June 2016 Version 4 Blueprint
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June 2016
Version 4
Blueprint
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Purpose
The purpose of this document is to set direction and scope for future work of the Smart Security project. It is not intended to endorse any particular technology or provider, but rather provide details of innovative technologies and processes that may come to the fore in the short, medium and long term. The intended audiences for this guide may include but is not limited to: Airports, Airlines, Technology Providers, Regulatory Bodies and Security Organizations.
Disclaimer
The information contained in this publication is subject to constant review in the light of changing requirements and regulations and technological improvements. No reader should act on the basis of any such information without referring to applicable laws and regulations and/or without taking appropriate professional advice. Although every effort has been made to ensure accuracy IATA and ACI shall not be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by errors, omissions, misprints or misinterpretation of the contents hereof. Furthermore IATA and ACI expressly disclaim any and all liability to any person or entity in respect of anything done or omitted by any such person or entity in reliance on the contents of this publication.
Conditions of Use
This document was produced by IATA and ACI. The parties assert the right to control the distribution and use of the content. Partial or integral reproduction of this work should be addressed to the Project Manager, Smart Security at [email protected] or [email protected]
Document Record
Document History
Version Status Date Summary of Changes
1 PUBLISHED Sep 2012 Version 1
2 PUBLISHED Dec 2013 Version 2
3 PUBLISHED Nov 2014 Version 3
4 Draft March 2016 Version 4 – Significant reduction in content, with much of it moved to operational guidance material.
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Contents
Document Record ........................................................................................................................... 1
Smart Security ................................................................................................................................ 3
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 4
2 Risk Based Security and Passenger Differentiation ................................................................. 6
3 Passenger Screening ............................................................................................................ 14
4 Cabin Baggage Screening ..................................................................................................... 18
5 Alternative Measures and Unpredictability ............................................................................. 25
6 Centralised Image Processing ............................................................................................... 30
7 Staffing .................................................................................................................................. 35
8 Checkpoint Management ....................................................................................................... 41
9 Checkpoint Environment ........................................................................................................ 45
10 Dependencies, Constraints, Assumptions. ............................................................................. 50
Annex A - Recommendations .................................................................................................... 55
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Smart Security
ACI and IATA Collaborate to Deliver Smart Security
Airports Council International (ACI) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in December 2013 to jointly develop Smart Security (Smart Security). With the MoU, ACI and IATA have aligned their resources and expertise to improve the journey from curb to boarding. Passengers will be able to proceed through security checkpoints with minimal inconvenience, security resources will be allocated based on risk and airport facilities can be optimized. “Smart Security is the way forward. A lot has been learned from the component tests conducted over the last two years. It forms the foundation for us to move confidently into the next phase of the development. The MoU with ACI on Smart Security will deliver synergies by drawing on the collective expertise and knowledge that both organizations have built over the years” said Tony Tyler, IATA’s Director General and CEO.
“A touch point in the passenger journey that triggers a sense of dread is the security check.
Through Smart Security, ACI and IATA will drive the needed change. Airports, airlines, control authorities and system suppliers all have a role to play in making the process more effective, efficient and pleasant for the passenger. Smart Security brings these stakeholders together with the shared goal of transforming the security checkpoint for the benefit of all the traveling public” said Angela Gittens, Director General, ACI World.
In 2012, IATA and ACI, together with a range of government and industry partners defined a roadmap for the future of passenger screening with proposals that were operationally achievable, technically feasible and believed to be publically acceptable. This roadmap was adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) High Level Conference on Aviation Security in September 2012. The roadmap prepared in 2012 is now a reference document, with many of the innovative technologies and practices being implemented at airports around the world. This updated Smart Security Blueprint details the further development of that roadmap. Elements of the original blueprint that were related to technologies or processes considered operationally ready were moved across to relevant Smart Security Guidance documents which are available upon request.
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1. Executive Summary
The need to modernize and improve passenger security screening has long been a topic of
conversation across the aviation industry. Screening works, but at great cost to the aviation
industry, to authorities, and to passengers. Given the predicted growth in air travel, continuously
evolving threats, and passengers becoming increasingly dissatisfied with queues and intrusive
measures, today’s model is no longer sustainable.
Through Smart Security, government and industry have come together to collaborate and to define
a future where passengers proceed through security with minimal inconvenience, where airport
facilities are optimized and where security resources are allocated based on risk, thus contributing
towards an improved journey from curb to airside.
As with any serious undertaking, specifics outcomes must be established to ensure that a
successful conclusion can be defined. To that end, the stakeholders have agreed that the goals of
the Smart Security are:
Strengthened security
o Increase unpredictability
o Better use of existing technologies
o Introduce new technologies with advanced capabilities
o Focus resources based on risk and advanced information
Increased operational efficiency
o Increase throughput
o Maximize equipment and space utilization
o Optimize staffing resources
o Optimize cost per passenger
Improved passenger experience
o Reduce queues and waiting times
o Use technology for a less intrusive and disruptive search
o Reduce divestment requirements
Smart Security sets the context and identifies considerations that the aviation community needs to
address in order to move away from the rigid and predictable “one-size-fits-all” approach that
characterizes today’s passenger security screening environment to a risk based approach based
on security outcomes, process improvement, and technology. The evolution to Smart Security can
be accomplished using options tailored to meet the specific needs of government and industry
within a State, the airport environment in which the checkpoint operates, and the availability of
emerging technologies.
1.1 2016 Blueprint
The purpose of the 2016 Smart Security Blueprint is to provide an overview of the program,
including today’s trends, envisaged capabilities for the future as well as key research, testing,
lobbying activities and regulatory action that may be needed to see these capabilities realized. It is
hoped that by setting out the short, medium and long term goals of the project, this document will
act as a roadmap to aid planning and coordination of solution development.
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1.2 The Scope of Smart Security
Smart Security encompasses the following key areas as they relate to screening of passengers
and cabin baggage:
Risk based security
Passenger Screening
Cabin Baggage Screening
Alternative Measures and Unpredictability
Centralized Image Processing
Staff/Human Factors
Checkpoint Management
Checkpoint Environment
1.3 Work so Far
Since 2012, Smart Security solutions have been tested and evaluated in partnership with
governments, airports, airlines, and solution providers. Several of the trial concepts
(as per key areas above) are now permanently installed and fully operational in airports worldwide.
Research, testing, and evaluation continue to be an ongoing effort to ensure that the industry
remains in line with the latest developments and leading edge innovations. Accordingly, in 2015,
Smart Security undertook to update the initial Blueprint Document (originally published in 2012)
with mature concepts and considerations moved to Smart Security Guidance Material1 to support
airports and key stakeholders with operational deployment of key concepts.
This 2016 blueprint (4th edition), in keeping with the structure introduced in the previous version, addresses each of the key Smart Security areas and outlines:
A summary of early solutions and those considered best practice today;
Near term evolution; and
Innovations and considerations for the future research and activity.
The blueprint concludes with a set of dependencies, constraints and assumptions.
A list of recommendations to support industry in meeting the objectives of the Smart Security
initiative are annexed to this document.
1 Please note that each chapter of this Blueprint corresponds to an independent Guidance Material document. Please contact the Smart Security team at [email protected] or [email protected] for further details on obtaining Guidance documents.
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2 Risk Based Security and Passenger Differentiation
2.1.1 Concept
In the context of Smart Security, risk is considered as twofold: the risk posed by a particular threat
(i.e. the item) on one hand and the risk posed by the person on the other. When considered
together, they provide a much clearer picture of the real threat than when in isolation. To date,
most risk based decisions regarding the checkpoint have focused on assessing the risk of a
particular item, but have largely considered all passengers equal.
The evolution of risk based security therefore is considered important to the future security
screening process and seeks a move away from this “one-size fits all” approach, providing
regulators and stakeholders with a holistic view of the sources of threats and therefore the
possibility to target security in a more focused and efficient way.
2.1.2 Risk based screening
Risk based screening is grounded in the premise that security effort and resources should be
applied to the greatest threats to aviation. As indicated above, this has historically meant the
physical threats, with security measures applied in response to the prevailing threat environment
and a regulators risk appetite.
.
This approach to security screening has been in place for many years and has seen passenger
security checkpoints evolve to what they are today. Examples include the use of passenger
security scanners and Explosive Trace Detection to address the issue of finding non-metallic items
or the use of increased randomized screening measures during periods of heightened security.
2.1.3 Risk based differentiation
Risk based differentiation incorporates the “person” in the assessment of threat. An underlying
premise of this approach is that the majority of people (whether staff, crew or passengers) present
a low risk to aviation.
Application
Risk based differentiation is distinct from risk based screening as it results in screening different
people in different ways based on a reasoned process of selection. Differentiation may take on
three key forms:
1. Identifying those people who pose a lower risk and permitting them an expedited screening
process;
2. identifying those people that pose a higher risk and applying additional measures to them,
so that the majority received a more expedited process on average; or
3. A combination of the above two, with both high and low risk identified through a risk
assessment process and measures updated accordingly.
Five example ‘risk categories’ are illustrated in the a diagram below, where the majority of
passengers could be considered as ‘normal risk’ with a proportion either requiring enhanced or
expedited search and an even smaller proportion denied a flight or exempt from screening.
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Whilst most states already make use exempt categories and several have implemented no-fly lists,
it is important to note that many may decide to utilize only two of the remaining three as part of a
risk based system (for example, enhanced search and standard search, or reduced search and
normal search).
2.1.4 Risk Assessment
This differentiation (and the allocation to risk categories) is facilitated by an assessment of the risk
posed by the person, which is used to objectively enable proportionate screening measures to be
applied. This risk assessment may be carried out based on:
1. Filtering – technology/animal or behavior – generally applied at the airport on day of travel;
or
2. Data – Population based (category, journey) or individual data based – with data assessed
prior to travel and/or in combination with data obtained on the date of travel.
2.2 Solution for today
2.2.1 Risk Based Differentiation: Filtering
With ‘filtering’, departing passengers are put through some form of ‘risk filter’, which would define if
they could be considered as of higher or lower risk passengers. Depending of the regulatory
requirements, the filter specifications can be adjusted to manage the proportion of passengers
falling in one of the categories. For example, the approach could be very specific and only select a
few passengers in every thousand or it could be much broader and select larger proportions of
passengers. This may be important to maintain unpredictability in the screening process as well as
to keep lanes fully populated with passengers.
One filtering technique that has been trialed and deployed in some States as an element of risk
based security is Behavioral Based Selection, which could be defined as the act of monitoring
people via covert (e.g. CCTV) or overt (e.g. uniformed officers) methods to identify personal
indicators that would suggest someone is more or less likely to commit an act of unlawful
interference with civil aviation.
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2.2.2 Risk Based Differentiation: Passenger Data
Passenger data for the use of a risk assessment may take on two key forms – population based
data (generic in nature) and individual passenger data. These two forms of data are already being
used by airports and regulators to apply differentiated screening and are discussed further below.
Passenger Data: Populations
Where it is not possible or desirable to risk assess individuals in their own right, potentially due to
privacy issues, operational practicalities, or other concerns, population based risk assessments
may be a viable alternative.
Risk based differentiation via population based data (category or journey) has been applied for
many years. Examples include different security measures for staff, airside workers, dignitaries and
heads of state, as well as different types of screening between international and domestic
passengers.
The three key population data sets currently in use today are:
- Category of passengers: potentially based on age, professional status, or possession of a
security clearance. Known examples of people that receive screening exemption or
reduced search in some states include, Heads of State, key diplomats, police and military
personnel (on duty), staff, children and the elderly.
- Journey based selection: a passenger might be deemed as a specific risk category by
virtue of their origin or destination. The best examples of this in action today, is heightened
security measures for passengers traveling on certain flights, or during certain periods, or
different measures applied between domestic and international passengers.
- Rules based selection: Rules based selection identifies populations of passengers based
on a defined set of rules or conditions which may involve the selection approaches above,
plus other criteria. Additional rules applied to the risk assessment may include things such
as date and time of flight, method of ticket purchase, and citizenship (local or foreign).
Passenger Data: Individual
Whilst population based risk assessment, as indicated, has been in use for some time, there are
relatively few examples of risk assessments based purely on individual passenger data.
Individual passenger data can be used to identify both higher risk and lower risk travelers for a
differentiated screening process. For an individual data risk assessment to be accurately
determined, it must begin prior to arrival at the airport. Data collection can start prior to the
booking of a trip for known travelers, through check-in and baggage acceptance right up to the
screening process. Each touch point by the passenger provides an opportunity to collect additional
data, which may be used in the analysis of risk.
Registered traveler programs are a good example of this type of risk based differentiation. The
best example is TSA Pre✓ that offers expedited screening to registered travelers who have
enrolled themselves and provided personal data for risk assessment.
Equally, Secure Flight, another risk based program, seeks to identify high risk passengers and
either prevent them from flying, or subjects them to additional screening measures prior to travel.
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In the United States, these two programs work together to provide improved security, operational
flexibility and passenger experience.
2.2.3 Identity Management and Networking
Where risk assessment is category or journey based, and segregation of people is easily controlled
identity management has played a relatively small role. It is why for example, airports have
generally opted to maintain dedicated international and domestic terminals, giving them the
flexibility to apply different measures to these groups of passengers.
However, with the emergence of joint departure halls, and registered traveler programs such as
TSA Pre✓ , identity management is likely to play an ever increasing role in the passenger
screening process. Today, segregation of passengers relating to these programs is largely a
manual process supported by electronic access gates, queue facilitators and document checks.
2.3 Solution for tomorrow
2.3.1 Risk based differentiation: filtering
2.3.1.1 Automated Behavior Analysis
It is anticipated there will be a move towards the use of automated technologies for behavior
recognition and integration of the result from behavior analysis with the risk score provided at the
entry to the checkpoint. For example, video-analytics technology currently exists that can conduct
some limited behavioral analysis; the objective would be to use this technology to monitor public
spaces for suspicious activities or left packages.
It is also expected that technology will advance and be capable of detecting some more subtle
behavioral anomalies to take action at the checkpoint. Other examples of automated behavior
analysis include Automated Questioning Kiosks, Facial Thermograms, and Layered Voice Analysis
that could potentially set a risk score for an individual and transmit this risk score to the checkpoint
for appropriate action. These technologies all exist today, but further work is needed to understand
how they may be best used in an aviation security context.
2.3.1.2 Technology/Animal Based selection
As passengers proceed through the ground journey, advanced detection technologies could be
applied to them as a means of ‘pre-screening’ prior to the main security area. This could
dynamically select certain passengers for higher or lower screening or be combined with other risk
analysis procedures to complement the risk assessment process.
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD)
For example state of the art access control gates could not only inspect a passengers travel
documents and their eligibility for access to the departure lounge but also perform explosive trace
detection on individuals credentials, skin or clothes to detect a wide variety of explosives. This
information could be digitally transferred to a security officer for resolution of the anomaly or
combined with biometrics to ensure the passenger is screened to a higher level at the checkpoint.
Alternatively explosive trace detection solutions could be incorporated into other process touch
points such as a kiosk. This could inspect a passenger’s passport, credit card or other form of
identification such as a driver license, during the usual check in or bag tag printing procedure.
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Early trials of this kind of technology have already taken place at some airports. The next step is to
understand how the results of these technologies will be communicated to the checkpoint and at
what point, early alarm resolution intervention is required, for example in the event explosive
material is suspected.
Selection procedures such as these should not inhibit the passenger’s journey through the airport
and could be covert with the passenger not knowing it is occurring, however this should be
appropriately balanced against privacy and intrusion considerations.
Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD)
Some trials have recently used EDD as a technique to ‘pre-screen’ individuals without being in
direct contact with them through the use of a screening cabin. From the passenger perspective
such a methodology will not be different from a technology one.
Technology based selection procedures such as these should not inhibit the passenger’s journey
through the airport and could be covert with the passenger not knowing it is occurring, however this
should be appropriately balanced against privacy and intrusion considerations.
At other locations, EDD are currently used in an overt fashion, to quickly comb queues, with
passengers generally responding well to their use. To date, they have not been used to select
large numbers of passengers for enhanced or reduced screening process. Further work is needed
to understand the operational benefits, costs and passenger experience considerations of
deploying them more widely as part of a differentiated screening system.
2.3.2 Risk based differentiation: data
It is expected that the risk assessment process may evolve such that a number of data sets may
be utilized within a specific state. For example, it could be envisaged that information from the
airline, regulator, and policing and border protection agencies is all collected and assessed to
generate an overall risk rating for the passenger. This overall risk rating could eventually be shared
between states to prevent privacy issues.
Further to this, it may even be that individual data is combined with population based data in
generating this overall score.
In the medium term, due to the complications with mutual recognition, it is likely that any such
system that relies on passenger data assessment may only be implemented on a domestic (or in
the case of Europe, within Schengen) basis, or where a country has no existing mutual recognition
agreements in place (i.e. all transit/transfer passengers will be re-screened at next port of call)
For this to happen however, States will need to agree on a risk assessment framework and the
data sets required for appropriate and robust risk assessment.
2.3.3 Dynamic Identity Management and Networking
As the use of differentiated screening expands, it will be increasingly important that the correct
level of screening is applied to the correct person/s. Use of “unique identifiers” will be an important
element allowing an airports and regulatory bodies to apply differentiated screening.
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Various biometric technologies which can enable Identity Management exist already: (e-passport,
biometric enabled access/membership cards) and can already be integrated in a risk based
security environment.
Airport workers, risk assessed prior to their commencement of employment, generally have their
identity checked each time the access secure areas of the airport. Historically this check has been
a manual face to ID check, however increasingly airports are making use of biometrics to improve
reliability of these checks and it is expected in the short term use of biometrics in this context will
continue to expand.
Whilst today technology exists to confirm a passengers’ identify, it still requires a passenger touch
point and there is currently no information link with the checkpoint.
Early trials have been carried out in a lab environment to look at processes to validate a
passengers’ identity, without the passenger undertaking an additional physical process –
essentially the existing technology in the lane will recognize the passenger and their biometric and
will update the risk status, applying different algorithms on the scanner or x-ray or alarming
accordingly. At the time of writing, a trial is conducted in a live environment, which will potentially
validate this concept.
2.4 Longer term Research and Development
2.4.1 Risk based differentiation: filtering
Stand-off detection based on technologies (such as laser, UV, electromagnetic waves, …) could
also be considered as an interesting development for passenger selection that could be deployed
across the airport starting from the access roads all the way to the checkpoint.
One of the other possible benefits of such approach will be to spread detection capacity across the
airport rather than concentrating them in the checkpoint. This might help airports to address future
requirements to deploy some landside security capacity, particularly in relation to front of house
infrastructure threats.
Further work is needed to understand the full capabilities of this technology, where it would be best
deployed within and airport and how results would be communicated to impact the screening
applied at the checkpoint.
2.4.2 International adoption and recognition
From the Smart Security perspective, current experiences, studies, and programs such as TSA Pre
✓ have shown that risk based differentiation can improve operational efficiency and passenger
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experience. Despite these findings, wider adoption of risk based differentiation has been slow
(whether filtering or data based).
The key issue is ensuring the mutual recognition of a risk assessment that has been performed in
the State of origin. Passengers will need to be screened, as a minimum, to an acceptable baseline
level, regardless of risk categorization. Countries moving away from a one-size fits all screening to
a more risk based approach that utilizes a robust process of differentiation will need to be accepted
and recognized by other countries, on the basis that the security applied delivers appropriate
security outcomes.
This issue is particularly true for passengers identified as lower risk who get an expedited
screening and who are flying to a country requiring more stringent measures. Without recognition
of the risk assessment by the country of destination, additional screening after the checkpoint
could be required which will nullify the benefits of the expedited screening and result in additional
costs for the originating airport/airline.
In this regard, further work is needed at the State level to set the framework for risk based
differentiation systems to support mutual recognition. Countries requiring more stringent measures
will need to enter into mutual recognition agreements with those deploying risk based screening to
ensure that additional screening after the checkpoint is not required for passengers departing to
that country.
However, given the mutual recognition of risk assessment leading to expedited screening for
passengers might take time for wider acceptance, States are encouraged, in parallel, to focus on
innovations that will increase the unpredictability to the screening process and allow for enhanced
screening of passengers where necessary. This is where filtering techniques may have a longer
term role to play.
.
2.4.3 Post Checkpoint Analysis
Current processes at the checkpoint treat each passenger as individuals and have very little way to
connect potential or known associates together. This creates the potential for multiple passengers
to each carry a component of an IED or other prohibited device through the checkpoint. In the long
term the advancement of API/PNR/DCS aviation security risk assessments will enable security
authorities to connect these individuals. Also, as X-ray images may be networked and the
passenger and their carry-on baggage linked, authorities will be able to link the passenger and
their screening results with that of the identified known or potential associates.
It should also be possible to use advanced data-mining techniques on all the data collected at the
different sources, to create a holistic picture of the checkpoint and correlate events and individuals.
It will be possible to automatically correlate, in real-time, any parts of devices that are detected at
the checkpoint and create a full picture among associated individuals.
Where a correlation or threat is identified, the use of video analytics could identify an individual’s
location in the terminal for law enforcement to intercept. The associates could also be intercepted
at the departure gate if necessary.
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2.4.4 Identity Management
In order to deliver a seamless end to end process for the passenger, progress is still required in the
area of identity management, particularly where individual passenger data is required. Smart
Security envisions a process where the passenger will be recognized as an individual through their
whole journey and will not have to repeat processes such as identity check. Through the use of
advanced technology and networking a passenger will be able to go from the drop-off counter to
the aircraft without having to present his/her ID or boarding token more than once as it is the case
today (check-in, access to the airside, border control, boarding gate).
It is hoped that in the future passengers will be able to self-enroll their biometric and authenticate
at determined locations, such as dedicated identity terminals or automated bag drop units, which
will be usable with minimal to no support from an airline representative. It is also anticipated the
biometric technology will be more pervasive and allow for shorter processing time of the
passenger’s biometric.
While standoff biometric acquisition may be possible it is still anticipated that the identity
authentication position (either fixed or mobile) will still require the passenger to stop and present
themselves using either an ID document or boarding token, rather than authentication “on-the-
move”. But as these are likely to be electronic and the biometric system is reliable and accurate,
the transaction time will be quick and require no active passenger activity to confirm identity.
Such identity management process will also be required to seamlessly implement a risk based
approach where a risk score is dynamically assigned to an individual through its journey, whether
this risk score is assigned by the passenger data analysis or a filtering technique deployed at the
airport (stand-off explosive detection, behavior analysis).
Trials and technology development aiming to deliver such seamless process should be
encouraged.
States will also need to consider whether they will accept biometrics captured outside their State
as well as the biometrics approved for use and how biometric data will be stored and by whom.
2.4.5 Identity Management - Passenger and belongings
A critical issue to improve passenger experience at checkpoint through a risk assessment is the
matching between passengers and their belongings, which should be done in an automated and
reliable way. Adding the advanced information results, passenger identity should also be matched;
and with all this a much better risk analysis can be performed.
Once passenger identity and their possessions (including cabin baggage) are reconciled, other
information can be added to the virtual tag that connects them. Other information sources including
security intelligence, individuals’ risk profiles and checked baggage data can be associated
dynamically with the virtual tag and used to guide the best possible screening level of individuals
and their bags. All this can enhance the level of security without affecting, or even enhancing, the
passengers’ experience.
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3 Passenger Screening
3.1 Introduction
In many states there has been little evolution in primary passenger screening processes at the
checkpoint. As threats emerge, new measures are simply added on as secondary processes,
which go some way to improving security outcomes, but do little to improve operational efficiency
or passenger experience.
However processes and technology are starting to advance and whilst further work is still needed,
airports can already benefit from these solutions today.
Future technology and research therefore should continue to seek ways to mitigate these risks, but
at the same time focus on developing integrated or complimentary tools and technologies that can
adapt to new threats as well as mitigate existing threats of today,
3.2 Solutions for today
3.2.1 Security scanner
Offering improved security and passenger experience outcomes, security scanners are
increasingly being adopted by airports across the globe. They can be deployed as secondary
screening equipment, however many airports and regulators are now looking to utilize them as a
primary screening method, either alone or in combination with a WTMD. The two main benefits of
security scanners compared to WTMD are:
- The capacity to detect concealed items on the body regardless of the substance;
- The ability to facilitate a targeted search, further detailed below.
Security Scanners are not the final solution and there are still imitations to what this equipment can
detect, therefore it is recommend that for optimum security outcomes, security scanners should be
used as part of a comprehensive security checkpoint that balances facilitation and unpredictability.
Another challenge for security scanners today is the relatively high alarm rate (as compared to a
WTMD), which results in large number of hand searches. Manufactures are working with
stakeholders and certification agencies to reduce these numbers.
3.2.2 Equipment Intelligence - Automated decision
Automated decision support algorithms applied to security scanners are designed to identify and
highlight anomalies for further investigation by the security officer. The introduction of automated
decision support algorithms on security scanners has two key benefits:
1. Privacy: Instead of requiring manual inspection of full images of passengers, new
algorithms identify anomalies and present them on a generic stick figure to the screening
officer. This provides a better passenger experience, whilst providing the officers with the
information needed to conduct their search.
2. Targeted pat downs: because the algorithm identifies where on the body a threat may be
concealed (unlike some WTMD alarms) the officer can perform a targeted search rather
than an intrusive full body pat down. This reduces search times, improves the passenger
experience and facilitates increased security by focusing the operator’s effort.
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3.2.3 Shoes
Due to current limitations of some passenger screening equipment, regulators may still require
passengers to remove their shoes for screening. As simple as this requirement might seem, it often
negatively impacts passenger experience and may add disproportionate overheads to the process.
There are a number of shoe screening solutions on the market, however the vast majority are
standalone solutions that necessitate an extra step in the process for passengers and security
officers. That said, some of these solutions are easier to use than others, for example, those
solutions that do not require the passenger to remove their shoes, may be preferable for airports
seeking to improve the passenger experience.
3.3 Solutions for tomorrow
3.3.1 Security scanner evolution
It is believed that next generation security scanners will bring improved detection capabilities with
lower false alarm rates largely due to the evolution of detection and decision support algorithms.
These developments may include further development of shape recognition and material
discrimination technology.
It is expected that more machines will come to market, offering airports greater flexibility both in
terms of space, CONOPS and the passenger process.
3.3.2 Dynamic adjustment algorithms
With risk assessment already playing a role in how passengers are screened there is increasing
emphasis on the need to develop flexible checkpoints, which can adapt to the risk level of a
passenger, or group of passengers without the need for dedicated lanes which exist to facilitate
this process today.
For security scanners, this means the ability to ‘switch’ algorithms according to the individual that is
presented. Trials of random switching have already been performed indicating successful proof of
concept. The integration of identity management, or at the very least passenger to flight matching,
into the passenger journey will be the final link which will allow dynamic adjustment on a target
basis to take place. Further trials, particularly those incorporating identity management are
therefore encouraged.
3.4 Longer term Research and Development
3.4.1 Improved detection capabilities.
Whilst security scanner technology will no doubt continue to evolve to be smaller, faster and less
intrusive, aiming for a system that allows passengers to walk through the equipment with no
divestment requirement, there will also be a continued need to plan and address emerging threats.
Next generation screening technology such as chemical-based scanners, sniffer dogs or synthetic
replacements (e.g. next generation electronic noses), and standoff ETD that can be applied during
existing processes should all be investigated.
Moreover, these technologies should not be looked at in isolation, but rather focus should be on
technologies that incorporate a number of capabilities.
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This ‘many-in-one’ concept may see WTMD and explosive detection capabilities combined with the
traditional security scanner helping to remove steps in the process whilst at the same time
improving security (e.g.: resolving the issue of screening shoes for explosives). Further research
into this area, should be a priority.
3.4.2 Equipment intelligence – decoupling hardware/software
Currently developed automated detection algorithms and technologies are tightly integrated with
the individual vendor’s models so they cannot be easily made available to the entire industry as a
vendor independent algorithm.
In the not too distant future it is hoped that the use of a common standard will enable the hardware
and software to become decoupled, meaning independent data processing can be utilized as
desired. It should be possible to use the image/data created by any scanner equipment, to be
analyzed by any type of algorithm independent of the manufacturer/developer of each. This could
for example enhance risk based screening as it would enable any algorithms to be run on images
from any equipment with the algorithm chosen based on a passenger’s risk profile, rather than
limited to the detection of generic anomalies or equipment specific threat analysis capabilities.
3.4.3 Standoff
As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, longer term consideration should be given to whether
screening activities should be confined to the security checkpoint. Technologically there would be
no reason why passengers (and for that purpose any other person in the airport) could not be
“screened” in any other place in the airport. Standoff ETD could be done, for instance, at the
entrance of the airport or at the boarding car scan e-gates. Detection technologies could also be
applied as passengers entered the terminal. This would distribute the screening process making it
less intrusive to the passenger, more dynamic, reliable and robust, while at the same time
increasing its deterrence effect.
How a passenger that has triggered an alarm at a location other than the checkpoint is managed,
is therefore another issue that would require consideration and planning. The passenger could be
approached immediately by airport security, or could be tagged virtually and automatically directed
at the checkpoint for secondary search. This would depend on operational decisions and possibly
the type of alarm raised or the reliability of the technology.
3.4.4 Long term evolution of passenger screening
In the medium term it is believed the passenger will still have to place their carry-on luggage
through a separate screening system, but there will be no requirement to divest any belongings. In
the longer term, it is hoped screening technology will evolve to permit a passenger to walk through
a screening area and flow through without the need to be separated from their carry-on baggage. If
both the passenger and its belongings are cleared to fly, they will be provided an exit from the
screening area but if they were selected for further inspection, they would be directed to the
secondary search area.
Dynamic adjustment and standoff screening are anticipated to be combined in the long term to
provide a dramatically different checkpoint to the conventional security areas we see today.
However, technology in itself, even from a long term perspective, will not be able to achieve the
detection of all the prohibited items considered today as a threat for the aircraft. Such ability for the
passengers to flow through a screening area without being stopped or required to separate from
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their cabin baggage will require a combination of screening technologies, risk assessment and
redefined list of prohibited items.
Areas of research and development that will contribute to this vision are supported by Smart
Security.
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4 Cabin Baggage Screening
Like with the screening of passengers, cabin baggage screening has remained fairly static in
recent years. Whilst there have been moves from single to multi-view, may airports are still
operating on traditional x-ray equipment with limited security capabilities to manage new threats.
Like in the passenger domain, this has resulted in a number of additional processes, impacting
both operational efficiency and passenger experience.
It is therefore a priority for Smart Security and a number of their stakeholders that further work is
undertaken to enhance detection capabilities and better integrate technologies for improved
security and operational efficiency.
4.1 Solutions for today
As indicated briefly above, single view x-ray systems have their limitations and can result in
additional divestment requirements for passengers as well as additional and more complex image
assessment for officers, For these reasons, many airports have, or are planning to move to more
advanced technology and networking, which provides better tools for security officers and
optimizes operations at the checkpoint.
4.1.1 Dual/Multi view X-ray
Dual/multi view x-rays utilized by a growing number of airports around the world are based on the
same technology as the single-view x-ray, but these systems provide the operator with multiple
viewing angles, i.e. additional information, especially with regard to complex and cluttered images.
The x-ray operator is therefore able to identify prohibited and permitted items more easily.
More specifically, multi-view technology:
- Enables bags to be screened more thoroughly...
- Reduces the volume of unnecessary secondary searches and helps promote a more
positive passenger experience.
- Enables the use of advanced equipment intelligence as it produces a larger amount of data.
- On the other hand, the use of multi-view xx-ray makes image analysis more complicated
and potentially time consuming for the operators and thus usually requires additional
training.
- Equipment is larger and heavier than he predecessors but the additional capabilities and
flexibility normally makes it worth the additional space and structural integrity required.
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4.1.2 Secondary search optimization
In traditional checkpoint operations the security officer allocated secondary search of bags rejected
by the X-ray operator is usually required to perform a time consuming full bag search potentially
leading to passenger frustration.
Current advancements in the secondary search process, linking the search station to the x-ray
,enable the search officer to see the same image as the x-ray operator with annotated information
relating to the nature of the threat mean targeted searches are an option. Not only is this
operationally more efficient but from a security effectiveness standpoint it focuses the officers
search activities rather than having them indifferently searching the full bag.
In addition to the potential security, operations and passenger experience benefits already noted,
the networked search station enables better classification of items found. It also provides an easier
way to track performance of security officers and log their manual interventions.
Although technology and Concept of Operations exist for targeted search, many States still require
full bag searches for all rejected images. Given the potential efficiency and passenger benefits,
relevant authorities should be encouraged to allow directed search based on many positive
examples around the globe.
4.1.3 Equipment intelligence
The ability to integrate automated and operator assisted detection algorithms is a key facilitator for enhanced security and enables a more efficient process at the checkpoint. “Automated Target Recognition” (ATR) refers to any kind of automated detection capability
available with security screening equipment and is more generic than the term “Automated Threat
Detection” since not every item being automatically detected is considered a threat.
Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) are already available on the market for some dual/multi-view
X-rays. These EDS are in fact dedicated ATR for bulk explosive. They provide the X-ray operator
with an effective assessment tool be able to detect explosive material that would have been
otherwise hard to find by visual inspection alone.
Similarly Liquid Explosive Detection Systems (LEDS) ATR are also available for some dual/multi-
view X-rays. Additionally, legacy single view X-rays can also be upgraded to LEDS. Some solution
providers have even been able to certify detection algorithms on third party platforms. Those LEDS
are all Type C compliant, meaning they can scan liquid, aerosol or gel containers simultaneously in
a tray without the need for the containers to be opened or scanned individually.
Whilst the algorithms themselves clearly have the potential to deliver significant benefits, there are
currently two key limitations to widespread adoption.
1. The inherent False Alarm rate (unnecessary reject rate) of the equipment; and
2. The complexity of the alarm resolution process imposed to clear those false alarms.
Smart Security therefore actively encourages continued research and development into this area to
firmly identify whether in the long term these types of algorithms are best run on traditional x-ray
equipment, or whether newer and more advanced equipment is required to see the full potential.
4.1.4 ETD
ETD provides and effective way to detect amounts of explosives and in many states its use is
mandated as part of the baggage screening process.
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In the short term, and whilst equipment intelligence and explosive detection algorithms are refined,
many States are likely to make use of ETD either as an additional measure for baggage, or as an
alarm resolution process. For those airports not able to make use of EDS capabilities, ETD is
recommended as part of the screening process to improve detection capabilities and checkpoint
unpredictability.
4.2 Solutions for tomorrow
4.2.1 Computed tomography
CT-based Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) are different from traditional X-ray systems in that
they provide a more accurate explosive detection in hold baggage screening environment, CT
systems have been shown to have lower false alarm rates than conventional X-ray based EDS,
and this has the potential to significantly improve operational efficiency by decreasing the need for
secondary alarm resolution.
In comparison to multi-view X-ray, CT displays the image in a 3D projection that can be rotated
freely allowing the operator to see around objects. However, CT equipment tends to be more
bulky, more expensive, and noisier than X-ray equipment. To date, only a few CT machines have
actually been deployed into checkpoints (and even in these cases it has been under trial
conditions). However, newer models are becoming available and their overall presence at the
checkpoint is increasing.
It is recommended that States further investigate the security effectiveness and capabilities of CT
equipment for passenger checkpoint deployment and that technology providers continue refining it
so that it becomes operationally viable especially in a high throughput checkpoint environment.
4.2.2 X-Ray diffraction
X-ray diffraction (XRD) is another technology that has been used for many years in hold baggage
screening and is now being considered in the context of passenger screening.
This technology is being adapted to work at the checkpoint by significantly reducing the size of the
equipment, but is not yet ready for deployment. Like CT, X-ray diffraction offers more accurate
explosive detection capabilities.
The expected detection capability of XRD equipment makes it a very promising technology for any
type of in-the-bag automated explosive detection. Deploying this equipment would speed up the
screening process and reduce the need for divestment and the amount of secondary searches.
Like CT technology, x-ray diffraction will be better able to cope with future threats due to more
technical possibilities and a scalable threats database.
Further research is encouraged.
4.2.3 Equipment Intelligence - Harmonization of Standards
While both of the above technologies are available today they are still relatively immature for use at
the checkpoint. However it is expected they will become a more prominent feature at checkpoints
in the future as airports seek to enable bags to be screened without the requirement for
passengers to divest their belongings (laptops and LAGs inside the bag).
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As these technologies develop, and to support new entrants to the market, a key requirement will
be harmonisation of international equipment standards. In support of this, the two certification
bodies in the United States and Europe are looking to standardize.
4.2.4 Equipment Intelligence – Additional Algorithms
Other ATR algorithms allowing for the automated detection of various items are also expected to
be available in the near-future, such as:
- Virtual Laptop Separation: This algorithm has already been trialed on CT equipment and
allows for the X-ray operator to virtually ‘remove’ a laptop from the image of the cabin
baggage and to inspect the bag and the laptop separately in a 3D view;
- Threat recognition: Ability to detect specific threats (gun or gun parts, explosive triggering
devices, sharp items, etc.) when comparing the content of a tray/bag against a threat library
to further enhance the detection capacity of the checkpoint.
- Auto Clear: Algorithms to automatically clear low clutter/simple trays, reducing the overall
number of images sent to an x-ray operator for analysis, have been tested in trial
environments and are now allowed by the European Union aviation security regulations.
4.2.5 Passenger and Bag Matching for risk based security
Today’s screening concept applies the same level of screening to all passengers, cabin baggage
and personal belongings. As explained in the chapter ‘Risk based security’, Smart Security
envisions a risk assessment framework (and thus the screening applied) that is based on both the
risk of the passenger and the risk of the item.
Once a risk level has been associated with an individual passenger or group of passengers, two
approaches may be available:
- Channeling the passenger to a dedicated lane where different screening methodologies are
applied (enhanced or expedited screening). This methodology is the one applied by TSA on
their lanes dedicated for registered travelers
- Dynamically adapt the screening equipment and screening process at every lane according
to the passenger’s risk level. Whilst the dedicated lane concept is available today and can
be applied in any state where differentiated screening is permitted, to achieve the objective
of a dynamic lane model further work is still required, particularly in ensuring that
passengers’ bags are screened to the same level the corresponding passenger.
Smart Security expects that in the near future it will be possible to match each baggage image to
an individual passenger, by a tagging and passenger/bag matching procedure at the checkpoint.
This means it will be possible to attach a passenger’s risk level (from their identity) to the bag
image resulting in applying specific screening decisions. For example:
- If the image was deemed to be from a high risk passenger it could be automatically rejected
for search. In a CIP environment, the image would not even need to be sent to the X-ray
operators, conducting the secondary screening (with the benefit of time) with a thorough
virtual and physical search of the bag.
- Deliver an expedited screening for lower risk passengers. For example rather than running
all algorithms on the bag of a lower risk traveler, algorithms could be run at random.
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Ensuring the checkpoint remains unpredictable, whilst at the same time improving
operational efficiency.
One of the key elements of such a dynamic lane model is to have screening equipment able to
adapt their screening level to a passenger’s risk level. Further work is needed to demonstrate the
track and trace technologies needed to enable this process in a live environment.
4.2.6 Human factor and training
Any implementation of ATR will deeply impact the tasks assigned to the X-ray operator. In the not
so distant future, we can anticipate that these operators will no longer be reviewing images that:
- Have been auto-cleared (very low clutter image);
- Have been auto-rejected (very high clutter image);
- Are automatically rejected because they might contain liquid or bulk explosive.
It could even be anticipated that sharp and blunt items would ultimately be automatically detected
by an ATR.
In addition, images would increasingly be presented in a 3-D fashion that can be rotated, making a
big leap forward compared to today’s 2-D image review. The skills required to use the screening
equipment would, of course, evolve with technology, and the reliability of the ATR algorithms.
Training and certification of equipment operators will therefore need to evolve with the technology.
4.2.7 ETD evolution
Available ETD solutions have not been designed for mass screening. It is then expected that the
operational experience gathered with them will drive research towards equipment that are more
passenger friendly, simpler and quicker to use.
4.3 Longer Term Research and Development
4.3.1 Standoff detection
As described in previous chapters, some technologies have the ability to perform explosive
detection from a standoff position, which could be used to further enhance the detection capacity of
the screening point. This technology can only detect the presence of explosives on the outside of
the cabin baggage and will not be able to replace radioscopic or tomographic images, but could be
used to support screening decision or provide information for a risk based approach. As an
example, this technology could be added in a lane before a tray/baggage enters the screening
equipment, if energetic material is detected, a higher risk level could be automatically set for the
image and for the corresponding passenger.
Such technology and innovative deployment models (before conventional screening equipment,
airport entry doors, parking…) should be investigated further by stakeholders for integration in a
risk based environment.
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4.3.2 Standardization and hardware/software de-coupling
Currently developed ATR algorithms and technologies are tightly integrated with individual vendor
models, so they cannot be easily made available to the entire industry as a vendor independent
device. As with passenger screening equipment, development of open architectures and common
standards for security equipment is encouraged to enable hardware and software de-coupling.
4.3.3 Certification
To ensure wide adoption of advanced screening technologies, equipment should be as attractive
as possible for the airports, meaning it is cost effective, fast, light, compact, as future proofed as
possible and having a FAR as low as possible. Manufacturers need market certainty to invest in
costly R&D to deliver this. Certainty comes from the need and clarity from industry and regulators
as to the technical specifications, standards and outcomes required. There has historically been a
question of what comes first: R&D, or standards? In order to drive innovation in the industry there
will need to be collaboration, where manufacturers are able to better understand the future needs
of their stakeholders, and thus be prepared to invest and innovate appropriately.
Regarding the certification processes, as the use of automated detection of threats is expected to
expand, it would be necessary that regulators not only consider detection performance during the
testing and certification process of the equipment, but also their false alarm rates. Indication of the
full performance of the equipment would facilitate assessing the impact of new deployments at the
checkpoint both for regulators and for airports. It is important to note that false alarms are not
necessarily an issue, first they can help with the unpredictability aspect of the screening process;
and their negative effect can easily be outweighed by the overall benefits of the new technologies.
If new equipment increases the general passenger experience and overall speed of the checkpoint
operation, FAR can be managed by airports.
4.3.4 Advanced automated data analysis
New threats are evolving not only in the form of new devices or materials, but also as new methods
for attempting to hide them from detection at the checkpoint. To ensure that the security process is
kept a step ahead from those with mal-intent, technology needs to evolve in various fronts as well.
Advanced data analysis is one aspect of equipment intelligence that is emerging as a powerful tool
to support this front.
Among the applications of advanced data analyses that need research and development are:
- Automated “trawling” of the Internet’s many places where new methodologies to create
threats are discussed. This is already happening to some degree by security experts and
advisors, who research the so called dark-net to find suggestions and instructions for
creating homemade versions of current weapons and devices (e.g. 3D-printed plastic
guns, explosive detonators, etc.). The result of this research feeds the databases of
patterns and materials to consider as a threat in X-ray images. The next step is to
automate this to make it scalable as threats are increasing globally and manual research
will soon become too limiting to reach and exploit all sources and amount of information.
- Detection of threats distributed in various pieces of baggage is another critical capability
that needs to be available as soon as possible. This includes the use of networked
equipment which should be capable of cross-correlating all suspicious items and alert the
security personnel if matching/complementary items have been detected in another
recently scanned piece of baggage so that further investigations (in addition to any
secondary search) can take place (e.g. follow passengers carrying components that put
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together could be a potential threat and investigate if they meet after the checkpoint). This
type of approach is nearly impossible to implement manually and by humans, but
networked equipment and advanced data analyses could perform very well in this task.
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5 Alternative Measures and Unpredictability
5.1 Introduction
As noted in the previous chapters, airports are increasingly required to adapt to new and evolving
threats. As no single technology is at present available for all, standalone technologies are
generally implemented representing an additional step in the process.
In an ideal world, and with no limitations in resources, the highest level of security would be applied
seamlessly to all passengers, with minimal operational impact and a strong focus on customer
service. However due to real world resource limitations, airports need to find a balance between
unpredictability, detection and deterrence and the reality of day to day checkpoint operations.
In the short term, unpredictable approaches and alternative measures can be used in an entirely
random way, to ensure a percentage of the travelling population are screened for each threat. In
the application of unpredictability, airports need to visibly “show” that anyone could get checked
with the highest level of security, at any time, and that no one can count on consistently avoiding
this level of screening. Many airports already make use of unpredictability and alternative
measures in this manner.
As technology progresses, additional/secondary measures can be applied in a more intelligent
manner to facilitate the journey for fully compliant passengers, while maintaining a high level of
deterrence and unpredictability. In the longer term, there is also an opportunity to implement
enhanced and/or alternative screening measures to optimise checkpoint operations and facilitate
the risk assessment of passengers.
Expected evolution of these concepts is detailed below
5.2 Solutions for today
5.2.1 Additional Measures
5.2.1.1 Explosive Trace Detection:
As residue left from the manufacturing, handling or transporting of explosives is hard to remove,
ETD equipment provides an effective means of detecting trace amounts of explosives on a person,
their clothes or their belongings. ETD has been used in some states since the early 2000s and
increasingly others are looking at how to incorporate explosive detection capabilities into their
screening systems, with traditional ETD being one of the key options.
The portability of traditional ETD systems, together with the unobtrusiveness of the process, makes
ETD an efficient and passenger friendly way to resolve alarms and/or introduce unpredictability
across the checkpoint. To date, ETD has primarily been used as a random or secondary screening
process applied to a percentage of the passenger population. It is expected that adoption will
continue to increase over the coming years and that selection methods will be refined to further
increase unpredictability.
As noted in earlier chapters, airports without other explosive detection capabilities are encouraged
to consider the use of ETD within their checkpoints.
5.2.1.2 Explosive Detection Dogs
EDDs have the potential to provide mobile detection capabilities within minimal passenger
disruption whilst also providing an additional visible deterrent. As the detection capability of the
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canines is different from that of the existing explosive detection technology, it can provide a further
increase in the detection probability when operated alongside existing procedures. One of the
important capabilities canines may have is to detect body cavity bombs, which most other
passenger screening equipment is currently unable to do.
EDD are already deployed in a range of transport settings, including airports, and with the ability to
easily move about the terminal while assessing a large number of passengers in a short space of
time, they offer greater operational flexibility than fixed screening equipment. Passengers
generally respond well to canines and their use is seen as fairly unobtrusive compared with other
checkpoint measures.
The main limitation of EDD today is the time that the canines can maintain effective detection
capabilities before requiring a break. In addition, training and human resources are other key
considerations for airports. As a result of these limitations, EDDs are generally not deployed as
permanent fixtures at passenger checkpoints, but rather, are used as roving resources or are
called to deal with specific issues. States are encouraged to think of innovative ways to incorporate
the use of EDD into checkpoint operations where it supports improved security, operational
efficiency or passenger experience.
5.2.1.3 Pat Downs and Searches
In addition to technology based alternative measures, many checkpoints incorporate some form of
pat down or hand search procedure, which may be applied to passengers and/or baggage. These
procedures are aimed at addressing any gaps in the technology and provide a means to identify
threats that may not have been picked up otherwise. These searches may be applied on a targeted
or purely random basis.
5.2.2 Unpredictability
As discussed above, in the absence of a single technology that can address all threats, it is not
practical or cost effective to screen all passengers via all technologies. As checkpoints become
busier and new threats emerge, unpredictability has come to play an important role in securing
airports.
The unpredictable use of alternative measures can enhance the effectiveness of pre-board
screening without disrupting the flow of passengers through the checkpoint. The advantage of
applying alternative screening methods is that an individual wishing to avoid detection has to
address the barriers of all the potential screening methods. Beyond the deterrence benefits, the
ability to intercept can be maximized.
The unpredictable use of alternative or secondary screening measures is already in use at airports
around the world, as part of both manual and automated processes. Unpredictability can be
considered in both the number of type of screening equipment and techniques used as well as in
the selection of passengers for screening via these technologies or methods.
Using equipment (rather than security officers) to select the individual passenger and item(s) at
random is the preferred alternative. This increases the passenger and security officer experience,
as it reduces the direct confrontation sparked from a security officer selecting an individual (which
could be the result of inaccurate personal perceptions on part of the officer and/or be perceived as
being a profiling based selection). This also allows for more control over the level, timing and
coverage of randomization. Whilst in use at a number of airports, it is expected that in the near
term a growing number of airports will adopt an automated driven approach.
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5.3 Solutions for tomorrow
5.3.1 Application of alternative measures
Smart Security strongly supports the use of random selection for all passengers as a method of
deterrence as well as security detection. However, the use of a more intelligent or targeted
approach could enable regulatory authorities to modify the frequency at which conventional
random methods are applied today and the manner in which it is used.
For example behaviour analysis and observations could be used to provide more focussed use of
secondary searches and reduce the random frequency among registered travellers or those in the
general population of passengers. Trained behaviour detection officers could determine this while
“combing” the queues or from information sent from the check-in areas or previous stages of
observation in the passenger journey through the airport, assuming a risk based framework exists.
Even better, the introduction of advanced technology could also reduce the frequency of random
checks as well as inform any risk assessment process. For example, chemical detection, ETD or
EDD in use within the checkpoint queue area could unobtrusively select passengers for automatic
secondary search, rather than through a purely random approach. These technologies could be
deployed either in a covert or overt manner, depending on the balance needed between passenger
experience and deterrence. There are some examples of this occurring today, although use is not
widespread. Where more work is needed in particular, is communicating the results of these
processes to the checkpoint without negatively impacting passenger experience.
5.3.1.1 New Technology
The use of technology for passenger selection provides opportunities for use of emerging
technologies, including those that may not yet be certified. Even if a particular piece of technology
is considered to have too many false positives it could still be used as a selection method (in place
of random) as the outputs from this technology would not be used with the purpose of standard
screening. Further to this, any false positives could actually serve the purpose of unpredictability
and deterrence.
Further work needs to be done in this area to understand what the resolution process would be if a
positive result is returned. From a facilitation and operational perspective, the ideal scenario would
be to have a silent alarm activated and the passenger automatically referred to an enhanced level
of screening at which time the alarm can be resolved. However, this may not be considered a
satisfactory security outcome, especially where a serious threat may have been identified. In this
regard, Smart Security encourages airports and regulatory authorities to further investigate how
new and emerging technologies can be used to support target selection of passengers for
alternative/additional security measures.
5.3.1.2 Risk based Regulatory change
As noted above, there are options related to random selection that could serve as alternative
measures to the current process that include:
Increase Random Measures and Decrease Sensitivity: It is worth evaluating the possibility to
adapt the sensitivity of screening devices in combination with other unpredictable measures. In
particular, this would apply to the WTMD and security scanner. A higher ratio of individuals
randomly selected could offset a decrease in detection sensitivity to enable small metallic items to
pass through without alarm (e.g. pocket change). Regulations in at least one region are under
review that could explore this option.
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Reduced Sample window to achieve a Ratio: some jurisdictions stipulate that a certain
percentage or volume of passengers is randomly selected for further inspection. However, the
period in which that must occur could be over the course of a day. The enforcement of the
percentage at shorter time intervals, for example, would improve the consistency of the selection
process as well as to reduce the potential for multiple passengers in a row being selected in order
to meet the specified quota at the end of a period.
5.3.2 Stand-off ETD
Traditional ETD is one of the more mature alternative measures that can be applied at the
checkpoint and is, unlike many others, currently certified for use. Airports are continuing to review
how ETD equipment can be most effectively deployed on a random basis, but many are also
beginning to focus on how the screening tool can be used on all passengers and/or in a more
automated and widespread fashion. As an example, early trials have demonstrated that vapor
based ETD technology presents interesting opportunities for collecting samples from automated e-
gate kiosks or from WTMDs as passengers use them, alleviating the need to apply and additional
process to the passenger.
If the walkthrough point were able to produce a real-time response (less than 1 second) it would be
sufficient to ensure the flow of passengers is structured but natural. These technologies could be
deployed even if not developed to a high level of accuracy, as long as the error rate occurs as false
positives (rather than failure to detect actual threats) as this would be in line with the
unpredictability and deterrence objectives outlined in this document.
5.3.3 Unpredictability
Whilst unpredictability today manifests in the selection and subsequent application of alternative
measures such as ETD, physical search etc., in the future the application of measures themselves
could become covert, with passengers not even aware that different measures have been applied
to them.
For example, lab trials of dynamically switching lanes have shown that it is technically possibly to
vary the algorithms on both passenger and cabin baggage screening equipment. This opens up
the possibility of randomly, or in a targeted manner, changing the number or type of algorithms
applied to a passenger or their baggage during the screening process. This has that benefit that all
passengers prepare in the same manner, whilst making it much harder for those with ill intent to
anticipate the system.
It is expected that initial use of dynamic lanes will largely be on a random basis (meeting today’s
regulatory requirements), however if and when risk based screening regimes are implemented,
these lanes will be able to facilitate targeted selection and application of measure based on risk.
5.4 Longer term Research and Development
5.4.1 Use of ETD as a primary screening measure
With ETD already used in some states as a primary screening measure for crew (in unpredictable
alternation with traditional screening methods), future work is needed to determine whether the
same principle, or a variation of it, could be applied to passengers as part of a risk-based
screening approach.
It is expected that any moves in this direction will involve significant international agreement and
liaison, particularly to avoid any impact on existing multilateral or bilateral recognition of
29
equivalence agreements. However, discussions on the viability of processes such as this should
commence in the near term and be incorporated into larger risk based screening discussions.
5.4.2 Risk based security
As noted in chapter 1, a number of states are currently investigating the option of differentiated
screening, whereby passengers may be screened differently based on the risk they might pose as
an individual or due to certain information that is known about them, their flight or their destination.
In this context, the ability to use multiple inputs into a given risk assessment is a key area of future
work.
If connectivity with the checkpoint is achieved, the checkpoint could receive real-time information
on which passengers have been observed and assessed at other contact points (e.g. check-in) or
for which confident data is available. The random selection could therefore be decreased for a
larger proportion of passengers and be used more readily for those of whom little is known and/or
observations leading to higher risk perceptions have been recorded.
Over time it is expected that more reliable and cost effective technology will gradually become
available, making it more attractive to deploy and adding to the overall security process. The net
result would be a general increase in the level of security applied to passengers, without increasing
their perceived process. This would further result in a higher deterrence level if the technology
were overt. However it would need to be accompanied by a lower frequency of random selections
to maintain a high passenger flow and should be applied as an intelligent replacement to purely
random measures and in support of passenger risk assessments, not as an additional security
burden on the passengers or operations.
5.4.3 Alternative Explosive Detection Technologies
In addition to conventional ETD and trace detection portals (nearing closer to operational
certification), further research should investigate other possible explosive detection technologies,
e.g. to operate in a covert manner to supplement primary passenger and cabin baggage screening.
As noted previously, testing has already been conducted in other sectors regarding stand-off laser
based explosive detection, which could conceivably be applied on entry doors or at other
touchpoints on the passenger journey. Trace detection technologies could also be applied during
any document check processes, helping to reduce the need for additional random checks at the
checkpoint.
Further investigation is needed to understand which of these technologies make sense in the
future, taking into consideration how the overall passenger journey will evolve over the coming
years. It is likely that many of the passenger touch points will be removed; making technology that
can be applied to basic infrastructure, such as entry doors, which all passengers must pass
through, all the more appealing.
Stakeholders will also need to understand how results of screening processes applied outside the
checkpoint area will be consolidated, and the resulting impact on the process applied to
passengers.
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6 Centralised Image Processing
6.1 Introduction
In the traditional checkpoint process, every open security lane requires an x-ray operator at the
checkpoint location to view and analyze the contents of cabin baggage and other passengers’
items as they pass through the machine. However, in this set up it is likely that neither the
machine, nor the operator, will be working to their full capacity as:
- The belt as to be stopped when X-ray operators need longer than usual time to assess an
image
- The in-feed of the x-ray is dictated by the passenger divestment time and the lane loading
at a specific period.
Centralized Image Processing (CIP), also sometimes referred to as ‘remote screening’ sees the
networking of checkpoint cabin baggage screening equipment that allows for the real-time
transmission of x-ray images to a remote location/s for review and analysis. In a CIP environment,
the x-ray operator is no longer attached to a dedicated x-ray and could potentially review images
produced by equipment located any distance apart from his/her screen. This provides airports with
the opportunity to configure their system so that the x-ray, the operators or both are working as
efficiently and effectively as possible.
Whilst CIP has been implemented at a number of airports and has already proven a number of
benefits, further work and research are required to ensure industry is able to get the most out of
this solution.
6.2 Solutions for today
6.2.1 Deployment models
Whilst there are a range of variables that should be considered when implementing CIP, including
things such as reject rates, processing times, training and regulatory requirements, there appear to
be three key decision areas that support the requirements for virtually all operational elements for
CIP implementation. These are:
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Resourcing – number of officers dedicated to x-ray analysis (can be more of less than the
number of machines);
Image presentation frequency and format – whether images come from a single
checkpoint, multiple checkpoints and from different types of checkpoints (staff v
passenger); and
Location – whether staff are co-located with the machines or in dedicated facilities either
on or off site.
It is a combination of these things that will determine the final deployment model for a given airport.
Even within a single airport, variables may change over the course of the day, for example one
centralized x-ray operator serving several lanes during quiet periods, and multiple x-ray operators
per lane (located both remotely and at the checkpoint) to support peaks.
Depending of the deployment model chosen by the airport, lane automation features (Automatic
tray Return Systems, automated tray separator, automated diverters) generally to be deployed to
reach the expected level of efficiency benefits. However, it has to be noted that in a low throughput
environment (such as staff screening points), CIP could be implemented with few hardware
upgrades of operational changes.
Much has been learnt from early CIP implementations and it is recommended that airports
continue to share as trials continue so that security effectiveness, operational efficiency and
passenger experience benefits can be quantified.
6.2.2 Security
It is assumed that centralized image processing will not only significantly improve the operation of
checkpoint, but also improve the security outcomes, as the officers are operating in a calmer,
quieter and more comfortable environment, away from the distractions of the checkpoint with no
opportunity to be coerced into making decision, either by spotting a passenger with whom they
have an arrangement (minimizing insider threat risk) or simply by trying to minimize a large queue
of passengers.
However further studies are required to validate these assumptions and to further understand how
security and detection performance is impacted by centralized screening. Of critical importance is
to determine formally if CIP has any risk of decreasing the level of security effectiveness, to make
sure all necessary risk mitigation measures are taken to avoid this.
As x-ray operators are no longer allocated to a specific x-ray, another potential security benefit of a
CIP environment is the capacity to use Combined Threat Images (CTI) for TIP, as already used in
hold baggage screening, where an entirely fictitious bag and fictitious threat is presented to
operators. This is in comparison to traditionally used Fictional Threat Images (FTI), where a
fictional threat item is inserted in a real bag. The benefit of using CTI over FTI are as follows:
CTIs have the potential to appear more realistic compared to FTIs;
CTIs also eliminates the possibility of masking a real threat with a fictional threat, which can
occur with FTI;
CTIs provide the foundation for a more fair assessment of x-ray operators competence and
training needs, as it is possible to determine the relative type and complexity of the images
in advance;
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Since February 2016, EU permits the use of CTIs as part of CIP. It is anticipated that other
international regulators will follow in the same footsteps.
Current studies have shown the operational benefits given by CIP, but few studies have
categorically concluded the systems robustness in terms of security. Airports and regulatory bodies
are encouraged to undertake further tests and trials and to share their findings with the wider
community.
6.3 Solutions for tomorrow
6.3.1 Variation on deployment models
Conceptually, with CIP there is no restriction on how far away an x-ray officer could be located
from the screening equipment. In the near term this may open up the possibility for centralized
image assessment centers centralized for an entire airport (including all passenger screening
points regardless of terminal).
6.3.2 Equipment Intelligence - Automated decision
To further enhance the efficiencies offered by CIP, the system can incorporate automated
decision-making, where the x-ray operator no longer has to review all of the images that are
produced by the screening equipment, namely:
Clearing very low clutter images (e.g. trays only containing a light jacket, a belt and a few
coins). The algorithm will assess the image as not containing any prohibited item and will
‘auto-clear’ the image, allowing the passenger to reclaim his tray without any human review
of the image. This has already trialed successfully in a lab environment.
Referring very high clutter images to secondary search, (e.g. bags containing thick metal
pieces). The algorithm would assess the image as too complex for on screen assessment
and will ‘auto-reject’ the tray for secondary screening even before any officer has seen it.
This is still under research and consideration,
By only sending images that require inspection to the x-ray operators and clearing or rejecting
others automatically and quickly, equipment intelligence can improve the x-ray operator’s utilization
and lane throughput.
6.3.3 Human Factors
As discussed in the following chapter, the unique CONOPS for CIP (remote in particular) opens up
the door for officer specialization or modifications to rotation times. It may even to some degree
change the type of person recruited into the role.
In the medium term it is envisaged that significant human factors studies will have been concluded,
resulting in optimized centralized image processing setups and configurations. This should result in
resourcing benefits and improved lane throughputs.
6.4 Longer term Research and Development
6.4.1 Variation on Deployment Models
It is expected that in the longer term, x-ray screening operations may be entirely decoupled from
airports, leading to further opportunities for CIP. For example:
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- A screening authority active in multiple small airports, instead of having to deploy an x-ray
officer for a couple of hours per day and a very low level of image to review will be able to
perform those operations from a central facility. The expected benefits will be:
o Cost reduction;
o An easier way to ensure that the screening is performed by an individual that is fully
trained, certificated and who is reviewing a sufficient number of images per day to
retain the screener’s skills.
- Large number of screeners could be allocated to the same screening location where
images from multiple checkpoints and airports belonging to different owners and/or located
across different countries could be received for reviewing leading to further efficiencies:
o Peaks in one of the networked airports might not be the same as in another one;
o Unexpected surges or drops in passenger numbers during operations will be easily
managed in terms of cabin baggage screening;
These above models listed as example, would need to be further evaluate to set the context in
term of cost sharing model, responsibility, regulatory environment, etc.
6.4.2 Human factors - specialization
In the longer term, an airport may choose to allocate to CIP a dedicated pool of security officers.
With different skill sets and aptitudes than their security officer colleagues at the checkpoint, this
decision could potentially optimize the labor cost and utilize more acutely performing security
officers for better detection and false alarm resolution.
If such task specialization occurs:
- Security officers with the primary role of image analysis at the centralized screening point
will need to be selected and trained on competencies associated with x-ray image threat
detection and interpretation, with strong spatial reasoning and a demonstrable ability to
remain vigilant and focused during screening periods.
- Security officers with the primary role of carrying out non x-ray image analysis tasks such
as bag/tray loading, passenger search, and passenger item/bag secondary search will
need to be more customer service orientated while maintaining a proficient understanding
of x-ray image analysis with respect to secondary search responsibilities at the checkpoint.
6.4.3 Other Sensor Feeds
For the longer term the introduction of passenger, image and risk assessment matching, with
specific action taken according to an individual's risk score in their entry in the secure passenger
information network is expected to be a common practice.
As a first step, it is anticipated that it will soon be possible to match each image to an individual
passenger (e.g. by a virtual tagging procedure at the checkpoint). This procedure will make it
possible to attach their risk level (from their identity) to the image, prior to its transmission to the
centralized image analysis location, where the specific screening decisions can be taken as
discussed in Chapter 3 and 4.
With increased networking of the airport, it is envisaged that other sensor feeds could support the
action taken with images. For example the checkpoint and hold baggage screening systems may
be linked and should a passenger's hold baggage fail initial screening and be sent for more
thorough inspection, this result could be fed into the checkpoint image analysis procedure and
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result in their hand luggage also automatically requiring manual or secondary inspection. Of course
managing of timing of these screening activities is critical to ensure that this could work.
How these kinds of approaches would play out in an airport environment would largely depend on
the deployment model implemented. But airports are encouraged to share their experiences with
early integration with risk based concepts so that processes and technology can be refined to
support ongoing operations.
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7 Staffing
7.1 Introduction
Since the start of the Smart Security program, technical solutions and associated processes have
evolved, resulting in an increased use of automation within the checkpoint. It is expected that this
trend will continue in the coming years, with even greater optimization possible, particularly in
relation to manual handling and flow management.
Whilst technology continues to improve however, it is not the intent of Smart Security to advocate
for the elimination of security officers from the checkpoint but rather to optimize their use so they
are able to focus on core detection and customer service related functions. The evolving
checkpoint raises important questions regarding recruitment, roles and responsibilities, training,
officer allocation and performance reviewing going forward. This chapter aims to identify some of
the possible changes that may be seen as a result of the changing checkpoint environment.
7.2 Solutions for today
7.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities
A trend towards a more customer service oriented security officer has recently emerged with
airports noting the compliance benefits these customer focused officers can bring, particularly
when engaged in the divest role. This is somewhat changing security officer demographics and
opening up questions as to whether specialization and differentiation within the checkpoint should
be considered.
With that in mind, to date, there have been few changes in the mandated training and qualification
requirements for security officers, meaning airports have only been able to take this concept so far.
Whilst some airports have been able to utilize customer service officers (who are not trained
security officers) within the checkpoint, many states still mandate training and qualification
requirements for all officers, regardless of the station they fill at the checkpoint.
On a similar vein, some airports have already reconsidered the role of the checkpoint supervisor
and are currently reviewing the key competencies required, developing different recruitment and
training streams for these roles. Like with customer service staff, it is expected that this revamp of
roles and responsibilities can have a positive effect on the checkpoint, however further work is
required to ensure that regulation supports the changing structure.
7.2.2 Rotation and officer allocation
A number of airports have started to vary officer rotation times and cycles in order to maximize
officer productivity, by reducing time spent moving between stations. The introduction of
Centralized Image Processing (CIP) has already seen some airports alter rotation time so that
officers spend up to two hours allocated to x-ray analysis activities before rotating back to the
checkpoint. Whilst there is no one size fits all, it is clear that in the short term a number of
efficiencies are available and airports are keen to exploit these. Therefore, the effect of shift length
and specialization on the performance of the officer is something that needs to be studied as well.
The ability to conduct the officer rotation based on a team concept is projected to provide similar
benefits in that it reduces the amount of transition time required between positions. A number of
airports have already made the switch to team based officer allocation, which in addition to
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operational flexibility provides greater control in relation to staff supervision, performance review
and management.
Further supporting officer allocation, is the emergence of real time data analysis. In the short term
it is expected that most, if not all, major airports will have some degree of real-time automated data
analysis. The ability to objectively view the current operating environment (live throughput, wait
time and officers per lane) will enable management to direct security officers to particular locations
based on passenger demand and/or identify areas not performing at optimal levels. This marks a
significant move away from static rotation and allocation plans used by many airports in the past.
7.2.3 Performance Review
Connected checkpoints and data collection and analysis now allow supervisors to look at
performance at an operationally diagnostic level for an individual security officer, the terminal or the
airport enabling a better understanding of specific areas for improvement, either on a team or
individual basis.
The use of networked secondary search stations for example (where the search officer can re-
classify an item after search processes are complete) allows shift managers to see how accurately
an officer rejected and classified suspected prohibited items.
Not only can connected checkpoints help identify whether officers are making correct decisions,
they can also assess the time the office took to make the decision. This is also important for an
efficient checkpoint, as officers who make fast decisions but with a lesser degree of accuracy may
have a negative impact on the checkpoint compared to those who take slightly longer, but are
more accurate.
Whilst an increasing use of data could be viewed negatively by security officers (with the
perception they are being micromanaged) management should focus on the positives this data can
bring. For example, offering targeted training on a per officer basis, adapting the compliance
information for passengers as well as providing feedback to regulatory authorities on what current
threats and trends may be, which can all help improve checkpoint operations.
7.2.4 Training
In the short term, modular training packages (already used by many airports) are likely to become
the norm, meaning that officers can be trained on tasks as and when is needed. Where permitted
under legislation, officers may even be able to commence as trainees in specific positions, as they
continue their training for other areas of the checkpoint. This kind of flexibility may be useful in
states where recruitment of new officers is a challenge.
Centralized Image Processing already sets the scene for a modified training program, with real
threat images able to be inserted into the image chain during lower peak periods, to supplement
standard TIP operations. Not only is this expected to produce greater benefits from training, but
also optimizes officer time as they can complete training activities during their shift.
7.2.5 Officer Driven Change
When it comes to checkpoint improvement projects, there has been a shift in the extent of officer
engagement, with airports now seeing officer input as a key element of design and operational
process development. Whilst this occurred to some degree in the past, often the focus was on
designing the best checkpoint for the passenger, whereas now, airports are recognizing the benefit
of designing checkpoints that meet both the needs of passengers and security officers.
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There have been a number of examples of airports working with security officers to determine what
elements the checkpoint needs to include, from break facilities, lighting, space, storage right down
to the ergonomics of the particular elements of the lane itself. Those that have taken this approach
have reported a more motivated and happy workforce with officers more invested and proud of
their role. It is expected that more airports will adopt this approach to change management and
checkpoint improvement in the coming years.
7.3 Solutions for tomorrow
7.3.1 Roles and Responsibilities
As noted above, most states are currently quite specific in the roles and responsibilities as well as
qualification and training requirements of those working within the checkpoint environment. With
some initial moves already underway it is expected that in the medium term, greater flexibility will
be introduced which will allow airports to recruit and train officers best suited to specific roles,
whilst managing resource allocation to meet security outcomes. Assuming this is possible, many of
the following are likely to become more common:
Specialization
It is expected that as the checkpoint evolves, and automation plays a greater role, security officer
functions may be further adapted or streamlined. Whereas officers in the past were trained for all
manner of roles, in the medium term, some specialization may emerge. It could be expected that
officers may be specialized in either image analysis or checkpoint operations, as the image
processing could be at a distant centralized location (remote CIP). Whilst not suitable for all
airports, a number of states are currently considering how this kind of staffing model may benefit
them, but see possible benefits particularly where small regional airports are concerned.
There may also be other specialists such as behavior analysis or canine handling.
Service Focus
As the x-ray technology improves, it will reduce the need for divest procedures such as those
currently required for electronic computers as well as liquids, aerosols and gels. Subsequently, the
role of the ‘divest’ officer function may evolve to enable a customer service specialist with
knowledge of the security process to fill that role. Eventually, the standard screening lane could
have a number of security officers as well as customer service agents. For enhanced screening the
divest role could be filled by a security officer with completed training in behavior analysis.
Further automation of tasks
An additional opportunity lies in the use of technology to fill the customer service function at divest.
Recent initiatives at airports have introduced holograms of people to facilitate customer service.
Traditionally this has been used outside the security checkpoint, but there is the possibility to use
the hologram to facilitate the divesting process or other customer service focused roles. The divest
position of a ‘registered traveler’ lane for example, could be an ideal location for a trial of this
nature.
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7.3.2 Recruitment and Training
Specialization and the evolution of checkpoint tasks has the potential for security officers to have
different skill sets and aptitudes from those needed today which is expected to help optimize labor
cost and utilize more acutely performing security officers for better detection and false alarm
reduction.
In line with this, it is expected that the recruitment and selection process will have to be altered to
attract the individuals that will be best matched to the roles and responsibilities of a security officer
in the long term vision of the checkpoint. This may have a positive impact on the checkpoint, with
officers being recruited who may not have previously had an interest in security tasks.
As equipment evolves and gets more intelligent, automated and reliable, a shift towards security
officer specialization may change the focus of training required per officer. For example, an officer
who is currently responsible for divestiture, x-ray inspection, manual search and prohibited item
detection as well as WTMD and hand held metal detection and passenger hand search during a
shift needs to be trained in all areas. With enhanced specialization, a security officer could be
recruited to conduct specific roles and may be trained to different levels for primary and secondary
duties. All training however should be sufficient to provide robust security in all circumstances and
consider how much the skill of the officer affects the process, i.e. if the security criteria are based
heavily on the operator or highly sophisticated equipment (e.g. automated threat detection on the
x-ray and/or centralized image processing). Contingency planning will also need to be considered
so that lack of appropriately trained officers does not impact checkpoint operations.
7.3.3 Staff Allocation and Deployment: Current and Forecast
As outlined in the Roles & Responsibilities section above, the medium term vision for the
checkpoint is expected to have reduced the number of security officers performing manual and
purely customer service tasks. As a result, the number of officers today will be able to process a
greater number of passengers in the future and thus be in a better position to handle expected
traffic growth. These considerations will need to be factored in to the staff allocation and
deployment system of the screening authority.
Forecasting and Planning
Improved modeling and simulation will enable the supervisory team to assess the potential impact
of different staff allocation and deployment models. This will significantly contribute to the
effectiveness of a checkpoint management
Forecasting is dealt with in more detail in the checkpoint management chapter, however, it is
expected that as data integration and sharing between airport stakeholders improves, security
managers will be able to better predict, in real time, their staffing allocation needs. In particular,
these systems will be able to readily adapt for unplanned circumstances such as group arrivals,
delays in other parts of the passenger process, weather conditions, traffic or public transport
delays. With near real time information, security managers will be able to make quick decisions to
reallocate staff members, or open security lanes before problems arise.
It is also expected that in the medium term the processes and methodologies of staff allocation and
deployment for checkpoint screening will have evolved to reflect any integrated risk-based
concepts. As a result, the developed forecast models will need to be adaptable to reflect the
changing dynamics of the checkpoint.
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Staff Allocation and Tasks
Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the human factors that impact a screening
officers’ performance of their duties. This has led to fairly standardized task and rotation
requirements to help support and manage work related fatigue and maintain effective task related
performance.
However, as technology improves, and many roles are supported by automation or decision
support, there is a need to re-assess elements such as rotation time and order and the impact
these have on detection and compliance. Both time on task and complexity of images or search
will impact an officer’s effectiveness. To date, time is the key element that defines rotations, with
complexity of task and physical fatigue only secondary considerations. In the future however, there
may be a greater rotation variance between roles, with even greater flexibility for airports to design
rotations to suit their officers.
Real time information on performance or task complexity could provide a further input, with
rotations not set, but rather influenced by what is happening in the checkpoint at the time. For
example, if an officer reaches a point in their shift where they are making a number of errors, the
supervisor could elect to commence a rotation early. Equally, if x-ray operators are receiving a high
number of low complexity images, they could be left in place for a longer period of time.
7.3.4 Performance Review
Officer input is important for evaluation purposes as well. As the methods and ways in which
performance review is carried out needs to evolve, officer input on these aspects needs to be
taken into consideration. This is further supported by the fact that not only officer functions will
evolve, as in addition there will be evolution of the relations between staff and the new equipment
and methods they will be using.
As noted above real time analysis of the checkpoint may not only support rotation times but also
officer training and development. Presently the key benefits are in relation to those conducting x-
ray operations and related search activities. But in the medium term it is expected that further data
may be available regarding performance on other tasks as well. Connected checkpoints may have
the ability to provide real time and daily information on all elements of officer performance.
Intervention could be made swiftly when needed and shift review could become a key part of
officer de-brief using accurate and qualitative data sources to help officers improve performance.
7.4 Longer Term Research and Development
7.4.1 Impact of CIP performed away from airports
For the longer term, as it is possible that the centralized screening of images will have moved
further away from the checkpoint it is likely that security officers will not just have different skills
sets, but be specialists in their area. For example geographical distance may even prevent
screeners from ever working at the checkpoint or even an airport at all. X-ray image analysis
activities may be centralized across a number of airports, particularly in regional airports.
Given the right regulatory environment, there may be further decoupling of x-ray analysis duties
from standard security tasks. “Centre of excellence” style screening providers, who only provide x-
ray analysts for cabin and hold baggage, may emerge to address the targeted needs of airports. All
of these changes are likely to make operations more cost effective and potentially even improve
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security outcomes, by utilizing officers specialized in x-ray image analysis. This would change as
well the complete paradigm of human factors for the x-ray screening officer.
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8 Checkpoint Management
8.1 Introduction
The Smart Security program is designed to capitalize on the evolution of technology to deliver new
detection capabilities as well as improve the passenger experience. As a result, a dynamic IT
infrastructure could help airports better coordinate and share information, monitor performance and
enable the technical integration of all checkpoint elements.
A holistic checkpoint management system should provide airports with a tool to integrate the data
streams produced by the various equipment and software that are related to the screening and
security operations, as well as data from external sources. Through this data integration, airports
should be able to plan their resources in more efficient way, to obtain real time information
enabling them to adjust their operations to the daily variations (flight delays, staff absenteeism,
etc.) and to assess how their checkpoint and staff operate based on accurate information. This
information would be used to improve the passenger journey and experience and enable the
airport and airline to make quicker decisions based on accurate, real time information.
8.2 Solutions for today:
8.2.1 Dashboard Control
During recent years, solutions have been developed internally by airports and externally by
integrators or manufacturer to increase the connectivity of the checkpoint screening technologies in
order that data gathered all across the process is sent to a supervisory system.
Aside from the technologies themselves, airport checkpoint operations make use of various data
source such as staff resource demand and supply, passengers forecast, boarding token scanning
or queue time. Those sources are usually generated by independent hardware and software
elements that could be fed as well to the supervisory system as mentioned above.
For the checkpoint supervisors, a dashboard could clearly display the performance, connectivity
and status of all technologies as well as the data needed to operate efficiently the checkpoint (e.g.:
staff resource supply, queue time, passengers forecast). The dashboard should be available at a
central office location and accessible via mobile devices (through the airports data network) to
provide measures such as key performance indicators to supervisors at the checkpoint, so that
they may understand how the system and security officers are performing. This information could
be used to make operational management decisions.
Recent trials and deployment across the globe have proved that such dashboard is already
achievable and solutions providers are working to develop off-the-shelf solutions for the airports.
8.2.1.1 Equipment networking
A fundamental element of an effective dashboard control is accurate and timely data inputs.
Airports are already starting to network their checkpoints, enabling them to better understand
throughputs, bottlenecks, security performance etc. While not all elements of the process are
currently capable of being network it is expected that research will continue….
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8.2.1.2 Additional outputs
In addition to supporting checkpoint supervisors and security managers, a checkpoint management
system could also be configured to provide separate information for the airlines and other
stakeholders (including border control agencies). For example at the gate it could provide the list of
passengers, the time they went through security (and importantly those who have not yet been
through security) and the messages presented to them. This would provide the airlines with basic
information on the passenger’s movement in the airport and help with flight departing punctuality.
8.2.2 Additional inputs
By adding tagging devices in their checkpoint, airports can capture information that identifies which
officers are performing which task at any given moment. The record trails from tagging systems
can be used for performance review as described in chapter 7, quality control and efficiency
purpose as described below.
8.2.3 Planning and Forecasting
There are potentially two forms of data that would feed into a Checkpoint Management system. -
Advanced planning information, to support airports plan resources and lane openings, as well as
real time information to help airports re-shuffle resources on the day to cope with unexpected
demands.
Whilst networking of the checkpoint and use of dashboard control will go some way to addressing
the real time element of the system, the longer term planning and rostering of staff still remains a
largely manual process for many airports, with security teams often comparing recent and historical
data against predicted airline loads and departure times. This current system has many limitations
and while dashboard control systems that can collect and analyze data go some way to addressing
the challenges, further work is still needed in this area.
In the short term airports should seek easy ways to integrate this data into their systems for
example by providing templates for external stakeholders (airlines, governments etc.) to provide
information so it can be easily entered into the system.
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8.2.4 KPI/KPM
In order to monitor checkpoint performance as well as the impact of any changes to the
checkpoint, airports will need to define a baseline set of measures.
To define the right set of information sent to the CMS for a given operational environment, Smart
Security Guidance Material on CMS describes a list of KPI and KPM that could be used by the
airport to measure their efficiency, passenger experience and security effectiveness.
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are a set of high level measures that help define success. The
“WHAT”.
Key Performance Metrics (KPMs) are the “HOW”. These are the measures an airport will use to
demonstrate that there has been a change in the KPI.
Using KPI and KPM that share the same definitions across the airport community will also allow
airports to benchmark themselves more easily.
8.3 Solutions for tomorrow
8.3.1 Evolution of the Dashboard Control
Initially the dashboard would be an information sharing platform to create situational awareness.
However, as it evolves and becomes more dynamic, it is envisaged that for the medium term it
could provide more action oriented support, including explicit suggestions and recommendations to
resolve situations.
8.3.2 Planning and forecasting
In the media term it is expected that at least some data sources from external stakeholders may
be incorporated into the CMS to support improved planning, reducing the manual data processing
discussed above. However, in order for this to occur, a platform (within the CMS or eternal to it)
may need to be developed in order to support sharing of this information, whilst at the same time
protecting commercial and security interests of external stakeholders.
Alternatively, if stakeholders are unwilling or unable to provide real time data to support the CMS
(such as passenger arrival at the airport) airports should seek other ways to collect this
information. Technology that enables reading of mobile boarding passes even when phones are
switched off, beacons, electronic gates and other similar technologies that can be applied early in
the passenger journey should be investigate for their ability to provide real time data inputs.
8.3.3 Merging of SeMS and CMS
Security Management System (SeMS) are slowly gaining prominence in the airport environment.
SeMS is a way for airports and airlines to manage security through a systematic, organized
approach. As SeMS requires an effective measurement of its security performance, it relies on
various data related to security operations (training, covert-tests, certification) to provide a dynamic
quality control there will be an opportunity in the future to feed some Data from the SeMS into the
CMS.
By displaying to checkpoint supervisors live information regarding the compliancy level and the
quality control of the security operations, they will be able not only to insure a better efficiency but
also to take immediate actions to solve issues that are security related (e.g.: the CMS could trigger
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alarms if a security officer is not trained or certified appropriately for the position he/she is currently
assigned for).
Further to the above, in the medium term it is likely that regulatory bodies will provide additional
flexibility in how airports can apply security measures provide that security outcomes are met. This
could result in a checkpoint where different measures, with varying ratios applied across different
lanes in the checkpoint. In this kind of environment, the ability, in real time to measure compliance
with mandated screening ratios will be a critical functionality for security managers.
8.4 Longer term Research and Development
8.4.1 Evolution of the dashboard control
For the long term it is envisaged that the dashboard system will have increasingly become action
orientated providing not only recommendations to resolve issues, but will also take automated
decisions to remedy situations dynamically, using artificial intelligence capabilities and contextual
rules.
8.4.2 Planning and Forecasting
It is expected that in the longer term a fully integrated airport wide data system will be in place that
supports provision of information to all stakeholders, including security managers. This system will
not only protect the confidentiality and commercial elements of provided data, by may be
customizable so that different stakeholders have different levels of access.
The system may even include functionality that scans the internet for key events and activities
such as road closures, sporting events and festivals, weather conditions etc. to more accurately
predict the impact on passenger arrival times and ultimately the resourcing required at security.
Questions still remain about the technological capabilities and platform to do this, who would
control and run such a systems and what information would ultimately need to be collected and
how long it would be retained. However, airports and their stakeholders are encouraged to
proactively start thinking about how they could collaborate to develop such a system.
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9 Checkpoint Environment
9.1 Introduction
Until recently, very little change had occurred within the checkpoint environment, with a typical
checkpoint layout and configuration being deployed at most airports. The introduction of newer
screening technologies has given rise to opportunities to re-think and reshape how security is
carried out. A number of airports have made tremendous progress in this regard seeing
considerable improvements in operational efficiency and passenger experience as a result of their
changes. A number of these innovations (aimed primarily at reducing the burdens imposed upon
the traveler, maximizing efficiency and providing officers with the best means to perform their
duties) and their expected progression is detailed in the following pages and largely focuses on:
Checkpoint Design and Configuration
Checkpoint Automation
Checkpoint Design (Look & Feel)
Passenger Communication and Feedback
9.1.1 Checkpoint Overview – Key Elements
In general, checkpoints today are organized in a number of key functional processes that
determine the flow of the passenger across the security screening process, and involve the
matching of timings between the passenger dependent activities (e.g. divesting) and security
activities (e.g. x-ray image analysis). This matching determines not only the throughput (as
discussed in other chapters), but also how the passenger perceives the process. Changes in one
area therefore, can have a huge impact on the rest of the checkpoint.
The typical “pipe-line” flow is:
Passenger Preparation – provides an opportunity for passengers to remove any items not
permitted through the checkpoint and to prepare their belongings.
Queuing – often intertwined with passenger preparation.
Divest – includes both tables and roller beds linked to the x-ray where passengers are able
to present their belongings for screening.
Core screening activities – includes both primary and secondary screening/search as well
as any mandated random measures.
Composure – area available for passenger repacking of belongings
Egress – the area allocated for passengers to wait for accompanying travelers and exit the
checkpoint
9.2 Solutions for today
9.2.1 Checkpoint Design and Configuration
Trends over the last few years have been towards longer and thinner checkpoints, with individual
lanes able to process a higher number of passengers. In addition, airports are planning for more
space between lanes recognising newer equipment is larger. To this end, airports have begun
experimenting with how passenger screening equipment is laid out between the lanes, with some
(where space permits) opting to stagger equipment to ensure a constant passenger flow.
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The additional space also provides greater flexibility in staffing options for the area. With more
space allowing for more search officers (which for many airports is the limiting factor) to passenger
throughput once you optimise the x-ray.
Moreover, there are trends towards designing for flexibility, making sure that the checkpoint has
room to expand should additional space be needed in the future.
Airports have not only focussed on designing for passengers, but also designing for staff, with
some new designs incorporating additional services and break areas for officers.
Airports have also recognised that as they optimise various elements of the process, divest, x-ray,
passenger screening for example, that bottle necks move to other areas of the checkpoint, namely
egress zones. As a result, allocation of additional space for this part of the process has been a
design criterion for many.
In some states, airports also have significant flexibility with how they meet mandated regulatory
requirements, in particular for random or secondary measures which may only apply to a
percentage of passengers. As a result, not all lanes within the checkpoint may be identical in their
layout.
9.2.2 Checkpoint automation
Legacy lay-out configurations limit how much airports can maximize the in-feed and out-feed of the
cabin bag screening equipment. This can lead to higher cost, limited throughput, capacity issue
and ultimately having a negative impact on passenger experience.
Automated solutions to many of the above challenges are now available and becoming
commonplace in major airports, allowing them to enhance the passenger experience, improve
security officer performance and satisfaction, and drive operational efficiencies. It is also important
to note that automation has the potential to improve security since passenger and tray can be
connected with time stamps and as images are stored for a while which makes it possible to track
back incidents at checkpoints. These new lane automation elements include:
Refined passenger divest and x-ray in-feed and out-feed models (e.g. continuous tray
movement to enhance divestment speed and optimal use of composure space)
Efficient passenger-security officer interaction points
Automated tray return systems
Automated bag divert systems
Tray to image matching via RFID or Barcode
Bag alarm resolution stations with targeted search screens
Refined secondary screening equipment (and its positioning)
Automated passenger selection for secondary search
9.2.3 Checkpoint design (Look & feel)
There is an abundance of research indicating the extent to which the look and feel of a particular
environment can influence behavior and/or customer and staff satisfaction. In aviation, many
airports have allocated significant resources to enhancing the look of common areas and on-site
retail locations, while at the same time largely ignoring checkpoint aesthetics.
This is changing, however, with several airports in recent years focusing more on visual design and
environmental factors like lighting, sound, and smell. By investing in the look and feel of the
checkpoint, these airports hope to reduce passenger anxiety and improve passenger satisfaction
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with the screening process. These airports also anticipate that the new elements will create a
better working environment for staff and will result in security officers taking fewer sick days and
performing better in their roles.
9.2.4 Passenger Communication and Feedback
In the past little information was provided to passengers regarding the security process. Today
airport, airline and government websites provide information to help passengers prepare for the
airport, signage and dedicated support staff are often on site to provide information as passengers
enter the checkpoint and many airports have started to provide what could be termed “facilitation
information” such as queue times, walk to gate times and other information that enhances the
passenger experience and allows them to better plan their journey.
In relation to passenger feedback, many airports have started to employ feedback mechanisms at
the end of lanes, to capture real time passengers thoughts as soon as they complete the process.
To supplement this, airports may also offer feedback opportunities via social media, which is useful
as it allows dedicated one to one follow up as well as general education opportunities for a wider
group of travellers.
9.3 Solutions for tomorrow
9.3.1 Checkpoint Automation
9.3.1.1 Selection Mechanisms
Automated selection mechanisms, to some degree already happening today, may become more
targeted. Automated entry gates/swing gates may replace the need for officers currently carrying
out directional activities such as lane allocation or queuing for secondary screening. This kind of
technology already exists but to date has not been widely deployed or tested in an airport
environment.
9.3.1.2 Virtual tray tagging
Whilst tray to image matching is available and currently supports bag search officers to pull up the
correct image on their screen whilst conducting a search, in the future this tray tagging could serve
additional purposes. For example security officers at any point in the process could apply a virtual
tag to the bag based on:
Its contents;
Behavioral indicators exhibited by a passenger;
9.3.2 Communication with the passenger
Communication with passengers today is passive, in many cases it is the passenger that must take
action to find the information. In the near term in is envisaged that airlines will start to push
communications to passengers automatically. For example, As soon as a boarding pass is
detected beyond the security area (e.g. scanned after a bag search, or in a retail transaction), a
signal can be triggered and the passenger will receive message on their mobile device (SMS or
email).
For security specifically, airports could use these channels to communicate security related
information (e.g. expected security wait times, and actual wait times as the passenger approaches
the security area as well as providing feedback mechanisms).
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Some early work on this kind of push based information has been done, however airport
stakeholders tend to act in isolation. Airports should therefore seek to understand how they can
access existing communication routes (particularly airlines products) and should commence early
work to develop common platforms withal stakeholders.
9.4 Longer term Research and Development
9.4.1 Checkpoint Design and Configuration
In the longer term it is possible that the checkpoint itself may look entirely different. With both cabin
and passenger screening technologies evolving (able to process larger numbers, with less
divestment) future design proposals may not even keep the two process linked in the way they are
today.
Assuming that technology will continue to progress as it does, work should be done to understand
how the future checkpoint may work both in terms of equipment needed as well as passenger
journey and overall configuration.
9.4.2 Automation
9.4.2.1 Self Service
Whilst today airports operate with a combination of manual and semi-automated lanes, at least for
some groups of passengers, airports may introduce the self-service concept – a fully automated
lane where interaction is only required to resolve alarms.
9.4.2.2 Virtual Tagging
In a risk based differentiated screening environment tray tagging will be an essential requirement
to ensure that the tray is screened to the same level as the passenger. This will require a direct link
between the passenger and the tray. Some airports already possess the technology to do this by
scanning the barcode in the passenger’s boarding card in conjunction with the tray’s tag. However,
an automated system would ensure the divest office could focus on core divest/loading activities if
in fact, an officer is even still in this role.
In a networked environment Biometrics could be used for tray-owner reconciliation. Not only would
this support security outcomes, ensuring the passenger and bag were screened to the same level,
but it would also support the collection of useful information that could be fed back into checkpoint
managements systems, including divest profiles and patterns that could be filtered by things such
as destination, gender or type of flight. This level of detail could provide valuable insights to
support improved checkpoint operations, in particular the deployment of staff.
It also expected that tray and passenger matching will allow redesigning the lanes, especially at
the reclaim/recheck position. For instance, trays belonging to a specific passenger could be
segregated from other trays. This opens opportunities to redefine the reclaim area in a set-up
where trays are stored in areas that are dynamically allocated to a specific passenger
9.4.3 Communication with the passenger
As noted above, proactive communication with the passenger through push style messaging is
already available in the market though not largely coordinated. Where airports and passengers can
benefit the most will be through an integrated communication strategy. It is expected that in the
future stakeholders may operate from a single platform with passengers able to receive all
messages relevant to them quickly and easily.
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In addition, through understanding passenger data (shopping habits, check-in and boarding times,
even how early they go through security etc.) stakeholders can more accurately target messages,
Search engines like google and even sites like Facebook all use historical tracking data to provide
targeted messaging and advertising to users, and it is likely that in the future this sort of data use
will make its way into airport environments.
This kind of airport wide passenger communication strategy not only aligns with the work of Smart
Security but also the end-to end passenger vision that IATA and ACI both support.
In terms of feedback mechanisms it is expected that airports will follow airlines in increasingly
using social media a means by which to collect feedback on services, including security. Moreover,
with the emergence of Big Data airports may have the opportunity to find what travelers are saying
about their security processes even without providing explicit feedback. Again, this can be useful
both from the customer service point of view as well as to find out if there is a perception of
security issues in the public domain.
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10 Dependencies, Constraints, Assumptions.
10.1 Screening processes and technologies
10.1.1 Airports
It is expected that regulators will gradually move away from the WTMD based screening process.
Therefore, airports should be encouraged to deploy security scanners as soon as possible to learn
CONOPS before regulators move to mandatory security scanners.
Relating to CIP, decoupling the screening operations from the airport will rely on the existence of a
strong, robust and secure network. Airports planners and airport IT departments are encouraged to
take into consideration the need for such a network architecture in the future.
It also important to note that the bandwidth required by the CIP environment will increase
continuously with the gradual introduction of advanced cabin screening equipment. Enabling the
integration of cabin baggage screening, staff carry-on screening and hold baggage screening will
increase the requirements for bandwidth as well.
In order to implement the new technologies, screening authorities will be required to work with their
policy and regulatory departments to ensure the governance of aviation security enables their
advancement. Some of the key metrics that will need to be tested against, as applicable, will be for
example the rate of false positives, false negatives, throughput rates, spatial dimensions and cost.
10.1.2 Industry
Standardizing the hardware and making it suitable for third party software is going to be a
challenge, not only from the point of view defining the standards, but also from the industry
accepting that this is the way forward rather than resorting to proprietary protocols to protect their
place in the market.
Software/Hardware decoupling is critical, as this will enable analysis algorithms to evolve and be
deployed at a much quicker pace, which is necessary to keep up with the evolution of threats in
conjunction with the increase in volume of passengers and the customer service level they expect.
One key aspect to support software/hardware decoupling is the standardization of the image
format and the image transfer protocols from the scanning equipment to the image servers, e.g. for
when CIP is used.
10.1.3 Regulators
Updates from regulatory and security intelligence activities to the threat or prohibited items
database will drive the deployment of advance technologies. International coordination and
alignment on the prohibited item database as well as on the performance of the equipment is
essential to create and unify efficient passenger travel.
The advancement of enhanced detection technologies will depend on their ability to provide
additional security detection capabilities at a performance level that is supportive of the air
transport industry. Advancement in one element without consideration for the other does not align
with the next generation of aviation security.
It will be important to understand the impact of other jurisdiction procedural and regulatory
changes. Smart Security fully supports the mutual recognition that occurs between countries to
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enable a passenger screened in one country to arrive in another without the need to be re-
screened at the gate, as is commonplace today for Annex 17 compliant countries.
However it will be important for countries to clearly understand how alternative or unpredictable
measures may impact the acceptance of these passengers both on arrival but also for those
connecting onward to a third country.
10.2 Alternative measures - Airports considerations
For each of the alternative measures described across this document, there is a resource or
equipment requirement in order for them to be effective.
Resources will be required to develop and implement any new explosive detection systems and
even in an automated system it remains likely that an officer will be required to be able to resolve a
potential alarm or to manage communication with the checkpoint.
The identified alternative measures should be considered a compliment to the regular checkpoint
operations. For example, a canine that is only effective for 3-4 hours per day would create a
considerable resource expense to have the necessary number canine teams available to cover the
checkpoint operating hours. Canine units require a substantial level of resources to train, maintain
and patrol. However, there is an opportunity for agreements to be established with government
authorities and/or private contractors to provide canine inspection to the checkpoint area at a
predetermined schedule, which would reduce the overhead costs associated with the canines.
Given the potential resource increase that may be required in the coming years, in line with general
Smart Security principles, airports are encourage to automate checkpoint processes where they
can, so that officers are freed up to focus on core screening activities.
10.3 Alternative measures – regulators considerations
10.3.1 Outcome based security
Where possible, introducing additional or unpredictable measures into security regulations should
be considered with the aim of producing the same or greater security outcome without additional
burden, with other techniques applied randomly or at different locations.
For the medium term, alternative measures should be considered by regulators, with the aim to
increase deterrence through unpredictability, without increasing the overall screening time.
In determining these alternative measures, consideration should be given to the visibility of the
random/unpredictable nature of the security screening process in order to maximize the deterrent
effect.
Regulators should consider new and alternative measures within the overall measures
implemented at the Airport. If alternative measures are applied prior to primary screening at the
checkpoint, the need for additional or random measures within the checkpoint should be
reconsidered.
10.3.2 Balance between facilitation and unpredictability
It is expected that in a few years with the use of alternative measures, the checkpoint process will
be unpredictable for those with mal-intent. However in support of the passenger experience
elements of the Smart Security program, the passenger journey should not be unduly impacted or
be subjected to a longer security process without justification.
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Alternative measures should be balanced with simplified or facilitated screening processes that
increase the throughput capacity of the checkpoint, whilst at the same time address all security
issues.
For example, the automated random algorithm application on the cabin baggage x-ray or security
scanners may provide an enhanced level of screening for prohibited items yet not impact the
passenger processes. Where a risk based differentiation system exists, the application of varying
algorithms may be linked to the risk level of a passenger, rather than being applied on a purely
random basis.
10.4 Process Consistency
Passengers who travel frequently are able to quickly go through the screening process due to the
fact that they know what to expect and how to manage the process (which could also be seen as a
vulnerability of the checkpoint). The introduction of unpredictable measures (either by using
randomness or a variety of alternative systems) is a source of potential frustration to these
travellers but at the same time a source of resilience against ill intentions.
The current principle should be defined (and to be accepted by passengers) that no one (even the
most seasoned traveller) should be able to “crack the code” to get consistently through the lowest
security path, as this would become a critical weak link to target in the whole security system.
10.5 Human Factors and Passenger experience
Screening technologies require security officer involvement to operate the device and/or resolve
alarms. As a result, human factors and its integration with technology has an important role in
improving system performance and should be considered when developing and implementing
technologies.
While introducing new advanced screening equipment, regulators, together with manufacturers,
will also need to anticipate passenger and staff concerns about privacy, but also health impacts of
these new machines. The publication of impact assessments covering potential concerns of the
general public should be considered.
Human factors and integration with technology, as well as relative to the effect in passenger
experience, play an important role in improving system performance and should be considered
when developing and implementing such technologies.
As security must also include a focus on the passenger experience, it is important to note that
future detection capabilities should not be introduced to the checkpoint environment unless proven
or accompanied by other measures to maintain (at a minimum) or preferably enhance the
operational efficiency of the checkpoint. This will promote faster throughput rates, which support
the ability to reduce queue times and move the passenger through the screening process faster
and more conformably.
With a focus on optimization of security technologies it is recommended for Smart Security
technology trials that human factors integration plans (HFIP) are developed to support effective
operational deployment of security technologies.
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10.6 Roles, Responsibilities and Training
A particular focus for the Smart Security program will be to identify and define opportunities for
optimized staff utilization in response to the trend for fewer manpower resources to be available at
the security checkpoint. As such, it will be important to define roles and responsibilities that
optimize the security officer utilization as well as to ensure that a motivated, well trained work force
is deployed on the ground. From a screening authority leadership perspective, this will require
additional resources to establish new measurements and techniques to better understand the
current staff allocation successes and failures and project the results forward to the forecasted
travel growth rates.
The definition of roles and responsibilities need to be updated in coordination with the evolution of
the Smart Security program. In particular, as trial initiatives or new processes, technologies, and
procedures are introduced, the security officer needs to be involved from the onset. This will
promote their support for the new concepts as well as facilitate their ability to provide input and
feedback with regards to their role. This can be enhanced and optimized through the introduction
of more formalized human factor integration (HFI) plans and programs
Whilst airports should seek to optimize checkpoint operations, which may include specialization of
roles, airports must ensure appropriate contingencies are in place so that operations can continue
(without minimum operational impact to key stakeholders) should threat levels be increased, or
forecasting incorrect.
For the medium term it is expected that new elements of screening technology and processes will
be introduced. As a result, new certification and training programs will need to be developed and
delivered to the security officers.
10.7 Ongoing threat assessments and information sharing
One of the main regulatory drivers regarding the introduction of enhanced detection capability will
be change to the prohibited item list. ICAO, together with Member States, are encouraged in the
short to mid-term to review their approach to the prohibited item and threat list with the aim to
introduce a more adaptive risk-based approach to the checkpoint detection requirements (which
could also be expanded to other areas like aircraft security for instance).
10.8 Checkpoint Environment
Industry is increasingly promoting an “end-to-end passenger experience that is secure, seamless,
and efficient”. Consideration should be given to ensuring that various elements of the passenger
journey are compatible, that infrastructure and systems are maximized and that there is minimal
duplication of effort, both on the part of the passenger and key stakeholders.
Smart Security should then promote the adoption of standards across the various stakeholders that
are active in a passenger’s journey.
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Annex A
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Annex A - Recommendations
Since 2012, Smart Security stakeholders have tested and evaluated various concepts to facilitate
improved operational efficiency, security effectiveness and passenger experience of checkpoints
around the globe. Several of the trial concepts are now permanently installed and fully operational
in a number of airports and Smart Security and industry stakeholders are invested in seeing wider
adoption.
However, to achieve the vision of Smart Security there is still further work to do, in particular the
continued refinement and improvement of existing technologies to ensure they can address future
threats, remain operationally efficient and contribute to a smooth experience for passengers.
This Annex contains a set of recommendations to support further development of technologies,
concepts and process considered as part of the Smart Security project.
A. Risk based differentiation
1. Further work needs to be undertaken in order to better understand the benefits and
constraints of the various risk based differentiation solutions.
Key to this work will be identify what outcomes industry is seeking to address via risk based
differentiation and assessing whether solutions are possible, practical, politically acceptable
and worthwhile (compared to alternatives that may deliver similar/the same outcomes).
2. Investigate and develop frameworks for national risk based passenger
differentiation.
Key areas to consider include:
• Defining which model is best suited to the national environment;
• Whether the model is suitable for application with domestic and international flights
• Regarding the latter, any implications for recognition of equivalence;
• Identity management – capture, storage and utilization through the journey.
• Whether an integrated risk based approach on collaboration with border agencies may
offer additional security benefits beyond the checkpoint.
3. In order to ensure continued recognition of equivalent security measures across
borders, key stakeholders (national regulators, policy setters and international
bodies) should work towards and agreed international framework for risk based
passenger differentiation.
Key areas to consider may include:
• Minimum acceptable screening requirements;
• Minimum data sets needed for a robust risk assessment;
• Agreement on methods, processes and data storage for identity management;
• Consideration of implications to any existing agreements;
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• Understanding of how data may be shared across borders.
4. Stakeholders are encourage to experiment with passenger filtering (behavior,
technology and animal) and population based (journey, category and rules) schemes
to better understand and quantify the benefits these could have for the checkpoint
and security outcomes.
5. Further studies and evidence to support the effectiveness of behavior detection in
the aviation security context are required. In particular, further work should focus
on:
• How behavior detection should be applied in order to achieve security benefits (stand off,
interview based etc.).
• Whether behavior detection should be overt or covert.
• Whether behavior detection should be applied to identify higher or lower risk passengers.
• What ratio of passenger/ behavior detection officers is required in order to deliver the
required security outcomes.
6. Technology/Animal based filtering methods should be further investigated including:
• New concepts such as automated behavior analysis technology;
• As well as how existing technology such as ETD, EDD can be used as a filtering
mechanism for risk based differentiation;
• How results of the application of this technology may be communicated to the checkpoint;
• Clear guidelines developed specifying when a result of the application of technology
should result in immediate alarm resolution in opposition to an alternative screening
process at the checkpoint.
7. Investigate mechanisms to enroll and validate passenger/staff identify to facilitate
application of integrated risk assessments for the purpose of differentiated
screening.
Consideration should be given to:
• Systems which cater for one off travelers as well as passengers who may elect to provide
their details (such as with registered traveler programs);
• Longer term vision – for example, passenger facilitation stakeholders are encourage to
work towards stand-off identity solutions that do not require additional passenger
touchpoints for enrolment of subsequent validation.
8. To facilitate risk based passenger differentiation (by whatever means), stakeholders
are encouraged to investigate mechanisms to track and trace individuals across the
airport, so that once a risk level has been allocated, appropriate action can be taken
each step of the journey.
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9. Once a risk based differentiation model has been defined, stakeholders are
encouraged to consider how measures may be applied at the checkpoint.
In this regard:
• Trials incorporating passenger’s risk score as trigger mechanisms to dynamically switch
the detection requirements of the passenger and cabin baggage screening equipment
should be run to investigate further the dynamic lane concept.
• Dedicated lane trials with dynamic/automated queuing mechanisms should be
investigated as an alternative to equipping all lanes with all possible technology.
10. Going a step beyond simple checkpoint application, stakeholders are encouraged to
investigate, and where possible trial, solutions to match passengers to their baggage
(cabin and hold) throughout the journey.
In particular, trials that demonstrate readiness for risk based differentiated screening, where
the cabin baggage and the hold baggage are screened according to the risk associated
with the passenger they belong to, are strongly encouraged.
B. Passenger screening
11. Smart Security encourages continued development of security scanner technology
such that detection and alarm rates continue to be refined for more optimum
operational deployment. The further development of algorithms for improved
detection of current and future threats should also be a key priority.
Such developments many include refinement/development of shape recognition algorithms,
zonal alarms, and algorithms that can better differentiate between different types of
passengers and clothing and those that can dynamically switch to search for different
threats on different passengers.
12. Smart Security supports the harmonization of security scanner detection standards
across States.
13. Smart Security encourages the development of a common industry image standard
for security scanners, supporting the longer term decoupling of hardware and
software.
14. Smart Security encourages further investigation and trials of the ‘many-in-one’
concept, where screening equipment detection capacity is combined (e.g. metal,
explosive detection, shoe scanning) to avoid additional steps in the process, and
improving security outcomes and operational efficiency.
As part of this work, manufacturers are encouraged to consider the ease of use of the
process, making it as intuitive as possible with little action required by the passenger.
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C. Cabin baggage screening
15. Smart Security supports the use of targeted baggage search when networked
secondary search stations are deployed, and encourages airports to discuss these
requirements with regulatory authorities.
16. Smart Security advocates for a common certification process and detection
requirements for cabin baggage screening equipment and encourages States and
stakeholders to take steps towards this.
17. Industry and regulators are encouraged to set standards and specifications for
hardware/software decoupling.
This recommendation is in relation both to today’s x-ray equipment and for any new
technology going forward.
18. Smart Security encourages research and development into EDS and LEDS in order
to firmly identify whether these types of algorithms are best run on traditional x-ray
equipment, or whether newer and more advanced equipment is required to achieve a
situation where laptops and liquids can remain in a passenger’s bag.
19. Airports should be incentivized to trial and deploy advanced cabin baggage
screening equipment that enables reduced divestment, better efficiency and/or
increased detection levels.
Smart Security encourages regulatory bodies to consider the ways in incentives may be
provided. Incentives could include:
Purchase funding for early adopters
Reduction in the need for additional/random measures
Flexible deployment options
20. Smart Security encourages the continued development of CT and XRD technology
and where possible, encourages stakeholders to undertake trials in live
environments to assess more accurately the limitations and benefits.
21. Smart Security encourages manufacturers to further refine detection capabilities
such that equipment can detect threats both in their final form, and at the component
level, with the technology able to identify the various elements and piece them
together to identify the threat.
Whilst initially the view would be that the equipment and supporting software could do this
at an individual bag level, in the longer term, supported by a connected checkpoint, it is
hoped that technology could evolve to detect componentry carried by multiple parties, in
multiple bags across a variety of security lanes.
22. Smart Security encourages manufacturers to improve ETD equipment such that the
process could be quicker and more passenger and user friendly.
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D. Alternative Measures and Unpredictability
23. Key stakeholders and regulators should consider ways to encourage airports with
limited or no explosive detection capabilities to incorporate capabilities such as
ETD, EDD or unpredictability into their checkpoints to help address the threat of
explosives.
This may be particularly important for airports/states seeking recognition of equivalent
measures and to support a reduction in gate screening.
24. Further work and trials are encouraged on flexible deployment options of
unpredictable measures. Including:
Concepts which allow for a higher number of passengers to be screened via a
particular measure, but with a lower sensitivity setting;
How random measures are applied across a checkpoint - same percentage applied
on every lane, or 100% of passengers subject to the measure on some lanes, with
little or no application on others (provided the passenger cannot self-select their
queue).
Assessment of the effectiveness of additional/alternative measures – should
percentage ratios the same for all measures?
25. Stakeholders are encourage to undertake further investigation and research of
technologies that support wider screening of explosives, including but not limited to:
Stand-off technologies (UV/Laser based);
Walk-through or gate explosive detection equipment;
EDD
Consideration should be given to the most sensible location for deployment of each
possible solution (terminal entry doors, security entrance, check-in, carparks, airport train
station exits etc.) and if outside of the checkpoint how alarms will be resolved and/or
communicated to the checkpoint to influence additional screening.
26. Regulatory bodies are encouraged to discuss and identify whether a process based
on the current EU Regulation 711/2012 (allowing the use of ETD to screen a
percentage of non-passengers – staff and crew) could be more widely adopted and
whether in the future it may be possible and politically acceptable to apply such an
approach, or variation of, to passenger screening.
E. Centralized Image Processing
27. Further trials of all CIP deployment models are recommended so that security
effectiveness, operational efficiency and passenger experience benefits can be
quantified. Key trial variables to consider include those where:
Officers remain within the lane environment;
Officers operate from a dedicated room co-located with the checkpoint;
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Officers operate from a more remote location (onsite or offsite);
Officers assess images from only one checkpoint;
Officers assess images from multiple checkpoints (with the same screening
requirements);
The number of officers allocated to x-ray image analysis exceeds the number of
open lanes;
The number of open lanes exceeds the number of officers allocated to x-ray image
analysis.
Fluctuating officer allocation – more officers allocated in high peak, less in low.
28. Further investigation and trials of ‘remote’ centralized image processing (where
officers may assess images from multiple checkpoints or airports) are encouraged.
Trials and research should seek to address such things as:
Network capabilities
Ideal CONOPS
Staff motivation and training needs in view of specialization
Regulatory issues – alarm resolution, training requirements, roles and
responsibilities etc.
Legal implications - accountability and protection mechanisms
Implications for security charges
Contingency planning – ability to resume traditional operations
Security outcomes
29. In the longer term it is recommended that regulatory bodies consider entering into a
mutual recognition process of the training and certification of x-ray operators as it
may be seen operationally relevant to deploy CIP operations across borders.
In this regard, airports are encouraged investigate the potential support that CIP could bring
in a risk based screening process.
F. Staffing
30. Where flexibility is permitted under regulation, airports are encouraged to conduct
trials utilizing non-security officers for some roles (divest officer, queue
management, overall checkpoint management/team leaders) to better understand
whether dedicated management and customer service roles can deliver benefits
within the checkpoint.
31. Further studies on the impact that rotation times and time on task have on officer
performance are needed.
This should not be limited to x-ray analysis duties but also to the effectiveness of bag
search, passenger search and provision of passenger information.
Studies should also investigate the concept of fluid and adaptable rotations times and time
on task that vary according to the operations and compare this to traditional models.
61
Consideration should be given to security outcomes, operation efficiency and staff
experience
32. Further trials should be undertaken in relation to new automation of checkpoint
elements and the use of operator assist support tools on equipment.
This work should attempt to quantify the impact these innovations may have on operation
efficiency, security outcomes and staff experience.
G. Checkpoint Management System
33. Off the shelf dashboards that have the ability to be linked with the majority of the
security equipment currently deployed in checkpoint should continue to be
developed and trailed in airport environments.
34. Checkpoint Management Systems that incorporate data analytics and real time
action support or decisions should be investigated.
In particular, development and trials of fully integrated airport wide checkpoint management
systems are encouraged.
35. Systems enabling passengers to be provided with push notifications regarding
essential information they need for their journey should be developed.
To further refine the information sent to the passengers, a ‘big data’ approach should be
investigated and outcomes incorporated into any airport wide management system.
H. Checkpoint Environment
36. Trials of fully automated lanes with only last line alarm resolution based intervention
are encouraged to understand if such set-up is viable from security effectiveness,
passenger experience and operational efficiency point of view.
37. Trials of checkpoints incorporating biometrics are encouraged to better understand
the potentials benefits of the technology and the considerations for operational
deployment.
Such trials should look at biometrics as a tool:
Granting access to airside and/or to dedicated area in the airport (such as the fast
track)
Improving passenger experience through touch point reduction and tailored
information
Enabling the introduction of risk based differentiation
38. Research and trials into future checkpoint design are encouraged, including giving
consideration to whether passenger and baggage screening cycles need to be
aligned and activities completed in the same location.
Consideration should be given to security outcomes, operational efficiency, passenger
privacy and experience, security of belongings etc.
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Airports Council International
ACI World
800 rue du Square Victoria
Suite 1810, PO Box 302
Montréal, Québec H4Z 1G8
Canada
Tel: +1 514 373 1200
Email: [email protected]
www.aci.aero/smart-security
International Air Transport Association
Geneva Executive Offices
33, route de l’Aéroport
PO Box 416
1215 Geneva 15 Airport
Switzerland
Tel: +41 22 770 2525
Email: [email protected]
www.iata.org/smart-security
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