Brains, Buddhas, & Believing -- The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist & Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind // Author: Arnold (2012)

So, the self is not causally effacious (since it does not exist) so therefore it is not ultimately real.

Witt. would reject this.

If universals do not make coherent sense, then intentionality cannot be about or categorized BY any one singal thing.

This is such a mistaken conception. The REASON part. We need to separate off reasons from XXX.

This matches what I have thought about what is ACTUALLY the causal source that hooks up with the external world.

It is in THIS sense, that we learn what is GIVEN, independent of xxx. It is possible to view the world, entirely without concepts. If normativity is the case, and without self, then, there is the compexity coming in (that induces one to talk) that comes PRIOR to our explication of it.

Well, I think that... this is how... it is said that causality is linguistically dependent.

How do we determine the boundary between the two? (Between mind and body.)

What synthesizes (or brings into unity?) the various sensory elements (I think).

Dude!!! This is how Wittgenstein could fit in. About... a link existing at the beginning and the end of a system, but not in the middle.

Bleh, well... I feel that, "mental," here, isn't actually appropriate.

Gross!!! But, it's not a vitalism!!! Since, it is causality, ONLY.

Oh, okay... yes, here we can see... how representationalism, has problems with respect to how they think it makes sense to themselves.

Well, the similarity, is, for one, "given." // Kant has mistaken where the memory component lies.

No, I don't think this is "eminently subjective." // Because, there is no more difference between inside and outside.

This, I think, accesses what I

(and Nietzsche?) was trying to say.

Intentionality is "internal"

and therefore not

accessible from outside?

But we DON'T/

CAN'T make that

distinction, at least not clearly.

This problem

COULD be clear if we say that we aren't clear

at the beginning

of it.

It IS incoherent,

even at THIS level.

Brains, Buddhas, & Believing -- The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist & Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind // Author: Arnold (2012)

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