BLE Last Cases Full Text

8/12/2019 BLE Last Cases Full Text

1/45

SECOND DIVISION[A.C. No. 4552. December 14, 2004]

JOSE A. ROLDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NATALIO PANGANIBAN and ATTY. JUANITO P.NOEL, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Jose A. Roldan againstrespondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty. Juanito P. Noel. Complainant charges thatrespondent lawyers reneged in their duties and obligations towards him as their client, especially in thecomplainants right toappeal to the higher court after losing his case in the lower courts. Theallegations in the complaint dated February 12, 1996[1] in support of the accusations are as follows:

1. Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A. Roldan vs.Ramon Montano & Robert Montano, na ang Judge ay si Honorable Severino De Castro, Jr. na angkaso ay Recovery of possession with damages. Itoy iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case

No. 95-73739 na ang Judge naman dito ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC. Si Atty.Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang abogado ko.

. . .

4. Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court room ay nagtanong sa akin si Atty.Noel, ng ganito: Mr. Roldan nasaan nga pala yung resibo na ibinigay ni Tessie sa iyo na nagbigay kang down payment na Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) noong March 1, 1986. Agad akong sumagotat sinabi ko sa kaniya, Atty. Noel lahat po ng original ay hiningi ninyo sa akin, lahat po ay binigay kosa inyo kasama iyong resibo ni Tessie Dalusong, na akoy magbigay ng Ten Thousand Pesos bilangdownpayment sa ipinagbili niyang bahay sa akin. Agad siyang sumagot Wala kang ibinibigay saakin!

5. Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Ibigay ninyo sa akin ang folder at ako ang hahanapng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong. Tumulong din si Atty. Noel, at nakita din namin. Sinabi ni Atty. NoelSayang hindi na natin maipasok ito, hindi na kasi pwedeng magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya. Di koalam kung bakit hindi niya ipinasok noon pa man. (Ang resibo na nagpapatunay na ako ang unangnakabili ng bahay sa 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Maynila).

6. Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako sa sinasabi ni Atty. Noel noRebuttal pero nagtaka ako kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay malinaw na ang aking deklarasyon atmalinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi na raw dapat mag rebuttal i-waive na lang daw saMemorandum kaya nga sinabi ng Judge na: Gumawa kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen dayssubmitted for decision. Noong March 8, 1995 ang memorandum ay submitted for decision;

7. Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, Bakit may ibinigay na zerox copies ngdecision si Robert Montano na aking kalaban sumagot si Atty. Noel, at sinabi sa akin Tsekin mo sa court. Gayon nga ang aking ginawa. At bumalik ako kay Atty. Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na maydecision na. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel na: Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo, magkano ang inilagay nila?Sa palagay ko ay hindi lang trenta mil (P30,000.00) pesos ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun angisinagot ko;

8. Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng motion for reconsideration, sinagat ako ni

Atty. Noel na: Ginapang na nila yun kaya dapat umapila na lang tayo. Sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na:Kung matalo pa rin ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa Supreme Court para parehas ang laban; Na bilangbahagi nito inilakip ko dito ang decision ng MTC; at ang apilasyon sa RTC, at ang petsa ng decisionng RTC na tinaggap ni Atty. Noel.


2/45

9. Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa Court of Appeal makaraan ang ilang buwan aydumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban, noong November 13, 1995 ang decision subalittinawagan ako ng sekretarya nila Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban noon lang November 24, 1995.Tinanong ko ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng sekretarya ayNasa probinsiya maraming inaasikaso doon. Agad kong sinabi: Hindi ba fifteen days lang paramaka-apila sa Supreme Court. Sumagot siZeny at sinabi Isang buwan daw yun para sagutin.

10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban) na sinasabi kongnakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin na ninyo ang apilasyon sa Supreme Court, itoy madalas kongsabihin sa sekretarya (si Zeny) kayat ibinigay niya ang bagong office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco CentreRm. 134, 1564 Mabini St., Ermita, Manila.

11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel gaya noong Dec. 1, 1995, Dec. 4,1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7, 1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon pang huling linggo ng November ay sisimulanko ng sabihin sa dalawang sekretarya (si Zeny at Marie Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihinkay Atty. Noel sa Supreme Court.

12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco 3rdFlr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila. Tinanong ko ang kaniyang sekretarya kung nakausap si Atty. Noel,sinagot ako ng sekretarya at sinabing Tinanong ko si Atty. Noel kung yari na yung apilasyong

ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose Roldan) hindi po niya ako sinasagot.

13. Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang alamin ang katotohanan nabatid konoon lang, na akoy natalo ng walang kalaban-laban, pagkat nag-laps na o lampas na ang panahongibinibigay ng batas para makapag-payl ng apilasyon sa Supreme Court.

14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa aking kaso ni Atty. Noel, at Atty.Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko sila ng Damages na halagang one hundred fifty thousand(P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang alisan ng karapatan na makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon.

In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban avers that he was neither aware nor did heparticipate in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A. Roldan vs.Ramon Montano & Robert Montano and in the appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 43; they do not have a lawyer-client relationship because he is on leave in the practice of lawsince October 18, 1993 when he was designated Acting Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and during hisincumbency as such, and up to the filing of this administrative complaint in 1996, he is still on leaveas law practitioner because he was elected Mayor of Laurel, Batangas in the last 1995 election;probably, complainant included him as respondent because he thought that he is practicing law and isstill an associate of Atty. Juanito P. Noel, due to the fact that on some occasions complainant mighthave seen him or they might have talked casually in the law office from which he was on leave in hispractice of law because he drops there from time to time to meet visitors from Laurel who are living

and who have problems in Metro Manila; and he has not received any single centavo from thecomplainant.

In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges: Sometime in 1994, he agreed to representcomplainant in recovering a one-half portion of the ground floor of a house located at 1723 Pedro GilSt., Paco, Manila which complainant bought from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by herdaughter Teresita Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for recovery of ownership andpossession was filed on February 8, 1994 with the RTC but upon the effectivity of the law expandingthe jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) the case was transferred to the MTC. From theevidence of the defendant, he honestly saw no need to present a rebuttal evidence. The MTC rendereda decision dismissing the case on the alleged ground that the identity of the subject matter of the actionwas not clearly established. He filed an appeal in due time to the RTC of Manila (Branch 43) and notwith the Court of Appeals as stated in paragraph 9 of the complaint. On November 13, 1995, hereceived a copy of the RTC decision dated October 10, 1995, affirming the decision of the MTC.


3/45

Through the telephone, he informed the complainant about the decision of the RTC. Complainantinstructed him to prepare an appeal to the higher court which actually refers to the Court of Appealsand not with the Supreme Court as complainant claims. He advised the complainant that he couldfind no error in the said decision and a further appeal would be frivolous and without merit andrequested the complainant to come over so that he could discuss the matter with him. Whenever thecomplainant went to the law office, he failed to see him because the latter was still attending courthearings. The complainant asked for the records of the case which was given by his secretary.Complainant never returned the case folder to him, neither did he call up by phone, or see himpersonally. He then assumed that the complainant had hired another lawyer to handle the appeal. Hewas surprised when he received on July 18, 1996 a copy of the resolution of this Honorable Courtdated June 19, 1996, requiring them to file their comment on the complaint of Jose A. Roldan.

We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. After hearing,IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel A. Quiambao submitted his Report and Recommendationdismissing the complaint against Atty. Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In aResolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP adopted and approved the said Report andRecommendation.

We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or non-existence of lawyer-client relationship betweenAtty. Panganiban and the complainant.

From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears that Atty. Panganiban and Atty. Noel usedto be law associates. However, Atty. Panganiban went on leave from the practice of law since October18, 1993 when he was designated as acting mayor of Laurel, Batangas[2] due to the indefinite leave ofabsence filed by the mayor and by reason of his election as mayor of the said municipality in 1995.The complainant claims that he secured the services of Atty. Panganiban on January 6, 1994.[3] It isthus clear that Atty. Panganiban was not an active associate of the law firm, since at that time, he wasalready on leave from the practice of law. Moreover, the complaint filed in 1996 before the RTC forRecovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages was prepared and signed by Atty. Noel alone

and not in any representation of any law firm. In fact from the filing of the said civil case in the RTC,it was Atty. Noel who represented the complainant. Not once did Atty. Panganiban appear for thecomplainant nor did he sign any document pertaining with the aforesaid case. Necessarily, thecomplaint against Atty. Panganiban must be dismissed.

As to the complaint against Atty. Noel.

The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a deliberate attempt to suppress evidence onthe part of Atty. Noel, to the prejudice of complainant and (2) whether it was correct for Atty. Noel torefuse to file a further appeal of the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review despitethe manifest desire of the complainant to do so.

Anent the first issue.

Complainant insists that Atty. Noels failureto present in evidence the receipt dated March 1, 1986was fatal to his cause. The receipt shows that complainant made a partial payment of P10,000.00 ofthe P40,000.00 price of the subject property. Complainant claims that this piece of document provesthat complainant bought the subject property ahead of the defendants who bought it only on July 30,1986. Thus, to the mind of the complainant, the non-presentation of the subject receipt is suppressionof evidence.

Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts that the same was mere fabrication of thecomplainant. He insists that said receipt did not exist during the preparation and filing of thecomplaint and even during the presentation of evidence. Otherwise, he argues that such fact shouldhave been alleged in the complaint to show that complainant bought the subject property ahead of theother buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that the receipt was given to him, the same cannot


4/45

be used as evidence because the receipt shows that it was signed by one Romeo Dalusong who is not aparty to the sale; neither does it appear in the receipt that Romeo was acting in a representativecapacity.

A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight of this issue.

It appears that the subject property was subjected to a double sale by the same seller. The Deed ofSale of the complainant is dated November 28, 1986 while that of the other buyer is dated July 30,1986. But complainant claims that actually the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 asevidenced by the subject receipt. Complainant however failed to take possession of the subjectproperty as the same is already in the possession of the other buyer. Complainant filed an ejectmentcase[4] against the tenant of the other buyer but the same was dismissed for the reason thatcomplainant failed to show that he had proprietary right over the property in question. Unable totake possession of the subject property, complainant filed a case against the seller for the annulment ofthe contract of sale, the Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1986. Complainant won and the courtawarded him damages of P80,000.00.

Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a Compromise Agreement.[5] The seller,agreed to sell one-half of her duplex house which is the same property that was previously sold tocomplainant on November 28, 1986, including all her proprietary rights over the land, in the amountof P80,000.00. Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant in the same amount, this was set-off against the price of the property. Pursuant to the said compromise agreement, a Deed of AbsoluteSale and Transfer of Right[6] in favor of the complainant was executed on December 22, 1990 by theseller over the said property.

Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject property as a result of the compromiseagreement, complainant still failed to take possession of the subject property, hence he filed acomplaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages against the other buyer. It is inthis case that complainant claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject receipt. The MTC

dismissed the complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed it again. Upon failure of Atty. Noel to filea petition for review with the Court of Appeals, complainant filed the present administrative complaintagainst him.

We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the subject receipt was not in existence at thetime he prepared the complaint or even at the time of presentation of evidence. The complaint wasverified by the complainant stating the fact that he caused its preparation, that he read the same andattested that the contents thereof are true and correct. If complainants allegation that he gave thereceipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and considering the importance of the subject receipt to his case, heshould have called the attention of Atty. Noel that there was no allegation of the existence of thesubject receipt.

We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing evidence.

As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty. Noels refusal or failure to file a petitionfor review before the Court of Appeals.

It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right to file a further appeal because he was notinformed immediately of the result of the appeal to the RTC. Complainant insists that Atty. Noel,through his secretary, called the complainant only on November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receiptof the adverse RTC decision and was given the impression that he has still one month within which tofile an appeal. The complainant also said that he paid the respondents visits on December 1, 4, 5, 7and 8, 1995, to follow up the filing of the appeal to the higher court but that he was not able to talk toAtty. Noel; that it was only when he went to the RTC that he learned that he lost the case because theperiod of the appeal has lapsed.


5/45

Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on November 13, 1995 and on the followingday, he instructed his secretary to contact the complainant to inform him of the adverse RTC decisionwith the directive for the complainant to call up Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he wasinstructed by the complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that he told the complainantthat there is no need to appeal the case because, first, the decision of the court is correct, and second,he is obligated by the code of professional responsibilities to refrain from filing a frivolous andunmeritorious appeal; that thereafter, complainant went to his office twice, the last of this instancewas when complainant took all the records of the case and never came back which led him to believethat complainant will not appeal the adverse RTC decision. Atty. Noel further states that, in anyevent, his relationship with the complainant ended upon the issuance of the decision and that thecomplainant should not expect that he would still appeal the case.

We find for the complainant.

It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in following up the status of the case. From thetime, complainant filed the case with the MTC up to the time he appealed with the RTC, complainantwas vigilant with his rights constantly in contact with Atty. Noel. We find it strange therefore that

upon receipt of the adverse RTC decision, it would seem, if Atty. Noels version is to be givencredence, the complainant had lost his zeal and just allowed the time to appeal to lapse. As correctlyobserved by the Investigating Commissioner in his Report:

Here was a complainant who went through several litigations over the same subject matter, including acase of ejectment, a case of annulment of contract of sale with damages, a case of action for recoveryof ownership and possession, an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, and he did not seem perturb thathe lost it (the appeal) and did not find it essential to discuss the matter with his lawyer for possibleremedial action? That is, as claimed by his lawyer?

. . .

As opposed to the general denial given by the respondent about the claim that the complainantfollowed up his case several times with his office (outside of the two occasions that he conceded thecomplainant did so), the complainant was precise in detailing the circumstances which described howhe tried his best to seek the presence of Atty. Noel to no avail. There were dates, detailedcircumstances, and specific places. Given the character which had characterized the effort of thecomplainant to seek appropriate legal remedies for his complaints, the assertions would be consistent,that is, that he made great efforts to find Atty. Noel.

We note that the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision within the 15-dayprescriptive period to appeal. As stated elsewhere, Atty. Noel received the adverse RTC decision onNovember 13, 1995 and the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision on November24, 1995. Hence, complainant has still four days to file an appeal. However, Atty. Noel failed to

ensure that the client was advised appropriately. Atty. Noel entrusted entirely with his secretary theduty to inform the complainant about the adverse decision. And the secretary informed thecomplainant rather late and worse with the wrong information that the complainant has still a monthwithin which to file an appeal. This resulted to the lapse of the prescriptive period to appeal withoutcomplainant having availed of the said remedy.

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewithshall render him liable.[7] If only Atty. Noels position of not filing an appeal because it would onlybe frivolous has been properly communicated to the complainant at the earliest possible time so thatthe complainant would be able to seek the services of another lawyer for help, it would have beencommendable. A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, hisclients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulouslyobservant of law and ethics.[8] But as it was, Atty. Noels negligence as afore-discussed robbed the


6/45

complainant of the opportunity to at least look for another lawyer for professional help and file anappeal, after all, it is the client who finally decides whether to appeal or not an adverse decision.

We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he should not be expected to file an appeal forthe complainant because their lawyer-client relationship ended with the RTC decision. First, a lawyercontinues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act ofhis client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to dohis best for the interest of his client.[9] Second, Atty. Noel admitted that complainant instructed him tofile an appeal with the higher court. Even assuming that their contract does not include filing of anappeal with the higher courts, it is still the duty of Atty. Noel to protect the interest of the complainantby informing and discussing with the complainant of the said decision and his assessment of the same.A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.[10] It is the obligation ofcounsel to comply with his clients lawful request. Counsel should exert all effort to protect theinterest of his client.

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer involves the exerciseof sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.[11] In cases of similar nature, the penalty

imposed by the Court consisted of reprimand,[12] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[13]suspension of three months,[14] six months[15] and even disbarment[16] in aggravated case.

The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer pursuant to theCode of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a suspension from the practice of law for onemonth is just penalty under the circumstances.

Complainants claim for damages cannot be entertained in the present disbarment case as it is not theproper forum. It is not an ordinary civil case where damages could be awarded.[17] A disbarment caseis a proceeding that is intended to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers;to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important functionshall be competent, honorable and reliable, men in whom courts and clients may repose

confidence.[18] It has been emphasized in a number of cases that disbarment proceedings belong to aclass of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action.[19]

Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban is DISMISSED. Atty. Juanito P. Noelis SUSPENDED for one month with a warning that a repetition of the same would be meted a moresevere penalty. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record in the Office ofthe Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines andto all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 511. August 31, 1971.]

JOVITO SAPALO, Complainant, v. RAYFRANDO DIAZ, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT IN VIEWOF COMPLAINANTS MOTION TO WITHDRAW. An administrative complaint was filedagainst respondent alleging that despite complainants reminder to the former to fulfill his promise ofmarriage, he failed to do. Later on, complainant sought that the complaint be withdrawn. Pursuant tothis Courts resolution, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental, submitted stenographic

notes of investigation conducted by him where it was made clear that petitioner personally appearedbefore the Judge of the City Court of Bacolod, to verify her petition to withdraw complaint. She was


7/45

asked as to whether the allegations were true and correct and she answered in the affirmative. Sheexpressly affirmed that she was neither threatened not forced into signing such petition. In the light ofthe foregoing, this complaint against respondent is dismissed.

R E S O L U T I O N

FERNANDO, J.:

On September 28, 1970, an administrative complaint was filed by Jovita Sapalo against respondentRayfrando Diaz, who passed the bar in 1970. While the facts were not stated with precision, it wastherein alleged that complainant and respondent, while students at the University of Negros Occidentalhad amorous relations as a result of which she became pregnant. There was an assertion thatrespondent had promised to marry her, an application for marriage license actually having been filedwith the Civil Registrar of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental on June 15, 1968, which application was

subsequently withdrawn without the knowledge of the complainant. Nonetheless, notwithstanding herreminder that he should fulfill his promise of marriage, he failed to do so. Then on December 19,1968, complainant gave birth to a child who was named Ma. Teresa Sapalo Diaz. Respondent didacknowledge the child as his own, consenting likewise that in the record of birth as well as in thebaptismal certificate, he should be named as the father. Mention is likewise made of complainant allthe while pressing her plea that respondent marry her, but he was adamant in his refusal. Thereafter, itcame to her knowledge that it was not legally possible for him to do so as he was already married.Hence this complaint.

This Court, in a resolution dated February 19, 1971, required an answer from Respondent. It was filedon May 14, 1971. There was no denial of the amorous relationship that existed between complainantand respondent as a result of which a child was born. It was therein made clear, however, that at such

time respondent was still single, then 24 years of age and a third year law student at the University ofNegros Occidental, while petitioner was likewise of the same age, taking courses in commerce at WestNegros College, also in Bacolod City. Then came this allegation: "That sometime in March 1968, thefrequent association as officemates between the herein petitioner and respondent resulted in intimaterelations brought about by mutual desire and passion, which was voluntarily and mutually entered intoby both parties and without misrepresentation or any other consideration on the part of one or theother. Both were still single and 24 years of age." 1 Respondent thereafter declared that he did, onApril 15, 1968, resign from his employment in Bacolod and went home to his hometown inBinalbagan, Negros Occidental, precisely "in order to put an end to the intimate relations with thepetitioner, . . ." 2 It was not until May 10, 1968 that, according to him, he was advised about herpregnancy, and it was then that she asked him to marry her. He pleaded for time as he wanted to getthe consent of his mother, which was not forthcoming. After which, he proceeded thus: "That

sometime in the first week of June 1968, the herein petitioner [did press the matter of marriage] on theherein respondent and, with the intercession of other persons, he was prevailed upon to sign blankforms of the application for marriage license and he likewise signed the marriage contract itself, whichpapers petitioner filed with the local Civil Registrar of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental on June 15,1968. After days and nights of deliberation, respondent realized that his efforts to force upon himselfthe marriage were of no avail as it would end up in a lifetime of misery and bring about a family wherethe shadows would never be lifted, for it would not be founded upon love which is the basicfoundation of a good marriage. In the third week of June 1968, respondent withdrew all the papersfrom the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, in the presence of thepetitioner." 3

There was an admission of petitioner having given birth to Ma. Teresa Sapalo Diaz on December 19,1968. He borrowed the sum of P200.00 from his sister and gave it to petitioner to help defray thehospital bills. On December 25 of that year, respondent married his childhood sweetheart. He stressed


8/45

that from April 15, 1968, he never had further "carnal relations with the herein petitioner because heprecisely wanted to put an end to the [affair]." 4 He included, as part of his answer, a decision byJudge Nestor B. Alampay of the Court of First Instance of Negros declaring that Ma. Teresa SapaloDiaz is the acknowledged natural child of respondent who was likewise ordered to support said childin the amount of P100.00 monthly beginning the month of April 1971. Such a decision was renderedon a stipulation of facts wherein complainant admitted that the intimate relationship between her andrespondent "was voluntary, mutual and without any misrepresentation or other consideration on thepart of either of them." 5

Subsequently on May 14, 1971, Petitioner, in a pleading before this Court, sought that the complaintbe withdrawn, stating therein that the circumstances pertinent to the intimate relationship between herand respondent were truthfully set forth in the stipulation of facts submitted by them in the aboveaction for recognition and support of the child, Ma. Teresa Sapalo Diaz. Then came this portion of herpetition to withdraw complaint: "That from the foregoing, it is obvious that both parties are to beblamed for any transgression that they may have committed, and that it would be unfair to lay theblame exclusively on the respondent; and [that] petitioner is making this verified admission of thecircumstances that led to the intimate relations between herself and respondent in order that she may

be able to live in peace with her conscience." 6There was a resolution by this Court on May 25, 1971 of the following tenor: "Considering (a) theanswers of the respondent to the complaint filed against him; and (b) the motion of the complainantpraying that her complaint against the herein respondent be withdrawn and dismissed, [the Courtresolved] to require the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental to verify the authenticity andvoluntariness of the withdrawal by the complainant of her complaint in this case, within 15 days fromnotice hereof." 7 Thereafter, on July 3, 1971, the 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental,Jose A. Encarnacion, forwarded to this Court the original of the transcript of the stenographic notes ofthe investigation conducted by him "wherein the complainant testified to the authenticity andvoluntariness of the withdrawal of her complaint against Rayfrando Diaz, Respondent." 8 In thestenographic notes submitted by such fiscal, it was made clear that petitioner personally appeared

before the Judge of the City Court of Bacolod, Alejandro Dinsay, to verify her petition to withdrawcomplaint. She was asked as to whether the allegations were true and correct and she answered in theaffirmative. She expressly affirmed that she was neither threatened nor forced into signing suchpetition.

In the light of the foregoing, this complaint against respondent Rayfrando Diaz is dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamorand Makasiar, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,vs.HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.


9/45

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed bypetitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion washis allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he wasnot in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judgeof such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being]to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitionerwas previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect himin his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure toallow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretioncorrectible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of theaccused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance.

This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to complywith the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that hecontinues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is notnow the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain ingood standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrarfor the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced todischarge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala ofrespondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny suchmotion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, onNovember 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,

premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on thevolume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately thedefense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. Amotion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw ascounsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed onFebruary 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of theobjection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel

for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of theCommission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who areready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied.When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knewsince October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice thecivil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for theaccused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963,October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964,and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Uponpetition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case ishereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at itsinstance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses haveto come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was noincompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of


10/45

his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would beserved by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecutionhas already rested its case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation ascounsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened withconditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, beingappointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as asurprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even moremanifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It isunderstandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recentstatement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinaryproceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it aresponsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Thoseenrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State,the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigentdefendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered

without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, ofcourse, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practiceto attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live;certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon himas counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficiocounsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officersand subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligencein the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is acourt-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the

accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he mustexercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is torender effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctoryrepresentation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have abigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension thatconsidering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare ofthe accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Itsimportance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In

criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard bycounsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard bycounsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he isguilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easilyto persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counselis deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that underrules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney,it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the courtshould assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time toprocure an attorney of hisown." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even moreemphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himselfand counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an


11/45

offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel deoficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to putmatters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his goodfaith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future,an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forthabove, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel withcompetence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of theprofession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legalpractitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takesprecedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.FIRST DIVISION

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., G.R. Nos. 135688-89Petitioner,Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,AZCUNA andGARCIA, JJ.

UEM-MARA PHILIPPINESCORPORATION, TOLLREGULATORY BOARD andPUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY,

Respondents. Promulgated:

October 18, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of a decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court ofAppeals (CA) dated July 28, 1998 and September 23, 1998, respectively, in the consolidated cases ofCA-G.R. SP Nos. 48111 and 48145 which set aside the order[4] and writ of preliminary injunction[5]issued by the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 147 (RTC) dated June 23, 1998 and June 24,1998, respectively, in Civil Case No. 98-1159.


12/45

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. alleged that he is a taxpayer and resident of Cavite. Heclaimed that he instituted this suit in the RTC in his behalf and in behalf of the other users of theCoastal Road which is the principal road connecting Metro Manila and Cavite.[6]

Private respondent UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) is a corporation dulyorganized and validly existing under Philippine laws. It was incorporated by two Malaysian entities,namely, United Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) and Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA).[7]

Public respondents are the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), created under PD 1112[8] and thePublic Estates Authority (PEA), a government owned and controlled corporation organized pursuantto PD 1084.[9]

On July 26, 1996,[10] UMPC entered into a Toll Operation Agreement (TOA) with theRepublic of the Philippines, through the TRB and PEA, for the design, construction, operation andmaintenance of the R-1 Expressway (Airport Road Junction to Zapote), the C-5 Link Expressway (linkbetween the R-1 Expressway and the South Luzon Expressway) and the R-1 Expressway Extension(Zapote to Noveleta, Cavite), all three (3) expressways being components of the Manila-Cavite Toll

Expressway Project (MCTEP). Pursuant to the TOA, UMPC was exclusively responsible for thedesign, construction and financing aspect of the expressways, while the PEA was exclusivelyresponsible for the operation and maintenance thereof.[11]

Under the MCTEP, PEA was to operate the R-1 Expressway (also known as the CoastalRoad)[12] as a toll facility and collect toll fees from its users. Part of these fees would be used tocompensate UMPC for its investment and participation in the project. Toll collection commenced onMay 24, 1998.[13]

On May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and declaration of nullityof the TOA, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ ofpreliminary injunction in the RTC praying that respondents be ordered to cease and desist from

collecting the announced toll fees for the use of the MCTEP on the following grounds: (1) that thetoll fees as fixed in the TOA were grossly exorbitant, unconscionable and violative of the allowablereasonable rate of return on investment and (2) that there was absence of notice and public hearing inthe fixing of the rate of toll fees in contravention of public interest.[14]

On May 25, 1998, Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC, Makati City,Branch 133, issued an ex parte TRO effective for 72 hours enjoining respondents from charging andcollecting the toll fees. The case was raffled to Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of Branch 150 whosubsequently inhibited himself from hearing the case.[15] The case was re-raffled to Judge Teofilo L.Guadiz, Jr. of Branch 147.[16]

On May 27, 1998, Judge Guadiz, Jr. issued an order extending the TRO to 20 days. On June 9,

1998, he issued an order setting aside his May 27, 1998 order and set the case for summary hearingpursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.[17]

On June 23, 1998, Judge Guadiz, Jr. issued an order granting petitioner's application for a writ ofpreliminary injunction, which writ was issued on June 24, 1998 after petitioner posted a surety bond inthe amount of P100,000.[18]

On June 26, 1998, UMPC filed a petition for certiorari with application for TRO and/or writ ofpreliminary injunction in the CA. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48111. On July 1, 1998,PEA and TRB likewise filed a petition for certiorari and this was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48145.The cases were consolidated.[19]

In a decision promulgated on July 28, 1998, the CA nullified and set aside the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued by the RTC. It ruled that the writ was issued in contravention of PD 1818[20] and


13/45

petitioner failed to prove that it satisfied the requisites for its issuance.[21] It denied reconsideration ina resolution dated September 23, 1998.[22]

Hence this petition.

In a manifestation and motion (in compliance with the Honorable Court's resolution dated August 2,

2000 requiring submission of memorandum) with motion to cite in contempt of court dated August15, 2001, petitioner prayed that private respondent UMPC and its counsel be cited in contempt formisrepresenting to the Court that UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of UMPC.

First, we shall resolve the sole substantive issue raised: should the prayer for a writ of preliminaryinjunction be granted?

We need to determine if PD 1818 is applicable to this case. This law, dated January 16, 1981, states:

WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 605[23] prohibits the issuance by the courts of restraining ordersor injunctions in cases involving concessions, licenses, and other permits issued by administrative

officials or bodies for the exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the country;WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to adopt a similar prohibition against the issuance of suchrestraining orders or injunctions in other areas of activity equally critical to the economic developmenteffort of the nation, in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government projects;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of thepowers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order as follows:

Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversyinvolving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development

project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others[,]public utilities for the transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, toprohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing theexecution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuingany lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

PD 1818 proscribes the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in any case involving an

infrastructure project of the government.[24] The aim of the prohibition, as expressed in its secondwhereas clause, is to prevent delay in the implementation or execution of government infrastructureprojects (particularly through the use of provisional remedies) to the detriment of the greater goodsince it disrupts the pursuit of essential government projects and frustrates the economic developmenteffort of the nation.[25]

Petitioner argues that the collection of toll fees is not an infrastructure project of the government. Hecites the definition of infrastructure projects we used in Republic v. Silerio:[26]

The term infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, andbridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage,water supply and sewage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, schoolbuildings, hospital buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the governmentcapital investment.[27]


14/45

He contends that the MCTEP does not involve the construction of a road since the Coastal Roadalready existed since the early 1980s and UMPC merely upgraded it.[28] He also asserts that since theproject was financed by a foreign group, it does not form part of the government capital investmentthat makes it a government infrastructure project as contemplated by PD 1818.

Respondents counter that the Coastal Road was repaired, rehabilitated and upgraded by UMPC, andthus falls under infrastructure projects as defined. Furthermore, the collection of toll fees is necessaryto the execution and implementation of the MCTEP because part of the fees collected, after meetingthe operation and maintenance expenses of the expressway, is used by UMPC to pay the commercialloans it incurred to finance the project. Therefore, if collection is enjoined, not only will the operationand maintenance of the Coastal Road be affected but the construction and completion of the othercomponents of the project will also be disrupted.[29]

According to UMPC, the obligations of public respondents under the TOA undeniably show that theMCTEP is an infrastructure project that forms part of the governments capital investment. They are

obliged to finance the acquisition of lands needed for the project.[30] The TOA also provides that thegovernment of the Philippines owns the toll expressways comprising the project.[31]

The CA held that the MCTEP is a government project considering that the government, through theTRB, is one of the contracting parties of the TOA. It is an infrastructure project because it involvesthe construction, design, operation and maintenance of the expressways. The collection of toll fees isan activity necessary for the execution, implementation or operation of this infrastructure project of thegovernment.[32]

We agree.

The definition of infrastructure projects specifically includes the improvement and rehabilitation of

roads and not just its construction. Accordingly, even if the Coastal Road was merely upgraded andnot constructed from scratch, it is still covered by the definition. Moreover, PD 1818 itself states thatany person, entity or governmental official cannot be prohibited from continuing the execution orimplementation of such project or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution orimplementation. Undeniably, the collection of toll fees is part of the execution or implementation ofthe MCTEP as agreed upon in the TOA.[33] The TOA is valid since it has not been nullified. Thus itis a legitimate source of rights and obligations. It has the force and effect of law between thecontracting parties[34] and is entitled to recognition by this Court. The MCTEP is an infrastructureproject of the government forming part of the government capital investment considering that underthe TOA, the government owns the expressways comprising the project.[35]

Next, petitioner argues that PD 1818 does not extend to injunctions or restraining orders against

administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.

In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although [PD 1818] prohibits any court from issuinginjunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance ofinjunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or theexercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involvingquestions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power torestrain or prohibit administrative acts.[36]

It is founded on the principle that to allow the courts to determine such matters would disturb thesmooth functioning of the administrative machinery.[37]

Considering the co-equal status of the three branches of government, courts may not tread into mattersrequiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and legislative branches,


15/45

unless it is clearly shown that the government official or office concerned abused his or itsdiscretion.[38] Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise ofpower. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty orto a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as not to act at all in contemplation of law orwhere power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[39]

Futhermore,

xxx courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies orofficials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally betterequipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as governmentpolicy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions.[40]

The imposition of toll fees, fixing the amount thereof and its proper collection are technical matterspublic respondents are surely more knowledgeable about than the courts. This is clear from thepowers and duties conferred on them by their charters.

Under Section 5 (k), PD 1084, PEA is authorized to collect tolls:

Sec. 5. Powers and functions of [PEA]. [PEA] shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it iscreated, have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

k. To issue such regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all ofthe highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees ortolls for their use provided that all receipts by [PEA] from fees, tolls and other charges areautomatically appropriated for its use.

Under Section 3 of PD 1112, the TRB was tasked to supervise the collection of toll fees:

Sec. 3. Powers and Duties of the [TRB]. The [TRB] shall have in addition to its general powersof administration the following powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

d. Issue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged the directusers of toll facilities and upon notice and hearing, to approve or disapprove petitions for the increasethereof. xxxx

In Padua v. Hon. Ranada,[41] we stated:

The TRB, as the agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of tollfacilities, has the necessary expertise, training and skills to judiciously decide matters of this kind. Asmay be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of petitioner Zialcita's argument is that theprovisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable. This isobviously a question of fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered indetermining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within the province of the TRB.[42]

The arguments petitioner advances to show that public respondents committed grave abuse ofdiscretion already go into the validity of the TOA itself or its terms, which was the subject of the maincase in the court below.[43] The issue that we are tackling herethe propriety of the issuance of aninjunctionmerely involves the collection of toll fees in the Coastal Road. Petitioner also claims thatthere were irregularities committed by the respondents. While it is true that PD 1818 was not intended


16/45

to shield irregularities committed by administrative agencies from judicial scrutiny,[44] petitioner hasnot proven the supposed anomalies and they remain as mere unsubstantiated claims. These factualissues were not passed upon by the courts below and we decline to resolve them now considering thatwe are not a trier of facts. In any event, as a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition forreview on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Consequently, there is no showing that public respondents abused their discretion in imposing andcollecting the toll fees. These are provided for in the TOA which, as mentioned earlier, remains validsince it has not been declared invalid by any court. Also, the presumption that official duty wasperformed regularly has not been overturned.

We now rule on the motion to cite in contempt filed by petitioner against UMPC and its counsel,Castillo and Poblador Law Offices, particularly Atty. Napoleon J. Poblador and Atty. Manuel JosephR. Bretaa III. Petitioner alleges that they should be cited for contempt for misrepresenting to theCourt in their memorandum dated November 17, 2000 that UEM and MARA were still thestockholders of UMPC when in fact the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC) had already bought theirshares.[45] UMPC stated:

87. Contrary to petitioner's malicious assertions, the Republic of the Philippines and publicrespondent PEA selected private respondent (then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM)based on established guidelines of the national government on joint venture agreements betweengovernment agencies and the private sector. xxx Private respondent, therefore, could only assume, as itreasonably assumed, that these government agencies performed their functions in accordance with lawand only after scrutinizing the qualifications of private respondent's stockholdersUEM and MARA.

88. Private respondent is more than qualified to be the joint venture partner of public respondent PEAbased on the track record of its aforementioned stockholders.

88.1 MARA is an instrumentality or corporate agency of the Malaysian government. The Malaysian

government specifically designated MARA to realize its agreement with the Philippine governmentto pursue and enter into jointand cooperative development undertakings. (cf., Annex D, supra).

88.2 On the other hand, UEM is a Malaysian company publicly listed on the Kuala LumpurStock Exchange (KLSE) since 1975. It has an authorized capital stock of RM500,000,000 orapproximately P5,000,000,000.00. It is one of Malaysia's largest engineering, design and constructiongroups with direct and indirect interests in five (5) publicly listed companies on the KLSE. xxxx[46](Emphasis supplied)

In their comment on the motion, Attys. Poblador and Bretaa stated that they had nothing to do withthe sale of UEM and MARA of their 283,744 shares in UMPC as other law firms, namely, CastilloLaman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose Law Offices representing UEM and Sycip Salazar Hernandez &

Gatmaitan Law Offices representing CRC were involved. The sale was approved by the TRB onNovember 18, 1999.[47]

We do not think that UMPC and its counsels should be sanctioned for contempt.

Counsels can be held in contempt of court[48] for making false statements in the pleadings theyfile[49] tending to mislead the Court and to degrade the administration of justice. We cannot see anydeliberate falsehood or misrepresentation in the aforequoted statements of Attys. Poblador andBretaa. On the contrary, they truthfully indicated that UEM and MARA were the former stockholdersof UMPC. This is the clear import of the phrase then represented by its stockholders MARA andUEM. This also implied that they had been replaced as such. Besides, the ownership structure ofUMPC as a party in this case was never material to the issue for resolution which is the issuance of awrit of injunction for the collection of toll fees. Hence, the Court was not deceived in any way.


17/45

Petitioner also insists that they be cited in contempt for showing disrespect and resorting to offensivelanguage against RTC Judge Guadiz, Jr. when they stated:

Despite the obvious legality of the project, petitioner, either by sheer arrogance or a malicious refusalto acknowledge the truththat the [MCTEP] and the imposition of toll fees for the use of the CoastalRoad are legal and above boardinitiated what is no more than a nuisance suit and secured from aninsufficiently-informed judge an illegal writ of preliminary injunction which public respondent, theHonorable [CA], subsequently reversed.[50]

Attys. Poblador and Bretaa, in their defense, countered that there was nothing insulting ordisparaging in describing someone as insufficiently informed. This was not intemperate languageamounting to vilification.[51]

They are correct. In criticizing a judge's decision, the test is whether it is done in good faith:

While the Court recognizes a litigant's right to criticize judges and justices in the performance of theirfunctions, it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill

over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,and abuse and slander of courts and the judges (or justices) thereof, on the other. Intemperate andunfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.[52]We cannot say that the use of the adjective insufficiently-informed is disrespectful, abusive orslanderous. Besides,

[it] is well settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts topreserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges howeverare enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the endin view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not forretaliation or vindictiveness.[53]

Therefore, we deny petitioners motion to cite in contempt for lack of merit.

In sum, PD 1818 prohibits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the collection oftoll fees for the use of the Coastal Road. None of the exceptions to this proscription is applicable here.The collection of toll fees for R-1 Expressway, one of the components of the MCTEP, is an activitynecessary for the execution of a government infrastructure project covered by the protective mantle ofPD 1818. It is noteworthy that the MCTEP was identified by the government as an urgent necessityto support the rapid development of the Calabarzon[54] area, particularly the province of Cavite.[55]Accordingly, no preliminary injunction can be issued enjoining or preventing its implementation. Weneed not go into a discussion of whether petitioner was able to prove the requisites for its issuance.[56]

To emphasize, we have limited ourselves to the issue of propriety of the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction. We are not resolving the substantive issues presented such as the validity ofthe TOA. We leave this to the RTC for resolution after trial on the merits.[57]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 28, 1998 decision and September 23, 1998resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 48111 and 48145 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner'smotion to cite Attys. Napoleon J. Poblador and Manuel Joseph R. Bretaa III in contempt of court islikewise DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila


18/45

THIRD DIVISION

A. C. No. 7421 October 10, 2007

ELISA V. VENTEREZ, GENARO DE VERA, INOCENCIA V. RAMIREZ, PACITA V. MILLS,ANTONINA V. PALMA and RAMON DE VERA, Complainants,vs.ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Complaint filed by complainants Eliza V. Venterez, Genaro de Vera, Inocencia V.Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon de Vera against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R.Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981 entitled, "Sps. Danieland Lolita Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al.," for Declaration of Ownership with Damages filedbefore the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Respondent represented thecomplainants, who were defendants in said case, until a Decision thereon was rendered by the MTC on25 February 2004. The MTC ruled against the complainants. Respondent received a copy of the saidDecision on 3 March 2004.

Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for Reconsideration or aNotice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. The 15-day period within which to file anappeal or a motion for reconsideration of the MTC Decision expired on 18 March 2004. ComplainantElisa V. Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for

Reconsideration which was filed on 19 March 2004. It must be stressed that the said motion wassigned by complainant Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer did not enter his appearance.

On 23 March 2004, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied1 by the MTC. Respondent wasnot furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a Certification2 issued by Clerk of Court IIZenaida C. de Vera. On 31 March 2004, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution3 was filed by theplaintiffs in Civil Case No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any commenton the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted4 by the MTC on 23April 2004. On 28 April 2004, a Writ of Execution5 was issued and on 26 April 2004, an Entry ofJudgment6 was made in the said case.

Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his Notice of

Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.

Feeling aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant administrative complaintagainst him.7

In his Answer,8 respondent denied the claim of complainants that soon after the Decision wasrendered by the MTC, they (complainants) directed him to file an appeal or a motion forreconsideration thereof. For his defense, respondent averred that Salvador Ramirez (the son of one ofthe complainants, Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed him that "he [was] withdrawing the case from therespondent because he already engaged another lawyer to take over the case, so respondent gave therecords of the case to him." Respondent explained that "after Salvador Ramirez withdrew the casefrom the respondent, and engaged another lawyer, the respondent turned over the records of the case tohim and the respondent ceased as the counsel of the complainants." Respondent further alleged that thesaid Motion for Reconsideration was already prepared by another lawyer. He denied being furnished a


19/45

copy of the Motion for Reconsideration allegedly prepared and filed by another lawyer engaged bycomplainant Elisa V. Venterez and that he was served with a copy of the denial of the said Motion bythe MTC. Respondent also clarified that the "last day of the 15-day period for the perfection of theappeal is 19 March 2004 since a copy of the decision was served on the respondent on 4 March 2004."Finally, respondent argued that "when the respondent was served a copy of the Motion for Writ ofExecution, he immediately notified Salvador Ramirez about said Motion but Salvador Ramirez cameto see the respondent only on 3 May 2005, when the respondent asked him to sign a Notice ofRetirement of Counsel signed by Salvador Ramirez which respondent immediately filed in court."

Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 15 February2006.

On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report andRecommendation,9 finding respondent liable for gross negligence and recommending the impositionupon him of the penalty of three months suspension, to wit:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY of Gross Negligence andshould be given the penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION.

Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution10 No. XVII-2006-457 dated 8 September2006, approving and adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report andRecommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of thisResolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and theapplicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty. Rodrigo Cosme ishereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.11

We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case, aswould warrant disciplinary action.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once heagrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful ofthe trust and confidence reposed in him.12 Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle thatan attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until thecase becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw hisservices without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.13 Anydereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client.14 This means that his client is entitled to the benefitof any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to

assert every such remedy or defense.15

The Decision in Civil Case No. 981 was rendered by the MTC of Calasaio, Pangasinan, on 25February 2004. Respondent admitted16 that he was served a copy of the said Decision on 4 March2004. After having received a copy of the MTC Decision, respondent did not bother to file a Motionfor Reconsideration or a notice of appeal with the proper courts. Thus, complainants were compelledto engage the services of a new counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the MTC who didnot, however, enter his appearance as new counsel. It bears stressing that during this time, respondenthad not yet filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981.Respondent only formally withdrew as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 981 when he filedwith the MTC his Notice17 of Retirement as Counsel on 5 May 2004, on the ground that "he was also

retired as Counsel for the [complainants] two days after he received copy of the decision rendered inthis case when SALVADOR RAMIREZ, a representative of the [complainants], withdrew all therecords of the case from [respondent] to be given to his new counsel."


20/45

We cannot accept respondents defense that he had already withdrawn from the case two days after hisreceipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly communicated this withdrawal to SalvadorRamirez, son of one of the herein complainants, Inocencia Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on thepart of respondent to wash his hands of any liability for failing to pursue any of the available remediesto complainants from the adverse MTC Decision.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-clientrelation at any time with or without cause.18 The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate therelation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.19 Among the fundamentalrules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedlystipulates to carry it to its conclusion.20 He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.21A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client'swritten consent or from a good cause.22

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or specialproceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from anaction or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the clientand attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution,the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of theformer one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of hisclient filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse togive his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the clientand adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The applicationfor withdrawal must be based on a good cause.23

What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are identified under Rule22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSEAND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:

a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he ishandling;

b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;

d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out theemployment effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retaineragreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

g) Other similar cases.


21/45

The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither can the circumstancesof this case be considered analogous to the grounds thus explicitly enumerated. Contrary torespondents contention, his professional relations as a lawyer with his clients are not terminated bythe simple turnover of the records of the case to his clients. Respondents defense completely crumblesin face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had noauthority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to terminate the latters services.

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however,cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presumethat his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court.24 Until his withdrawal shall have beenapproved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court,to do what the interests of his clients require.25 He must still appear before the court to protect theinterest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are notterminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel ofrecord for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from

the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave his clients without representation. An attorney mayonly retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the court after duenotice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney isrecorded in the case.26 Respondent did not comply with these obligations. Therefore, he remains thecounsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the duty to protect complainantsinterest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the status of the case, he would have known that hewas still the counsel of record as no entry of appearance was ever made by another counsel. It wouldhave been easily discernible on his part that there was no change in his status as complainants lawyer.As of that time, their client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting. Therefore, he would have knownthat the Motion for Reconsideration was denied; and a writ of execution had been issued under thecircumstances.

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest ofcomplainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Respondent is reminded that the practiceof law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academicallyand morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to alwaysuphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission whichmight lessen the trust and confidence of the public.1wphi1

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer involves the exerciseof sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.27 In cases of similar nature, the penaltyimposed by the Court consisted of reprimand,28 fine of five hundred pesos with warning,29

suspension of three months,30 six months31 and even disbarment32 in an aggravated case.

The facts of the case show that respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer pursuant to theCode of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a 3-month suspension from the practice of lawis a just penalty under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report andrecommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY.RODRIGO R. COSME is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt withmore severely.


22/45

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the BarConfidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to allcourts of the land.

SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant,vs.ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent.

D E C I S I O NGARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. LuisaHadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.

The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September 7, 2002 and filedwith the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda withviolation of Article 2092 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as theyboth worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officerwhile she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimedthat, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further allegedthat, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosedpersonal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismalcertificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter toa lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling hercase only after she had already heard her secrets.

Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later

part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant's account,precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded acellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.

According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed aCOUNTER COMPLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation ofSection 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last twocharges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basisof the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against herbefore the Professional Regulation Commission.

Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosingpersonal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legaladvice.


23/45

In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to fileher answer to the complaint.

In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5 respondent denied giving legal advice to thecomplainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship betweenthem. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitivedocuments adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions ofthe answer read:

5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of herAFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had anyLAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legaladvice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewisenever delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets.That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONALMATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to

privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact,whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private lawpractitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept anydocument.

9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of herAFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and herillegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILDSUPPORT case against her lover where she has a child .

Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are allpart of public records .

Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me orto force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she willcertainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL andCRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.

On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline cameout with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to therespondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from thispostulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she"[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation," and accordingly recommended thatrespondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. RocelesMadianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.

On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading asfollows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report andRecommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part ofthis Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence onrecord and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information givento respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.

We AGREE

BLE Last Cases Full Text

Documents