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Brazil CP

Brazil CP ............................................................................................................................................................ 1Overview ............................................................................................................................................................ 2Venezuela AFF................................................................................................................................................... 2Cuba Aff ............................................................................................................................................................. 4Cuba Aff ............................................................................................................................................................. 5Mexico Aff .......................................................................................................................................................... 6Northwest centrism K 1NC ................................................................................................................................. 7

Alt Solvency ....................................................................................................................................................... 9CP Solves the alt .............................................................................................................................................. 10

Autonomy Good/AT: Perms .............................................................................................................................. 11Internals - investment ....................................................................................................................................... 12Solvency modeling ........................................................................................................................................ 13Solvency- Venezuela ........................................................................................................................................ 14Internals Development assistance ................................................................................................................. 15

A/T: Brazil Heg Bad .......................................................................................................................................... 16A/T: You dont solve demo promo..................................................................................................................... 17AFF Perm ......................................................................................................................................................... 18AFFCP doesnt solve the K........................................................................................................................... 19AFF No Solvency -General ............................................................................................................................... 20AFF No Solvency ............................................................................................................................................. 23AFF No Solvency: Cuba ................................................................................................................................ 24AFF No Solvency: Demo Promo .................................................................................................................... 25

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Overview

The Brazil CP is functionally a Brazil does counterplan but due to the varied nature of the affirmatives at this camp,the CP solvency/offensiveness functions differently. You must always run a net benefit whether it be politics or NorthCentrism.

Critical Mexico Read the Brazil CP text and then read the critical net benefit. Read the argument that South/Southcritical regionalism net benefit offsets solvency. The unique reason to vote for the neg is that viewing this situation froma Eurocentric/neo-liberalism lens is bad and that Latin American relations should always be solved contextually.

Mexico (oil)Brazil solves for Mexico oil by offering specific subsidies

Venezuela Brazil solves for regional stability in Venezuela.

CubaYou cant solve for the US Soft Power link/reputation internal link the 1AC. Instead you can only solve for theHuman Rights and economy impacts. Read North Centrism K to hedge against the aggressive hege impacts.

AFF: the cards from the Western Thought K and the cap K can be used to answer the Link/Impact level of the NorthCentrism K. Otherwise the debate comes down to whether the CP solves north centrism.

Venezuela AFF

Plan: The Federative Republic of Brazil should offer subsidized loans to Venezuela.

Brazil is interested in a democratic Venezuela and holds much influence in their politicalprocess.

Burges 2013[Sean, POST-CHAVEZ TEST FOR BRAZIL LEADERSHIP. Senior associate with the Australian National University's Australian National Centre for LatinAmerican Studies and senior research fellow with the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs. March 7, 2013http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/post-c havez-test-for-brazil-leadership/story-e6frg6ux-1226591901810]

VENEZUELA's PresidentHugo Chavez has just died after a prolonged battle with cancer. While his death raises

questions about the longevity and sustainability of his Bolivarian revolution, it also stands as a significant test ofthe democracy-promoting credentials of Brazil and the two important regional clubs it runs: theSouth American political grouping Unasur and the trade bloc Mercosur.Venezuela's presidentialsuccession procedures are clear. Article 232 of the constitution mandates a new election within 30 days if a president diesduring the first four years of their term. The questions many are asking now is if this vote will happen -- vice-president

Nicolas Maduro says ``yes'' -- and how democratic it will be, which is open to debate based on past precedent.Historically,

a technically free vote on schedule would satisfy Brazil's pro-democracy requisites. But, eventsin 2012 suggest Brazil may now be valuing the spirit as much as the process of democracy.Venezuela's upcoming vote stands as a test of this new pro-democracy policy in Braslia.On June 22,2012, Paraguay's Liberal and Colorado parties joined forces to impeach leftist president Fernando Lugo in a process that many in the region now call a ``coup-peachment''. Strictly speaking, the process was legal, but politicised to the point of farce. Charges were laid, a congressional trial held, and a conviction delivered inless than a day.What astonished many was the degree of political pressure Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff applied in Mercosur and Unasur to punish the politicalfactions that had deposed her leftist ally, suspending Paraguay from both groupings. Suggestions that she was simply playing ideological favourites werestrengthened when Brazil refused to take a similarly strong stance against Venezuela when Chavez failed to take his oath of office in January.Such criticism mayhave been a bit unfair and missed the nuance in Brazil's approach. Brazilian presidential foreign policy adviser Marco Aurelio Garcia offered the opinion, whichbecame his country's policy, that he agreed with the Venezuela Supreme Court judgment that as a re-elected president article 234 of the constitution allowed Chavezup to six months leave of absence before a new election would be necessary. In an act of quiet bureaucratic resistance Brazilian diplomats pointedly noted that

article 232 still applied and that prompt elections would be required if Chavez died within the next four years.With new elections now requiredin Venezuela we have an opportunity to see if there has been a real change in Brazil's regionalforeign policy to advancing substantive democracy or if the Lula-era tradition of selectivelyadvocating a brand of pro-leftist democratic outcomes remains in place.The upcoming electionin Venezuela is going to be difficult and divisive . The obvious strategy for Maduro will be to wrap himself in the mantle of Chavez'smemory while Henrique Capriles will likely resume his message of bringing Chavez's social welfare policies to a sustainable path. All of this is an expected part ofelectoral politics. Where matters get tricky is the extent to which Maduro deploys executive presidential powers to artificially boost his campaign. One standout tacticfrom the October 2012 election was Chavez's proclivity for mandating lengthy broadcasts of ``government service'' programming to pre-empt television coverage ofCapriles's campaign events. Another question is whether or not the military and security forces will take on the role of pass ive spectator expected in a consolidateddemocracy or if they will directly or covertly i nterfere with the campaign. Indeed, the temptation for political intervention by some sectors in the military will be

immense if reports about their links to narcotrafficking and organised crime are correct.Brazil has the back-room influence to preventthese sorts of violations of the democratic spirit of an election. Dilma, as well as key adviserssuch as Garcia, have enormous influence with the Chavez faithful.Moreover, Rousseff's 2010 presidential campaignadvisers are likely to again play an important role in the pro-Chavez electoral push, fulfilling much the same role as Clinton campaign hothouse Carville and

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Associates did around the world in the 2000s.A behind the scenes steadying hand on Maduro-camp temptations to unduly exploit their position of power will beessential to the country's future political stability. Venezuelans will know if the election is rigged, which would erode the credibility of a possible Maduro victory and

further polarise the country. But if he were to win in a truly clean race it could create the conditions neededfor a national political reconciliation. The same holds true for a possible opposition win.Even if uncomfortable fordiplomats, helping to make this happen is exactly the sort of responsibility that goes with theregional leadership role Brazil has been claiming in South America. Post-Chavez Venezuela mayprove to be Brazil's first real test.

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Cuba Aff

Plan: The Federative Republic of Brazil should offer subsidized loans to Cuba.

Brazil resolves democracy, economic normalization, regional stability Brazilian soft power andeconomic stability in Cuba

Lyons 2012[John, Latin American News, Brazil's President Flexes Clout in Cuba TripRousseff Offers Closer Economic Ties, Reflecting Nation's Bid for Greater Regional Leadership; Human Rights Remain I ssue 2 February 2013http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203920204577195323279961812.html]

President Dilma Rousseff offered closer economic cooperation to Cuba during a visit to the communist island on Tuesday,

marking Brazils highest-profile bid to transform its growing economic might into diplomaticleadership in Latin America. Brazils state development bank is financing a $680 million rehabilitation of Cubas portat Mariel. Work on the port is being managed by the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht SA, which may also providesupport for Cubas sugar industry, Brazilian officials have said. Ms. Rousseffs closer engagement of Cubashe is visiting

the island before a trip to the White Houseis the latest example of Brazils strategy to expand itsregional influence by offering subsidized loans to poorer nations. In recent years, Brazil hasdisbursed tens of billions of dollars around Latin America, and as far away as Africa. But none ofthese efforts have the same symbolic resonance as in Cuba, which has opposed the U.S. sinceshortly after Fidel Castros 1959 revolution and remains a lightning rod in U.S. domestic politicsand a sticking point for U.S. relations with other Latin nations. This is about growing Brazils softpower on the international scale and raising Brazils role in the world, said Matthew Taylor, a Brazilspecialist at the American Universitys School of International Service. Brazil is taking on a bigger role in thehemisphere in terms of aid and finance, and by helping out Cuba they really draw attention tothis new role they are playing. Although the U.S. has been the predominant power broker in LatinAmerica since the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, experts say the U.S. doesntoppose Brazils bid for regional influence.Many analysts say they believe Brazil could become astabilizing force in a region known for political and economic volatility. In Cuba, for example, Brazilmay provide a more moderate alternative to the impoverished islands main economic benefactor, Venezuelan PresidentHugo Chvez. Mr. Chvez, a self-described foe of the U.S., delivers some 100,000 barrels of oil and refined products toCuba a day in exchange for the services of Cuban doctors for Venezuelans in poor neighborhoods, along with other barterarrangements. Cuba, meanwhile, is desperate for economic lifelines. Ral Castro, who has taken over the presidency fromhis ailing brother Fidel, has experimented with limited economic overhauls in order to bring life into a moribund economy,

where citizens are still issued ration books that allow them access to some basic foods at subsidized prices. The morenormal Cubas economic relations are, the easier normalization with the U.S. will be in thefuture,said Archibald Ritter, an expert on the Cuban economy at Canadas Carleton University. I would imaginethat the U.S. would privately hope that Brazil will play a mediating role in issues that concern us,like human rights,said Cynthia Arnson, the director of the Latin American program at Washingtons Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars. Still, during Tuesdays visit, Ms. Rousseff criticized the existence of the U.S. base atGuantanamo Bay, where terror suspects are held, and the U.S. trade embargo, which she said contributes to poverty on theisland.

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Cuba Aff

Removing US embargo does not solve for Cubas economy, Brazils regional influence key tostabilize trade

Glickhouse 2012 [Rachel,American Society/Council of the Americas, Rousseff Extends Brazils RegionalInfluence in Cuba and Haiti 2 February 2012 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/rousseff-extends-brazil%E2%80%99s-regional-influence-cuba-and-haiti]

In Cuba, investment was the order of the day. Trade between Brazil and Cuba increased 31percent from 2010 to 2011, and reached $642 million last year. Brazils development bank andconglomerate Odebrecht will invest in an $800 million renovation of Cubas Mariel port, astrategic infrastructure project to increase trade. Odebrecht will also invest in Cubas sugarindustry, in a bid to increase flagging production levels. The Brazilian government will also opena $350 million credit line to Cuba to finance food purchases, and another $200 million topurchase agricultural equipment. On Tuesday, Rousseff signed several science and technologycooperationagreements, including a plan to create a geological data bank in Cuba and boost the technology center at the Ministry of

Metallurgy. Rousseff also pointed to the U.S. embargo on Cuba as a source of its economic woes,and as another motive for Brazils support of the Cuban economy.

Brazil solves Cuba, including terrorism establishes regional stabilityLopez-Levy 2012 [Arturo, The Havana Note, President Rousseff goes to Cuba: Towards a more effectiveBrazilian policy 1 February 2012 http://thehavananote.com/node/988]

Brazils Cuba policy could be more effective but any improvement should be based ondiplomatic outreach and in collaboration with Cuba's gradual reform. For example, businessactivities should be coordinated in a manner that creates a better legal climate, promotes anti-corruption efforts and transparency, enhances environmental protection, provides better access to informationtechnologies, and prevents racial discrimination. Brazil can empower Cuban actors who are identified withthese agendas through its local corporate policies in Cuba and by encouraging educational andcultural exchanges with the island.Currently, Brazil's role in the training of journalists, economists, lawyers, and administrators and likewisethe interaction of the civil societies of both countries is meager in respect to their potential. In the hemisphere, Brazils diplomacy mustexercise mature leadership, outmaneuvering Chavezs Manichean polarization, by promotingCubas integration to hemispheric organizations, not just the CELAC. Given the 2009 OAS resolution in San Pedro Sula, thatended Cuba's exclusion from the Inter-American system, Brazil could create avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation between Cuba and hemispheric

organizations, without falling for any fevered anti-American position typical of Cuban allies in ALBA. Some potential areas to explore are technical expertise aboutmacroeconomic management and financial consulting, training of healthcare personnel, natural disasters preparation and response, crime fighting, anti-drug

trafficking, and anti-terrorism. Cubas integration, at Brazils request, to the Inter-American Committeeagainst Terrorism, would complete the hemispheric effort to undermine Cubas unfair inclusionon the US State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.When interacting with amultilateral agency, Cuba could offer the necessary assistance, compliance and information toall member countries without making specific concessions to the U.S., which might imply someacceptance of a responsibility for being included.

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Mexico Aff

Plan: The Federative Republic of Brazil should offer subsidized loans to Mexico

Brazil Mexico Oil Coop SolvesPerez 13 (Santiago, staff member for Dow Jones, Petroleo Brasileiro Petrobras SA : Mexico, Brazil Leaders Discuss Potential Oil-Sector Ventures, 4-Traders,January 26, 2013, http://www.4-traders.com/PETROLEO-BRASILEIRO-PETRO-6496795/news/Petroleo-Brasileiro-Petrobras-SA-Mexico-Brazil-Leaders-Discuss-Potential-Oil-Sector-Ventures-15975240/)

SANTIAGO, Chile--The leaders of Brazil and Mexico have agreed to create a working group to studytechnology exchange and potential projects between the government-run oil companies of both nations,Mexican president Enrique Pena Nieto said Saturday. "We will explore these options," Mr. Pena Nieto said at a pressconference after meeting with Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. Both leaders are in Santiago to attend a summit of the heads of stat e of the European Union and the Community of

Latin American and Caribbean states, also known as Celac. Mr. Pena Nieto saidPetroleos Mexicanos (PEM.YY) and Petroleo Brasileiro SA(PBR, PETR4.BR) could "explore potential alliances" to develop projects and exchange technology.Petrobras, as Brazil's oil company is also known, has expanded aggressively through offshore, deep-wateroil exploration in partnership with foreign oil majors. Mr. Pena Nieto, who was elected last year, is seeking to reform the country's energyregulations, as local oil monopoly Pemex has faced significant funding constraints to conduct capital-intensive, deep-water exploration projects in the Gulf of Mexico.

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Northwest centrism K 1NC

U.S. economic engagement tries to remake the world in the image of the global north - thisdevelopmentalist discourse reinscribes neoliberalism

Sheppard et al., 2010 (Eric, Geography @ Minnesota, Quo vadis neoliberalism? The remaking ofglobal capitalist governance after the Washington Consensus, Geoforum, 41.2, ScienceDirect)

We have shown that there have been marked periodic remakings of global capitalist governance from a Washington to apost-Washington consensus, and beyond, in ways that have begun to question some key aspects of global neoliberal

governance. Taken together, they hardly represent a consensus. Yet such shifts and disagreements have beencontained within a developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary that has, in effect, repeatedly legitimized discoursesof first world expertiseeven as the policies based in this expertise repeatedly fail. In this section, we summarize theelements of this imaginary, and discuss how it has persisted even in the wake of crises that create space for alternative

imaginaries. The developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary has three components that are closely intertwined: A stageist,

teleological thinking that constitutes capitalism, Euro-North American style, as the highest formof development; a leveling metaphor, according to which a flattening of the world equalizes opportunities for allindividuals and places; and an imagining of socio-spatial difference as coexisting with this leveling through its

commodification. At the center of mainstream policymaking discussed above is the conception of asingle trajectory of development, namely capitalist development, along which all places are imagined assequenced. Rostow famously articulated such a trajectory in his modernist non-communist manifesto, The Stages of

Economic Growth (Rostow, 1960). As dependency, post-colonial and post-development theorists have argued, this hasthe effect of presenting places with no choices about what development means, and of rankingplaces, and their inhabitants, on a scale of developmentaccording to which the prosperous capitalist

societies of western Europe and white settler colonies (North America, Australia and New Zealand) occupy the apex, withrespect to which other places are imagined as incomplete in their development. This also implies the desirability of erasingor making over less adequate states of affairs, replacing them with their more efficient and rational Northern exemplars.

Notwithstanding very substantial shifts and disagreements in how the apex is imagined (as liberal civilization during thecolonial era, as Fordist industrialism after 1945, as neoliberal after 1980, and as good governance and poverty reduction

after 1997), the effect is to locate expertise at the apex. Ifall places are on a common path, then those who have reachedthe end seem naturally pre-destined to teach others about how to achieve thiseven when the paternalist advice is dontdo as I do, but do as I say (cf. Chang, 2002 and Chang, 2008). The new development economics supplement of Keynesianstrategies, while critical of and presenting itself as a departure from the Washington Consensus, still endorses a stageistimaginary. Sachs is explicit about his debt to Rostow, framing the specific diagnostic interventions in any nation in terms ofthe goal of achieving a healthy (first world capitalist) economic body. Sutured to stageist thinking is an imaginary offlattening, of globalization and capitalist development as a process that is flattening out the world, creating a level playingfield that equalizes opportunities everywhere. It is this flattening that enables progress along the stages of developmentwhat Blaut has termed a diffusionist conception of development (Blaut, 1993). Some claim that the world is actuallyflattening outthat socio-spatial positionality matters less and less, with the implication that it is the conditions in a place,rather than its connectivity to the rest of the world, that becomes the important differentiating factor (for critiques of such

claims, in both the mainstream and political economic literatures, see Sheppard, 2002 and Sheppard, 2006). TheWashington Consensus, in effect, sought to alter the conditions in place; pressing nations toadopt best practice neoliberal governance norms, structural adjustment, which would thenenable them to progress towards prosperity in a flat world.The new development economistsacknowledge that the world is not flat. Thus Sachs and Stiglitz argue that certain differences between nations persist in theface of globalization, creating unequal conditions of possibility for development. Sachs argues that certain biophysicaldifferences can never be erased, making places prisoners of their geography (Hausmann, 2001). This barrier can beovercome by directing more investment toward and/or giving more policy latitude to, backward cities, regions, and nations.Stiglitz stresses how institutions of global governance reinforce power inequalities that disadvantage the global South,arguing for countervailing policies that favor the latter. Both advocate global redistribution and affirmative action for poornations in order to redress inequalities resulting from disadvantaged geographical or political positionalities, in the belief thatsuch interventions can level the playing field. Again, a flattened world, or leveled playing field, is seen as providing all placeswith the same opportunities to advance toward prosperity.

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Northwest centrism 1NC

West-centric Neoliberalism is a genocidal illusion that leads to extinctionSantos, sociology prof, 3 (Boaventura de Sousa, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and Distinguished Scholar at the Universityof Wisconsin-Madison Law School. "Collective Suicide?" March 28, 2003 online http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try tosave humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction,committed in thename of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which i t is supposed to have total power.This

is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the Africanslaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions ofdeaths in two world warsand many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism,with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is inneoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery ofthe world system. With the war against Iraq,it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion,and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald theradicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanityin the illusion of saving it.Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief thatthere are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing totake its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World,this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there isterrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence hasnot been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the

supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims

to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, theWest has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history:Stalinism,with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan;Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperableefficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actorssufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of politicaldemocracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is

found to he incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers.At all these moments, a death drive, acatastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, onlypreventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader thedefinition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide

becomes.

CP remaps the global imaginary - South American regionalism enables alternative models oftrade and cooperation

Riggirozzi 10 (Pia, Politics and IR @ U of Southhampton, Region, Regionness and Regionalism inLatin America 2-3)

The paper is concerned with the question of how transformative these new regionalist projects are in shapingnew spaces for thinking and negotiating alternative models for political and social cooperation .Looking at the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) we ask:

how are we to understand regional agreements that are grounded in different systems of rules,that contest open regionalism and that are part of a complex set of alternative ideas andmotivations affecting polities. In a context marked by the declining ability of the US to shaperegional orders, institutions and discourses, can we genuinely discern forms of new regionalgovernance emerging that amount to more than rhetorical rebellion against the Washington

Consensus? In addressing this question, we argue that UNASUR and ALBA should not simply be seen asad hoc subregional responses to the recurrent crisis of neoliberal governance and the collapseof US-led hemispheric leadership, but are best conceived as visible manifestations of the re-politicisation of the region, creating foundations for new polities in which citizens, socialmovements, political parties, and government leaders interact and construct newunderstandings of regional community. Our claim is, thus, that ALBA and UNASUR represent new and distinctprojects in constitution of a post-hegemonic and post-trade regional order (Acharya 2009).

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Alt Solvency

Remapping the socio-spatial imaginary is key to reversing economic and culturalsubordination

Sheppard et al., 2010 (Eric, Geography @ Minnesota, Quo vadis neoliberalism? The remaking ofglobal capitalist governance after the Washington Consensus, Geoforum, 41.2, ScienceDirect)

Challenging the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary, however, will require not just probingthe limits of neoliberalism, but exploring imaginaries that exceed capitalism. Within the academy, aplenitude of conceptual alternatives highlight capitalisms complicity in producing the inequalities and hierarchies that thedevelopmentalist socio-spatial imaginary claims to overcome, including Marxist, world-systemic, feminist, post-colonial andpost-developmental scholarship (cf. Sheppard et al., 2009). These alternatives imagine capitalism, development andgovernance otherwise seeking more just and sustainable alternatives that create space for variegated trajectories, uneven

connectivities and ineluctable difference, instead of stageism, flattening and commodification. Beyond theacademy, civil society is expanding the range of alternativesand is arguably better equipped todisrupt the current experimentations of global policymakers. Experiencing the disabling effectsof capitalism and its supplements, those living precariously actively contest neoliberalization,articulating alternative imaginaries and practices through actions ranging from local initiatives totransnational activist networks. The World Social Forum is just the most prominent of innumerable inter-relatedcounter-neoliberal globalization movements (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003, Glassman, 2001, Evans, 2008, Sheppard andNagar, 2004, Notes From Nowhere, 2003 and Reitan, 2007). Santos (2008, p. 258) regards its gatherings as a productiveforum for alternative thinking of alternativeswhere different kinds of knowledge about social transformation and

emancipation, exceeding the hegemonic epistemologies of the West, are valorized and actively debated, andwhere the existence of alternatives is asserted without defining their content. It may seem unlikely that such emerging

alternatives constitute a serious near-term challenge to capitalist imaginaries, but they are provincializing Westernunderstandings of governance and social transformation, and re-politicizing capitalism.Politicization is essential to make space for transformative rather than affirmative remedies,changing the frameworks that generate unequal power relations, and dismantling EuroAmericancentrism so as to undo the vicious circle of economic and cultural subordination (Fraser, 1997, p.28).supplements are in question, contestations can play a vital role in shaping capitalisms trajectories, and viability.

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CP Solves the alt

Brazils investment in regional integration key to UNASUR (Union of South American Nations)

Bruer 10 (Council of Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate, http://www.coha.org/brazil-and-unasur-regional-security-and-the- nations-world-sanding-in-the-era-of-rousseffs-rule/)

Brazil, as the continents newfound economic success story, is the locus of much of UNASURsmomentum.As Brazils middle class continues to expand in terms of numbers and political influence, the nationfinds itself at a critical political juncture. As President-elect Dilma Rousseff prepares to lead the country, bothBrazils national and international ambitions seem boundless. Tasked with guiding the future evolution ofUNASUR, which continues to hang in the balance, Rousseff will soon lead a continent in whichnothing is for certain. She will have to balance Brazils regional and global ambitions with the countrys currentlimitations, keeping South American integration a priority even as Brazil surpasses its neighbors tobecome an integral part of the international system.

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Autonomy Good/AT: Perms

Autonomous brazil action key to multipolarity and regional cooperation

Gratius and Saraiva 13 (Miriam Gomes, I.R. @ Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janiero,Susanne, Sr. Researcher at FRIDE a European Think Tank for Global Action, Feb. ContinentalRegionalism: Brazils Prominent Role in the Americas, CEPS Working Document no. 374)

In these times of change in the shaping of a new world order, Brazil has begun to stand out for its assertive participationin international politics, where it has favoured anti-hegemonic,[1] multi-polar positions and itsincreasingly strong leadership in its own region. During the Lula administration from 2003 to 2010, Brazilgradually started step-by-step to shoulder the costs inherent in cooperation, governance and integration in the region.[2] At

that time, the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES with a total budget that exceeds that of the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bankbegan to finance infrastructure projects in South America. [3]The election of Lula da Silva at the end of 2002 and the ensuing rise of an autonomy-oriented group in Brazils Ministry ofForeign Affairs cast the countrys foreign policy in a new light.[4] Diplomatic support for existing international regimes in the1990s gave way to a proactive push towards modifying these regimes in favour of southern countries or Brazils particularinterests, which was defined by Lima as soft revisionism.[5]

The idea of bringing other emerging or poorer southern countries on board to counterbalancethe might of traditional Western powers served as the basis for the countrys internationalactions. While coalitions with emerging partners helped boost Brazils global pretensions, [6] its diplomatic effortswere geared towards bolstering its international standing independently of any other nation, withits role as a global player being firmly grounded in the ideas of autonomy and universalism that were the predominant

diplomatic thinking at the time.Alongside Brazils international rise, its leadership in South America also started to be seen as a priority. Indeed, the movesto boost its global and regional projection came simultaneously and were seen by Brazil as mutually beneficial. Thecooperation with its regional neighbours was perceived by policy-makers as the best way for Brazil to realise its potential,support economic development and form a bloc with stronger international influence. The creation of the South AmericanDefence Council and the Brazilian command of the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti, whose troops are drawn from differentcountries in the region, were seen as helping Brazil towards a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. According to

Flemes, in its upward progress in a new, more multi-polar world order, Brazil would need regionalclout in global negotiations, but would not be tied down to any form of institutionalisation thatmight restrict its autonomy.[7

Decreased U.S. profile in Latin America key to Brazilian soft balancing. Perm doesnt solve -only autonomous Brazil policy can promote regionalism.

Gratius and Saraiva 13 (quals, Feb. Continental Regionalism: Brazils Prominent Role in theAmericas, CEPS Working Document no. 374)

There was no agreement with the United States over how regional issues should be dealt with, but the absence of aUS policy for the region prevented any stand-off between the two countries. The Braziliangovernment has operated autonomously whenever issues relating to the continent have arisen.Washingtons low-profile in Latin America and the concentration of a few countries of strategic interest(Colombia, Central America and Mexico) facilitated Brazils proactive Latin American policy. The Free Trade

Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) project was the last attempt to design a hemispheric project. Its failure at theSummit in Mar del Plata in 2005 proved the limits of Washingtons traditional hegemony in theAmericas and contributed to a stronger regional profile of its rival in the South. Without a hemispheric

project, the Organization of American States (OAS) lacks a guiding vision23 and lost appeal in Latin America. Althoughthe OAS is still the most consolidated collective institution in the Americas, it lacks both leadership and followers. Moreover,

a serious financial crisis is further weakening the traditional organisation. Brazil is promoting regional

concertation outside the traditional framework instead of increasing its weight in the inter-American environment, which reflects a US hegemony.

Against that background, Brazil perceives regional integration not only as a goal in itself but also as an

instrument for autonomy and soft-balancing the United States.24 Thus, its attitude towards integration isnot free of self-interest. Apart from common regional goals, the country also seeks to implement a neighbourhood policy thatserves Brazils power aspirationsin South America and the Americas.

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Internals - investment

Brazil Underinvestment in South America leads to regional instabilityBruer 10 (Council of Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate, http://www.coha.org/brazil-and-unasur-regional-security-and-the- nations-world-sanding-in-the-era-of-rousseffs-rule/)

The challenge for Brazil, therefore, is to successfully pursue both regional and global policiesthat will yield the greatest benefit for itself and its neighbors. This may be a tough balancing act; though Lula, aspresident, seems to have mastered the task, it may be hard for a less experienced politico like Rousseff to emulate.

Indeed, to focus too heavily on one concern, risks jeopardizing another. For example, any sign ofBrazilian under-investment in South American integration efforts may allow intra-continentalconfrontation to fester. On the other hand, regional integration effortswhich have historically fizzled before effectingmuch lasting transformationmay very well constitute a waste of resources that would be better spent on advancing thenations own global economic standing and improving the lives of Brazilians at home. An indispensable equilibrium betweenregional and domestic priorities is of vital concern and will prove to be an important goal for the newly elected Rousseff.

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Solvency modeling

Brazil heg key to poverty reduction, energy, and AIDS solutions in Africa - modeling solvesStolte 13 (Christina, PhD Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies, Brazil in Africa,Harvard Intl Review March 30, http://hir.harvard.edu/the-future-of-democracy/brazil-in-africa?page=0,0)

The issue areas of Brazilian South-South cooperation with African nations comprise key development

challenges such as poverty reduction, health, and energy security. Brazil has tackled thesedevelopment challenges successfully through the implementation of large-scale socialprograms, such as the worlds biggest cash transfer program Bolsa Familia (Family Scholarship) that has lifted around50 million people out of poverty, and the worlds largest rural electrification program Luz para Todos (Light for All) that hasbrought electricity access to three million families in remote rural areas. In the field of AIDS, Brazil has been praised for i tssuccessful program that has significantly reduced AIDS-related mortality and morbidity in Brazil and reduced infectionsthrough large-scale prevention campaigns.

Being praised internationally for its domestic successes in the fight against poverty, AIDS, andenergy scarcity, Brazil has started exporting its social programs to interested partner countries.Other areas of Brazilian South-South cooperation programs include the transfer of know-how intropical agriculture and the production of biofuels.Brazil has emerged as a leader both as afood exporter and producer of biofuels from sugarcane that now offers its experience to othercountries. In this context, the Agricultural Research Institute EMBRAPA (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuria)opened an Africa office in Ghana in 2006 to coordinate South-South cooperation projects in the field of tropical agricultureand biofuels. In 2008, Brazil also opened an office of its biomedical research and public health institute FIOCRUZ (OswaldoCruz Foundation) in Mozambique in order to intensify its health cooperation with the African continent.

B Heg key to global modeling of Brazils development model, which has effectively reducedpoverty, energy insecurity, and AIDS

Stolte 13 (Christina, PhD Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies, Brazil in Africa,Harvard Intl Review March 30, http://hir.harvard.edu/the-future-of-democracy/brazil-in-africa?page=0,0)

To be sure, Brazil has an impressive development record: It has achieved the first millennium goal ahead oftime by cutting extreme poverty by 50 percent. It has established an inclusive growth modelgiving more than 30 million people the chance to rise to the middle class through an effectiveincome transfer program. It has succeeded in preventing a looming AIDS epidemic through theimplementation of a highly successful AIDS-program, including large-scale prevention campaigns and freeaccess to AIDS medicine. And it has effectively improved energy security bydeveloping alternativeenergy sources like biofuelsand bringing electricity to vast rural areas through decentralized energy programs Itis interesting to note that Brazil has also been very successful in using these domestic achievements as an instrument to

sharpen its international profile as a Champion of the South. Whats more, the export ofits social programsthrough South-South cooperation has allowed Brazil an impressive role reversal: it has risenfrom an aid- receiving developing country to a donor country that helps poorer countries tackle theirdevelopment challenges.

As a country lacking major hard power resources or an important geostrategic location, Brazil has managed toengage in international politics through the instrument of South-South cooperation. Theprovision of technical assistancebeyond its own regionhas provided an opportunity forBrazil to demonstrate its willingness to assume global responsibility and to underscore its claimto take part in the shaping of global politics. By assisting African countries in the fight againstpoverty, AIDS, and energy insecurity Brazil has seized the opportunity to embrace pressing

global issues and demonstrate leadership on these development and security challenges of the 21st century.

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Solvency- Venezuela

Brazilian engagement of Venezuela key to regional stabilityDos Reis and Teixiera 09 (Elton Gomes Dos Reis, MSc. Political Science @ Federal University ofPernambuco and Augusto W. M. Teixiera Jr. Msc. Candidate @ the same, Regional Integration,power projection and international insertion: Brazils strategy towards alternative integrationprojects)

We understand that BAA seeks to promote important public goods to the countries of the region, as economic and socialdevelopment, poverty reduction and the entrance of new social actors in the building of a new political scenario in theregion. Although this claims arent deprived of polit ical and influence interests by Venezuelan government. But this socialand economic agenda is broader than that is presented in the main objectives of MERCOSUR, as seen in the Treaty of

Asuncion13. Another aspect that differ BAA from MERCOSUR is its explicit aim to reach the Caribbean countries andpreserving the idea of Latin America, differing from the Brazilian diplomacy trend to use South America concept then Latin

America. Last but not least, the views endorsed by BAA, promotes the idea of a regional developmentand more political autonomy to the region. This is not possible without a country or a group ofcountries able to provide regional public goods, as security, stability, economic growth anddevelopment. The main locomotive in this process is being Brazil, but in recent times , the oldbilateral spine of sub-regional integration, Argentina and Brazil, is being strengthened with geometry ofpower and influence in the region, an axis formed by Argentina-Brazil-Venezuela in the effort ofchange South America in a different power pole. Brazil has accepted Venezuelas intention of building acooperative agenda. Although they had moments of non clear tension, as in the Venezuelan support to Bolivia duringthe Gas Crisis with Brazil (in 2006), Brazil didnt lost either the Gas and a relatively low price, neither the Venezuelan market

and it political support. Venezuela did not openly confronted Brazil in the issue.The apices of Brazilian strategy towards South America, especially to BAA and Venezuela were the creation of UNASUR,its greater institutional power in it. Instead making clear the objective of creating a regional institution for regulating and

solving regional problems without the interference of any major power, as the United States, UNASUR and its leadingpart of Brazil sought to show that this country, with the cooperation of other important actors inthe region (as Argentina, Chile and Venezuela) can provide regional stability and conflictresolution by diplomatic and presidential diplomacy (Nogueira, 2008). This was clear during the separatist crisis inBolivia in 2008.

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Internals Development assistance

Latin America is key to Brazil heg Lula needs to satisfy demands for development assistanceon the continent

Burges 13 (Sean, Politics and IR @ Australian National University, International Affairs 89:3)

As was the case with Brazilian initiatives in South America, Lulas attempts to position Brazil as a pan-southern leader have not been totally successful.

At a basic level, Brazil has been unwilling or

unable to meet the demands it has created, most particularly in the constant petitioning fordevelopment assistance and FDI from African partners. Yet it is in the very failure to satisfy what amount to demandsfor Brazilian leadership that we also find the signs of success in Lulas ideational leadership. Attitudes across theglobal South shifted to see Braslia as a potential source of political support, developmentalassistance and commercial opportunity. This in turn shifted decision-making matrices,generating important elements of political support for key Brazilian initiatives, most notably formationof the G20 WTO trade negotiating coalition and at least a renewal of discussions about reforming the United NationsSecurity Council, all of which helped entrench Brazils position in what became the G20 global governance framework.Continued work by Lula and his foreign policy team to mobilize and coordinate pan-southern voices added force to Brazilscalls to be included as a major player at global decision-making tables even if the price of admission was fundamentallyacceptance of a role as interlocutor to an increasingly vocal global southern coalition.

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A/T: Brazil Heg Bad

Brazilian heg is non-confrontational and peaceful. Disproves multipolarity => war cardsBertonha 10 (Joao Fabio, History @ Maringa State University, Brazil: An Emerging MilitaryPower? Rev Bras Polt. Int. 53:2 p.110)

Similarly, in spite of our neighbors continuous memories of Luso-Brazilian expansionism over the centuries and the

occasional concerns that still appear, there is no about the fact that Brazils frontiers have beenconsolidated for a long time and there was no need of a war to make that happen, but rathernegotiation and diplomacy.Other contentious issues are trade questions or the role of Brazil and Argentina in the UN Security Council. Such problems,

however, are not uncommon in the routine of nations and no-one has ever gone to war because of that. The BrazilianState makes a great effort not to take regional questions into the defense field and to showcaution in the intentions of its leadership. Mercosur may be understood in the context of thisnon-confrontational logic.Concerning the world outside South America, Brazils intentions have never been based on anymilitary power, but on mediation, the righteousness of its cause, and the performance in themany international organizations the country belongs to (Miyamoto, 2009: 24-26).

All of this indicates how the international projection plan so long ago by the Brazilian elite does not meantaking an aggressive posture toward our neighbors, much less any attempt to modify the globalorder by the use of force.Brazil is, to all intents and purposes, a peaceful country which does not relateits external politics to the capacity of military projection, choosing instead to opt for dialog andcontinuous concessions.

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A/T: You dont solve demo promo

Turn: Increased international presence forces Brazil in the long term to step up demo promoefforts Struenkel and Jacob conclude NEG

Struenkel and Jacob 10 (Oliver Struenkel, assistant professor of international relations @ theGetlio Vargas Foundation and Jabin Jacob, Assistant Director @ Institute of Chinese Studies,

Portugese Journal of Intl Rel.Autumn/Winter, p. 29-30)

The question is what form this desire to promote stability abroad will take. And will the form that this desire takes be differentfrom country to country? The emerging powers will discover that in order to protect their economic interests, not only is astrong political regime required, but its persuasion matters too. Respect for the letter of the contract is an essentialcomponent of any economic relationship and this is also inevitably tied to respect for the rule of law. It is this latter facet thatis often missing in authoritarian regimes such as China. Add to the fact that emerging powers are themselves in the process

of developing their economies and at various stages of social and political churning, emerging powers like Braziland India could decide in one of two ways to continue in the current vein of non-interference inanother countrys affairs, deciding that their economic interests are not as important as their respect for the principleof sovereignty, or to take a stand in order to defend their interests. And if they have to take an active politicalstance, in the absence of military muscle or a veto on the un security council, like the united states

enjoys, they will have less leeway to act in contradiction to their own political values. Thus, if

they are democratic at home, they cannot be seen to be hypocritical and supporting authoritarian

regimes, for the costs would be high both domestically and externally. Indeed, as Manoj Joshi hasargued, Indias regional grand strategy must be based on our belief that what is good for us is also good for our neighbors;

in other words, pluralistic political systems, the rule of law, the rights of the individual.17 Therefore, will Brazil and Indiaseek to promote regimes that are modeled on themselves? Will china encourage regimes to attain stability without recourseto democracy or free and fair elections?In the short-run, it does seem likely that the rise of emerging powers will contributeto the decreasing importance of democracy promotion in the international political discourse. african dictators will show littleinclination to accept loans laden with conditions if they can opt for chinese, indian or Brazilian loans without any stringsattached, and central asian despots will seek to take advantage of instability in their neighborhood or the fear of possible

chaos in their own country to play one power against the other. But in the long-run, as they grow and becomemore confident of their positions in the world order, at least some emerging powers might seethat they have little to gain from kowtowing to dictators . they might also seek increasingly to distinguishthemselves not so much from the west as from each other. and at least Brazil and India could well find that theirdemocratic nature is an important marker also of their global identity, and that democracypromotion is a useful tool for furthering their national interests worldwide.

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AFF Perm

Perm do both: Brazil cant do it alone, needs United States influence in the region Zibechi 2013[Raul, Covering Activism and Politics in Latin America The Challenges of the Pacific Alliance: RegionalSoveregnty in Latin American or a Pampered Periphery 2 July 2013 http://upsidedownworld.org/main/international-archives-60/4354-the-challenges-of-the-pacific-alliance-regional-sovereignty-in-latin-america-or-a-pampered-periphery]

To this structural difficulty one must add that in Brazil the "preference for a model of regional

relations based on the projection of Brazilian political capacity and not on a model of regionalintegration" prevails. The densification of business activity is not the same as a strategy ofintegration. In his opinion this is due to the fact that there exists a weak "internal coalition" infavour of integration and this gives rise to intensive diplomatic activism that contrasts with thelow institutional levels of integration. In conclusion, "regionalization, an increase in regionalrelations that do not result from policy and agreements between states, has advanced morerapidly and more deeply than regional integration." This is manifest when one notes that the members ofMercosur have established more profound agreements with countries outside this alliance than they have among

themselves. Sennes concludes that beyond the declarations, "the regional project of Brazil is not part of thecentral artery of their international strategy." This is a strong statement, but it is hardlyunrealistic. He summarizes it thus: preference for high-level meetings rather than institutionalagreements; "superficial economic integration", that is centered on bilateral commercialquestions to the detriment of productive, financial and logistic integration; prioritizing domesticagencies of credit such as BNDES in place of regional institutions; and supporting private investment initiatives rather than

regional agreements to promote investment.

Starting from this mound of difficulties, Fiori proposes a hard choice. ThatBrazil and the region become a "pampered periphery" of the big powers, as were Australia and Canada, with agreements of"preferential associates", along the lines of Cardoso's proposal, and those of the elites in every country, deeply rooted in the

role of exporters of commodities. Or that they undertake an alternative route, centered on self-sufficiency in energy and in strategic natural resources, combining "an industry of high addedvalue, as a high productivity sector producing food and commodities" that, without renouncingcomplementary and competitive position vis--vis the United States, "struggles to increase theircapacity for autonomous strategic decision" ("Brasil e Amrica do Sul: o desafo da insero internacionalsoberana", Brasilia, CEPAL/IPEA, 2011). The elites have chosen their option and fight for it. The National Federation ofIndustry (CNI for its Portuguese acronym) and the Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo have increasinglyrejected Mercosur and do not even take Unasur into account. Aecio Neves, candidate for the Social Democratic Party which

represents these sectors, speaks clearly: "We must have the courage to rethink and revise Mercosur. Inthis sense, the Pacific Alliance is an example of movement and dynamism." (La Nacin, June 9, 2013).

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AFFCP doesnt solve the K

Brazil hegemony cant escape path dependence on the colonialist model predicated onAmerican interestcounterplan doesnt solve the Kritik

Dos Reis and Teixiera 09 (Elton Gomes Dos Reis, MSc. Political Science @ Federal University ofPernambuco and Augusto W. M. Teixiera Jr. Msc. Candidate @ the same, Regional Integration,power projection and international insertion: Brazils strategy towards alternative integrationprojects)

As an attention reader may noticed above, the main methodological perspective present in this paper in concept of pathdependence. Developed within the greater influence of historical institutionalism, path dependence helps the analyst tounderstand how history matters and how it can be used to organize a historical analysis of political problems and issues.Encompassing a greater comprehension of the complexity of human affairs, as politics itself, this concept and method

provides a way to understand the importance of regional integration for Brazil , its main criticaljunctures and possibility for change. Putting in path dependence terms, we can assert that the Brazilian regionalintegration strategy suffers the historical legacy of Brazil first insertion in international economica political order. First as a colony, second as a country within the influence area of UnitedKingdom and since the end of World War II linked to American influence and interests in theregion.Its knows that this historical process is not linear as we speak of cooperation and conflict. In several momentsBrazil had imposed to itself a needed distance from the Great Britain (in the period of the Paraguay War) and from theUnited States (During the Vargas authoritarian government 1930-1945; During the developmentist years of JuscelinoKubitschek and Janio Quadros 1956-1964, and during the Geisel military government 1974-1979) (Moniz Bandeira, 2008).

Dont trust the hype Brazilian economic policies are neoliberal like whoa. It tacitly servesWall Street

Chossudovsky 3 (Michael, Prof of Economics @ OttowaWhile the new PT government presents itself as an alternative to neoliberalism, committed topoverty alleviation and the redistribution of wealth, its monetary and fiscal policy is in the hands of itsWall Street creditors.Fome Zero(zero hunger), described as a program to fight misery, largely conforms to World Bankguidelineson cost-effective poverty reduction. The latter require the implementation of so-called targeted programs,while drastically slashing social sector budgets. World Bank directives in health and education require curtailing socialexpenditures with a view to meeting debt servicing obligations.

The IMF and the World Bank have commended President Luis Ignacio da Silva for hiscommitment to strong macroeconomic fundamentals.As far as the IMF is concerned, Brazil is on trackin conformity with IMF benchmarks. The World Bank has also praised the Lula government: Brazil is pursuing a bold socialprogram with fiscal responsibility.

Another World is possible?What kind of Alternative is possible, when a government committed to fightingneoliberalism, becomes an unbending supporter of free trade and strong economicmedicine.Beneath the surfaceand behind the Workers Partys populist rhetoric, the neoliberal agenda under Lularemains functionally intact.The grassroots movement which brought Lula to power has been betrayed. And theprogressive Brazilian intellectuals within Lulas inner circle bear a heavy burden ofresponsibility in this process. And what this left accommodation does is to ultimately reinforcethe clutch of the Wall Street financial establishment on the Brazilian State .Another World cannot be based on empty political slogans. Nor will it result from a shift in paradigms, which is notaccompanied by real changes in power relations within Brazilian society, within the State system and within the nationaleconomy.

Meaningful change cannot result from a debate on an alternative to neoliberalism, which onthe surface appears to be progressive, but which tacitly accepts the globalizers legitimate

right to rule and plunder the developing World.

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AFF No Solvency -General

No Solvency regional neighbors distrust Brazilian heg

Gratius and Saraiva 13 (quals, Feb. Continental Regionalism: Brazils Prominent Role in theAmericas, CEPS Working Document no. 374)

When it comes to its regional neighbours, however, Brazils global projection has been observed

with some unease. It has not been regarded as beneficial for the region, but simply as a means for Brazil topursue its own individual goals. This has raised the cost of its regional leadership, which hascome under fire repeatedly by neighbouring countries in global dimensions.[8]

Brazil has no credibility in the regionCrandall 11 (Russell, Intl Politics @ Davidson, The Post American Hemisphere in Foreign Affairs90:3)

Brazils emergence as a serious power is a direct result of the increasing absence of U.S. influence in the region. Sensingan opportunity to gain the regional stature that has long eluded it, the country has begun to act more assertively. But

complicating Brazils power play is the reaction from its fellow Latin American nations.Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian officials, among others, talk privately about their dislike ofBrazils arrogant diplomacy. In some quarters, Brazils re- sponses to developmentssuch asChvezs ongoing assault on Venezuelas democracy and even the 2009 coup in Hondurashave undermined its credibility as a serious leader. (Braslias reluctance to speak out for hemisphericdemocracy is particularly inexcusable for a government that includes many officials who served under the successive

military regimes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.) Many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they arenot eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemispheres hegemon . As one diplomatrecently put it, The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese.

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AFF No Solvency

Brazils Human Rights violations prevent it from having influence in the regionPrada 2013[Paulo, Reuters Special Report: Why Brazil's new middle class is seething http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/03/us-brazil-middle-specialreport-idUSBRE9620DT20130703]

And at a time when Brazil's once-booming economy is stuck in a prolonged lull, the governmentis being tight even with money it does have to invest. Last year, Brazil spent less than 10 percent of thefunds it allocated for urban transport projects, according to data compiled by Contas Abertas, a watchdog group. The

result is poor public services. For those who rely on them, day-to-day life is a battery of hasslesthat, at best, are a terrible grind, but often even dangerous and deadly. Two-hour commutes, or worse,aren't rare in big cities like Sao Paulo or Rio - not to mention the grimy, unpredictable and overpriced trains and buseshelmed by overworked drivers. In April, during an argument with an irate passenger, a bus driver careened off an overpass,killing nine. When Brazilians get home, often in neighborhoods where basic trash collection and sewage are lacking, they

worry about some of the highest violent crime rates in the world. The homicide rate in Brazil, as tallied bythe United Nations, was 21 deaths per 100,000 people in 2010 - compared with 4.8 in the United States, and1 in China. Sometimes it's not police Brazilians look to for protection, but drug gangs or other criminal factions that controlentire suburbs. Their kids are less truant than in years past, thanks to a welfare plan that pays parents to keep them in

school. But children aren't learning a whole lot once there. Literacy rates and test scores lag those of manyother developing countries, let alone the advanced economies that Brazil so hopes to join. Thosewho can't afford private health insurance - and most Brazilians can't - are at the mercy of publichospitals that often lack sutures, spare beds and, increasingly, doctors, some of whom are sodisgusted with the public health system that they limit their work to private providers. Such isthe shortage of physicians in public hospitals that the government wants to import them

fromCuba.

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AFF No Solvency

Brazil cant afford Economic investment in Latin American countries World Cup provesMoran 2013[Michael, Global Post Brazils brand is battered, but its no Turkey 2 July 2013http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/business/emerging-markets/130701/brazil-protests-turkey-economics-investment]

With Brazil straining every muscle to meet the construction deadlines FIFA and the Olympics

IOC demanded of it in exchange for the high-profile honor of hosting the 2014 and 2016 events,the light the protests shined on basic infrastructure and social failings has embarrassed thegovernment.More seriously, though, it coincides with a distinct economic performance falloffthat has some emerging market specialists in the financial world wondering if Brazil is just thelatest in a series of post-Cold War bubbles. While the country has never tamed inflation (to be fair, in partbecause of the tsunami of cheap capital unleashed by the US Federal Reserve and other central banks after 2008), itseconomic indicators have been impressive in the past decade. Annual GDP growth, for instance, averaged about 3.6

percent during the period from 2001 to 2011. For the moment, those now look like the good old days. On Friday,Brazils Central Bank raised its 2013 inflation estimate to 5.4 percent and cut its growth forecastto 2.7 percent from an initial projection of 3.1 percent. Even that may be optimistic. Economicoutput in the first three months of this year was under 2 percent, following a disastrous 2012,when annual growth nearly flatlined at 0.9 percent. This is not to say Brazils emergence is anillusion: The demands of its growing middle class are in keeping with the raised expectations ofan emerging powerhouse.The real question is whether Brazils government, its corruption-riddled bureaucracy and an educational system that compares very poorly with other emergingmarket powers, can meet those demands. And while Brazil may or may not have all the paint dryon its super-stadiums for the opening of the big sports festivals of the next few years, even moretroubling would be if its recent travails dampen enthusiasm for its all-important offshore oiltenders in October and November. Rousseffs government is not only counting on that revenue,but already earmarking it for major infrastructure and other spending in years to come.

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AFF No Solvency: Cuba

Removing the United States embargo is the only way to solve human rights in CubaGlickhouse 2012[Rachel, American Society/Council of the Americas, Rousseff Extends Brazils RegionalInfluence in Cuba and Haiti 2 February 2012 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/rousseff-extends-brazil%E2%80%99s-regional-influence-cuba-and-haiti]

When asked about human rights issues in Cuba, Rousseffavoided criticizing the Castro regime. Its not possible to use

human rights as a political and ideological weapon. The world needs to be convinced that itssomething every country has to take responsibility for, including our own, she said. She alsomade reference to Guantanamo Bay, the U.S.-run prison in eastern Cuba, as an example ofhuman rights violations.Brazils Minister of Human Rights, Mria do Rosario, went further, reportedly saying:Cubas hallmark isnt one of violating human rights but actually suffering a historic violation,the American embargo.Rousseffs foreign policy advisor, Marco Aurlio Garcia, commented onBrazils stance onhuman rights in Cuba: We arent going to tell them what to do. But human rights advocates hoped Rousseff would havetaken a different approach. Elizardo Snchez, president of the Cuban Human Rights and National Reconciliation

Commission,criticized Brazils position: I continue to insist that Brazilian diplomacy should update itsinterpretation of non-intervention...because Cuba no longer respects [human rights agreements],and instead, the human rights situation has worsened in our country.

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Brazil cant solve democracy promotionStruenkel and Jacob 10 (Oliver Struenkel, assistant professor of international relations @ theGetlio Vargas Foundation and Jabin Jacob, Assistant Director @ Institute of Chinese Studies,Portugese Journal of Intl Rel.Autumn/Winter, p. 25)

While western democratic governments and organizations continue to spend billions of dollarsevery year on democracy-related projects, there is a notable shift of power towards countriesthat are eitherreluctant when it comes to democracy promotion or reject the idea altogether. The rise of apparentlyviable alternative political models such as those of China, makes the future look increasingly uncertain for the supporters ofdemocracy. One overarching topic all emerging powers seem to espouse dearly is the defense of sovereignty. Foreignintervention of any kind, even well intentioned advice, is considered an inappropriate intrusion into anothers domesticaffairs. as a consequence, the issue of democracy promotion, prominent in western foreign policy, is, with a few exceptions,largely absent from the discourse of emerging powers. Carothers survey of different types of democracy promotion in 2009includes only north american and european strategies as there are virtually no formal programs of overt democracypromotion outside of the west.Democracy promotion is, for obvious reasons, not an issue in Russia and china. the case is however, more surprising withrespect to Brazil and India, two vibrant democracies whose leaders have often been personally involved in the fight fordemocratic rights. indias first prime minister Jawaharlal nehru was one of the key figures in the fight for independence fromthe British and a leading proponent of decolonization in asia and africa. Brazilian presidents fernando henrique cardoso(1995-2002), luiz incio lula da silva (2003-2010) and dilma Rousseff (since 2011) have all endured some form ofrepression during Brazils military dictatorship. Rousseff, the first woman to assume the presidency in Brazil, was even

tortured. nevertheless, propagating values cherished at home or criticizing foreign leaders who donot embrace these values has traditionally been frowned upon in both Brazil and india .There is in fact, little discernible difference between Brazilian and indian ties to democraticcountries such as south africa and to non-democratic ones such as Russia, with which both Brasliaand new delhi have cordial relations. Brazil is on good terms with leaders such as cubas Ral castro,irans mahmoud ahmadinejad, and venezuelas hugo chvez, and it has been notoriouslyreluctant to endorse measures to prevent genocides in Rwanda, sudan and former yugoslavia.Similarly, India has for over a decade followed a so-called constructive engagement policy with myanmars military junta inwhich it has not criticized the regimes human rights abuses even as it hosts large numbers of Burmese refugees andpolitical exiles on its soil. nor did new delhi take much of a position one way or the other on the elections held there last

year, disappointing pro-democracy activists everywhere.