biography.pdf

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2Publisher:JU Muzej /Museum Alija Izetbegovi

On behalf of the publisher:Elvis Kondi

Author:Zehrudin Isakovi

Editor:Elvis Kondi

Translation:Saba Risaluddin

Design & DTP:Sanjin Manov, Zijah Gafi

Printed by:BEMUST

Print run:750

Museum Alija Izetbegovi. All rights reserved.

3By Zehrudin IsakoviSource: Dostojanstvo ljudskog izbora, Alija Izetbegovi, OKO, 2005

BIOGRAPHY

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5A lija Izetbegovi was born in Bosanski amac on 8 August 1925, to a distinguished beys family (belonging to the gentry) which, though originally from Belgrade, was compelled in 1868, under Serbian terror, as the chronicles have it, to move to a place of greater safety.

They chose Bosanski amac. Izetbegovis grandfather, also called Alija, was mayor of Bosanski amac. He is said to have been highly regarded by the townspeople for his fairness and honesty. The town will long recall the way in which he resolutely protected a group of leading Serb townspeople from the Austrian authorities when, following the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-presumptive to the throne of Austria, they

planned to hold them as hostages. Alija Izetbegovis earliest years were associated with the two rivers overlooked by the windows of the house where he was born: the Bosna and the Sava. The name of the former foreshadowed the time when, already advanced in years, he and his Party of Democratic Action (SDA) came to power and he entered the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not long before war broke out, and a desperate struggle to preserve the countrys newly-won independence and territorial integrity ensued. In his youth, he had fought for the idea of Islam; in the final years of his life, he was focused entirely on the struggle for the rights of the Bosniacs

and their homeland of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Alija was not yet two when his father Mustafa, a merchant and banker, decided to move to Sarajevo. The family was a large one; his parents were to have five children, three daughters and two sons, of whom Alija was the elder. He also had two half-brothers from his fathers first marriage. Tragically, Mustafa was badly wounded on the Italian front in World War I, injuries which were later to result in a kind of palsy or paralysis that left him more or less bed-ridden for the last ten years of his life. Though the whole family helped to look after him, Alijas mother

Hiba bore most of the burden of her husbands illness. His mother was a very pious woman, and Alija would later note that it was to her that he owed his early religious convictions. Though he admitted that he found it hard to rise before first light to say his morning prayers with his mother, Izetbegovi

6liked to recall that period in his life, and in particular the beautiful Quranic sura Ar-Rahman which older people recall was never recited more beautifully than by Imam Rahmanovi in the hajjis mosque opposite the City Hall. The whole family agree that the young Alija combined the genetic features of both his parents: physically, he resembled his mother, but in character, they say, he was like his father. This, no doubt, helps to explain why Izetbegovi junior broke free from parental influence at a fairly early age to live his own life. When he was about fourteen, Izetbegovi was influenced atheist and communist writings and his faith began to waver. Communist propaganda was at its height in Yugoslavia just before the outbreak of World War II, partly as a reaction against fascism, which was in its golden or rather, most sinister age. Yet, according to the later Izetbegovi, communism did not mean democracy red totalitarianism grew stronger to counter the

black version. Izetbegovi was attending the First Boys Grammar School, where the communists were particularly active at the time. The school itself was reputed to be communist according to the grapevine, some of the professors belonged to the movement. A number of leaflets thus came into his hands, and he was not immune to their message; he began to be in two minds between the problems of social justice and injustice, on the one hand, and belief in God on the other. However, even at first glance, the young Izetbegovis doubts were aroused by the fact that the communist propaganda portrayed God as the bad guy and religion as the opium of the people, a way of keeping the masses so subdued and deadened that they would not struggle to improve their lot in real life. Contrary to this, it always seemed to Izetbegovi himself that the central message of faith, in its various forms,

was to live a moral, responsible life. Finally, after a year or two of spiritual and philosophical vacillation, Izetbegovi returned to his faith with renewed strength, and in a new way. Later it would seem to him that the steadiness of his faith was in fact the outcome of his youthful doubts; it was no longer the faith into which he had been born, a tradition he had inherited, but one he had adopted anew. He was never to lose it again, even though later, as his

7writings on religious matters reveal, he constantly re-examined and studied it. (The universe without God seemed utterly pointless to me, Izetbegovi

was later to write in his Memoirs.) Meanwhile, he read the classic works of European philosophy, and by the age of nineteen he already had a solid grounding in the writings of Hegel, Spinoza and Kant, whose categorical imperative had a particular impact on the inquisitive young man. He matriculated in 1943, at the height of the war, when the Izetbegovi family, like most of their neighbours, were feeling the effects of war shortages and were more often hungry than sated. Sarajevo was occupied by the Ustasha, who had imposed a harsh Nazi regime. Izetbegovi should have reported for military service, but did not do so; in the eyes of the authorities, he became the typical draft dodger, and had to remain in hiding throughout 1944. When it became too risky for him to remain in Sarajevo, he escaped to his native Sava valley region. As he would himself later admit, none of the armies there impressed him: neither the Partisans nor the Muslim militia, and least of all the Chetniks and the Ustasha. However, the fact that he did not take up arms did not mean that Izetbegovi was uncommitted; on the contrary, he and a few others of like mind sought to articulate their political views through the Young Muslims organization. The first attempt to register the society under the laws of the day was in March 1941. Not surprisingly, it failed, for in April, Germany attacked Yugoslavia, and the sole priority was to survive. Strangely enough, the Young Muslims movement focused mainly on foreign policy and spiritual matters in other words, questions relating to the contemporary Muslim world. These Young Muslims recognized that the state of politics in the Muslim world is wretched and unsustainable, while Islam is a living idea that can (and should) be modernized, without losing any of its essence (as statements made at that time put it). They were also well aware that most Muslim countries were under foreign rule, whether by a military presence or

that of (foreign) capital. Though not formally constituted, the organization was becoming ever more popular among grammar school pupils and students, and continued in operation throughout World War II. Izetbegovis first clash

8with the movement was in 1944, when it formed an alliance with El-Hidaja, the imams association. As he often remarked, Alija never fully agreed with the hojjas, critical as he was of their rigid interpretation of Islam, the result of which, as he put it in his memoirs, was to block its inward and outward development.

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First term in prison

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T o the dismay of the communist authorities, once the war was over the organization continued its operations with renewed enthusiasm. At first, Young Muslim activists received discreet warnings, but when they ignored them, the order was given to arrest them, and Alija Izetbegovi

spent his first spell in prison. Since he was serving out his military service in

the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia at the time, the military court

sentenced him to three years strict confinement, which he began in March

1946 and completed in 1949. While under investigation, Izetbegovi was

held in the military gaol of the Marshal Tito barracks in Sarajevo, in a cell

where half the inmates were under sentence of death. The mood among them

was sombre as they awaited a final ruling on their appeal against the death

sentence. Izetbegovis three-year sentence was regarded as fairly lenient

in the circumstances of the time, when some political prisoners received

sentences of death or long prison terms. Even so, innocent as he was of any

crime, he had to spend a thousand long days and nights behind bars. He was

sent first to Zenica to serve his time, but after only two months was transferred

to Stolac, where he spent seven months before being moved again, this

time to correctional labour on a building site near Borako Lake. As fate

would have it, here Izetbegovi found himself working on the building that

was to be a recreation centre for the UDB (State Security Authority the

Yugoslav secret police), where his udbai, the people who had interrogated

him, would later enjoy a break from duty. After Borako Lake, Alija was

moved to Sarajevo, where the ironies of fate showed that they had not done

with him. Here he and other prisoners were to build the headquarters of the

Communist Party Central Committee. Perhaps the whole idea was that the

political opponents of communism were to build its temples. The isolation

of prison was made easier for the young Izetbegovi by the loving letters he

exchanged with Halida, a girl he had known since he was eighteen and had

gone out with throughout the war. When he was sent to prison, they kept

in touch by letter, describing their feelings and expressing their respect and

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love for each other, which separation only served to strengthen and deepen.

Alija was sent to the Hungarian border for the third and final year of his

sentence, to work on the Belje agricultural estate near Beli Manastir. There

he was put to felling trees, at which he became adept. Many years later,

Izetbegovi himself used to say that if ever he had to resort to manual labour

to earn a crust, he would choose to be a wood-cutter: of all the manual work

I have done and Ive done plenty that is the one that appeals most, he

would say. He spent that winter of 1948-1949 cutting up firewood with

a hand-saw. This physical activity, combined with enough food, enabled

him to make a full recovery by the end of the third year of his sentence.

He was 24 when he came out of prison, and looked extremely well. His

family wept with joy when they saw how strong, healthy and mentally fit he

was. No sooner had he left prison than, as expected, Alija married Halida.

He was proud of her beauty, considering her physically far more attractive

than he himself, though many women found him handsome, with his vivid

blue eyes and, despite his youth, the aura of prison martyrdom about him,

which earned him the respect and affection of those around him. Just as it

was the natural thing for him to marry Halida, so those who knew him best

fully expected him to continue his political activities. Izetbegovi renewed his

connection with the Young Muslims covertly, through Hasan Biber. Exactly

forty days after they made contact, on 11 April 1949, Biber was arrested.

During his interrogation, he was under constant pressure to reveal Alijas

renewed involvement with the Young Muslims, but he would not buckle.

The other members of the organization were still unaware of Izetbegovis

activities, so thanks to Biber, he remained at liberty, though with little time

to enjoy his freedom, as he had still not fully recovered from his three years

in prison. At his trial in July, Biber received the death sentence, which the

zealous communists carried out in October. This trial led to widespread

arrests throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and raids on the Young Muslims

organization in Mostar began, when files and the minutes of meetings were

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confiscated. This was followed by a simultaneous action in Zagreb, where

the authorities arrested a large group of students, all of which culminated

in a trial in Sarajevo in August 1949. Some of those arrested were already

on trial for the second time, and were convicted and sent to prison. Adding

up all the prison sentences in all the political trials of the Young Muslims

gives a total of a thousand years confinement. The organization was wiped

out, with all its leading figures in gaol or executed. There were, it is true,

still some who continued inwardly to nurture the Young Muslims idea,

and there were frequent secret meetings at which it was discussed, but the

organized operations that could have turned into specific political action

were over. Meanwhile, Alija Izetbegovi was studying Yugoslav society,

based, it was claimed, on social equality and a refined sense of justice. In

his view, however, it had more to do with hypocrisy, with ordinary people

going hungry as leading communists drew their supplies from secret caches.

The masses were eating potatoes and rice, while the privileged and the

ideologically correct were living in the lap of luxury: they had everything,

from milk to chocolate. Yet any open discussion about privileges was treated

as anti-constitutional and anti-state. Izetbegovi spent the next ten years

working on building sites, mainly in Montenegro, where he spent seven years,

overseeing the construction of the Peruica hydro power plant near Niki.

He tried to spend his free time broadening his formal education, first studying

agronomy before transferred to law in his third year. Within two years, he

graduated. It was 1956.

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the islamic Declaration

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I t was a wonder that with all this his job, his studies, and looking after his family Izetbegovi was also able to write extensively on matters Islamic. In 1969 he produced a first draft of his Islamic Declaration, producing and publishing a final version in 1970. This short work, some 40

pages, was to arouse keen interest only after the Sarajevo Trial of 1983, when

Izetbegovi was convicted for a second time, for Islamic fundamentalism.

Though written in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then part of Yugoslavia, the

Declaration focused not on that countrys political circumstances but on the

Islamic world, which the book treated as a coherent spiritual and even political

entity. To the apologists of the socialist system, the Declaration appeared

fundamentalist, a threat to the social system, as indeed it was, in essence:

it called for a return to authentic Islam. To the communists, fundamentalist

atheists, extolling the virtues of Islam and celebrating belief in God was heresy

of the worst kind. The Declaration was both acclaimed and challenged with

equal passion. The problem, however, was that those who took issue with it

were mainly those who were in power, and the force of argument gave way

to the argument of force. The Islamic Declaration was later translated into

seven languages, becoming one of the most widely-read political texts on its

subject at that time. Though he never said so explicitly, it would seem that as

Izetbegovi became more critical of Muslim countries, he came to see that the

Declaration was too idealistic, and to realize that there was no such thing as a

coherent Islamic world as he had viewed it; rather, that it consisted of many

different entities, each of which had its own specific problems and context,

which was particularly true of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some passages in

the Declaration were seen as a call for a polity structured on Islamic principles,

which was maliciously interpreted as an appeal by Izetbegovi to reorganize

Yugoslavia, or at least Bosnia and Herzegovina, along Islamic lines. Whatever

those who advanced such views may have claimed, it is worth noting that in

his later political activities, Alija Izetbegovi opted for a secular state, based

on the principles of modern western democracy, where religion has its place

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in society on an equal footing with other factors. Another surprise is the

fact that Izetbegovi wrote another of his works, Islam Between East and

West, even before going to prison in 1946. When he was arrested, his sister

Azra, who died in 1997, managed to hide the almost completed manuscript

under the rafters of the family house. By force of circumstance it remained

there, in quite unsuitable conditions, and when Alija found it, it was, as he

himself said, a bundle of half-decayed paper. Even so, the bundle was in

good enough condition for Izetbegovi to transcribe the text, to which he

then added some new passages, sending the whole thing to a friend in Canada.

The book was published there in 1984, by which time Izetbegovi was already

serving his second prison sentence, this time a fourteen-year term. This book, translated into no fewer than nine languages, also dealt with Islam,

and its place in the world of today. In his view, Islam fell somewhere between

eastern and western thought, just as the Muslim world lay geographically

between east and west, hence the title of the book. To put it in the briefest

of terms, just as everything is created in pairs, so too each of us is a dual

being, composed of body and soul, in which the body is the abode of the

soul. This abode is the product of evolution, with its own past, but the soul

is not: it is breathed into us by the touch of God. The abode or body is the

object of science, but the soul is the object of religion, art and ethics. In

Izetbegovis view, therefore, there are two narratives and two truths about

humankind, symbolized in the West by Darwin and Michelangelo, whose

truths are different, but not mutually exclusive. Izetbegovi sought to argue

his views by developing the notion that these truths are presented as the

clash between civilization and culture, in which science and technology are

the domain of civilization and religion and art the province of culture. The

former is the expression of our existential needs (how we live), the latter

of our human aspirations (why we live). Civilization aspires to an earthly

kingdom, religion to the kingdom of heaven. In Islam Between East and

West, Izetbegovi sought to demonstrate that Islam is a synthesis between

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these two opposites, a third way between the two poles that define all

that is human. In his recension of the book, Predrag Matvejevi wrote

that the book reveals (the authors) passionate and thrilling reflections on

Islam and its place between East and West, geographical terms taken both

literally and metaphorically, with all the contradictions they entail in the

Cold War period. More recently, Matvejevi revised this, adding that from

our current perspective, it is a moderate book, free of any integralism or

fundamentalism. He also observed that These days, after the trials endured

by Bosnia and Herzegovina, one could say that Izetbegovis approach also

included a kind of warning. If only it could have been heeded at the right

time, adding that on re-reading Izetbegovis manuscript, he seemed to see

the figure of a mild, wise man, which is how he always remembered him.

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intellectual maturity

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I n addition to his existential concerns and his interest in matters Islamic, Izetbegovi was still preoccupied with certain inevitable subjects: communism, capitalism, and the nature of these different social systems. He could never reconcile himself to the ideas proposed by

communism as the pattern and measure of existence, and was profoundly

offended by the hypocrisy that held there was one standard for ordinary,

impoverished people and another for communist apparatchiks and officials,

enjoying the good things of life and the hedonism specific to socialism and

communism. Izetbegovi realized that the essential problem of the Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and indeed of the Balkans as a whole, was

the absence of democracy. Countries that called themselves socialist were at

different levels of development. What even a superficial analysis revealed,

however, was the extremely strong, and indeed decisive, impact of certain

key figures on the state of affairs in those countries. Though each was based

on the same matrix, the actual, real-life circumstances of ordinary citizens

differed from country to country, depending on their leaders. ivkov,

Hoxha, Ceauescu, Tito four different men, four different lifestyles, and

as a result, four different regimes. Yet despite their differences, all four

regimes were of the same authoritarian essence. A new shadow fell over

Alija Izetbegovis life in 1979, when the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz

Tito, received Raif Dizdarevi and Branko Mikuli, leading officials of the

Communist League, at his favourite hunting lodge, Koprivnica near Bugojno.

Izetbegovi recorded in his memoirs that Sarajevo Televisions prime time

news programme reported Titos order to the two officials to use the harshest

measures to deal with attempts to revive clero-nationalism and pan-Islamism

in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Izetbegovi saw this as applying to him, and

could already hear the knocking at the door. Following the brief relatively

liberal era of the 1970s, this was none other than the intimation of a new

showdown with those who were not in sympathy with or were opponents

of communism, a warning that the final reckoning was to come for those

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who were pondering the merits of Islam, and who were therefore unable to

agree with the atheist postulates of a socialist or communist society that was

falling ever deeper into crisis. Despite his previous unhappy experience and

constant threats against him, Izetbegovis interest in study did not wane.

He continued writing, publishing his articles in the Takvim, the Islamic

calendar, using the initials L.S.B. as a pseudonym, taken from the initial of

his three children, Lejla, Sabina and Bakir. The articles were a series with the

general heading Problems of the Islamic Revival. The articles were later

published as a book, which received excellent reviews. For example, Prof.

Dr. Esad Durakovi, noting that the book consisted of a collection of articles

dealing with some of the issues of Islamic revival, wrote that the author, in

a kind of revolutionary zeal emphasized the importance of reinterpreting

the sources of Islam as a priority, a thread that runs through all his writings.

According to Izetbegovi, there can be a revival only in a bold return to the

fundamentals of Islam. In fact, the whole of Izetbegovis contribution to

Islamic thought, and this book in particular, reveals him as a reformer, not

so much of Islam itself as of Islamic societies and states. Many years later,

speaking at the Islamic Summit conference in Tehran in 1997, Izetbegovi

made direct reference to all the failings, as he saw them, of the countries that

called themselves Islamic, putting it in the plainest of terms: Islam is the best,

but we are not. In addition, these articles, which appeared over a thirty-

year time span and were reissued under the general title Problems of Islamic

Revival, reveal an ecumenical approach to the problems: far from expressing

religious exclusivity, the manuscript actually affirms the diversity of religions

and cultures as a blessing from God. It is true that Izetbegovi also insisted

that Islam should be on an equal footing with others in this world, saying that

his ultimate aim was, first, to conduct an objective analysis of contemporary

Islamic thought and, second, to revitalize the Islamic world and incorporate

it into the modern world on the principles of mutual respect and equality.

It is worth noting that Izetbegovis approach to the problems he studies

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in these articles is largely essayistic rather than scholarly, which does not

prevent them from achieving objective value, as a significant and original

contribution to thought in general, not confined solely to Islam.

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the sarajevo trial

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G radually, Alija Izetbegovis writings, which of course had not escaped the attention of the UDB, led him into new difficulties, when he and several other Islamic intellectuals were suspected of anti-state activities. Early in the morning of 23 March 1983, Alija was

woken by a banging on the door of his flat on the third floor of no 14 Hasan

Kiki Street. When he opened the door, a number of obscure figures burst in,

without removing their shoes, brandishing a search warrant, and proceeded

to search the flat, dragging cupboards away from the wall, taking down roller

blinds, pulling out drawers in their attempt to find evidence of Izetbegovis

intellectual political activities and the books in his private library. Late in the

day they ordered him to accompany them to the State Security Service

premises, where he was told that he was to be held in detention for three

days. This was later extended to thirty days, and then to an indefinite term of

pre-trial detention. The investigation and interrogations lasted for about a

hundred days and nights (night-time interrogations were not uncommon).

Hundreds of Muslims from all over Bosnia and Herzegovina were arrested

along with Izetbegovi and interrogated the famous Sarajevo Trial had

begun.The indictment was based on Articles 114 and 133 of the Criminal

Code of Socialist Yugoslavia: association with a view to undermining the

constitutional order, and verbal delict. In addition, the indictment against

Izetbegovi also charged him with being leader of a group of conspirators,

though as it would later turn out at the trial, he had never seen some of the

accused before. It was true that five of the twelve accused had all belonged

to the Young Muslims in the late 1940s, but when the organization was

abolished in the early 1950s they had ceased to act in concert, mainly out of

fear for their very lives. Even so, the court found sufficient evidence to

bring a number of Muslims to court, accusing them, to put it simply, of

wanting to break up Yugoslavia (posing a counter-revolutionary threat to

the social order in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and,

allegedly, to build an Islamic state on the ruins, which they would then

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perhaps incorporate into the rest of the Islamic world. Though such

accusations now provoke only wry smiles, at the time the situation was

anything but amusing. On day one, Alija Izetbegovi, Omer Behmen,

Hasan engi, Ismet Kasumagi, Edhem Biaki, Husein ivalj, Ruid

Prguda, Salih Behmen, Mustafa Spahi, Demaludin Lati, Melika

Salihbegovi, Dervi \urevi and \ula Biaki were brought into the

courtroom. Almost all were known to have played a more or less significant

part in safeguarding Bosnia and Herzegovina against aggression, which to

some extent corroborates the hypothesis that the Yugoslav authorities knew

whom they were dealing with. The prosecutor was Edina Reidovi, who,

the accused were to say, conducted her case with particular zeal in what was

obviously a show trial. She based the accusation of counter-revolution

activity on Izetbegovis Islamic Declaration which, she claimed, had been

translated into Arabic, Turkish, English and German between 1974 and 1983

with the intention of posing a counter-revolutionary threat to the social order

of Socialist Yugoslavia, and published in these languages with a foreword; in

addition, with a view to creating a body of like-minded associates at home to

pose a counter-revolutionary threat to the social order in the manner and

with the aims set out in the Declaration, the accused had given copies to

numerous intellectuals Husein \ozo, Muhamed Kupusovi, Husein ivalj,

Hasan engi, Rusmir Mahmutehaji, Mehmedalija Hadi, Melika

Salihbegovi and Edhem Biaki, following which Hasan engi, Ismet

Kasumagi, Huso ivalj and Edhem Biaki had become members of the

group. Since there was no evidence to support these claims, it being

perfectly clear that the Islamic Declaration did not pertain to Yugoslavia at

all, the prosecution resorted to extorting statements from witnesses. One by

one, Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders were brought in by the secret

police and interrogated day and night. Under pressure, many signed a certain

statement, but when brought before the court to repeat what had ostensibly

been their own statement, their consciences pricked them and they refused

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to do so, contrary to what the prosecution had expected. Nonetheless, the

judiciary, under political orders, high-handedly upheld their signed statements

one by one. Fifty-nine witnesses were questioned, 56 requested by the

prosecution and only three by the defence. The statements of 23 of them

were irrelevant to both the prosecution and the defence, and were not called.

Of the remaining 36, fifteen held largely to their accusatory pre-trial

statements, but 21 altered their pre-trial statements to a greater or lesser

degree, and in some cases, repudiated them altogether. Many of the

witnesses complained of their treatment while making their statements.

Some claimed that their testimony had been altered to suit the charges. The

principal methods used by the interrogators were blackmail and various kinds

of pressure and threats. For example, one witness, Reid Hafizovi, stated

that the interrogator had pulled a gun on him, and Enes Kari that his

statement had been so altered as to be unrecognizable, after which he was

forced to sign it. Even as he did so, he was planning to deny everything in the

statement. At a Supreme Court hearing on 14 March 1984, one of the

accused, Mustafa Spahi, said that he had been faced with a choice by his

interrogators: either to sign a statement against one of the three principal

accused or to be charged himself. On refusing to give false evidence, he was

sentenced to a five-year prison term. Izetbegovi demanded a public trial,

and also complained that for the most part, only politically correct media

representatives were allowed into the courtroom, whose reports were not

impartial, but followed the prosecution line. Gradually, various human

rights organizations began to put in an appearance, calling for a stay of

proceedings, since it was increasingly obvious that this was a trial of non-

sympathizers, not for what they had done, but simply because they held

different views. With hindsight, it may seem somewhat strange that it was

from Belgrade, albeit only well after the verdicts had been handed down, that

a trenchant voice against the Sarajevo Trial of the twelve was heard. A

petition signed by twenty leading Belgrade intellectuals was sent to the

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Presidency of Yugoslavia on 6 June 1986: Twelve Muslim intellectuals were

on trial in Sarajevo between 18 July and 19 August 1983. This trial will go

down in the history of the present-day Yugoslav judiciary as the archetype of

exemplary punishment for word and thought. The court of first instance

handed down draconian sentences for delict of opinion, unusual even in our

circumstances: three of the accused received a five-year prison sentence, two

a six-year sentence, one a sentence of six years and six months, one of seven,

two of ten, one of fourteen and one of fifteen years. The sentences handed

down by the Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina were only slightly less

harsh, ranging from three years and six months to twelve years noted the

petition. The petition was reissued in October 1986, noting that the charges

were concocted and that the trial was unjust and not conducted lawfully, and

calling on the Presidency to free the accused. Contrary to what might have

been expected, this did not induce the court to reduce the sentences. As the

principal accused, Izetbegovi was sentenced to a seemingly endless fourteen

years in prison. Commenting on the verdict, he observed that he loved

Yugoslavia, but not its authorities. The final few sentences of his closing

remarks reveal a man who was willing to sacrifice literally everything for his

ideals: I was and shall remain a Muslim. I saw myself as a fighter for the

Islamic cause in this world, and shall see myself in the same way to the end of

my days. For me, Islam is another name for all that is fine and noble, a name

for the promise or hope of a better future for Muslim nations, for their life in

dignity and freedom, in a word, for everything that, in my belief, is worth

living for. The day after the verdict was pronounced, the daily newspaper

Osloboenje came out with the headline: 90 years for the enemies. The long years of incarceration were to follow.

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28

prison Days

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I n November 1983, Izetbegovi was transferred to Foa to serve his fourteen-year sentence. As he entered the prison compound, he took a deep breath, preparing himself for a long struggle to maintain his physical and mental health. It was vital to stay normal on that rocky, uncertain

path to which he could see no end. He was put in Block S-20, known as the

homicide block, since most of its inmates had been convicted of at least one

murder. Alija would later often make a point that sounds somewhat strange,

but once he had explained it, you would see that it made sense, saying, I was

lucky to be in a block with murderers. Some of my comrades from the trial

were worse off, because they were put with petty thieves and criminals, which

is a real misfortune in prison. People like these have no moral fibre, but

murderers are another class of people. He often referred to the case of a

man who killed a man in a coffee-house after the man had almost killed his

father when you think about it, you find yourself thinking you would have

done the same. The days in prison dragged by, and Izetbegovi turned

increasingly to reading and contemplation, as well as finding various ways to

make the time seem shorter and to keep physically and mentally fit. The

knowledge that ahead of him lay an endless succession of identical or barely

different days in a cell of two by two metres was incredibly disheartening.

Given his age (he was already about 60), Izetbegovi often caught himself

wondering if he would survive to the end of his prison term and live to enjoy

freedom again. Yet he was a man with the spiritual strength to endure all the

trials of his days in prison and all the painful tribulations that assailed him

from every quarter. Despite all his anxieties, the end of his incarceration

found Izetbegovi in a good state of mind. He would himself say that he owed

his preservation as much to his faith as to the loyalty and constant moral

support of his son Bakir and his two daughters, Lejla and Sabina. The letters

they exchanged throughout his time in gaol were full of parental affection

from him and infinite concern for their father on his childrens part. Those

of the family who were at liberty lived for their father in prison, and the

30

reverse was equally true: in his prison cell, their father thought constantly

about his family. This helped him through the moments when he had the

bitter taste of abandonment and sorrow in his throat. (My courage would

gradually fail me as the day passed, reaching its lowest point in the early

evening, when I would find it hard to fight off the onset of melancholy. It

would seem that I incautiously wrote about this to my daughter Sabina, for

one day I received a letter from her: I dont know if you used to feel this, but

in my case that feeling always comes over me as dusk falls. I have to keep

really busy to keep it, to some extent at least, at bay. Sometimes this sadness

is mingled with fear and physical weakness. I know that it has always been

somewhat difficult for me to get ready when I had to go out at that time of

day. But as soon as I was out and darkness had fallen, it would all pass. Its as

though all my fears, uncertainties and sorrows come together in that feeling,

and I would think that this is how people feel when they decide to turn to

alcohol or drugs to escape. Im telling you this because I want you to know

that I too know that feeling, in part at least, and that I can imagine how it is

for you. Prison must make it harder, just as for me the feeling of freedom in

this house helps me to get through that part of the day. Perhaps it would be

best for you to try to be doing something when it comes over you, to read

something light if you can, to do a crossword or watch TV. What I know for

sure is that its not good to think about it at those times, or to give in to those

feelings; it only makes things worse. There I go again, preaching to you, but I

wanted to make it a bit easier for you. In fact, what I would like best is for us

to be at my place at that time of day, sitting over a cup of coffee. But at least

I want you to know that I am thinking of you always, and particularly as dusk

falls. Quoted in Memoirs.) The effect of all this was to create an unusually

strong emotional bond between father and son and between father and

daughters, particularly between Izetbegovi and his son Bakir, who was

following in his fathers footsteps by becoming interested in politics and the

state of the society in which he lived. Bakir developed a keen sense for politics

31

and a strong desire to become involved. This bond between father and son

would become even more marked later, under the even greater tribulations of

the unimaginably turbulent years of war, in which Izetbegovi the elder would

play one of the key roles. Once the interrogations and the trial were over

and he had to some extent adjusted to his new living quarters, Izetbegovi

began to keep notes reflections on life and destiny, on religion and politics,

on the works he had read and their authors, and on the many other things

that came to his mind as he spent some two thousand days and nights in

prison. These notes finally amounted to thirteen A5 exercise books of minute,

deliberately illegible script, which would be published in late 1999 with the

title My Escape to Freedom. Following publication, the critics would express

the view that Izetbegovis notes shed considerable light on his personality, in

all its complexity. Prof. Dr. Enes Kari, whom UDBAs interrogators had

unsuccessfully tried to pressure into giving false testimony against Izetbegovi

and his co-accused, wrote in his review of the book that it was impossible to

read the book without becoming aware of the importance of Alija Izetbegovis

intellectual, spiritual and political biography, for these notes, written while

serving his prison sentence, fill many gaps in the mosaic that constitutes the

intellectual biography of an outstanding figure, one who had a major impact

on the final decade of the twentieth century. Kari also observed that

Escape to Freedom is in fact a refusal to allow the spirit to be quenched, and

thus a way in which its author transcended the harsh reality of prison,

becoming a quest for human freedom. It is in this blend of the personal and

the universal that the importance of Izetbegovis writings is to be found. Alija Izetbegovi used his time in prison to read and fill the gaps in his

education. He had plenty of time, and the will to spare as well (true, there

was no great choice of things to do), so that gradually, from an already solid

base, he moulded himself into a man ready for any historic challenge. Those

who read his notes from prison will be fascinated by the lucidity of his

thinking. They may recognize their own thoughts in some of his conclusions

32

or hypotheses, while others will give them an insight into the spiritual

complexities of this unusual man. Specific circumstances meant that the

personality of Alija Izetbegovi developed along specific lines. First,

Izetbegovis faith grew still stronger during his incarceration. His infinite

devotion to God was an oasis of calm in which he always found refuge during

particularly turbulent days in prison. Second, his long spell behind bars

meant that he developed a particular feeling for freedom: what other people

take for granted, was for Izetbegovi the Holy Grail. (Much later, during

the 1992-1995 war, he would utter the words that would be so often quoted:

I swear by Almighty God that we shall not be slaves.) To this prison inmate,

to be free meant both the supreme desire and the highest responsibility a

person can have. In some of his interviews, therefore, Izetbegovi spoke of the

terrifying side of freedom which everyone who is not strong-willed enough

has felt; in fact, they do not know what to do with their freedom, and

subconsciously want to be un-free, to be captives. Third, no doubt under

the constant pressure of injustice, Izetbegovi would spend the rest of his life

fighting for justice as he saw it, both for himself and for the people and country

to which he belonged.

33

34

FreeDom at last

35

A lawyer himself, Izetbegovi continued his campaign for a reduced sentence from his prison cell. He wrote to the Federal Court in Belgrade, drawing attention to the unlawful nature of the trial itself. The international media also described the Sarajevo trial as a show

trial and, slowly but thoroughly, a climate of opinion conducive to amending

the sentence was created. The softening-up process took about three years,

but finally, under the terms of a Federal Court ruling, Izetbegovis sentence

was symbolically reduced from fourteen to twelve years; more important, the

charges were altered, leaving only the office of verbal delict of Article 133 of

the Criminal Code. After various turns of events, the final verdict was nine

years. Izetbegovi ultimately served five years and eight months which

was what it cost him to try to convey his beliefs to others. Between three and

four in the afternoon of 25 November 1988, Izetbegovi was summoned to

the prison offices, where the chief warden, Malko Koroman, in ceremonial

uniform, read out to him in an equally ceremonial voice the decision by the

Presidency of Yugoslavia exempting him from the remainder of his sentence.

It was his 2705th day in prison. Izetbegovi could scarcely believe it: he was

a free man at last. Whatever doubts he may have had after his first term in

prison, now, after his second, there were none. His plan was clear in his mind:

to form a political party, and to win the elections.

36

FounDing the party

37

T he end of the 1980s gave a foretaste of the turbulent beginning of the 90s. The crisis in Yugoslav was reaching its peak. In the western regions of the country there were demands for democratization and for the introduction of a multi-party system, and the finger was being pointed

more and more openly at Serbian hegemony. In Serbia, meanwhile, Miloevi

was coming to the fore, and was convincing the Serbs that it was they who

were under threat, so gradually creating the psychological climate for war.

Slovenia and Croatia, for their part, were increasingly keen to break away

from Yugoslavia to become independent states. New political elites were

coming to the fore, soon to bring changes to the country. One after another,

new political parties were being formed. Franjo Tuman set up the Croatian

Democratic Union (HDZ, with an independent Croatia as its central aim. Izetbegovi watched all these changes, keen that the Muslim population,

from Novi Pazar to Cazin (as he wrote in his Memoirs), be ready to meet

them. From the outset it was the Yugoslav Muslim Organization of Mehmed

Spaho that was his political inspiration, though he believed it had had certain

weaknesses, as was clear from the fact that it fell apart with the very first

trials of war in 1941. Izetbegovi, who had a premonition of war, did not

want the same thing to happen to his party. Work on the formation of the

party began in November 1989, just a year after he left prison. Somewhat

against his will, he was leader of the party from the outset. He admitted in his

memoirs that he even asked himself, If Im the best, what are the rest like?

He answered himself thus: I suppose leaders have to have some major faults,

and I certainly had enough. The first person he contacted was Prof. Dr.

Muhamed Filipovi, who courteously turned him down on the grounds that,

in his view, the time was not ripe to form a Muslim party. He probably had in

mind the law, still in force at the time, prohibiting all political activity not

under the auspices of the Communist League. Anyone acting in breach of

this law could in theory receive a ten-year prison sentence. Izetbegovi

decided to take the risk. Throughout his life he had always challenged the

38

odds, and besides, it seemed to him that it was in fact the time to form his

party. In his quest for like-minded associates, he went to Zagreb, where

political events had progressed further, and where he therefore hoped to find

a better reception for his ideas as indeed he did. There he met emso

Tankovi and Salim abi (who has since died). About fifteen invitees

attended a meeting in the Zagreb mosque, organized by abi, and agreement

in principle was rapidly reached to form a political party from the Muslim

cultural community, with pan-Yugoslav aspirations: Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. Branches were soon

set up abroad as well; the idea spread like wildfire. These developments were

favoured by the crisis that was sweeping through the entire socialist-

communist camp. The Berlin Wall fell, and with it the power of the ideology

that had ruled the Eastern Bloc. On 27 March 1990, as spring was breaking,

Izetbegovi called a press conference at the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo to

announce the formation of his political party. His voice shaking somewhat

from emotion, he read out a press statement, later to be known as the

Statement by the Forty, after the number of signatories, which read as follows:

We the undersigned, faced with the crisis of Yugoslav society, which is not

only economic but also political and moral, concerned to preserve Yugoslavia

as a union of peoples and nations and interested in the unhindered

advancement of the democratic processes that have already begun towards a

free, modern state with the rule of law, desirous of encouraging this

advancement and in achieving, in such a state, not only the interests common

to all its citizens, but also those particular to us as citizens belonging to the

Muslim cultural community, have resolved to launch an initiative to found

the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), and to this end hereby announce

the sixteen programmatic principles of our political action. This was

followed by the list of principles. Though it made nominal appeal to all

citizens, it was clear from the very first paragraph that the party was to be

nationally-based: The SDA is a political alliance of the citizens of Yugoslavia

39

who belong to the Muslim cultural community, as well as to other citizens of

Yugoslavia who accept the partys programme and objectives. (Nominally,

therefore, those who were not Bosniacs were also invited to join the political

alliance, but the Serbs already had their own Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)

and the Croats their Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).)The principles

dealt with the procedures of the party and its aims and objectives. In brief,

the founders of the SDA called for elections, democratic rule, equality for all

the peoples of Yugoslavia and in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

for a polity based on human rights and freedom of belief. They made no

demands for the break-up of Yugoslavia, and though events were to move in

a different direction, it even seemed that they saw it as a desirable though not

necessary political framework. Of particular significance for gaining a fuller

picture of the political interests of the partys founders is Principle 7: Faced with the disregard for the national specificity of the Muslims of Bosnia

and Herzegovina and the consequent encroachment upon them, and rejecting

these aspirations as contrary not only to the historical facts but also to the

clearly expressed will of the (Muslim) nation, we hereby affirm that the

Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both those living in BiH and those

beyond its borders, are an indigenous Bosnian nation and, as such, constitute

one of the six historic peoples of Yugoslavia, with its own historical name, its

own land, its own history, its own culture, its own religion, its own poets and

writers in a word, its own past and future. The SDA will therefore seek to

revive the national consciousness of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina

and insist that the fact of their national identity be respected, with all its legal

and political consequences. Emphasizing the right of the BH Muslims to live

in this country under their own national name and as an indigenous people,

we acknowledge the same right equally, without no qualifications or

reservations, to the Serbs and the Croats, and to all the other nations and

peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, we affirm our particular

interest in the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the common state

40

of Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The SDA will therefore resolutely oppose

attempts to destabilize, partition or encroach upon Bosnia and Herzegovina,

regardless of the source of these and similar ideas. The Principles drew

particular attention to the right to absolute freedom of action of all religions

on Yugoslavia. The document ended with the signatures of each of the forty:

Alija Izetbegovi, LLB, Sarajevo; Muhamed engi, BSc. Eng, Sarajevo; Dr.

Maid Hadiomeragi, dentist, Sarajevo; Dr. Muhamed Hukovi, teacher,

Sarajevo; Edah Beirbegovi, attorney, Sarajevo; Dr. acir erimovi, chief

physician, Sarajevo; Salim abi, businessman, Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Sulejman

Maovi, Faculty of Special Education, Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Fehim Nametak,

scientist, Sarajevo; Salih Karavdi, attorney, Sarajevo; Fahira Fejzi,

journalist, Sarajevo; Dr. air engi, physician, Sarajevo; Edhem Tralji,

LLB, Sarajevo; Demaludin Lati, writer, Sarajevo; Omer Pobri, musician,

Sarajevo; Dr. Sead esti, scientist, Sarajevo; Dr. Tarik Mufti, chief

physician, Mostar; Safet Isovi, performing artist, Sarajevo; Dr. emso

Tankovi, senior lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Zagreb Mirsad Veladi,

MSc.Chem.Eng., Velika Kladua; Dr. Kemal Biaki, chief physician,

Sarajevo; Abdulah Skaka, artisan, Sarajevo; Omer Behmen, BSc.Civ.Eng.,

Sarajevo; efko Omerbai, chief imam, Zagreb; Dr. Mustafa Ceri, senior

lecturer, Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo; Dr. Sulejman amdi,

scientist, Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Lamija Hadiosmanovi, Faculty of the Humanities,

Sarajevo; Dr. Halid auevi, LLB., Sarajevo; Kemal Nani, BSc.Civ.Eng.,

Zagreb; Bakir Sadovi, student, Sarajevo; Faris Nani, student, Zagreb;

Nordin Smajlovi, student, Zagreb; Husein Huski, MSc. Mech.Eng., Zagreb;

Mirsad Srebrenkovi, LLB, Zagreb; Nedad Dumhur, BSc.Chem.Eng., Banja

Luka; Fehim Nuhbegovi, businessman, Zagreb; \ulko Zuni, businessman,

Zagreb; Prof. Dr. Almasa airbegovi, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine,

Sarajevo; Prof. Dr. Ahmed Brakovi, Faculty of Economics, Sarajevo. There was talk that the forty signatories might find themselves on the wrong

side of the law; yet things were changing, and the authorities no longer had

41

the strength for another major political trial. All that happened in reaction to

the formation of the SDA was that a series on the 1983 trial of Alija

Izetbegovi was launched in Osloboenje. The journalist who had reported

on the trial had retained the style that prevailed at that time: the same

accusations, the same way of faking them, as if nothing had happened in the

meantime. The hidden agenda of the series was to use the Izetbegovi case as

yet another way of showing what kind of political freaks were founding the

party. The authorities, who really did see the newly-emerging political actors

in this way, were convinced they would win the forthcoming elections, and

that these reminders of the reactionary plans of ex-cons and incorrigible

fanatics would merely increase their lead. They got it wrong, however. Time

would show that the people were sympathetic to the ex-cons, and were

increasingly ready to adopt their political aims as their own. Two months

after the press conference at the Holiday Inn, the Constituent Assembly of

the SDA was held at the same venue, in a packed hall, where euphoria swept

through all those present. As eye-witnesses report, the initial fear had been

replaced by defiance and resolve. The invitees included many distinguished

figures. The cameras focused in particular on Adil Zulfikarpai, a Bosnian

migr and cult figure who at the time was still living in Zrich, where he had

founded the Bosniac Institute and assembled some extremely valuable

documents on the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With others of like

mind, he had already been a signatory to a number of democratic initiatives

relating to the former Yugoslavia. He had considerable political experience,

and his presence served as a major incentive to other SDA members to

continue their political action. Izetbegovi had personally invited Zulfikarpai

to the constituent assembly. In Zrich the two had already discussed forming

the party, and had clashed over the term Muslim versus Bosniac: Zulfikarpai

held the view that the term Bosniac should be incorporated into the

programme document from the outset, while Izetbegovi agreed that the

term Muslim was not appropriate, but did not agree with the immediate use

42

of an alternative. He believed that the sudden introduction of the term

Bosniac could confuse people when the population census was carried out,

and wanted to leave the renaming of the nation for a later date, which was

done. In his Holiday Inn speech, Izetbegovi addressed the issue of possible

encroachments on Bosnian territory, saying, I am certain I rightly understand

the deepest sentiments of the Muslim people when I say that they will not

allow Bosnia to be dismembered. The shameful Cvetkovi-Maek agreement

to partition this country is dead and gone, and the force being born in this

hall today is the guarantee of that. These words were met with a burst of

applause.

43

44

the election campaign

45

T he constitution of the SDA created the formal prerequisites for joining the race to win power. Branches sprang up all over the place. Particularly memorable was a rally in Banja Luka attended by about 20,000 people, at which a speech by Academician Prof. Dr. Muhamed

Filipovi, a native of that part of the world, was especially well received. Izetbegovis visit to the US was memorable for his meeting with Nijaz Batlak,

nicknamed Daida, who introduced himself as a Croat of the Islamic faith.

He asked Alija if the Bosniacs were making preparations for war, and chillingly

foretold the slaughter of Bosniacs in the Drina valley. Daida was later to

play a controversial part in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SDAs

largest election rallies were in Foa, Novi Pazar and Velika Kladua, with

Foa the most emotional and Velika Kladua the most impressive. There,

on 15 September 1990, about 200,000 people came to hear Izetbegovi give

a speech in which he was quite explicit: Bosnia and Herzegovina as a civil

republic is what the Muslim people want: not Islamic, not socialist, but civil.

Vigorous demands for independence were already being made in Slovenia

and Croatia, prompting the leader of the SDA to emphasize that the Bosniacs

would not agree to remain part of Greater Serbia. He was quite direct:

If necessary, the Muslims will take up arms to defend Bosnia. The speech

he made at this rally will be remembered as the first time Izetbegovi spoke

of arms as a possible alternative. Perhaps even he himself did not believe

that the armed conflict he spoke of was soon to become a reality. Three days after the Kladua rally, Zulfikarpai and Filipovi tried to overthrow

the SDA leadership. They were unhappy with the iconography of the

rallies, and believed that the party was moving towards religious radicalism.

Izetbegovi emerged as victor, his position as leader consolidated, leaving his

two opponents to form their own party, the Muslim Bosniac Organization

(MBO). Meanwhile, the leader of the SDA was getting to know, one by

one, the main political actors in the Yugoslav crisis. When he arrived in

Zagreb, Stipe Mesi, whom he also met at that time, invited him to a meeting

46

with Tuman. Unlike Tuman, whom he did not take to, Izetbegovi liked

Mesi, and despite all the turbulent events that followed, their sincere

friendship lasted until Izetbegovis death. At their very first meeting, to

Izetbegovis horror, Tuman showed a complete lack of tact when he said,

Mr. Izetbegovi, dont create a Muslim party, thats quite the wrong thing,

because the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina are one people.

The Muslims and the Croats both feel that way. He resorted to what were

ostensibly historical arguments in support of this claim. After Izetbegovi had

heard him out with no great enthusiasm, Tuman predicted electoral defeat

for the SDA: The HDZ will get seventy percent of the vote, because it will

get all the Croat and the Muslim votes, he claimed. Izetbegovi responded

by saying that he respected his interlocutors knowledge of history, but that

he himself was somewhat better acquainted with the Bosnia of today, and

that the HDZ would get exactly 17 percent of the vote, corresponding to

the number of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was exactly what

happened at the 1990 November elections: the HDZ gained the 17 percent

of the vote represented by the Croats. But Izetbegovi returned from Zagreb

with a bitter taste in his mouth. It was the start of the unconcealed antipathy

between the two men.

47

48

election victory

49

T he elections were held on 18 November 1990. The SDA won 86 of the 240 seats in the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while three of the seven-member Presidency members were SDA candidates. The clear winner among these three was Fikret Abdi, with 1.2 million votes; Izetbegovi won 870,000 votes. Abdi was helped by the popularity he had gained as the founder of Agrokomerc and a victim of the 1986-1987 promissory notes affair. His image was of a successful businessman, unencumbered by national affiliation or nationalism, which was good reason to believe that he received some Serb and Croat votes as well. Despite this, political agreement was reached and Abdi conceded the post of chair of the Presidency to Alija Izetbegovi. Regrettably, the clash that was smouldering between these two politicians, with their different ideas, and also their different vanities and temperaments, was to culminate during the war that broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Abdi returned to Velika Kladua and raised his own army, which was to join forces with the Croatian Serb army, continuing to fight the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the last. As it turned out, Slobodan Miloevi and Radovan Karadi were able, thanks to Abdi, to achieve one of their strategic goals: a rift between different groups of Bosniacs. The inter-Bosniac conflict in the Krajina (the old Military Frontier region) was to exacerbate the misfortunes of the Bosniacs to unimaginable proportions. Following the elections and the investiture of the members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a government was formed from a coalition between the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ. The parties opposing interests, however, resulted in a dysfunctional government. Karadis SDS wanted the country at all costs to remain part of rump Yugoslavia, without Croatia and Slovenia, which in any case were an obstacle to his visions of Greater Serbia. The HDZ, under the influence of Dr. Franjo Tuman, was increasingly inclined towards the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite this, Izetbegovi worked with these parties in an attempt to achieve some kind of (multi-) national consensus, but without success; the clashes grew more and more bitter, the clamour of arms became ever louder, and the skies over Yugoslavia steadily darkened.

50

Failure oF talks onthe preservation oF yugoslavia

51

I n early January 1991 the newly-elected member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina began attending meetings of the enlarged Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting not only of its own members but also the presidents of the republics, and also

attended by the federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovi, and the Defence

Minister, Veljko Kadijevi. Fruitless attempts were made to reach consensus

on the future of Yugoslavia. In despair, the Macedonian and Bosnian

presidents, Kiro Gligorov and Alija Izetbegovi, tabled a proposal for a graded

federation, as a compromise between the options proposed by Slovenia and

Croatia on the one hand, and Serbia on the other. Though clearly made with

the best of intentions, the initiative came to nothing, and barricades began

going up in the regions of Croatia inhabited by Serbs. Assisted by armed

locals, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) followed Slobodan Miloevis

orders and surrounded the area they claimed as a Serb Autonomous Region,

a model later to be transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the spring of 1991 the SDS was creating Serb Autonomous Regions by force, as facts on

the ground. Military sources reveal that the JNA distributed 51,900 items

of infantry arms to the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991, to which

should be added another 17,300 rifles distributed by the SDS through its own

channels which again means the JNA according to intelligence sources.

It was clear that Karadi was attempting, in the absence of arguments, to

strengthen his negotiating position by force of arms. Meanwhile, Izetbegovi was acquiring his first experiences as an international statesman. In March

1991 he travelled to Austria, where he met Kurt Waldheim, then president

of Austria. It was Izetbegovis first official foreign visit. Waldheim had his

own major problems at the time, his Nazi past having been revealed. Even

so, Izetbegovi decided to go to Austria, a country of great importance for

the fledging Bosnian diplomacy. Later, Austrias Foreign Minister, Dr. Alois

Mock, was to receive the order of Zmaj od Bosne (Dragon of Bosnia) from

Izetbegovi, in recognition of all that his country had done for Bosnia and

52

Herzegovina. Visits to Iran and Turkey followed. The reception he received in Tehran was far beyond what Izetbegovi had expected: he was met at the

airport with a guard of honour of three branches of the Iranian army, every

one of the countrys highest-ranking officials, and a line of fifty diplomats.

For a man who had until recently been a traitor to the regime, this was a

considerable shock, and he was not sure he had been at his best during

that first reception. It is well known, however, that Iran would later play a

crucial part in arming the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in deliberate

defiance of the unjust arms embargo imposed on the country. His visit to the United States left Izetbegovi disappointed by the lack of understanding

of the Yugoslav crisis, and under the impression that the USA would not

do anything. As part of the diplomatic offensive, he also went to Rome to

attend a meeting of European Community countries, at which a Declaration

on Yugoslavia was adopted. While all this was going on, Miloevi, Tuman and Izetbegovi also met a number of times in the summer of 1991 to try to

find a way out of the crisis. The heads of state of Serbia and Croatia tried

to persuade the Bosnian to agree to some kind of three-way partition, but

Izetbegovi responded with the proposals he and Gligorov had put forward.

On his return from Split, where he had attended one of these meetings, he

was asked by a journalist to comment on the speculations about the partition

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which he replied, For me, that is non-

negotiable.

53

54

Karadis threats

55

T he brief war in Slovenia broke out on 17 June 1991, the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia under fire. It began with the secession of this small state, with a population of two million, from which the conflict soon spread to Croatia. There the police clashed with the JNA,

culminating in the siege of Vukovar and the shelling of Dubrovnik. The top

Serb echelons stormed their way through Croatia, on the crest of a wave of

enthusiasm illustrated by two remarks made by their leader, Jovan Rakovi:

The Serbs are a crazy people and, Stepping on Serb meadows, you can

get from Knin to Belgrade. Izetbegovi held to the view that Bosnia and Herzegovina would not remain in a rump Yugoslavia, without Slovenia and

Croatia, for it would no longer be Yugoslavia: it would be Greater Serbia.

He had the support not only of his own party, but also of most middle-class

intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Karadis response was his famous

parliamentary speech in which he threatened: Dont think you wont lead

Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell, and the Muslim nation perhaps to extinction,

speaking not only to parliament but also to the camera, and to a horrified

public. Izetbegovi reacted immediately. Karadis speech and its message

are the best possible explanation why we may not remain in Yugoslavia. No

one will want the kind of Yugoslavia that Mr. Karadi wants no one except

the Serbs. The clamour of arms could be heard everywhere, and under Izetbegovis leadership, the SDA decided to set up a National Defence

Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina, from which the Patriotic League would

later emerge, the first military formation created to defend the country. This

was on 10 June 1991. Though poorly armed, the Patriotic League would itself

later become the pattern for the organization of the Army of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, the official army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another sign of resistance was the decision, put forward by Izetbegovi and

adopted by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to send military

recruits to Croatia. It was on this occasion that he appeared on Sarajevo

Television to appeal to his people not to respond to the call-up, uttering the

56

famous (and controversial) words: Remember, this is not our war. Later these words would be reinterpreted to suit Tumans regime as meaning that

the Croatian struggle for independence was not Izetbegovis war, when he

really meant the very opposite. One of the manoeuvres with which attempts were made to prevent the war spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina was the

Serb-Muslim Accord engineered by Zulfikarpai and Filipovi. Armed

with Izetbegovis agreement, the two of them went to Belgrade for talks with

Miloevi, but the results were slim; the agreement was used to set up rump

Yugoslavia through the back door and for the Bosniacs, that simply meant

Greater Serbia. Nonetheless, this unsuccessful accord was yet another sign

of good will on the part of the Bosnians to prevent the war into which the

country was hurtling at breakneck speed. A conference on Yugoslavia was

held in The Hague in early November, but ended in total fiasco; it was now

obvious that war was inevitable. Still hoping for a miracle that might avert it,

Izetbegovi suggested that the European Community send a good will mission

to Bosnia and asked the UN to send blue helmets to prevent the conflict

already breaking out around the Bosnian borders from escalating. This was the atmosphere in which the SDAs first Congress was held on 1 December

1991. The three-day congress was attended by 600 delegates and as many

guests, to whom Izetbegovi described the situation in his speech. Though

he, of all key participants, least wanted war, it seemed to him that it was

now inevitable, and he predicted an all-out war in which everything would

disappear in smoke and infamy. The international media would later often

quote these prophetic words.

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58

the reFerenDum

59

O n 14 January 1992 the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a Resolution on Sovereignty, opposed by the countrys Serbs, and preparations were made to hold a referendum on the question Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and

Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs, Croats

and others who live in it? Commenting on the SDS boycott following the

announcement of the referendum, Izetbegovi said, They (the SDS) have

blocked the adoption of a new constitution as proposed by the Constitution

Drafting Committee, and constantly accuse us of wanting a Muslim republic.

The fact is, though, that with their proposal to partition the country into

a Serb, a Croat and a Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina, they are the ones

seeking to impose it on us. Our position is clear: we will not accept it. The

referendum was to be held on 29 February and 1 March 1992, with the

Croat electorates response still an unknown quantity. After calculating the

odds, Tuman gave the all-clear, and 63 percent of the population voted, 99

percent of whom voted in favour of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The countrys future was decided, in the legal sense at least; but its actual

fate would soon be decided on the battlefield. Yet what the referendum had

achieved was something no military victory could bring: the legality and

legitimacy of official power. The EC recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as

an independent state on 6 April 1992, followed the next day by the United

States. Meanwhile, under European patronage, there were on-going talks on

the partition of the country. At the February talks in Lisbon, Izetbegovi

was joined by Dr. Haris Silajdi, whose powerful presence helped greatly to

ensure that the breakneck speed with which things were going downhill was

slowed at least a little. The positive features of the Lisbon proposals, in their

view, was that they envisaged the continuation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

within its administrative boundaries, but the negative side was the reference

to several possible entities. Izetbegovi was to write in his diary that he

had sought with all means in his power to save Bosnia and peace, while

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wondering if it was even possible. As things turned out, it was not; the day

was fast approaching when the choice had to be made between them. All-

out war broke out in April 1992. Izetbegovi, now 67 years old, was faced

with huge new challenges and, though he was not yet aware of it, with the

most turbulent period of his life.

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62

the outbreak oF war

63

O n 2 May Izetbegovi was on his way back from the Lisbon talks, together with his daughter Sabina, Dr. Zlatko Lagumdija (at the time deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Nurudin Imamovi, his personal bodyguard, when he was captured by the

JNA at Sarajevo airport. After a sleepless night and dramatic negotiations,

it was agreed that UNPROFOR would escort them into the besieged city.

This was just the beginning of the four-year war with Alija Izetbegovi at its

very heart. He himself said that there was widespread fear of the Chetniks

and that the psychological framework had been dismantled. And so it was:

once battle commenced, the fear evaporated, to be replaced by defiance. As

the fighting wore on, its cost in blood kept mounting. Izetbegovi often asked

himself if the conflict could somehow have been prevented. He answered his

own question in one of his diary entries: Until Slovenia and Croatia seceded,

yes, it could; after that, no. Or rather it could have, but only at the cost of

capitulation. And slavery is the worst possible solution, worse than war. He

was to repeat, again and again, that freedom was the supreme goal in life. Despite the open fighting all over Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was not until

20 June 1992 that the Presidency declared a state of war. This was followed

by its Manifesto appealing for active involvement in the patriotic front of

the struggle against aggression. A war government was appointed, headed

by Jure Pelivan, and charged with the existential issues of a country under

attack. Dr. Haris Silajdi was appointed as Foreign Minister, and the other

members of the government were Jusuf Puina, Jerko Doko, Ranko Nikoli,

arko Primorac, Rusmir Mahmutehaji, Alija Delimustafi, Radovan

Mirkovi, Hasan Muratovi, Tomislav Krstievi, Ugljea Uzelac, Munir

Jahi, Mustafa Beganovi, Nikola Kova, Martin Ragu and Miljenko Brki.

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the problem oF arming the bih army

65

B it by bit, in almost impossibly difficult circumstances, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina came into being. The main problem was the lack of arms, and the arms embargo for the former Yugoslavia proclaimed by the UN Security Council rubbed salt into the wound. The

Bosnian government repeatedly pointed out the absurdity of this resolution:

the aggressors already had more arms than they could use, so that the

embargo affected only the victims. Despite this, the Army was being armed,

to some extent at least. The full details will probably never be known, but

the embargo was breached on several occasions with the tacit agreement of

certain western governments, including the US. A key arms delivery was a

shipload from Iran which docked in the port of Ploe, whereupon Tuman

ordered that half the arms be immediately unloaded for the Croatian Army;

still more were lost when, on the way to central Bosnia, the Croatian Defence

Council relieved the load of another 25 percent. Despite being drastically

reduced, this quantity of arms was crucial to the defence of certain stretches of

the front. The arming of the Bosnian military is in fact a thrilling story of its

peoples courage, persistence and ingenuity. As Alija Izetbegovi described it

for Stern, the German newspaper, towards the end of the war, Two processes

evolved side by side from the start of the war. We were becoming stronger

day by day, and they were becoming weaker. They did not form a straight

line on the graph, nor did they proceed at the same speed, but the general

trend was as I have just described it. Our infantry has been better than theirs

for a long time. Or, to put it another way, our handicap was heavy weapons,

artillery; theirs was the infantry. There will be more unpleasant surprises

for us and for them, but overall we have reached a state of equilibrium and

taken the initiative. The equilibrium is strategic in nature, while for now

the initiative is merely tactical. How can one explain our successes in Biha,

Kupres, Sarajevo? There are numerous factors, but the most important one

of all, the question of morale, does not lend itself to analysis. Our people

have the single-minded inner resolve to survive, a nation that had been

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condemned to death. Alija Izetbegovi, that seemingly fragile man with

such deep religious sentiments, had so many things to deal with during the

war in Bosnia, as this passage from his biography vividly illustrates, in his own

words: The need for arms led us into all kinds of adventures. Once when

I was in Brussels, I dont remember the date, I was told that certain people

had offered to procure arms for us with which we could effectively target

Karadis troops holding Sarajevo under siege. They would supply us with

two special armoured helicopters and some missiles. It was a very attractive

offer, for we had already been trapped for more than 500 days, exposed to

random mortar and sniper fire day and night. There seemed no end to our

misfortunes. When I received them, these unknown people offered to land

helicopters with precision missiles on Mt Igman and the Zenica Stadium

on a given night. There were two of them, of rather innocuous appearance.

They did not introduce themselves, saying only that they were from South

Africa and that they operated world-wide. They laid down two conditions:

first, they wanted cash, to be paid the moment our people confirmed that

the helicopters had landed at the agreed sites; and second, that before

delivery we agree to their taking one of our men as hostage to an unidentified

location, as a guarantee that we wouldnt trick them. They suggested that

the entire business be conducted at one of our embassies in Europe, and that

the hostage be our charg daffaires there. After much haggling, we agreed

to their first condition but not to the second. They then said the money

should be brought in and handed over the moment our people confirmed that

the consignment had reached its destination. Arms dealers, along with drugs

mafiosi, are some of the most unscrupulous and dangerous people, ready for

anything to acquire their illicit gains. But if you wanted arms, they were the

only people you could buy them from. We told our connection in Istanbul to

procure the money and courier it to our embassy in this European city. The

dealers arrived at the agreed time, saying that the operation was ready to go

and that the helicopters, which were to take off from a base in Italy, could be

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over the destination in Bosnia at around midnight. Our charg daffaires and

our courier, complete with the cash, were sitting in one corner of the room,

the dealers in another. I dont know who was more scared: our people of them,

or they of us. Our people were afraid, naturally enough, that the dealers, in

typical gangster style, would go for them and grab the cash; guns cocked, they

were on high alert. Just in case, the dealers were told that guards had been

posted in the corridors and at the entrance to the embassy. The dealers kept

calling someone on their mobiles. Our man later told me, Eleven oclock

struck, then midnight, then one, two, three. We stared unblinkingly at each

other, watching every move. About dawn, they asked permission to leave

the room to check, saying something was wrong. They left, and never came

back. It remains a mystery whether they were really arms dealers whose

operation failed as a result of some unforeseen developments, or just con

men trying to get hold of some easy money. Be that as it may, General Deli

in Zenica and a group of officers waited in vain beside burning fires, waiting

from a miracle from heaven; but the miracle never came. I too had a sleepless

night, sitting up by the telephone.

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the grabovica investigation

69

A s the Bosnian war dragged on year after year, the hastily mustered patriotic troops grew into an organized army with its own rules. The nearest and dearest of many combatants suffered a terrible fate: deportation, injury, rape, murder... In some of the places where Bosniacs

were massacred, entire families were wiped out. These traumatic events filled

people with anger at the enemy, and in some cases their rage gave rise to

the desire for revenge. One can understand their mental state, but a proper

army cannot be ruled by emotion; it was vital to prevent retaliation from

becoming the norm. The only person who seemed able to do this was Alija

Izetbegovi, whose authority was unquestioned among the troops, and that

is what he tried to do. He seized every opportunity not only to encourage the

men to keep on fighting, but also to make them aware of the moral aspect

of the Bosnian struggle. He insisted that they refrain from killing civilians

and from damaging or destroying Orthodox and Catholic places of worship.

When he was told by David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, in August

1993, that BiH Army troops had committed atrocities against Croat civilians

in the village of Doljani near Jablanica, Izetbegovi wrote to General Rasim

Deli asking him to take immediate action: A few days ago I asked over

the telephone for an investigation into accusations by the HVO (Croat

Defence Council) that a unit of our troops had committed an atrocity by

massacring a number of civilians of Croat nationality in the village of

Doljani near Jablanica. I have not yet received a report on the matter, and

it is important you inform me of the results of the investigation and let it

be known publicly. Use every opportunity to warn our men that they must

uphold the laws of war. Do not hesitate to punish the offenders severely, and

do not hesitate to let it be known publicly. Despite these warnings, some

BiH Army troops undoubtedly committed atrocities against Serb and Croat

civilians. One known case is that of the village of Grabovica in Herzegovina,

where members of the Bosnian army killed 27 Croat civilians. Izetbegovi

ordered an immediate inquiry into the case, and promptly forwarded the

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documents on the atrocity to The Hague, via a factotum. This horrific

case notwithstanding, the balance sheet of casualties of war reveal that

such things were not widespread, but tragic exceptions. Unlike the Serb

army, with its built-in genocidal plan, and the HVO, which in its own way

acted to create homogeneous ethnic territories by expelling non-Croats, the

Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully preserved the image of an army

that refrained, despite the indescribably difficult circumstances, from mass

executions, arson and looting. The model was simple: the respective armies

reflected the official policies on behalf of which they are waging war, and the

official policy of the authorities in Sarajevo was a multiethnic state based

on civil and human rights. In year one of the war, the Army of Bosnia

and Herzegovina was without doubt a multiethnic army with a number of

extremely competent and experienced non-Bosniac generals, most notably

former JNA officers Stjepan iber, a Bosnian Croat, and Jovan Divjak, a

Serb. They greatly enhanced the Bosnian armys multiethnic credentials,

which was one of the ideals of Bosnias patriots. But as the war progressed,

and in particular once the conflict with the HVO broke out, the number

of non-Bosniacs in the BiH Army dwindled, and the number of units with

a Muslim prefix grew. It is hard to judge objectively, without the necessary

historical distance, how far the loss of non-Bosniacs from the Army could

have been prevented and the tendency to turn a multinational army into

a mononational one could have been halted; and still harder to reach an

unambiguous conclusion concerning Izetbegovis role in the process. Still,

the fact remains that by the end of the war in 1995, the Army of Bosnia and

Herzegovina was almost entirely Bosniac. It should also be recalled, however,

that mononational or not, it resolutely defended multinational, universal

principles. Throughout the four years of war Izetbegovi, though supreme

commander, was himself in almost