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Black mischief: crime, protest and resistance incolonial
Kenya
David M. Anderson
The Historical Journal / Volume 36 / Issue 04 / December 1993,
pp 851 - 877DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X00014539, Published online: 11
February 2009
Link to this article:
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0018246X00014539
How to cite this article:David M. Anderson (1993). Black
mischief: crime, protest and resistance in colonialKenya. The
Historical Journal, 36, pp 851-877
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The Historical Journal, 36, 4 (1993), pp. 851-877Copyright 1993
Cambridge University Press
BLACK MISCHIEF: CRIME, PROTESTAND RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL
KENYA*
DAVID M. ANDERSONSchool of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London
A B S T R A C T . This article examines the history of African
resistance to colonial rule among theNandi and Kipsigis peoples of
Kenya's Western Highlands. Anti-colonial protest centred on
theactivities of a group of ritual leaders, the orkoiik of the
Talai clan, who were believed to possesssupernatural powers of
prophecy and divination. Between the late i8gos and 1905, the
orkoiyotKoitalel had come to prominence as a leader of resistance
to conquest. After his defeat the Britishbriefly attempted to
harness his Talai clansmen to the system of colonial government,
promoting themas chiefs. This move was based upon a
misunderstanding of the status of the orkoiik, whose powersoften
stood in direct conflict with the authority of the elders and who
were greatly feared by manyNandi and Kipsigis. By the igsos the
orkoiik were deeply implicated in much criminal activity,especially
the theft of livestock from European settler farmers. On three
occasions orkoiik attemptedto organize armed risings.
The article concludes with a discussion of the place of the
orkoiik in the historiography of Kenya.Although Koitalel and
Barserion are commonly presented as heroes of a glorious resistance
tocolonialism, it is suggested that this interpretation fails to
reflect the deep ambiguity of the status ofthe orkoiik, and the
complexity of the struggles that took place within African
societies under colonialrule.
On a near-moonless night in June 1934, a group of eight Africans
entered thecompound of a European-owned farm in the Kinangop area
of NaivashaDistrict, Kenya Colony. The farm was the home of Alex
and Stella Semini, asettler couple who had only been farming in the
district for the past year. Theintention of their African visitors
was burglary: the theft of money, firearmsand ammunition. Why these
interlopers selected the Semini farm is unclear,but their simple
burglary was to go horribly wrong, with consequences theycould not
have foreseen. The burglars clumsily disturbed the family from
theirsleep, and when Alex Semini went on to the porch to
investigate, a struggleensued. In the general melee Alex Semini was
speared and then beaten whilehe lay injured, and Stella Semini
assaulted. Hearing the Seminis' farmlabourers coming to investigate
the commotion, the African interlopers made
I am grateful to Roy Foster, John Lonsdale, Joseph Miller,
Terence Ranger, Neal Sobania,Ed Steinhart and Richard Waller for
their comments on an earlier version of this paper, and alsoto
seminar groups at the University of Cambridge, University of
Minnesota, and the School ofOriental and African Studies,
University of London, whose constructive criticisms helped to
shapethe ideas presented here.
85I
-
852 DAVID M. ANDERSON
their escape into the night, taking with them some of their
booty but leavingbehind pieces of clothing and personal possessions
dislodged in the fracas.These would later be crucial items of
evidence in the apprehension andconviction of the criminals. Dazed
and in a state of shock, Stella Seminibundled her husband into the
family car, and the couple managed tomanoeuvre the vehicle over the
two miles to the nearest neighbouring farm.Alex Semini passed into
a coma later that night, and survived for the nextthree weeks,
before finally succumbing to his wounds.1
News of the 'Kinangop Outrage', as these events came to be
known, causedan immediate furore among the settlers of Naivasha and
quickly became amatter of debate and concern throughout Kenya's
White Highlands.2Rumours that Stella Semini had been sexually
assaulted fuelled the 'BlackPeril' anxieties of the white settler
community. The response of the police andthe administration was
accordingly rapid and intense, and within days thefirst of a series
of arrests was made. The police had identified the culprits asbeing
Kipsigis, a people whose home reserve lay some 100 miles to the
west ofKinangop, beyond the Mau escarpment (Fig. 1). A small number
of Kipsigis- less than 100 - were employed on farms in the Naivasha
district, but noneof those eventually charged with the murder of
Alex Semini was found to bea resident of Naivasha (although one had
previously been employed on theSemini farm).3 The Kipsigis people,
along with their neighbours the Nandi,had long been stigmatized in
European perceptions as habitual cattle thievesand were commonly
portrayed as the most 'criminally' inclined of all Kenya'sAfrican
peoples. That reputation had taken on a more sinister tone as
attackson the property and person of European settlers and Asian
traders in theWestern Highlands had steadily increased from 1928,
reaching proportionswhich generated considerable alarm among
sometimes over-anxious settlersand calmer colonial officials alike
by 1933. Over this period thefts of livestock,money and firearms,
which had initially been concentrated on the Europeanfarms in the
immediate vicinity of the Kipsigis reserve, gradually increasedand
spread over an ever-widening area. In the interpretation of the
colonialgovernment, the 'Kinangop Outrage' conformed to this wider
pattern ofcriminal activity involving the Kipsigis (and to a lesser
extent their otherKalenjin neighbours).
1 This account is based upon the trial papers. Criminal Case 123
(1934), Rex. v. Kibet arap
Boregi and 6 others. P.R.O. CO 533/481/1. Eight persons were
known to have been involved inthe crime, but only seven were
prosecuted. For a brief reference to the case, but only in the
contextof settler reaction, see Dane Kennedy, Islands of white:
settler society and culture in Kenya and SouthernRhodesia,
i8go-ig3g (Durham, NC, 1987), p. 133. This murder has taken its
place in settlermythology, with perhaps predictable distortions.
See the settler traditions collected by MaryGillett, Tribute to
pioneers (privately published, Oxford, 1986), [no pagination,
entries listedalphabetically], where Alex Semini is stated to have
been 'murdered on his farm in 1954 duringthe Mau Mau
rebellion'.
2 'Report of public meeting of Naivasha Farmers' Association', 2
July 1934, KNA [Kenya
National Archive] PC/RVP.6A/17/50.3 Criminal Case 123 (1934),
trial transcript, CO 533/481/1.
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CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 853
N A N D I Ethnic groups
Kisii Towns
Laikipia Districts
0 miles 30
Rumuruti
V///////AThomson's Falls //, Nanyuki
Fig. 1. Central and western Kenya.
Investigation of this spiralling pattern of lawlessness led, in
the early monthsof 1934, to the revelation that much of this crime
was 'organized', and thata particular section of the Kipsigis
people were its principal instigators.Responsibility for this
'lawlessness' was attributed to the activities of the malemembers
of the Talai clan, known by the Kalenjin term orkoiik (sing,
orkoiyot),who were believed to possess ritual and supernatural
powers. The ' KinangopOutrage' was believed to have been instigated
by one of these ritual experts.By the time of the trial of the
seven Africans accused of the murder of AlexSemini, the colonial
administration had become convinced that the' witchcraft' of the
Kipsigis orkoiik had been turned towards crime, and thatmuch of
that criminal activity was deliberately directed against the
authorityof the government.4 The victims of these crimes included
African chiefs andtheir agents as well as Europeans and Asians, and
the colonial authoritiescame to realize that some of these
incidents had a political significance that
4 Governor Byrne to secretary of state, 3 May 1934, CO
533/441/1, summarizes the findings
of the government inquiry into the activities of the
orkoiik.
-
854 DAVID M. ANDERSON
went beyond-simple accumulation: crimes against colonial laws,
protestagainst colonial authorities, and ultimately the aim of a
general armedresistance were seen to be linked in a serious
challenge to colonial rule in theWestern Highlands. The murder of
Alex Semini, coming just as the Nairobiadministration was debating
how to deal with the threat posed by theseAfrican 'gangsters',
contributed significantly to the decision to take the drasticand
unparalleled action of deporting the entire Talai clan from the
KipsigisReserve and detaining them indefinitely in an alien and
inhospitable area ofNyanza province in what was, in effect, an open
prison.5
The 'outrage' on the Semini farm was part of white Kenyan
history (andlater its mythology). It can also be too easily adopted
into nationalisthistoriography as part of a tradition of resistance
in which the leading orkoiikhave a heroic role. But Kenya has many
histories; what historians think (oronce thought) important may not
be what their subjects were most concernedwith. All African
societies had their internal conflicts, which are revealed
onlytangentially and perhaps misleadingly in their brushes with
colonial authority.This is a case study of trying to see through
the misperceptions which ourinherited historiography has imposed
upon us. What mattered to the Kalenjinwas male generational
conflict over livestock resources and access to thevarious forms of
political and moral authority which underwrote, orpatronized,
household strategies of accumulation, stock management andalliance.
All this was problematic, even threatening, to those involved:
disease,drought, enmity had to be combated. There were different,
even conflictingmeans of doing so. There was the 'normal' authority
of elders, exercising con-trol through seniority and the
manipulation of kin and herds: and there weretwo forms of'
abnormal' (and to varying degrees, abhorrent) means of insur-ance
and seeking advantage. One was everyday witchcraft, available to
all whowere malignantly inclined. There were also the 'prophetic'
or divinatorypowers available only to the most senior and most
proficient orkoiik, powerswhich could most successfully be invoked
and harnessed during moments ofhigh social drama, when society was
challenged from outside or when its ownmechanics of social change,
such as the age-sets that regulated the relationshipsbetween
generations, went through contested processes of transition. We
haveto understand 'resistance', if we are to understand it as part
of African, ratherthan merely colonial, history, as an external
manifestation of this deeperrhythm of social life. And these
rhythms changed as colonial rule created thepossibility of a new
moral order - ultimately to be shaped by those elders whograsped
the opportunities of Christianity, who accepted the political
authorityof the new state, and who turned their energies to
economic gain in anincreasingly agricultural (rather than
cattle-keeping) economy. This new
5 'The Laibons Removal Ordinance' (no. 32 of 1934), was
initially drafted and put before the
Colonial Office in May 1934. The amended ordinance became law on
25 Sept. 1934, Laws ofKenya, 1948 (Nairobi, 1948), Cap. 46.
Comments on the provisions of this legislation are to befound among
the papers in CO 533/481/1. The term 'gangster' was employed by the
prosecutingcounsel in the Semini case, none other than
Attorney-General William Harrigan, in his openingremarks to the
court. Criminal Case 123 (1934), trial transcript, p. 4, CO
533/481/1.
-
CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 855
world was inevitably built at the cost of the authority of the
orkoiik, whosepowers were intrinsically linked to older social
patterns, and whose successdepended upon the exploitation of the
ambitions of younger men with as yetno household (and thus no moral
authority) to their name. This essay is aboutthe ways in which the
struggles of the orkoiik to adapt to the new rhythms ofthe colonial
world were and have been perceived, and about the importanceof such
perceptions in shaping our views of villains and heroes in the
colonialpast.
Laibons, orkoiik and witchcraftWe must begin by dealing with the
definition of certain terms and categories.The Kipsigis and the
Nandi are sections of the broader group now known asthe Kalenjin,
and in earlier ethnographic literature referred to as the
'Nandi-speaking peoples'.6 Among Kalenjin the term orkoiyot refers
to the malemembers of specific clans, who are attributed with a
variety of supernaturalpowers. Orkoiyot was not an ' office', and
there was no automatic legitimacy forany person to claim to be the
'paramount' or 'senior' orkoiyot. The status of anorkoiyot depended
entirely upon reputation, and that in turn depended uponthe
fulfilment of prophecy, success in rain-making and divination,
theacknowledged efficacy of medicines, and so on. Each practising
orkoiyotoperated within a limited geographical area, which might
contract or expandwith his reputation. However, certain orkoiyot
were believed to hold greaterpowers, and people came from much
further afield to consult such a person.These individuals also took
a prominent role in rituals and ceremonies with adeeper
significance for the wider community, most notably those involving
thetransitional phases of age-sets.7
The powers of the orkoiyot were believed to be hereditary; that
is to say, theywere thought to possess mental powers that were
passed through the lineage.You could not learn to be an orkoiyot:
you were born one. All male membersof specific clans among the
Nandi and Kipsigis were, by definition, orkoiyot. Butit was
recognized that though all had inherited the powers, only some
wouldbe able to use them. This ambiguity as to the 'redistribution'
of powersthrough each generation led to rivalry and competition
within immediatefamily groups, most frequently between cousins, but
sometimes also betweenbrothers and half-brothers. If you were born
the son of a well-respected and
6 C. W. Hobley, Eastern Uganda: an ethnological survey
(Anthropological Institute, occasional
papers no. 1: London, 1902) and A. C. Hollis, The Nandi: their
language and folk-lore (Oxford, 1909)are the earliest works, but
what have become the standard texts were published later. SeeG. W.
B. Huntingford, Nandi work and culture (Colonial Research Studies
no. 4, HMSO, London,1950); idem, The Nandi of Kenya: tribal control
in a pastoral society (London, 1953); idem, Ethnographicsurvey of
Africa: East Central Africa, part VIII, the southern Nilo-Hamites
(London, 1953); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 'The political structure of
the Nandi-speaking peoples of Kenya', Africa, xin (1940),250-67 ;J.
G. Peristiany, The social institutions of the Kipsigis (London,
1939); and I. Q. Orchardson,The Kipsigis (Nairobi, 1961, abridged
version reprinted Nairobi, 1971).
7 Huntingford, Nandi of Kenya, pp. 38-52; Peristiany, Social
institutions, passim; Orchardson,
The Kipsigis, chs. 4 and 5.31 HIS 36
-
856 DAVID M. ANDERSON
powerful orkoiyot, the public perception was that you had a
higher probabilityof inheriting similar powers. Rivalries within
lineages were matched by thosebetween lineages, as each struggled
for pre-eminence within the clan. Lessobviously, this led to a
degree of fictive kinship: on the one hand, younger andaspiring
orkoiik used their relationship to senior and highly regarded
clansmenas a form of legitimation (and such patronage was an
important aspect of thepolitical domain exercised by leading
orkoiik); on the other, the wider publiccommonly assumed kinship
between successive generations of powerful orkoiik.
The colonial authorities described the practices of the orkoiik
(and laibons) asa form of witchcraft, and troublesome individuals
were often prosecuted underthe witchcraft ordinance.8 This seems
straightforward enough from theperspective of the colonial
administration, but is both confused and confusingwhen explored
from the perspective of the Kalenjin. Witchcraft (ponisiet),
asNandi and Kipsigis understood it, was not confined to the members
of theTalai clans, but could be practised by any person. Witchcraft
was believed torequire skills which could be learned, and although
in certain cases it wasthought to pass through the lineage, in
general it was not consideredhereditary.9 Some orkoiik were
recognized practitioners of witchcraft, but thiswas seen as being
distinct from their potential to hold greater powers asmembers of
an orkoiik clan. Orkoiik could be witches, but witches who were
notmembers of the specific orkoiik clans could not be orkoiik: and
there werebelieved to be many such people. To Kalenjin, witchcraft
and the practices ofthe orkoiyot were two quite distinct phenomena.
The important point here isthat colonial debate about the
prevalence of witchcraft and the activities of theorkoiik assumed
the two categories to be synonymous. From the perspective ofthe
Christian missionary churches, who entered the Western Highlands in
theearly years of this century, both were pagan and represented
elements ofAfrican belief to which Christianity was implacably
opposed: in the missionarymind the orkoiik were, like witches,
practitioners of the black arts.10
A further confusion of terms must be explained. Throughout the
colonialperiod male members of the Talai clan among the Kipsigis
were referred to byEuropeans as ' laibon' rather than 'orkoiyot'.
The activities of the Kipsigis laibonwere, in general terms,
identical to those of the Nandi orkoiik. However, laibonis the name
given to a category of ritual expert among the Maasai (the wordis
from the Maa language, not Kalenjin), whose practices and social
status arenot the same as those of the Kalenjin orkoiyot. The
confusion stems partly fromthe tendency of early colonial officials
to use laibon as a generic term for ' ritual
8 Witchcraft accusations were commonly used by district
commissioners as the basis for
deportation orders to be issued against troublesome orkoiik.
This involved the collection of swornaffidavits from local elders.
See, for example, several cases from Elgeyo district reported
in'Laibons, 1934-63', KNA PC/NKU/3/1/10.
9 Huntingford, Nandi of Kenya, pp. 107-11; Orchardson, The
Kipsigis, pp. 119-22.
10 Huntingford, ibid. For an account of mission work among
Kalenjin which deals with early
(pre-1914) perceptions of the orkoiik, see W. R. Hotchkiss, Then
and now in Kenya Colony (New York,1937), and for an introductory
discussion of mission conflict with the orkoiik Huntingford,
Nandiwork and culture, pp. 116-18.
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GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 857
expert', and to give the role of such an individual pronounced
politicalovertones: this generic was avoided in the case of Nandi,
where the prolongedresistance to British conquest in which the
orkoiik were involved gave thecolonizer an early awareness of the
precise Nandi term. At the same time,there is a strong historical
connection between Kalenjin and Maasai ritualexperts throughout the
Rift Valley and Western Highlands, and this alsocontributed to the
blurring of indigenous categories and types in British eyes.11For
the sake of simplicity, and also because (as we shall see) there
are verygood historical reasons for doing so, I shall hereafter
refer to all these ritualexperts among the Kipsigis and Nandi as
orkoiik.
This historical connection is essential to an understanding of
the colonialhistory of the Kalenjin. During the second half of the
nineteenth century therole of the orkoiik among some sections of
the Kalenjin was ' overlaid' byaspects of Maasai laibon practice.
Although ritual experts throughout EastAfrica were commonly
identified with a particular community, thatassociation was not
necessarily bounded by notions of ethnicity: Maasai laibons,in
particular, were widely consulted by non-Maa peoples during
thenineteenth century.12 Some time during the 1860s a laibon named
Barsabotwo(or Kapuso), from the Uas Nkishu Maasai (who had until
then occupied thegrazing lands of the plateau adjacent to Nandi
country), came to prominenceamong the Nandi. Nandi oral histories
date the emergence of a pre-eminentorkoiyot, with greater powers
and gaining a wider constituency than hadpreviously been the norm,
to this event. Precisely what may have existedbefore this date, and
how the role of the orkoiik may have been evolving at thistime, we
do not know: but the arrival of Barsabotwo - the embodimentperhaps
of the intrusion of a broader wave of influences brought into
Nandiby Uas Nkishu Maasai refugees, defeated and scattered after
internecinesquabbles with other Maasai herders - marks a watershed
in Nandi perceptionof their recent history.13
The introduction of these influences among the Kipsigis came c.
1890,around the time that Kimnyole, according to some accounts
Barsabotwo'sgrandson, was stoned to death by Nandi following a
sequence of failedpredictions: whatever the power of the lineage,
the status of any orkoiyotdepended upon performance. In the
unsettled period surrounding Kimnyole'sdeath, part of his family
departed from Nandi and moved south to settleamong Kipsigis. By the
late 1890s one of this group, Kipchomber arap
11 J. L. Berntsen, 'Pastoralism, raiding and prophets:
Maasailand in the nineteenth century'
(Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979), and ' Maasai
age-sets and prophetic leadership',Africa, xux (1979), 134-46.
12 J. L. Berntsen, 'The Maasai and the Inkidongi: prophets,
followers and pastoralism in the
Rift Valley in the nineteenth century', paper delivered to the
conference on 'Seers, prophets andprophecy', London, Dec. 1989, pp.
116.
13 P. K. arap Magut, 'The rise and fall of the Nandi Orkoiyot',
in B. G. Mclntosh (ed.),
Ngano: studies in the traditional and modem history of East
Africa (Nairobi, 1969); S. K. arap Ng'eny,'Nandi resistance to the
establishment of British administration 1883-1906', in B. A. Ogot
(ed.),Hadith 2 (Nairobi, 1970), pp. 104-26; G. W. B. Huntingford,
'The genealogy of the Orkoiik ofNandi', Man, xxiv (1935), 24.
31-2
-
858 DAVID M. ANDERSON
Koilege, one of Kimnyole's many sons, had emerged as the most
prominentorkoiyot among the Kipsigis. At the same time, another of
Kimnyole's sons,Koitalel arap Samoie, had come to prominence among
Nandi. WhetherKipchomber and Koitalel were fictive or real kin to
Kimnyole is a moot point,although sources from the early 1900s
appear to confirm that they wereperceived and presented as such
then. As Nandi and Kipsigis prepared toencounter colonialism in the
1890s, the most prominent ritual experts amongboth peoples were
therefore drawn from the same family: a lineage whoseorigins are
widely attributed as being Maasai, and whose leading members
arebelieved to have gradually recast the role of the orkoiyot to
give themselvesgreater political power over the community.14 The
extent of that power wasestablished in the resistance of the Nandi
to colonial conquest.
Koitalel and Kipchomber
The Nandi orkoiyot Koitalel arap Samoie is a hero of African
resistance tocolonialism in Kenya. His story is well known to most
Kenyan schoolchildrentoday. Koitalel is portrayed as the military
leader of the Nandi warriors intheir stubborn and protracted
resistance to British colonialism between 1896and 1905.15 Having
marshalled the Nandi and successfully held the colonialpower at bay
for more than a decade, over which time the Nandi enduredseveral'
punitive' raids and two major military campaigns against them by
theBritish, Koitalel's glorious struggle was brought to an end by
treachery. Withthe Nandi and the British locked in a war of
attrition in 1905, Koitalel metwith a British officer, Captain
Meinertzhagen, in a forest clearing under a flagof truce. Many
accounts are given of what transpired in that clearing, butmost are
agreed in the simple fact that Meinertzhagen drew his revolver
andshot Koitalel.16 In the weeks following this event Nandi
resistance crumbled,and along with it the resistance of the
Kipsigis, whom Koitalel's brotherKipchomber arap Koilege had
allegedly been mustering to support the Nandiin 1905.17
The events following Koitalel's death are less well known, yet
form a crucialelement in understanding the internal struggles and
divisions within Nandiand Kipsigis society over the colonial
period. In establishing control of the
14 Ng'eny, 'Nandi resistance', pp. 97-102; S. C. Lang'at, 'Some
aspects of Kipsigis history
before 1914', in B. G. Mclntosh (ed.), Ngano: studies in the
traditional and modem history of East Africa(Nairobi, 1969), pp.
87-92.
15 William R. Ochieng', A history of Kenya (Nairobi, 1985), pp.
945. A. T. Matson, The Nandi
campaign against the British, i8g5~igo6 (Nairobi, 1974),
provides a brief account (pp. 116), whilst hisNandi resistance to
British rule, i8go-igo6 (Nairobi, 1972), is the first of what had
been conceived asa multi-volumed and highly detailed study.
16 Col. R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya diary igo2-o6 (Edinburgh, 1957),
pp. 232-39, gives a
protagonist's account of these events, with subsequent sections
of the book discussing thecontroversy that led to three separate
inquiries into Meinertzhagen's conduct. The oral history ofNandi
provides many vivid accounts, which are consistent in asserting
that the orkoiyot wasunarmed and held in his hand a small bundle of
grasses, a symbol of peace.
17 Matson, Nandi campaign, p. 12.
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CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 859
Nandi and Kipsigis areas, the British first dealt with those
Nandi whom theybelieved to have been in league with Koitalel: some
were executed, othersdeported and imprisoned.18 Then, believing the
position held by the orkoiikamong the Nandi and Kipsigis to be one
of executive authority, they set aboutestablishing the rudiments of
the new administrative structure by appointingseveral orkoiik as
colonial chiefs. Among these was Kipchomber arap Koilege.19
This placed the orkoiik in a position of authority over the
community whichhad no precedent. Worse still, it neglected the
subtle, ambiguous andsometimes contradictory nature of the
relationship between these ritualexperts and the main body of the
Kalenjin. The orkoiik were both feared andrespected, for their
powers could be exploitative just as they could beexploited. They
were therefore deliberately kept at a distance from thecommunity,
socially and politically, their power having no role in the
runningof day-to-day affairs, their public authority confined to
specific ritualfunctions. Indeed, the power of these ritual experts
was in some senses'external' to the Kalenjin community,
deliberately cordoned off: the orkoiiklay beyond the moral codes
governing social behaviour, operating within aquite separate moral
sphere defined by their own special status. For theMaasai the
ambiguity of the relationship between the laibon and thecommunity
has been summed up in a subtle observation that is equallyapposite
for the Kalenjin orkoiik: Maasai could not live with the laibon,
but norcould they live without him.20 Like the Maasai laibon, the
orkoiik only cameinto a closer relation to the wider community at
what might be termed liminalphases, especially those linked to the
passage of age-sets and the organizationof initiation ceremonies,
at which prominent orkoiik presided. Even in thesedeeply
significant affairs, the role of orkoiik was complementary to, yet
also inconflict with, the authority of the elders.
This conflict was most apparent in relation to male generational
tensionssurrounding the acquisition of cattle and wives. Around the
time of initiation,young men hoped to begin to acquire cattle of
their own, which would markthe beginnings of herds which would
provide the economic basis for theireventual marriage and the
establishment of independent households. Elderswithin a family
would commonly contribute to this process through
variousarrangements of loaning or bonding out cattle, but this
naturally placed theelder in a position of considerable authority
regarding the redistribution ofwealth, and (by extension) over the
ability of young men to marry andestablish households. The orkoiik
intervened in this process in two importantrespects: first, leading
orkoiik were consulted over the timing of initiations,
18 More than a dozen Nandi believed to be close associates of
Koitalel were sentenced to five
years rigorous imprisonment in September 1906; see 'Nandi
political prisoners, 190514', KNAAG4/4995.
19 C. M. Dobbs, 'Memorandum on the Lumbwa laibons', 12 May 1930,
CO 533/441/1.
'Lumbwa' was the incorrect colonial name given to the Kipsigis
people and their land.20
The phrase is drawn from Paul Spencer, ' The diviner's oracle
and the prophet's domain inMaasai', Africa, LXI (1991), 360-70, and
is also employed by Berntsen, 'Maasai and Inkidongi',p. 1.
-
860 DAVID M. ANDERSON
being able to- effectively slow down or accelerate the passage
of the age-setcycle (and thereby exert pressures on elders to
redistribute wealth); andsecondly, the powers of the orkoiik were
invariably invoked by young men inthe organization, sanctioning and
conduct of cattle raids. Theft of cattlerepresented a means by
which younger man might acquire wealthindependently of the
redistribution of the wealth of their immediate relatives.For
services rendered in regard to cattle raids, orkoiik were rewarded
with ashare of the cattle seized, and so this was also an important
element in theorkoiyot's own pattern of wealth accumulation. The
orkoiik were thus placed ina strategic position in the mediation of
generational conflicts concerning age-set transitions, and the
social and economic transactions that followed in theirwake: the
balance between them and male elders was a delicate one. So it
wasthat, by placing orkoiik in a position of administrative
authority, the Britishhad unwittingly turned the world of the
Kalenjin on its head, undermining theauthority vested in elders by
the community and placing orkoiik in a positionto challenge the
accepted principles of moral order for their own advantage.21
It took the colonial administration some time to realize their
mistake: ittook the orkoiik among the Kipsigis no time at all to
capitalize upon theirunexpected opportunity. Although there was a
steady trickle of complaints tothe administration from Kipsigis
elders from 1907 onwards about the excessesof those orkoiik
appointed as chiefs, it was not until 1911 that the
administrationbegan to appreciate the enormity of their error. From
1912 onwards a numberof orkoiik were removed from positions of
authority, largely for failing to carryout government orders. Over
the next two years groups of elders levelled aseries of accusations
of witchcraft against Kipchomber arap Koilege, claimingthat he was
plotting to turn the people against the government. In
1914Kipchomber arap Koilege was tried under the witchcraft
ordinance, alongwith several other orkoiik who had held the posts
of chiefs and headmen. Hewas convicted and deported to Fort Hall,
where he subsequently died.22
Shortly after Kipchomber arap Koilege had been taken away by the
Britisha strange illness was reported to be sweeping through the
Kipsigis reserve. Thedisease was named kusto, and it was said that
people became suddenly feverish,and would writhe and agitate with
severe sweats and acute swellings of theglands, and that within a
few hours they would die. It was reported to theDistrict
Commissioner that hundreds were dead and dying in every
location,and it was alleged that the disease had originated in the
locality whereKipchomber arap Koilege had lived. Although the
District Commissioner andthe European doctor who rushed to Kericho
found people who claimed to be
21 Huntingford, The Nandi, pp. 38-52, offers a general
discussion of the relations between elders
a n d orkoiik.22
The deportation of Kipchomber and two other orkoiik, arap Boisio
and arap Kiboyot, wassanctioned by the secretary of state on 26
Dec. 1913, under the removal of natives ordinance(1909). They left
the Kipsigis reserve on 20 Jan. 1914, Kipchomber being taken to
Fort Hall;Barton to Hemsted, 30 May 1928, KNA DC/NYI/2/8/1 .
Kipchomber died in exile on 18 July1916, see District Commissioner
[DC] Fort Hall to DC Nyeri, 19 July 1916, KNAPC/NZA.3/31/12.
-
CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 86l
smitten, they could locate no visible symptoms; and though
everyone spokento claimed that many had died, no body was ever seen
by a European. In hisreport on the incident, the District
Commissioner concluded it to be a form ofhysteria, and ventured to
suggest that it was in some way connected to thedeportation of
Kipchomber arap Koilege. Later that same year, in the midstof a
worsening drought, a group of Kipsigis petitioned the
DistrictCommissioner for the return of the orkoiyot, on the grounds
that his removalwas the cause of their present misfortunes.23
The history of the next twenty years in the Kipsigis reserve is
dominated bythe struggle for ascendancy between the orkoiik of the
Talai clan and thoseelders who came to oppose them. The evidence of
elders' complaints againstthe orkoiik suggests that ' opposition'
took many forms. Some elders indicatedthe alien character of
orkoiik practice among the Kipsigis since the arrival ofKipchomber
in the 1890s, and argued for their expulsion back to the
Nandireserve: others reacted against the subversion of'tradition'
displayed by theencroachment by the orkoiik into the domain of
civil authority; others tiedtheir fortunes to those of their new
colonial masters, and opposed the orkoiiksimply as enemies of law
and order, following the ' official line'; others stillbecame
converts to Christianity, and viewed the orkoiik as the pagan enemy
inthe struggle for' hearts and minds'. On the other side were those
who favouredthe orkoiik. The motives of these people are less easy
to characterize, but amongthem were certainly those who wished to
perpetuate Kalenjin resistance tocolonialism and also those who saw
the orkoiik (rightly or wrongly) asprotectors of an older and
preferred social order. There were also certainlymany who supported
the orkoiik out of fear and a genuine belief that they heldthe
power whether natural or supernatural - to inflict real harm
andmisfortune. The patterns of motive, loyalties and patronage were
made all themore complex by the various transformations that had
occurred in the roleand functions of the orkoiik between the 1860s
and 1910s - first by the intrusionof a Maasai element in the
nineteenth century, then by the experience ofresistance to colonial
conquest, and again by the early ' alliance' with
colonialauthority.24 The tensions this generated within the
community were thereforenovel, a product of recent 'crises'. But it
would be wrong to label theseconflicts in simple terms of
collaboration and resistance: the orkoiik stood at thecentre of the
battle to redefine the moral order, to establish a new
socialconsensus in a transformed world. We can follow that struggle
through thecareers of leading orkoiik during the colonial
period.
23 Acting provincial commissioner [PC] Nyanza to chief
secretary, 4 May 1935, quoting from
the district political record book for 1914, KNA
PC/NZA.3/15/116. On agitation for the returnof the orkoiyot see
Dobbs, 'Memorandum on the Lumbwa laibons', 12 May 1930, CO
533/441/1,pp. 14-15- 24 Magut, 'The rise and fall', passim.
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862 DAVID M. ANDERSON
Barserion arap Kimanye
The struggle between the authority of the elders and the power
of the orkoiikemerged among the Nandi in the months following
Koitalel's death, but theramifications took longer to penetrate the
consciousness of the colonialadministration than in Kipsigis. The
reasons for this seem clear enough.Several leading Nandi orkoiik
had been killed in the fighting of 1905, andothers had subsequently
been deported by the government. Of those who hadsurvived, some had
dispersed to other parts of the Western Highlands, andonly a rump
remained in Nandi.25 Defeated and depleted by the events of1905-6,
the Nandi orkoiik were in no position at that time to challenge
theauthority of their new colonial masters. As among the Kipsigis,
the Britishinitially sought to govern the Nandi through their
orkoiik, appointingKoitalel's erstwhile rival, Kipeles, as chief.26
Kipeles held his colonial post,though to little effect, until his
death in September 1911. The British thenappointed Lelimo arap
Samoie, a son of Koitalel, as chief, in the belief thatthey were
honouring local ' custom' in maintaining authority in the
lineage.This was a grave error of judgement: Lelimo was little
respected by the Nandi,his powers thought to be very limited in
comparison to his brothers and half-brothers.27 Upon the death of
Kipeles, in 1911, the power of the orkoiik amongthe Nandi had sunk
to a low point, and a small group of elders were alreadyemerging as
conspicuous allies of the British in their role as chiefs
andheadmen. By 1918 it seemed to the colonial administration that
the power ofthe orkoiik was a thing of the past, and that the Nandi
were slowly settlingdown 'to an orderly way of life' under the pax
britannica.28
This optimistic outlook was soon overshadowed by a very serious
challengeto colonial authority among the Nandi. The challenge was
led by an orkoiyotnamed Barserion arap Kimanye, the youngest son of
Koitalel. Resident as a'squatter' on a European farm just north of
the Nandi reserve, Barserion laybeyond the authority of the Nandi
elders and beyond the immediate controlof the District Commissioner
at Kapsabet in the Nandi reserve.29 FollowingKipeles' death, he
emerged unrivalled as the most prominent Nandi orkoiyot.By 1920 the
colonial officers in Nandi viewed him with suspicion: the
initiationof a new age-set was imminent, and it was rumoured that
Barserion was deeplyinvolved in the growing number of stock thefts
from settler farms near theNandi reserve, and that he had sworn
vengeance on the colonial governmentfor his father's murder.30
Barserion had reason enough to oppose the colonial government,
but by theearly 1920s unrest among the Nandi was widespread, and it
was by no means
25 ' N a n d i political prisoners, 1905-14 ' , K N A A G 4 / 4
9 9 5 .
26 Hun t ing fo rd , The Nandi, p . 25.
" Ibid. p. 52; Huntingford, 'The genealogy', p. 24.28
Nandi District Annual Report, 191819.29
Castle-Smith to Senior Commissioner [SC], Kisumu, 22 Oct. 1923,
'Report on Nandiunrest', p. 1, KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.
30 Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 5 Oct. 1923, KNA
PC/NZA.3/31/11.
-
CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 863
all instigated by the orkoiyot. The years following the end of
the first world warwere a difficult period among the Nandi.
Influenza took its toll of the humanpopulation, and stock diseases
swept through the cattle herds. At the sametime, the colonial
government increased its demands for taxes and improvedits system
of collection, compelling more Nandi to take employment on
theEuropean-owned farms on the Uasin Gishu plateau, along the
northernborder of the Nandi reserve.31 Most serious of all, in 1920
the governmentalienated a further 100 square miles of the Nandi
reserve in the Kipkarrenvalley to provide farms for Europeans under
the post-war Soldier SettlementScheme, and permitted further land
grants to Europeans in the Kaimosi area.In 1906 the Nandi had lost
substantial grasslands in the Songhor area as partof their
punishment for resistance, and the alienations of 1920
furtherrestricted the grazing land available to several pororoisiek
(territorial units,based on clans). Many Nandi viewed this as a
hostile act on the part ofgovernment, and by 1921 it was apparent
that the Nandi were againbecoming 'disaffected'.32
Although he was not entirely the source of this 'disaffection',
Barserionbecame its focus.33 During 1932 Nandi elders petitioned
the DistrictCommissioner on the subject of the ceremony of
saket-ap-eito, an importantritual in the transition from one
age-set to another. According to Nandi'custom' (as presented at the
time), this ceremony involved a gathering of allthe murran of a
single age-set under the guardianship of senior elders, butpresided
over by the most prominent orkoiyot.3* Although the
saket-ap-eitoshould be held every 14 years or so, no ceremony had
been conducted sincebefore the troubles of 1905, and an unusually
large body of men awaitedinitiation, many of them much older than
would normally be expected. Nandielders earnestly pressed upon the
administration the urgency of the situation.Adopting an attitude of
non-interference, the administration permitted theorganization of
the ceremony to go ahead. Barserion arap Kimanye was toofficiate,
and it was proposed to hold the ceremony on the European farmwhere
he then resided.35
In the months leading up to the saket-ap-eito, the authority of
the eldersdiminished, giving way to the influence of the orkoiyot.
'Lawlessness' amongthe Nandi increased markedly, particularly the
incidence of stock theft by theNyongi age-set, who were preparing
to participate in the ceremony. Settlerswere quick to report these
thefts, and also to comment upon what theyperceived as the growing
'truculence' of the younger Nandi men. Therealization that most of
the Nandi labour from the settler farms on the Uasin
31 D iana Ellis, ' T h e Nand i protest of 1923 in the context
of African resistance to colonial rule
in K e n y a ' , Journal of African History, x v n (1976), 562-6
.32
Hunt ingford, The Nandi, pp . 41 -2 .33
Ellis, 'The Nandi protest', remains the only detailed study of
these events.34
H u n t i n g f o r d , Southern Nilo-Hamites, p p . 3 1 - 2
.35
For a detailed account of administrative actions concerning the
saket-ap-eito see Castle-Smithto acting SC Kisumu, 22 Oct. 1923,
'Report upon Nandi unrest', KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.
-
864 DAVID M. ANDERSON
Gishu plateau >vould be absent for three days to attend the
ceremony raiseda further crop of complaints.36 More seriously,
rumours began to circulate theEuropean farms and the Nandi reserve
that the ceremony was to be the signalfor a rebellion, led by
Barserion arap Kimanye, to take back the Nandi landsfrom the
Europeans and to avenge the death of Koitalel. With this
intelligence,the gathering of several hundred Nandi men on a farm
in the midst of theEuropean settler community began to take on a
distinctly sinister appearancein the eyes of European officials.37
Uncertain of Barserion's intentions, and ofthe reliability of their
own intelligence network, the administration dallied.Finally, only
four days before the ceremony was due, Barserion and four elderswho
had been prominent in the organization of the gathering were
arrested bythe District Commissioner, accompanied by a detachment
of armed police. Aweek later, the orkoiyot was brought before the
magistrate at Eldoret, andsentenced to be deported to Nyeri, in the
Kikuyu area of central Kenya.38
Unlike the 1914 disturbances among the Kipsigis, which had seen
a groupof elders emerge in direct conflict with the orkoiik, the
1923 troubles in Nandiappear to have united a broad spectrum of
Nandi society behind the orkoiyotand against the government. The
driving force behind this was not the orkoiyothimself, but the
resentments that still lingered over the injuries of a war
thenstill strong in the memory, and the continuation of what seemed
to be furtherpunitive measures in the further land alienations of
1920.
The road to Gwassi
With the deportation of Barserion arap Kimanye the
administration had, forthe time being, gained the upper hand in the
struggle against the Kalenjinorkoiik. Or so it seemed. However, in
Barserion's absence, his Kipsigis cousins(the sons and nephews of
his uncle Kipchomber arap Koilege) mounted achallenge of their own
to the authority of the colonial government.
To place the actions of the Kipsigis orkoiik in context, we must
first brieflyconsider the manner in which the colonial government
sought to enforce lawand order among the Kalenjin during the 1920s
and 1930s. Stock theft was thecrime with which the Kalenjin were
most closely associated in the eyes of thegovernment.39 It had long
been understood by the colonial administrationthat the orkoiik were
involved in stock thefts. Their role in sanctioning andblessing
pre-colonial cattle raiding by murran had continued in a modified
form
36 Ibid. p. 2; J. J. Drought to SC Kisumu, 4 Oct. 1923; and
Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu,
confidential, 13 Oct. 1923, all in KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.37
Capt. Slade Hawkins to Castle-Smith, 22 Oct. 1923, 'Nandi
unrest'; 'Statements regardingunrest', 15 Sept. 1923, and 'Evidence
of Kipto arap Kimais' (East African Police), enclosures 3and 10 in
Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 22 Oct. 1923, all in KNA
PC/NZA.3/31/11.
38 Barserion was arrested on 16 October . Castle-Smith to SC
Kisumu, 17 Oct . 1923, K N A
PC/NZA.3/31/11. He was deported to Meru early in 1924.39
The following section is based on David M. Anderson, 'Stock
theft and moral economy incolonial Kenya', Africa, LVI (1986),
399-416.
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CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 865
in the colonial period, although the practice of large-scale
raiding had ended.For his ritual and practical assistance in the
organization of thefts and thedisposal or secretion of stolen
animals, an orkoiyot stood to make considerablepersonal gain, in
the form of livestock and other tribute; and there wasevidence that
some orkoiik actively encouraged theft as a means ofaccumulating
wealth for themselves. The inability of Kalenjin elders to stampout
cattle rustling by the murran came to be viewed by the
colonialadministration as confirmation of the general acquiescence
of the widerKalenjin community in such crimes: the Kalenjin
considered stock theft to bea 'sport' rather than a crime, it was
alleged. The thrust of colonial sanctionagainst stock theft was
accordingly aimed at cultivating a community moralityagainst the
criminal activities of the murran. In prosecutions against
stockthieves, or against those believed to have aided them, the
colonial authoritiesfrequently invoked collective punishments: that
is, the punishment of thewider community for the offence of one of
its members.40 For example, theresidents of a particular location
might be collectively fined if stolen livestockwere found within
the location boundaries, the assumption being that theyknew the
animals were there and should have reported the matter.
Theenforcement of collective punishments had two broad effects:
firstly, inbringing pressure to bear on chiefs and headmen to
discourage stock theft, itpushed them into direct conflict with
those orkoiik who were actively involvedin - and benefiting from -
the activities of the murran; secondly, it pushed theorkoiik and
the stock thieves into a more highly organized system of' rings'
inorder to avoid detection and transfer stolen stock without
implicating localKalenjin communities.
The colonial challenge to the involvement of the orkoiik in
stock theft wastherefore moral as well as legal. It sought to turn
the community, andespecially the chiefs, against the orkoiik and
their agents. As the colonialauthorities stepped up the enforcement
of legislation against stock theft duringthe 1920s, these tensions
became more apparent, especially among theKipsigis. Matters came to
a head in the middle of 1928, and rumbled throughthe next year. The
transition of the Kipsigis' Maina age-set was thenimminent, a phase
when (as we have seen) the orkoiik could exploit their
closestrelationship with, and greatest influence over, the
murran.*1 In 1928 thiscoincided with a serious and prolonged
drought, which increased still furtherthe spate of stock thefts
that officials had now come to expect when age-settransitions were
due. But as the drought worsened, in July and August 1929,Kipsigis'
'lawlessness' took a different, and unexpected form: a series of
arson
40 T h e collective punishments ord inance (1909) and the stock
and produce theft o rd inance
(1913) bo th allowed magistrates the power to apply fines to
communit ies for the offences of theindividual , and both further
allowed punishment in respect of non-cooperat ion or the
withholdingof information on the pa r t of any communi ty . As a
control against abuse, these punishments hadto be referred to the
governor for approval . See Anderson, 'S tock theft ' , p p . 404-6
.
41 Orchardson , The Kipsigis, p . 12. Dobbs , ' M e m o r a n d
u m on the L u m b w a la ibons ' , 12 M a y
1930, CO 533/441/1. p. 21.
-
866 DAVID M. ANDERSON
attacks began on the property of Africans in the Kipsigis
reserve. Huts andgrain stores were set alight, and on several
occasions these acts were clearlyintended to endanger life. As the
months passed the attacks appeared to takeon a pattern: they were
concentrated in those locations where theadministration had been
most successful in its efforts to suppress stock theft,and the
principal victims were those colonial chiefs, their headmen
andretainers, who were known to have informed against stock thieves
or to havespoken out against the orkoiik}2
These attacks brought the covert struggle between the elders and
the orkoiik,which had simmered since the deportation of Kipchomber
arap Koilege in1914, into the open. Elders once again began to seek
the assistance of theadministration against the orkoiik. Prominent
among these elders were earlyparticipants in the Christian churches
that were then being established amongthe Kipsigis. We do not know
enough about the discussions that took placeamong Kipsigis elders
over this crucial period, and it would be unwise to viewthis as
reflecting what might be termed a climate of' popular opinion'
amongthe Kipsigis, but it appears that some individuals elected to
take a standagainst the orkoiik. In coming forward to give evidence
to the districtcommissioner, several elders requested that the
orkoiik be removed from thereserve, on the grounds that their
influence was ' evil' and that they should beremoved back to Nandi
or Maasailand, from where they had come.43
Disturbed by the challenge to the authority of the chiefs, and
concerned toreduce stock theft and subdue the crescendo of European
settler complaintsabout the 'lawless Kipsigis', the administration
mounted an investigation intothe activities of the orkoiik. The
evidence accumulated by District Com-missioner Brumage led to the
conviction and imprisonment of several orkoiikfor their involvement
in stock theft, and gave a clearer picture of the extent oforkoiik
activity in the 'handling' of stolen animals. In a reassertion of
colonialauthority, a military levy force patrolled the Kipsigis
reserve for 18 months tomaintain law and order, paid for by
increased taxation. With the support ofhis provincial commissioner,
C. M. Dobbs (who had considerable experienceof Kipsigis), Brumage
went so far as to suggest that the entire clan should beremoved
from the Kipsigis reserve, presenting signed affidavits from
severalelders and chiefs to indicate that this was the wish of the
people. But the
4 2 Beresford-Stooke to P C Nyanza, 15 Oct . 1929, K N A P C / N
Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . The police were
warning of trouble in Kipsigis reserve from early in 1928; head
of criminal investigationdepar tment to chief native commissioner,
22 Feb. 1928, K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . It was
believedthat the orkoiyot a r ap Boisio, who had been deported to
Nyeri in 1914 along with Kipchomber, wasbehind these disturbances;
Filluel to PC Nyanza, 24 April 1928, K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 /
3 9 . Forfuller details of his activities see ' A r a p Boisio', K
N A D C / N Y I / 2 / 8 / 1 .
43 T h e inqui ry in to these events was conducted by D C
Beresford-Stooke, assisted by the district
officer [ D O ] , Brumage , bo th unde r the direction of senior
commissioner C. M . Dobbs . Dobbs toBrumage , 22 Sept. 1929;
Brumage employed six Kipsigis ' a g e n t s ' to collect
information on theorkoiik, Brumage , ' R e p o r t for week ending
16 November 1929 ' ; and Beresford-Stooke to Dobbs ,25 Sept. 1929,
all in K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . O n proposals to remove
the orkoiik in 1930,suppor ted by the N a n d i local native
council, see P C Nzoia to chief secretary, 23 J u n e 1930, K N
ADC/KAPT/1/9/24.
-
GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 867
suggestion was rejected as being too extreme a reaction to what
were perceivedby most officials as simply the activities of a few
criminal types.44
With the presence of the military patrol things were quieter in
the Kipsigislocations over 1930 and the early part of 1931.
Thereafter the situation rapidlydeteriorated. The normal pattern of
stock thefts again spiralled, but crimes ofa new character became
more common: thefts of cash, items of high value,firearms and
ammunition from settlers and government officers. In the lastmonths
of 1933 there was a rash of attacks on settler farms, in which
twosettlers in Lumbwa were physically injured, and a substantial
number of gunsstolen.48 In response to settler criticism and
rumours of Kipsigis 'insurrection',and with a growing sense of
unease at the pattern of events, the administrationmounted a second
investigation into crime among the Kipsigis, bringing backDistrict
Commissioner Brumage to conduct the inquiry.46 Over severalmonths
of 1934, Brumage interviewed Kipsigis chiefs and elders, detained
andinterrogated all the more important orkoiik, and reviewed the
materialcollected in the district files. Playing one orkoiyot
against another, exploitingthe rivalries between individuals (and
often pretending he knew more than hedid), and coaxing the elders
into believing that it would be safe to speak outagainst the
orkoiik, Brumage began to assemble a fragmentary, but
fascinatingpicture of recent events. His final report made a quite
startling set ofrevelations about the extent of organized crime
among the orkoiik, and itsconnection with anti-government
activities.47
Several elements of this report are strikingly problematic, but
highlysuggestive of the nature of the conflicts within Kipsigis
society at this time.Many of the principal informants were young
Kipsigis who had very recentlycome under the influence of Christian
missionaries; others were beleagueredchiefs and elders, victimized
by the orkoiik and pressured by the colonialadministration; at
least one was a member of the Talai clan, whose immediatefamily was
involved in a long-standing dispute with other leading
orkoiik}*Above all else, the tone of the evidence assembled by
Brumage conveys a veryreal sense of the tension and deeply rooted
fear that surrounded the revelationof these events for those
involved. The evidence presented in Brumage's reportclearly
requires careful assessment, both for what it can tell us about
Kalenjinsociety in this period and for what it tells us about the
colonial mind. Brumagewas not a policeman, but his report was
compiled in much the same manner
44 O n the levy force, see commissioner of police to D C Ker
icho , 19 Oct . 1929, and related
papers in K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . T h e events of
1928-9 were closely linked to an increase instock thefts along the
Maasa i border with Kipsigis. Dobbs strongly advocated the removal
of theorkoiik; Dobbs to PC Nzoia, 22 June 1930, KNA
DC/KAPT/1/9/24.
45 Relevant correspondence on these events is to be found in
'Law and order: Lumbwa
laibons, 1930-34', KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115.46
Montgomery to colonial secretary, 8 Feb. 1934, KNA
PC/NZA.3/15/115.47
Brumage to P C Nyanza , 19 April 1934, K N A A G 3 / 2 9 .48
Crucial evidence was provided by Kibinot a r a p Rongoe, an
orkoiyot whose family wereinvolved in a prot rac ted dispute with
the family of K ipchomber . His role as a n informant, and
hisconflicts with other orkoiik, cont inued at Gwassi; P C Nyanza
to colonial secretary, 12 J u l y 1944,KNA MAA/9/974; PC Nyanza to
DC Kisii, 11 Jan. 1949, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/99.
-
868 DAVID M. ANDERSON
that any detective might draw together the strands of a case.
Perhaps, overkeen to make connections and see patterns in the
morass of detail, Brumagemay be guilty of having laid too much
stress upon the degree to which theactivities of the orkoiik were
orchestrated by powerful individuals. All the same,it is quite
clear that, whether individually or collectively, the orkoiik
weredeeply involved in what Brumage termed 'criminal activities'the
theft ofproperty from both Africans and Europeans, along with
actions whichcolonial law determined as forms of extortion. Brumage
also gave thesematters a political slant, accusing the leading
orkoiik of plotting a rising againstthe state. Thus, the colonial
view of the orkoiik tarnished them at once ascriminal accumulators
- lining their own pockets - and as subversive rebels,holding a
political purpose against the legitimacy of colonial authority.
The burden of the evidence gathered by Brumage indicated that
theKipsigis orkoiik were at the head of a sophisticated and
well-organized criminalnetwork, operating throughout the Western
Highlands. Several informantsalluded to a meeting of orkoiik that
had allegedly taken place in the Buret areaof the Kipsigis reserve
some time during 1928.49 Some presented this meetingas an effort to
resolve a power struggle between rival orkoiik families.
IfBrumage's recounting of this information is correct, the
resolution of thestruggle was found in cooperation rather than
conflict. The meeting wouldseem to have had two principal outcomes:
first, it defined a group ofconfederates among the orkoiik who
stood in direct opposition to government(the arson attacks in the
Kipsigis reserve apparently began in the wake of thismeeting), and
who agreed to accumulate resources with which to mount afuture
rebellion; secondly, it seems that the eight leading orkoiik agreed
upona division of territory, each identifying a 'domain' over which
he had control.This territorial division extended over the entire
Western Highlands,incorporating the lands of other Kalenjin groups
and extensive areas ofEuropean settlement. Brumage described these
territories as 'fiefdoms'.50
The eight orkoiik who were the principal parties of this
agreement - the ' BigEight', as colonial officials came to call
them-were all closely related.Brumage went to considerable trouble
to reconstruct a family tree for theseorkoiik, taxing each of his
informants as to the precise relationships ofindividuals and
collecting details of orkoiik wives and their numbers ofchildren.
His findings may not be biologically accurate (fictive kin may
wellbe presented as real kin), but the evidence is strong to
support the view thatthese relationships reflect Kipsigis
perceptions. Four of the 'Big Eight' wereidentified as sons of
Kipchomber arap Koilege: Ngasura arap Chomber,Kiboin arap Sitonik,
Sauli arap Mibei, and Kiberenge arap Toinge. Another,Marumah arap
Bore, was Kipchomber's nephew. The remaining three, thebrothers
Chebuchuk arap Boigut and Telile arap Boigut, and Muneria
arapTonui, were cousins of Kipchomber arap Koilege (see Fig. 2).51
All of these
48 Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115, p.
8.
50 See KNA PC/NZA.3/15/117 for a detailed map outlining the
'fiefdoms' controlled by each
orkoiyot. s l Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA
PC/NZA.3/15/115.
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CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA
Barsabotwo (Kapuso)869
Kipsokon Kibogui Turugat Marasoi
arap Sokon
1Kipchoira. Koik
iberge
Ngasuraa. Chomber
ChomberKoilagen
1Kisano
1Kiboin
a. Sitonik
a. Kimnyole Kib(
1Ogui
1Baserion
a. Kimanye1
Saulia. Mibei
1Chebuchuka. Boigut
Koitalela. Samoei
1Lelimo
1Kiberengea. Toinge
sigut
Telile a.Boigut1
Kibore
Marumah
IonBo
ni a>iek
Muneriaa. Tonui
a. Bore
Fig. 2. Genealogy of the orkoiik.
men were found to be deeply involved in 'criminal activities',
and each wasalleged to be at the head of a network of' lesser
orkoiik' who were also involvedin crime. The networks of agents
were found to include at least two chiefs,several location headmen
and a number of other government employees.52
The eventual list of charges against each of the eight, along
with several oftheir accomplices, was long. Marumah arap Bore was
found in possession ofthree rifles and a quantity of ammunition,
all hidden in a cave. Chebuchukarap Boigut was also found to have
stolen weapons and ammunition, andseveral valuable jewels stolen
from a settler farm were recovered from his hut.Muneria arap Tonui
was found to be responsible for a wide range of crimesin the Nakuru
and Rumuruti districts (and was later to be strongly suspectedof
involvement in the 'Kinangop Outrage'). Most serious of all, Kiboin
arapSitonik was in possession of no fewer than eight firearms,
including three -303magazine rifles (one of which had been stolen
from the police in 1929), and aMartini-Henry rifle that had been
stolen from a forest department official in1928. A further four
orkoiik were found to be hiding other stolen weapons andammunition.
Numerous charges relating to old stock theft cases were alsobrought
against many orkoiik. Where less concrete evidence could be
found,charges were made under the witchcraft ordinance. As a result
of theinvestigations of 1934 more than a dozen orkoiik were
imprisoned, with hardlabour, for terms of between one and five
years.53
52 Ibid. pp. 9-11; also, Brumage to PC Nyanza, 19 April 1934,
KNA AG3/29.
53 Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115, pp.
4-7; Byrne to Cunliffe-
Lister, 3 May 1934, CO 533/441/1, summarizing convictions of
orkoiik and sending a first draftof the 'Laibons removal
ordinance'.
-
870 DAVID M. ANDERSON
Portraying-the orkoiik as the ' evil' and disruptive force among
the Kipsigis,whose powerful influence was based upon intimidation
and the fear ofwitchcraft, Brumage reiterated his earlier
recommendation for the wholesaledeportation of the entire Talai
clan from the Kipsigis reserve. The legal andmoral objections that
had been raised to so extreme a measure in 1930 nowmelted away: the
extent of Talai involvement in crime and witchcraft hadbeen
substantively documented, and the alleged intention of the orkoiik
tomount a rebellion gave these events a deeper significance than
had beenapparent four years earlier. In May 1934, with the strong
support of othersenior administrators, and no doubt conscious of
settler anxiety about thesituation in the Western Highlands, the
attorney general drafted legislation toprovide for the mass
deportation of the orkoiik clan, and forwarded it toLondon for
approval.54
While this extraordinary and unprecedented proposal was under
con-sideration at the colonial office, Alex Semini was murdered.
The 'KinangopOutrage' was soon rumoured to be yet another example
of the activities ofKipsigis 'gangsters', a rumour given some
substance by evidence gatheredwhich implicated the orkoiyot Muneria
arap Tonui, who, it was claimed, hadgiven 'blessings' to the eight
burglars before their raid on the Semini farm.Lingering doubts in
London and Nairobi about the propriety of the proposedlegislation
dissipated in the weeks following the 'Kinangop Outrage'.55 On
25September 1934, the day after seven Kipsigis had been found
guilty in the highcourt of the murder of Alex Semini, the Laibons
Removal Ordinance (no. 32of 1934) was added the laws of Kenya (Cap.
46).56 Over the following threeyears, all members of the Talai
clan, men, women and children - more than700 persons in all - were
removed, with a portion of their livestock and otherpossessions, to
the Gwassi location in South Nyanza, where the bulk of themwere to
remain, under direct supervision, until the mid-1950s.57
The official record of this forced migration portrays the
removal of theorkoiik as marking the welcome end of tyranny in the
Kipsigis reserve and therestoration of the ' traditional' authority
of the elders. There were certainlysome Kipsigis who viewed events
in these terms, but not all shared this senseof well-being. Aside
from the involvement of orkoiik in organized crime,members of the
Talai clan were recognized and respected practitioners of sucharts
as divining, rain-making and witch-finding: who would now
perform
54 On the detailed drafting of the ordinance, see Montgomery to
chief secretary, 19 July 1934,
KNA PC/NKU/3/1/10.65
For discussion of the legislation in the colonial office, see CO
533/481 / 1 .58
For the Semini case see criminal case 123 (1934), Rex v. Kibet
arap Boregi and 6 others, CO533/481/15. 'The laibons removal
ordinance' (no. 32 of 1934), Laws of Kenya, 1948 (Nairobi,1948),
Cap. 46; see CO 533/481/1.
57 On the selection of Gwassi see DC South Kavirondo to PC
Nyanza, 27 March 1934, and
subsequent papers, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115, and on the beginnings of
the move itself, DCKericho to Acting PC Nyanza, 22 Oct. 1934, KNA
PC/NZA.3/15/116. The first move of elevenfamilies (120 people in
all, with their livestock) was completed on 10 Nov. 1934. By June
1937 thelast family had been moved, and 113 orkoiik with 647
dependants were resident in Gwassi; PCNyanza to chief secretary,
3ojune 1937, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/117.
-
rCRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 871
these mundane, but essential social functions? The departure of
the orkoiik lefta vacuum which the aspiring Christian churches were
not yet in a position tofill. The position of the churches was
strengthened after 1935, but the powerand influence of the orkoiik
lingered on. On many occasions the administrationuncovered evidence
of attempts by Kipsigis to contact the orkoiik at Gwassi,seeking to
employ their services for ritual purposes.58 While the departure
ofthe orkoiik was welcomed by some, it marked an immediate social
crisis ofsignificant proportions for others: towards the end of
1935, following theimprisonment of several leading orkoiik and the
beginnings of the deportationsto Gwassi, the strange illness known
as kusto was once again reported to besweeping through the Kipsigis
reserve. This time the administration weremore confident in
asserting that this was nothing more than a minor outbreakof
cerebral meningitis, but the district commissioner stated plainly
that manyKipsigis saw this as part of the revenge to be exacted by
the
' The promised land*
With the Kipsigis wing of the family removed from the Western
Highlands, letus return to the story of Barserion arap Kimanye and
the Nandi. Accused ofwitchcraft and revolt, Barserion had been
exiled to central Kenya in 1923. Inhis absence, the Nandi had
continued to consult other orkoiik-somc of whomcontinued to be
actively involved in the encouragement of stock theft ondivinatory
and other matters.60 Although the Nandi orkoiik remained a threatto
progress and to law and order in the eyes of the administration,
there is noevidence that their opposition to the policies of the
colonial government tookthe same form as among the Kipsigis.
Certainly, by the late 1920s none of theNandi orkoiik had achieved
a reputation to match that of the exiled son ofKoitalel.
In 1929 the district commissioner reported that 'certain Nandi
elders' werepetitioning for the return of Barserion. The reason for
their request was statedto be the seriousness of the drought then
afflicting the Nandi reserve, the eldershoping that the restoration
of the orkoiyot might restore the fortunes of thepeople. This
argument seems to have been accepted by the administration,and
Barserion was permitted to return to Nandi, where he was compelled
tolive at the government town of Kapsabet, under the watchful eye
of the district
58 For example , Kiboin a r a p Sitonik and M u n e r i a a r a
p Tonu i , two of t h e ' Big E igh t ' who were
exiled to Gwassi following prison sentences served in the 1930s,
man ag ed to main ta in ' cons tantcontact with the Kipsigis ' from
Gwassi, and as a result were moved to Mfangano Island in
LakeVictoria du r ing 1944; P C Nyanza to colonial secretary, 31
Aug. 1944, and related papers , K N AMAA/9/974.
59 Dr Howell to D C Kericho, ' A mysterious disease among the
natives of south L u m b w a
distr ict ' , 17 April 1935, K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 1 5 / 1 1 6
. Like the similar events of 1914, Europeansbelieved this to be
associated with an outbreak of cerebrospinal meningitis, a l though
this wasnever established.
60 See 'Laibons and deportees, 1927-35', KNADC/NDI/4/i,for
monthly intelligence reports
from the criminal intelligence department on the activities of
orkoiik in Nandi, and on Barserion'sactivities in exile.
-
872 DAVID M. ANDERSON
commissioner.61 But it also seems likely that the request for
Barserion's returnwas part of a wider conflict within Nandi
society, between those who wishedto restore the orkoiik to the
prominence they had enjoyed in the recent past andthose who did
not. Among other evidence, this is indicated by events thatfollowed
Barserion's homecoming in 1930 when, within a few months of
hisreturn, another group of elders (including a number of recent
Christianconverts) complained to the district commissioner that the
orkoiyot was'practising witchcraft'. Although the district
commissioner found insufficientevidence to support this accusation,
similar claims were reiterated at intervalsthroughout the 1930s. It
is certain that all the Christian churches in Nandiviewed Barserion
as an evil and potentially dangerous influence. For his ownpart,
Barserion undoubtedly continued to ply his trade over this period,
butthere is no evidence that his activities mounted a serious
challenge to thegovernment, or to the Nandi chiefs. None the less,
his presence remained afocus of attention for those elders and
(increasingly) chiefs who sought toreduce the power and influence
of the orkoiik among the Nandi.62
Barserion was to commit one final act, however, that brings our
story fullcircle. In the late 1940s the question of land again
became a critical politicalissue in the Nandi reserve, following
the decision of the settler-controlleddistrict councils of Uasin
Gishu and Trans Nzoia to repatriate the majority ofthe Nandi
squatters and their livestock to the Nandi reserve. The
squatterswere resident labourers, living and working on farms in
the European-settledareas to the north and east of the Nandi
reserve. Many squatter families hadresided on these lands since
before 1920, but they were treated under the lawas tenants-at-will
and thereby had no rights. The agreement by which mostworked for
the Europeans permitted them to graze a stipulated number oftheir
cattle on the farm. In the early days of European setdement this
systemhad evolved as an essential element in securing labour -
without grazingrights, Nandi simply would not work the farms. By
the 1940s the economicposition of the farms had changed, and the
majority of European landowners(though by no means all) desired to
move towards a better-defined system ofcontract labour and to
remove African-owned livestock from their lands inorder to
implement fuller development on the farms and to remove the risk
ofthe spread of stock diseases.63
After considerable debate, and a good deal of persuasion from
the61
Barserion returned to Nandi in May 1930, after requests from the
elders; DC Nandi to PCNzoia, 28 Dec. 1929, KNA DC/KAPT/1/9/23.
62 'Law and order: Barserion arap Kimanye, 1932-39', KNA
PC/RVP/6A/17/27, for
accusations against the orkoiyot made by Nandi elders in 1932
and 1938. Also, Hislop to PC RiftValley, 12 Jan. 1935, KNA
DC/NDI/4/1.
63 O n the squat ter system in general , the best account
remains Roger van Zwanenberg , Colonial
capitalism and labour in Kenya 1919-1939 (Nairobi , 1975), ch.
8. O n the impor tance of the settlerpressures in the Western
Highlands to remove squat ter labour , see David M . Anderson and
DavidT h r o u p , ' Africans and agricul tural product ion in
colonial K e n y a : the my th of the war as awatershed ' , Journal
of African History, xxv i (1985), 327-46, and Chris topher P. Youe,
'Se t t lercapital and the assault on the squat ter peasantry in
Kenya ' s Uas in Gishu District, 19421963',African Affairs, LXXXVII
(1988), 393-418.
-
CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 873
government, the Nandi chiefs agreed to accept the returning
squatters backinto the reserve and to supervise the ' reabsorption'
of thousands of head ofcattle. Part of the government plan to
accomplish this involved a landclearance and resettlement scheme in
the Nandi reserve and the compulsorysale of stock that was surplus
to the calculated carrying capacity of theavailable land, along
with the compulsory branding of all stock to berepatriated to the
reserve. All of this implied more people and livestock withinthe
Nandi reserve, and greater direction from government as to the use
of theirland.64 Barserion, by then an old man, entered the
political debate on thesequestions, predictably taking the side of
those returning squatters who seemedlikely to lose their livestock
and be made landless in this process of change.After an abortive
campaign in 1951, as the main process of repatriation gotunder way,
to persuade the squatters to march back to the farms and'repossess'
the land, Barserion again seemed to disappear from the
politicalarena. At this time government energies were diverted by
the Mau Mauemergency, and the removal of Kikuyu labour from farms
throughout manyparts of Kenya created openings for Nandi squatters
then being repatriatedfrom the Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia farms.85
This lessened the pressures ofabsorbing so many people and
livestock back into the reserve, and lowered thepolitical
temperature, albeit temporarily.
It was not until May 1957, with the Mau Mau emergency in its
fourth year,that Barserion arap Kimanye made what was to be his
final bid to avenge thedeath of his father, Koitalel. In the early
months of 1957 the districtintelligence reports began to mention
that Barserion was again active. Hissupporters had been seen
travelling about the reserve and, mysteriously,several of them had
made visits to Nandi squatters on the Laikipia Escarpment,on the
eastern side of the Rift Valley.66 Nandi had only gone to Laikipia
assquatters in any numbers during the Mau Mau emergency, replacing
Kikuyulabour on the farms. Many Nandi expelled from Uasin Gishu and
Trans Nzoiahad made their way to Laikipia instead of returning to
the overcrowded Nandireserve. They had done this with the tacit
knowledge of the administration,who viewed this strictly illegal
procedure as neatly ameliorating theirdifficulties in accommodating
more people in the Nandi reserve and solvingthe problems of labour
shortage in those areas of Kenya where Kikuyu labourhad
predominated.67
64 On the planning, implementation and political repercussions
of the scheme to repatriate
Nandi squatters to the reserve, see papers in 'Return of Nandi
stock from Uasin Gishu, 1944-59',KNA DC/NDI/5/2, and 'Nandi: return
of squatter stock, 1954-57', KNA DC/NDI/5/3.
65 DC Kericho to D C Nandi , 15 J a n . 1955, K N A D C / N D I
/ 5 / 3 , for details of special branch
reports. T h e administration were concerned enough by the
re-emergence of Barserion and by thedisaffection of those sections
among the Nandi who supported him to secure approval from
thesecretary of state (Lennox-Boyd) for the extensions of the
laibons removal ordinance to apply toNand i ; see Baring to
Lennox-Boyd, 29 Ju ly 1955, and ' M e m o , on laibons in Nand i '
, fromMinistry of African Affairs, 21 April 1955, both in K N A M A
A / 9 / 9 7 4 .
66 Acting PC Rift Valley to D C Nandi , 27 April 1957, K N A D C
/ N D I / 5 / 3 ; D C Thomson's
Falls to PC Rift Valley, 2 May 1957, reporting Nandi activities
on Laikipia.67
Acting PC Rift Valley to secretary for African affairs, 1 May
1957, KNA DC/NDI/6/1.
-
874 DAVID M. ANDERSON
From the evidence of Nandi who took part in the events of 1956
and fromthe intelligence on his activities gathered by the
government, it appears thatBarserion's scheme was to lead a
rebellion of the Nandi squatters on Laikipiawho, taking advantage
of the preoccupation of the British with Mau Mau,would turn on the
European settlers, kill them, and claim Laikipia as theNandi's
'Promised Land'.68 The killing of Koitalel would thus be
avengedand, symbolically at least, the lands taken from the Nandi
as punishment forthe resistance led by Koitalel would be restored.
On the day prior to theplanned insurrection Barserion and a group
of his supporters were arrested onthe road between Kapsabet and
Laikipia. On the next day the police roundedup a large number of
Nandi squatters in the fringes of the Marmanet Forest,on the
western edge of Laikipia. They also confiscated over 5,000 newly
madearrows and large quantities of freshly prepared poisons.69
Protest and resistance in Kenyan historiography
Barserion arap Kimanye was once again deported in 1957, this
time toMfangano Island in Lake Nyanza, where he remained until
1961.70 Hiskinsmen among the Kipsigis were allowed to return from
Gwassi to theKipsigis reserve from the mid-1950s, where those
orkoiik suspected of anti-government or criminal activities were
kept under close watch. By then theinfluence of Kipchomber's
immediate family was much diminished within theclan, many of the
children were attending school and some had embracedChristianity.
Back among Kipsigis, the orkoiik resumed many of their
socialfunctions as diviners, and it may be assumed that some
continued to maintainan interest in stock t^eft: but there was no
significant political disturbanceinvolving the orkoiik in the last
years of colonial rule.71 By the eve of Kenya'sindependence in
1963, it would appear that the civil authority of the
elders,bolstered by the colonial state, had ultimately triumphed
over the orkoiik. Butthat is too simple a conclusion: the pattern
of gains and losses was morecomplex, and requires a more cautious
and ambivalent assessment.
68 Barserion's intentions and plans are described fully, from
intelligence reports, in DC Laikipia
to PC Rift Valley, 25 April 1957, KNA DC/NDI/6/1 .69
' A r m e d uprising by Nand i squatters aver ted ' , East
African Standard (14 M a y 1957). Nand ichiefs were quick to
condemn Barserion and his suppor ters ; see ' Repor t on visit of
Governor toNandi, 5 July 1957', KNA DC/NDI/IO/2.
70 PC Rift Valley to DC Nandi, 29 July 1957, KNA DC/KAPT/1/9/25.
Two of Barserion's
sons were also later deported to Mfangano Island, see
'Deportation Orders, 17 September 1959',KNA PC/NZA/1/15/27.
71 The decision to allow younger orkoiik to return to Kipsigis
was taken in 1947, see minute by
chief native commissioner, 14 Feb. 1953, KNA MAA/9/974. The
policy regarding theestablishment of a school for orkoiik children
(devised in 1947) had originally involved theirsegregation. This
policy was changed to one of integration in 1953; acting chief
nativecommissioner to PC Rift Valley, 21 March 1953, KNA MAA/9/974.
The decision to allow allsurviving orkoiik to return was announced
to a baraza (public meeting) in the Kipsigis reserve on14 February
1961, the day on which their greatest opponent and staunch ally of
the government,chief arap Tengecha, formally retired from office;
PC Nyanza to colonial secretary, 2 Feb. 1961,KNA
PC/NZA/1/15/27.
-
CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 875
Kalenjin orkoiik have taken up a surprising and symbolically
significantposition in the evolving historiography of Kenya since
the 1960s. Thishistoriography has remained an arena for sharp
political controversy, withinwhich highly divergent views of
Kenya's past are contested. The theme ofresistance dominates this
discourse, both of African resistance to colonialconquest and (more
poignantly) African resistance in the Mau Mauemergency of the
1950s. The Mau Mau war was a struggle which dividedAfricans in
Kenya among themselves, even dividing those Kikuyu com-munities who
were at its centre. These divisions were not an accidentalproduct
of the struggle, but were cultivated as a deliberate tactic: the
Britishcolonial government mobilized a Kikuyu home guard to combat
Mau Mau,and were conspicuously successful in keeping groups other
than Kikuyu out ofthe armed struggle.72 While many Kalenjin may
have sympathized with thearmed struggle, and some elements
certainly organized themselves to supportthe Mau Mau land and
freedom army, it remains true that the British, for verygood
reason, considered the Kalenjin to be the most loyal of all the
peoples ofKenya during the 1950s.73 Moreover, whilst the Mau Mau
fighters may bethought to have ultimately won the war even in
military defeat - in so far astheir activities can be seen to have
dramatically altered the political landscapeof Kenya and brought
the end of imperial rule much faster than mightotherwise have been
the case they did not win the peace. The spoils of war- political
power in the independent Kenya - went not to the freedom
fightersfrom the forests, or even to their commanders, but instead
to the more liberalelements in the nationalist movement of the
1940s and 1950s, most of whomhad argued throughout for
constitutional settlement and remained, at best,ambivalent in their
attitudes towards the armed struggle.74
The popular image of nationalist struggle that the state in
independentKenya has consistently promoted is predictably devoid of
the contradictionsimplicit in this rendering of the historical
evidence. The process of nation-building has required a simplistic
picture of a glorious nationalist struggleduring Mau Mau in which
all Kenya peoples played a part.75 Yet withlandlessness - the most
fundamental aspect of the land and freedom army'scharter - having
not diminished in Kenya since independence, and with
72 Frank Furedi, The Mau Mau war in perspective (London, 1989);
Carl G. Rosberg and John
Nottingham, The myth of Mau Mau (New York, 1966), chapter 8. For
a very sophisticatedreassessment, J. M. Lonsdale, 'Mau Mausof the
mind: making Mau Mau and remaking Kenya',Journal of African
History, x x x i (1990) , 3 9 3 - 4 2 2 .
73 F . D . Corf ie ld , Historical survey of the origins and
growth of Mau Mau, C m d . 1030 ( L o n d o n ,
i960), pp. 211-17.74
Lonsdale, 'Mau Maus of the mind', passim; John Spencer, KAU: The
Kenya African Union,especially chapters 5-7; D. W. Throup, Economic
and social origins of Mau Mau 1945-53 (London,Nairobi and Athens,
Ohio, 1987).
75 T h e m o s t obv ious e x a m p l e r e m a i n s J o m o K
e n y a t t a , Suffering without bitterness: the founding of
the Kenya nation (Nairobi, 1968). For the most recent example of
the way in which textbooks forKenyan students avoid any controversy
in this respect see D. N. Sifuna, 'Nationalism anddecolonisation',
in W. R. Ochieng' (ed.), Themes in Kenyan history (Nairobi, 1989),
especially pp.195-9-
-
876 DAVID M. ANDERSON
politics continuing to be seen in largely local terms, the
nationalistinterpretation has been undermined by class-based and
ethnocentricalternatives.76 None of this is very surprising, yet it
emphasizes that resistanceremains the most prominent yet also most
problematic theme of Kenya'shistoriography.
This brings us back to Koitalel, Kipchomber and Barserion, and
the way inwhich they have been portrayed in writings on Kenya's
past. In his widelyread and highly praised novel Petals of Blood,
Ngugi wa Thiong'o includesBarserion and Koitalel in his pantheon of
true heroes of African resistance tocolonialism, invoking their
names as a plea for justice and right.77 This literaryallusion
reflects what might be considered the 'orthodox' view of
manyKenyan-born historians. William Ochieng' has echoed this in his
school anduniversity textbooks written for Kenyan students, while
Atieno Odhiambo hasdescribed Koitalel as 'the greatest of the
resisters'.78 In another literary work,Homecoming, Ngugi praises
Koitalel as the leader of a 'violent peasantresistance' against
colonialism, and in his work Detained he applauds Barserionas a
leading Mau Mau activist.79 In the only work to deal at any length
withKipchomber, Henry Mwanzi smears those who opposed the orkoiik
as'collaborators' with colonialism.80 To these writers, the orkoiik
are heroicfigures.
All history needs its heroes and heroines, but it must also have
its villains:and, depending upon your perspective, the same
individuals may fulfil bothroles. The orkoiik may be seen as heroes
of resistance, yet they were also villainsof the piece among
Kalenjin, who feared their power and the role they cameto assume in
the years prior to and during colonialism. If we accept
Koitalel,Kipchomber and Barserion simply as heroes of resistance,
where does thisleave the elders who stood against the power of the
orkoiik? Are theseindividuals to be stigmatized as colonial
stooges, collaborators with theimperial power, and thereby
opponents of the forces of African nationalism?This question has
much importance for the writing of Kenya's history, andfor an
analysis of present Kenyan politics. But the simplistic view of
resistanceand collaboration cannot begin to explain the social and
moral process inwhich the elders' 'collaborative' search for a new
order that kept materialprogress under household control was
fundamentally opposed to the occultpower of the orkoiik. The
authority of the orkoiik was more appropriate to the
76 Maina wa Kinyatti (ed.), Thunderfrom the mountains: Mau Mau
patriotic songs (London, 1980);
i d e m , ' M a u M a u : the peak of African political
organizat ion and struggle for l iberation in colonialK e n y a ' ,
Ufahamu, x n (1983), 9 0 - 1 2 3 ; Furedi , Mau Mau war, in t
roduct ion ; Lonsdale, ' M a u M a u sof the m i n d ' , passim. "
Ngugi wa Th iong 'o , Petals of blood (London, 1977).
78 Ochieng ' , History of Kenya, pp . 9 4 - 5 ; E. S. Atieno O d
h i a m b o , ' " M i n d limps after r e a l i t y " :
a diagnostic essay on the t rea tment of historical themes in K
e n y a n writings since independence ' ,pape r delivered at the
annua l conference of the Historical Association of Kenya , Nai
robi (1976).
79 Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Homecoming: essays on African and
Caribbean literature, culture and politics
(London, 1972), p. 49, and Detained: a writer's prison diary
(London, 1981), pp. 48-9. CarolSicherman, Ngugi wa Thiong'o: the
making of a rebel. A source book in Kenyan literature and
resistance(London, 1990) deals with these themes in detail .
80 H e n r y Mwanz i , 'Koi ta le l a r a p Samoei ' ,
passim.
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CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 877
potentially violent entrepreneurial drive of livestock
accumulation on therelatively open pasturage of pre-colonial times.
Modern Kenya is the productof its collaborative elders who learned
to exploit the state, with its newconcepts of fixed household
property and agricultural production. In essence,those who opposed
the orkoiik in the Western Highlands have inherited thepower of the
colonial state:81 the parallels with the Mau Mau forest fightersare
clear.
But resistance has more meanings than Kenya's historiography
presentlyreflects. 'Africa, after all', Ngugi reminds us, 'did not
have one but severalpasts which were in perpetual struggle'.82 This
holds true as much for thehistory of the orkoiik within the context
of Kalenjin social history as it does forthe more generalized
reconstructions of the history of resistance to colonialismin
Kenya, but one can surely inform our understanding of the other.
Despitetheir prominence in the heroic litany of resistance, the
deeper social history ofthese actors and their actions has been
woefully neglected. In this, and inmany other respects, Kenya has
many pasts yet to be fully explored.
81 For a splendid example see A. T. Matson,' Elijah Cheruiyot
arap Chepkwony: a great Nandi
chief, in B. E. Kipkorir (ed.), Biographical essays on
imperialism and collaboration in colonial Kenya(Nairobi, 1980), pp.
209-43. 82 Ngugi, Petals of blood, p. 214.