Bloch Business as Usual

The Vanished Jews of Stühlingen Ralph Bloch 14 Ormerod Close, Dundas, ON CANADA L9H 7N7 [email protected]

Business as Usual Page 1 of 23

Chapter 7. Business As Usual

The Jews newly arriving in Stühlingen, having been expelled from the cities, were not permitted

to own and operate farms, were barred from the craft guilds and were hobbled by a variety of

restrictions in their letters of protection. Their first priority had to be establishing an economic

base to meet their hefty tax burden, to support themselves and their families, and to maintain

community institutions. Rural populations tend to be inherently reserved towards outsiders in

general,1 and were outright hostile to the manifest Christ killers in particular.2 It is remarkable

that the Jews were able, under such circumstances, to find an ecologic niche, not only to survive

but even to flourish. The only possible way to succeed was by providing added value over what

was already locally available. In other words, they had to plug an existing gap in the rural market

economy.

A widely accepted view among historians of the period holds that the Jewish merchants in rural

Germany were essentially “bottom feeders”; they supposedly made their living either by

peddling or by usury – activities no good Christian merchant would consider.3 This chapter

attempts to challenge this interpretation by demonstrating the complexity of Jewish business

practice at the transition from the Middle Ages to the early modern period, an interpretation also

supported by the findings of Sabine Ullmann in her careful, systematic study of Jewish life in the

margraviate of Burgau.4

In the following we will review some fundamentals of market economies in general, explore the

nature of 17th century rural market economies in southern Germany and identify gaps. We will

inspect the skill- and tool-set Jews brought with them to match these gaps. Next we will describe

trading activities of the Jews, and finally we will examine the nature of the solutions Jews

brought to market deficiencies in early modern Stühlingen.

1 (Malcolm 2013) 2 (Perry and Schweitzer 2002) 3 (Kellenbenz 1977) 4 (Ullmann 1999) p. 298



Basics

Starting in the Stone Age, hunter-gatherers evolved to self-sufficient subsistence farmers. With

growing skills and technological progress some managed to produce surplus; but what to do with

the excess? They could exchange surplus for luxuries, for implements to further increase their

productivity, or they could shelter it in suitable form for a rainy day. It took society centuries if

not millennia to figure out how to render this exchange process efficient. At first glance, barter

seems to provide the solution: I give you my surplus and you give me what I want or need. But

what if I can spare a basket of apples, but need a cow? Or, I have the apples now, but your cow

needs to give suck to a calf for the next three months. In the words of the renowned 19th century

British economist William Stanley Jevons: “Barter suffers from three serious inconveniences: a

want of coincidence of needs, a want of measure of value, and a want of means for

subdivision.”5

Maybe this problem could be solved with some tokens serving as intermediaries. But what would

keep enterprising individuals from also manufacturing these tokens? The tokens, in some explicit

way, needed to be linked to the value of goods against which they could be exchanged. In other

words, it should not be cheaper or easier to produce the tokens than to produce the corresponding

goods. The Babylonian Hammurabi code already referred to un-minted gold as value

intermediary around 1750 BC.6 Coins appeared around 700 BC.7 The value of these exchange

tokens — we can now start talking about money — was guaranteed by the scarcity of their base

material. Paper money was invented under the Chinese Sung dynasty in 1024 AD and continued

by the Mongol regime of the Yuan dynasty.8 Its value was supposedly guaranteed by a powerful

state, but still succumbed periodically to issuing excesses and forgery.

Germany did not become a unified nation until the 19th century. Before that it consisted of a

loose federation of more or less autonomous kingdoms, duchies and counties, all subject to the

Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of Germany. Many of these states minted their own coins,

some in similar, some in different currencies. But even two coins of the same denomination

5 (Jevons 1877) ch. 1. 6 (Harper 1904) p. 13 7 (Kagan 1982) 8 (Chen, Chang and Chen 1995)



could differ in value, depending on where they were minted.9 The value of coins varied over the

years because the metal was debased or the size was clipped.10 Germany did not introduce paper

money until the late 19th century. Doing business in cash was a challenge for the 17th century

peasant. Even if he actually had sufficient money, it was often in mixed currencies and

denominations. It took expertise to determine the actual value of a purse’s content,11 and

carrying a large sum could be a backbreaking task.

The nominal currency in 17th century Stühlingen was the florin (fl), originally a gold coin minted

in Florence from 1252 to 1533 as the fiorino d’oro, named after the prominently embossed lily

on its reverse. The florin was produced in sufficient numbers to become a leading currency all

over Europe. Subsequently, it was copied in many countries in order to support market

economies. In Germany, the best known of these copies was the Rhenish florin, or florin of Four

Electors of the Rhine (gulden), struck from 1354 on.12 Unfortunately, Florentine bankers

previously had also introduced a silver florin, or fiorino grosso in 1237.13 A gold fiorino

originally was worth 20 silver fiorini. This silver fiorino eventually became the florin of account,

or affiorino.14 Account books recorded moneys in florins, independent of the currencies and

coins the business was actually transacted in. In fact, the florin is not even listed among the

popular, historic coins used in Stühlingen.15

Jevons’ first inconvenience, described above, might also be read somewhat differently: “I require

some goods now, but I will only have the means to satisfy the needs of their current holder in the

future.” In these cases, money won’t do as intermediate tokens. The corresponding transaction

sounds suspiciously like a loan. It may be secured by a movable (pawn) or unmovable

(mortgage) object. But why would anybody loan his money to somebody else? After all, while

the money is loaned out, the owner is deprived of its use and even risks losing it. Yet, the Torah

9 (Döring 1854) pp. 14 - 38 10 (Shaw 1896) pp. 103 - 105 11 (Grierson 1972) 12 (Munro 2010) 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 (Häusler 1966) p. 252



obliges the just to lend his money to the poor members of his people and prohibits the taking of

interest,16 although collecting interest from strangers is permitted.17 Both the New Testament18

and the Koran19 scorn interest-based loans altogether. But money lending represents not only a

moral, but also a practical issue. Without a positive incentive for money lending, a society’s

economic activity will be severely curtailed. All Abrahamic religions have seriously struggled

with this thorny problem over the centuries, and all have eventually found solutions, sophistic in

their justification and pragmatic in their application.

Instead of real money, a certificate issued by a trustworthy person or body guaranteeing its

exchange value would fit the bill. One of the first known such instruments was a draft issued by

“The Guarantor at Elephantine-Syene.”20 It is among the so-called Elephantine papyri, a

collection of ancient Jewish manuscripts dating from the 5th century BC found during

excavations on Elephantine Island in the Nile on the border between Egypt and Nubia. By

shifting the guarantee of the letter from its bearer to a known and respected independent entity,

the receiver is more likely to trust and honor its value. But it all rests (i) on the trustworthiness of

the issuer, and (ii) on the authenticity of the instrument. Such drafts eventually evolved into what

are now called Negotiable Promissory Notes. The literature places their early appearance in 12th

century Genoa.21 A variant, namely the Negotiable Promissory Note Payable to the Bearer on

Demand (also known by its Hebrew acronym MaMRaMe), became the favorite financial

instrument of Jewish merchants by the 16th century.22 Simply put, the issuer of the certificate

promises its bearer a sum of money, to be repaid at the bearer’s request. The great feature of the

MaMRaMe was its validity both in external gentile and in internal Jewish business transactions.

Thus, the certificates could be issued, held, sold or bought, independent of one’s dogmatic frame.

They became, in fact, a money substitute when the real thing was not available.

16 Ex. 22:24, Lev. 25:35-37 17 Deut. 23:20-21 18 Luke 6:34-35 19 Al-Baqarah 2:275 20 (Porten and Greenfield 1969) 21 (Rabinowitz 1956) 22 (Katz 2000) p.58



In Stühlingen this instrument was simply called a “claim” (Forderung). Once its nominal value

exceeded a certain threshold, it had to be registered with the authorities. This registration and the

associated increased trustworthiness of the claims added further to their wide acceptance. Claims

were always valued in florins. Our data set mentions 1,880 such claims over the 139 years from

1604 to 1743. Credit, prior to the arrival of Jews, was not unknown in rural Germany. Merchants

might allow customers some payment delays. Similarly, some landlords showed flexibility in the

collection of their rents.23 The church too, occasionally provided mortgage funds.24 Property

could be converted to income streams through annuities (Renten).25 But claims had the double

advantage of being easily available and flexible, almost like today’s credit cards.

Rural Market Economies in 17th Century Southern Germany

Serfdom had been abolished in western Germany by 1600. The policies of West German princes

had encouraged an entrenched landholding peasantry, so that in the period under discussion the

peasantry had taken hold of up to 90% of arable land.26 The people who make up an agrarian

workforce are commonly designated as peasants or farmers. But this designation is very

imprecise, since it includes a varied group of people with a wide spectrum of wealth, skills and

status. Statistical ensembles can change easily over time and place, a fact that clouds the validity

of any generalisation.27 Peasants could be subdivided into two major groups: those who owned

the land they tilled and those who did not. Among the former were the wealthy owner/operators

of large contiguous family farms and the smallholders, the latter often with fragmented holdings.

The landless included farm workers who worked for wages and tenants who leased the land

against a share of their harvest.

Much of the Black Forest landscape is rugged and suited more for small farms than for large

contiguous family farms. The famines of the 16th century had left the German peasantry

23 (Toch 1995) 24 (GLA) 61/14184: Mortgage proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1738-1750; Mar. 7 1741 25 (Gilomen 1992) 26 (Brenner 1976) 27 (Robisheaux 1989)



impoverished,28 at best leaving only a small surplus of production over consumption. Economic

pressures in the late 16th and early 17th century tended to gradually segregate agrarian society

into two layers – by 1581 the bottom 80% who collectively owned some 40% of the wealth, and

the top 20% who owned the other 60% .29 The large contiguous family farms at the top were

generally successful in getting passed over intact to the next generation, while the smallholders’

properties tended to get constantly fractured and redistributed.30 In contrast to the margraviate of

Burgau,31 the Stühlingen region lacked a significant, export-oriented textile production, although

the town featured small dyeing and pottery manufacture.32 The town had its complement of

tanners and tawers, bakers and barbers, as well as several inns. But the economy of the region

was based mainly on agricultural produce. Stühlingen featured its own public market hall, in

which also Jews were allowed to trade.33 But most likely, it served only as a retail market

(macellum publicum) supplying residents with their basic needs.34 Up to 1659 the town held

three annual fairs; two more were added that year.35 But the Stühlingen fairs paled in comparison

to the bi-annual Zurzach fair, 30 kilometers to the southwest in Switzerland.

The Scope of Jewish Business Activity

Most Jews arriving in Stühlingen had a thorough understanding of business matters. They were

familiar with sophisticated credit instruments and accounting. They were literate, numerate and

able to keep business books.36 While some may have arrived bearing a reasonable starting

capital, most probably did not. Those who came from cities had little knowledge of animal

husbandry or the idiosyncrasies of agricultural products. They had no access to merchandise

28 Ibid. pp. 69 - 79 29 Ibid. table A.3 30 Ibid. 84 - 89 31 (Ullmann 1999) pp. 56 - 57 32 (Häusler 1966) p. 241 33 (FFA) Politica, Amt Stühlingen, Div. I, Subdiv. 1. Die Annahme der Juden 1615 - 1784 34 (Dickinson 1945) 35 (Häusler 1966) p. 221 36 (Botticini and Eckstein 2005)



supply chains. They had to survive on their wits. They did this largely by providing the

“economic yeast” that helped the market economy to rise.

The personal transaction ledger was the pivot of a rural Jewish merchant’s business practice. In

fact, it was more valuable than gold or silver.

After Isak of Stühlingen (B1) had escaped from Conrad of Pappenheim in 1599 and fled to

the little town of Aach, his son Mayer (B1.1) together with a granddaughter were visiting

Isak’s elderly wife in Stühlingen. As they were about to leave, the mother started crying

disconsolately. She felt unable to handle all the debtors and creditors who had business

with her husband. So Mayer and his daughter packed the account books in a little wooden

box to take it to Isak. Mayer and his daughter were promptly arrested by Pappenheim’s

sheriff on the way. The count was furious that no tangible valuables were found, and

incarcerated Mayer for almost two years.37

As recorded through the lens of the municipal court, these business books are today very difficult

to interpret. Furthermore, little agreement existed between the parties as to who paid what, when,

and how.

We will work our way through an example. On May 16, 1652, Menckhe (C2.1.2) claimed 164 fl.

capital plus another 50 fl. for a field, on behalf of his father Mayerle (C.1) from cooper and tub

maker Hans Bühlmann of Eberfingen. The claim had originated as far back as 1637. Bühlmann,

on the other hand, admitted a debt of only 170 fl. including the field. Menckhe insisted that his

books were correct, but he was willing to inquire of his brother Eli (C1.2.1) who had been

keeping the books and now lived elsewhere. On that basis, both parties were willing to base the

account tentatively on the admitted 170 fl. Let us inspect the court transcript:38

Explanation in document fl. Comment by the book author

Amount owed 170 Agreed upon amount (120 + 50)

accumulated interest 72 4.5% simple interest on 120 fl for 16 years

37 (Rosenthal 1927) pp. 462 - 6 38 (GLA) 61/12663: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1651–1655; May 16 1652



Subtotal 242

Payments rendered -26 Both parties agree that these payments were

made

Subtotal 215

Transfer of a claim -30 Probably an outstanding claim of Bühlmann as

payment

Payment to the church in Eberfingen -5 Unclear why such a payment should be

deducted from debt

Subtotal 180

Interest on remaining for 1650/1 9 5% simple interest on 90 fl. (two years)

Subtotal 189

Menkhe demands capital 8 No explanation

Interest on 8 fl. for 21 years 9 Simple interest at 4.5%

Total debt in 1653 207 1 fl. discrepancy

Finally, Menckhe and Hans Bühlmann settled for a total payment of 160 fl. Of this total, 100 fl.

were to be paid in 1652 and the rest plus applicable interest subsequently in tranches of 10 fl. per

year. The questionable 44 fl. was to be reviewed again once the answer from Eli was in. The

transcript suggests that both logic and arithmetic were intransparent, and there was always room

for compromise.

Jewish business books probably contained amounts written in Indo-Arab numerals, but the text

was Yiddish spelled in Hebrew letters. The Stühlingen records describe at least 19 incidents

where Jewish merchants had to present their business ledgers in court, either as plaintiffs or as

defendants to argue their case. Receipts too often bore inscriptions in Hebrew letters. In such



cases the courts could either accept the writer’s testimony, or call a trustworthy Jew as expert

translator.39

The local business practice of “cattle deposition” (Viehverstellung), common both in

Stühlingen40 and Lengnau41 demonstrates another aspect of this complex business model: A

farmer who needed money sold a cow to the merchant. But the merchant had neither a

prospective buyer ready nor a stable to take care of the animal. So the farmer kept the cow in his

stable, “renting” the animal from the merchant and benefiting from the milk. He could buy back

the cow at any moment for the initial price. If the merchant, in the meantime, found a potential

buyer and the farmer couldn’t buy back his cow, it went to the new owner. One might readily

interpret this type of transaction differently as money loaned to the farmer with the cow serving

as security and the rent representing interest on the loan. This type of business was not without

its own inherent risk. Contracts often were not sufficiently clear as to who had to bear the loss if

a deposited cow should get sick or die.42 A farmer might have had his own ideas about the legal

ownership of the deposited cow and sell it surreptitiously to a third party.43 For all these reasons,

cattle deposition was frowned upon by the authorities.44

Cattle-dealing in the early modern period is readily comparable to today’s used car market.

Buyers were trying to get as cheap a deal as possible, and they easily felt cheated when the goods

did not meet their expectations. Isaac (B1.2.2) was sued because a horse he had sold dropped

dead soon after.45 But liability could also be taken too far. Marumb Jekhoff’s son (G1.3) was

sued for a horse he had sold 18 years earlier.46

Jews also traded in prime goods:

40 (GLA) 61/12658: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1628-1634; Mar. 2 1628 41 (Weldler-Steinberg and Guggenheim-Grünberg 1966) p.42 42 (GLA) 61/12666: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1659-1663; Mar. 16 1662 43 (GLA) 61/7130 Court proceedings of Tiengen Dominion, 1612-1617; Apr. 16 1613 44 (GLA) 61/12673: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1691-1693; May 29 1683 45 (GLA) 61/14176: Proceedings of the Stühlingen Municipal Court, 1632-1660; Mar. 19 1637 46 (GLA) 61/12666: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1659-1663; Mar. 17 1661



Jägglin Jew sold a horse which the prince took to Bohemia for 84 fl. 47

Many other types of assets could serve as security as well.

Jerg Hoz and his stepmother demand the return of a ploughing harness from the heirs of

Jekhoff (G1) that had been deposited as pawn 16 years earlier. Jonas Jew (G1.4), Jekhoff’s

son, responded for himself and his brother Marumb (G1.3) that they were not aware of this

matter and had to look it up in their books. They were also going consult with their brother

(G1.1) in Lengnau.48

Some degree of specialisation existed among the merchants. Lemble Weil (R1.1.1 ), who

initially had traded in the full spectrum of good allowed to Jews, by the 1690s sold mainly nails,

cloth, linen, silk and ribbons.49 The Jews also did business with the Count’s court. Some were

straightforward sales and purchases of horses.50 But in 1619 the Jews collectively gave a loan of

100 fl. to the Dominion of which 10 fl. was used to pay off a loan to Jeggle (C2) and 90 fl. to the

mason for the reconstruction of castle Hohenlupfen.51

In the beginning, Jews could easily buy and sell land and buildings, particularly in the villages

and surrounding country. At times they made a good profit. Things changed in the 1670s due to

restrictions imposed on land holding. For example, in 1677 Sandel (S1.2) bought a meadow for

100 fl. and had to resell it again for 60 fl.52 From about 1730 on, most real estate transactions

required a gentile resident representing the Jewish buyer or seller.53 The reasons for this practice

are not apparent. Jews were allowed to own houses in Stühlingen, and often family members

47 (FFA) Geldrechnung Stühlingen 1650/51 (undated, unpaginated) 48 (GLA) 61/12663: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1651-1655; Feb. 15 1652 49 (FFA) Geldrechnung Stühlingen 1694/95; undated, page 240 50 (GLA) 61/12673: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1691-1693; Jul. 8 1692 51 (GLA) 61/12655: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1611-1621; Apr. 15 1619 52 (GLA) 61/14177: Proceedings of the Stühlingen Municipal Court, 1661-1692; Jun. 4 1677 53 E.g. (GLA) 61/14178: Proceedings of the Stühlingen Municipal Court, 1728-1745; Mar. 1 1730



shared a building.54 Occasionally, a Jew did share a building with a gentile neighbour.55 But each

purchase of a Jewish residence had to be approved by the authorities.56

In 1731 the scope of Jewish trade was reined in further:

The wool-weavers complain that Salomon Weyl, Sandels Marumben son, is illegally

importing woollen cloth from Nördlingen. The Jews respond that according to their letter-

of-protection, they are allowed to trade in any merchandise except steel, iron, and salt.

Decision: The Jews are obliged to buy the cloth from the local wool-weavers.57

Business ethics of the Jews likely spanned the whole spectrum between honesty and outright

fraud and theft, although acts of rectitude are unlikely to be found in court proceedings and

municipal records. The worst case probably involved organized cattle rustling:

Veit Weihl (U1.2) Jew who has lived in Stühlingen dominion for a while and last in

Donaueschingen dominion, is sued for payment of 69, 51, and 64 fl. for horses. His

protection in Donaueschingen was annulled and he is on the run. The stables of Jews

Jäckle (C2.1.4), Joseph (G1.3.3) Marumb’s son, and Judele (U1.1), Veit’s brother were

inspected and the horses were found. Plaintiffs can get their horses back if they present

evidence that they are the owners. The wife of Veit Weil had arrived with a little child last

night, heading for Lenglau (Lengnau) as he (Veit) had ordered her to go.58

Purchase59 and sale60 of stolen goods was not uncommon. The records for the period of 1604 to

1743 show 13 accusations or convictions for trading in stolen goods. As well, Stühlingen’s Jews

committed such offenses outside its jurisdiction: In 1632/3 “Jakob of Stühlingen” (?R1.1) was

caught in Rheineck, 100 km southeast in Switzerland, trying to sell stolen goods – jewelry, pearls

and roses of gold. It is likely that he was trying to fence plunder bought from soldiers in the

Thirty Years War. Rheineck is distant enough from Stühlingen that he hoped to be safe. These

54 (GLA) 61/12682: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1724-1726; Mar. 1 1726 55 (GLA) 61/12757a: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, concepts, 1701; Jun. 21 1701 56 (GLA) 61/12684: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1730-1732; Aug. 1 1732 57 (GLA) 61/12684: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1730-1732; Sep. 26 1731 58 (GLA) 61/12670: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1682-1685; Nov. 10 1684 59 (GLA) 61/12670: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1682-1685; Dec. 5 1684 60 (StAStG) AA 1 B 3, Bl. 181V.



crimes not only contravene the laws of the land; knowingly trading in stolen goods is also clearly

forbidden by the Halacha.61

In 1629, “Davidt Jew of Eberfingen (Z1) is fined for buying stolen items”62 Later on “Lew

(G1.4.1) Jew at Stühlingen is fined 6 fl. for buying stolen cloth from some soldiers,” 63 and the

same “Lew of Stühlingen is fined 10 pounds for buying stolen property.”64 Stolen goods were

also taken as security on loans: “Jäcklein Lehman’s son-in-law in Horheim (M1.1) has taken

stolen clothes as a pawn and is fined 10 pounds.”65

An Integrated Business Model

So far, we have shown that the Stühlingen Jews traded in many goods and that they also loaned

and borrowed. But were money lending and trading related? Can you consider their trading

independent from their lending? We will now leave the purely descriptive stance for a hypothesis

testing model, as used for quantitative research in the natural, medical and social sciences. The

hypothesis we would like to test states: Money lending and trading activity were highly related –

the more a merchant bought and sold, the more loans were involved. Unfortunately, as the

philosopher Karl Popper has shown, positive statements cannot be proven directly, one can only

show that their reverse is false.66 In other words: a double negation is an affirmation. We

therefore have to show that the observed data are not compatible with the hypothesis that trading

and money lending were unrelated.

Among the 5,176 collected records, we identified 2,630 commercial transactions involving 131

Jewish merchants. Because of the nature of the records we simply counted the transactions

according to type, independent of their value. We found 1,387 credit records and 324 debit

records,67 as well as 559 cattle and horse deals, 316 real estate deals, and 44 grain transactions.

61 Lev. 19:11, (Quint 2003) 348:2, Prov. 29:24, (TB 1901) B.K. 118b 62 (GLA) 61/12658: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1628-1634; Oct. 4 1629 63 (FFA) Geldrechnung Stühlingen 1675/76 (undated) 64 (GLA) 61/12669: Proceedings of Stühlingen district; Apr. 8 1676 65 (GLA) 61/12669: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1674-1681; Jan. 2 1681 66 (Popper 1954) ch. 1 67 Both from the perspective of Jewish merchants



The relatively small part the grain

trade played in the business

spectrum of the Jews may appear

surprising at first glance. But the

requirement for a hefty

infrastructure, largely barred to

them, for transportation and

storage, may offer a plausible

explanation. We have to accept

that the initial recording of

transactions was probably

incomplete, that documents may

have gotten lost over the intervening 300 years, and that the data capture from the archives was

incomplete. The data set available for analysis thus constitutes only a sample of the universe of

business deals transacted by the Jewish merchants of Stühlingen between 1604 and 1743. We

have no reason to suspect explicit bias in this sample. But we don’t know the threshold value

above which transactions had to be recorded. We may have slightly oversampled cattle and horse

deals, because they seemed to have given rise to legal repercussions more frequently than other

types of transactions. The reason for this will be discussed later.

This bird’s eye view of business transactions, unfortunately, does not provide us with a detailed

breakdown of the business mix of individual merchants. Of the 131 merchants, 71 contributed

less than 10 recorded transactions each, another 26 between 10 and 19 each. We selected the

remaining 34 merchants with 20 or more transactions for detailed inspection. Merchants were

sorted according to the number of total transactions and the data presented as stacked columns

graphs, both as absolute values and in percentages (Fig. 2 & 3). Since we are primarily interested

in patterns of economic activity rather than individual performance, only every second merchant

is labelled by his identifier.

Figure 1. Total business activity (Transactions)

12%

21%

53%

12%

2%

Overall Business Activity

Real Estate

Cattle & Horses

Credit

Debit

Grain



Figure 2. Activities, absolute by type

Figure 3. Activities, percentage by type

From Figure 2 it is quite evident that one merchant – Jekoff’s son, Marum Gugenheimb (G1.3),

who was active from 1632 on and died in 1685/6 – sticks out from the crowd. He must have had

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Events

Commercial Activity (Absolute)

Real Estate Cattle & Horses Credit Debit Grain

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

Events

%

Commercial Activity (Percentage)

Real Estate Cattle & Horses Credit Debit Grain



a special knack for business and appears quite prominently in Peter Stein’s attempt at

reconstructing the Jewish community of Stühlingen.68 But because of Marum’s dominance,

Figure 2 is not suited for comparing the business spectrum of individual merchants. Figure 3

shows the same data, but in a proportional representation. We can now see that they practically

all employed similar patterns of business mix.

Merchants (R1), (B1.2.2), (R2) and (B1.2.1.2) had a markedly higher frequency of debts than the

rest. But rather than just eyeballing the similarity between the merchants, we can use a statistical

method to compare the patterns of the full sample of 131 merchants.

We want to compare the total number of trades for each merchant with the number of his

outstanding loans. We, therefore, plot the sum of grain, cattle and horse, and real estate

transactions on the x-axis against their number of owed claims on the y-axis (Figure 4).

Enter Karl Pearson (1857–1936), a

British mathematician with a keen

interest in biometrics. In 1895 he

published a method for estimating

the likelihood that a certain

experimental pattern may result by

chance alone, a measure now called

the “Pearson Product Moment.”69

This measure, designated R2, is 1.0

if the two variables are totally

correlated and 0.0 if the two

variables are totally unrelated. In our

case, “correlated” signifies

“proportional”.

For the 131 Jewish merchants, R2 = 0.65. The resulting likelihood of falsely rejecting the null

hypothesis (no correlation exists between goods sold and credit collected) is significantly less

68 (Stein 1994) 69 (Pearson 1895)

y = 1.161x + 2.4708 R² = 0.6524

0

50

100

150

200

0 50 100 150

Cred

it Co

unt

Merchandise Transactions Count

Merchandise - Credit Correlation

N = 131

Figure 4. Correlation of Goods vs. Credit



than 1 in 100.70 In other words, it is practically certain that the total count of collected claims is

highly proportional to the actual number of sales. A statistically savvy reader might object that

Marum the super salesman distorts the statistics. True, but even if we repeat the calculation

omitting Marum, we get a resulting R2 = 0.616, which is still highly significant – better than

99%.

Could there be alternative explanations for these findings? Successful people, possibly, had more

available capital. But this hypothesis can be shot down easily. One would then have to expect

that the sons of successful traders would be successful too because they were more likely to own

inherited capital. When we rank the merchants according to their total numbers of collected

credits and examine the achievements of the three top ranked merchants’ sons, we are

disappointed: number one merchant’s sons rank 48th, 67th, 68th, and 69th; the sons of the

second most successful merchant rank 33rd and 36th; number three’s sons come in ranks 21 and

17 respectively. In a somewhat more quantitative fashion, the ranking of the ten top salesmen

does not correlate at all with that of their sons.

But that doesn’t mean that merchant

skills don’t run within families. Five of

the top ten salesmen (highlighted in

Figure 5) are to be found in three

branches and three generations of the

Gugenheimb family71. In other words,

commercial success did not seem to

primarily depend on available financial

capital, but seemed to rest on individual

skills or motivation that might well have

had a genetic component.

70 (Cohen 1977) p. 93 71 Of Copper and Museum fame - (Frank and Stein 2006)

Figure 5. Four of the ten top merchants were members of the Gugenheimb family.



In 1738 Prince Joseph Wilhelm

Ernst von Fürstenberg ordered that

a summary of outstanding debts

(claims) to the Jews be compiled in

preparation for their planned

eviction. The officials went to work

and by April 25, 1739, produced a

beautifully crafted document

entitled Extractus Summarius72

listing the total credit entitlements

of the 22 Jewish merchants active

at that time. Every single one of the

listed Jews is identifiable, and his major commercial activities have been recorded. For only

three of the 22, no sales are reported. One was a young son (W1.3.4) in partnership with his

father (W1.3) and the sales may have been listed in the latter’s name. Two others (G1.2.2.3.4 &

C2.1.4.2.4) had paid their protection tax for several years, their outstanding credits were

minimal, but they never recorded any sales. It is likely that they plied the peddling trade73 and

their individual transactions did not reach a level where they had to be recorded. Thus it is

possible to compare total sales with credit earned (Fig. 6).

72 (FFA) Politica Div. 1 Subdiv. 2 Extractus Summarius; Apr. 25 1739 73 (Fontaine 1996) pp. 8 - 34

y = 113x + 280.29 R² = 0.7797

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Sum

mar

y Am

ount

fl

Registered Trades

Extractus Summarius

N = 22

Figure 6. Correlation between trade and total assets.



Figure 7. Extractus Summarius of 1739 (facsimile)

Again it shows a statistically highly significant association between the number of sales enacted

and the total amount of money owed. The amount of accumulated credits is directly proportional

to the number of goods a merchant sold. Thus it appears that there were no exclusive “money

lenders” among the Stühlingen Jews listed in the Extractus Summarius (Fig. 7). Their

accumulated, outstanding loans were proportional to their trading activity.

To paraphrase the result in non-statistical language: credits did not exist independently from

trade. The more a merchant bought and sold the more claims he collected. Rather than a primary

money lender, he was a businessman who employed credit as tool of his trade in goods – cattle,

horses, land and grain.

The comment accompanying the document, describing the reason for the magnitude of credits as



“the vicious, double-dealing and fraudulent purchase, barter, credit and other contracts

against the poor inhabitants who had to seek the assistance of the Jews out of necessity

and poverty” 74

amply illustrates the attitude of the Princely house and its administration. But the governor’s

(Obervogt) verdict to grant the population 16 years to repay the loans presents a strong argument

that the credit system provided by Stühlingen’s Jews constituted a significant component of

market capitalization in the local economy.

Another transaction illustrates the whole complexity of the credit instruments:

Hürzel (B1.2.1 ) sells a claim of 30 florins for 24 florins to the Dominion from which he

uses 14 florins for his own protection fee and 10 florins for the protection fee of his step-

brother Jeslin Jew.75

Claims were thus discounted, traded, and used as payment like cash. Some of these claims had a

very long validity. Marum Tochtermännlin (S1) wanted to collect a 28-year-old claim in 1660.76

Some debtors owed money to as many as eight different merchants:

Claims against Hanns Rebmann called Gussi: Jäggle Jew (C2) 134 fl. Hürtzle Jew

(B1.2.1) 60 fl. Meierle Jew (C2.1) 8 fl. Jecoff Jew (G1) 8 fl. Cost (R2) 1 fl. Isaac (B1.2.2) 4

fl. + 3 fl. The heirs of Sannel Jew(C1) 15 fl. Judele Jew of Ofteringen (O4) 30 fl. + 5 fl.77

In 1684 Meyerlin, Menkhin’s son (C2.1.2.1) passed a claim to his sister, who just got married.78

Estates were frequently settled in claims as well:

Jeckoff (G1.2.2.2) has inherited a claim from his father Callmel (G1.2.2).79

And similarly:

74 (Rosenthal 1927) p. 180 75 Ibid. May 4 1618 76 (GLA) 61/12666: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1659-1663; Oct. 29 1660 77 (GLA) 61/12658: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1628-1634; Feb. 1 1629 78 (GLA) 61/12670: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1682-1685; Nov. 17 1684 79 (GLA) 61/12672: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1688-1691; May 16 1691



Marumb (G1.3) and Jonele (G1.4) Jews Jeckhoff´s (G1) sons and heirs, ledger. The

following participate in the claim: The heirs of Schmul (G1.2) Jew (22 fl.), Marumb

(G1.3) Jew, Jonas Jew, and the heirs of Josephle(G1.1) Jew (38 fl. each).80

Credits did not have to be heartless. The Stühlingen protocols record a deposition:

Christa Fössler and his wife in Schwaningen are grateful to Jew Sandel (S1.2). Since he

did not aggressively pursue his interest at their bankruptcy, they were able to keep their

farm. As the Jew lost about 150 florins, they assigned him a mortgage of 50 florins beyond

the court settlement.81

In fact, while crimes and misdemeanors of Jews occupied the courts quite frequently, not a single

accusation of, or conviction for usury was among the 622 cases concerning Jews.

Jews were not only lenders; they also borrowed money for leverage. With the general cash

shortage in the country, the major lenders were in the cities:

Treasurer (Säckelmeister) Hurter of Schaffhausen claims 202 florins from Jägglin Weyl

Jew (R1.1) in Stühlingen. The claim originates from 1640.82

In summary: Overall, the Jews of Stühlingen were quite successful merchants. There is evidence

that their credits acted almost as substitute currency, one even used by the authorities.83 As a

group, they probably wouldn’t have rated highly with the Better Business Bureau. But they

seemed to have provided an integrated business and credit system that helped the rural market to

function.

80 (GLA) 61/12664: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1655-1659; Nov. 22 1657 81 (GLA) 61/12675: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1702-1705; Mar. 16 1703 82 (GLA) 61/12666: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1659-1663; May 4 1662 83 (GLA) 61/12655: Proceedings of Stühlingen district, 1611-1621; May 4 1618



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