protest upon the basis of President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points;

d) To avoid any immediate clash with the Allies, and reserve to their party such powers of compromise, as would put them in a position of being at once the saviour of their country, and able to come to a settlement with the Entente.

Following this programme, Mustafa Kemal and his associates continued to organize the country. As a preliminary step to the overthrow of Damad Ferid Pasha, they summoned a congress at Sivas. The Sivas Congress differed from the Erzerum Congress in that its delegates came from the whole of Turkey. It was at the Sivas Congress that the delegates decided on the seizure of the telegraph offices in Anatolia, thereby securing the isolation of the government in Constantinople.

A second account, dispatched on 30 June 1919, from General Milne, Commander of the Army of the Black Sea, to Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner, may also be taken as representative of the views frequently expressed at the time by the men on the spot. In his account, Milne informed Calthorpe that he had just received a series of reports from the interior suggesting that a 'serious movement' was developing in the districts of Sivas and Konia, and that armed bands were being assembled there. This movement, which had, it was reported, been set up by Mustafa Kemal Pasha at Sivas, and Djemal Pasha at Konia, aimed at 'action independent of the Ottoman Government'.

A third account, entitled History of the Movement, composed by Commander Heathcote-Smith, and dispatched to London on or about 24 July 1919, may also be taken as typical. In his report Heathcote-Smith traces the events leading up to the declarations, issued on 8 July 1919 by Mustafa Kemal (on the occasion of his resignation from the army), and on 9 July by Raouf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine. In recent months, Heathcote-Smith reports, members of the CUP, left at liberty in Anatolia, had made much propaganda, promoting the idea that President Wilson's 14 Points guaranteed the territorial integrity of Turkey. But hampered by their 'inveterate instinct for intrigue' they had made little headway. Then came the Greek occupation of Smyrna (15 May 1919) and the 'Greek bungling' that accompanied it. From that date the resistance movement began to thrive, and the national defence organization, set up by Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues, became 'practically Turkey'. The organization, Heathcote- Smith was informed, was backed by the Ottoman government, or at least elements within it. Members of a congress, shortly to be assembled in

30 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Erzerum, would act as political advisors to the movement. Methods to be employed would include the threat of massacre.'

The view frequently expressed by the various intelligence agencies, on the other hand, found its clearest expression in three reports on the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, drawn up by the India Office and the War Office in the autumn of 1920.2 According to Major N.N.E. Bray, a special intelligence officer, attached to the Political Department, India Office, and author of two of the reports, the Turkish national movement, like other national movements active in the area (Arab, Syrian, Mesopotamian) was merely a 'compliment of a far wider conspiracy', organized in Berlin and Moscow. The aims of that conspiracy were:

a) By every possible means to discredit the Entente; b) To organize national forces in Anatolia and Thrace, if possible with the

assistance of men and money from the Bolsheviks and Berlin; c) To prepare rebellion on a large scale in Syria and Mesopotamia; d) To organize all the parties concerned so as to produce a simultaneous

action.

These plans could not be carried out until arrangements had been made for the organization of the national elements in Turkey, Syria and Mesopotamia, the alliance of the pan-Arab movement with the Turkish national movement, the co-operation of the tribes and the unification of the whole on a pan-Islamist basis. When unification was completed and all the plans were ready, a signal would be given and a simultaneous action undertaken. This action would, it was hoped, be of so widespread a nature as to force the withdrawal of the Entente Powers from the Middle East, and possibly even from Asia.

Much evidence was adduced by the British intelligence services in support of the contention that the Turkish national movement was part of a wide-ranging conspiracy, aimed at the expulsion of the British and French from the Middle East. In November 1919, so it was reported, a 'very important' meeting was held at Montreux, presided over by Talaat Pasha, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) leader and former Ottoman Grand Vizier. At this meeting, which was also attended by Amir Shakib Arslan, a 'delegate of the Damascus extremists' and representative of Feisal, the leader of the Arab national forces in Syria, proposals were discussed for the formation of a defensive alliance between the Syrian nationalists, the Turkish nationalists and the Arab sheikhs of Arabia. The Arab sheikhs, in particular, might be united under the leadership of Emir Husein, Feisal's father, the so-called 'King of the Hedjaz'. In December, at a similar meeting, held at St Moritz, again attended by Amir Shakib Arslan

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 31

(who had it seems in the meantime been instructed by Feisal to agree to the proposals put forward by Talaat at Montreux), a proposal - so it was reported - was discussed for the formation of an alliance between Enver Pasha, the exiled CUP leader and Ottoman Minister of War in the First World War, Mustafa Kemal, the Arab sheikhs and the Bolsheviks. At the meeting, Amir Shakib Arslan was instructed to go to Moscow, to make contact with the Soviet government; but in the event it seems he did not do so. Rather he sent a letter to Litvinoff, the Soviet representative in Copenhagen, asking him to inform Moscow of the conference proposal. In the meantime letters and telegrams, dispatched by the Ottoman Minister of War and other officials in Constantinople, to Ottoman army commanders in Anatolia, intercepted by British intelligence or otherwise obtained, indicated that the Turkish nationalist army commanders concerned, in particular the commander of the XIII Army Corps, stationed at Diarbekir, were being instructed to make contact with leading sheikhs in Syria and Mesopotamia, and where possible promote resistance to the forces of the Entente Powers stationed there. Thus on 8 December 1919 it was reported that the Under-Secretary of War, Constantinople, had instructed the GOC XIII Army Corps, Diarbekir, to maintain contact with the Arab sheikhs in Mesopotamia; and on 29 December that he had instructed the GOC XV Army Corps to instruct one Ajaimi, the 'Chief Sheikh of Iraq', to keep in touch and patiently await events. On 31 December it was reported that Djevad, Chief of the Ottoman General Staff, and Djemal, Minister of War, had ordered that contact be maintained with Ibn Saud, the ruler of Nejd, and Sheikh Rashid, the ruler of Ha'il; and on 21 February 1920 that various Arab tribes had made it clear that they were ready to take action as soon as they received orders.

Other reports received about this time appeared to confirm the existence of a wide-ranging conspiracy. In November 1919 MI ic reported that the Turkish nationalists intended to convene a pan-Islamic conference at Sivas, and that delegations were expected to attend from Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan. Efforts were also being made to make contact with pan-Islamic elements in the neighbourhood of Kashgar.3 In December the Director of Military Intelligence, Constantinople, dispatched a copy of a report, drawn up by Major Hay, on Possible Relations between the Nationalist Leaders in Anatolia and Agents of the Soviet Government, based in the Ottoman capital. Soviet agents based in the Ottoman capital had, it was believed, made contact with the Turkish nationalists in September; and in October they had dispatched an emissary (actually a British agent), supposedly a member of the 'Council of the Representatives of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Constantinople', to the interior.4 In January 1920 it was reported that a pan-Islamic organization

32 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

in Constantinople had received funds from Germany and Switzerland; and that the Ottoman Minister of War was engaged in the direction of pan- Islamic intrigue in India, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Arabia.' In July 1920 it was reported that Bolshevik influence was becoming increasingly apparent in nationalist circles;6 and in August that Mustafa Kemal had arrived at an understanding with Feisal.7

Particular attention was paid by the British intelligence services to the activities of secret societies operating in the Near and Middle East, in particular al-Nadi-al-Arabi, an extreme pan-Islamic society set up in Damascus, al-Ahd, a secret society, set up by ex-Ottoman Army Arab officers and others, in Mesopotamia, and Mouvahiddin, a pan-Islamic society, set up in Sivas in November 1919.8 These secret societies, British intelligence concluded, were directly linked with Constantinople and Switzerland, and from there with the German Foreign Office in Berlin. They were, it was believed, generally formed for some specific political purpose, to tap a 'new source of activity' (Islam) in the struggle with the Western imperial powers.9 Mouvahiddin, in particular, had been set up by the CUP and Turkish nationalists, with the object of 'enlisting the support and co- ordinating the efforts of all anti-foreign and disaffected elements in Islamic countries'.'? Acting in conjunction with the Bolsheviks, they were capable of causing much trouble, more particularly if, as appeared likely, they were 'able to dispose of the large funds in the possession of the CUP'."

In the second of the three reports on the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, Bray described in some detail the part played in the anti- imperialist movement by Moscow and Berlin. Soviet efforts to create world unrest, Bray declared, were 'ceaseless and effective' .l Opportunism as regards means was absolute, and it did not exclude an 'alliance with opposites'.'3 Lenin and his Commissariat of Military Affairs were aiming to 'bring the whole world under the communist system', and secure the downfall of the British Empire in Asia.'4 Their main centre of endeavour was the Middle East where they were busy undermining stable government, organizing secret societies and spreading revolutionary propaganda. In Anatolia, in particular, they were hoping to have Mustafa Kemal replaced by Enver, and a Soviet regime established.

German reactionaries were similarly seeking to create unrest and revolution in the Middle East. To this end they were 'undoubtedly' providing Enver, and possibly also Mustafa Kemal, with capable German officers. In December 1919 Enver, it was reported, had been in Berlin, working hard to establish an alliance between the Germans and the Bolsheviks, and unify the Arab, Turkish and Egyptian national movements. About the same time a number of CUP, nationalist and pan-Arab leaders (Talaat, Shakib Arslan, Fuad Selim, Nedjmeddin Molla) had come together

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 33

to discuss the possibility; and shortly thereafter Enver, with German and Bolshevik support, had formed an Asiatic Islamic Federation through whose medium all the various movements and societies would be co-ordinated. Enver and Talaat would provide substantial funds, from CUP accounts held in Berlin. Large scale operations, from Mesopotamia to India, might be expected to begin in the autumn of 1920.'5

Not that the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia were necessarily entirely committed to the Bolshevik cause. Opinion in Anatolia, according to various accounts, was divided on the issue. A number of army commanders were sceptical. But Bolshevik propaganda was rampant, and several towns had highly organized revolutionary organizations. In the Grand National Assembly 105 members were committed to the Bolshevik programme and direct contact had been made with the Bolsheviks by way of Nakhichevan.'6

Further support for the view that the Turkish national movement should be seen as part of a world-wide conspiracy, aimed at the destruction of the British Empire in Asia, was provided by Commander Luke, a political officer, attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the British fleet, stationed in Constantinople, and Andrew Ryan, a member of the British High Commission staff. In a report on the Effects of Bolshevism on the British Empire, composed in December 1919, Commander Luke argued that in order to inflict injury on the British Empire, the Bolsheviks were prepared to disavow their own principles and seek allies in their struggle in all parts of the Muslim world, including Turkey, Transcaucasia, Persia, Afghanistan, India, Arabia and Egypt. Skilfully making use of every circumstance lending itself to misinterpretation or distortion, they had succeeded in making large numbers of Muslims throughout the Near and Middle East honestly believe that Great Britain was the enemy of Islam. The dispatch of a Greek Army of Occupation to the Muslim province of Aydin, with its 'deplorable' results, had been a useful and much used argument. The delay in concluding peace, resulting in the rise of the national movement and the resurrection of the CUP, had provided 'valuable allies', or more correctly 'tools'. Another successful argument used had been the 'injudicious' policy of Britain's ally, Denikin, towards Muslim Daghistan and Azerbaijan.'7

Very skilfully, Luke continued, the Bolsheviks were contriving to turn the 'somewhat vague and unframed' aims of the pan-Islamic movement, such as it was, into anti-British channels; while Mustafa Kemal was reported to be summoning a pan-Islamic conference in Sivas, attended by delegations from Persia, India and Afghanistan.'"

Andrew Ryan, in a memorandum attached to the above report, expressed more or less complete agreement with Luke. The principal object of the Bolsheviks, he wrote, was to wield all Muslims into one whole, to be used as an instrument against the West, especially the British. Constantinople

34 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

was the natural pivot of this movement on the Muslim side. How far all the converging activities had a common instigation in Germany remained in doubt; but there was no doubt that Constantinople and Turkey were now the 'creatures' and 'instruments' of the CUP and the nationalists. While some of the forces in play, such as Bolshevism, an essentially anarchical movement, might exhaust themselves or be crushed, others, such as Islam, especially dangerous for the British, might continue to grow.'9

The view put forward by the British intelligence services, that the Turkish national movement was part of an international conspiracy, organized in Berlin and Moscow, found support in the assumption, held by virtually all of the British officials involved, at least in the early stages, that the national movement was organized by the CUP, in particular the CUP leaders in exile. In a note on Local Opposition to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, written in October 1919, a British naval intelligence officer remarked that the national movement was merely a 'recrudescence of the Committee of Union and Progress', presented under a 'new, high sounding name'. In a report presented to de Robeck in the same month, Captain Perring, the British representative in Samsun, remarked that in his view the whole national movement originated with Enver, whose presence in the Caucasus was not to be doubted.2' In a petition presented to the British High Commissioner by the notables of 27 villages in the Bozgir region, it was asserted that the national forces in the area had been set up by the Union and Progress Committee.22 In November Captain Hadkinson, who had just completed a two-month tour of the province of Bursa, reported that in recent weeks the western national movement, which originated with the Greek occupation of Smyrna, had now amalgamated with Mustafa Kemal's eastern movement and Ali Fuad's central movement. The movement was spreading all over the country, though not as fast as the ringleaders had expected. Having had the opportunity of watching the proceedings of the late congress, held at Balikessir, he, Hadkinson, was more than ever convinced that the CUP was 'at the bottom of all this national movement', whatever may be said to the contrary.23 As de Robeck remarked, in a telegram to Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, dispatched in October:

Whether the organizers of the national movement can properly be called Committeemen or not is a question of labels. They may differ from the Committee to some extent in personality. Indeed, they are just now at pains to advertise their past differences with, and present horror of, people like Enver and Talaat. They may differ in minor points of sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their fundamental character is, however, the same. They want Turkey for the Turks. They want no foreign interference or foreign protection.

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 35

Ottoman Christians are their cattle and they want to do with their own what they will. They want to fight Europe, and above all, England, with the weapons of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. They aspire to sign, not the death warrant of the Empire, but a lease of new life.24

Recognition of the important part played by the CUP in the organization of the national movement did not lead British officials to ignore the part played by the military, generally seen as decisive. As Calthorpe remarked in a letter to Curzon in August 1919, the Congress of Erzerum appeared to be dominated by dashing young soldiers, who are willing 'to stake everything on a gambler's throw'.25 And as Captain Perring remarked in a note on the Nationalist Movement in the Samsun Area, where the Central Government pinned its hopes on the goodwill of the Allies and the influence of the 'mass of the Muslin world', the Military Party (most of whom were in any case CUP) hoped to save Turkey by its own activities: 'The Turks were excited. They had been caught napping at Smyrna. There was good reason for believing that an Armenian state was to be formed, and many talked of a Greek Pontus state. The military were prepared to prevent another coup.'26 In other words, as de Robeck remarked in a telegram to Curzon dispatched in December, the movement was not so much a 'national' as a 'military political' organization.27

To the British officials on the spot, Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish national movement, remained for some time an enigma. He was known as a leading member of the CUP (orders had been issued in February 1919 for his dismissal) and a hero of the Gallipoli campaign, but otherwise little was known about him. According to GHQ Constantinople, which in January 1921 compiled a character sketch of Mustafa Kemal, based on information provided by his former commanding officer, school and college companions, the nationalist agent in Constantinople and others, he had been born in humble circumstances in Salonika, and educated at the military college, Salonika, the cadet school, Monastir, and the War College, Constantinople. At an early age, it was said, he had become a passionate nationalist. After graduating from the General Staff College, as a Staff Captain, he had been posted in 1905 to Syria, and in 1907 to the General Staff, Salonika. In 1913 he had been appointed Turkish Military Attache at Sofia, where he is said to have indulged in 'dissipation' and contracted 'venereal'. This had imbued him with a 'contempt and disgust for life', prohibited marriage and driven him to 'homosexual vice'. Careless of his life in action, he had deliberately disobeyed Liman von Sanders at Gallipoli, and quarrelled with Enver. In the fighting he had 'lost an eye'.28

Mustafa Kemal's quarrels with Enver and the German commander had induced the present Sultan (then Prince Vahideddin) on the occasion of the

36 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

coronation of Karl of Austria-Hungary to invite Mustafa Kemal to accompany him to Vienna, with the intention of using him as a counterpoise to Enver and the CUP. It was the present Sultan, Vahideddin, who had sent Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia in May 1919, with instructions to thwart Greek aspirations to a Pontus republic. In spite of the fact that Mustafa Kemal was probably a comparatively wealthy man there was no reason to suppose that he had resorted to dishonest methods. On the contrary, almost alone among unionist leaders, he had never been accused of peculation. Finally, he was known as a fluent speaker, but he was probably too egotistical to envisage wider issues and ultimate consequences.29

The discrepancy between the two explanations offered by British officials on the spot and the intelligence services was never fully resolved. But as British Foreign Office and other comments on a secret intelligence report, received in August 1920, from a 'well educated and intelligent Turkish gentleman', recently returned from Ankara, show, they eventually concluded that there must in fact be two parties at work in Anatolia, one that of Mustafa Kemal and the nationalists and the other that of Enver, Talaat and the CUP.3" As D.G. Osborne, a Foreign Office official, remarked:

This shows that there are two parties in Anatolia and not only one. The weaker is that of Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists, who, induced by patriotic and religious motives, have been, and are, endeavouring to resist the Peace terms and the resultant dismemberment of Turkey and the reduction of the prestige of the Ottoman Khalifate. They have failed: their adherents are going over to the other and far more dangerous party, that of Enver and Talaat and the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination. The latter are not concerned with the defence of Turkey but with the Pan-Islamic offensive of Bolshevism throughout the East, primarily directed against Great Britain. The plans for this offensive have recently been discussed at Baku. Enver and his associates have sacrificed Turkey to the Bolshevik conception of Pan-Islam, have accepted the principles of Lenin and are disseminating them by means of the Green propagandist Army. Mustafa Kemal on the other hand has rejected Lenin's principles and is consequently about to be discarded in favour of Enver and Talaat.3

In his report the 'well educated and intelligent Turkish gentlemen', recently returned from Ankara, pointed out that opinion in the nationalist camp regarding relations with the Bolsheviks was divided. Where the 'Unionist' wing, led by Eyub Sabri, argued that in order to secure effective Bolshevik support it was necessary to adopt the Bolshevik system with all its consequences, the 'genuine' nationalists who were devoted to Mustafa

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 37

Kemal argued that, whilst Bolshevik support might be accepted, their system should not be introduced. In the national assembly, about 100 deputies had been won over to the Bolshevik cause, and their party, which was in a constant touch with Talaat Pasha, the 'principal protagonist of Islamic Bolshevism in Europe', was steadily gaining strength. Recently they had formed the Green Army organization, 'a vehicle for the fulfilment of the Soviet Government's campaign to arouse the whole Islamic world against Europe in general and Great Britain in particular'. Supporters of the Green Army argued that the principal tenets of Islam could easily be reconciled with Bolshevik doctrine. Differences between the Unionists and the 'genuine' nationalists were exacerbated by the personal rivalry that existed between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.32

In an introduction to the above report, the British intelligence service in Constantinople concluded that the development of Bolshevism in Anatolia should be seen as a product, not of nationalist, but of Unionist co-operation:

It is scarcely open to doubt that the introduction of Bolshevism into Turkey, as the foremost of the Eastern Muslim countries, was in accordance with the plan of campaign formulated by the Unionist leaders, when the defeat of Germany ruined their former schemes. The rise of the Nationalist movement in Turkey merely provided a practical vehicle for the progress of this later Unionist programme, which included the spread of Bolshevism. The Soviet Government had directed its attention to the possibilities of Islam as early as 1917. But, in spite of constant efforts, no progress has been made, in Turkey at least. After the Armistice we saw from reports from Geneva, Rome and London, the development of Unionist activities working in Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Russia. These same Germans and Turks who had been working together during the war again came to notice in association, and as early as February 1919 it became evident that the Unionist chiefs were actively preparing a Pan-Islamic movement in connection with Bolshevism and with the assistance of the very efficient, but so far unsuccessful, German organization which had been co-operating for five years against British prestige in the East. After the Armistice, too, the purely Russian efforts of the Bolsheviks to develop Bolshevism as an Eastern world movement were assisted by many Indians and other Pan-Islamists, who had gravitated to Berlin and Moscow on the final defeat of Turkey. As soon as the Nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal showed signs of reaching serious proportions, the Unionist made an immediate attempt to gain control of so potentially powerful an instrument. In spite, however, of the expenditure of a certain amount of money, the

38 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

attempt then failed, partly owing to personal jealousies, as for example that between Mustapha Kemal and Enver, and partly owing to the Nationalist dislike of the Jewish Free-Masonic elements dominating the Unionists. More oblique methods were then adopted and advantage was taken of the circumstance that Mustapha Kemal, having realised the impracticability of rousing the Muslim world by such poor instruments as the Mouvahiddin Society and ordinary Pan- Islamic propaganda, was turning in despair to the Soviet Government. The reluctance to accept Bolshevism in principle may be seen from the little we know of the earlier stages of Mustapha Kemal's dealings with the Soviet Government. In the first proposals for an agreement it was stipulated that the Nationalists should place no obstacle in the way of Bolshevik propaganda in Anatolia, but only in so far as it was not in conflict with the tenets of Islam. This agreement was reported to have been concluded in the autumn of 1919 and it was shortly afterwards that the activities of Bolshevik propagandists in Anatolia were first reported. It has since become evident that an energetic campaign has been in progress in Anatolia assisted in some cases, as at Eski Shehir, by the Nationalist authorities but we cannot be sure, and it still seems unlikely that Mustapha Kemal had any cordial sympathy with that campaign. It is to be observed that the National Assembly has never officially declared its adherence to Bolshevism and it has never been very clear by what means or under what auspices the movement was gaining ground.33

Thereafter the assumption that two parties existed in Turkey, a Unionist party headed by Enver and Talaat, and a nationalist party, headed by Mustafa Kemal, became a regular component of British reports on the issue. In a set of notes on Relations between the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists, drawn up by D.G. Osborne, a Foreign Office official, in November 1920, for instance, a clear distinction was drawn between the two parties."4 And in a War Office Report on the Situation in Mesopotamia, drawn up about the same time, it was pointed out that two militant parties existed in Anatolia, the CUP led by Enver and Talaat, which had decided to throw in its lot with the Bolsheviks, and the nationalist party, led by Mustafa Kemal, which, while anxious to secure Russian arms and ammunition and the recovery of the western provinces, had decided to oppose a Bolshevik penetration of Anatolia. In dealing with the Turks it would be well to remember that Mustafa Kemal and Enver were rivals. Enver's influence was greatest with the Russians, but in the West he was discredited. Any arrangement made with the Turks would have to be made with a 'representative government', and this would of necessity have to include

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 39

both 'Old Turks' and 'Young Turks'. Any such 'representative government' would require a leader and it seemed probable that Mustafa Kemal would emerge as the most suitable condidate. His recognition should have the effect of driving Enver and Djemal into obscurity.35

British intelligence in this period appeared well informed about the nature of the struggle taking place between Mustafa Kemal and Enver. According to a note on the Soviet Government's Intrigues with Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha, composed in June 1922, Enver had initially been prepared to co-operate with Mustafa Kemal. But Mustafa Kemal, driven by 'indescribable megalomania and lust for power', had brusquely rejected the offer. As a result Enver, with Soviet backing - the Soviets feared that Mustafa Kemal would open the way to capitalist and imperialist intrigue in the area - had attempted to build up his position in Anatolia, preparatory to a take-over of power. To this end he had attempted to win over the Defence of Rights associations in the eastern provinces, the labour guilds (artisans, porters, lightermen) and the officer corps of a number of regiments, stationed in the area. Mustafa Kemal had then taken fright and reached a secret agreement with the Bolsheviks, promising them support, with the result that the Soviets had taken steps to undermine Enver's position, leaving him thoroughly puzzled and unable to cope. Meanwhile Mustafa Kemal had taken steps to secure his hold on the Defence of Rights associations; and he had had Yahya Kahya, the Unionist strong man in Trabzon, arrested, and untrustworthy officers posted or otherwise dealt with. It was at this point that Enver, discovering the true nature and extent of Soviet duplicity, had decided to withdraw to Turkestan and join the Basmachi insurgents.36

The different appreciations of the nature and significance of the national movement in Anatolia, offered by British officials and the intelligence services were not merely of academic interest, for it can be argued that they implied different policy responses. Policy responses to an essentially locally based national movement, seeking to achieve limited aims and objectives, might include Allied support for the sultan's government in Constantinople (the policy adopted by the Entente Powers in November 1918), the use of the Greek forces in western Anatolia to bolster the Allied position on the Straits, support for the sultan's efforts to suppress the national movement by force (attempted in 1920), and when these efforts failed, as they did, attempts at conciliation and the conclusion of a negotiated settlement, satisfying some but by no means all of the aims of the national movement, as set out in the National Pact of January 1920 (the policy later pursued). Policy responses to an internationally organized national movement, aimed at the destruction of the British Empire in Asia, might include the dispatch of British forces to secure the defeat of the movement (never attempted), the

40 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

exploitation of the full potential of the Greek expeditionary force, stationed in western Anatolia (never fully attempted), the expulsion of the Turks from their capital city (considered by the Allies in December 1919 and January 1920 but never implemented), vigorous support for the minorities, a determination to secure the neutralisation and demilitarisation of the Straits (secured in the treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923) and vigorous steps to secure the defeat of the forces of revolution in other parts of the world, in particular Russia and Germany.

One of the strongest cases put forward in favour of a policy based on the assumption that the national movement was essentially a locally based movement with limited aims and objectives, was surprisingly that put forward by Commander Luke, in a note on the Future Peace with Turkey, composed in March 1920.37 In his paper Commander Luke suggested that, as the policy of suppression so far pursued by the Entente Powers appeared likely to fail, they might now consider a substantial modification of the proposed peace treaty, involving the possible return of Izmir, western Thrace and the so-called Armenian provinces to Turkish rule. The Entente Powers might then seek to rallier the Turks by giving them a peace, which, while conforming to the principle of self-determination and sufficiently severe to satisfy the claims of justice, would not be vindictive:

The Turk, and indeed, the Muslim in general, is by instinct opposed to the theory of Bolshevism, which is wholly incompatible with the principles of Islam. Only necessity, as he understands it, will drive him to this unnatural alliance. Cannot the necessity be avoided? I submit that it is worth avoiding, even if the avoiding involves the non- acquisition by Greece of Smyrna and Thrace and the reduction of the area to be ceded by Turkey to Armenia. A stolid conservative people such as the Turks should prove a valuable buffer against the ferment of Bolshevism in the Middle East.38

One of the strongest cases put forward in favour of a policy based on the assumption that the national movement was essentially part of an international conspiracy, organized in Berlin and Moscow, and aimed at the destruction of the British Empire in Asia, was that put forward by the author of the War Office memorandum on the Cause of Unrest in Mesopotamia, composed, in October 1920.39 At an important meeting of representatives of the Third International held at the Foreign Office in Moscow, the author declared, Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, had personally expounded his design for attacking British imperialism in the East, striking hardest at India, where the national movement was to be encouraged and assisted. A secret treaty had then been signed between Soviet Russia and the Islamic countries, including the government of Mustafa Kemal; and the Bolshevik advance on

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 41

Enzeli (on the Caspian Sea), the Arab outbreak in Mesopotamia, the Turkish advance on the Armenian provinces, and the Arab uprising in Syria had followed. These developments indicated the inception of a 'general strategic plan', directed ostensibly from Moscow, against France and England, more particularly the latter. The Moscow Direction had a gap in their line of attack against the British Empire, which they were prepared to fill with a combined movement of Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. Enver, it may be assumed, controlled the 'connecting lever'. This he would pull as soon as, but not before, British policy towards Turkey was definitely determined.

The sinister influence of Moscow, in other words, could be discovered behind every form of political unrest in the Middle East. There could be no doubt what the British response should be:

As long as the Moscow Direction survives to absorb into its organization, thrive on and exploit agencies of local discontent, Nationalism will be the instrument of Internationalism, and until the International Monster has been starved, or severed at the neck, its various heads will have to be dealt with in detail when and where they arise.4"

Paradoxically the War Office, which in the above memorandum at least appeared to advocate a vigorous response to the problem of international conspiracy, opposed the expulsion of the Sultan from Constantinople. In a report on the Strategic Position on the Straits, composed in December 1919, they argued that, if the sultan were removed from his capital the whole military position in the area would be altered to Britain's disadvantage. In peacetime she would lose both knowledge of the Sultan's plans and power to check his preparations. The powerful deterrent of having the sultan and the whole of his government under her guns would have disappeared. If the sultan were removed a much larger garrison would be required, and a more elaborate system of defence, especially on the Asia Minor side, where a 'veritable frontier' with 'all its disadvantages and bickerings and constant aggravations', would have to be set up.41

The case for the expulsion of the sultan from Constantinople was put forward most effectively by Curzon. In a memorandum on the Future of Constantinople, presented in January 1920, he argued that, if they had to face, as he thought they probably would, a new form of Turkish nationalism, founded on either religion or race, and exploiting pan-Islamism or pan- Turanism, would it not be a more formidable factor if its 'rallying point' and 'inspiration' were the sultan at Constantinople rather than a sultan at Bursa? Would not the retention of the old capital give a prestige and an impetus to the movement, which would add immensely to its potentiality for harm. A nationalist party in Anatolia under Mustafa Kemal may be a 'hard nut to

42 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

crack'. But a nationalist party with its sovereign in Constantinople would be a 'much more anxious problem'. Were the sultan to remain in his capital, the Turk would be ideally placed to 'set the Powers by the ears, to embroil Governments and nations, and to inoculate the West with the worst vices of Eastern intrigue'.42

Ryan and Forbes Adam, a member of the Eastern Department at the Foreign Office, supported Curzon, emphasising the dangers to Britain inherent in the forces of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism, forces, according to Forbes Adam, dependent on the maintenance of the prestige of Turkey, a thing itself dependent on the retention of the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople.43

The problems caused to British policy makers by what they perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be the existence of a divided leadership in Anatolia were for the most part resolved in the autumn of 1921 when, following the battle of Sakarya (August-September 1921), Mustafa Kemal emerged as the supreme leader of the Turkish people. As a British General Staff memorandum on the Position in Anatolia, composed following the victory put it:

There is no doubt that the prestige of Mustapha Kemal himself has been greatly enhanced as a result of these operations. Formerly in the position of a Prime Minister answerable to a Government, he now appears to be almost in the position of a Dictator. We may, therefore, assume that the Moderate Party in the Angora Government is, for the time being, firmly in power, and this assumption, if correct, would seem to remove any immediate danger of the return of Enver Pasha, or of a military alliance between the nationalists and Bolshevik Russia, especially as the Nationalists will shortly be no longer wholly dependent upon Russia for the supply of war material. At the same time, Mustapha Kemal is in such a strong military position, that there appears to be no reason why he should moderate his political demands, in the event of peace negotiations being re-opened.4

But in the period following the battle of Sakarya British concern regarding the true nature of the Turkish national movement remained. As Sir Horace Rumbold, who replaced de Robeck as British High Commissioner in Constantinople in November 1920, remarked, in a telegram to Curzon, dispatched following the expulsion of the Greek expeditionary force from Anatolia, in October 1922, it was possible that for the Kemalists the realisation of the National Pact, now virtually assured, was merely an 'immediate objective', a 'first step':

It is a step at which they will pause, and there will not be the same union afterwards regarding a completely revolutionary policy at home

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 43

and a policy of expansion abroad. Many of the leaders and the majority of ordinary Turks will wish them to preserve traditional institutions and 'cultivate their garden' in peaceful conditions. It would, however, be folly to forget that others among the leaders cherish the dream of reconstructing the Turkish Empire, if only on a federal basis and establishing Turkey in a position of hegemony in a grand Islamic combine. For these Great Britain not only is but also will remain the enemy. They desire nothing less than the collapse of our position, first in Mesopotamia, then in the East generally. The real vital issue at the Peace Conference will not be any of the questions enumerated above, important as they are [Smyrna, the Straits, Thrace, the Caucasus, the capitulations], but whether Turkey is to be placed in such a position as to enable these men to dominate her internally and so carry forward their plan.45

Thus to the end of the period of Turkish national struggle the British remained uncertain how far the Turkish nationalists intended to 'cultivate their garden' in Anatolia, and how far they intended to become embroiled in some kind of great pan-Islamist conspiracy, aimed at the destruction of the British Empire in Asia.

Just how far the different views of the Turkish national movement, put forward by British officials, the 'men on the spot', and the various intelligence services, actually affected the formulation of British policy in the period of Turkish national struggle must remain a subject for future investigation. It has been the intention of this article merely to draw attention to what may be considered real or apparent differences in British views of the Turkish national movement in Anatolia, and to point to some of the possible consequences. Incidentally, in the process, much evidence has been adduced, which would seem to support the view, put forward by E.J. Zurcher and others, that the national movement, in its early stages at least, was organized by elements within the Ottoman government, in particular the Ministry of War; that CUP leaders in exile, acting in conjunction with German right wing elements in Berlin and the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow, struggled to gain, or keep, control of the movement; and that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the 'man-on-the-spot' in Anatolia, eventually succeeded in undermining their influence and taking over the leadership of the movement. This he succeeded in doing because the national movement, as it emerged, particularly following the Allied occupation of Constantinople in March 1920, was despite all its numerous international connections, essentially a 'locally based' movement, seeking for the most part to achieve merely local aims and objectives.

44 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

NOTES

1. British Public Record Office, WO 32/5733 History of the National Movement in Turkey, Nov. 1919. See also FO 371/4158/105780 Milne to Calthorpe, Constantinople, 30 June 1919; FO 406/41 No.126 de Robeck to Curzon, 10 Oct. 1919; FO 371/4158/118411 Calthorpe to Curzon, 30 July 1919, enclosure; FO 371/4158/96979 Calthorpe to Curzon, 21 June 1919, enclosure; K. Bourne, D. Cameron Watt (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFA) (University Publications of America), Part II, Series B, Vol.1, Doc.68, enclosure. The histories and accounts drawn up by Milne, Calthorpe, Heathcote-Smith and their colleagues, the 'men on the spot', appear in retrospect remarkably accurate. That is because they were, for the most part, based on information provided by British control officers, posted to strategic points in Anatolia (until their arrest or expulsion in the spring of 1920), members of the Levant Consular Service, members of the Ottoman government, loyal to the Sultan, members of the Greek Orthodox church, resident in Anatolia, and even members of the Turkish national movement itself. Surprisingly the History of the National Movement in Turkey makes no mention of the declaration, issued by the leaders of the national movement at Amasya in June 1919, seen by some as the founding document of the national movement. The Congress of Erzerum was organized, not by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, but by the Society for the Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces.

2. FO 371/5230/E 12339 Mesopotamia, Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest, by Major N.N.E. Bray, 14 Sept. 1920; FO 371/5231/7765 Mesopotamia, Causes of Unrest - Report No.2, by Major N.N.E. Bray, Oct. 1920; WO 33/969 Cause of the Outbreak in Mesopotamia, General Staff, War Office, Oct. 1920. The material used by the Political Department, India Office, and the War Office, in the above reports, was assembled from information sent in by the various British intelligence services in Europe, the GOC, Army of the Black Sea, Constantinople, British Military Intelligence, Cairo, the Arab Bureau, the GOC, Mesopotamia, Embassy and legation staff throughout Europe and Asia, Russian and other government publications and broadcasts, and German, French, Italian, Russian and Turkish telegraph and wireless intercepts. Turkish telegraph and wireless signals were intercepted by Cable and Wireless, from 1919. They were decrypted, where necessary, by the Admiralty (Room 40 OB) and by MI. For an account of this work, see Robin Denniston, Churchill s Secret War (Stroud: Sutton, 1997).

Evidence available elsewhere would suggest that the information provided in the above reports was, with one or two exceptions, not referred to in this article, factually correct. But it can be argued that the interpretation placed on the evidence was to some extent misconceived. For an analysis of this aspect of the question, see A.L. Macfie, 'British Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919-21', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.35, No. 1 (1999).

In their various reports the British recognized that Emir Feisal, though apparently duplicitous, may have been forced by the extremists to 'acquiesce in action distasteful to him personally'. In the first of his reports on the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, Bray noted that the Mouvahiddin Society, which had representatives in Moscow, had definitely proclaimed itself pro-Bolshevik, and that it had converted 105 members of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara to Bolshevik principles. Enver, Talaat and Djemal Pashas, who fled the Ottoman Empire in the last days of the First World War, all remained politically active for some years, Enver mainly in Russia and Central Asia, Talaat in Germany and Djemal in Afghanistan.

3. B.N. $imrnir (ed.), British Documents on Atatuirk (BDA) (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1973-84), Vol. 1, No.96, enclosure.

4. Ibid., No.101, enclosures. 5. Ibid., No.112, enclosure. 6. Ibid., Vol.2, No.73, enclosure. 7. Ibid., No.96, enclosure. 8. Mesopotamia, Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest, pp.6-7. 9. Ibid., p.6.

10. Ibid.

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 45

11. E.L. Woodward and R. Butler (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy (London: HMSO) First Series, Vol.4, No.660.

12. Mesopotamia, Causes of Unrest - Report No.2, p.3. The War Office report concluded that the Soviet connection with the Arab situation was by way of the channel 'Arslan-Talaat-Enver'.

13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., p.4. 15. Ibid., p.6. According to Mesopotamia, Causes of Unrest - Report No.2, Talaat Pasha would

be charged with the direction of the revolutionary movement in Syria, Egypt and Arabia; Djavid with the direction in Greece, Italy and France; Enver with the direction in the Caucasus, Djemal with the direction in Afghanistan, and Khalil [sic] with the direction in Persia.

16. Ibid., p.14. In August 1920 British intelligence acquired a copy of a proclamation, supposedly issued by Mustafa Kemal, as 'President of the Turkish Republic'. In Bray's view this designation signified a Turkish national acceptance of Bolshevik policy and an abandonment of the Sultan as Caliph. It signified in other words the detachment of the national movement from the body of Islam.

17. BDA, Vol.l, No.109, enclosure 1. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid., enclosure 2. 20. BDFA, Part II, Series B, Vol. 1, Doc.96. 21. Ibid., Doc.69. 22. FO 406/41 No.186, 1, de Robeck to Curzon, 2 Dec. 1919. 23. BDA, Vol.1, No.86, enclosure. 24. FO 406/41 No.126, de Robeck to Curzon, 10 Oct. 1919. 25. BDFA, Part II, Series B, Vol. 1, Doc.40. 26. Ibid., Doc.75. 27. Ibid., Doc.95. 28. BDA, Vol.3, No.35. In a later account of Mustafa Kemal's life, written in April 1921, it was

asserted that in the pre-war years he had been an ardent exponent of Unionist ideas and a freemason. In 1919 he had been active in the organization of a military society in Constantinople, one of the 'germs' of the national movement. Though 'spectacular and domineering', there was no reason to accuse him of lack of patriotism (see FO 371/6469/E5233). In June 1921 Refet Pasha, the nationalist leader, told Major Henry, a British businessman, that Mustafa Kemal was not a Jew. By extraction he was a 'nomad' Turk (see FO 371/6472/E7936). There is of course no reason to suppose that Mustafa Kemal lost an eye in the First World War.

29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., Vol.2, No.92. 31. Ibid., minute of 23 Sept. 1920. 32. Ibid., Vol.2, No.92. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., No.175. 35. FO 371/5232 The Situation in Mesopotamia, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for

War, 10 Dec. 1920. 36. BDA, Vol.4, No.115, appendix. 37. FO 406/43 No. 190, 1, de Robeck to Curzon, 7 April 1920, enclosure. 38. Ibid. 39. Cause of Unrest in Mesopotamia. 40. Ibid., p.12. 41. CAB 23/20 Cabinet meeting, 6 Jan. 1920, appendix 3. 42. FO 371/4239 The Future of Constantinople, memorandum by Curzon, 4 Jan. 1920. 43. FO 800/240 Ryan to Forbes Adam, 26 Nov. 1919; FO 371/4239, Constantinople and the

Straits, memorandum by Forbes Adam, 10 Jan. 1920. For a more complete account of the British debate about Constantinople, see A.L. Macfie 'The British Decision regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 1918-January 1920', Historical Journal, Vol. 18, No.2 (1975).

46 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

44. BDA, Vol.4, No.9. Opposition to the Kemalist regime continued. In March 1922 British intelligence identified a number of groups or parties in the national assembly, opposed to Mustafa Kemal, in particular a clerical party, consisting of 20-25 deputies, and an eastern provinces party, consisting of 45-50 deputies. It was the eastern provinces party, which according to British intelligence first openly drew the attention of the assembly to Mustafa Kemal's 'private excesses' (see BDA, Vol.4, No.52).

45. FO 371/7906 6468 Rumbold to Curzon, 17 Oct. 1922.