Beyond Traditional International Relations: Discontent in authoritarian states. Presented at ISA 2015, New Orleans. Open for comments and suggestions

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BEYOND TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: DISCONTENT IN AUTHORITARIAN STATES

The stir in Tunisia, that later swept across the Arab world, led to awe and shock for the rest of

the world. Social scientists and analysts, from within the region and outside, had failed to

predict the coming of this change. Today, while some states are undergoing transition, others

are still in a state of upheaval. Furthermore, none of the mainstream International Relations

Theory could explain what went wrong. Why? Firstly, because the nature and character of every

Arab world state was distinct; and secondly, IR scholarly focus centered around states'

interaction with the rest rather than domestic concerns specific to area studies. While scholars

have used many variables to explain the ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon, this paper, while going

beyond traditional IR concerns, will look into how there is a causal linkage between low political

opportunities, especially in authoritarian state structure, and discontent in societies leading to

uprisings.

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INTRODUCTION

On 18 December 2010, street protest started in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, after the self-immolation of

Mohamed Bouzizi. On 17 December 2010, Bouzizi, a street vegetable vendor, was threatened by

a Tunisian policewoman and his ‗unlicensed‘ cart, along with his goods, was impounded. He

tried to pay off a fine in order to get his only means of livelihood back but was instead

humiliated, threatened and abused by the police. He then rushed to the Governor‘s office to file a

complaint. Faced with no response, Bouzizi poured fuel, in front of the building, and set himself

on fire.

This abuse of power by those in position of power was, more or less, a prototype of what was

going on throughout the Arab world. The incident had a ‗demonstrative effect‘1for the rest of the

Arab world states with people taking to the streets with their demands for a life of dignity and

freedom. This phenomenon was termed as ―Arab Spring‖, ―Arab Uprising‖, ―Arab Awakening‖,

―Arab Revolution‖2or what Mustapha-Sayyid calls as ―Dignity Revolt‖. The result of this

uprising was widespread causalities, removal of incumbent leaders in some states and a

continued struggle in others.

This struggle was not easy for people of the Arab world, who, for decades, did not engage in

public dissent due to the perceived danger and doubt over its ability to produce substantive

outcomes. Over the years, people had started to show signs of discontent and dissatisfaction with

the state of affairs in these countries. Ignorance and denial to address the concerns led to growing

1The term has been used by many authors to describe the Arab Spring phenomenon. For more visit: Rugh A.

William (2011), “Evidence and limits of the “demonstration effect” in the Middle East”, 7 March, Whirled View, Accessed on 27 January 2015, URL: http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2011/03/evidence-and-limits-of-the-demonstration-effect-in-the-middle-east.html#sthash.H18H5db9.dpuf; Murphy, Dan (2011),“Egypt protests and the demonstration effect of Tunisia: Shouts of 'Tunis' and 'down with Mubarak' at Egypt protests”, The Christian Science Monitor”, Accessed on 27 January 2015, URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0125/Egypt-protests-and-the-demonstration-effect-of-Tunisia

2 All the terms mentioned are used in the literature on the topic interchangeably but to indentify the same

phenomenon. Throughout this paper, for the purpose of convenience and uniformity, I will be using the term “Arab Spring”.

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disillusionment with regime and people began to demand a change of leadership. The

incumbents, however, did not want power to slip from their hands. The structure of the state also

favoured the incumbents. However, in the year 2011, many ‗defied this calculus‘ (Wendy, 2013:

388).

Going beyond traditional International Relations concerns, this paper is an attempt to understand

the phenomenon by way of linking low political opportunities to rising discontent in society that

led to uprising. In this paper, discontent is used as a dependent variable and low political

opportunity as an independent variable. To do this, I have, categorised the five states that

witnessed Arab uprising, into various regime types by using Freedom House data. I have then

picked two case studies- Egypt and Libya- to show structural constraints in each that inhibited

political opportunity and allowed change. To explain political opportunity, I have used the

concept of political participation as defined by Verba and Nie, who have defined it as ―those acts

by private citizens, that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of

governmental personnel and/or the actions they take‖ (Salisbury 1975). In the following section,

I have tried to show causal linkage between low or lack of participation leading to simmering

discontent by way of drawing from previous literature present on discontent. Here, I have also

tried to underscore how literature on discontent has neglected structural constraints as a variable

to explain rising frustration in the masses by way of highlighting the situation in Egypt and

Libya.

CLASSIFICATION OF REGIME TYPE IN THE ARAB WORLD

Huntington, in his Democracy‘s Third Wave, identifies two analytical concerns to democratic

transition- one is institutional, calling for free, competitive, fair elections and accountability from

the side of the leader and the other one is political culture, which is citizen‘s attitude and values

(Huntington 1992).In the post-Cold War era, there emerged many regimes that held multiparty

elections with adult franchise. However, failure to democratise completely into liberal forms of

democracy led to the appearance of authoritarian states with ‗democratic‘ streaks breaking down

the typological classification of states with outlier regime types (Gilbert 2011). The Arab World

was not alien to this pressure and various regime types emerged in this part of the world too. A

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lot of work has been done on classification of regimes into different categories. The

categorisation made, with methodological innovation, brought forth thereafter, led to confusion.

Collier and Levitsky (1997) kept democracy as the focal point and then tried to move up and

down the ladder of conceptual categorisation identifying civilian regime, competitive regime,

electoral regime, parliamentary democracy, two-party democracy and federal democracy as some

of the variations. This was then countered by scholars who used authoritarianism as the focal

point and studied variations around it and the resultant mixture was one that consisted of

Competitive Authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002), Electoral Authoritarianism (Diamond

2002; Schedler 2002) and Semi-Authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003). The period in between saw

the emergence of what Terry Karl (1995) termed as Hybrid regimes.

For the purpose of uniformity, in this paper, I have classified five3 Arab states. The classification

done by the Freedom House is of two kinds- one where they classify regime types on the basis of

democracy score (mostly used for democratic transition states) and second in which they assign

scores to Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) to identify states as free, partly free and

not free ( as shown in Category I table). The average of both PR and CL for those five years has

been calculated. Then I take the average of both (PR and CL) to calculate the Freedom Rating

(FR). The FR is what I have used to classify these states into Category I regime types (on the

basis of their scores). Both the categories were important to be used since, as mentioned above,

states in the few Arab states were outliers.

3 These five Arab states have been chosen on the basis of highest number of fatalities in each between December

2010 and December 2011.

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CATEGORY I

The Freedom House4* methodologically classifies regimes on into five broad categories-

DEMOCARCY SCORE REGIME TYPE

1-2 Consolidated Democracy

3 Semi-Consolidated Democracy

4 Transitional Government or Hybrid Regimes

5 Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

6-7 Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

*Freedom House Nations in Transit, 2010

CATEGORY II

There is another classification performed by the Freedom House5 that assigns the status of Free,

Partly Free and Not Free to states. Following is the break-down of the scores and status.

SCORE STATUS

1.0-2.5 Free

3.0-5.0 Partly Free

5.5-7.0 Not Free

4This classification takes into account the general working condition of institutions to gather information about its

democratic well- being. The determining variables are: electoral process; civil society; independent media;

governance; constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework; and corruption. For a detailed review on the

methodology of classification followed by the Freedom House refer www.freedomhouse.org . For this paper, I have

used Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010 report. This method is used mostly to assess the Central Europe and

Eurasia states. 5 This classification is done more broadly on the basis of Political Rights and Civil Liberties wherein the

questionnaire consists of 10 political rights and 15 civil liberties questions. This classification is more on the basis of

deviations from what Freedom House characterises as ―Electoral Democracy‖. For a detailed review of methodology

refer to www.freedomhouse.org . For this paper, I have used Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010 Report.

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*Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2010

CATEGORISATION OF REGIME TYPE ON THE BASIS OF FREEDOM HOUSE

CLASSIFICATION (USING CATEGORY I AND II)

COUNTRY 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 AVERAGE AVERAGE FREEDOM RATING

REGIME TYPE

LIBYA(PR) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

LIBYA (CL) 7 7 7 7 7 7

SYRIA(PR) 7 7 7 7 7 7

6.7

Consolidated Authoritarian Regime SYRIA(CL) 6 6.5 6.5 6 7 6.4

EGYPT(PR) 6 6 6 6 6 6

5.5

Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

EGYPT(CL) 5 5 5 5 5 5

TUNISIA(PR) 7 7 7 6 6 6.6

5.8

Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

TUNISIA(CL) 5 5 5 5 5 5

YEMEN(PR) 6 5 5 5 5 5.2

5.1

Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

YEMEN(CL) 5 5 5 5 5 5

For the current paper I have chosen two cases- Egypt and Libya. The rationale for choosing these

states is, first, to be able to analyse a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime and a consolidated

authoritarian regime and second, because these two states witnessed the highest number of

causalities, among the five other Arab states that witnessed high causalities, between December

2010 and 2011. I have chosen not to include Syria since it is still in a state of turmoil.

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EGYPT AND LIBYA

Political participation, here, is defined as the ‗intent or effect of influencing government action –

either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or, indirectly, by

influencing the selection of people who make those policies‘ (Verba et al., 1995). Electoral

participation, thereby, is the most essential form of participation in political life, like in case of a

democracy. However, Egypt is a Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime that Freedom House

defines as:

―While national elections may be held at regular intervals and contested by opposition parties

and candidates, they are marred by irregularities and deemed undemocratic by international

observers. Public resources and state employees are used to guarantee incumbent victories.

Political power may change hands, yet turnovers in the executive are well orchestrated and may

fail to reflect voter preferences.”6

And Libya is a Consolidated Authoritarian Regime that is defined by Freedom House as:

“Elections serve to reinforce the rule of dictators who enjoy unlimited authority for prolonged

periods of time. Pro-governmental parties and candidates dominate elections, while an

independent opposition is typically barred from seeking office. Rotations of executive power are

unlikely, absent, death or revolution.”7

Case of Egypt: Egypt was a semi-authoritarian regime where elections for various offices were

conducted at three levels - Presidential, Parliamentary and Shura Council8. However, Presidents

have remained the main source of policy making and ideology transformation and had the power

6 For more details refer to www.freedomhouse.org , URL: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-

2010/methodology#.VNhQfeEwCGY 7 For more details refer to www.freedomhouse.org , URL: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-

2010/methodology#.VNhQfeEwCGY 8 Otherwise known as the Consultative Council or the Lower House of the Parliament (bi-cameral parliamentary

system).

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to change ‗the rules of the game‘ at their will (Hinnebusch, 1981) even though reforms were

made to include competing parties to run for Parliamentary elections and multi-candidate

Presidential elections were allowed in the year 2005.

Historically, the structure of Egypt altered after the President Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a

coup, in 1952, along with his Free Officers Group, to remove King Farouk. His rule was

characterised by power in the hands of a charismatic leader and the military presiding over an

authoritarian, bureaucratic state attempting to impose a revolution from above and redistribute

power from upper class elites to middle and lower classes (Hinnebusch, 1981). Likewise, the

state structure under Anwaral Sadat (28 September 1970), Nasser‘s successor, remained close to

what it was under Nasser with the President overruling above- judiciary, legislature and a

submissive bureaucracy. It is important to mention that Sadat had worked closely with Nasser in

his dominant National Democratic Party by being the Minister of State (1954), the President of

the National Assembly (1960 to 1964), the Vice President and the member of the Presidential

council in 1964. During his Presidency, he brought in some political reforms, like a move

towards multi-party Egypt and allowing other parties to run election in the Parliament. However,

as soon as a counter elite force, with a distinct ideology, began to assert itself, Sadat cracked

down on them in 1978 (Hinnebusch, 1981). After the assassination of President Sadat, Hosni

Mubarak took office as on 13 October 1981.

Changes under Mubarak‘s regime, too, remained top-to-bottom and never the other way round,

more so in the post 1990s period with increased international pressure to democratise. In 1984

elections, he allowed the New Wafd Party to run and it appeared as if he was continuing Sadat‘s

plan of allowing multi-parties to run for elections even though certain senior members in the

NDP expressed their dismissal. However, in subsequent elections in 1990, 1993 and 1999, NDP

won all the majority votes. Mubarak, in a move to make space for his son Gamal Mubarak to

successfully succeed him, had realized the need to amend the Constitution to allow for multi-

party and, more importantly, multi-candidate elections. Thus, he set his agenda beginning with

the amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution (Amrani 2012) to allow multi candidates to run

for 2005 Presidential elections. In this regard, he also released political prisoners like Ayman

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Nour of the Al-Ghad party and the Muslim Brotherhood. But the skewed pattern of election

results (shown in the next section) proved how these changes were merely superficial.

CASE OF LIBYA: Muammar-al-Gaddafi, and his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),

seized power in Libya after overthrowing King Idris in a coup in 1969. Under Gaddafi, a staunch

anti-imperialist, anti- Zionist and Arab Nationalist leader, Libya never witnessed elections.

Gaddafi, initially, tried to follow the footsteps of Nasser, but eventually he came up with his own

brand of socialism, ‗natural socialism‘, and declared himself as the Colonel. Alongside, RCC

assumed all legislative and executive powers and functions and reserved its supreme authority in

all aspects of governance (Qaddafi 1973a). Though people were welcoming the change and the

RCC portrayed themselves as the mirror of the people of Libya, there were various problems

with the RCC, like the prohibition of the formation of autonomous political groups or

organizations.

In the post 1969 revolution period, Gaddafi gained legitimacy through his symbolic acts of

national independence. In a speech given by Gaddafi in Zuwarah, he referred to upholding the

tenets of the revolution and stridently spoke of the means to achieving this by way of ‗eliminate

law‘, ‗removal of all elements of opposition‘, and ‗burning of imported books‘ (Mezran et al,

2007). In a way, he set the tone for his authoritarian ways.

He was extremely doubtful of any form of dissent that could potentially threaten his position. He

would dissolve established institution if he found them attempting to conspire or if he felt

dissatisfied with their functioning. For instance, in a move to emulate Nasser‘s Liberation Rally,

in 1971, Gaddafi had formed the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). ASU was to remain under the

control of the RCC and, together, they were supposed to increase public participation by way of

creating new roles and an attitude that supported modernisation (El-Fathaly and Chackerian,

1977). However, Gaddafi soon became dissatisfied with the working of the ASU as conflicts

began to arise (Alexander 1981) due to the way in which it had started to work as parallel

machinery to the one already established by the RCC. He, likewise, re-shuffled the RCC after he

sensed conspiracy in the armed forces (Vanderwalle, 1986) with only 5 out of 12 members

remaining (St. John 2011; Vanderwalle 1986).

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After the dissolution of the RCC, between the years 1976 and 1978 he wrote three volumes of his

Green Book enunciating his 'instruments of governing' in his 'Third Universal Theory' to revamp

the entire system. To him democracies prevailing in other parts of the world were dictatorial

systems and he set out to establish his Jamahirriyya system that he referred to as a true

democratic system. He declared the creation of a General People's Congress, affirming himself

as its General Secretary. The function of this body was to meet annually and discuss the policies,

plans, and programs of the RCC and to discuss and ratify programmes developed at the lower

level (Qaddafi 1976; El Fathaly and Chakerian 1977).

LIBYAN JAMAHIRRIYAA STRUCTURE

The Basic Peoples' Congress was represented as a kind of parliament for local groupings.

Members of this group then were represented in the Peoples' General Congress. Secretaries and

deputies of both the Basic Peoples' Congress and the Peoples' Congress for Municipality formed

a General Popular Committee (GPC), what was called the Council of Ministers in other places,

which formed the Peoples' General Congress at the National level. Theoretically, the People's

Committee was answerable to the People's Congress and members of the People's committees

could be removed. At times, if there was a real issue at hand, Gaddafi himself would interfere.

The most striking element, as pointed out by Libyan academic Dr. Mohamed Zahi Mogherbi,

was how since the revolution in 1969 till 1999, in the GPC, Libya had a total of only 112

National :People's General Congress

Municipal:People's Congress for Municipality

Local: Basic Peoples' Congress(Assembly

Groupings of the locals

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ministers, constantly reshuffled (Pargeter, 2007). Vandewalle (1986) argued that the system was

smooth but little was known about the exact way in which members were chosen. It was a

network of Gaddafi‘s personal and ideological ties that occupied key ministerial positions

(Brahimi, 2011). Overtime, Gaddafi introduced some reforms but they were mainly cosmetics

and he remained resistant to opening up the political system while he spoke stridently about

economic modernisation and transparency (Pargeter 2007). For instance, in the year 2002

Gaddafi tried to bring in administrative reforms in order to decentralize certain functions

undertaken by the Central government only to withdraw it and move back to the pre -2002

structures by 2006 (Alexander, 1981), thereby keeping the old system intact (Pargeter 2007). The

legislative and executive powers were transferred to the committees, but these pertained mostly

to the non-vital sectors of the economy (Mezran, et al 2007). Thus, with this the vital power and

decision-making tools were left in the hands of Gaddafi and his close 'Men of the Tents'. Brahimi

(2011) calls this a web of formal and informal sectors wherein the formal sector serves as a

vehicle to execute decisions made in the informal sector, thereby lacking people‘s participation.

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND DISCONTENT: LINKAGE

History has remained witness to violence, rebellion, uprisings caused due to discontent. Many

studies look at causes of aggressive behaviour in men and what prompts them to become

aggressive, which is what Muller and Jukam (1983) calls ―discontent as a ‗pre-condition‘ to

aggressive behaviour‖. Gurr (1970) explains discontent on the basis of the perceived ‗relative

deprivation9‘ that eventually instigates ‗condition for participants in collective violence‘. He

further explains, drawing from psychology and group conflict theory, the direct proportionality

of discontent and the likelihood of violence (pp. 13). On the other side of the deprivation theory,

Davies (1971) purports; dissatisfaction is a state of mind. It may so happen that well- fed people

are dissatisfied while under-fed are satisfied or even vice-versa.

These ‗pre-conditions‘ to discontent have been viewed from the prism of – economy (Down

1957), psychology (Lederer 1986, Gurr 1970, Davies 1962), sociology (Marsh and Kaase 1979),

and politics (Milbrath and Goel 1982, Kinder and Sears, 1985). Many studies have used non-

structural factors such as attitude, behaviour and values (Sigelman and Simpson, 1977), relative

deprivation (Ted Gurr, 1970), inequality or the perception of it (Russett, 1964) and rank

disequilibrium10

(Galtung,1964) to explain the accumulated alienation and frustration among

people propelling them to revolt. However, the Arab uprising phenomenon displayed structural

factors (or ‗pre-conditions‘), prevalent in authoritarian regimes (consolidated and semi-

consolidated) that led people to resort to ‗aggressive behaviour‘ due to accumulated discontent.

One of those structural factors was low political participation.

Ted Gurr (1970) in his work on discontent titled ‗Why Men Rebel?‘ classifies political violence

as: turmoil, conspiracy and internal war. In his hypotheses, he develops three aspects of political

violence- its source, magnitude and form. In this paper, I have identified the source as low

political participation in authoritarian regime, its magnitude measured using lives at risk and its

9 This deprivation has been explained in terms of the gap between what ‘ought’ to be and what ‘is’ of collective

value satisfaction of that leads men to commits acts of violence. For more read Ted Gurr (1970), Why Men Rebel, Boulder, London: Paradigm Publisher 10

He explain this as a condition where people with high education who consider their occupational status as less than that of their qualification.

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form as increased people‘s participation to fight regime security forces to have their demands

met.

From the classification done by Gurr, the Arab uprising typically falls under the definition of

‗internal war‘ that he explains as-

―highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation,

designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by

extensive violence, including large- scale terrorism and guerilla wars, civil wars,

and revolutions‖.

Eckstein (1965) in ―On the Etiology of Internal War‖, similarly, defines internal war as,

―any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers, or

policies‖.

Gurr, in his hypotheses, on internal war proposes that, ―the likelihood of internal war increases as

the ratio of dissident to regime coercive control approaches equality‖. He further adds, ―in the

face of superior force, intensely discontented dissidents sometimes initiate violent clashes or

respond riotously to repressive measures‖. It simply means that highly discontented masses,

despite lesser coercive control compared to the regime, will resort to, and sustain, internal wars.

In the following section, I have elaborated ‗pre-conditions‘ like lack of participation, arising due

to the structure of the states, to show that the people of Egypt and Libya were highly

discontented with those prevailing condition to have resorted to uprising, while enduring brutal

clashes by the regime security forces. I have looked at these general ‗pre-conditions‘ focusing

primary post 2000. I have also tried to show how responses to these conditions, from the side of

the regime, further alienated the people, making them more aggressive, thereby giving

momentum to their internal war to resist regime clashes.

CASE OF EGYPT: On January 25, 2011 people of Egypt gathered in the streets of Central Cairo,

demanding the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak and calling for reforms, in the year of

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Presidential elections. It was described as the biggest protest in years11

. The National Association

for Change (NAC) demanded the immediate dissolution of the Parliament, dominated by the

National Democratic Party (NDP),that had secured 90 percent of the seats12

.

Before the 2011 outburst, some ‗pre-conditions‘ had begun to show up in Egypt. For instance,

the Kefaya Movement, translated to Enough, in early 2000s, calling for reforms in the system,

was a display of mass discontent with the Mubarak regime (Lynch, 2011). The regime, in

response, tried to curb the movement and when that failed, it resorted to ‗detaining and torturing‘

the activists (Oweidat, 2008). The people of Egypt wanted change through participation and they

felt handicapped with the regime tactics of making President Mubarak stay in place and creating

conditions for Gamal Mubarak to succeed him.

As Blaydes (2006) rightly explains, ―acts of voter abstention can provide meaningful signals of

discontent and voter preference.‖ This was strikingly visible with the decline in voters‘

participation (shown in the table below) since 2000 indicating the growing disillusionment with

the regime and the ruling NDP.

The regime responded to the growing disillusionments by Mubarak allowing for multi-

candidates to run for the 2005 Presidential elections. However, even before the elections were to

take place, democracy promoters in Egypt had started seeing this reform of multi-candidate

elections as a ‗sham‘, calling for its boycott (Wittes 2005). This was because first, Mubarak

imposed stringent clauses due to which very few candidates could qualify to stand for elections

(Sika 2012) and, second, intimidation of voters and fraud (Rubin, 2010), in addition to

widespread vote buying (Blaydes 2006), did not allow for people‘s choice to come through.

After the elections, there were enough evidences to prove that the results were manipulated.

Mona El- Ghobashy (2012) argued that during Mubarak‘s regime, elections were rigged by the

rules that limited competition, engaging in blatant fraud at the voting booths and polling centers,

and by intimidating voters through the security forces. An electoral commission was set up to

overlook the 2005 elections but this hardly satisfied the critics as they were in doubt of the

11

For a detailed news report visit URL: http://www.npr.org/2011/01/25/133211784/egyptian-protesters-demand-end-to-mubareks-rule 12

For a detailed report visit URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12290167

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commission being entirely independent (Nathan, Dunne and Hamzawy 2007). Interviews

conducted by the United Nations Development Programme suggest that the youth felt elections

were not fair and it did nothing to redeem their immediate requirements (Human Development

Report 2010). As a result (shown in table 1 below) the decline in voter turn was striking (almost

half), especially after 2000.

Not only under Mubarak, Blaydes (2006) argued that until the 2005 reform, the NDP would

nominate a leader, in this case Mubarak (since 1981), and conduct a ―yes-no‖ referendum. The

result of the referendum conducted during the Presidency of the three leaders show anomalous

results (shown in table 2 below). In none of the cases did the referendum result fell below 90

percent (Hartog 1998).

TABLE 1: DECLINING VOTER TURN OUT IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN EGYPT13

YEAR VOTER

TURNOUT

TOTAL

VOTES

REGISTRATION POPULATION

2012 62.04% 29,279,884 47,192,169 83,688,164

2010 27.47% 7,995,022 29,109,107 80,471,869

2005 28.13% 8,790,708 31,253,417 77,505,756

2000 Not available Not available 24,602,241 65,158,549

1995 47.99% 10,072,017 20,987,453 59,135,000

1990 44.43% 7,253,168 16,326,229 52,691,000

1987 50.32% 7,207,467 14,324,162 49,050,000

1985 43.14% 5,323,086 12,339,418 45,657,000

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Source: Voter Turnout Data for Egypt [Web: Online] URL: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=69

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TABLE 2: EGYPT, REFERENDUM RESULTS 1956-1981

1956 99.84% Constitution and presidency of Nasser

1958 99.99% Unity with Syria

1965 99.999% Reelection of Nasser's presidency

1968 99.989% On Nasser's statement

1970 90.04% Presidency of Sadat

1971 99.9% Arab Union between Egypt, Syria and Libya

1971 99.98% Constitution

1974 99.95% October Paper

1976 99.93% Reelection of Sadat's Presidency

1977 99.42% National unity law

1978 98.49% Interior affairs law

1979 99.90% Peace treaty

1980 98.96% On modifying the constitution

1981 99.45% National unity

1981 98.46% Election Mubarak as president

Source: NATO FELLOWSHIP FINAL REPORT, Den Hartog, Michael (1998).

The façade of elections was only a tool of reform and restrain (Amrani 2012) and it dissuaded

people from going to the polling stations to vote. Again, the grooming of Gamal, further angered

the people who began to view elections as nothing more than a political rhetoric. Thus,

frustration grew with the forcible inability of the people to bring change in the leadership and

structure, in spite of the regime conducting so-called regular elections. In 2010 (as seen in the

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table above), the total number of voters went down further and the NDP, fraudulently, won all

the seats in the People‘s Assembly.

In another incident that took place on 8 April, 2008, the textile workers from Mahalla and Kafr al

Dawwar along with their locals and groups in Cairo's associational landscape called a general

strike and national day of protest. The police dispersed the rioters and took action even before

the protest could take off. Apart from this, clashes took place continuously throughout 2010 with

incidents leading to mass arrests and curfews (El Ghobashy 2012).

Gurr (1970) points out, that a regime establishes coercive control over its people by way of

increasing the number of regime security agencies and judicial in proportion to the population in

order to inhibit or control violent responses. This was evident in case of Egypt. In response to the

public display of dissent, the regime increased its control over the population further aggravating

frustration. According to report published in Al-Arabiya (2011), up to 2 percent of the Egyptian

population worked in the police department, with police elements estimated up to 22 percent of

the population. Apart from this, the Interior Minister also had a semi-military troop known as the

Central Security with an estimated 2.5 million personnel. As El Ghobashy (2012) explains, the

police had virtually taken over all the administrative sectors of Egypt from Helwan University

students, from villagers in the Delta province of Daqhaliyya, from Cairo lawyers and from

Aswan horse cart drivers. This suffocated the already frustrated population.

The turning point came when the lack of government response to the event in June 2010 where a

young man, Khaled Mohamed Said, was beaten by the Alexandria police stayed in public eye

and triggered the 25 January, 2011, protests where the participation of people was beyond what

the regime had ever seen or expected.

CASE OF LIBYA: In case of Libya, the coercive control by the regime was even stronger and

was what became the main cause of accumulated aggression since any pre-condition stage that

displayed dissent was nipped in the bud by the regime. Regime response, in case of Libya, was

much harsher, if any such attempt reached the stage of displaying differences- ideological or

otherwise. Any form of dissent or ideological incompatibility resulted in the either dismantling

18

or by putting their respective leaders under arrest. For instance, after 1975 when Gaddafi

suspected a conspiracy in the armed forces with ideological incompatibility with the ruling elites,

he placed the conspirators‘ in house arrest or they were exiled (St. John 2011). This year was

marked as the watershed year since it dissolved the RCC rule and Gaddafi emerged as the sole

ruler of Libya (Vanderwalle 1986). Thus, by the end of 1975, only five of the original 12 RCC

members were left and this remained as the political elite clout of Gaddafi's Libya (St. John

2011; Vanderwalle 1986). After the dissolution of the RCC even a minor form of articulated

economic opposition to the policies of the ruler came to an end (Vanderwalle, 1986). Gaddafi

mostly faced opposition from three sides- dissatisfied tribes, the armed forces and the Islamic

fundamentalist for various reasons. The opposition from the Islamists coincided with the

opposition from the dissatisfied tribes. This was centered mostly around Cyrenaica, an area with

Sanusiyya loyalists. Tribal uprisings did take place from time to time. In October 1993, a failed

coup attempt was made by the armed forces that led to the arrest of about 1500 people (St John

2011: 73). He successfully suppressed the Islamic fundamentalist movements operating from

inside Libya.

Post 2000, after Libya softened its stance on the Lockerbie incident, turning the suspects and

agreeing to negotiate, some ‗reformists‘ based in London believed that it was time for Libya to

modernise. This was due to Libya‘s attempt and desperate need to be more integrated with the

globalised world after years of sanctions had crippled the economy. Arab Developments Reports

(2004) suggested, opposition abroad continuously pressed for reforms through civil and political

movements. However, Pargeter (2007), argued that the Jamahiriya structure and the lack of

political will on top did not allow for any kind of internal change to take place. Also, the fact that

theoretically, there was no personalized army, instead there was a notion of armed citizens

(Brahimi, 2011) and therefore, there was no question of defection from any side. This was also

the reason why Libyan uprising was bloodier than the other Arab states. As Dollard et al (Gurr,

1970) argued that punishment generate two kinds of responses- one that deters aggressive

behaviour and the other than intensifies aggression. Another study by Maier (Gurr 1970) also

finds that under extreme frustration, punishment increased the intensity of aggression. This

explains why the Libyan uprising turned into a protracted civil war and why people did not back

when faced with heavy crackdown from the side of the regime. Libyan had no outlet up until

19

now and they knew this was only manner in which they could bring change. The coercive

capability of the Libyan regime and the intensity with which it imposed brutal punishment later

became directly proportionate to the dissenter‘s coercive capacity to sustain the internal war till

the dismantling of the regime. Thus, the magnitude (causalities) in the Libyan uprising was

higher.

20

CONCLUSION

Egypt and Libya are just two samples explaining the growing intolerance of the people towards

an authoritarian structure. Albeit there were also other factors, like the growing economic

inequality, lack of employment to educated youth, and so on, leading to growing discontent but

what provoked an uprising of this magnitude was the inability to change the prevailing

conditions. Assessing the situation in both the country through the prism of discontent literature,

a causal linkage could be seen.

Egypt has been explained as a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime where elections did take

place implying that change should have taken place, too. Additionally, as mentioned above, the

response of a regime to public demands is an important factor that explains the magnitude of

reaction from the side of the masses. In Egypt these reactions came in the form of: a) conditions

created by the leader to remain in power, like rigging of results, intimating the voters and so on,

further disappointed the people, which over the years only aggravated; b) increased police

control and brutality to signs of dissents or otherwise; and/ or c) completely ignoring public

grievances. This led to the loss of legitimacy, of the ruler and the party, in the eyes of the people,

generating intense anger that could no longer be contained.

In Libya, the concern was the absolute lack of space or opportunity to participate coupled with

high ‗negative sanctions‘ (Gurr 1970) to the slightest sign of dissent behaviour. The way in

which Gaddafi consolidated the state structure, turning it more and more inward looking,

suddenly became unacceptable to the people. After the economic sanctions (1992) imposed on

Libya, its economy had crippled, the burden of which fell on the people. The regime not only

failed to address the concerns, it was focusing more on consolidating the structure while Gaddafi

trained his son, Saif al Gaddafi, to succeed him. Gaddafi never felt that he could face a

legitimacy crisis and thereby never thought it necessary to bring in reforms. Years of

consolidated rule resulted in the most brutal civil war in Libya. The brutality explained the level

of discontent simmering in the people of Libya.

21

The subtle difference between the two states was the magnitude of the uprising- that is the

number of casualties that took place. It shows that more repressive regime, here Libya, witnessed

higher casualties as compared to Egypt thereby validating Gurr‘s (1970) hypothesis.

Thus, by way of drawing lessons from the uprising, in the current transition phase it is important,

that the erstwhile authoritarian structure be dismantled and replaced with a more participatory

structure. By way of asking important questions, there is a need to interrogate how participatory

values are being introduced.

22

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