Brezhnev Doctrine

AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

Containment – By Any Means Necessary

CIA and KGB Covert Actions that Shaped the Cold War

Eric Alford

HIST102 – United States History Since 1865

September 4, 2014

The Central Intelligence Agency, established in the National

Security Act of 1947 after the disbanding of the Office of Strategic

Services, was created specifically with the Cold War and Russia's

Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union, also referred to as

the KGB, in mind. In the aftermath of World War II, the balance of

global power was dramatically altered. When the dust had finally

settled, every major power in the world, save for the United States

and Russia, had seemingly been crippled by the irreconcilable costs

of the war in one way or another. Within the post-war void, the two

superpowers were divided in almost every manner conceivable. In light

of the cataclysmic devastation wrought by World War II no political

entity in their right mind would again risk another war of such a

scale between superpowers. However, when two entities are as opposing

as the United States and Russia were after the war, conflict is

inevitable. Nowhere was this embodied more than in the CIA and the

KGB and the operations they conducted throughout the Cold War. While

the political war between the United States and Russia was very much

defined by “Atomic Diplomacy” and the threat of Nuclear War as a

political tool, the truly defining acts of the Cold War played out in

proxy wars and conflicts around the world, in the shadows via covert

action and clandestine operations conducted by the two rival

Intelligence Services. These activities ranged widely, from

surveillance and assassinations to the funding, training, and

equipping of opposing sides of various coup d'état across the globe

in places such as, but certainly not limited to, Vietnam, Korea,

Iran, Cuba, Guatemala, and Afghanistan. While there is far more to

write about this topic than the scope of this essay truly

encompasses, there are some significant events that stand out as

having shaped the course of history as the Cold War progressed.

The United States' strategy of Containment, primarily developed

from the “Long Telegram” written by George Keenan, was the defining

focus of all action, covert and overt, during the Cold War. In

describing his strategy for foreign policy regarding the Soviets,

Kennan felt that “the West's only recourse was to meet the Soviets

with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs

of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” and

called for “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant, containment of

Russian expansive tendencies.”1 America became obsessed with intense

anti-communism and limiting the spread of it around the world from

Russia to only Eastern Europe without relying upon nuclear war and

1 Keene, George. "Photocopy of Long Telegram – Truman Library". Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers. Retrieved 27 June 2011.

countering with the establishment of capitalism and democracy in

Western Europe.2 It was also a highly criticized and debated topic.

"Cold War critics of covert action saw secret intervention not as

instruments of statecraft but as tools of political and economic

self-interest designed to serve hegemonic, if not imperialist,

aims.”3 More often than not, many critics felt that covert action

during the Cold War, despite some short-term successes, often

devolved into failure in the long run and was rarely beneficial to

the United States4. CIA influences in the Middle-East, particularly

Iran and Afghanistan, and in the Far East, with Vietnam and Korea,

are often cited as poster-child examples of this inevitability.

In Vietnam, this influence can be traced as far back as the OSS

Patti mission near the end of World War II, inevitably resulting in

Vietnam's independence from France, the establishment of Ho Chi Minh

as the country's leader, and the Vietnam War, the most blatant

example of Cold War proxy conflict devolving into drawn-out,

unpopular conflict.5 While the CIA focused much of their initial

2 Edwards, Rebecca; Henretta, James A; and Self, Robert O. America: A Concise History, Volume 2: since 1865 (New York, NY: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2012), 762.

3 Coll, Alberto. "Can American Democracy Employ Covert Action as an Instrument of Statecraft?." In Legal and Moral Constraints on Low-Intensity Conflicts n,d. Newport: Naval WarCollege, 1995.

4 Diamond, John M. The CIA and the Culture of Failure: US Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq. Stanford University Press, 2008.

5 Patti, Archimedes LA. Why Vietnam?: Prelude to America's Albatross. Univ of California Press, 1982.

attention on Korea after the agency was founded, the covert action

wing of the CIA did not yet exist at the onset of the Korean War in

1950. However, the Directorate of Plans (which eventually became

known as the National Clandestine Services) was created in 1951 to

fulfill that role, largely in response to criticism of the CIA

failing to predict events leading to the Korean War, and to "serve as

the clandestine arm of the CIA and the national authority for the

coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of clandestine operations

across the Intelligence Community of the United States".6 Many of the

earliest Intelligence Estimates ever written by the CIA were, in

fact, in regards to Soviet influence and strategy within Korea, but

the CIA initially viewed the situation as just another Cold War

front. While analysts accurately and consistently reported current

intelligence, the reports did not emphasize that the Korean situation

represented anything extraordinary beyond routine Soviet schemes and

“tests” of American resolve.7

In Iran, the CIA worked with the United Kingdom in the 1953 coup

d'état of the democratically elected government of Iran where the

United Kingdom, as exposed in declassified documents, was fearful of

6 "Mission of the National Clandestine Service". CIA Website. Retrieved April 28, 2011.

7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/korean-war-baptism-by-fire/baptism-by-fire.pdf

Iranian plans to nationalize their petroleum industry which would

undercut the profits of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, later known as

BP.8 The resulting puppet regime's inefficiency then directly caused

the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the American Embassy hostage

crisis that lasted over a year, in which fifty-two diplomats and

citizens were, after a series of failed operations by conventional

forces, rescued following 444 days of captivity. In Afghanistan, the

United States was contemplating options for aiding the Mujahideen

(Pashto for strugglers), who were attempting, and failing, to resist

Soviet invaders. Russia's invasion was significant in that this was

the only time during the Cold War where they decided to operate in a

country outside of Eastern Europe. One plan by the United States was

to arm the rebels with Stinger Anti-Aircraft missiles, which would

counter the successful use of Soviet helicopters. But policy-makers

were concerned that these Stingers would fall into the wrong hands or

be acquired by Soviets. Ultimately, Reagan decided to send the

Stingers, leaving them in the hands of the Mujahideen after their

victory, but this was deemed an acceptable risk compared to a Soviet

victory in Afghanistan, foreshadowing events that would result in a

very unstable and shattered country, in which the Taliban (Pashto for

8 "Special Report: Secret History of the CIA in Iran". New York Times. 2000.

students), an Islamic fundamentalist group formed from the more

moderate Mujahideen, seized control, later providing Osama bin Laden

with a training base from which to launch terrorist operations

worldwide.9

9 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan

At the end of December 1979, the Soviet Union sent thousands of

troops into Afghanistan and immediately assumed complete military and

political control of Kabul and large portions of the country. This

event began a brutal, decade-long attempt by Moscow to subdue the

Afghan civil war and maintain a friendly and socialist government on

its border. It was a watershed event of the Cold War, marking the

only time the Soviet Union invaded a country outside the Eastern Bloc

—a strategic decision met by nearly worldwide condemnation. While the

massive, lightning-fast military maneuvers and brazenness of Soviet

political objectives constituted an “invasion” of Afghanistan, the

word “intervention” more accurately describes these events as the

culmination of growing Soviet domination going back to 1973.

Undoubtedly, leaders in the Kremlin had hoped that a rapid and

complete military takeover would secure Afghanistan’s place as an

exemplar of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that once a country

became socialist Moscow would never permit it to return to the

capitalist camp. The United States and its European allies, guided by

their own doctrine of containment, sharply criticized the Soviet move

into Afghanistan and devised numerous measures to compel Moscow to

withdraw.

In the summer of 1973, Mohammed Daoud, the former Afghan Prime

Minister, launched a successful coup against King Zahir. Although

Daoud himself was more nationalist than socialist, his coup was

dependent on pro-Soviet military and political factions. Since 1955

Moscow had provided military training and materiel to Afghanistan; by

1973, a third of active troops had trained on Soviet soil.

Additionally, Daoud enjoyed the support of the People’s Democratic

Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 upon Marxist ideology

and allegiance to Moscow. In 1967 the PDPA split into two factions:

the Parchamists, led by Babrak Karmal (who supported Daoud), and the

“Khalqis” led by Noor Taraki. For the next five years, Daoud

attempted the impossible task of governing Afganistan’s Islamic

tribal regions, while also struggling to reconcile the PDPA split.

But the more radical Khalq faction never fully recognized Daoud’s

leadership, while Karmal viewed the coup largely as a means to

consolidate his own power. In response, Daoud hoped to mitigate both

of these threats by steering Afghanistan away from Soviet influence

and improving U.S. relations, while decreasing the influence of

radical elements in the government and military.

Daoud’s middle course ended in disaster. On April 28, 1978, soldiers

aligned with Taraki’s “Khalq” faction assaulted the presidential

palace, where troops executed Daoud and his family. In the following

days Taraki became the Prime Minister, and, in an attempt to end the

PDPA’s divisions, Karmal became Deputy Prime Minister. In Washington,

this Communist revolution was met with alarm. The Carter

administration recognized that Taraki would undo Daoud’s attempt to

steer Afghanistan away from Moscow, and it debated whether to cut

ties with Afghanistan or recognize Taraki in the hopes that Soviet

influence could be contained. Although the President’s Assistant for

National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated the former

course, Carter supported the Department of State’s advocacy of

recognition. Shortly after the revolution, Washington recognized the

new government and soon named Adolph Dubs its Ambassador to

Afghanistan. Until his kidnapping and death at the hands of Afghan

Shia dissidents in February 1979, Dubs strongly pursued good

relations with the Taraki regime in the hopes that U.S. support would

keep Soviet influence at bay.

Once again, the tumult of internal Afghan politics complicated both

U.S. and Soviet jockeying. In the summer of 1979, Hafizullah Amin, a

longtime ally of Taraki who became Deputy Prime Minister following

the April Revolution, received word that Babrak Karmal (Daoud’s early

supporter) was leading a Parcham plot to overthrow the Taraki regime.

Amin took the opportunity to purge and execute many Parchamists and

consolidate his own power. Complicating matters further, this

internal strife damaged the Kabul Government’s major national

program, namely, to bring the Communist revolution to the Islamic

tribal areas beyond Kabul. By the winter of 1978, this program was

met by armed revolt throughout the country. In response, Amin and

Taraki traveled to Moscow to sign a friendship treaty which included

a provision that would allow direct Soviet military assistance should

the Islamic insurgency threaten the regime. This insurrection

intensified over the next year and it became increasingly obvious to

the Soviets that Taraki could not prevent all-out civil war and the

prospect of a hostile Islamic government taking control. By mid-1979

Moscow was searching to replace Taraki and Amin, and dispatched

combat troops to Bagram Air Base outside of Kabul. This move prompted

the Carter administration to begin supplying non-lethal aid to

Afghan mujahedeen, or Islamic insurgents. In August, a high-ranking

Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to assess the situation.

U.S. officials interpreted this mission as one last Soviet attempt to

shore up the Taraki regime, and also an opportunity to devise a

military takeover. Regarding the latter, most analysts in Washington

believed that such a move remained possible but unlikely.

But this calculus was bound to change. Amin sensed the Soviet mission

was designed to strengthen Taraki at his expense. In response, forces

loyal to Amin executed Taraki in October—a move that infuriated

Moscow, which began amassing combat units along its border. At this

juncture Washington was still unsure how to interpret the Soviet

maneuvers: was the Soviet Union planning a full takeover or did it

remain committed to preserving the April Revolution? Analysts

remained skeptical that Moscow would occupy the country given the

political and economic costs. By the winter of 1979, faced with

mutinies and an uncertain leadership, the Afghan Army was unable to

provide basic security to the government against the onslaught of

Islamic fighters nearing Kabul. By that point the Soviets were

sending in motorized divisions and Special Forces. Washington

demanded an explanation, which the Soviets ignored. Finally, on

Christmas Eve, the invasion began. Soviet troops killed Amin and

installed Babrak Karmal as the Soviet’s puppet head of government.

Although the Carter administration had closely watched this buildup

from the outset, its reaction following the invasion revealed that,

until the end, it clung to the hope that the Soviets would not

invade, based on the unjustified assumption that Moscow would

conclude that the costs of invasion were too high. In response,

Carter wrote a sharply-worded letter to Brezhnev denouncing Soviet

aggression, and during his State of the Union address he announced

his own doctrine vowing to protect Middle Eastern oil supplies from

encroaching Soviet power. The administration also enacted economic

sanctions and trade embargoes against the Soviet Union, called for a

boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and stepped up its aid to the

Afghan insurgents. In sum, these actions were Washington’s collective

attempt to make the Soviets’ “adventure” in Afghanistan as painful

and brief as possible. Instead, it took ten years of grinding

insurgency before Moscow finally withdrew, at the cost of millions of

lives and billions of dollars. In their wake, the Soviets left a

shattered country in which the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist

group, seized control, later providing Osama bin Laden with a

training base from which to launch terrorist operations worldwide.

Kennan’s ideas, which became the basis of the Truman administration’sforeign policy, first came to public attention in 1947 in the form ofan anonymous contribution to the journal Foreign Affairs, the so-called “X-Article.” “The main element of any United States policy toward theSoviet Union,” Kennan wrote, “must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” To that end, he called for countering “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world” through the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.” Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would “promote tendencies which must eventually find theiroutlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”

Kennan’s policy was controversial from the very beginning. Columnist Walter Lippmann attacked the X-Article for failing to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests. The United States, Kennan’s article implied, should face down the Soviet Union and its Communist allies whenever and wherever they posed a risk of gaining influence. In fact, Kennan advocated defending above all else the world’s major centers of industrial power against Soviet expansion: Western Europe,Japan, and the United States. Others criticized Kennan’s policy for being too defensive. Most notably, John Foster Dulles declared duringthe 1952 election campaign that the United States’ policy should not be containment, but the “rollback” of Soviet power and the eventual “liberation” of Eastern Europe. Even within the Truman administrationthere was a rift over containment between Kennan and Paul Nitze, Kennan’s successor as director of the Policy Planning Staff. Nitze, who saw the Soviet threat primarily in military terms, interpreted Kennan’s call for “the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force” to mean the use of military power. In contrast, Kennan, who

considered the Soviet threat to be primarily political, advocated above all else economic assistance (e.g., the Marshall Plan) and “psychological warfare” (overt propaganda and covert operations) to counter the spread of Soviet influence. In 1950, Nitze’s conception of containment won out over Kennan’s. NSC 68, a policy document prepared by the National Security Council and signed by Truman, called for a drastic expansion of the U.S. military budget. The paperalso expanded containment’s scope beyond the defense of major centersof industrial power to encompass the entire world. “In the context ofthe present polarization of power,” it read, “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”

Despite all the criticisms and the various policy defeats that Kennansuffered in the early 1950’s, containment in the more general sense of blocking the expansion of Soviet influence remained the basic strategy of the United States throughout the cold war. On the one hand, the United States did not withdraw into isolationism; on the other, it did not move to “roll back” Soviet power, as John Foster Dulles briefly advocated. It is possible to say that each succeeding administration after Truman’s, until the collapse of communism in 1989, adopted a variation of Kennan’s containment policy and made it their own.

According to legend, the intelligence community, perhaps for base and selfish motives, overestimated the number of Soviet strategic missiles. But that legend is largely untrue. The overestimate came largely from political critics of the Eisenhower administration, not the intelligence agencies themselves. Not only did these critics overestimate the number of strategic-range Soviet missiles, but the intelligence community underestimated the number ofmedium- and intermediate-range missiles that the Soviets were building to cover their main theater of concern, Europe. SECDEF McNamara’s distrust of what he perceived as self-serving Air Force parochialism moved him to create the Defense Intelligence Agency.

This was one of the earliest instances of intelligence being used forpolitical purposes. It also underscored the problem of secrecy, in that Eisenhower did not believe he was able to reveal the true state of the strategic missile balance, which he knew. He did not want to be asked how he knew, which might have led to a discussion of the U-2program, in which manned aircraft equipped with cameras penetrated deep into Soviet territory in violation of international law. U-2 flights over the Soviet Union continued until May 1960, when Francis Gary Powers, on contract with the CIA, was shot down over Sverdlovsk.Powers survived and was put on trial.

Dulles used the newly created (1947) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), run by his brother, Allen Dulles. When Iran’s nationalist premier, Mohammad Mossadegh, seized British oil properties in 1953, CIA agents helped depose him and, eventually, installed the young Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as shah of Iran. Iranian resentment of the 1953Iranian coup, followed by twenty-five years of U.S. support for the shah, eventually led to the 1979 Iranian Revolution (see Chapter 30).In 1954, the CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala against the democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, who had expropriated land owned by the American-owned United Fruit Company. Eisenhower specifically approved those CIA efforts and expanded the agency’s mandate from gathering intelligence to intervening in the affairs of sovereign states

"The essence of a covert operation is to be deniable, not necessarilyhidden."

In 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency was conducting operation in Iran in order to disrupt the current government and put Shah into power. At the time, Iran was refusing to conduct negotiations over oil as it became a leader in production. If Iran was not willing to negotiate then it would have had a negative impact on the United States, the global economy, and would have given the Soviet Union an upper hand in the Cold War. The actions conducted in Iran were used to influence the country by placing a favorable leader into power. These actions show that it supported statecraft because it impacted how the government conducted foreign policies and served as a tool bysecuring a stable economy in the United States.

During the Cold War era, the U.S. decision-makers made extensive use of covert action to bring about regime change in Third World countries. Some of the more famous cases of the U.S. covert action during the Cold War era include: Operation AJAX in Iran to topple Mossadeq regime (1952), Operation PBSUCESS in Guatemala (1953) to unseat Arbenz regime (1953), and Operation FUBELT in Chile to overthrow Allende regime (1973).

Covert action is a necessary—yet sometimes controversial—instrument of U.S. foreign policy. It is distinctive in that, unlike traditionaldiplomatic or military operations, U.S. officials could plausibly deny involvement in the activity, which is predicated upon the fact that the covert action remains secret. U.S. law authorizes only the CIA to conduct covert action activities approved by the Executive Branch. President must determine, through a document called a presidential finding, that a covert action is necessary to support “identifiable foreign policy objectives” of the U.S. Proper covert actions are undertaken because policymakers—not the intelligence agencies— believe that secret means are the best way to achieve a desired end or a specific policy goal.[1] It encompasses a broad

spectrum of activities, to include propaganda, political or economic action, paramilitary operations, and lethal action. Some intelligencespecialists have objected to the phrase “covert action,” believing that the word covert emphasizes secrecy over policy. (The British hadearlier referred to this activity as special political action – SPA.)The distinction is important, because even though these activities are secret, they are undertaken as one means to advance policy goals.[2]

Three factors come together to create weaknesses in the accountability of covert action: precision stand-off weapons; increased strategic reliance on discretely targeted counter-terrorismuses-of-force that are enabled by new technologies; and the blurring of different kinds of counter-terrorism uses-of-force that do not neatly fit into categories of the statutory definition.[3] In the drone warfare secrecy and accountability debate, at issue is public disclosure of drone strikes and targeted killing by the CIA, operating under the authority of Title 50 of the United States Code. Recently, attention has also been focused on issues of surveillance, particularly domestic surveillance, as a result of Edward Snowden's actions. The 1987 Iran-Contra affair serves as another example of theaccountability issue, which involved the White House’s use of non-sanctioned covert action in Iran and Nicaragua in defiance of the lawand without proper reporting to Congress, caused intense public controversy. American involvement in the 1961 Bay of Pigs operations is also a popular example of the secrecy needed for covert action being compromised.[4]

Clearly, there is room for certain reforms of secrecy, accountability, and oversight structures, but reform should proceed under two fundamental premises. First, there are legitimate government secrets. Second, accountability and oversight are the responsibility of the political branches alone, not of unelected and unappointed individuals such as Edward Snowden. Reform of the definition of covert action to allow explicitly for different levels of appropriate acknowledgment and public information could be one

way. In some cases things must remain genuinely secret. In others, revelation of the program and its legal and political bases — withoutacknowledgment of particular operations — should be required. In others, acknowledgement of particular operations should be a matter of policy, but without any further details.[5] There is one additional statutory reform, however, that would have to take place in tandem with reform of the covert action definition: creation of a safe-harbor for the CIA (or relevant intelligence community actor) torefuse to respond to FOIA requests even in the case of acknowledged or quasi-acknowledged programs or activities, except as specifically required in the statute.[6] One consequence of September 11 is that much more has become known of intelligence activities and operations.“Either the sophistication with which covert action is kept secret will need to increase. Or we may learn more about the phenomenon. Theproblems of learning about covert action (and clandestine diplomacy) will nevertheless persist, as the need to evaluate and judge them will undoubtedly grow.”[7]

Works Cited

1. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Fifth Edition (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012),

2. Ibid

3. Anderson, Kenneth. “Secrecy, Accountability, and the CIA's “Covert” Drone Strikes”, The Briefing: Perspectives on National Security and Law, Hoover Institution. http://www.hoover.org/research/secrecy-accountability-and-cias-covert-drone-strikes (published January 29, 2014).

4. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. ""Covert Action"." Covert Action. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19149/covert_action.html (accessed June 18, 2014).

5. Anderson, Kenneth. “Secrecy, Accountability, and the CIA's “Covert” Drone Strikes”, The Briefing: Perspectives on National

Security and Law, Hoover Institution. http://www.hoover.org/research/secrecy-accountability-and-cias-covert-drone-strikes (published January 29, 2014).

6. Ibid

7. Scott, Len “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy,” Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows, (New York: Routledge, 2004).

Covert action provides a tool that allows one more option on the table for strategic decision makers besides the normal diplomatic pressure and use of multinational organizations.  It is not Jason Bourne, it is not Spy vs. Spy, they are well orchestrated, finely tuned executions that enable policy makers the ability to move forward the plans and goals of the United States.  As Scott points out, it is “unwise to infer that disruptive activity is exclusively clandestine.  Some activities might involve passing information to other states and agencies to enable them to act against arms dealers or terrorists…”[i]

I do not see any conflicts regarding the use of and carrying out executive level decisions via covert action.  The CIA is not authorized to carry out covert actions unless it receives the authority to do by the executive branch.  Further, the executive branch is required by law in most cases to notify Congress of any covert action[ii] While the argument can be made as to when and why the President must notify Congress of such action, it is imperative to point out the authorization to execute covert action lies within the executive branch, a power which is given to the office by the Constitution and legislation passed by Congress.

In the role of serving state-craft, covert action serves as an aid tofurther US interests through its ability to offer the executive branch, key policy, and decision makers with the flexibility to shapean adversaries mindset with regards to their political, military, and

security actions.  Covert action supports state-craft insomuch that it has allowed the United States to become and maintain it hegemony within the global arena.  Covert action is not simply assassinations,or toppling dictators, setting up new powers in far off places, it can be subtle and non-evasive, where it is the “hidden hand” as Aldrich pointed out, it is also out in the open and in plain sight[iii].  Covert action serves both state-craft and furthers US interests, not one, or the other.

You posed some very good questions that I would like to offer my opinion on.  The issues you point out regarding covert actions and notifications to Congressional oversight are valid, but in my opinionnot likely.  While the National Security Act has been amended by Congress many times over the years, it clearly identifies when the executive will notify congressional oversight.  Further legislation provided that Executive branch only be required to notify the Gang ofEight instead of the entire Intelligence Committees and also has the ability to withhold notification all together based on those instances where lives are at risk(1).  There is however a requirementto notify oversight after the fact in these cases to ensure the oversight requirement has been met.  While the House and Senate have both attempted to change the verbiage of legislation regarding these executive powers, under the Intelligence Authorization Act, it has still not be settled and things remain as they are(2).

In an effort to answer your questions regarding secondary and tertiary effects, I would offer that no other IC agency could offer insight that would be able to fully delineate those effects accurately. There are simply variables that cannot and will not be able to be taken into account.  At the end of the day, a decision will be made based on all information available regarding covert action.  If the decision for covert action rests at the executive level, a democratically elected president is trusted to make the bestdecision possible.  Further there are those with the responsibility

to provide oversight to that system to ensure there is not an abuse of power.   It is this process by which we continue to put our faith in every time we utilize our given responsibility when we cast a vote.

Covert action has the capacity of playing a very crucial role in the strategic decision-making process. According to EO 12333 in conjunction with the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, covert actions exist as an instrument to foreign policy initiatives to influence a target covertly to achieve overt results.  This requires its incorporation into the deliberation that goes behind long-range foreign policy objectives. Covert action is strategic in nature because it requires “long lead times for planning, for establishing necessary infrastructure, for recruiting necessary agents, and for budget development…” in order to be successful.  It offers the president and national security advisors a “flexible, responsive, andmuch less costly” option that enables the US to secretly pursue actions that are beneficial to it. It also provides an alternative tomilitary force where simple overt action will not do the trick. (Daugherty 2006)

I do not think that covert action in itself creates a conflict of interest between the intelligence community and national government objectives. But the employment of covert action IS a peacetime [not wartime] tool constructed by the CIA that, utilized properly, is meant to abet strategic policy not create or replace it. According toformer Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, because “…the CIA conducts such activities only when specifically authorized bythe National Security Council….CIA covert actions reflect national policy.” When incorporated early on into strategic foreign policy, covert action is set up to play an effective and successful role, enhancing the practice of state-craft. (Daugherty 2006)

Proper utilization relies heavily upon the president and key policy maker’s abilities to understand the uses and limitations of such

operations. Conflicts of interest come from this lack of understanding or, perhaps in some cases, deliberate disregard for lessons learned. “Should the president nonetheless order a covert action operation that lies outside the disciplines capabilities or limits, program failure is virtually guaranteed…”  A conflict of interest could result when a covert action is not cleared through theproper channels (as identified in EO 1233 and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991), is taken to address a time-dominant initiative, used in place of a failed/failing public policy, used as a short-term response to a crisis, or most importantly- lacks a clearobjective. Additionally, the result of improperly executed covert action that becomes public knowledge has disastrous results. For thisreason, covert action that is not aligned with the interests and moral standing of the American public will create a larger problem once compromised than the issue it was intended to address. (Daugherty 2006)

Conclusively, covert action that contradicts the above guidelines andis incorporated into an operational plan without the proper planning will ultimately be vulnerable to abuse and destined for failure. And because success of a covert action is measured by overt events, a failure can quite easily become a public catastrophe that damages thetrust of the American people. Losing the trust of the American peopleleads to a huge loss in the capabilities and power of a democratic government such as that found in the United States. (Daugherty 2006)

ReferencesDaugherty, William. Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. Louisville, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.

First, we must define the difference between counterintelligence and covert action.  Many people, including our intelligence specialists, place covert action in the sane realm of counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence is the spy vs. spy scenario, where an agency or government tries to hide the nature of the activity it is performing from the host or targeted country.  Covert action simply means to hide the Source of the activity or action that’s taking place.  A good example of this was the 2010 Stuxnet worm employed on Iran’s nuclear program.  The operation was designed to hide the culpability of U.S. and Israeli intelligence involvement in the activity.

"As Cold War critics of covert action saw secret intervention not as instruments of statecraft but tools of political and economic self-interest designed to serve hegemonic, if not imperialist, aims.” [1]In the current era as it was during the Cold War, covert action enables leaders, decion0makers to conduct actions required to maintain the integrity of our Republic, without alarming the Americanpopulace.  Our Executive requires options to defeat an enemy that threatens our sovereignty, our economic interest and the global security of the world.  George Washington’s precedent of non-interventionism is not possible in today’s global environment.Therefore, the role of covert-action or secrecy is highly contested, but necessary in order to secure our national interests.  This can benoted in the Constitution Article 2, Section 2, and an attempt to respond both to the needs of national security and the structure of checks and balances.[2]

In the matter of checks and balances, The Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) having exclusivity of the process and execution of covert action can produce bias reports and potentially harmful outcomes to the U.S. and its citizens.  Additionally, Morton Halperin, a former senior official of the American Civil Liberties Union a member of President Clinton's National Security Council staff believes that “covert action commits the U.S. to policy initiatives that are not debated publicly and without giving citizens an opportunity to express their views. This is, in his constitutional interpretation, inimical to the democratic process.[3]  This becomes the debate of need to know vs. need to share information and intelligence with other agencies both military and civilian.

“Cold War critics of covert action saw secret intervention not as instruments of statecraft but tools of political and economic self-interest designed to serve hegemonic, if not imperialist, aims”. [4]Many defense and policy leaders point to post World War II and the merging Soviet challenge that some sat required Western Democracies to conduct such activates.[5]  There are two competing opinions of covert action employment.  One perceives covert action as a “last resort” option when there is a dire threat to the U.S.  This opinion can be perceived as minimalist and rare Two, that covert action should be a normal instrument of statecraft in support of foreign policy objectives, which is viewed as too broad.[6]   It is left to the statesman to decide the how to develop a framework for the consideration of covert action as an instrument of statecraft. [7]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Coll, Alberto. "Can American Democracy Employ Covert Action as an Instrument of Statecraft?." In Legal and Moral Constraints on Low-Intensity Conflicts , . Newport: Naval War College, 1995.

Scott, Len “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy,” Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows, (New York: Routledge, 2004).

[1]. Coll, Alberto. "Can American Democracy Employ Covert Action as an Instrument of Statecraft?." In Legal and Moral Constraints on Low-Intensity Conflicts , . Newport: Naval War College, 1995.

[2]. Scott, Len “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy,” Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows, (New York: Routledge, 2004).

[3].  Ibid

[4]. Coll, 1995

[5]. Scott, 2004

[6]. Coll, 1995

[7]. Ibid.

The United States emerged from World War II as one of the foremost economic, political, and military powers in the world. Wartime production pulled the economy out of depression and propelled it to great profits. In the interest of avoiding another global war, for the first time the United States began to use economic assistance as a strategic element of its foreign policy and offered significant assistance to countries in Europe and Asia struggling to rebuild their shattered economies.

In contrast to American unwillingness to politically or militarily entangle itself in the League of Nations, the United States became one of the first members of the international organization designed to promote international security, commerce, and law, the United Nations. The United States also took an active interest in the fate of the colonies the European powers were having difficulty maintaining. In addition to these challenges, the United States facedincreasing resistance from the Soviet Union which had rescinded on a number of wartime promises. As the Soviets demonstrated a keen interest in dominating Eastern Europe, the United States took the lead in forming a Western alliance to counterbalance the communist superpower to contain the spread of communism. At the same time, the United States restructured its military and intelligence forces, bothof which would have a significant influence in U.S. Cold War policy.

Was there any significant Soviet penetration of the American government? Records opened after the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union — intelligence files in Moscow and, most important amongU.S. sources, the intercepts of Soviet cables collected in a U.S. intelligence project code-named Venona — indicate that there was. Among American suppliers of information to Moscow were FDR’s assistant secretary of the treasury, Harry Dexter White; FDR’s administrative aide Laughlin Currie; a strategically placed midlevel group in the State Department (including Alger Hiss, who was with FDR

at Yalta); and several hundred more, some identified only by code name, working in a range of government departments and agencies.

After World War II, however, most suppliers of information to the Soviets apparently ceased spying. For one thing, the professional apparatus of Soviet spying was dismantled or disrupted by American counterintelligence work. For another, most of the well-connected amateur spies moved on to other careers. The State Department official Alger Hiss, for example, was serving as head of the prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace when he was accused in 1948 by Whittaker Chambers, a Communist-turned-informant, of having passed classified documents to him in the 1930s. Historianshave thus developed a healthy skepticism about Soviet espionage in the United States after 1947, but this was not how many Americans sawit at the time. Legitimate suspicions and real fears, along with political opportunism, combined to fuel the national Red Scare, longer and more far-reaching than the one that followed World War I.

To insulate his administration against charges of Communist infiltration, Truman issued Executive Order 9835 on March 21, 1947, which created the Loyalty-Security Program. The order permitted officials to investigate any employee of the federal government (some2.5 million people) for “subversive” activities. Representing a profound centralization of power, the order sent shock waves through every federal agency. Truman intended the order to apply principally to actions intended to harm the United States (sabotage, treason, etc.), but it was broad enough to allow anyone to be accused of subversion for the slightest reason — for marching in a Communist-leddemonstration in the 1930s, for instance, or signing a petition calling for public housing. Along with suspected political subversives, thousands of gay men and lesbians were dismissed from federal employment in the 1950s, victims of an obsessive search for anyone deemed “unfit” for government work.

Dulles used the newly created (1947) Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA), run by his brother, Allen Dulles. When Iran’s nationalist premier, Mohammad Mossadegh, seized British oil properties in 1953, CIA agents helped depose him and, eventually, installed the young Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as shah of Iran. Iranian resentment of the 1953Iranian coup, followed by twenty-five years of U.S. support for the shah, eventually led to the 1979 Iranian Revolution (see Chapter 30).In 1954, the CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala against the democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, who had expropriated land owned by the American-owned United Fruit Company. Eisenhower specifically approved those CIA efforts and expanded the agency’s mandate from gathering intelligence to intervening in the affairs of sovereign states.

The Act Establishes the Role for CIA

When lawmakers finished editing the section on intelligence, however,the language managed to summarize and ratify most of the crucial arrangements already made by the Truman administration. The National Security Act would:

authorize a Central Intelligence Agency (but leave the powers and duties of the Agency's head for a separate bill to enumerate);

that CIA would be an independent agency under the supervision ofthe NSC;

that CIA  would conduct both analysis and clandestine activities, but would have no policymaking role and no law enforcement powers;

and, finally, that the DCI would be confirmed by the Senate and could be either a civilian or an officer on detail from his homeservice.

The legislation gave America something new; no other nation had

structured its foreign intelligence establishment in quite the same way.

The CIA would be an independent, central agency, overseeing strategicanalysis and coordinating clandestine activities abroad. It would notbe a controlling agency. The CIA would both rival and complement the efforts of the departmental intelligence organizations. This prescription of coordination without control guaranteed competition as the CIA and the departmental agencies pursued common targets, but it also fostered a healthy exchange of views and abilities.

What the act did not do, however, was almost as important as what it did. It helped ensure that American intelligence remained a loose confederation of agencies lacking strong direction from either civilian or military decision makers. President Truman had endorsed the Army and Navy view that "every department required its own intelligence." The National Security Act left this concession in tact. Only later would the Defense Intelligence Agency be created to coordinate military intelligence.

Its job was to help him see the big picture, put the latest crisis inhistorical and economic perspective, give early warning on the likelycrises of the future, and evaluate whether political instability in one country or another was of any importance or interest to the United States. It was a civilian, nonpartisan organization, without vested interests such as those of the military-industrial complex, and staffed by seasoned, occasionally wise analysts with broad comparative knowledge of the world and our place in it.

The act also made a crucial concession to members concerned about threats to civil liberties. It drew a bright line between foreign anddomestic intelligence and assigning these realms, in effect, to the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, respectively. The CIA, furthermore, would have no "police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers," according to the act.

Bibliography

Edwards, Rebecca; Henrietta, James A; and Self, Robert O. America: A Concise History. Volume 2: since 1865. New York, NY: Bedford/St.Martin's, 2012.

Lens, Sidney. The Forging of the American Empire: From the Revolutionto Vietnam. Pluto Press, 2003.