BRA Raid of Cabanatuan

THE GREAT RAID OF CABANATUAN

1LT LITO F SALANGUSTE O-14345 (SC) PASOAC 33 - 2012

A Battle Review and Analysis

SEQUENCE OF PRESENTATION Bottom Line Up Front (Lessons Learned) Define the Subject Analyzed Appropriate Strategic Information Essential

to the Battle Describe the Action (i.e. Terrain, Forces,

Events, Outcome etc) Assess the Significance

Easily recognizable key events Cause/effect relationships Lessons learned Doctrine



“The Raid of Cabanatuan was the most successful military rescue operation in US military history with 522 Allied POW’s liberated despite the numerical advantage and firepower superiority of the Japanese Imperial Army because US-Philippines Allied Forces effectively combined and used INTELLIGENCE and DECEPTION with mastery of the terrain during planning to achieve SURPRISE, SYNCHRONIZATION, and SPEED with overwhelming firepower in the actual execution.”

LESSONS LEARNED



DEFINE THE SUBJECT ANALYZED Camp Pangatian, Cabanatuan City, NE

GC 6316 WHO FOUGHT THE BATTLE?US-Philippines Allied Forces6th US Rangers Battalion(-)Alamo ScoutsLuzon Guerilla Armed Forces

VERSUS Japanese Imperial ArmyJapanese Regular GuardsDokuho 359 Bn, 14th Area Army WHEN DID THEY FIGHT?

30 January 19451940H to 2100H

WHERE DID THE BATTLE TOOK PLACE?Pangatian, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija



STRATEGIC INFO ESSENTIAL TO THE BATTLE1941 December 8: Eight hours after Pearl Harbor, Japan attacks U.S. air bases in the Philippines.

1942 Early January: The Japanese occupy Manila. U.S. forces retreat south into the Bataan peninsula. March 11: General MacArthur is ordered to leave the Philippines. April 9: U.S. surrenders Luzon. Bataan Death March: the Japanese marched prisoners of war five to nine days north to Camp O'Donnell. May 6: U.S. surrenders their last stronghold, the island of Corregidor. Early June: American POWs are transferred to Capaz and Cabanatuan.

1944 August 1: Tokyo War Ministry issued the “KILL ALL ORDER” to all POW Camps. October 20: U.S. Forces invade Leyte, South of Luzon. December 14: Nearly 150 American POW’s were executed at Palawan Camp.

1945 January 9: U.S. Forces invade Luzon. January 30-31: Rescue of POWs from Cabanatuan.



CAUSES OF BATTLE

When the 72,000 US-Filipino Allied Forces surrendered to the Japanese Imperial Army on 09 April 1942.

When the Tokyo War Ministry had issued a memo on August 1, 1944 to all POW camps, came to be known as the “August 1 Kill-All Order.”

When a POW Camp in Palawan composed of nearly 150 American POW’s were executed by their Japanese captors on December 14, 1944.

The US Forces imminent fear of mass executions of the POW’s in Camp Pangatian, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.



DESCRIBE EACH OTHERS OBJECTIVESUS-FILIPINO ALLIED FORCES:

To infiltrate behind the enemy lines in order to gain additional intelligence on the objective by utilizing the Alamo Scouts;

To raid the Cabanatuan POW camp and rescue the remaining POW’s in Pangatian in order to prevent another Palawan POW massacre;

To undertake the safe and rapid withdrawal of the POW’s from the objective to the pre-planned withdrawal route to the American friendly lines.



DESCRIBE EACH OTHERS OBJECTIVESJAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY:

The main objective of the Japanese Imperial Army is to execute all the allied Prisoners of War by implementing the August 1 “Kill-All Policy” issued by Tokyo War Ministry.

To ensure the rapid and safe passage of the withdrawing troops of the Japanese 14th Area Army from Manila to Northern Luzon via Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.



PERST PERST US-FILIPINO ALLIED

FORCESJAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY

POLITICAL

US gov’t prioritized the Europe War Theater than Pacific War

Commonwealth gov’t of the Phils was replaced by a “Puppet Gov’t” created by the Japanese

Japan aimed to colonize its neighboring countries

Created a “Puppet Gov’t in the Phils to show their own version of liberal democratic governance

ECONOMIC

By 1941, Philippines was the “Pearl of the Orient” due to booming economy

Undergone economic rehabilitation due to war time recessions

Economic aspects was heavily affected due to war and unstable political leadership

Filipinos who have taken advantage of the situation by using the “black market” scheme of buy and sell

Leading in economy in the entire Southeast Asia prior WWII

Japanese occupation in the Phils led to war time recession

Japan’s chaotic conditions of civilian livelihood gave rise to much grumbling and dissatisfaction, against those held directly responsible for immediate breakdown of the civilian economy.

Schools were converted to house war workers, or become factories, hospitals or warehouses.



PERST PERST US-FILIPINO ALLIED

FORCESJAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY

RELIGION

Filipinos since World War II (1939-1945) have been increasingly taken over by the Westerners in Roman Catholic, Anglican and Protestant churches in the Third World.

Adaptations of native customs pose problems of theology and tradition like supertitious beliefs in amulets or “anting-anting”.

Both the americans and filipinos (priests, clergies, nuns and other civilians) utilized religious organizations as covers for secret meetings and churches as place for their intelligence activities.

The dominant religions are Shintoism and Buddhism. Shinto is native to Japan. Generally translated as “the Way of the Gods” it was also Japan’s state religion

Used and exploited the religious sectors for its political purposes; the government wasted no time to introduce state shintoism in the country

The Japanese government forced her people to practice State Shinto and to accept that the Emperor was their living god.



PERST

PERST US-FILIPINO ALLIED FORCES

JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY

SOCIAL

Public social service has been geared to wartime needs, the filipino people faced its own problems of conversion and high war related crimes during the years 1940 to 1945.

Social problems were rampant usually tied to a number of social factors, known and unknown, whose impact upon the welfare of the ordinary people set the pattern of public welfare during and after the world war years.

School children were deprived of the later years of their education by being drawn into industry or the armed services.

Teachers protested vainly against ten and twelve-hour shifts for both boys and girls in war industry.

Japan fueled by years of propaganda, they believed that the americans will show no mercy. Tokyo acknowledges this fears convincing its own people that they must prepare to defend their country to the death.



PERST

PERST US-FILIPINO ALLIED FORCES


TECHNOLOGICAL

Most of the allied forces weaponry were product of the World War I era.

US forces technological weaponries were prioritized to the Europe’s war theater

Alamo Scouts and Filipino guerilla’s relay most of their weapons technology to improvisations from intelligence to CSS using carabao pulled carts

US forces were able to use P-61 Black Widow Plane for diversion

Japanese has powerful and high degree military forces, equipment, naval and air striking force and modernized firearms used during the war.

Standard Japanese troops were well supplied with equipments and every Japanese unit have armored capabilities

Lack of aerial assets during the withdrawal of 14th Area Army to Cabanatuan



COMPARE MILITARY SYSTEMS

US-FILIPINO ALLIED FORCES

MILITARY SYSTEMS

COMPARISONJAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY

Utilized Alamo Scouts and the LGAF network for intel

Well provided of info by the local populace

Aerial reconnaissance planes

Intelligence Operating

System

Rely mostly its intel from its organic intel operatives

Losing their own network of “Makapili” or Filipino symphatizers

Lack of aerial assets All troops are light infantry that have no terrain restrictions

Highly mobile and capable of both direct and indirect fires

No POL requirements

Maneuver System

Troops are mixture of both light infantry and mechanized infantry

Armored vehicles dependent on road network as mobility corridors

Limited and dependent on POL for movement





MILITARY SYSTEMS


Weapon Systems: Machine guns Mortars Bazooka (anti armor) Landmines and

explosives Standard weapons &

ammos

Fire Support System

Weapon Systems: Machine guns Mortars Artillery Tanks & Armored vehicles Standard weapons & ammos

P-61 Black Widow Plane (see attached Annex B, Picture 2)

Air Defense System

AA Machine Guns





MILITARY SYSTEMS


Used P-61 Black Widow plane for deception

Maintained OPSEC throughout the operation

Identified routes, pre-planned withdrawal routes and ORP’s

Mobility, CM &

Survivability System

Established a series of check points and choke points

Built barbed wires walls around camp

Fortified camo pillboxes and guard towers with 24hr sentries

Created gates with padlocks and roving guard sentries Make shift hospitals

at Plateros Carabao-pulled carts Organic trucks and

ambulances (upon reaching friendly lines)

Combat Service Support System

Organic vehicles Organic medical

personnel




US-FILIPINO ALLIED FORCESMILITARY SYSTEMS


Leadership: Ltc Henry Mucci – 6th

Rangers Bn Cpt Robert Prince – 6th

Rangers Bn 1Lt John Murphy – 6th

Rangers Bn Lt Bill Nellist – Alamo

Scouts Cpt Juan Pajota – LGAF

(Guerilla) Cpt Eduardo Joson – LGAF

(Guerilla)C2 Equipments: SCR 694 Tactical radio

Command and Control System

Leadership: Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita–

14th Area Army Col Shigeji Mori – Cmdt,

POW camp Col Tomeo Oyabu – Dokuho

359 Bn

C2 Equipments: Organic tactical radios

and military telephone lines

Both US Rangers and Alamo Scouts have complied and undergone mandatory recruitment processing

Handful of Filipino Guerillas were recruited but most were volunteers

Methods of Recruitment

Most have been forced to serve during their younger years in the military service and most of them were coming from Korea and other Japanese controlled countries





MILITARY SYSTEMSCOMPARISO

N


US Rangers and Alamo Scouts have war experiences

Filipino Guerillas are well experienced in guerilla fighting against Japanese Imperial Army

Battle Experience

14th Area Army have been fighting in the Asia Pacific War since 1939 from Korea to the Philippines

Controlled the Phils for almost 3 years since the Fall of Bataan and Corregidor Ltc Henry Mucci is a product

of USMA, West Point, New York, well experienced ranger

Cpt Robert Prince is an ROTC advance graduate and a product of OCS, USA

All other officers & EP were Rangers and Alamo Scouts qualified; highly trained but lack war experiences

Cpt Pajota and Cpt Joson both Phil Scouts, experienced guerilla leaders and fighter

Filipino guerillas lack formal trng but well experienced in guerilla fighting

Training and Leadership Developments

14th Area Army Commanders are graduate of Imperial Japanese Army Academy while others are product of Japan War College

Japanese troops are all well experienced and battle hardened in the Asia Pacific wars

Strict adherence to the Samurai’s way of life or Bushido Code

Experienced NCO’s but others are too young for formal military trainings



SPECIFIC EVENTS THAT LED TO THE BATTLE

January 1945

Jan 7: PFC Eugene Nielsen, a Palawan survivor, tells his story of Palawan POW Massacre to U.S. Army Intelligence.

Jan 9: MacArthur invades Luzon, the Philippines.

Jan 26: General Walter Krueger is alerted to the situation at Cabanatuan. The Alamo Scouts are briefed.

Jan 27: General Krueger assigns Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci and his 6th Army Rangers to raid Cabanatuan and liberate the POWs. The Alamo Scouts slip behind enemy lines to begin reconnaissance.

Jan 28: The Rangers slip behind enemy lines. The Alamo Scouts arrive at Platero, two miles north of the camp.

Jan 29: The Rangers meet with USAFFE guerrilla Captain Juan Pajota at Balincarin, five miles north of camp. After receiving reports of heavy Japanese activity in the area, Lieutenant Colonel Mucci postponed the raid for 24 hours. The Rangers move to Platero.



SPECIFIC EVENTS THAT LED TO THE BATTLE30 January 1945

1130H: Alamo Scouts Lieutenant Bill Nellist and Private Rufo Vaquilar dress like locals and gain access to an abandoned shack in the knoll above the camp; they prepare a detailed report on camp activities.

1430H: Lieutenant Colonel Mucci receives the Nellist report.

1500H: Captain Robert Prince finalizes his plan for the rescue and submits it to Lieutenant Colonel Mucci.

1700H: The Rangers depart Platero.

1800H: The P-61 night fighter takes off.

1850H: The P-61 buzzes the prison camp to distract the guards. Meanwhile, the Rangers gain positions.

1900H: C Company Rangers are in place.

1940H: F Company Rangers crawl into place. A nerve-wracking ten minutes later than planned, a fire-fight starts. Evacuation begins.



DESCRIBE THE ACTION (OCOKA) Camp Pangatian, Cabanatuan City, NE

GC 6316 OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE

US-FILIPINO FORCES• Terrain is flat, unfavorable to US Forces to approach during day light

• Provides good observation and fields of fireJAPANESE FORCES

• Terrain is flat;keeps the vegetation clear provides good observation and fields of fire

• Towers and pill boxes have interlocking fields of fire advantageous against enemy attacks

• Due to good observation, Japanese Guards no longer patrol the camp vicinity




GC 6316 COVER AND CONCEALMENTUS-FILIPINO FORCES• No concealment during movement

• Timed their mov’t to dusk to take advantage of low visibility to offset enemy observation advantage

• Disadvantageous for day light attack

• Used the ditches for cover and concealment prior to attack

JAPANESE FORCES• Utilized the available barracks as cover; fortified guard houses and mortar emplacements for same purposes

• They have all man made structures for cover and concealment




GC 6316 OBSTACLESUS-FILIPINO FORCES• Bypassed several mud dikes of ricefields on their way to obj w/c is unfavorable during movement

• Took advantage of the ditches and canals despite being an obstacle

• Fortified gates and wire fences is to be breach to enter the camp

JAPANESE FORCES• Built 8ft wire fences to surround the camp for all around security

• Built fortified camo pill boxes and towers with sentries

• Emplaced gates with padlocks and sentries to ensure security




GC 6316 KEY TERRAINUS-FILIPINO FORCES• Took advantage of the abandoned shack in a small knoll located 270m away from the camp for observation and intel opns

• No other dominating terrain that will provide advantage to US Forces

JAPANESE FORCES• Built fortified guard towers with sentries which in itself are the only man made structures that dominate the terrain

• They control all key terrains within the camp vicinity




GC 6316 AVENUES OF APPROACHUS-FILIPINO FORCES• Took advantage of the tree lines for the staging of their assault

• Used plane for divertion to enable their troops to approach the objective

• AA’s are flat and wide, the camp can approached from any directions

JAPANESE FORCES• Wide AA’s to cover for defenses since the terrain is flat and unfavorable for defensive positions

• Failed to think the possibility of enemy to approach from tree lines

• Failed to fortified AA’s with passive or defensive obstacles to slow down enemy approach



DESCRIBE THE ACTION (WEATHER)Camp Pangatian, Cabanatuan City, NEGC 6316 WEATHER

US-FILIPINO FORCES• US Forces are already accustomed to the Philippine weather

• Air hotness and humidity affects the movement of troops

• Offset the summer effects by allowing troops to drink water

JAPANESE FORCES• Due to the hot and humidity of weather, they rested and relaxed

• The hotness of the temp compelled the Japanese to remove some of their gears like bandoolers.

• Others have gone for drinks due to the hotness of the temperature



DESCRIBE THE ACTION (FORCES)US-FILIPINO ALLIED

FORCES

Dynamics of Combat Powers


All troops are light infantry that have no terrain restrictions

Highly mobile and capable of both direct and indirect fires

Maneuver

Troops are mixture of infantry and mechanized infantry

Armored vehicles dependent on road network as mobility corridors

Type of Units: Light Infantry (Rangers

& Alamo Scouts) Para-military (Guerilla)Weapon Systems: Machine guns Mortars Bazooka (anti armor) Landmines and explosives Standard weapons & ammos P-61 Black Widow planeStrength: 133 US Rangers & Alamo

Scouts 330 Filipino Guerillas

Firepower

Type of Units: Medium Infantry (14th Army &

359 Dokuho Bn) Light Infantry (Japanese

Regular Guards)Weapon Systems: Machine guns Mortars Artillery Tanks & Armored vehicles Standard weapons & ammosStrength: 100-300 regular soldiers

within the camp 1,000 regular soldiers

across Cabu River 7,000-9,000 est. division-

size regular soldiers within Cabanatuan City



DESCRIBE THE ACTION (FORCES)

US-FILIPINO ALLIED FORCESDynamics of Combat Powers


Used P-61 Black Widow plane for deception

Maintained OPSEC throughout the operation

Took advantage of the sewage canals and irrigation ditches around the camp

Protection

Built barbed wires walls around camp

Fortified camo pillboxes and guard towers with 24hr sentries

Created gates with padlocks and guard sentries

Ltc Henry Mucci – 6th Rangers Bn, USMA

Cpt Robert Prince – 6th Rangers Bn, ROTC

1Lt John Murphy – 6th Rangers Bn

Lt Bill Nellist – Alamo Scouts

Cpt Juan Pajota – LGAF, Phil Scouts, experienced guerilla leader and fighter

Cpt Eduardo Joson – LGAF, Phil Scouts, experienced guerilla leader and fighter

Leadership

Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita – 14th Area Army, Imperial Japanese Army Academy, well experienced

Col Shigeji Mori – Cmdt, POW Camp, Imperial Japanese Army Academy

Col Tomeo Oyabu – Dokuho 359 Bn (Cabu Creek), Imperial Japanese Army Academy




DESCRIBE THE ACTION (Plans and Scheme of Maneuver)


US-Filipino troops will infiltrate enemy lines stealthly towards the objective in order to liberate the POW’s in Camp Pangatian

To execute all the POW’s in the camp per standing “Kill All Policy” from Tokyo War Ministry

Alamo Scouts will conduct intelligence operation on the objective (Pangatian POW camp) to fill up the required intel requirements for the operation

Japanese troops to temporarily hold in the camp for rest before continuing for withdrawal to Northern Luzon

Cpt Joson's guerrillas were to establish a roadblock on the main highway and 800 yards southwest of the camp to stop any Japanese who might come out from Cabanatuan City. A six-man bazooka team under Staff Sergeant James O. White of 2nd Pltn, F Coy, would give the guerrillas antitank protection.

Japanese regulars and guards to hold and defend the Camp in an event of attack.




Cpt Pajota’s guerillas were to establish a roadblock at the highway bridge over Cabu Creek 300 yards northeast of the compound and stop any Japanese who might come out of Cabu River.

Japanese guards to man the defensive positions around the camp to maintain all around security

C Coy under Cpt Prince and F Coy under Lt Murphy will crawl from the tree lines while Ltc Mucci will call for aircraft to buzz over the objective to divert the enemy’s attention to enable the rangers reach their pre-designated assault positions

Pltn(+) under Lt Carlos Tombo with some US Rangers will maneuver towards the Camp to cut off the telephone lines linking the Camp to the outside large force in Cabanatuan City

Once prepositioned, F Coy will start the attack in the rear portion of the objective (East fence) targeting quarters and barracks to fix the enemy

The Japanese will be caught by surprise and will try to CATK the Rangers.The Japanese will try to establish contact to HHQs but will fail.




C Coy will synchronized assault with F Coy to take out the sentries of the guard towers to breach the main gate of the POW’s compound

359 Dokuho Bn CATK to destroy the guerilla’s defensive positions in Cabu Bridge to reinforce the belanguered Japanese soldiers at the POW Camp

Both Cpt Joson and Cpt Pajota will hold and defend their respective blocking positions from all possible reinforcement of Japanese troops from Cabu River and Cabanatuan City

Pltn(+) from 359 Dokuho Bn to breach the guerilla’s defensive position at Cabu Bridge using the Cabu Creek bed to flank Cpt Pajota’s position

C Coy will temporarily sieze the Camp, Cpt Prince will fire 1st signal flare to stop the assault and facilitate the safe evacuation of the POW’s towards Pampanga River; fire 2nd signal flares for the withdrawal of the blocking forces

*Japanese regular guards will be anihilated.

US-Filipino forces and POW’s will proceed to the link-up area at Pampanga River to reorganizeAlamo Scouts and Cpt Pajota’s troops to form as rear guard to ensure the safe passage of the raiding teams and POW columns in entering the American lines

DESCRIBE THE ACTION (SEQUENCE OF EVENTS)

Lobong

Phase I – Intel preparation and movement to assembly area

Event 1 – On January 27: General Krueger assigns Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci and his 6th Army Rangers to raid Cabanatuan and liberate the POWs. The Alamo Scouts slip behind enemy lines, fetched native guerilla guides at the Guerilla Headquarters from Guimba and proceeded to Platero, 2 miles North of the objective to begin reconnaissance and intelligence operation. (KE #1)

Event 3 - At about 281400H January: F Company as part of the group left with native guides and proceeded to a guerrilla camp near Lobong about 5 miles to the Southeast of the camp. The 80 guerrilla men joined the Rangers at Lobong, left for Balincarin.

Event 4 – On 290600H January: The Rangers meet with USAFFE guerrilla Captain Juan Pajota at Balincarin, five miles north of the camp. After receiving reports of heavy Japanese activity in the area, Ltc Mucci postponed the raid for 24 hours. The Rangers move to Platero.

Event 2 – On 280500H January: The Rangers slip behind enemy lines and proceeded to Guimba, about 75 miles East of base camp, pick up 80 men guerrilla force and native guides at a nearby guerrilla camp. The Alamo Scouts arrive at Platero, two miles north of the camp.




Phase II – Finalization of plans and movement to contact

Event 5 – At 301130H January: Alamo Scouts Lt Bill Nellist and Pvt Rufo Vaquilar dress like locals and gained access to an abandoned shack in the knoll above the camp; they prepare a detailed report on camp activities. At about 1430H: Mucci receives the Nellist report and by 1500H Cpt Robert Prince finalizes his plan for the rescue and submits it to Ltc Mucci.

Event 6 - At about 1700H, the Rangers depart Platero towards the objective while at 1745H, a guerilla under Cpt Pajota set a timed bomb at Cabu wooden bridge while Cpt Joson’s troops and the Rangers proceeded to their designated assault and blocking positions. By 1800H, a P-61 from the 547th Night Fighter Squadron takes off.

Event 7 - At 1840H, three-quarters of an hour before the attack was to begin, a single P61 Black Widow approached and buzzed the prison camp to distract the guards. Rangers from C Coy and F Coy gain positions. As the plane buzzed the camp, Lt. Carlos Tombo and his guerrillas along with a small number of Rangers cut the camp's telephone lines to prevent communication with the large force stationed in Cabanatuan. (KE#2)



./The%20Great%20Raid%20of%20Cabanatuan,%20Philippines%204_5.mpg

DESCRIBE THE ACTION (SEQUENCE OF EVENTS)Event 8 – On 1930H: When C Coy is in position, 2nd Pltn, F Coy, which was to kill the guards at the rear of the stockade, split off from the main body and headed east under its platoon leader, 1Lt John F. Murphy. After marching about a half mile, it dropped down into a streambed that it would follow to the east fence of the compound.Event 9 - F Company Rangers crawl into their predesignated assault position. 2nd Pltn, F Coy is prepositioned at the rear portion of the camp and was tasked to eliminate the guards at the rear entrance of the stockade to prevent Japanese Guards from moving into the area of the compound occupied by the prisoners. Six men from the platoon were also detailed to destroy the pillbox at the northeast corner of the stockade.Event 10 - At 1930H (ZERO Hour): Murphy's Rangers were in position

and ready to attack, but 1Lt Murphy wanted to be certain that they were completely prepared and their positions were secure. He thus sent several men to retrace the route the platoon had followed while getting in place, inspect the squad positions, and check nearby buildings to ensure that they were not occupied.

Event 11 - At 1945H: 1Lt Murphy aimed his M-1 rifle at an open window in the nearest guard tower and fired. His shot was the signal to begin the attack. F Company from 1st Pltn and 2nd Pltn all began throwing hand grenades and firing carbines, rifles, automatic weapons, and rifle grenades into the compound from the outside of the east fence. Meanwhile, Weapons Pltn concentrated their fire on pillboxes, guard towers, and to the Japanese soldiers who were unfortunate enough to be exposed. (KE #3)Event 12 – At almost the same time 1945H: Cpt Juan Pajota and his guerrilla unit began firing on the Japanese battalion (359 Dokuho Bn) in bivouac less than 300 yards beyond Cabu Creek and hold off suicidal Japanese forces, securing the Rangers' positions. Cpt Pajota's time bomb blew a gap in the bridge, his machine guns emplacements killed hundreds of Japanese soldiers who tried to jump to the Filipino's side of the bridge or cross the creek.


./The%20Great%20Raid%20of%20Cabanatuan,%20Philippines%205_5.mpg

CPT PRINCE C COY (ME)

1LT MURPHY F COY (SE)



I I




DESCRIBE THE OUTCOMEPrisoners Rescued

American soldiers

464

British soldiers 22Dutch soldiers 3American civilians

28

Norwegian civilians

2

British civilian 1Canadian civilian

1

Filipino civilian

1

Total POW’s Liberated

522

Table 8 – Tabulated result of the liberated or rescued allied Prisoners of War and civilians from Pangatian POW Camp. (See attached Annex B, Picture 1)



DESCRIBE THE OUTCOME

CASUALTIES AND LOSSESUNITED STATES and Allied Forces JAPAN

2 Killed in Action – 6th Ranger Battalion (-)

530 – 1,000 combined elements of Dokuho 359 Bn and Japanese Regular Guards (estimate)

4 Wounded in Action – 6th Ranger Bn (-)1 Prisoner Died - POW20 Wounded in Action – LGAF

(combined)

Table 9 – Table of casualties and losses between the US-Filipino Forces and the Japanese Imperial Army.



ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCEKey Event #1 – On January 27: General Krueger assigns Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci and his 6th Army Rangers to raid Cabanatuan and liberate the POWs. The Alamo Scouts slip behind enemy lines, fetched native guerilla guides at the Guerilla Headquarters from Guimba and proceeded to Platero, 2 miles North of the objective to begin reconnaissance and intelligence operation.

a) Cause – Since there was no exact intelligence data or information regarding Japanese activities and disposition of Japanese troops, US Forces was prompted to conduct reconnaisance and intelligence operation.

b) Effects – The US Forces were able to obtain a concrete intelligence on the Japanese Forces which aided in the planning and preparation and provided a better picture of the enemy’s strength, locations and capabilities. Although indirectly, this provided F Company a clear picture of its objective and its possible tasks to be accomplished.



ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCEKey Event #1 – On January 27: General Krueger assigns Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci and his 6th Army Rangers to raid Cabanatuan and liberate the POWs. The Alamo Scouts slip behind enemy lines, fetched native guerilla guides at the Guerilla Headquarters from Guimba and proceeded to Platero, 2 miles North of the objective to begin reconnaissance and intelligence operation.

c) Lessons learned – The initiative of the Commander to conduct intelligence operation in the absence of information greatly helps in the planning for future operations. This will allow him and his subordinate leaders (Company Commanders) to see the battlefield clearly and shape the kind of action they needed in order to accomplish the mission.

d) Doctrinal Implication – FM 34-1 and FC 2-00231 S.2005 in Intelligence Preparation in the Battlefield (Operational Environment) pp.1-8 & pp.2-3 states that, defining the significant characteristics of the battlefield environment also aids in identifying gaps in current intelligence holdings and the specific intelligence required to fill them. This will help Commanders to identify significant characteristics of the environment, such as avenues of approach, engagement areas, and zones of entry, collect additional information and other intel requirements.



ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCEKey Event #2 – At 1840H, three-quarters of an hour before the attack was to begin, a single P61 Black Widow approached and buzzed the prison camp to distract the guards. Rangers from C Coy and F Coy gain positions. As the plane buzzed the camp, Lt. Carlos Tombo and his guerrillas along with a small number of Rangers cut the camp's telephone lines to prevent communication with the large force stationed in Cabanatuan.

a) Cause – Cpt Pajota suggested the availability of US Plane to buzz around the POW camp.

b) Effects – Diverted the attention of the Japanese guards while the assaulting US Rangers specifically critical to F Company who has the farthest infiltration route, is on low crawl towards the objective while Filipino guerillas simultaneously cut off the lines of communication to the large force stationed in Cabanatuan. The Japanese now lost a critical factor in their C2 capability.



ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCEKey Event #2 – At 1840H, three-quarters of an hour before the attack was to begin, a single P61 Black Widow approached and buzzed the prison camp to distract the guards. Rangers from C Coy and F Coy gain positions. As the plane buzzed the camp, Lt. Carlos Tombo and his guerrillas along with a small number of Rangers cut the camp's telephone lines to prevent communication with the large force stationed in Cabanatuan.

c) Lessons Learned – Diverting the enemy’s attention from the main effort would give advantage in the offensive. This will also aid to achieve surprise, an important principle of war in offensive operations like raid. Meanwhile, the cutting of the telephone wires is also a critical factor that will paralyze the Japanese command and control due to loss of communication among Japanese units.

d) Doctrinal Implication – FM 7-24; SP 3-014 S.2005 pp.xxvii to pp.4-56 states that deception operations deceive the enemy as to the true intentions of the attacker. Actions which mislead the enemy and induce him to do something counter to his interests. It includes manipulating, distorting, or falsifying information available to the enemy to ensure security of the REAL plans, operations, or activities. Further, US rangers achieved synchronization courtesy of 1Lt Murphy’s first shot which per RM OAC Intro to Army Operations states that synchronization is arranging the activities in time and space to mass combat power at the decisive point.



ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCEKey Event #3 – At 1945H: 1Lt Murphy aimed his M-1 rifle at an open window in the nearest guard tower and fired. His shot was the signal to begin the attack. F Company from 1st Pltn and 2nd Pltn all began throwing hand grenades and firing carbines, rifles, automatic weapons, and rifle grenades into the compound from the outside of the east fence. Meanwhile, Weapons Section concentrated their fire on pillboxes, guard towers, and to the Japanese soldiers who were unfortunate enough to be exposed.

a) Cause – The first shot was the important signal to synchronized all the assault forces to start their attack on their respective targets.

b) Effects – After the first shot, synchronized and overwhelming barrage of small arms fire coming from the combined forces of US Army Rangers, Alamo Scouts and Filipino Guerilla’s as blocking forces erupted and completely caught the Japanese troops by surprise which led to the failure of the Japanese to mount an organized counter attack against the assaulting forces of the camp and even against the blocking guerilla forces which also became a decisive reserve in the battle. Hence, if the blocking forces failed, the 359 Dokuho Bn can reinforce the belanguered Japanese Guards at the POW camp which might cause the raid to fail.



ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE

Key Event #3 – At 1945H: 1Lt Murphy aimed his M-1 rifle at an open window in the nearest guard tower and fired. His shot was the signal to begin the attack. F Company from 1st Pltn and 2nd Pltn all began throwing hand grenades and firing carbines, rifles, automatic weapons, and rifle grenades into the compound from the outside of the east fence. Meanwhile, Weapons Section concentrated their fire on pillboxes, guard towers, and to the Japanese soldiers who were unfortunate enough to be exposed.

c) Lesson Learned – The synchronized execution of offensive actions like raid gives the attacker the advantage of surprise. This overloaded the Japanese C2 thus effectively reduced his ability to command and counter the raiding teams (Rangers). This also enabled the raiding team achieved synchronization by using arranged timed attack to mass combat power at the decisive point, place and time. Further, actions like the attack of 1Lt Murphy from the rear, mislead the enemy and induce him to think that the raiding party will assault from the rear which is something counter to the interests and TRUE intentions of the mission of the ME (C Company).

d) Doctrinal Implication – SP 3-014 Infantry Company Operations pp.4-2 to pp.4-18 states that surprise is defined as to strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared. This important characteristic of an offensive action (like raid) and a principle of war led to the successful fixing of the enemy by the F Company thus diverting the attention of the Japanese from the ME (C Company) to give Cpt Prince a room for flexibility and maneuver in order to successfully evacuate the POW’s.



THE RAID OF CABANATUAN

BRA Raid of Cabanatuan

Documents