Book 2 - Property and Land Title_v1.docx

School of Law

Compilation of Questions and Suggested Answers

Book 2(Property & Land Title and Deeds)

Submitted by:

CIVIL LAW (Weekday & Weekend) CLASS(A.Y. 2015-2016)

Submitted to:

ATTY. JENNOH TEQUILLOCivil Law Review Professor

December 17, 2015

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Table of Content

PROPERTY.......................................................................................................................1Property....................................................................................................................1

Spouses Vergara vs. Sonkin.........................................................................1Republic vs. Cortez, Sr................................................................................3Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.......................................5Hortizuela vs. Tagufa..................................................................................7Republic vs. Vda. De Joson.........................................................................9Republic vs. Zurban Realty & Development Corporation........................10Cabrera vs. Ysaac......................................................................................12Francisco vs. Rojas...................................................................................13Spouses Fortuna vs. Republic...................................................................15Spouses Vilbar vs. Opinion.......................................................................17Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Sanchez...............................................19Republic vs. Cortez....................................................................................21Teodoro vs. Espino....................................................................................23Cotoner-Zacarias vs. Spouses Revilla.......................................................24Abadilla, Jr. vs. Spouses Obrero...............................................................25Mangaser vs. Ugay....................................................................................27Department of Education vs. Tuliao..........................................................28Quintos vs. Nicolas....................................................................................30Mercado vs. Spouses Espina.....................................................................32Guido-Enriquez vs. Victorino....................................................................33Spouses Cabahug vs. National Power Corporation..................................35Republic vs. De Asis, Jr.............................................................................36Pilar Development vs. Dumandag.............................................................37Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran............................................38Republic vs. Santos III...............................................................................40VSD Realty & Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc.............42Republic vs. Lorenzo.................................................................................44Marcado vs. Espinocilla............................................................................46

EASEMENT.....................................................................................................................48Easement................................................................................................................48

Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.....................................48Right of Way..........................................................................................................49

Reyes vs. Spouses Valentin........................................................................49Jopauen Realty Corporation vs. Spouses Dominguez...............................51Star-Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Paper City Corporation...........................53

LAND TITLE...................................................................................................................54Collateral Attack....................................................................................................54

Bagayas vs. Felicidad................................................................................54

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Judicial Reconstitution of Torrens Title................................................................55St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Bretheren Foundation, Inc. vs. Riel.............................................................................................................55

Land Registration...................................................................................................57Spouses Peralta vs. Heirs of Bernardina Abalon......................................57

Restitution of Titles...............................................................................................59Republic vs. Camacho...............................................................................59

Tax Declaration vs. Original Certificate of Title...................................................60Heirs of Alejandra Delfin vs. Rabadon.....................................................60

NUISANCE......................................................................................................................62Per Se & Per Accidens...........................................................................................62

Rana vs. Wong...........................................................................................62

OWNERSHIP..................................................................................................................64Accessory Follows the Principal; Exception.........................................................64

Villasi vs. Garcia.......................................................................................64Accretion................................................................................................................66

Republic vs. Santos III...............................................................................66Builder in Good faith.............................................................................................68

Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. Lagrosa........................................................68Mirallosa vs. Carmel Development, Inc....................................................70Benedicto vs. Villaflores............................................................................71

Co-ownership.........................................................................................................73Arambulo vs. Dela Cruz............................................................................73Recio vs. Heirs of Spouses Aguendo.........................................................75

Co-Ownership; Partition; Inchoate right...............................................................76Quijano vs. Amante...................................................................................76

Co-Ownership; Pro-Indiviso Share........................................................................77Torres, Jr. vs. Lapinid...............................................................................77

Period of Redemption of Foreclosed Property......................................................78Ermitaño vs. Paglas..................................................................................78

Property Obtained in Fraud...................................................................................80Romero vs. Singson...................................................................................80

Protection Over Right of Possession.....................................................................81Suarez vs. Emboy.......................................................................................81

Registration of Title...............................................................................................83Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc......................................................83

Right of Accession; Builder in Bad Faith / Good Faith.........................................84Vda. De Roxas vs. Our Lady's Foundation, Inc........................................84

Tax Declaration, Not a Proof of Ownership..........................................................86Heirs of Paciano Yabao vs. van der Kolk.................................................86

POSSESSION...................................................................................................................87Possession..............................................................................................................87

Gabriel vs. Crisologo................................................................................87Agricultural Lands.................................................................................................89

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Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Ramos....................................89Forcible Entry........................................................................................................90

Pabalan vs. Heirs of Simeon A. B. Maamo, Sr..........................................90Movable Property..................................................................................................92

Subic Bay Legend Resorts & Casino, Inc. vs. Fernandez.........................92Right of Possession................................................................................................94

Estanislao vs. Estanislao...........................................................................94Unlawful Detainer.................................................................................................97

Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs. Galabo.........................................97

QUIETING OF TITLE...................................................................................................99Quieting of Title....................................................................................................99

CLT Realty Development Corporation vs. Phil-Ville Development & Housing Corporation................................................................................99Heirs of Pacifico Pocido vs. Avila...........................................................101

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PROPERTYProperty

I.

Civil Law Topic : Property

Source : Spouses Vergara vs. SonkinG.R. No. 193659, June 15, 2015

Contributor : Quiron, Maria Cristina

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PROBLEM:

A and B are adjoining landowners in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The property owned by B is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by A.

B raised the height of his partition wall and caused the construction of his house thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that a portion thereof became part of the wall of the master's bedroom and bathroom.

A on the other hand levelled the uneven portion of the of his Property by filling it with gravel, earth, and soil making it to become even higher than that of B Property by a third of a meter. Eventually, B began to complain that water coming from A Property was leaking into his bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet floor. B repeatedly demanded that A build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that he had dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded. Hence, B filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Will B’s case prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

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No, B’s case will not prosper. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that B’s property is lower in elevation than the A’s property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code which provides:

“Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.”

The law further provides that owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.

In this light, B should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to his property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, he disregarded the easement and constructed his house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins A property, thereby also violating the Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which shall be at least 2 meters from the property line.

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II.


Source : Republic vs. Cortez, Sr.G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015

Contributor : Sayson, Gerlyn Mae

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PROBLEM:

CL , established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaiu Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of the 50 hectares of land located in the western part of Palaiu Island. Together with the Aetas and the people under him, they develop the land for agricultural purposes to support his charitable activities. However, his peaceful possession was disturbed when the Palaui Island was declared to be a marine reserve through a series of presidential proclamation issued in 1967 and in 1994but subject to private rights. To protect his right over the land, he filed a writ of preliminary injunction. He alleged that he has been in peaceful possession of the property for 30 years and such, his possession ripened to ownership. Is the contention of CL tenable? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The contention of CL is untenable because possession in the concept of an owner under Art 530 of the Civil Code can only ripen to ownership if the property is susceptible of being appropriated.

To prove that the property can be appropriated or alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.

In the case at bar, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when CL started to occupy the same in 1962. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code.

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CL’s possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

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III.


Source : Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015

Contributor : Udtohan, Liljoy

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PROBLEM:

A and B are co-owners of an unregistered agricultural land who filed a complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against XY Realty. They contend that they had been denied access from their property to the nearest public road and vice versa due to the residential subdivision developed by XY Realty. XY Realty pointed out that A and B failed to show the requisites for the grant of easement of right-of-way. It presented the Municipal Assessor who testified that the Provincial Assessor denied the application for issuance of tax declaration by A’s husband since one had already been issued to Z. A and B asserted that A’s husband had been in continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof for 50 years.

Can A and B demand for an easement of right-of-way from XY Realty?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO. A and B cannot demand for an easement of right-of-way from XY Realty.

Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.

In this case, the property is still an unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain, A and B in order to validly claim acquisition thereof through prescription, must first be able to show that the State has expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject [property] is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

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Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from XY Realty for lack of personality.

Moreover, while A’s husband indeed attempted to declare the subject property for taxation purposes, his application, as previously mentioned, was denied because a tax declaration was already issued to Z.

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IV.


Source : Hortizuela vs. TagufaG.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015

Contributor : Baquero, Hope Cesely

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PROBLEM:

By virtue of the special power of attorney executed by Mari Horti, Jo Tagu instituted this case against defendants Gregoria Tagu praying for the peaceful surrender of the property, located in Isabela, unto them and further ordering the latter to reconvey in plaintiff’s favor the same property which was titled under her name via fraud. Said property was originally owned by plaintiff’s parents, although untitled, mortgaged the same to DBP, but was foreclosed due to failure to redeem the property, sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez who, in turn, sold it back to Red Tagu, husband of Gregoria Tagu using the fund sent by plaintiff Horti who was in America and with the agreement that Red will reconvey the said property to her sister when demanded. However, plaintiff discovered that the same unregistered property was titled in the name of Gregoria Tagu, and was able to title the said property by virtue of a free patent application before the DENR and the execution of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Spouses Leandro Tagu and Remedios Talo. Does the action for reconveyance and recovery of possession filed by Mari Horti, constitute an collateral attack on the validity of the subject certificate of title which is prohibited by law?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Direct attack means that the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Plaintiffs plainly question the title generated in the name of defendant Gregoria Tagu having been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. However, in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action. What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.

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The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land. "Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.

In the case of MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA vs. GREGORIA TAGUFA, G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015, a private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.

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V.


Source : Republic vs. Vda. De JosonG.R. No. 163767, March 10, 2014

Contributor : Corbo, Rhobie

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PROBLEM:

In the early, 1900’s Don Teburcio owned a vast parcels of land which composed primarily of ricefields in the Negros Occidental. More than twenty years thereafter or in 1926, he decided to sell a portion of his ricefield with an area of 12,342 sq.m. to Senyora Elisa and upon her death was inherited by her twin sister Donya Elisondra. Donya Elisondra had his unico hijo named Joselito who was the sole heir to his mother’s wealth. In 1963, Donya Elisondra boarded on a plane bound to Manila which unfortunately crashed. Joselito, inherited the parcel of land which was originally owned by Don Teburcio by virtue of succession and owning and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of owner since then as well as the taxes due on the property. Sometime in 1981, Joselito filed for an application for land registration over the property under the courts of Negros.

Will Joselito’s application for land registration be granted?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO. Land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR. This doctrine means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

In this case there was no evidence was presented that the subject land had been declared alienable and disposable by the State.

Thus, the application for land registration cannot be granted.

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VI.


Source : Republic vs. Zurban Realty & Development CorporationG.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014

Contributor : Labella, Margaret

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PROBLEM:

Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) an application for original registration of land in Cabuyao, Laguna, which it had purchased in 1992 from one Jane de Castro Abalos. The application alleged that the Corporation and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the property in the concept of an owner, but did not state when possession and occupation commenced and the duration of such possession.

The RTC granted the registration in favor of Zurbaran Corporation. The CA likewise promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded that the reports made by the concerned agencies and testimonies of those familiar with the land had buttressed the court a quo’s conclusion that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.

The Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor-in-interest did not show any proof that they had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of land since June 12, 1945, that they did not present competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and that the land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to private appropriation. As a consequence thereto, the Republic argues, that the application must be construed to be based on acquisitive prescription, not open possession of the land. Furthermore, the evidence presented by the (Zurbaran) Corporation and its averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The distinction is that Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.

With the application of the respondent corporation having been filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State. As there is no evidence

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showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, the Republic asserts that Zurbaran Corporation’s application must fail as it was unable to establish that the land has been declared patrimonial, which is essential if its predecessor-in-interest had acquired the land by prescription.

Should the application for registration be granted to respondent Corporation? Decide with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the application must be denied. The corporation did not make any allegation in its application that it had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier, nor did it present any evidence to establish such fact. The Director of Lands is correct in saying that the application must be construed to be based on acquisitive prescription, not open possession of the land.

Under the law, distinctions on the requirements for original registration of land depend on what basis the application was filed. An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish that applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Since the evidence presented by the Corporation and its averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), the crucial query is NOT “open, continuous and exclusive possession” but whether the land subject of the application had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State.

In other words, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the Civil Code. For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being possessed and occupied must already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of possession would vest any right in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public dominion.

An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously been declared alienable and disposable, but also that the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation required under the law on acquisitive prescription.

Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of Civil Code). Property of public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of patrimonial property of State. (Article 422 of Civil Code).

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VII.


Source : Cabrera vs. YsaacG.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014

Contributor : Tejano, Misaellee

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PROBLEM:

Henry, Harvey and Harry are the heirs of Spouses Hector and Hazel Hughes and thus, co-owners of Lot 123 with an area of 1000 square meters. Harry sold 333 square-meters of the property to Harold for a consideration P500,000.00 without the consent of Henry and Harvey.

Is the sale valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned property.

The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.

The rules allow co-owner to sell his undivided interest in the co-ownership. However, this was not the object of the sale between Harry and Harold. The object of the sale was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has "no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication." Without the consent of his co-owners, respondent could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property.

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VIII.


Source : Francisco vs. RojasG.R. No. 167120, April 23, 2014

Contributor : Tirol, Mark Jason

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PROBLEM:

Subject of the controversy is a portion of the 3,181.74 hectares of a vast track of land, known as the Hacienda de Angono, in Angono, Rizal. Sometime in September 1911, Decreto No. 6145, covering the same 3,181.74-hectare portion of Hacienda de Angono was issued in favor of the Rojas brothers. On the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 633 over the same 3,181.74 hectares was issued in the names of the two (2) brothers.

It appears, however, that, an Application for Registration of Title over four (4) parcels of land are overlapping a portion of the area covered by OCT No. 633, was filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 10, by Rosalina, Rodolfo, Carmela and Carmen, all surnamed Francisco (the Franciscos).

Subject parcels of land were eventually registered in the names of the Fransciscos on July 29, 2000 with the issuance of TCT Nos. M-102009, M-102010, M-102011, and M-102012. Less than a year later, on January 3, 2001, the Rojas brothers already filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.

Does the principle that Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked applicable in this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as a final decree has not yet been entered by the LRA and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the

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registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

Therefore, the principle that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked does not apply.

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IX.


Source : Spouses Fortuna vs. RepublicG.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014

Contributor : Arañas, Niña Grace

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PROBLEM:

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application in the RTC for registration of a Lot situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. They acquired the lot through a deed of absolute sale from Rodolfo dated May 4, 1984. The spouses claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the said lot for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment. The Republic opposed the application, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. The Spouses Fortune presented evidence, which includes a notation in the survey plan, which states that, “This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940.. The spouses also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel.” The Spouses claim documents presented are adequate proof of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.

If you were the judge, would you grant the Spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant has failed to show such positive act from the government. Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’

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alienable and disposable character. The applicant, must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.

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X.


Source : Spouses Vilbar vs. OpinionG.R. No. 176043, January 15, 2014

Contributor : Manuales, Eisone Brix

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PROBLEM:

Sps. Vilbar claimed that on July 10, 1979, they and Dulos Realty entered into a Contract to Sell involving two (2) lots, LOT20-B and LOT 20-A. They took possession of Lot 1-B in the concept of owners sometime in August 1979 after making some advance payment. Upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot 20 on June 1, 1981, Dulos Realty executed a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Sps. Vilbar and delivered the owners duplicate copy covering Lot 20 to Sps. Vilbar.

Sps. Vilbar were not able to register and transfer the title in their names. Sps. Vilbar and Dulos Realty also executed a Contract to Sell covering Lot 21. The spouses Vilbar have been in actual, open and peaceful possession of Lot 21 and occupy the same as absolute owners since 1981.

On the other hand, Angelito L. Opinion claimed that he legally acquired Lots 20 and 21 through extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage constituted over the said properties by Gorospes. They defaulted in payment, prompting Opinion to file a petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. Subsequently, the subject properties were sold at a public auction where Opinion emerged as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued in his favor on December 18,1995 and annotated on the TCTs of the properties. Thus, the issuance of the titles to Opinion.

Sps. Vilbar now contends that they have better title and/or has preference over the subject properties because it was sold prior to the acquisition of Opinon. Is the contention of Sps. Vilbar correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Court recognizes the settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the properties involved were duly covered by the Torrens system which works

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under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. This Court has ruled that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Having no certificate of title issued in their names, Sps. Vilbar has no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim. Further, it is an established rule that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.

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XI.


Source : Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. SanchezG.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014

Contributor : Sumampong-Espejo, Marietes

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PROBLEM:

Greta, Xiaxel and Ruby are sisters who owned a parcel of land located in Subangdaku, Mandaue City. On June 2012, Gabby, owner of VVer Subdivision developer, offered to buy the subject land for P2M. The parties thereafter agreed with the following terms; the sisters will have to surrender the documents necessary for the reconstitution of the lost title and for the transfer the title in his favour; upon surrender the earnest money of P50,000.00 be given; that upon full payment the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale be executed for Gabby.

On October 2012, Gabby issued six checks for the purchase price of the land but two of which are post dated. To further protect their interest, a written agreement was constituted that once the all of the checks be encashed the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale be executed but if any of the checks be dishonoured by the bank for whatever reason, the sisters have the right to rescind the contract, forfeit the earnest money, and pay for damages.

The bank dishonored the last two cheks for being drawn against insufficient funds. Greta demanded from Gabby several times for replacements but remained unheeded. On the other hand, Gabby took possession of the said property, started to construct several town houses, caused the advertisement to sell the units and eventually sold some of it without the knowledge and consent of the sisters. Hence, the latter wrote the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) informing the latter of the existing public advertisement offering for sale townhouses illegally constructed on the subject property and urging the HLURB to cancel any existing permit or license to sell the said townhouse units or to deny any application therefor, filed complaint in the office of the city building officials for the illegal constructions and later found out that none of the offices mentioned issued corresponding permits to Gabby. HLURB then issued Cease and Desist Order to stop whatever activities going on in the said property. Gabby replied that only ground levelling was done but upon actual inspection thereof several constructions were almost done. This prompted Greta, Xiaxel and Ruby in filing for the rescission of the contract and recovery for the possession of the land with damages.

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The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff but on appeal affirmed the decision with modification declaring both parties acted in bad faith thereby making them to comply under art. 448 of the civil code. It is on the failure on the part of the plaintiff to file injunction prohibiting the illegal construction, thereby making them equally in bad faith with the respondent.Did the plaintiff acted in bad faith? Rule on the decision of the appellate court.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:

If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.

The three sisters did take action to oppose the construction on their property by writing the HLURB and the City Building Official of Mandaue City wherein, the HLURB issued Cease and Desist Order against Gabby which was left unheeded. The respondent took possession and made construction therein without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. During this period they were demanding the full payment of the subject lot and were exercising their right of extrajudicial rescission of the Agreement. They did not sleep on their right to find remedy under the law by resulting and consulting the different offices of the government to seek redress. Thus, they cannot be declared to be acting in bad faith and cannot in anyway find shelter in our laws. Under art. 449 and 450, the provisions state:Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

Hence, as the owners of the subject property who were in good faith are entitled to the remedy provided under the above provisions. The ruling of the appellate court was misplaced by declaring them in bad faith or in pari delicto with the respondent therefore the applicable provision in the civil code is art. 448.

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XII.


Source : Republic vs. CortezG.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2014

Contributor : Perias, Christine Joymarie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

X filed an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land as there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and X was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. X claimed that the subject parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that it was inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946 and that the subject property had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial. RTC granted X application for registration. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application pointed out that, although X declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, the subject property was not classified as alienable and disposable land that may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years over which title by prescription can be acquired. Thus, the requirement that those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land was not satisfied.

Is the contention of the Solicitor General correct? What are the legal requirements for the registration of property under PD 1529 and in the Civil Code?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, The requirement was not satisfied in this case, X failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish;

1. that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;

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2. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; 3. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Pursuant to Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.

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XIII.


Source : Teodoro vs. EspinoG.R. No. 189248, February 5, 2014

Contributor : Siega, Mar Teresa

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Teo , along with the children of his first cousins inherited from their ancestor Lot No. 2476 which is still registered under the name of the ancestor Genaro. In one portion of the land an ancestral house stood until its demolition in June 2004 at the instance of Teo. Such ancestral house was devised to Teo through a Holographic will by his ancestor Petra. Teo effected the demolition of the ancestral house, intending to use the subject property for other purpose. After the demolition, the children of his first cousins who resided at portions of Lot 2476 that surrounded the subject property on which the ancestral house previously stood, erected a fence on the surrounding portion, barricaded its frontage and put up a sign thereat, effectively dispossessing Teo of the property bequeathed to him by Petra. After Teo’s demand for the respondents to vacate the subject property went unheeded, he filed the complaint for forcible entry against the respondents. MTC dismissed the case since Teo has not proven exclusive ownership thereof. Was the MTC correct in dismissing the case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO.Exclusive ownership of Lot 2476 or a portion thereof is not in this case required of Teo for him to be entitled to possession. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons (Art. 484).

Certainly the whole Lot 2476, owing to the fact that it has remained registered in the name of Genaro who is the common ancestor to both parties herein, is a co-owned property.All, or both Teo and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession as co- owners. Neither party can exclude the other from possession.

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XIV.


Source : Cotoner-Zacarias vs. Spouses RevillaG.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014

Contributor : Dacudao, Ron Juko

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Alfredo and Paz Revilla (Revilla spouses) own an unregistered parcel of land in Silang, Cavite. Faced with financial difficulties in raising funds for Alfredo's travel to Saudi Arabia, Paz borrowed money from Amada Zacarias (Amada), with the said property as security.

Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled "KasulatanngBilihanngLupa" before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, with the Revilla spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of the property. Consequently, Amada sold the property to the spousesRodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses) who had no knowledge of the forgery.

Upon discovery that the property's tax declaration was already in the name of the Sun spouses, the Revilla spouses filed a complaint before the Tagaytay Regional Trial Court for the annulment of sales and transfers of title and reconveyance of the property. The Sun spouses argued good faith belief that Amada was the real owner of the property as Amada showed them a tax declaration in her name and the "KasulatanngBilihanngLupa" allegedly executed by the Revilla spouses. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The defense of the Sun spouses must fail. The rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was made from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. Necessarily, those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued under the Torrens system for registered lands must be protected. On the other hand, those who purchase unregistered lands do so at their own peril.

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XV.


Source : Abadilla, Jr. vs. Spouses ObreroG.R. No. 199448, November 12, 2014

Contributor : Imperial, Christine

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Complainant Sps. Bonifacio P. Obrero and Bernabela N. Obrero initiated a case for forcible entry against defendant Rolando S. Abadilla, Jr. Complainants claimed that they are the registered owners of the land in question based on a TCT registered under the name. They claimed they were in possession thereof based on improvements erected therein utilized for residential and business purposes prior to the alleged acts of Respondent who forcible fenced the perimeter of the land with barbed wire.

By way of defense, defendant claimed that the land was sold by complainants to his late father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Being one of the heirs, he is one of the owners thereof. In fact, they left a caretaker to oversee the land. Despite the sale, complainants supposedly attempted to remove the fence and even built concrete structures on the land using it for dwelling purposes.

a) Is title or ownership to the property essential for an ejectment case to proper? b) Discuss the nature of a Torrens Title.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) In an ejectment case, title is not involved as the sole issue is the determination of who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. “Thus, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue but only to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. As such, any adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding; it is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.”

b) A certificate of title is evidence of indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A title issued under the

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Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession.A Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished except in a direct proceeding. Thus, issues as to the validity of a party’s title can only be definitively resolved in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTCs.”

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XVI.


Source : Mangaser vs. UgayG.R. No. 204926, December 3, 2014

Contributor : Nalia, Ellen

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Ellen Bryant filed Forcible with damages against Louie Millan. She presented the original certificate of title and tax declarations evidencing her ownership over the property occupied by Louie Millan. However, Louie contended that Ellen has failed to prove prior physical possession over the property despite her presentation of the original certificate of title and tax declarations. He reiterated that when the law would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de Jure. What Ellen proved was legal possession, not her prior physical possession. On the other hand, Ellen argued that in ejectment cases, possession of the land does not only mean actual or physical possession or occupation but also by the fact that a land is subject to the action of one's will or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Is Ellen’s contention tenable? Defend your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Ellen’s contention is tenable.

In the case of Mangaser vs. Ugay G.R. No. 204926, December 03, 2014, the court categorically ruled that possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.

In the given circumstance, the issuance of an original certificate of title to Ellen evidences ownership and from it, a right to the possession of the property flows. It goes

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further. Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations presented by Ellen strengthens her claim of possession over the land before her dispossession by Louie.

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XVII.


Source : Department of Education vs. TuliaoG.R. No. 205664, June 9, 2014

Contributor : Macatangay, Maria Theresa

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

In March 2000, upon discovering that a structure was being constructed on the land in dispute, X demanded that the DepED cease and desist and vacate the property as well as pay for reasonable rent. But these demands were ignored. On October 8, 2002, X filed an action for recovery of possession and removal of structure with damages against the Department of Education (DepEd) with the MTC. X alleged that he was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land, evidenced by a certificate of title and with a tax declaration and a tax receipt, and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as an access road for the schoolchildren in going to and from the school. DepEd denied the material allegations, averred that it did not state a cause of action, and even if there was, the same was already barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the subject land was adverse, peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than fifty (50) years, evidenced by the testimony of testimony of a lone witness who is a retired teacher. It also alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice to vacate. As owner of the school site, it could not be compelled to pay rent or its reasonable value.

a) Who has a better right to the subject property?b) Is X not barred by laches, in this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) The plaintiff X showed as evidence tax declarations and a certificate of title over the property, the lone testimonial evidence the DepEd presented is not sufficient to controvert the landowner’s case.As between a certificate of title, which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership, accompanied with a tax declaration and a tax receipt on one hand, and a testimony of a lone witness who is a retired teacher on the other, the former prevails in establishing who has a better right of possession over the property, following the rule that testimonial evidence cannot prevail over documentary evidence

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b) The landowner’s claim is not barred by laches when the school’s possession of the property is not adverse, and when the landowner brought suit two years after he learned that the school is constructing a gymnasium over the property.

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XVIII.


Source : Quintos vs. NicolasG.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014

Contributor : Parilla, Dave Edward Velasquez

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

A, B, C, D, E, F and G are siblings. Their parents passed away, leaving to them ownership of a parcel of land situated along Purok 8, Barangay Kamputhaw, Cebu City with TCT Number 14344.

Subsequently, A and B brought an action for partition over the parcel of land against C, D, E, F and G. However, for failure of the parties to appear despite due notice, the case was dismissed.

Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, C, D, and E siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the seven siblings.

Subsequently, C, D and E siblings sold their undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses F and X. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses F and X, an Agreement of Subdivision purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 14344 was partially canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the spouses F and X.

On June 1, 2009, A and B filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against C, D, and E wherein they alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of their seven children. Upon distribution A and B alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.

If you were the Judge, decide on whether or not A and B were able to prove ownership over the parcel of land.

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A and B were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property. The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, plaintiff, in this case failed to discharge the said burden imposed upon them in proving legal or equitable title over the parcel of land in issue.

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XIX.


Source : Mercado vs. Spouses EspinaG.R. No. 173987, February 25, 2013

Contributor : Parawan, Eula

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

X inherited a parcel of land from A & B. Shortly thereafter, Y claimed ownership over the parcel of land alleging that he bought the same from W who in turn, previously bought it from C who allegedly purchased the property from A before his death. X alleged that C, through fraudulent machinations, was able to obtain a title over the subject property in his name. X prayed for the declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale between W & C and between C & A. Should X be declared the owner of the disputed property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Since the subject property was already covered by a Torrens title at the time Y bought the same, the law does not require him to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The lot has, thus, passed to Y who is presumed to be an innocent purchaser for value, in the absence of any allegation to the contrary.

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XX.


Source : Guido-Enriquez vs. VictorinoG.R. No. 180427, September 30, 2013

Contributor : Ygana, Angeline

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Sometime in Feb. 1980 Marie Agwanta filed in the RTC an Application for Registration of Title over a 10,603 square-meter lot, situated in Rizal.Marie Agwanta asserted that she and her predecessor-in-interest "have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adversed possession and occupation" of said land.However, the Republic, opposed for the ground that the subject lot is not for private appropriation. Furthermore, as per Report, dated July 17, 1981of the Division of Original it appeared that the subject lot is a portion of a large parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-1000, registered under the name of Lizel Uy, et al., and, at the same time, overlapped with another lot which was also a subject of an application for registration. On August 15, 1988, the RTC-Pasig issued a Decision granting Marie Smith’'s Application. Meanwhile, on November 21, 1991, the Supreme Court issued a Decision and declared TCT 23377 issued under the name of Lizel Uy et. al. true and authentic. The Supreme Court, however, took judicial notice of the fact that prior to the reconstitution of the title, "certain portions of the area were in possession of occupants who successfully obtained certificates of title over the area occupied by them … and also of occupants who had not obtained certificates of title over the area possessed by them but the lengths of their possession were long enough to amount to ownership, had the land been in fact unregistered." On December 4, 2002, Petitioner Kris Uy-Sy filed an MR that the assailed Decision and Orders of the RTC are in derogation of the established laws and principles on land registration and that petitioner contends that TCT No. M-1000 has become indefeasible.Is the Kris Uy – Sy contention meritorious?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the contention of Kris Uy- Sy is not meritorious. Although the primary purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable and indisputable. That the registration shall bind the land and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons including the national government and all the branches thereof. The registration only confirms ownership and does not vest or give title to the land. Ownership is different from certificate of title while the certificate of title may be

36

considered as best proof of ownership, the mere issuance thereof does not foreclose the possibility that the property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the COT or the registrant may be a trustee or other parties acquired adverse interest therein subsequent to the certificate of title. (Source: Land Titles and Deeds by Aqcaqili)

In this case rule that while prescription is unavailing against the owners, on the ground that they are holders of a valid certificate of title, the equitable presumption of laches may be applied against them for failure to assert their ownership for such an unreasonable length of time.

However, it was held that it is imperative for those possessors, whose alleged bona fide occupancy of specific portions of TCT No. 23377 is not evidenced by Torrens Titles, to prove their claims in an appropriate proceeding. Among these occupants was, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Marie Agwanta who, as duly proven that, together with her predecessor-in-interest, she has been in public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession against the whole world and in the concept of an owner of the subject lot for a period of more than thirty (30) years regardless of good faith or just title which is called an extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

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XXI.


Source : Spouses Cabahug vs. National Power CorporationG.R. No. 186069, January 30, 2013

Contributor : Ygnacio, Marie Angelee

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Lola NiDoraowns several parcels of land in Bulacan. She was among the respondents in an expropriation case earlier filed by the National Power Corporation. The suit was later terminated after NPC arrived at a settlement with the land owners. For and in consideration of P51,000,500, Lola NiDoragranted NPC a continuous easement in favor of NPC but reserved the option to seek additional compensation as easement fee based on the decision of the Supreme Court G.R. No. 60077 entitled NPC vsSps Gutierrez. In the said case, the Supreme Court made NPC liable for the payment of the full market value of the affected property despite the fact that transfer of title thereto was not required by said easement.

Two years later, Lola NiDora filed a complaint for the payment of just compensation. NPC argued that the reservation in the grant referred to additional compensation for easement fee and not the full just compensation. It further argued thatto allow Lola NiDora to again collect from it the payment of just compensation would amount to unjust enrichment at the expense of NPC and would sanction violation of the their contract.Does the payment of just compensation amount to a violation of the contract between Lola NiDora and NPC?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the payment of just compensation does not amount to a violation of the contract.From the reservation stated in the contract, it is evident that the Lola NiDora’s receipt of the easement fee did not bar her from seeking further compensation from NPC.The rule is settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its stipulationswhich, when couched in clear and plain language, should be applied according to their literal tenor.

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XXII.


Source : Republic vs. De Asis, Jr.G.R. No. 193874, July 24, 2013

Contributor : Bacalso, Vernie Rose

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Santos filed a petition for reconstitution of title under RA 26, otherwise known as “An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed.” Pursuant to the 30-day publication requirements of the said law, Santos caused the publication of the notice of the petition in the December 23 and 30, 2002 issues of the Official Gazette. However, the NPO certified that the December 30, 2002 issue was officially released only on January 3, 2003, evidently short of the thirty-day period preceding the January 30, 2003 scheduled hearing. Before the RTC, Santos argued that the requirement has been substantially complied. Rule on the contention.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Santos is not correct. Section 9 of RA 26 reads:the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require.

The thirty-day period that precedes the scheduled hearing should be reckoned from the time of the actual circulation or release of the last issue of the Official Gazette, and not on the date of its issue as reflected on its front cover. Moreover, while it is true that the thirty-day period in this case was short by only three (3) days, the principle of substantial compliance cannot apply, as the law requires strict compliance, without which the Court is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the petition.

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XXIII.


Source : Pilar Development vs. DumandagG.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013

Contributor : Solon, Roger Benjamin

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

P filed a complaint for accion publiciana with damages against R and other residents (respondents) for allegedly building their shanties without his knowledge and consent on his property. The trial court dismissed P’s complaint, finding that the land being occupied by leads towards a creek and within the three-meter legal easement and thus, considered as public property and part of public dominion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in a similar manner.

On appeal, P argued that although the portion of the subject property occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion.

What are the two kinds of easement according to source? Does P still retain ownership over the 3 meter strip?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under Article 619 of the New Civil Code, there are two kinds of easement according to source: by law or by will of the owners – the former are called legal and the latter voluntary easement. A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by necessity constituted by law has for its object either public use or the interest of private persons.

No, P does not retain ownership over the 3 meter strip. The New Civil Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. Thus, Petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks.

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XXIV.


Source : Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CacayuranG.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013

Contributor : Yray, Rhea

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

The Municipality’s Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a multi-phased plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the RizalPlaza. The SB initially then authorized Mayor Antonio Luna to obtain a loan from Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a lot as collateral. On November 21, 2005, Bayan Bank extended a P4,000,000.00 loan in favor of the Municipality (First Loan), the proceeds of which were used to construct ten (10) kiosks at the northern and southern portions of the Imelda Garden. On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution approving the construction of a commercial center on the Plaza Lot as part of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan and in consequence, Bayan Bank granted a second loan in favor of the Municipality on October 20, 2006 in the principal amount of P28,000,000.00 (Second Loan).

Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was vehemently objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led by respondent Andres Bonifacio, these residents claimed that the conversion of the Rizal Public Plaza into a commercial center, as funded by the proceeds from the First and Second Loans (Subject Loans), were "highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and public park."Is the petitioner’s contention tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. It is well-settled that public plazas are properties for public useand therefore, belongs to the public dominion.

Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

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(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; x xx

Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.In this relation, Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is considered voidand as such, creates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations.

Hence, as public land used for public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is subject to the administration and control of the Republic of the Philippines.Hence, without the said grant, the Municipality has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.

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XXV.


Source : Republic vs. Santos IIIG.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012

Contributor : De los Santos, Naiza Mae

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, Joel applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the RTC of Cebu City. The property, which had an area of 1,045square meters, more or less, was located in Brgy. Basak Pardo, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to Brian, in the Southeast by the Mananga River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Jedd.

The City of Cebu (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. The RTC granted the application of Joel and Brian. The CA has affirmed.

1. Define Accretion. Requisites of Accretion.2. Do Joel and Brian have a right to claim the dried up river as accretion according to Art. 457 of the Civil Code?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

2. No, Joel and Brian cannot claim the dried up river as accretion.Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)

43

made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.

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XXVI.


Source : VSD Realty & Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc.G.R. No. 170677, October 24, 2012

Contributor : Rivera, Clieford

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

VSD filed a Complaint for annulment of title and recovery of possession of property against respondents Uniwide and Dolores Baello with the RTC.VSD alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Caloocan City, wherein VSD purchased the said property from Felisa D. Bonifacio. VSD proved the identity of the land it is claiming through the technical description contained in its title, TCT No. T-285312; the derivative title of Felisa D. Bonifacio, TCT No. 265777; the technical description included in the official records of the subject lot in the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City; and the verification survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Evelyn Celzo of the DENR-NCR.On the other hand, Baello countered that the subject property was bequeathed to her through a will by her adoptive mother as approved by the probate court. Therafter, she entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent Uniwide. As a consequence of the lease agreement, Uniwide constructed in good faith a building worth at least P200,000,000.00 on the said property.

Assuming that VSD is entitled to recovery of possession of the subject property, Is Uniwide, as a lessee, entitled to recover the amount of improvements introduced to the land?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Uniwide cannot avail of the rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, as the said provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract. Parilla v. Pilar held: Articles 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not

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apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property.

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XXVII.


Source : Republic vs. LorenzoG.R. No. 172338, December 10, 2012

Contributor : Guma, Israel

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Jose Patalo and his relatives filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3980 before the RTC covering a parcel of land in Echague, Isabela. Said OCT, however, did not contain the date when such document was issued. Petitioners claimed that Jose and his wife bought the subject parcel of land from Tinodora Bayola and that a deed of sale was executed for the said transaction. Hence, an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 3980 was delivered unto the spouses. They also averred that the owner's copy of the said title was eaten by termites while the original copy of the title filed before the Register of Deeds of Isabela was burned when the latter was razed by fire. Should the court grant the petition?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The court should deny the petition.

Under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26, the relevant law that governs the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens Certificate of Title, original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources enumerated therein such as (a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Here, the petitioners were unable to present any of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) above. Moreover, the lack of date of issuance of the OCT presented

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by the petitioner is fatal to their cause as have been reiterated in Republic v. El Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas that the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of a petition for reconstitution.

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XXVIII.


Source : Marcado vs. EspinocillaG.R. No. 184109, February 1, 2012

Contributor : Villamor, Cletus

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

X died leaving a property. His five children divided the property equally among themselves. Later, D one of his children died without issue ahead of her four siblings, and M took possession of D’s share claiming that D had donated her share to him.

M and his daughters B and Ssold225 sq. m. to his son R, husband of respondent E, and on March 8, 1985, R 114 sq. m. to C. Per actual survey, respondent E occupies 109 sq. m., C occupies 120 sq. m., Y 209 sq. m., and petitioner, occupies 132 sq. m.

Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions and avers that he is entitled to own and possess the said lots, having inherited it from his mother Salvacion and bought it from his aunt.

Respondents agree that Doroteo’s five children each inherited 114 sq. m. of Lot No. 552. However, Macario’s share increased when he received Dionisia’s share. Macario’s increased share was then sold to his son Roger, respondents’ husband and father. Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Is petitioner’s action to recover the subject portion is barred by prescription? Decide with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes.

Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other

49

real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.

Here, petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents’ possession with his assertion that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share created a constructive trust. In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee and cestuique trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse. Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship.

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EASEMENTEasement

I.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Easement

Source : Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015

Contributor : Ocat, Mylene

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

A and B who are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against C. Are A and B entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from C considering that their parcels of lot are not registered?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same. In the problem, A and B’s property is an unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain, A and B must first be able to show that the State has expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject property is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

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Right of Way

II.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Easement; Right of Way

Source : Reyes vs. Spouses ValentinG.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015

Contributor : Armenion, Ramy

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Rudy filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court for easement of right of way against Grace. Rudy alleged that he was the registered owner of a 450-square-meter parcel of land. The property was surrounded by estates belonging to other persons. Rudy also alleged that Grace's 1,500-square-meter property surrounded his property, and that it was the only adequate outlet from his property to the highway. A 113-square-meter portion of Grace's property was also the "point least prejudicial to her." In her Answer, Grace contended that the property chosen by Rudy as easement was also the most burdensome for her. After an Ocular Inspection the trial court found that the proposed right of way would pass through improvements, such as Grace's garage, garden, and grotto. The trial court also noted the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to the public road. However, the trial court pointed out that "other than the existing irrigation canal, no permanent improvements/structures can be seen standing on the subject rice land." Moreover, the nearby landowner was able to construct a bridge to connect a property to the public road. Should the easement of right of way be constituted on Grace's property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Access to the public highway can be satisfied without imposing an easement on Grace's property. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. Also in Floro v. Llenado, we refused to impose a right of way over petitioner’s property although private respondent’s alternative route was admittedly inconvenient because he had to

52

traverse several ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention that said passage is impassable during the rainy season.

Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate." Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement of right of way, the requirement of "least prejudice to the servient estate" trumps "distance between the dominant estate and the public highway." "Distance" is considered only insofar as it is consistent to the requirement of "least prejudice." This court had already affirmed the preferred status of the requirement of "least prejudice" over distance of the dominant estate to the public highway. Thus, in Quimen, this court granted the longer right of way over therein respondent’s property because the shorter route required that a structure of strong materials needed to be demolished.

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III.


Source : Jopauen Realty Corporation vs. Spouses DominguezG.R. No. 212725, August 4, 2014

Contributor : Amores, Ernesto Miguel

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Cedric Realty Corporation (Cedric Realty) filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against Sps. Josephus and Abegail Bernz (Sps.Bernz) and the National Badminton Association (NBA) claiming that they conspired to block its immediate access to the Yellow Brick Road or private way, thus, depriving it of direct access to said road and causing substantial and undeserved inconvenience.

On September 8, 2004, an ocular inspection was conducted which found that the subject property impeded Cedric Realty's access to the national road. The ocular inspection yielded the following findings:

The disputed property lies between plaintiff's property and the national road. Technically, the said lot impedes plaintiff's access to the national road. Ingress and egress to plaintiff's property is through a strip of land which abuts the bordering creek and which was allegedly formed by natural accretion.

On May 4, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. It found that Cedric Realty did not have the legal personality to institute an action for reversion.Aggrieved, Cedric Realty appealed its case to the Court of Appeals.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA said that the case was not one of reversion of public land but one for the enforcement of a right of way, the CA found that Cedric Realty failed to prove its entitlement to a compulsory easement of a right of way because an outlet already exists, in particular, a strip of land by the creek, which leads to Yellow Brick Road.Was the CA correct in affirming the decision of the RTC?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the CA was correct in doing so.

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Under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, to be entitled to a compulsory easement of a right of way, the following must be established: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

In the case presented, the first element is absent. As stated in the Commissioner's report, an outlet already exists, a strip of land which abuts the bordering creek, which in turn leads to Yellow Brick Road. As found by the trial court, plaintiff-appellant is using another parcel of land as its access road to Yellow Brick road, although the same is not the direct or shortest route

Well-entrenched is the doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.

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IV.


Source : Star-Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Paper City CorporationG.R. No. 169211, March 6, 2013

Contributor : Avenido, Anna Mae

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

XYZ company applied and was granted a loan from ABC bank. The loan was secured by a Deed of Continuing Chattel Mortgage over their machineries inside XYZ’s plant. Later on, the Chattel Mortgage was cancelled and was replaced with Real Estate Mortgage – the buildings on the plant of XYZ Company. The company defaulted in its payment. Can the Bank ask for the foreclosure of the mortgaged buildings including the machines inside the building?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The machineries are considered as real properties and should be included in the foreclosure. Law and jurisprudence provide and guide that even if not expressly so stated, the mortgage extends to the improvements.

Art. 2127 of the New Civil Code Provides: The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor, or it passes into the hands of a third person.

In the early case of Bischoff v. Pomar and Cia. General de Tabacos, the Court ruled that even if the machinery in question was not included in the mortgage expressly, Article 111 of the [old] Mortgage Law provides that chattels permanently located in a building, either useful or ornamental, or for the service of some industry even though they were placed there after the creation of the mortgage shall be considered as mortgaged with the estate, provided they belong to the owner of said estate.

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LAND TITLECollateral Attack

I.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Land Title; Collateral Attack

Source : Bagayas vs. FelicidadG.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013

Contributor : Isidro, Dalisay

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Does a complaint for annulment of sale and partition which requires a resolution on the issue of ownership, constitute a collateral attack upon the certificate of title or Torrens title issued over the disputed realties?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., which is an action for partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The “title” referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.

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Judicial Reconstitution of Torrens Title

II.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Land Title; Judicial Reconstitution of Torrens Title

Source : St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Bretheren Foundation, Inc. vs. Riel

G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015

Contributor : Jaen, Bea Marie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

ABC claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80’s. In order for the petition to be granted, what are the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens title?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens title, to wit:

Sec. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;

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(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

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Land Registration

III.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Land Title; Land Registration

Source : Spouses Peralta vs. Heirs of Bernardina AbalonG.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014

Contributor : Calvo, Mario Dennis

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

A certain parcel of land registered under the name Bernadette Gonzales was fraudulently transferred to Alden Mendoza, who in turn subdivided the land and sold separately to Spouses Tinidora with a xerox copy of the TCT and to Pauleen, Ann and Jose, all surnamed Aldub another portion of the land. Thereafter, they individually registered their respective portions of the land. The heirs of Bernadette were claiming back the land alleging that it was sold under fraudulent circumstances and no valid title passed upon the buyers. The Aldubs and SpsTinidora averred that they are buyers in good faith. Heirs of Bernadette claimed their family has the poseesion of the said property through their tenant Wally Belen and to his son Paolo Belen and alleged that Alden Mendoza never set foot in this parcel of land. The RTC rendered the decision ordering the restoration of the OCT and ordering the Sps. Tinidor and the Aldubs to peacefully surrender such lots. The RTC conclude that the said document was a mere forgery the fact that only a xerox copy of the purported deed of sale between Mendoza and Gonzales was presented before the Register of Deeds for registration. The CA reversed the decision holding that the Aldubs are innocent purchasers for value while the TCT registered under SpsTinodora shall be cancelled for being null and void for they are buyers in bad faith.

a.) Can a forged instrument become the root of a valid title?b.) Is the CA correct in declaring the Aldubs as innocent purchasers for value thus the transfer of the parcel of land to their names deemed valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

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a.) The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. The forged instrument eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The new title under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value. Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered titles.

b.) Yes, the CA is correct. Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in good faith.

The Aldubs were a buyer in good faith, despite its determination that fraud marred the sale between Bernadette Gonzales and Mendoza, a fraudulent or forged document of sale may still give rise to a valid title. The appellate court reasoned that if the certificate of title had already been transferred from the name of the true owner to that which was indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have been subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, whose title is thus considered valid. The CA concluded that this was the case for the Aldubs. On the other hand, Sps. Tinidora are indeed buyers in bad faith, in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the title provided by Mendoza, a mere photocopy of the title should have made them suspicious that there was some flaw in the title because he was not in possession of the original copy.

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Restitution of Titles

IV.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Land Title; Restitution of Titles

Source : Republic vs. CamachoG.R. No. 185604, June 13, 2013

Contributor : Ramirez, Gemma

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

A holder of an original certificate of title (OCT) filed a petition for its reconstitution because the OCT number therein is no longer legible due to wear and tear.

What is the nature of the proceeding for the reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. 26 which was lost or destroyed.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The nature of the proceedings for reconstitution of a Certificate of Title under R.A. 26 denotes a revocation of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of such proceeding is merely to have the Certificate of Title reproduced after proper proceedings in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred.

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Tax Declaration vs. Original Certificate of Title

V.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Land Title; Tax Declaration vs. Original Certificate of Title

Source : Heirs of Alejandra Delfin vs. RabadonG.R. No. 65014, July 31, 2013

Contributor : Regudo, Marion Thursday

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

On October 19, 1993, X filed before the RTC an action to recover the ownership and possession of the subject property from Y. X alleged that: (a) the subject property was owned by her predecessor-in-interest, XXX, pursuant to Decree No. 12345;(b) while the foregoing decree was lost during the last World War, its existence could still be shown by a certification (LRA certification) issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and a certified copy from page 19 of the daybook of cadastral lots issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) of Cebu City (daybook entry);(c) after XXX’s death, XX took over the possession of the subject property and upon his death, his child, X, took over its possession until 1988;(d) in 1989, X discovered that the said property was already in the possession of Y and some of her children and their families already constructed their houses thereon; and(e) when she confronted Y, the latter claimed that her predecessor-in-interest, YY, previously bought the said property; however, when she asked to see a copy of the deed of sale, Y could not produce the same.

For their part, Y countered that(a) they inherited the subject property from their predecessor-in-interest, YY, who bought the foregoing even before the second World War;(b) the subject property was issued a certificate of title in the name of YY, however, the said title was lost;(c) Y inherited the subject property by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and after its execution, she and her children, took over the possession of the same; and(d) the subject property had been declared by them for taxation purposes and they paid the corresponding realty taxes due thereon.

As the RTC Judge, decide who has the better right to the ownership and possession of the subject property.

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

X has the better right to the ownership and possession of the subject property.

It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the Property Registration Decree.

Jurisprudence provides that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises, must prevail. Accordingly, respondents’ Decree No. 12345 for which an original certificate of title was issued should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in this case.

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NUISANCEPer Se & Per Accidens

I.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Nuisance; Per Se & Per Accidens

Source : Rana vs. WongG.R. No. 192862, June 30, 2014

Contributor : Andales, Ziazel

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Tim, Kawhi and Dirk lives in Spursville. Tim’s property abuts the subdivision road. On the opposite side of the road are the adjacent lots of Kawhi and Dirk. The said lots follow a rolling terrain with Dirk’s property standing 2 meters higher than and overlooking Kawhi’s property which is at the same level with the subdivision road.

Without prior consultation with the homeowner’s association, Dirk elevated and cemented a portion of the subdivision road that runs betweenhis and Tim’s properties in order to level the said portion with his gate. He likewise backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence separating his and Kawhi’s properties without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials.

With the developments introduced by Dirk to his property, the ingress and egress of Tim to his lot "in the usual and normal manner has been affected, such that he now have to practically jump from the elevated road to gain access to his lot and scale the same elevation in order to get out". As for Kawhithe backfilling done by Dirk would pose a clear and present danger to the his life and limb arising from the premature weakening of his perimeter fence due to the seeping of rain water from the Dirk’s property that could cause its sudden collapse.

What is a nuisance? Give its classification according to (a) object/s they affect; (b) legal susceptibility to summary abatement.

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In the case at bar, classify what type of nuisance the developments introduced by Dirk to his property are and advice the affected parties Tim and Kawhi on possible action/s to take.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as "any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property."

Based on case law, however, the term "nuisance" is deemed to be "so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort."

Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that they affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which "affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"); or (b) a private nuisance (or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" [or, as case law puts it, one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons"]).

Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which "affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity"); or (b) a nuisance per accidens (or that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.")

Based on the definition mentioned above, the improvements introduced by Dirk to his property may be classified as a private nuisance and a nuisance per accidens.

It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.Thus, in the case at bar, Tim and Kawhi may seek abatement judicially through a civil action. In addition, they can also file a civil action to recover personal damages. To note, the remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.

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OWNERSHIPAccessory Follows the Principal; Exception

I.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Accessory Follows the Principal; Exception

Source : Villasi vs. GarciaG.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014

Contributor : Bernaldez, Josephus

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment ordering ROYALE CORP. to return the excess payment made by Virnee on their contract for a construction of a condominium building.

To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building which was declared for taxation purposes in the name of ROYALE CORP. who is in actual possession of the said building. All the court processes in a near lier collection suit between ROYALE CORP. and Virnee were served, thru the former’s representative Mr. Cuatro, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is located. Nonetheless, the lots in which such building was erected were registered in the names of Spouses Cuatro.

Spouses Cuatro filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. They contended that since they have the title over the land the law presumes them to be owners of the improvements built there on under the doctrine that the accessory follows the principal.

Is the contention of Spouses Cuatro meritorious?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the contention of Spouses Cuatro is without merit.

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The Supreme Court held in the case of Villasi vs. Garcia that in cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption that the accessory follows the principal shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. It further provides that actual possession of the building and as the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.

In the case at bar, although Spouses Cuatro were the registered owners of the lot where the subject property is located, they failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. They were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove such ownership. Furthermore, ROYALE CORP. was in actual possession of the property and at the same time paid the tax due it.

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Accretion

II.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Accretion

Source : Republic vs. Santos IIIG.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012

Contributor : Tohay , Ada Bonita

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Takya and Pedro applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B in the RTC. Accordingly, the said Lot was bounded in the Northeast by the lot of Pedro and in the Southeast by the Paranaque River and in the Southwest by an abandoned road and in the Northwest by Lot owned by Takya. They alleged that Lot 4998-B had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. The City of Paranaque opposed on the ground that the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. The RTC granted the application for land registration.

Is the RTC correct? Why or Why not?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO. The RTC is not correct.

Under the Civil Code, Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be gradual and imperceptible, it must be made through the effects of the current of the water and it takes place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. Accordingly, the process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current.

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In the given case, Takya and Pedro did not show the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed the contested property. They did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current.

Thus, the RTC's ruling is not correct.

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Builder in Good faith

III.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Builder in Good faith

Source : Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. LagrosaG.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014

Contributor : Bautista, Mel-Lisanina

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PROBLEM:

A land was sold by an agent on the basis of a SPA where there was palpable irregularity in its acknowledgment. Yet, the buyer relied solely on the said document without further investigation on the alleged agent’s authority. Thereafter, a new certificate of title was transferred to the name of buyer and he built his house. Is he a builder in good faith?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. He is a builder in bad faith.

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry.

The buyer knew – or at the very least, should have known – from the very beginning that they were dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property considering the palpable irregularity in the subject SPA’s acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on said document and without any further investigation on the agent’s capacity to sell, the buyer still chose to proceed with its purchase and even built a house thereon. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be seriously doubted that the buyer was actually aware

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of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal contemplation.

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IV.


Source : Mirallosa vs. Carmel Development, Inc.G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013

Contributor : Digaum, Lucks Mae

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PROBLEM:

X owned two parcels of land by virtue of the contract he entered into with the government. Subsequently, P.D. 5 was passed declaring void the contracts entered into by the government with X and declared such lands as open for sale to members of ABC Association. X filed a case assailing the constitutionality of P.D. 5 while reluctantly allowed Z, a member of ABC Association to occupy one parcel of land of X which Z eventually ceded to Y who build his house over the said lot.

Later on, the P.D. 5 was declared unconstitutional. With the law being declared unconstitutional, X sent a notice to vacate against Y which the latter refused to heed. This prompted X to file a case against Y asking the court to vacate the said land and remove what he had build over the property. Y filed a motion to dismiss alleging that X has no cause of action against himthe declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. 5 should not affect the rights of other persons not party to the case and that he is a builder in good faith. The MTC ruled in favor of Y on the ground that he is not a privy to the case previously filed by X and that he is also a builder in good faith for he has no knowledge as to the infirmity of P.D. 5. Is the ruling of the MTC correct? Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO, the ruling of the MTCis not correct.A builder in good faith is “one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.”

In this case, at the time Y occupied the said lot and build improvements on the land, the case filed by X was already pending before the court.He ought to have been aware of the binding effects of the case filed by X and the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 5, a matter of mandatory judicial notice. Thus, he could not be considered as a builder in good faith.

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V.


Source : Benedicto vs. VillafloresG.R. No. 185020, October 6, 2010

Contributor : Tabada, Ian Rene

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PROBLEM:

A owns a lot situated in Cebu City having an area of 277 square meters under TCT No. 1435. In 1980 he sold a part of it to her nephew B through a deed of absolute sale but B failed to register the same with the register of deeds. B immediately took possession of the portion sold to him and built thereon a house made of concrete materials and fenced it. In 1994, A sold again the said parcel of land to C but this time it was the whole 277 square meters that was sold through a deed of absolute sale and registered the same with the register of deeds of Cebu City. As a result TCT 1435 in the name of A was canceled and TCT No. 1988 was issued in the name of C. In 1995, C demanded that B should vacate the portion he occupied because the former had bought it from his aunt and had registered the same in his name. B refused to vacate contending that he is the owner of said lot as he also bought it from his aunt as evidenced by an unregistered deed of sale. C instituted a suit with the RTC to recover said lot. The RTC ruled that B is a builder in good faith but declared that C has a better right to the land being the first to register the sale. Both parties appealed but the RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. If you are the Justice of the Supreme Court handling this case how are you going to resolve this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The only question to be settled in the instant case is whether B as a builder in good is entitled to reimbursement of his necessary expenses over the lot. To answer the above issue, article 448 of the Civil Code is very explicit as it provides that “the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does

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not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

In the case at bar, B being a builder in good faith is entitled indemnity and reimbursement of his necessary expenses if the owner choses to appropriate the improvements as his own. However the owner may compel the owner of the improvements to pay the price of the land if the value of the improvement exceeds the value of the land.

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Co-ownership

VI.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership

Source : Arambulo vs. Dela CruzG.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014

Contributor : Cataquis, Jasmine Rawen

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PROBLEM:

Rosa and Pedro Castro had three children named Nicolas Castro, Miguel Castro and Luisa Castro-Lim, who is married to Antonio Lim. When Pedro Castro died, he left two parcels of land with an aggregate area of 233 square meters in Tagbilaran, Bohol where there were existing coconut trees and mango trees. The property was then co-owned by the siblings with their mother. On September 2, 2005, Luisa died due to illness and was succeeded by her husband, Antonio Lim and son Michael. On February 11, 2006, the co-owners, excluding Luisa, decided to sell their respective shares of the property including Luisa’s share. Nicolas and Miguel sought judicial relief based on Article 491 of the Civil Code alleging that Antonio and Michael intentionally withheld their consent to prejudice the common interest. However, in their answer, Antonio and Michael stated that they were not made aware of the intention of the other co-owners to sell the property and raised their defense based on Article 493 which provides that they are the full owners of their share of the property and that any alienation of their share without their consent is void. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Antonio and Michael are correct. Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the co–owner, clearly establishing that each co–owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.Art. 493. Each co–owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it[,] and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or [the] mortgage, with respect to the co–owners, shall be

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limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co–ownership.

Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by some co-owners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the other co-owner the part that belongs to them.

It may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.

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VII.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership

Source : Recio vs. Heirs of Spouses AguendoG.R. No. 182349, July 24, 2013

Contributor : Canasa, John Paul

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PROBLEM:

AA entered into lease contract with BB in a parcel of land inherited by the latter from his deceased parents. BB has several siblings one of whom is CC(one of the co-owners of the property). BB offered to sell the subject property to AA and without hesitation the latter accepted the offer. Unfortunately the sell did not push through, but AA continued to occupy the property. CC by representation of the rest of the heirs contracted a sale with AA with the subject property but it was not put into writing. AA later found out from his friend working in Register of Deeds that the said property was under a different name. Was the sale entered by one of the co-owners valid in the absence of special power of attorney.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the sale was valid but only up to the aliquot share of the co-owner. When AA relied only on the words of CC without securing a copy of the SPA, AA is bound by the risk accompanying such trust on the mere assurance of CC. Hence, it is valid only up to the share of the co-owner.

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Co-Ownership; Partition; Inchoate right

VIII.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership; Partition; Inchoate right

Source : Quijano vs. AmanteG.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014

Contributor : Melicor, Joreyna Mae

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PROBLEM:

A, B, C and D inherited from their father. Prior to any partition among the heirs, C sold a portion of the share to X.

A, B, C and D executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father's estate. The partition resulted earlier in the portions sold by C to X being adjudicated to D instead of C.

D demanded X to vacate the property but X refused, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for ejectment and damages. Was the sale of the subject property void?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership.

Accordingly, when C sold the disputed property to X, the sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property to X, but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso share to him, consequently making X, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned. As C's successor-in-interest or assignee, X was vested with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent.

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Co-Ownership; Pro-Indiviso Share

IX.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership; Pro-Indiviso Share

Source : Torres, Jr. vs. LapinidG.R. No. 187987, November 26, 2014

Contributor : Jordan, Rebecca

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PROBLEM:

Vicente, Mariano, Carlos and Jesus are co-owners of a land. On 1993 before partition, Jesus without notice to the other co-owners, sold 3000 sq. meter of the parcel of land to Lapinid. Vicente, Mariano and Carlos filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of the sale on the ground that it was without notice and that what was sold was a definite and specific portion of a co-owned property. Can Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another person?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

YES. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. The Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will

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be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition.

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Period of Redemption of Foreclosed Property

X.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Period of Redemption of Foreclosed Property

Source : Ermitaño vs. PaglasG.R. No. 174436, January 23, 2013

Contributor : Jurolan, Marymar

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PROBLEM:

On May 21, 1989, Ali entered into a contract of lease with Baba over the 5 storey commercial building of the latter located at # 134 Pusong Bato, Cebu City for a period of 15 years. Unknown to Ali, Baba already contracted a prior mortgage over the said property in favor of Caca and the same was already foreclosed with Caca as the purchaser of the disputed commercial building in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered on January 13, 1990. Caca later offered to sell the subject property to Ali and the latter entertained the said offer and negotiations followed thereafter.

On March 20, 1990, Ali bought the subject property from Caca for P9,500,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as evidence of the contract. However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the property was still subject to Baba's right of redemption. Baba filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Caca. Meanwhile, on April 10, 1990, Baba sent 2 demand letters to Ali demanding to pay the rentals which are due and to vacate the leased premises but to no avail. Baba then filed a case for unlawful detainer against Ali claiming that he is still the owner of the property pending the expiration of the redemption period. Is Baba’s contention correct? Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. Baba’s contention is correct.

Under the law, it is settled that during the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is

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that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right being exercised. The title to land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and conveyance by the master's deed. Indeed, the rule has always been that it is only upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes consolidated in the purchaser.

In the problem given, since the period of redemption has not yet expired, Baba’s right over the mortgaged property is still subsisting. Thus, he is still the valid owner of the said property.

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Property Obtained in Fraud

XI.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Property Obtained in Fraud

Source : Romero vs. SingsonG.R. No. 200969, August 3, 2015

Contributor : Esmeña, Kimberly Marie

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PROBLEM:

Will the registration of a property obtained fraudulently be sufficient to vest the one who did the fraudulent act the title to the property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to theproperty. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.

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Protection Over Right of Possession

XII.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Protection Over Right of Possession

Source : Suarez vs. EmboyG.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014

Contributor : Maylon, Ron Stephane

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PROBLEM:

Siblings Feliz and Marilou have been occupying for decades a house from a partitioned lot that they inherited from their ancestors. The siblings were asked by their cousins to vacate said lot and transfer to a different one but they refused insisting that their inheritance pertained to the lot in which they were staying at.

Carmencita purchased from the cousins the lot that the siblings were occupying. She then sent a demand letter to the siblings to vacate the house. When the siblings filed for nullity of the partition, Carmencita filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them alleging that she is entitled to possession since she bought the lot from the cousins who were the real owners and that the siblings were occupying the same by mere tolerance, therefore she had the right to demand for them to vacate. Is Carmencita correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Carmencita is not correct.

The law provides that every possessor has a right to be protected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by means established by the laws and the Rules of Court. Under the Rules of Court, one requirement of unlawful detainer is that possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.

In the case at bar, Carmencita failed to prove how and when such tolerance came about. Firstly, the siblings have been occupying the lot for decades as owners thereof.

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Carmencita only had bare allegations that the siblings’ occupation was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and that they became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot's possession after she, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. She failed to sufficiently aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

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Registration of Title

XIII.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Registration of Title

Source : Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc.G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

Contributor : Gula, Maria Monica

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PROBLEM:

Under P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, what must an applicant establish for him to register his title over a land?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

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Right of Accession; Builder in Bad Faith / Good Faith

XIV.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Right of Accession; Builder in Bad Faith / Good Faith

Source : Vda. De Roxas vs. Our Lady's Foundation, Inc.G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013

Contributor : Apatan, Rosane

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PROBLEM:

ABC, the subdivision management decided to widen its subdivision road. In doing so, it encroached upon the property Mr. X, one of the subdivision land owners. The value of the land when it was purchased by Mr. X was only P10,000. The current fair maket value of the land is P500,000. Mr. X filed a complaint against the subdivision management to recover the value of this land. a. Is Mr. X allowed to do so? If yes, how much should be reimbursed to him?b. If instead of a road, the subdivision management built a building worth P450,000, can Mr. X compel the management to buy the encroached portion of his land? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a. Yes, Under Article 448 pertaining to encroachments in good faith, as well as Article 450 referring to encroachments in bad faith, the owner of the land encroached upon – Mr. X herein – has the option to require respondent builder ABC to pay the price of the land.As to the value of the reimbursement. jurisprudence provides that the present or current fair value of the land is to be reckoned at the time that the landowner elected the choice, and not at the time that the property was purchased. Hence, ABC should reimburse him P500,000.00 not P5,000. (Vda de Roxas vs. Our Lady’s Foundation Inc. G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013)

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b. No, Mr X cannot compel the management to buy his land. If the present or current value of the land, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, the subdivision management cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property, but it must pay Mr. X reasonable rent for the same. The subdivision management and Mr. X must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms. (Art. 448 of the Civil Code).

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Tax Declaration, Not a Proof of Ownership

XV.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Tax Declaration, Not a Proof of Ownership

Source : Heirs of Paciano Yabao vs. van der KolkG.R. No. 207266, June 25, 2014

Contributor : Solatorio, Carol

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PROBLEM:

Mr X filed a complaint for ownership and possession over a parcel of land against Mr Y who is currently occupying the land. Mr X presented a tax declaration as evidence of his ownership over the land. For failure to file an answer, Mr Y was declared in default. The trial court decided in favor of Mr X based on the allegations of the complaint. Is the action of the court proper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. While under Section 3 of Rule 9, when a defendant is declared in default, the court has the option to either proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant or require the claimant to adduce his evidence ex parte, the court should have required Mr X to present evidence ex parte to substantiate their claims. The basis of respondents’ claim of ownership was a mere tax declaration. However, a tax declaration is not a proof of ownership; it is not a conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. It can only be a strong indication of ownership if coupled with possession. In the case at bench, it was Mr Y who was in possession of the property and not the Mr X. Consequently, the tax declaration, standing alone, is not an acceptable proof of ownership.

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POSSESSIONPossession

XXIX.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Possession

Source : Gabriel vs. CrisologoG.R. No. 204626, June 9, 2004

Contributor : Geli, Cheska Marie

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PROBLEM:

David Lee was the registered owner of two parcels of land in Baguio City covered by TCT No. 13935 and T-13936. The properties were covered by an assessment of real property and the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were updated. He eventually discovered that Julius Cane constructed a house in the subject property without her prior consent and knowledge. Upon discovery of his occupation, David offered Julius to buy the property to which the latter assent. David gave Julius time to produce the said amount, but Julius reneged on their promise to buy them and refused to vacate the subject properties despite several demands. Julius believes that David’s titles of the subject properties were void based on Section 1 of PD No. 1271, "An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211”. Who between David and Julius have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

David Lee has a better right. His certificates of title give him the better right to possess the subject parcels of land. It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Further, Julius attack on the validity of David’s title by claiming that fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to

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defend their possession of the properties in an "accionpubliciana," not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.

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Agricultural Lands

XXX.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Possession; Agricultural Lands

Source : Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. RamosG.R. No. 179181, November 18, 2013

Contributor : Legaspo, Marje

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PROBLEM:

In the application for registration of land title, the law provides that the applicant must be in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. What constitutes possession and occupation of agricultural lands?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The word “possession” contemplated in the law is actual, not fictional or constructive. Taken together, “occupation” serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

It must be shown that at the time of the filing of the application, the applicant must possess the same in concept of owner. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to the applicant's own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.

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Forcible Entry

XXXI.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Possession; Forcible Entry

Source : Pabalan vs. Heirs of Simeon A. B. Maamo, Sr.G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013

Contributor : Mamao, Arief

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PROBLEM:

Harvey Specter executed a sale of parcel of land situated in the Butuan City for the stated consideration of P500,000.00 in favor of Jessica Zane. Faulting Louis Ross with forcible entry into the property, Jessica, represented by Rachel Zane, later filed the ejectment complaint. Invoking the decision redeemed in favor of Jessica Zane in said Civil Case, Rachel Zane maintained that her parents later relented to Louis Ross' entreaty to be allowed to stay on the property as administrator. On the other hand, Mike Ross, heir of Louis Ross, insisted that he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the litigated portion in the concept of owner since then. He contended that the court erred in relying that judgment rendered in a forcible entry case is conclusive with respect to the issue of material possession. Is Mike Ross correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Mike Ross is not correct.

While it is true that a judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership, the rule is settled that such a judgment is conclusive with respect to the issue of material possession. The rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties and their privies on a different claim or cause of action.

Under Articles 444 and 1942 of the Civil Code, possession of real property is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are merely tolerated by the possessor, or which

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are due to his license. Granted that long, continued occupation, accompanied by acts of a possessory character, affords some evidence that possession has been exerted in the character of owner and under claim of right, this inference is unavailing to Mike Ross since Louis Ross’ continued possession of the property after his defeat in the ejectment suit was clearly upon the tolerance of Rachel Zane’s predecessors-in-interest.

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Movable Property

XXXII.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Possession; Movable Property

Source : Subic Bay Legend Resorts & Casino, Inc. vs. FernandezG.R. No. 193426, September 29, 2014

Contributor : Lumantas, Jessa Faith

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PROBLEM:

Brothers Bernard, Ludwin and Deoven owned a car shop and received casino chips as payment for the car services they rendered to a Chinese customer. Eager to spend the casino chips, Ludwin and Deoven went to Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. to play. The surveillance staff of the establishment paid close attention to them simply because it was "unusual" for a Filipino to play using dollar-denominated chips. They were accosted and was made to confess that such casino chips really came from one of their employee, Michael Cabrera with which it was contended that said chips were stolen from the casino. No criminal charges were filed however, either against the said brothers or the said employee. Nonetheless, it claimed that it is the lawful owner hence has the right to recover from the person in possession of the same. Is Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. correct in saying this? Who has the burden of proof to show lawful ownership?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The onus fell on the petitioner to prove that the casino chips were stolen from them.

Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law that prohibits their use or trade outside of the casino, which issues them. In any case, it is not unusual that a Chinese client at the brothers’ car shop could pay it. The said transaction, if not common, is nonetheless not unlawful. Given this premise that casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding representative value, it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick

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or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative value in exchange therefor.

If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.

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Right of Possession

XXXIII.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Possession; Right of Possession

Source : Estanislao vs. EstanislaoG.R. No. 173166, March 13, 2013

Contributor : Trias, Parker

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PROBLEM:

Gudito’s are the owners of a residential lot being leased by Estanislao family on a month-to-month basis. The latter had been renting and occupying the subject lot since 1934 and were the ones who built the house on the subject lot in accordance with their lease agreement with one Gaspar Vasquez. When Gaspar Vasquez died, the portion of the lot on which petitioners' house was erected was inherited by his son Victorino Vasquez, married to Ester Vasquez (Vasquez couple). In the 1980's, the Vasquez couple wanted the Estanislao family and the other tenants to vacate the said property, but the tenants refused because of laws allegedly prohibiting their ejectment therefrom.

In the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Vasquez couple in favor of Norma Vasquez Gudito. Hence, in October 1994, the latter notified Sps. Estanislao to remove their house and vacate the premises within three months or up to January 31, 1995, because of their urgent need of the residential lot. In a letter dated March 5, 1995, Noma reiterated the demand and gave the spouses another three months or up to June 30, 1995, within which to remove their house, vacate the subject lot and pay the rental arrearages. However, the latter failed to comply. Accordingly, on November 10, 1995, Norma Gudito filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer/Ejectment against Sps. Estanislao before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Sps. Estanislao strongly argue that Norma Gudito cannot evict them from the subject property pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, as the subject property is allegedly within one of the 245 Proclaimed Area for Priority Development and/or Urban Land Reform No. 1967, as amended by Presidential Proclamation No. 2284. They further contend that they were not aware that the subject property had been acquired by Norma Gudito via a Deed of Donation executed by the

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Vasquez couple. Thus, they assail that said donation was merely simulated in order to deprive them of their right of first refusal to buy the subject property. IS THE CONTENTION OF THE SPOUSES ESTANISLAO CORRECT?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the contention of the spouses are not correct.

In the case under review, Spouses Gudito have overwhelmingly established their right of possession by virtue of the Deed of Donation made in their favor. Moreover, they have complied with the provisions of the law in order for them to legally eject the petitioners.

Section 5 (c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 states: Sec. 5. Grounds for judicial ejectment. — Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:xxx xxx xxx(c) Legitimate need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the use of any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or immediate member not being the owner of any other available residential unit within the same city or municipality: Provided, however, that the lease for a definite period has expired: Provided, further, that the lessor has given the lessee formal notice within three (3) months in advance of the lessor's intention to repossess the property: Provided, finally, that the owner/lessor is prohibited from leasing the residential unit or allowing its use by a third party for at least one year.

Here, it is undisputed that respondents do not own any other lot or real property except the herein subject lot. They have urgent need of the same to build their own house to be used as their residence. Also, Estanislao’s had already been asked to leave the premises as early as 1982, but sternly refused, When the same property was donated to Sps Gudito, Estanislao family were allowed to continue occupying the subject lot since Sps. Gudito did not as yet have the money to build a house of their own. Clearly, since the latter have complied with the requirements of the law, their right to possess the subject property for their own use as family residence cannot be denied.It is also worthy to note that Estanislao have failed to prove that the transfer of the subject property was merely a ploy designed to defeat and circumvent their right of first refusal under the law. The Deed of Donation executed in favor of Sps. Gudito was signed by the parties and their witnesses, and was even notarized by a notary public.

By the same token, Estanislao’s insistence that they cannot be evicted in view of Section 6 of P.D. 1517 is misplaced, which states —

SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. — Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract,

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continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, Estanislao cannot use P.D. 1517 as a shield to deny Gudito of their inherent right to possess the subject property. Under P.D. 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, the lessee is given the right of first refusal over the land they have leased and occupied for more than ten years and on which they constructed their houses. But the right of first refusal applies only to a case where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party. If the owner of the leased premises do not intend to sell the property in question but seeks to eject the tenant on the ground that the former needs the premises for residential purposes, the tenant cannot invoke the land reform law."

Clearly, the circumstances required for the application of P.D. 1517 are lacking in this case, since respondents had no intention of selling the subject property to third parties, but seek the eviction of petitioners on the valid ground that they need the property for residential purposes.

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Unlawful Detainer

XXXIV.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Possession; Unlawful Detainer

Source : Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs. GalaboG.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013

Contributor : Patatag, Arnel

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PROBLEM:

Nenita Quality Food Corp. (NQFC) filed a case complaint for forcible entry against Galabo on Lot No. 102. NQFC claimed ownership over the land because it purchased the same from Santos Nantinas evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. According to NQFC, Nantin acquired the land from Galabo sometime in July 10, 1972 as shown in the Deed of Transfer of Rights. On the contrary Galabo, contended that he is in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession over the land since 1948. NQFC contended that it has the rightful possession of the property because it validly acquired ownership over Lot No. 102 when it purchased it from Santos, entitling it to the right, among others, to possess the property as ancillary to such ownership. The court ruled in favor of NQFC stating that the right of NQFC was anchored on the Deed of Absolute Sale. Is the decision of the court correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. The possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. The word "possession" in forcible entry suits refers

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to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue.

In the case at bar, NQFC merely anchored its claim to possession over said property on its alleged ownership. It did not prove its prior physical possession. On the other hand, Galabo’s allegation of prior physical possession had not been refuted. Since in an unlawful detainer case, physical possession is the issue not ownership. The ground relied upon by NQFC to claim right of possession is misplaced.

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QUIETING OF TITLEQuieting of Title

I.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Quieting of Title

Source : CLT Realty Development Corporation vs. Phil-Ville Development & Housing Corporation

G.R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015

Contributor : Repaso, Jurdelyn

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PROBLEM:

A Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Injunction filed by CC Corporation against DD Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila. CC claims that it is the registered owner and actual possessor of sixteen (16) parcels of land in Baesa, Caloocan City. CC claimed that it had been in “actual, open, notorious, public, physical and continuous possession” of the 16 parcels of land “before 1980 up to the present.” It fenced said parcels of land in 1980 and 1991. CC presented a chart showing that the 16 parcels of land were derived from and were part of Lot 26, originally covered by Original Certificate of Title It alleged that based on official records of the office of respondent Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority, DD was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013, covering a parcel of land situated in Caloocan City. CC claimed that an actual plotting of the relative position of Lot 26 as particularly described in DD’s TCT No. T-177013 in relation to the positions of all the lots covered by CC’s transfer certificates of title, respectively, proved positively that said TCT No. T-177013 of DD overlaps CC’s parcels of land. CC contended that DD’s TCT No. T-177013, although apparently valid or effective, is in truth and in fact, invalid and ineffective, and unless declared as such by the court, will inevitably prejudice CC’s title over its 16 parcels of land, as said title of DD is a potential cause of litigations between CC and DD, as in the present suit, as well as suit/s involving CC and transferee/s of DD of the entire and/or a portion of Lot 26 in question. Did DD’s TCT No. T-177013 impose a cloud on CC’s titles to the 16 parcels of land subject matter of the case, as provided in Article 476 of the Civil Code?

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The New Civil Code provides the basis for an action for Quieting of Title. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides that whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

In the case of CLT Realty Development Corporation vs. Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation, the Supreme Court held that in order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Thus, both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title to prosper have been met in this case: (1) CC had established its equitable title or interest in the 16 parcels of land subject of the action; and (2) TCT No. T-177013, found to overlap titles to said properties of CC, was previously declared invalid. The RTC and the Court of Appeals both arrived at the conclusion that respondent Phil-Ville had a valid title to the 16 parcels of land subject of the complaint, and that petitioner’s title is invalid despite its prima facie appearance of validity. This conclusion was arrived at after a thorough study of the pieces of evidence presented by both parties.

The Supreme Court said that there is no cogent reason to reverse and disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals quoted above, affirming the RTC Decision, likewise extensively quoted above, especially as they are supported by the evidence on record. It has been held in a long string of cases that as a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are deemed final, conclusive, and binding on this Court. Hence, TCT No. T-177013 does not impose a cloud on CC’s titles to the 16 parcels of land subject matter of the case.

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II.

Civil Law Topic : Property; Quieting of Title

Source : Heirs of Pacifico Pocido vs. AvilaG.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014

Contributor : Maico, Ma. Noelle

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PROBLEM:

In 1950, Adolfo Arum began his occupation and claim on three lots situated in Albay. Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) for lots 1 and 2 were issued by the DENR in 1990. Lot 3, however, was not approved due to a memorandum issued by the DENR Secretary.

Aurelio Arum (Aurelio), an heir of Adolfo, ceded his rights over the three lots to his brother, Arnel Arum (Arnel) in exchange for a one hectare lot to be taken from Lot 3. Aurelio then entered into a contract with Anita Agila (Anita) authorizing the latter to undertake the segregation of his one-hectare land from Lot 3 in accord with the brothers’ agreement. In exchange, Aurelio would award to her 2,000 square meters from Lot 3. Accordingly, the subdivided lots were declared for tax purposes and the corresponding tax declarations issued with 8,010 square meters going to Aurelio and 1,993 square meters to Anita. A Certificate of Exclusion of 993 square meters of Lot 3 (disputed property) was then issued to Anita. Arnel then filed a complaint to quiet title alleging that Anita unlawfully claimed the disputed property which belonged to him as part of his inheritance from his father, Adolfo. Is the action for quieting of title proper in this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Arnel has no legal or equitable title to the disputed property.

In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for “an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist.” Under Articles 47611 and 47712 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim,

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encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.

In this case, the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 3, remains a public land as Arnel’s predecessor-in-interest, Adolfo, was not granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over the same lot.

Book 2 - Property and Land Title_v1.docx

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