BLUE ANGEL ARUNI RICKMERS - Transport Malta

Marine Safety Investigation Unit

MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT

Safety investigation into the allision involving the

Maltese registered bulk carrier

BLUE ANGEL

and the German registered container ship

ARUNI RICKMERS

at the South Outer Harbour Anchorage, Busan

on 12 July 2012

201207/009

MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 10/2013

FINAL

ii

Investigations into marine casualties are conducted under the provisions of the Merchant

Shipping (Accident and Incident Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011 and therefore in

accordance with Regulation XI-I/6 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at

Sea (SOLAS), and Directive 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23

April 2009, establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of accidents

in the maritime transport sector and amending Council Directive 1999/35/EC and Directive

2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

This safety investigation report is not written, in terms of content and style, with litigation in

mind and pursuant to Regulation 13(7) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident and Incident

Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings

whose purpose or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame, unless,

under prescribed conditions, a Court determines otherwise.

The objective of this safety investigation report is precautionary and seeks to avoid a repeat

occurrence through an understanding of the events of 12 July 2012. Its sole purpose is

confined to the promulgation of safety lessons and therefore may be misleading if used for

other purposes.

The findings of the safety investigation are not binding on any party and the conclusions

reached and recommendations made shall in no case create a presumption of liability

(criminal and/or civil) or blame. It should be therefore noted that the content of this safety

investigation report does not constitute legal advice in any way and should not be construed

as such.

© Copyright TM, 2013

This document/publication (excluding the logos) may be re-used free of charge in any format

or medium for education purposes. It may be only re-used accurately and not in a misleading

context. The material must be acknowledged as TM copyright.

The document/publication shall be cited and properly referenced. Where the MSIU would

have identified any third party copyright, permission must be obtained from the copyright

holders concerned.

MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION UNIT

Malta Transport Centre

Marsa MRS 1917

Malta

iii

CONTENTS

LIST OF REFERENCES AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION .......................................... iv

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................v

SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................. vi

1 FACTUAL INFORMATION .............................................................................................1

1.1 Vessel, Voyage and Marine Casualty Particulars ...............................................................1

1.2 Narrative .............................................................................................................................2

1.2.1 Description of vessels .............................................................................................2

1.2.2 Events on Blue Angel ..............................................................................................2

1.2.3 Events on Aruni Rickmers ......................................................................................5

1.3 Extent of Damages ..............................................................................................................7

1.4 Crew Members on Blue Angel ............................................................................................9

1.4.1 Master .....................................................................................................................9

1.4.2 The navigational officer of the watch (OOW) ........................................................9

1.4.3 The helmsman ........................................................................................................9

1.5 Environmental Conditions ..................................................................................................9

2 ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................10

2.1 Aim ...................................................................................................................................10

2.2 Consumption of Alcohol ...................................................................................................10

2.3 Fatigue ..............................................................................................................................10

2.4 The Approach to Busan South Outer Harbour Anchorage ...............................................10

2.5 Post Anchoring Events .....................................................................................................12

2.6 Communication between Busan VTS and Blue Angel .....................................................14

3 CONCLUSIONS ...............................................................................................................16

3.1 Immediate Safety Factor ...................................................................................................16

3.2 Latent Conditions and other Safety Factors ......................................................................16

3.3 Other Findings ..................................................................................................................16

4 RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................17

iv

LIST OF REFERENCES AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Crew members MV Blue Angel

Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation, Germany

Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal

Managers MV Blue Angel

v

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AB Able Bodied Seaman

°C Degrees Celsius

E East

hh. Hours

LT Local Time

N North

m Metres

mm Millimetres

mm. Minutes

OOW Officer of the Watch

OTC Over the Counter

ss. Seconds

(T) True Bearing

USA United States of America

UTC Coordinated Universal Time

VDR Voyage Data Recorder

VHF Very High Frequency

VTS Vessel Traffic Service

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SUMMARY

On 12 July 2012, at 11301, the Maltese registered bulk carrier Blue Angel, was

involved in an allision with the German registered container vessel Aruni Rickmers.

At the time of the accident, Aruni Rickmers was on anchor in the South Outer

Harbour, Busan.

Blue Angel had sailed from Luoyuan, China in ballast on 10 July 2012 for Busan. The

plan was to take bunkers before proceeding to Tacoma, USA. End of sea passage was

logged on 12 July 2012 at 0948. Her destination was South Outer Harbour. Busan

VTS had directed the vessel to drop her anchor in N4 Anchorage Area. However,

upon anchoring at 1121, Busan VTS instructed the master to relocate her anchorage as

it was deemed to be very close to Aruni Rickmers.

While weighing up the anchor, the master ordered engines on ‘dead slow astern’ but

found himself in close quarter situation with a bunker-barge supplying bunkers to a

vessel astern of Blue Angel. In quick successions, the master ordered ‘dead slow

ahead’, ‘slow ahead’, and ‘full ahead’ on the main engine in order to clear the bunker

barge. However, this manoeuvre brought Blue Angel even closer to Aruni Rickmers

A subsequent ‘hard to starboard’ helm and various engine movements were not

sufficient enough to clear her from Aruni Rickmers.

At 1130, Blue Angel made heavy contact with Aruni Rickmers in position

35° 02.21’N 129° 03.64’E, in the N4 Anchorage Area. Aruni Rickmers sustained

minor damage to her bulbous bow. However, Blue Angel suffered extensive hull

damage. Although there were no reported injuries or pollution, her port side shell

plating in way of cargo hold no. 3 was punctured and a number of side shell plating,

frames and brackets were either deformed or dented.

It was concluded that the immediate cause of the accident was Blue Angel’s anchoring

in very close proximity of Aruni Rickmers. Two safety recommendations were made

to the managers of the vessel with the scope of addressing the hazards related to

anchorage in waiting areas.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all times in this safety investigation report are local time (UTC +9).

1

1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 Vessel, Voyage and Marine Casualty Particulars

Name Blue Angel Aruni Rickmers2

Flag Malta Germany

Classification Society Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Germanischer Lloyd

IMO Number 9071765 9270828

Type Bulk Carrier Container

Registered Owner Lyrics Navigation Ltd Aruni Rickmers Schiffahrts

Managers Rev Maritime Ltd. Rickmers Reederei GmbH &

Cie. KG

Construction Steel (Double bottom) Steel (Double bottom)

Length overall 184.53 m 196.87 m

Registered Length 176.87 m 196.82 m

Gross Tonnage 25457 21932

Minimum Safe Manning 16 16

Authorised Cargo Bulk Containers

Port of Departure Luoyuan, China Pusan, Republic of Korea

Port of Arrival Busan, Republic of Korea NA

Type of Voyage International International

Cargo Information In ballast Containers

Manning 24 21

Date and Time 12 July 2012 at 1130 (LT)

Type of Marine Casualty or

Incident

Serious Marine Casualty

Serious Marine Casualty Less Serious Marine

Casualty

Location of Occurrence N4 Anchorage Area in position 35° 02.21’N 129° 03.64’E

Place on Board Cargo hold / over side Bulbous bow

Injuries/Fatalities None None

Damage/Environmental

Impact

None None

Ship Operation Manoeuvring On anchor

Voyage Segment Departure Arrival

External & Internal

Environment

Moderate breeze, slight to moderate seas and low swell with

a visibility of about one nautical mile

Persons on Board 24 21

2 Since 18 January 2013, the vessel has been renamed Arut and is under new management.

2

1.2 Narrative

1.2.1 Description of vessels

Blue Angel is a Maltese registered geared bulk carrier fitted with five cargo holds and

owned by Lyrics Navigation Ltd. The vessel was built by Hakodate Dock Co. Ltd. in

Hokkaido, Japan in 1994. The vessel is classed by Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK).

Blue Angel has a length overall of 184.53 m, a moulded breadth of 32.00 m and a

moulded depth of 16.00 m. The vessel has a summer draught of 11.318 m and a

summer deadweight of 44950 tonnes.

Propulsive power is provided by a 6-cylinder B&W 6SMC, slow speed direct drive

two-stroke diesel engine, producing 6914 kW at 104 rpm. This drives a single fixed

pitch propeller.

Blue Angel is equipped with a range of bridge and navigation equipment, including

two sets of radars fitted with plotters.

At the time of the accident, the vessel had 22 crew members on board, all Filipino

nationals. The compliment included a master, three mates, a chief engineer, three

engineers and an electrician.

Aruni Rickmers is a German registered fully cellular container ship and was owned by

Aruni Rickmers Schiffahrts. The vessel was built by Jiangsu Yangzijiang

Shipbuilding Co. Ltd., People’s Republic of China in 2004 and was classed by

Germanischer Lloyd (GL).

Aruni Rickmers has a length overall of 196.87 m, a moulded breadth of 27.80 m and a

moulded depth of 16.60 m. The vessel has a summer draught of 11.00 m and a

summer deadweight of 24219 tonnes.

Propulsive power is provided by a 6-cylinder MAN B&W 6K80MC-C, slow speed

direct drive two-stroke diesel engine producing 21660 kW at 104 rpm, driving a

single fixed pitch propeller.

1.2.2 Events on Blue Angel

Blue Angel was waiting for orders at Luoyuan anchorage, China after discharging

38,315 tonnes of fine iron Ore in bulk on 02 July 2012. She departed in ballast from

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Luoyuan at 0500 on 10 July 2012. The vessel’s next port was Tacoma, USA en-route

to the port of Busan, Korea for bunkers and crew change.

On 12 July 2012, at 0948, Blue Angel ended her sea passage and commenced

manoeuvring to anchor in the South Outer Harbour of Busan. At 1000, the master

requested the crew to stand by on the forecastle. About 25 minutes later, the master

called Busan VTS to communicate his arrival reports. The vessel was directed to

proceed to N4 Anchorage Area. During the transit to the anchorage position, Blue

Angel had been steering between 010°(T) and 020°(T) to avoid numerous fishing

vessels. There was dense fog and the visibility was restricted to less than one nautical

mile.

At about 1040, the fog cleared and the visibility improved. The vessels detected on

the radar could now be seen from the bridge. There were several vessels anchored in

N4 Anchorage Area. Blue Angel approached South Outer Harbour with a heading of

between 350°(T) and 360°(T) and a speed of about 4.0 knots. At 1104, in position

35° 01.01’N 129° 03.07’E, the vessel altered course to 332°(T) and to 011°(T) at

1108, as she made her final approach to N4 Anchorage Area at about 4.6 knots

(Figure 1).

At 1121, Blue Angel dropped her port anchor in position 35° 03.3’N 129° 02.4’E.

There were several other anchored vessels in the area. The nearest one,

Aruni Rickmers, was not more than 2.5 cables from her starboard bow. At 1122,

Busan VTS called Blue Angel on VHF Channel 09 and instructed the master to heave

up anchor and relocate either West or East of N4 Anchorage Area since the anchor

position was less than the stipulated four cables from the other anchored ships.

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Not to be used for Navigation

© Crown Copyright and/or database rights. Reproduced by permission of the

Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and the UK Hydrographic Office

(www.ukho.gov.uk)

Figure 1: Approach to N4 Anchorage Area

By about 1125, the master had already heaved up the anchor and ordered ‘Dead Slow

Astern’ on the main engine. This action brought Blue Angel close to the bunker

barge, which was alongside a vessel astern of Blue Angel. To avoid contact with the

bunker barge and possible pollution, the master ordered the engine to ‘Dead Slow

Ahead’, ‘Slow Ahead’ and ‘Full Ahead’ in this order and a hard to starboard helm to

clear Aruni Rickmers, which was now fine on Blue Angel’s starboard bow.

At 1130, although Blue Angel cleared the bow of Aruni Rickmers, her port side mid-

ship section hit Aruni Rickmers’ bulbous bow, followed by another contact on her port

quarter. As a result of the contact, Blue Angel suffered significant damage to her side

shell plating. The VTS radar picture showed that at the time of allision, the vessel

was in position 35° 02.21’N 129° 03.64’E.

The master on board Blue Angel called the master of Aruni Rickmers soon after the

contact at 1132. The master on the latter vessel confirmed that there was neither

5

pollution nor injury to personnel. At 1140, Blue Angel reported the accident to Busan

VTS. The local authorities directed the master to drop anchor at N5 Anchorage Area.

At 1148, Blue Angel anchored safely in the newly designated anchorage area. The

track made by Blue Angel (Figure 2) was captured by the Busan VTS.

Figure 2: Track of Blue Angel before and after collision

1.2.3 Events on Aruni Rickmers

Aruni Rickmers was on anchor with seven shackles on her port anchor at Busan

N4 Anchorage Area.

At 1120, the third mate, who was on anchor watch, informed the master about the

manoeuvres by Blue Angel, which had anchored just about two cables from the bow

of their ship. The master tried to call Blue Angel on VHF Channel 16 but there was

no response.

Following the instructions received from Busan VTS and as Blue Angel started her

manoeuvre, the master of Aruni Rickmers requested the engineers to prepare the main

engine and bow thruster for emergency manoeuvre. The master observed

Blue Angel approaching Aruni Rickmers and instructed the bosun to go to the

forecastle and pay out eight shackles on the port anchor chain. At about 1127, the

6

master observed that Blue Angel was less than a cable from his vessel’s bow. He also

noticed Blue Angel to turn to her starboard in what seemed to be a manoeuvre to clear

Aruni Rickmers.

From the forecastle deck, the bosun reported that the other vessel was approaching

fast. He also paid out on the port chain as requested by the master. At 1130, Blue

Angel made heavy contact with Aruni Rickmer’s bulbous bow (Figure 3). The crew

on board the anchored vessel noticed that there was a second contact and scraping

against the port anchor chain while Blue Angel was still moving ahead and turning to

starboard.

By 1135, the two vessels were clear of each other. The master of Aruni Rickmers

informed the port authorities and gave order to have the rescue boat ready should the

need for its use arise. There were no reported injuries and damage to Aruni Rickmers

was reported to be minimal.

Figure 3: VTS radar picture showing allision between Blue Angel and Aruni Rickmers

7

1.3 Extent of Damages

Damage surveys were carried out on both vessels in Busan by the respective

classification society surveyors.

The damage survey on board Aruni Rickmers revealed the following damages:

Bulbous bow indented on starboard side in way of platform stringer, between

frames 138 and 140;

Frame 139 distorted and damaged over a length of about 50 mm; and

Platform stringer deformed in way of frame 139, measuring about 200 mm by

600 mm.

As indicated below, the damage sustained by Blue Angel was more severe:

Penetration in way of cargo hold no. 3 port side shell plating, measuring about

4000 mm by 5500 mm (Figure 4);

Frames 123 to 127 in way of cargo hold no. 3 port side found buckled (Figure

5);

Damaged bilge hopper plate, web and brackets in way of water ballast tank no.

3 port;

Side shell plates dented between frames 55 and 62 in way of cargo hold no. 5

port (Figure 6);

Top and bottom frame brackets dented between frames 58 and 62 in way of

cargo hold no. 5 port.

Figure 4: Side shell damage in way of cargo hold no. 3

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Figure 5: Damaged frames in way of cargo hold no. 3

Figure 6: Contact damage in way of cargo hold no. 5

9

1.4 Crew Members on Blue Angel

Blue Angel manning was in accordance with her Minimum Safe Manning Certificate

issued by the flag State Administration.

1.4.1 Master

The Master, who had the conn before and at the time of the accident, was a 43 year

old Filipino national and had more than 21 years of sea service of which, four years

were as master. He had obtained his Class 1 Certificate of Competency in 2005 and

had joined Blue Angel as master on 20 February 2012.

1.4.2 The navigational officer of the watch (OOW)

The duty navigational OOW assisting the master was the third mate. The OOW was

39 years old with more than seven years sea experience. He had joined the vessel on

29 October 2011. At 0930, the navigational OOW arrived on the bridge to assist in

the preparations of the anchor stations. The navigational OOW frequently checked

the ship’s position on radar, reported to the master, and attended to telegraph

movements.

1.4.3 The helmsman

The helmsman was a Filipino able seaman (AB). He was 45 years old and had 18

years sea going experience as an AB. He had been on the vessel for about 9 months.

Just before and at the time of the accident, he was manually steering the ship. He had

been on duty since 0745.

1.5 Environmental Conditions

On the morning of 12 July 2012, as Blue Angel proceeded to the South Outer Harbour

of Busan for anchorage, heavy fog was reported and visibility was reduced to well

under one nautical mile. However, at about 1040, the fog lifted and the navigational

OOW on board Blue Angel had visual contact of other vessels in the anchorage area.

The wind was from the South-West with Beaufort Force 3 to 4. The air temperature

was 24°C and that of the sea was 23°C. Tidal current, was not recorded on

Blue Angel.

10

2 ANALYSIS

2.1 Aim

The purpose of a marine safety investigation is to determine the circumstances and

safety factors of the accident as a basis for making recommendations, to prevent

further marine casualties or incidents from occurring in the future.

2.2 Consumption of Alcohol

The consumption of alcohol on board Blue Angel was restricted by the Company and

prescribed in the Company’s Alcohol and Drug Policy. There was no evidence to

suggest that any of the bridge team members was either under the influence of alcohol

or prescriptive and / or OTC medication.

2.3 Fatigue

An analysis of the available evidence was carried out in order to identify whether

fatigue was an immediate contributing factor to the accident. This included an

analysis of the ‘Record of Hours of Rest’ of bridge team members and of other

behavioural factors, which are synonymous with fatigue, e.g. a reduction in the

physical and cognitive capabilities. It may be concluded that on the basis of the

available evidence, fatigue was not considered to have been a contributing factor to

this accident.

2.4 The Approach to Busan South Outer Harbour Anchorage

Navigation in any congested anchorage area is fraught with difficulty and risks. It has

the potential for close quarter situations and even contact damage with other anchored

vessels. In this particular case, the situation became even more complex as result of

the environmental conditions, reduced visibility and anchorages without defined

anchor positions.

Whilst vessel characteristics and engine power may impose restrictions on the

manoeuvrability capabilities, the operation would require the master to exercise

11

extreme caution, plan well and evaluate inherent risks when entering congested waters

including waiting anchorages.

Evidence suggested that from the time the sea passage ended at 0948, the master

cautiously approached South Outer Harbour. The visibility was less than one nautical

mile and he had to alter the ship’s course a number of times to avoid fishing vessels.

The focus of the master’s attention was on collision avoidance. At 1025, Busan VTS

recommended N4 anchorage and by 1040, the visibility had improved. However,

although the vessel’s position was plotted regularly using radar and distances between

the vessel and other vessels on anchor as reported to the master, evidence suggested

that the master had no clear plan of where he would drop the anchor.

The approach to an anchorage needs to be planned, ideally in advance and this may

have not been completely possible in this particular case, given the poor visibility and

fishing vessels obstructing the approach to South Outer Harbour, which directed the

master’s attention on collision avoidance. Thus, whilst the master approached the

anchorage point with caution, he was unable to determine exactly the approaches to

critical points.

As indicated above, it was acknowledged that in waiting areas, it may not always be

possible to plan an exact anchoring position in advance. However, the master had to

consider the instructions received from the coastal State authorities, ensure that there

was sufficient room to swing, and observe the movements of other ships. Thus, the

choice of the anchorage area should have been in relation to other ships and therefore,

the distance to Aruni Rickmers was a vital factor, which was not appreciated by the

bridge team on Blue Angel.

The lack of crew members’ interaction in the decision-making process, which was

considered to play a major role in this accident, may be indicative of the strength of

safety leadership on board.

One of the dimensions of leadership as identified in safety studies is ‘participative

decision-making’. By adopting this leadership style, the team leader (i.e. the master

in this case), uses the inputs of the navigational OOW and other members of the

bridge team, by encouraging them to express their ideas and opinions. This leadership

12

style is only possible if there is a sense of group belonging and commitment towards

safety. The safety investigation did not find evidence which indicated that this was

the case. Therefore, this suggested that ‘participative decision-making’ was possible

but not adopted.

This is less than desirable in the circumstances similar to the one on board Blue Angel.

Academic studies in another transportation domain concluded that team members who

are motivated to contribute their ideas will perform much better in hazardous and

critical situations. It is highly probable that the bridge team members could have

contributed their ideas in a significant way, given that they shared a common

understanding of the aspects of common tasks.

Evidence also suggested that the master’s choice of anchorage point was not in

accordance with the instructions that had been given by Busan VTS, safety factor

which was also not highlighted by the bridge team members.

2.5 Post Anchoring Events

Table 1 summarises the VHF radio communications between Blue Angel and Busan

VTS.

Of particular importance was the voice recording at 1122. Although the master

followed the instructions by the coastal State’s VTS to anchor elsewhere, the safety

investigation did not come across evidence which indicated that there was a planned

strategy to depart from the area.

Table 1: MSIU’s transcript of relevant VHF radio communications

Time

(Local

Time)

hh.mm.ss.

Station Details of Communication

11.21.56 Busan VTS to

Blue Angel

What is your intention

11.22.00 Blue Angel to

Busan VTS

Dropping my anchor

13

Time

(Local

Time)

hh.mm.ss.

Station Details of Communication


Blue Angel

You cannot drop anchor in that position. Before I say to you,

recommend to you more than 4 cables, more than 4 cables from

anchoring vessels for safety. Now your anchoring position is

too close, too close to anchoring vessel. So move to another

position, move to another position. Now there is some space

West or East of N4, West or East of N4. As there is so many

spaces for you, why you didn’t drop anchor in that position?


Busan VTS

OK ma’m, we will heave anchor.


Chang Sun

One more information for you now. There is a vessel on your

port bow about 6 cables, 6 cables; his name is Blue Angel, Blue

Angel. It is now heaving up anchor, so be careful.


Busan VTS

Can you give me anchor position?


Blue Angel

Go to West of N4, West of N4. There are so many spaces. You

keep distance of more than four cables from anchoring vessels.


Blue Angel

Keep clear of ahead of your vessel, Gurasis.

Keep clear of other anchoring vessels.


Busan VTS

Yes m’am, we are manoeuvring. We clear other vessels. We

are manoeuvring.

11.32.40 Aruni Rickmers

to Busan VTS

Aruni Rickmers at anchor reported collision. Blue Angel hit

bow and have big hole in his port side.


Busan VTS

Blue Angel confirmed collision with Aruni Rickmers


to Blue Angel

Do you need assistance?


Blue Angel

Drop anchor N5


to Busan VTS

Aruni Rickmers reported no major damage to his ship but big

hole in the port side hull of Blue Angel.


Blue Angel

Blue Angel check your damage


Busan VTS

One minute. We are manoeuvring. Very busy


Busan VTS

Can I drop my anchor in present position


Blue Angel

Negative. Your position is still close to other vessels. Drop

anchor N5. Be careful…


Busan VTS

Blue Angel reported dropped anchor N5 and checking damage.

03.15.00-

03.24.34

Aruni Rickmers

& Blue Angel

Aruni Rickmers and Blue Angel Exchange of information-

vessel/operator/P&I etc.

14

Blue Angel was a large ship in ballast condition, drawing 4.31 m forward and 5.97 m

aft. It required well thought manoeuvring because of other ships and restricting sea

room. The engine order given by the master to go astern while anchoring and again

on heaving up the anchor brought the vessel to gather considerable stern way. Blue

Angel was also close to the bunkering vessel Glorious Rena and bunker barges Hae

Yang and Sam Jin Ho. Conscious of the developing situation, the master took

remedial action and at 1127, he ordered ‘Dead Slow Ahead’, gradually increasing to

‘Full Speed Ahead’. He also ordered a hard to starboard helm when he came closer to

Aruni Rickmers. In so doing, he exposed his vessel to the South-West wind and

gradually started to drift towards the bow of Aruni Rickmers and the latter’s bulbous

bow.

2.6 Communication between Busan VTS and Blue Angel

Busan Port is one of the regional VTS centres whose role is to provide 24/7

information, traffic organisation and navigation assistance service to ships in the

Busan VTS zone in order to increase the overall effectiveness and safety. The VTS

Centre establishes navigation order by observing the movement of ships and by

promptly providing good information promptly of vessel traffic status, so that

mariners could refer to it when making navigational decisions.

Although Busan VTS has extensive local knowledge of the area under its jurisdiction

on traffic pattern and environmental conditions. Notwithstanding, this local

knowledge of the crew and the high density of vessels on anchor, the master neither

consulted nor requested navigation assistance on the identification of a safe anchorage

position.

15

THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS, SAFETY

ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SHALL IN NO

CASE CREATE A PRESUMPTION OF BLAME OR

LIABILITY. NEITHER ARE THEY BINDING OR

LISTED IN ANY ORDER OF PRIORITY.

16

3 CONCLUSIONS

Findings and safety factors are not listed in any order of priority.

3.1 Immediate Safety Factor

The immediate cause of the accident was Blue Angel’s anchoring in very close

proximity to Aruni Rickmers.

3.2 Latent Conditions and other Safety Factors

.1 The approach to the N4 Anchorage Area was unplanned with no particular

attention given to select a suitable anchoring position with respect to Busan

VTS recommendation to keep a safe distance of four cables from other vessels

on anchor.

.2 Poor visibility and numerous fishing vessels during the approach to Busan

South Outer Harbour, deviated the master’s attention on the prevention of

collision from the actual anchorage area.

.3 The bridge team was not involved in the decision-making process in

preparation for the anchoring manoeuvres.

.4 The master did not appreciate the manoeuvring characteristics of his vessel

and the effect of wind in light condition.

.5 The master did not consult with Busan VTS on the identification of a suitable

and safe anchorage position.

.6 The master did not use the radars effectively to select a suitable anchoring

position, assess risk or close quarter situations with other vessels.

3.3 Other Findings

.1 The departure from the N4 Anchorage Area was not properly planned and no

assessment was made of the potential risks involved.

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4 RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the conclusions reached and taking into consideration the safety actions

taken during the course of the safety investigation,

Rev Maritime Ltd. is recommended to:

10/2013_R1 Ensure that crew members are aware of the risks of anchoring in

waiting areas and that special reference is made in the company’s safety

management system manual on the importance of engaging either local VTS

or authorities to help in the identification of safe anchorage areas.

10/2013_R2 Inform masters serving on board company ships on the importance of

engaging the bridge team in decision-making processes related to the safe

navigation of the ship.

BLUE ANGEL ARUNI RICKMERS - Transport Malta

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