"Beyond the Front Line: China's rivalry with Japan in the English-language press over the Jinan Incident, 1928" Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 48, No.1 (January 2014): 188-224.

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Beyond the Front Line: China's rivalry with Japanin the English-language press over the JinanIncident, 1928

SHUGE WEI

Modern Asian Studies / Volume 48 / Issue 01 / January 2014, pp 188 - 224DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X11000886, Published online: 27 March 2013

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0026749X11000886

How to cite this article:SHUGE WEI (2014). Beyond the Front Line: China's rivalry with Japan in theEnglish-language press over the Jinan Incident, 1928 . Modern Asian Studies, 48,pp 188-224 doi:10.1017/S0026749X11000886

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Modern Asian Studies 48, 1 (2014) pp. 188–224. c© Cambridge University Press 2013doi:10.1017/S0026749X11000886 First published online 27 March 2013

Beyond the Front Line: China’s rivalry withJapan in the English-language press over the

Jinan Incident, 1928 ∗

SHUGE WEI

School of Culture, History, and Language, The Australian NationalUniversity, Canberra, AustraliaEmail: [email protected]

Abstract

This paper examines how China and Japan fought for supremacy in China’streaty-port English-language press during the Jinan Incident of 1928. Itargues that China’s defeat in this media battle was a result of the long-term, unsettled political conditions the country was experiencing. The constantchanges of government thwarted China’s official and non-official efforts toestablish a national news network. The threat from the northern warlordsand China’s intricate relations with the imperialist powers deterred theNanjing regime from formulating decisive foreign propaganda policies. Incontrast, Japan, with a strong news network in China, quickly installedits version of the event in the media. Its response was fast, consistent,and intensive. Japan also took advantage of the Nanjing Incident to justifyits actions in Jinan. Press opinion in the treaty ports towards the JinanIncident was split, with the British press supporting the Japanese andAmerican papers favouring China’s case. However, Japanese accounts, with theendorsement of the British treaty-port papers, still dominated the reports inThe Times of London and influenced the views of the Manchester Guardian andThe New York Times.

Introduction

The Jinan Incident, a military conflict between China and Japan thattook place in May 1928, has not received much scholarly attention

∗ I would like to thank Brian Martin, Tomoko Akami, and Richard Rigby for theirinvaluable guidance for this research. I am also indebted to Nathan Woolley for hiscogent comments. The two anonymous reviewers’ suggestions also helped shape thefinal version of this paper.

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since it is commonly regarded as a local clash that had a limited impacton Sino-Japanese relations. However, the circumstances surroundingthe Incident are more complex than has generally been realized. Thispaper aims to introduce a new dimension to research into the event.It examines the confrontation between China and Japan over theIncident through the lens of the English-language papers in China’streaty ports. By analysing the efficiency of Japan’s propaganda andChina’s deficient response, I argue that China’s defeat in this mediabattle was the result of long-term, unsettled political conditions inthat country.

In April 1928, Chiang Kai-shek launched the second NorthernExpedition against the warlord-backed Beijing government led byZhang Zuolin. As Chiang’s troops marched towards Jinan, theprovincial capital of Shandong, to remove the local warlord Han Fuju,the Japanese government dispatched troops to the city ostensibly toprotect the 2,000 Japanese nationals living there and their property.On the morning of 3 May, firing broke out in Jinan between Chiang’sarmy and the Japanese troops. Chiang immediately sought a peacefulresolution to the crisis by sending a diplomatic team led by CaiGongshi to negotiate with the Japanese. However, Cai and his 16associates were tortured and murdered by Japanese soldiers.1 On 7May, without conferring with his superiors in Tokyo, the Japanesecommander General Fukuda Hikosuke presented Chiang with a 12-hour ultimatum which Chiang was unable to accept. The fightingescalated on 8 May. By 11 May, the Japanese had driven Chiang’stroops out of the city and governed the area through a puppetorganization composed of Chinese citizens. Instead of continuingthe fight with Japanese forces, Chiang bypassed Jinan to resumethe Expedition northward. Not until March 1929 did Japan, underpressure from Western powers, return Jinan to the Guomindanggovernment.2

1 See the memoir by the wife of China’s then foreign minister, Huang Fu: ShenYiyun (1968). Yiyun huiyi [Shen Yiyun’s memoir], Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, Taipei,volume 2, pp. 369, 371.

2 Iriye, A. (1965). After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 193–205; Wilbur,C. M. (1983). ‘The Nationalist Revolution: From Canton to Nanking, 1923–28’in Fairbank, J. (ed.) The Cambridge History of China, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, volume 12, pp. 703–705; Morton, W. F (1980). Tanaka Giichi and Japan’sChina Policy, Dawson, Folkestone, p. 118; Jordan, D. A. (1976). The Northern Expedition:China’s National Revolution of 1926–1928, University Press of Hawai‘i, Honolulu,pp. 158–161.



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The Jinan Incident, the most serious military clash between Chinaand Japan in the 1920s, was also the Nanjing government’s firstexperience of handling military confrontation with Japan. However,eclipsed by more serious Sino-Japanese conflict in the 1930s, theIncident has escaped scholarly attention. Historians tend to regardthe Manchurian crisis as the turning point in Japan’s imperialist policyfrom economic cooperation to military expansion. Existing studies onthe Sino-Japanese War mainly focus on events between 1931 and1945. Iriye Akira, among the few to study the Jinan Incident, hasprovided a detailed narrative of the event. He argues that the Incidentended the brief period of Sino-Japanese amity and foreshadowedthe more significant collisions between the two nations in 1931 andbeyond.3 Donald A. Jordan considered the implications of the Incidentfor the Northern Expedition, arguing that it damaged the reputationof the Japanese-supported northern warlords and accelerated theirdefeat.4 Despite such valuable insights, these studies mainly focuson the conventional military and political aspects of the event. Theplaying out of the Chinese and Japanese confrontation in the mediaduring the Incident remains to be explored.

While the battle on the front line was fierce, the rivalry between thetwo nations in the media was equally bitter. Both sides endeavouredto present their cases in the English-language press in the hopeof eliciting foreign support. Japan sought to justify its militaryaction in Jinan and dissuade Western powers from intervention,while China hoped to exert moral pressure on Japan’s aggression,invite foreign mediation, and boost the international prestige of thenewly established Nanjing regime. Since the treaty-port English-language press was an important and credible source for themetropolitan press abroad, both countries actively sought control ofthis channel to extend their international influence. Many scholarshave noticed the importance of the treaty-port English-languagepapers in China. Studies have focused on their transnational nature,5

their connection with the newspapers abroad, and their influence on

3 Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 193–205.4 Jordan, The Northern Expedition, pp. 158–161.5 Goodman, B. (2004). ‘Semi-Colonialism, Transnational Networks and News

Flows in Early Republican Shanghai’, The China Review 4:1, pp. 55–88; Wagner,R. G. (1995). ‘The Role of the Foreign Community in the Chinese Public Sphere’,The China Quarterly 142, pp. 423–443.




foreign communities in China.6 However, little research has been doneto examine the role of these papers in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Thispaper intends to fill this gap.

In examining the development of news networks by China andJapan before the Jinan Incident, I first analyse how well each sidewas prepared for the rivalry. I then consider competition betweenthe two countries in the English-language press in the treaty ports,focusing on how they responded to the Incident and how they justifiedtheir positions. The opinions of the British- and American-controlledtreaty-port papers will be discussed to reveal their engagement in thismedia battle. This will be followed by a review of public opinion inLondon and New York in order to demonstrate the extent to whichChina’s voice was drowned out by Japanese propaganda abroad.

English-language newspapers and news agenciescontrolled by Japan

News never becomes news without being told. It was irrelevant howChina and Japan would justify their cases in the press, until theirmessage reached the target audience. Before analysing narratives ofthe Incident delivered by both countries, it is necessary to ask howwell Japanese and Chinese news networks had been developed totransmit their messages. Competition between China and Japan inthe construction of news networks in China began in the 1910s. By1928, Japan’s international news agencies were more advanced thanthose of China.

Japan’s news service in China began with the Toho news agency,which was reorganized by an agent of Japan’s Ministry of ForeignAffairs in 1920.7 The agency became the ministry’s official organin China. It received a regular subsidy from Tokyo and achievedquick successes after breaking into China’s news market. To breakReuters’ monopoly, Toho sold its news at aggressive discounts thatdrastically undercut the prices Reuters charged foreign and Chinese

6 Bickers, R. (1999). Britain in China, Manchester University Press, Manchester;O’Connor, P. (2010). The English-language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918–1945, GlobalOriental, Folkestone.

7 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan first founded the Toho news agency inShanghai in 1914. See Akami, T. (2008). ‘The Emergence of International PublicOpinion and the Origins of Public Diplomacy in Japan in the Inter-War Period’, TheHague Journal of Diplomacy 3, pp. 105–106.



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newspapers.8 By 1928, Toho had won contracts with most of thenewspapers in China, English-language and Chinese-language alike.Its news was even frequently quoted in key metropolitan papers, suchas The Times of London and The New York Times.

Japan also controlled several English-language papers in China, thefirst being the Manchurian Daily News in Dalian. Among these, theNorth China Standard was an important paper based in Beijing. Thepaper was founded in 1919 by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairswith financial support of $60,000 per year.9 Apart from explainingJapanese views and activities in China, the paper also had the goal ofcompeting with a Chinese-operated English-language daily, the PekingLeader, to offset the anti-Japanese influence that the Leader exertedupon foreign and Chinese readers. The Standard tried hard to squeezethe Leader out of the Chinese market. As a contemporary journalistwrote, the two fought ‘like cats and dogs’.10 Although the Leader passedfrom Chinese to American control in 1925, the change of ownershipdid not shift its editorial direction and the Standard continued to seethe Leader as its primary rival. The Standard’s anti-Guomindang stancewon it immense popularity in the Beijing Legation Quarter and amongdie-hard foreign businessmen in Shanghai. Its ties with the Fengtianclique, the most powerful warlord faction in North China, also allowedit to be directly involved in China’s political struggles.11

In addition to establishing English-language papers in North China,Japan also attempted to control newspapers operated by Westernersin Shanghai, such as the Far Eastern Review: Engineering, Finance,Commerce. This monthly journal was originally founded in Manila in1904 by an American national, George Bronson Rea, and movedto Shanghai in 1912. The journal maintained offices in New York,London, Paris, Berlin, and Tokyo. Its large network enabled it to reachaudiences worldwide. Apart from providing engineering and financial

8 O’Connor, P. (2001). ‘Endgame: The English-language Press Networks of EastAsia in the Run-up to War, 1936–41’, Japan Forum 13:1, p. 69; Desmond, R. W (1982).Crisis and Conflict: World News Reporting between Two Wars, 1920–1940, University of IowaPress, Iowa, p. 186.

9 The $ here refers to Mexican dollars. O’Connor, ‘Endgame’, p. 69.10 Chao, T. (1931). The Foreign Press in China: Preliminary Paper Prepared for the Fourth

Biennial Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to be Held in Hangchow, from October21st to November 4th, 1931, China Institute of Pacific Relations, Shanghai, p. 28.

11 Feng Yue (2010). ‘Jindai jingjin diqu yingwenbao de yulun yu waijiao pingxi’[Review of the opinions and diplomatic functions of the English-language newspapersin Beijing and Tianjin in modern times], Beijing hangkong hangtian daxue xuebao 23:3,p. 93.




information, the journal also carried long editorials on political issuesin East Asia. Its wide scope attracted readers in various fields. By thelate 1920s, the Far Eastern Review had an estimated monthly circulationof 6,000, making it a highly competitive player in the English-languagepress market in Shanghai.12

Initially Rea was sympathetic to China’s desire for autonomy andopposed Japan’s growing power in the Pacific. He endorsed the opendoor policy in China and saw Japan as a potential enemy of theUnited States.13 As the Chinese government lacked its own English-language papers to present its case, the Far Eastern Review—Rea’sprime platform for the dissemination of his political ideas—becamean effective propaganda tool for advocating China’s position. In the1910s, Rea had been close to senior Guomindang officials, notablySun Yat-sen and his son Sun Ke. He had also been an adviser to theChinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.14

However, in 1920 Rea suddenly shifted sides, becoming a supporterof Japanese interests. He changed the policy of the Far Eastern Reviewand published several books and pamphlets justifying Japanese actionsin China.15 Rea’s reversal of opinion led to the resignation of hisco-editor, W. H. Donald, who openly declared his disapproval ofRea’s new policy.16 Rea’s shift was investigated by both the Officeof Naval Intelligence of the United States and the American Legationin Beijing. Although he explained that he ‘had become tired of fightingChina’s battles when their own statesmen were selling their countryto Japan’,17 the American investigators believed that the problem layelsewhere, namely that Chinese officials had failed to pay the bill Reahad presented to them for his pro-Chinese publicity in the Far EasternReview at the time of the Paris Peace Conference.18 In a letter to themilitary attaché, John B. Powell, editor of the China Weekly Review,confirmed that Rea had complained about being ‘unfairly treated’

12 Chao, The Foreign Press in China, p. 78.13 Rea, G. B. (1915). Japan’s Place in the Sun, Gibson Bros, Washington DC.14 Chao, The Foreign Press in China, p. 78; Pugach, N. H. (1979). Paul S. Reinsch, Open

Door Diplomat in Action, KTO Press, Millwood, New York, p. 113.15 See George Bronson Rea’s pamphlets: Rea, G. B. (1920). Japan’s Right to Exist,

Shanghia; (1924). The Greatest Civilizing Force in Eastern Asia, Shanghai.16 Editorial notice by William Donald, Far Eastern Review (March 1920).17 ‘George Bronson Rea’, MLMSS 7594/5, Winston George Lewis papers, State

Library of New South Wales [hereafter SLNSW].18 ‘George Bronson Rea’, MLMSS 7594/5, Winston George Lewis papers, SLNSW;

‘George Bronson Rea: Character of and Activities in Far Eastern Affairs’ (16 February1920), MLMSS 7594/5, Winston George Lewis papers, SLNSW.



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by Chinese leaders ‘in view of the great amount of service he haddone for them’.19 With Rea on the verge of breaking ties with theChinese government, Japan promptly invested in the magazine andtransformed it into one of its key propaganda organs in Shanghai.20 Itwas estimated that the Japanese government paid US$100,000 a yearto the journal.21 Indeed, obtaining Rea’s support was a significant coupfor Japan: it both strengthened its own foreign propaganda networkand weakened that of China.

Another important paper that fell into Japanese hands was theShanghai Times. This paper was officially registered as a British dailyand operated by a British subject, E. A. Nottingham. Yet beneaththe veneer of British ownership lay Japanese interests. The policeoffice in the French Concession in Shanghai discovered that thepaper not only received a grant from the Yokohama Specie Bank,but also accepted subsidies from the Japanese government, beginningin 1924.22 Although the paper never openly acknowledged its linksto Japanese interests, its pro-Japanese editorial line raised suspicionsamong some Western journalists in China. Carl Crow, an Americanjournalist and businessman, believed the paper was controlled byJapan even though it was owned and edited by the British.23 JohnB. Powell also regarded Nottingham’s editorship as nominal.24

China’s English-language news network

Compared with the resources possessed by Japan, China’s foreignpropaganda network was underdeveloped. By 1928, China still hadno efficient national or international news agency of its own. Most ofChina’s domestic and international news was transmitted by foreignnews agencies, particularly Reuters, which had begun operating inChina in 1872. With special correspondents in practically all of

19 ‘John B. Powell to Military Attaché’ (June 1920), MLMSS 7594/5, WinstonGeorge Lewis papers, SLNSW.

20 ‘George Bronson Rea’, MLMSS 7594/5, Winston George Lewis papers, SLNSW.21 O’Connor, ‘Endgame’, p. 68.22 Compte-rendu de renseignements No. 104/2 (9 July 1932). U38–2-715

Concession Francaise de Shanghai, Services de Police, Shanghai Municipal CouncilArchives.

23 French, P. (2007). Carl Crow, a Tough Old China Hand, Hong Kong UniversityPress, Hong Kong, p. 28.

24 Powell, J. B. (1945). My Twenty-Five Years in China, Macmillan, New York, p. 359.




the principal telegraphic centres in China,25 Reuters controlled thechannel of news distribution and became the narrator of Chinesedevelopments for both the foreign press and Chinese native papers.26

Nevertheless, with the proliferation of international news agenciesafter the First World War, by the 1920s Reuters was facing significantchallenges from Japan’s Toho agency, the Havas agency of France, theTass agency of Russia, and the United Press of the United States.27 Inthe fierce competition among foreign news agencies, none of China’sown news agencies was strong enough to compete. The privilege ofinterpreting Chinese issues was held tightly in the hands of theseforeign agencies.

The lack of a strong Chinese-owned news agency did not gounrecognized. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinesenewspapermen had tried to organize news agencies in various forms.Although these efforts began much earlier than Japan’s establishmentof Toho in China, none of these attempts succeeded because of theunstable political environment.

Efforts came primarily from individual journalists who registerednews agencies of their own and sold their services to their warlordpatrons. Such private news agencies mushroomed during the late Qingdynasty and the early Republican period. It has been estimated thatby 1926, the number of news agencies in China had reached 155.28

Despite the large number of agencies, the quality of the servicesthey provided was far from satisfactory. Since most agencies reliedon local warlords for funding, their services focused on promoting theinterests of their patrons and were seen largely as propaganda organsfor various factions.29 The warlords’ patronage also prevented theseprivate agencies from expanding their business beyond the bordersof their patrons’ domains. The majority of these private agencies,therefore, remained local organizations.

Realizing that news agencies run by individual journalists wereprone to factional manipulation, small newspapers sought toform news agencies by grouping themselves together into newscooperatives. In May 1920, two leading newspapers in Guangzhou

25 Chao, The Foreign Press in China, p. 48.26 Zeng Xubai (1966). Zhongguo xinwenshi [The history of journalism in China],

Guoli zhengzhi daxue xinwen yanjiusuo, Taipei, p. 571.27 Storey, G. (1951). Reuters’ Century, 1851–1951, Parrish, London, pp. 204–206.28 Zeng Xubai, Zhongguo xinwenshi, p. 571.29 Zeng Xubai, Zhongguo xinwenshi, p. 573.



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(Canton)—the 72 Hang Shang Bao and Xin Min Guo Bao—rallied 120newspapers and news agencies across the country and establisheda ‘National Press Cooperation Committee’ (Quanguo baojie lianhe hui).Inspired by the model of the Associated Press, the Committee intendedto create a news agency by combining the resources of its membernewspapers. The Committee also envisaged expanding its nationalnetwork abroad by sending professional journalists to key Europeancities and securing contacts with Chinese students abroad.30 Grandas this plan was, the Committee’s operation was constantly hinderedby struggles among the warlords. Unable to survive in the unstablepolitical environment, the Committee soon broke up.

Owners of big newspapers also sought to set up news agencies,making them a sub-organization of their papers. The relativelyinfluential news agencies of this type were the Guo Wen news agencyestablished by Hu Zhengzhi, managing director and editor of Da GongBao, and the Shen Shi news agency initiated by two of the mostprominent Chinese dailies in Shanghai, Shen Bao and Shi Shi XinBao.31 Yet by 1928 these agencies only offered services in Chinesefor vernacular papers. They had failed to forge direct links with theforeign press.

Aside from such private efforts, the Guomindang government inGuangzhou also made attempts to build news agencies. It establishedthe Central News Agency within its propaganda department in 1924,hoping to develop it into a national agency. Without a long-term planor a streamlined structure, the Agency remained a loose organization,unable to compete with Guo Wen and Shen Shi, let alone Toho andReuters.32 In 1927, immediately after Chiang Kai-shek established hisregime in Nanjing, the government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs setup the Guo Min news agency, with the goal of making the Chinese caseto the outside world. It became the only Chinese news agency to offeran English-language service. Based in Shanghai, the agency boasted astrong management team led by Zhang Sixu (Samuel H. Chang) and LiCai (Lee Choy). Both had received university degrees in the West andpossessed extensive experience in operating English-language papers

30 Ge Gongzhen (1964). Zhongguo baoxueshi [The history of China’s newspapers],Taiping shuju, Hong Kong, p. 255.

31 Shen Shi dianxunshe (1934). Shi nian: Shen Shi dianxunshe chuangli shi zhounianjinian [The tenth anniversary of the Shen Shi news agency], Shenshi dianxunshe,Shanghai, p. 43.

32 Feng Zhixiang (1975). Xiao Tongzi zhuan [A biography of Xiao Tongzi], Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe, Taipei, p. 3.




in China. Despite this, the agency did not have sufficient fundingto hire its own correspondents. Instead, it collected information bytranslating and rewriting news from Chinese papers. Its close tieswith the government, which ensured that it had priority in gainingexclusives from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry ofFinance, was the main reason why the agency was quoted by the foreignpress.33

In parallel with the failure to build a strong news agency were theChinese governments’ repeated yet unsuccessful attempts to controlan influential English-language paper. After the fall of Qing rule, thewarlords and members of the elite in Beijing were keen to invest inEnglish-language papers. The Peking Leader was one such example.The paper was founded in 1920 by the Research Clique (Yanjiuxi), apowerful political group headed by Liang Qichao. The group invitedDiao Minqian (M. Tukzung Tyau), an expert on Chinese foreignrelations, to edit the paper.34 Political changes in the government,however, necessitated its reorganization in 1925. The AmericanGrover Clark gained control of the paper, becoming both editor andpresident.35 Yet American patronage did not save the paper fromfrequent financial difficulties due to its small number of subscriptionsin North China and a business downturn caused by endless militarydisturbances. Meanwhile, the paper’s American identity and financialhardship made it ideal prey for local warlords. In 1927, Hallet Abend,co-editor of the paper, discovered that the Leader was receiving regularallowances from Feng Yuxiang, a northern warlord sympathetic toBolshevism.36

Members of the Guomindang also attempted to gain a position in theEnglish-language press. After the 1911 revolution, the Guomindang,under instruction from Sun Yat-sen, founded the China Republican (alsoknown as the China Gazette) in the French Concession of Shanghai. Thepaper was edited by Ma Su, Sun Yat-sen’s English secretary; DongXianguang (Hollington K. Tong), a graduate from the JournalismSchool of the University of Missouri; and R. I. Hope, a Briton of Indianextraction. Chesney Duncan, editor of the Hong Kong Telegraph, alsofrequently contributed to the paper. The goal of the Republican was to

33 Chao, The Foreign Press in China, p. 6.34 Diao later became director of the Intelligence and Publicity Department of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nanjing.35 Chao, The Foreign Press in China, p. 74.36 Abend, H. (1943). My Life in China, 1926–1941, Harcourt, New York, p. 52.



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glorify Sun’s plans for the nation and to denounce Yuan Shikai’s rule.37

Its anti-Yuan policy soon caught the attention of China’s elites and theauthorities.38 In 1913 the paper was closed down by the consul generalof France in Shanghai, upon the request of the Yuan government. MaSu, the publisher of the paper and of Chinese and French parentage,was deported from China and the contributor Chesney Duncan wasthreatened with prosecution.39

After the Guomindang established its authority in Guangzhou, itstarted a semi-official English paper, the Canton Gazette, operated byLi Cai. The paper supported the left wing of the party and gainedpopularity in the mid-1920s when Guangzhou was the political centreof China. It attracted prominent foreign journalists like Hallett Abendand gained editorial assistance from Chen Youren (Eugene Chen),the foreign minister of the Guangzhou government.40 However, afterthe Guomindang moved its capital to Wuhan in November 1926, itsinfluence quickly waned .

In Wuhan, the Guomindang started a political journal called thePeople’s Tribune. This paper was set up by Chen Youren and MikhailBorodin, a Comintern agent in China, with the help of Americanjournalists, William and Rayna Prohme, who were sympathetic toBolshevism. The Tribune, mailed daily to a list (provided by Borodin)of more than 5,000 liberal individuals and radical organizations acrossthe world, aimed to inform a foreign audience about the Wuhangovernment’s ideology and achievements.41 Nonetheless, the journalwas short-lived as a result of the Guomindang’s internal struggles.In July 1927, Wang Jingwei closed down the paper after it carriedan article by Song Qingling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) criticizing theGuomindang for having betrayed Sun’s doctrines.42

While Japan had a powerful news network comprising Toho andseveral English-language newspapers, China’s propaganda networkwas, by comparison, deficient. With neither an effective news agency

37 Abend, My Life in China, pp. 51–52; Morrison, G. E. (1976). The Correspondence ofG. E. Morrison, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 10–11.

38 Morrison to Yen Ho-ling, 4 November 1913, in Morrison, The Correspondence ofG. E. Morrison, pp. 238–239.

39 Morrison, The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, p. 112.40 Abend, My Life in China, pp. 15–19.41 Bennett, M. and Grunfeld, A. T. (1993). On Her Own: Journalistic Adventures from

San Francisco to the Chinese Revolution, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, p. 176.42 Hahn, E. (1941). The Song Sisters, Doran and Company, New York, p. 115; Rand,

P. (1955). China Hands: The Adventures and Ordeals of the American Journalists Who JoinedForces With the Great Chinese Revolution, Simon & Schuster, New York, p. 61.




nor an English-language paper to reach a foreign audience, China’sside of the story could only be heard when the foreign-controlledagencies or papers chose to quote its version of events. Such adisadvantage manifested itself fully during the Jinan Incident.

Responses to the Jinan Incident in the English-language press

With the benefit of a powerful news network, the Japanese media’sresponse to the Jinan Incident was swift, consistent, and intensive.The first dispatch about the military conflict was sent shortly afterfighting broke out. Before any investigation of responsibility had beenmade, the Toho news agency had dispatched accounts from Beijing tothe world, asserting that the trouble had been caused by looting carriedout by Chinese soldiers.43 In the hours that followed, dispatches on theIncident continued to be distributed from Toho’s branch offices aroundChina. Despite their different sources, all messages consistently stuckto the explanation of ‘looting’, with each bringing new details of thecrime. Japanese soldiers were thus portrayed as innocent defenderswho were ‘compelled’ to return fire at the disobedient Chinese looters.By the end of the first day, at least seven dispatches had been sentfrom Toho, all blaming Chinese soldiers for the fighting,44 and as thesole source of the conflict, reinforced by consistent statements andrepetition. It should be noted that the first few reports on the Incidentwere likely to have been decisive in forming public opinion, since theygave readers their first basic information on events and were thuslikely to influence any future judgements they made.

Toho’s reports went unchallenged in the English-language press fordays. China’s lack of an effective news network was to some degreeresponsible, but this alone could not explain the complete absence ofits side of the story. The situation was exacerbated by the state ofcommunications with forces on the battlefield. In order to isolate thearmies of the northern warlords, the Nationalist troops had cut raillines linking Jinan with Nanjing, Beijing, and Qingdao prior to thebattle.45 The telegraph lines, which followed the rail lines, were also

43 See quotes of Reuters’ reports on the Jinan Incident, in ‘How the JapaneseReported the Tsinan Incident’, China Weekly Review (12 May 1928).

44 ‘How the Japanese Reported the Tsinan Incident’, China Weekly Review.45 ‘Chinese Defy Tokyo, Cut Tsinan Railway’, The New York Times (1 May 1928);

‘Communications Cut’, China Press (1 May 1928).



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destroyed. Communication with Jinan, therefore, was solely reliant ontwo wireless stations in the city, one controlled by the Japanese and theother by the Chinese. Soon after the clash began on 3 May, Japanesesoldiers destroyed the Chinese wireless station, leaving the Japanesestation as the only channel for communications.46 The destruction ofthe Chinese station not only impeded the transmission of news, butalso affected general communications between Jinan and Nanjing.It was reported that the Nationalist government could only reachChiang by first telegraphing to Yanzhou, about 60 miles south ofJinan, and then sending messages by courier.47 The lack of efficientcommunications on the Nationalist side left Japan in control of allnews from Jinan to the outside world.

Had alternative explanations been offered by other foreign mediasources, Japan’s version of events may not have so easily prevailed.Despite Toho’s heavy stake in China’s news market, it was stillReuters that occupied the primary position globally. Reuters alsoenjoyed higher credibility than Toho because of its third-partyposition. However, Reuters did not present an alternative view. Rivalrybetween Toho and Reuters in China was primarily a matter ofbusiness, not politics. Instead of giving credence to non-Japanesesources or remaining sceptical about the Japanese version of events,Reuters followed the Japanese line, reporting that the troublehad arisen because of looting by Chinese soldiers.48 In doing so,Reuters buttressed the Japanese side in three ways: first, repeatingToho’s reports helped to reinforce belief in the Japanese version ofevents; second, Reuters’ worldwide service assisted in distributingthe Japanese story more widely; and third, Reuters enhanced Toho’scredibility in the world press. Together the two agencies monopolizedoutgoing reports of the Incident and established the cause of ‘looting’as a fact in the press.

Compared with Japan’s immediate and intensive explanations in theEnglish-language press, China’s response was slow and inconsistent.The Nanjing government’s report on the Incident did not appearin the English-language papers until 5 May, when the North ChinaDaily News49 cited a dispatch from the official Guo Min news agency.

46 Shen, Yiyun huiyi, p. 371.47 ‘How the Japanese Reported the Tsinan Incident’, China Weekly Review.48 ‘Japanese and Southerners Clash at Jinan’, North China Daily News (4 May 1928).49 The North China Daily News was the most influential English-language paper in

China. Operated by British interests, the paper was regarded as the official organ ofthe Shanghai Municipal Council.




According to the Guo Min report, the shooting occurred when Japanesetroops arrested several members of the Nationalist propagandacorps and threatened to shoot anyone attempting to pass througha Japanese-controlled barricade.50 However, in the two days thathad passed since the Incident, Toho and Reuters had thoroughlyestablished the Japanese version of events in the press. China’stask now was to convert the audience’s entrenched understandingof events rather than introduce its version of what was happeningin Jinan. Converting opinion is far more difficult than establishingit in the first place. It may require the media to put forward thecounter argument continuously and with greater intensity. Withoutan efficient news network, the Nanjing government was unable toachieve this. Indeed, China could barely make its voice heard in theEnglish-language press. For example, the China Press,51 one of the mostpopular English-language papers in China, offered intensive coverageof the Jinan Incident for the ten days after its start. Among the 168reports concerning the Incident that appeared in the paper duringthis period, only 14 were sourced from Guo Min. In comparison, itcarried 107 reports from Reuters and 47 from Toho. These figuressuggested that its main sources were Western or Japanese agencies,which together accounted for 91.6 per cent of reports in the ChinaPress concerning the Incident.

China’s reports on the Jinan Incident were also inconsistent.Multiple explanations concerning the origin of the fighting weredistributed to the English-language press. The various accounts notonly confused the foreign audience but also severely damaged China’scredibility. Shortly after Guo Min’s interpretation found its wayinto the press, Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu, the minister offoreign affairs, issued another account on 5 May, stating that theIncident was caused by Japanese troops shooting Chinese soldierswhile the latter were passing through Japanese-controlled streets.52

While Guo Min’s account declared that the fighting had begun with aclash between Chinese propagandists and Japanese soldiers, Chiang’sversion dropped the reference to Chinese propagandists and assertedthat the conflict was triggered by fighting between the two groupsof troops. Another account circulating in the press claimed thatJapanese soldiers had prevented Nationalist forces from crossing the

50 ‘The Chinese Version’, North China Daily News (5 May 1928).51 The China Press was owned and edited by Britons in the late 1920s.52 ‘End Tsinan-fu Fight Both Sides Accused’, The New York Times (6 May 1928).



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railway line in order to protect fleeing northern troops.53 Althoughall versions blamed Japan for the fighting, the disagreement onthe basic reason for it gave the impression that the Chinese werefabricating their accounts, unsure of how to effectively justify theiraggression. Indeed, the existence of multiple accounts was a resultof the Nanjing government’s lack of institutions for disseminatingsystematic propaganda in the treaty-port press. There appears to havebeen no coordination between the official agency Guo Min and theGuomindang’s top leaders regarding explanations for the cause of theIncident.

The Nanjing government’s indecision over how best to deal with theforeign propaganda was also significant. After the fighting broke out,the immediate solution pursued by the government was to localize theproblem and solve it rapidly. Initially Chiang Kai-shek was not keen topublicize the affair internationally, fearing that extended exposure ofthe Incident in the media would complicate the issue and undermineattempts to reach agreement with Japan. After all, in Shandong atthe time the completion of the Northern Expedition was deemed tobe more important than confrontation with Japan.54 It was hopedthat a quick solution could be found, perhaps by negotiating withJapanese forces locally. Accordingly, Chiang’s reaction was twofold:while seeking a cease-fire with Japanese military officers on thefront line, he also appealed to foreign consulates in China, especiallythose of Britain and the United States, for mediation.55 However,both approaches failed to produce favourable results. The Nanjinggovernment found it difficult to satisfy the Japanese generals whothreatened to bomb Jinan to force further concessions from China. Theforeign consulates also refused to mediate unless a request to do sowas received from both Japan and China.56 This reply was tantamountto a denial of help, since Japan did not favour mediation by a thirdparty.

53 ‘Nationalist Statement’, The Times (5 May 1928).54 Shi lue gao ben [Chiang Kai-shek’s memoir] (17 May 1928), Academia Historica,

Taipei, volume 3, p. 316.55 Chiang Kai-shek’s telegraph about the Jinan Incident (4 May 1928), in Zhonghua

minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: duiRi kangzhan shiqi: xubian [Collection of importanthistorical materials: the anti-Japanese war: pre-1937], Zhongguo guomindangzhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, Taipei, p. 126.

56 Consul General at Shanghai (Cunningham) to the Secretary of the State, UnitedStates Department of State (1928). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, volume 2, pp. 137–138.




The Nanjing government changed its foreign propaganda strategyfrom 8 May when Japanese forces launched a new round of attackson Nationalist soldiers and began bombing Jinan. Believing that theineffectiveness of China’s voice was due not to the lack of a case butrather to the lack of a channel to make its case known, the Nanjingleaders began to seek a new way to distribute China’s views.57 Insteadof publicizing news inside China and passively waiting for the foreignmedia to transmit it externally, Nanjing sought to present its casedirectly to foreign audiences. The first step taken by Nanjing was toreport the Jinan Incident to the League of Nations, calling upon itto intervene and arrange an international inquiry into the Incident.58

On 11 May, Tan Yankai, chairman of the Nationalist GovernmentCouncil, issued an official appeal to the secretary-general of theLeague of Nations. In the appeal, Tan gave a thorough account ofthe Chinese interpretation of the Jinan Incident. He criticized Japan’sdispatch of troops to Shandong, the attacks and atrocities committedsince 3 May, and the bombing of Jinan on 8 May. Tan demandedthat the League intervene to end Japanese hostilities, press Japan towithdraw troops from Shandong, and arrange an international inquiryinto the Incident.59 By so doing, Nanjing officials indicated to theworld that they had faith in their version of events and hoped animpartial inquiry from the League would endorse their position. On13 May, the League rejected China’s appeal on the grounds that itstill recognized the Beijing government, not that of Nanjing, as theofficial government of China. Guomindang leaders were fully aware oftheir lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the League prior to their appeal.Nevertheless, they still saw their appeal as an opportunity to publicizetheir case before the court of international opinion, since any move bythe League of Nations would be monitored by the world’s press.60 HuHanmin, one of the Guomindang’s top leaders, indicated the purposeof reporting the Jinan case to the League of Nations in correspondencewith Huang Fu:

57 Chen Gongbo (1928). ‘Women duiyu Tianzhong baoxing de zhuzhang’ [Ouropinion on the outrages by the Tanaka government], Ge Ming Ping Lun, volume 3,p. 5.

58 ‘China to Ask League for Tsinan Inquiry’, The New York Times (8 May 1928).59 ‘China Presents Her Case to the World’, China Weekly Review (19 May 1928).60 Hu Hanmin, ‘Shandong shijian tichu Guojilianmeng de jingguo’ [How the Jinan

incident was presented to the League of Nations], in Guomindang dangshi ziliaobianzuan weiyuanhui (1978). Ge Ming Wen Xian, volume 19–21, p. 1936.



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[T]he Nanjing Government has not gained recognition from the League ofNations, yet issuing the appeal with the support of the Beijing governmentwill boost the prestige of the northern warlords. The league was controlledby the big powers, with a Briton being the president and Japan stronglyinfluencing its political decisions. China has no chance to win. Even ifthe league intervened, it would only conduct investigations of the incident,offering no immediate solutions. That is why the United States refrains fromstepping in. Nevertheless, we should appeal to the league for propagandapurposes. . . The chance of winning is always slim when it comes to the rivalrywith the powers. But publicizing our causes is better than remaining silent.61

The Nanjing government also appealed directly to AmericanPresident Calvin Coolidge, inquiring about ‘the attitude of theAmerican government and the people towards this grave situationcreated by Japan’.62 In this appeal, the Nanjing government againlengthily reviewed events as it saw them, aiming to reinforce theChinese version of the Incident. As expected by Nanjing officials, theappeal received no response from the United States. However, China’scase was widely publicized in the process, which partly served Nanjing’spurpose.

To further reinforce China’s position concerning the Jinan Incidentin the eyes of world, the Nanjing government sent high officials as‘special envoys’ to key capitals. Among them, Wu Chaoshu (C. C. Wu)was sent to Washington, Wang Chonghui to London, Wang Jingweito Geneva, Hu Hanmin and Li Shizeng to Paris, and Sun Ke to theHague and Berlin. Their job was to offer liaison between key foreignnewspapers and Chinese sources, to give public talks on the JinanIncident, and to elicit support from government officials in the targetcountries.63 Prior to his trip, Wu intimated to American journaliststhat the object of his mission to Washington was ‘to make theNationalist case clear to the United States’ and ‘make sure Americawill not be led astray by propaganda’.64 These emissaries hoped todraw Western countries into mediation, but Chinese officials knew

61 Hu Hanmin’s telegram to Huang Fu (12 May 1928), quoted in Shen, Yiyun huiyi,p. 383.

62 ‘China Asks Coolidge Our Stand on War by Japan in Jinan’, The New York Times(14 May 1928).

63 ‘Hu Hanmin, Sun Ke, Wu Chaoshu zi Bali zhi Tan Yankai zhuxi deng chenshudui Jinan yijian dian’ [Telegraph about opinions on the Jinan Incident, sent by HuHanmin, Sun Ke, Wu Chaoshu from Paris to Tan Yankai] (12 May 1928), Zhonghuaminguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: duiRi kangzhan shiqi: xubian I, p. 147; Shen, Yiyun huiyii,p. 382.

64 ‘Nanking Sends Wu Here on Shandong’, The New York Times (11 May 1928).




that these countries would not intercede until they had a clearerunderstanding of the situation. With the Japanese interpretationdominant, making the Chinese version acceptable to foreign audienceswas a prerequisite for securing foreign support.

The influence of the context of treaty-port opinion

Japan: The Jinan Incident—a second Nanjing Incident, 1927

In addition to its advantages in the dissemination of news, Japanalso enjoyed the favourable opinion of other foreigners in the treatyports. Indeed, Japan shared with Western powers their ‘foreign’identity and experience of colonization in China. China’s anti-foreignsentiment was a common problem for both Japan and Western nations.Resentment against China could easily be stirred if Japan was able toconvince Western readers that the Jinan Incident was simply a furtherexample of an outrage committed by the Chinese against foreigners.

To invoke anti-Chinese feelings among Westerners, Japanesenewspapermen attempted to portray the Jinan Incident as a secondNanjing Incident in the English-language press. The Nanjing Incidenttook place during the first Northern Expedition. On 24 May 1927,Guomindang troops defeated northern warlords in Nanjing andoccupied the city. They then embarked on looting and killingforeigners throughout the city. American and British warships onnearby rivers responded by shelling Chinese forces, causing heavyChinese casualties and damaging property. Chiang Kai-shek laterblamed the acts on communist elements within the army, anexplanation that Westerners were ready to accept. Negotiations onthe settlement of the Nanjing Incident dragged on for over a year.The Nanjing government only reached an agreement with the UnitedStates regarding an apology and a remedy in April 1928, less thana month before the Jinan Incident began.65 Settlement with Britain,however, was still pending due to a deadlock over issues related to therevision of treaties.66

65 ‘The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (MacMurray)’ (4 April 1928),United States Department of State (1928). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, volume 2, p. 337.

66 ‘Mr. MacMurray’s Brilliant Diplomatic Victory’, Far Eastern Review (April, 1928).



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The Nanjing Incident offered a favourable precedent for Japan tojustify its own actions in Jinan. The two incidents shared many commonfeatures: both occurred during the nationalistic Northern Expeditionsand both involved clashes between Guomindang troops and foreigners.Furthermore, the Nanjing Incident had taken place just the yearbefore and was the most recent example of Sino-foreign conflict. Theforeign community’s memory of the Guomindang’s lawless actionswas still fresh and resentment against Nationalist troops had not beenallayed due to the incomplete settlement of the case.

Japanese newspapermen reported details of the Jinan case after theNanjing model. As mentioned above, Toho intensively repeated itsdescriptions of the scenes of looting in its discourse on the Incident,thereby justifying Japan’s military action. It should be noted thatJapanese reports of the looting during the Jinan Incident may not havebeen accurate. Reports from neutral sources, such as the ManchesterGuardian67 and The New York Times, failed to confirm the looting, andcontemporary scholars have also been unable to verify whether thelooting took place and, if it did, its intensity.68 Japanese propagandistsmay have fabricated the looting in order to portray events in Jinanas a second Nanjing Incident in the media. Even if the looting didoccur, repeatedly reporting it made for effective propaganda, sinceit resonated with foreigners’ experiences in Nanjing and reaffirmedtheir impression of China’s ‘barbarism’.

The Japanese-controlled news institutions also repeated argumentsfrom the Nanjing case. While looting in the Nanjing Incident wasbelieved to have been started by rebelling communists within theGuomindang army, the communist element and the internal chaoswere introduced in Japan’s reporting on the Jinan affair, despite thefact that Chiang had excluded the communists from the NorthernExpedition Army in 1927.69 Immediately after the conflict on 3 May,Toho claimed that the looting had been planned by Feng Yuxiang,a ‘communist general hidden in the nationalist armies’. According

67 H. I. Timperley’s eye-witness report on the Jinan Incident can be found in‘Japanese Troops Isolated’, Manchester Guardian (5 May 1928).

68 Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 199–200; Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, pp.703–705.

69 Elleman, B. A. (2009). Moscow and the Emergence of Communist Power in China,1925–30: The Nanchang Uprising and the Birth of the Red Army, Routledge, New York, pp.65–79.




to Toho, disturbances were created in order to overthrow Chiang’sauthority.70

Nonetheless, Japan’s strategy of linking the two incidents hadits drawbacks. It invited readers to question Japan’s expedition toShandong in the first place. While the Nanjing Incident was initiallya clash between Chinese soldiers and Western civilians, the JinanIncident was, in fact, a battle between Chinese and Japanese troops.The existence of Japanese troops in Jinan had brought about thepossibility of a military clash. Without a good reason for reinforcingtroops in Jinan, Japan’s claim to be a victim remained weak since theIncident could easily be perceived as trouble Japan brought on itself.

Justifying the Japanese expedition to Shandong was more difficultthan explaining Japan’s attack in Jinan. It could be argued that theexpedition was a result of the inability of the civil government—ledby Tanaka Giichi—to rein in military ambitions. China and Japan hadopportunities to avoid confrontation in Jinan and both governmentsmade attempts to do so. From the autumn of 1927, Chiang Kai-shekhad made several attempts to persuade Japan not to intervene inShandong. He had repeatedly guaranteed that he would not tolerateanti-foreign activities by his troops and had given assurances that hewould work to protect the lives and property of foreigners in China.71

To seek further amity with Japan, Chiang replaced the Western-educated Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Chaoshu with the Japanese-educated Huang Fu in February 1928, even though some top leadersin Nanjing strongly opposed Huang’s appointment.72 Meanwhile, theTanaka cabinet also hesitated before dispatching more troops to Jinan.Neither the prime minister nor the general staff were fully convincedthat the expedition was necessary for the protection of Japanesenationals.73 However, the military had its own views on the subject.Pressure from the War Ministry finally forced Tanaka to sanction theexpedition in mid-April 1928.

70 Toho’s reports on the Jinan Incident, quoted in ‘How the Japanese Reported theTsinan Incident’, China Weekly Review.

71 MacMurry to the Secretary of the State (13 April 1928), United StatesDepartment of State (1928). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,volume 2, pp. 130–131. Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao bianzuan weiyuanhui (1978).Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (Jan–Jun 1928) [The historical record of the RepublicanChina], Zhongzheng shuju, Taipei, p. 503.

72 MacMurry to the Secretary of the State (29 February 1928), United StatesDepartment of State (1928). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,volume 2, pp. 323–324.

73 Iriya, After Imperialism, p. 196.



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Japan’s propaganda also faced challenges from its domesticaudience. On 5 May, Tokyo newspapers, with the exception ofNichi Nichi, blamed the Japanese government’s hostile policy for theconflict in Jinan.74 They believed that Japan’s dispatch of forcesto Shandong, instead of protecting Japanese property, had severelyharmed trade with China. Japanese commercial interests in Shandong,which ‘amounted to no less than $440,000,000 for the current fiscalyear’, ‘were too large to incur the ill-will of the Chinese, who were theirbest customers’.75 Furthermore, some argued that the troops whichwere intended to protect the inhabitants only provided other forceswith a pretext to attack. They maintained that the trouble could havebeen avoided had no Japanese troops been present.76 If the intention toprotect the Japanese nationals was genuine, challenged the domesticpapers, the government could have temporarily relocated Japanesecivilians to the nearby city of Qingdao instead of leaving them inJinan to face possible military conflict.77 The Japanese propagandamachine was thus caught in a dilemma: the more Japanese nationalssuffered in the Jinan Incident, the more Japan could blame Chinafor its ‘barbarism’ and thus justify its use of force, but at the sametime, casualties among Japanese nationals would enrage the domesticpublic. The War Office was believed to have tried to withhold reportson Japanese casualties for fear that ‘publication of exceptionally heavyJapanese civilian losses would have a detrimental effect politicallythroughout the country’.78

The opposing views in Japan’s domestic papers reflected a generaldisagreement on the government’s shift in foreign policy. While theprevious Minister of Foreign Affairs Shidehara Kijuro had pursueda non-interventionist policy towards China, seeking good relationsthrough trade and economic cooperation, the newly inauguratedcabinet led by Tanaka Giichi tended to deal with the rising Chinesenationalist government by force. The sharp change of strategy wasnot welcomed by those in financial circles, especially in the Kansairegion. Distrusting the capacity of northern warlords to maintaincontrol, they also feared that Japan’s military actions would alienatethe Nationalist Party and thus affect their trade with China after the

74 ‘Tokyo Papers Blame Cabinet’, The New York Times (6 May 1928); ‘Comment ofPress’, China Press (6 May 1928).

75 ‘Correspondence’, China Press (17 May 1928).76 ‘Press Criticism of Tanaka’, The New York Times (7 May 1928).77 ‘Press Criticism of Tanaka’, The New York Times.78 ‘Says Tokio Hide Casualties’, The New York Times (6 May 1928).




Party seized power.79 They believed that Japan’s limited interestsin Jinan were not worth running the risk of unfavourable traderelations with China in the future. However, they were unawarethat the government had its own plans. Their goal in interveningin Jinan was to protect Japan’s larger interests in Manchuria. Foryears, Japan had been strengthening its control over the region bysupporting the local warlord Zhang Zuolin. By facing the approachingNationalist army, Tanaka sought to prevent Chiang from reachingManchuria. Reinforcing Japanese troops in Jinan was in part a strategyto demonstrate the government’s determination to protect its treatyrights and to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas and practicesin North China.80

Meanwhile, Zhang Zuolin also sought to reap political benefits fromthe Jinan Incident. His participation in the propaganda battle furthercomplicated Japan’s position. Although Japan insisted that its action inJinan was taken solely to protect its nationals, Zhang tried to embroilJapan in China’s internal struggles through the media. Soon after theIncident began, Zhang distributed a message to the press, offeringto assist Japan with arms and ammunition.81 His offer immediatelyraised people’s suspicions about Japan’s connections with the Beijinggovernment. Rumours began to circulate in the press that Japan wasusing the Jinan Incident to assist the northern army. However, Zhang’sstatement was not a genuine offer to help Japan. Throughout theJinan Incident, Zhang exhibited an ambiguous stance, making him anunreliable ally for both Japan and the Nanjing government. Two daysafter his announcement, Zhang did an about turn and issued a protestto the Japanese diplomats in Beijing, demanding that Japanese troopswithdraw from Chinese territory.82 On 9 May, he circulated anothermessage announcing a temporary cessation of the civil war due to theSino-Japanese conflict.83

79 Zhang Qun (1980). Wo yu Riben qishi nian [My seventy years with Japan], ZhongRi guanxi yanjiu hui, Taipei, p. 36

80 Nish, I. (2002). Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, Greenwood PublishingGroup, Westport, p. 60; Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy, p. 118.

81 ‘Chang Tso-Lin’s Offer’, The Times (5 May 1928).82 ‘Chang Protest to Japan’, The New York Times (6 May 1928).83 ‘Chang Tso-lin Favours Truce between North and South before Tsinan’, North

China Daily News (10 May 1928).



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China’s dilemma

In 1928 China was unfavourably positioned in the court of publicopinion. Two features characterized its image in the Western press,the first being underdevelopment and disorder, the second beinganti-foreignism. China’s anti-imperialist passions had peaked in the1920s. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen wrote nationalism into the ThreePeople’s Principles, which became the guidelines for the NationalistParty. The aim of this nationalism was to overthrow imperialismand achieve racial and national equality with the other nations ofthe world.84 In 1925, the May Thirtieth Movement elevated anti-foreign sentiment, particularly against the British, to new heights.85

The 1926 Northern Expedition constituted further aggravation. WithBolshevik support, the National Revolutionary Army had reclaimedthe British settlements of Hankou and Jiujiang and had alsothreatened foreign lives and property after taking Nanjing. Theseevents convinced Western audiences that Nationalist armies werelikely to be responsible for another anti-foreign incident in Jinan.

Nevertheless, leaders in Nanjing clearly understood that China, as aweak country, could not afford to confront all the foreign powers at thesame time. With regard to events in Jinan, the Nanjing governmentsingled out Japan as its sole enemy and was anxious to seek amity withWestern powers, in particular looking to Britain and the United Statesto check Japan’s aggression through mediation. Chiang was concernedto have Britain on side in the event that diplomatic efforts failedand China was forced to confront Japan militarily.86 Furthermore,following the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek was keen toestablish his government’s prestige and gain international recognitionfor his regime. These aims required a shift in diplomatic paradigmfrom anti-imperialism generally, particularly against Britain, to afocus on Japan.

This shift was not an easy one to make. With anti-foreign sentimentrunning high among the Chinese public, any party in China hoping togain popular support understood the need to address public angertowards imperialism and mobilize it for their own use. Both the

84 Sun Yat-sen, (1928). San Min Zhu Yi [Three People’s Principles], CommercialPress, Shanghai.

85 Rigby, R. (1980). The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes, Australian NationalUniversity Press, Canberra, pp. 112–113.

86 Shi lue gao ben, p. 300.




Nationalist Party and the communists understood this. Even thewarlords who secretly looked for support from imperialist powersconsistently adopted anti-foreign positions to gain public support.Although Chiang severed relations with the Soviets after eliminatingthe communist element in the Nationalist army and adopted amoderate attitude towards foreign countries, he could not affordto abandon anti-imperialist rhetoric completely. Campaigns againstextraterritoriality continued and negotiations over the control of tariffrates dominated China’s diplomacy.

Not all Guomindang leaders supported Chiang’s overtures to theWest. For example, Li Shizeng, one of the top leaders of the Party,tried to dissuade Chiang from reporting the Jinan Incident to theLeague of Nations, regarding such an effort as futile.87 Other left-wing members of the Nationalist Party, in their continuous oppositionto Chiang, condemned his resort to the League as ‘begging for mercy’(qi lian) and betraying the Party’s anti-imperialist tradition. Aneditorial in the Ge Ming Ping Lun, an official paper of Guomindangleftists, exemplifies this attitude:

How stupid and humiliating it is to beg other imperialist powers to help Chinaout of Japan’s threat! . . . There is no fundamental difference between Japanand other imperialist countries. The only difference is that Japan acted moredirectly while other powers coerced China in a concealed manner. Whicheverway they pursue, their goal is the same, that is, to obtain special rights inChina.88

The opinion of the English-language press in the treaty-ports

While China and Japan were trying hard to influence opinion inthe treaty-ports, the Westerners in these cities were not a passiveaudience. They had their own interests to serve. Many Britons in thetreaty ports feared China’s acts might lead the foreign powers torelinquish their special rights in China, one after another. In the caseof Jinan, Japan’s defence of its interests in Shandong strengthenedimperialist ends in China more generally. China’s underdevelopmentand lawlessness, as emphasized by Japan, not only justified Japan’s

87 Li Shizeng to Zhang Jingjiang and Huang Fu (13 May 1928), quoted in Shen,Yiyun huiyi, p. 384.

88 Xing Cun (1928). ‘Jinan shijian zhi waibao yulun’ [Foreign newspapers’ opinionson the Jinan Incident], Ge Ming Ping Luni, volume 3, p. 53.



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military action, but also offered all imperialists a reason to maintaintheir involvement in China—to teach China how to behave.89 Despitethe end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1923 as the result of theWashington Conference, in the 1920s, when competition between thetwo countries was not as great as it would later become, they stillsaw each other as allies rather than as enemies. When their interestswere threatened by Chinese nationalism or the growing influence ofthe United States, many people on both sides quietly hoped for thereturn of the alliance.90 Yet for American progressives, who saw anindependent and open China as the best market for American exportsas well as a means to check Japan’s rise in the Pacific,91 events in Jinanprovided them with a chance to attack foreign intervention in China’saffairs. These divergent goals translated into views split between theBritish and American press in the treaty ports: the British pressstrongly upheld the Japanese argument, whereas American papersdisplayed sympathy for China’s cause.

The support of British papers for Japan was explicit.92 They acceptedboth Japan’s version of the facts and its rationale. In early May, the twolargest English-language papers in China—the North China Daily Newsand the China Press—both endorsed the Japanese version of events.A cursory glance at the headlines of their reports indicates that thepapers firmly followed the Japanese line: ‘Chiang Kai-shek Reportedto be Powerless to Control Undisciplined Soldiers Who Have GotOut of Hand in City’,93 ‘Outburst of Looting by Southern Troops’,94

‘Japan Losing Patience under Calumnies of Nanjing’.95 It was acceptedprofessional practice for a journal to report a controversial issue usingphrases such as ‘alleged by’. Yet this caution was absent when thepapers quoted Japanese sources. In contrast, Chinese sources were

89 Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 22–66.90 Hosoya Chihiro (1982). ‘Britain and the United States in Japan’s View of

the International System, 1919–1937’, and Nish, I. ‘Japan in Britain’s View of theInternational System, 1919–1937’, in Nish, I. Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919–1952,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 3–57; Nish, I. (1972). Alliance in Decline:a Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908–1923, Athlone Press, London.

91 Sokolsky, G. E. (1932). The Tinder Box of Asia, Doubleday, Doran & Company,New York; Crow, C. (1937). Four Hundred Million Customers, Harper Brothers, NewYork.

92 ‘British papers’ refer to papers owned and operated by British citizens whosupported British interests in China. The most popular ones during the period underexamination are the North China Daily News and the China Press.

93 China Press (4 May 1928).94 North China Daily News (5 May 1928).95 North China Daily News (15 May 1928).




usually labelled as ‘unfounded’. As noted earlier, between 4 May and15 May, when the Incident was at its height, only 8.3 per cent ofreports in the China Press derived from Chinese sources. AlthoughChina’s inability to offer English-language updates on the event waspartly responsible for this, the omission of a Chinese voice was morethe result of deliberate choice. The editor of the North China DailyNews stated that ‘we are inundated with correspondence, manifestoes,student resolutions, copies of telegrams sent abroad, all putting theChinese view of the Tsinanfu affair. . . [But] we regret to say that wecannot open our columns to propaganda of this kind’.96

The Japanese strategy of linking the Jinan Incident with earlierevents in Nanjing was also welcomed by British editors. The North ChinaDaily News endorsed the view that the two incidents were connected,believing that events in Jinan were the Guomindang’s ‘attempt toreproduce the Nanking outrage as the result of the recent diplomaticindulgence in negotiations for a settlement of that affair’.97 Withthe Nanjing Incident unresolved and anti-British sentiment runninghigh for the previous five years, the British were sympathetic to theJapanese explanation. They trusted Japanese sources not becausethey found them more persuasive, but because the looting and otheratrocities described by Japan vividly reminded them of their ownunhappy experiences with China and they believed that such thingswere very likely to happen again. ‘It would be idle to deny,’ confessedthe editor of the North China Daily News, ‘that some of the Southerntroops have a bad reputation for looting and arrogance. At a crisis likethe present, this cannot be ignored.’98 The China Press also supportedthis view, saying that:

Undisciplined [Nationalist] soldiers on nearly every occasion seem to getbeyond the control of their commanders. At Hankow, at Nanking, in Nantaoand Chapei, to mention only the instances of the past year, scenes ofcarnage, chaos and indiscriminate brigandage have characterized everychange of government. Innocent citizens have been shot down, valuableproperty burned, and in other ways the terrible toll of warfare has been madeneedlessly more horrible. Now Tsinan is suffering from the same degradinglawlessness.99

96 ‘The Chinese View of Tsinan’, North China Daily News (10 May 1928).97 ‘From Rodney Gilbert’, North China Daily News (5 May 1928).98 ‘Notes and Comments: The Responsibility at Tsinan’, North China Daily News (9

May 1928).99 ‘A Repetition of Nanking?’, China Press (May 5, 1928).



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The British papers also upheld Japan’s justification for its expeditionto Shandong. They intimated that ‘after the experiences of the Britishin China, it is difficult to be very censorious over the decision ofthe Japanese government to defend the lives and property of theirnationals by the dispatch of troops’.100 They believed that Japan ‘in hervast interests in Shandong, has every reason for acting in defence of herown’.101 Japan ‘was not only justified in sending troops to protect herpeople and property in Shandong, but would have gravely neglectedher duty if she had not’.102

Although the Jinan Incident was basically a Sino-Japanese affair,the British community also used it as an opportunity to vent itsanti-Chinese views. Criticism went well beyond the Incident itself,expanding to a condemnation of the Chinese nation. The Britishpress believed that the Jinan Incident only reaffirmed China’sunderdeveloped status and its uncivilized nature. ‘Now and again,’stated the China Press, ‘the foreign residents of China are jerked backa few centuries to be reminded that, however modern living conditionsin Shanghai may have been made, they are still living on the fringe ofa civilization which is back in the Middle Ages.’103 Thus, the troublein Jinan, instead of being caused by Japan, was invited by China itself.The editor of the North China Daily News sarcastically commented that:

The Chinese have only themselves to thank that many of their nationals aredead and the prospects of the northern campaign gravely imperilled. And thequestion arises, will the Chinese never learn sense? What good did they dothemselves by the raid on Hankow? The Concession was left to them. Butthe moral ascendancy, the honour due to those who could have hit back anddid not, passed to Great Britain. What good did the Nanjing outrages do?What could it have profited even if the Southern army in Tsinan had wipedout every Japanese in the place? By every one of these Incidents the Chineseleaders put themselves a stage lower in the eyes of the civilized world andremove their country yet further from that position of acknowledged equalityin the family of nations which they so ardently desire.104

The anti-Chinese stance, common among the British and Japanesepapers, was not without its disagreements however. When Japanbombed Jinan on 8 May and decided to dispatch more troops

100 ‘North and South May Sink Differences and Unite in Present Situation’, ChinaPress (8 May 1928).

101 ‘The Chinese View of Tsinan’, North China Daily News (10 May 1928).102 ‘The Judgement on Tsinan’, North China Herald (16 May 1928).103 ‘A Repetition of Nanking?’, China Press (5 May 1928).104 ‘The Tsinanfu Explosion’, North China Daily News (7 May 1928).




to Shandong, the British papers shifted their pro-Japanese stanceslightly, suggesting then that Japan’s actions were unwarranted. Eventhough the British community was ready to accept Japan’s versionof events and blame China for starting the clash, it still viewed anyescalation unfavourably, fearing that the Sino-Japanese fighting couldextend to a new round of anti-foreign activities in China. In an editorialof 11 May, the editor of the North China Daily News called for a jointinvestigation into the Incident in order to make possible an immediatesettlement. The paper also approved of Nanjing’s reaction to theIncident for the first time, commending it for localizing the dispute andsuccessfully preventing popular outbursts in the region.105 Editorialcolumns, in which pro-Chinese comments had previously been rejectedas propaganda,106 now began to report Chinese voices and to quoteprotests against the British bias towards Japan.107 Meanwhile, thepaper became cautious about further Japanese moves. It advised Japanto minimize its military operations,108 and cited rumours from thetreaty ports that Japan’s action in Jinan was aimed at intervening inChina’s civil war in the hope of gaining a favourable position to secureits Manchurian interests.109

The China Weekly Review and the Peking Leader, two of the mostpopular American-owned papers, had taken a decisively anti-Japaneseattitude from the outset, disagreeing with the account of the Incidentprovided by the Japanese authorities. Rather than relying on Japanesereports, the China Weekly Review relayed the information provided byH. J. Timperley, Beijing correspondent for the Manchester Guardian,regarding his version of events as ‘the first impartial accounts by aneutral witness’.110 Timperley’s reports on the Incident differed fromJapanese versions. Before the Incident, he characterized the initialSouthern troops’ occupation of Jinan as ‘peaceful’ and ‘exemplary’.He also confirmed that Chiang’s soldiers were ‘friendly disposedtoward foreigners’.111 Regarding the origins of the clash on 3 May,

105 ‘An Atmosphere of Reasonableness’, North China Daily News (11 May 1928).106 See editors’ explanations for their rejection of Chinese sources in ‘The Chinese

View of Jinan’, North China Daily News (10 May 1928).107 ‘Correspondence: A Chinese Voice’, China Press (12 May 1928).108 ‘Japanese Press for Early Withdrawal’, North China Daily News (13 May 1928).109 ‘The Chinese War: Japanese Hint to Chang’, The Times (21 May 1928); ‘The

Situation in North China’, North China Daily News (23 May 1928).110 ‘The Clash between the Nationalist and the Japanese in Tsinan’, China Weekly

Review (12 May 1928).111 ‘The Clash between the Nationalist and the Japanese in Tsinan’, China Weekly

Review.



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Timperley claimed that the fighting began when Japanese soldiersfired on Nationalist troops passing by in the street. Instead of regardingthe fighting as the result of looting, he saw the confrontation asa continuation of a series of Sino-Japanese clashes, including theshooting of a Nationalist officer on the previous day and the detentionof Nationalist street lecturers by the Japanese.112

Apart from quoting non-Japanese sources, the China Weekly Reviewalso condemned the British papers’ support for Japan, believing thatthey had assisted in the dissemination of Japanese propaganda. In afront-page editorial on 12 May, the Review singled out the three Britishdailies—the North China Daily News, the China Press, and the ShanghaiTimes—for having lined up with Japan ‘without awaiting reports fromAmerican and British or other neutral sources in Tsinan’.113 Thereadiness displayed by the three British newspapers in Shanghai toblame China for the trouble, stated the Review, ‘indicated that “die-hard” stock in Shanghai is again on the up-turn’.114 In the next issueon 19 May, the journal continued to criticise the British papers,arguing that the Jinan Incident was ‘unfairly reported in the ChinaPress’.115 The Peking Leader, while not accusing the British papers ofsympathy for Japan, warned those papers to treat Japanese sourceswith caution. Whatever the causes, commented the Leader, the caseitself had inevitably stirred furious feelings between China and Japan.Their passion may have resulted in grossly exaggerated reports of whathappened on the ground. In such circumstances, warned the Leader, itwas ‘peculiarly necessary to exercise caution both in accepting as validreports which may be circulated and in voicing condemnation of oneside or the other’.116

Besides challenging Japanese sources, the Review also disagreedwith Japan’s claim to be fighting in Jinan for ‘self-protection’. Thepaper perceived the presence of Japanese troops as the factor thatbrought about the clash. ‘The presence of a comparatively largearmed Japanese force on Chinese soil, cheek by jowl with somethinglike a hundred thousand Nationalists flushed with victory,’ arguedthe Review, ‘created an atmosphere which rendered some kind of an

112 ‘The Clash between the Nationalist and the Japanese in Tsinan’, China WeeklyReview.

113 ‘Foreign Die-hard Press Blames Chinese’, China Weekly Review (12 May 1928).114 ‘Foreign Die-hard Press Blames Chinese’, China Weekly Review.115 ‘Correspondence’, China Weekly Review (19 May 1928).116 Comments from the Peking Leader quoted in the China Weekly Review (19 May

1928), p. 364.




explosion inevitable’.117 This view was endorsed by Hallet Abend inhis article in the Leader, in which he claimed that whatever had startedthe clash, it had only triggered the explosion of tension rather thancreating it.118 Grover Clark, editor of the Leader, believed that theJapanese commander, knowing of the tensions inside Jinan, couldhave averted serious disturbance. ‘There certainly would have beenno clash,’ argued Clark, ‘if he [General Fukuda Hikosuke] had movedhis troops and the civilians only a few miles down the railway towardsTsingdao and kept them there until the main body of the southernarmy had moved on northward.’119

The Review also saw the Nanjing Incident in 1927 as insufficientjustification for the Japanese reaction in Jinan. During the NanjingIncident, argued the journal, both the American and Britishgovernments had advised their nationals to evacuate prior to theevent.120 In contrast, Japan had made no effort to evacuate itsnationals before dispatching troops to Jinan. Thus Japan took theaction ‘deliberately’ for the purpose of ‘creating trouble’.121

Disagreement over the facts and justifications put forward byJapanese sources aroused suspicion of Japan’s motives in theseAmerican papers. Several explanations were popular. The Americaneditors saw the Incident as an effort by Japan to block the advanceof Nationalist troops and assist the warlords in Beijing. They alsoexplained to readers that the Incident was created to ‘shift theJapanese people’s attention to the foreign complication’ so as toturn attention away from Japan’s troubled domestic politics.122

Furthermore, the editors argued that by clashing with the Nationalistgovernment, Japan hoped to extract some concession from theNationalists and win a favourable position in negotiations over itsspecial interests in Shandong and Manchuria and over the tariffproblem.123

117 ‘Presence of Japanese Troops Made Tsinan Clash Inevitable’, China WeeklyReview (19 May 1928).

118 Quotes of Abend’s comments from the Leader (May 1928), ‘In the Orient View:A Survey of the Periodical Press of China and Japan’, Pacific Affairs 1:1, pp. 22–23.

119 Leader, ‘In the Orient View’.120 ‘Tanaka’s Shandung Adventure a Failure from Every Possible Point of View!’,

China Weekly Review (26 May 1928).121 ‘Tanaka’s Shandung Adventure a Failure from Every Possible Point of View!’,

China Weekly Review.122 ‘Reason for Japan’s intervention’, China Weekly Review (19 May 1928).123 ‘Reason for Japan’s intervention’, China Weekly Review; ‘The Japanese Version’,

China Weekly Review (12 May 1928).



218 S H U G E W E I

While China lacked its own English-language network to presentits case, the American treaty-port papers provided a channel for apro-Chinese voice to the outside world. But the effect was limited.The American treaty-port journals were less popular than the British-operated dailies. Compared to the North China Daily News, which soldabout 8,000 copies daily,124 the China Weekly Review had a circulation ofonly 4,000–5,000 per week.125 In addition, China’s weak news networkwas unable to supply an adequate number of credible reports at criticaltimes. As a result, the Review failed to compete effectively with theJapanese and British papers in the treaty ports and make its voiceheard in the metropolitan papers.

Opinion of The Times, Manchester Guardian, andThe New York Times

The views presented in the British treaty-port press were largelyechoed by the largest newspaper in London, The Times, althoughthe paper was less decided in venting anti-Chinese sentiment. Asa paper representing British business interests, it supported Japan’sjustification of its actions in Jinan. It reported the Incident as resultingfrom looting by Chinese soldiers.126 The editorial on 5 May gave adetailed account of the start of the clash: ‘Looting of Japanese propertyby individuals followed, and when the Japanese battalion stationedin the quarter interfered, 2,000 Nationalist soldiers quartered closeat hand came to the rescue of the criminals and opened fireon the Japanese troops.’127 The editorial continued to commendthe Japanese government for treating the Incident ‘with sobrietyand sound judgement’, and blamed the escalation of fighting onthe Guomindang whose passion had gone ‘beyond bounds’.128 Thenewspaper’s correspondent also saw the conflict as a repeat of theNanjing Incident by the undisciplined Nationalist soldiers and rejectedthe explanation offered by Nanjing:

124 Chao, The Foreign Press in China, p. 53.125 Chao, The Foreign Press in China, p. 76.126 ‘Fighting in Shandong’, The Times (4 May 1928); ‘Looting at Tsinan’, The Times

(4 May 1928); ‘The Tsinanfu Outrage’, The Times (7 May 1928).127 ‘The Chinese Puzzle,’ The Times (5 May 1928).128 ‘The Chinese Puzzle,’ The Times.




Some of the Nationalist troops at Tsinanfu were formerly in Chang Chien’sdivision, which committed the outrages at Nanjing, and are now commandedby a general who was ejected from Canton under the Communist outbreakof last December. . . The Nanking Foreign Minister’s version of the origin ofthe outbreak and his statement of the Japanese troops are not regardedby foreigners here as credible. Barbarous conduct is incompatible withthe strict discipline of the Japanese Army. . . It is a matter of universalcomment here that the career of the Nationalist Army has been markedby outrageous conduct in many places, and that is easy to believe that it hasbeen guilty of further atrocities. In fact, the Nationalist Government, insteadof making frank amends for the Nanking outrages, has endeavoured to evaderesponsibility by making unfounded counter-charges against foreigners andto instil the bitterest anti-foreign feeling into the Army. It will need a greatdeal of evidence to the contrary to shake the conviction that the Tsinanfuoutbreak is the work of the powerful extremist element which pervades thewhole Nationalist movement, and is as active today as it was when Borodinwas present in person to lead it.129

However, most of the paper’s discussion of the Incidentfocused on the event itself, rarely venturing to criticise China’sunderdevelopment and lawlessness as had the press in the treatyports. The paper did not seek to interpret the Incident as an outburstof anti-foreign anger by ordinary Chinese soldiers at the front, butbelieved that it was staged by extremist leaders in the Guomindanggovernment who intended to use the Jinan outrage, together withthe Nanjing Incident, to exert pressure on foreign powers to makeconcessions in the revision of the treaties.130

The stance taken by Times, however, was not fully shared by theManchester Guardian, a platform for liberal and left-wing opinion. TheGuardian’s take on the Incident was ambiguous. Drawing on the Britishexperience in dealing with the National Revolutionary Army, the papersympathized with Japan’s pre-emptive action to protect its nationalsand their property:

The situation is almost exactly that which had been feared might arise whenBritish troops were sent to defend Shanghai, and probably would have arisenhad they been sent to defend the towns along the Yangtze valley, where Britishlives and property were in danger from uncontrolled soldiery. . . Persons canbe withdrawn if transport is arranged in time, but property cannot, and afterour own experience it is difficult to be very censorious over the decision of

129 ‘The Tsinanfu Outrage’, The Times.130 ‘Japan and China: Severe Fighting in Shandong’, The Times (9 May 1928).



220 S H U G E W E I

the Japanese Government to defend both lives and property by the dispatchof troops.131

However, while acknowledging that Japan was following the Britishmodel and demonstrating to the Guomindang government thatforeign powers had not forgotten previous outrages and insults, thepaper was not satisfied with Japan’s supervision of its troops in Jinan.132

It complained that Japan did not follow the British model completely,and had failed to limit the extent of its reaction as Britain had done inthe Nanjing case. While the British government had the wisdom andmoderation to resist appeals to exact revenge for the Nanjing outrage,the Japanese did not.133 The Japanese army unwarrantedly bombedJinan in 8 May and reinforced its troops in Shandong.134 All thesecontinued to fuel the tension.

The Guardian expressed similar ambiguous attitudes towardsChina’s case. The paper quoted Reuters’ reports to give Japan’s sideof the story and relied on Timperley, its correspondent in Beijing, tocover the Chinese side. Timperley, as mentioned above, blamed Japanfor starting the fighting. He also quoted Huang Fu’s protest againstJapan’s killing of the entire staff of China’s Foreign Bureau in Jinanand mutilation of the Chinese Foreign Commissioner Cai Gongshi,material often neglected by other papers who viewed it as Chinesepropaganda.135 He reaffirmed that Chiang’s troops had ‘showed keendesire to avoid any appearance of anti-foreignism’136 and testified thatBritons and Americans in Jinan were not disturbed by the southerntroops.137 However, the paper also blamed the low fighting capacitiesof the National Revolutionary Army:

The great numbers of the Nationalist armies could not make up for theirhopeless inferiority in military training and equipment. The Japanese coulddoubtless seize and hold the whole province of Shantung, if they have a mindto, without extraordinary exertion.138

131 ‘China and Japan,’ Manchester Guardian (7 May 1928).132 ‘Chang Tso-Lin’s Peace Move’, Manchester Guardian (13 May 1928).133 ‘From Bad to Worse’, Manchester Guardian (9 May 1928).134 ‘China and the Powers’, Manchester Guardian (15 May 1928).135 ‘Japanese Troops Isolated’, Manchester Guardian (5 May 1928); ‘The Clash

in Shantung’, Manchester Guardian (6 May 1928); ‘Japanese Action in Shantung’,Manchester Guardian (7 May 1928).

136 ‘What Happened at Tsinanfu’, Manchester Guardian (11 May 1928).137 ‘Japanese Action in Shantung’, Manchester Guardian (7 May 1928).138 ‘From Bad to Worse’, Manchester Guardian (9 May 1928).




Although looting was not regarded as the cause of the fighting, thepaper still believed that it had exacerbated the conflict and reaffirmedChiang’s lack of control.139 Such suspicions of Chiang’s authority aswell as the capabilities of his army were a heavy blow to the prestigeof the Nanjing regime, whose authority at the time rested primarilyon military power.

Indeed, the paper refrained from making a judgement on the casebut saw the fighting as a ‘natural and almost inevitable consequence’of long-term Sino-Japanese tensions.140 The paper was more worriedabout the outcome of the Incident than interested in determining thecause of it, fearing that the Incident would spark a new round of theanti-foreign movement in China:

With the Japanese firmly entrenched in Shantung one may expect a renewalof the demand that Great Britain should assert herself more firmly in theYangtze Valley. There may be a recrudescence of the policy of parcellingChina into spheres of influence which before the war threatened not onlythe integrity of China but the good relations of the grabbing Powers. Anti-foreign sentiment, which is almost as strong in the Northern armies as inthe Southern, will be inflamed everywhere, and we may look for a renewal ofboycotts and other manifestations of hostility.141

In contrast, although the American treaty-port papers challengedthe Japanese interpretation, their views do not appear to have foundtheir way into newspapers back in the United States. The prominentAmerican newspaper The New York Times maintained a largely neutralstance on the Jinan Incident, with slight indications of sympathy forthe Japanese cause. Unlike most of the foreign press, which gainedits information on the Jinan event from Reuters and Toho, The NewYork Times derived its facts from the Associated Press news agency andfrom its own Chinese correspondents, namely Henry F. Misselwitzand Hallet Abend. All these sources took a cautiously balanced view,giving space to accounts from both sides. Yet the paper still reportednews from Japanese sources when they were the only news providersof the event. After fighting broke out on 3 May, for example, theJapanese side of the story dominated coverage of the fighting. Japanesecasualties were reported frequently,142 while details of Chinese losses

139 ‘Japanese Troops Isolated’, Manchester Guardian (5 May 1928).140 ‘China and Japan’, Manchester Guardian (7 May 1928).141 ‘From Bad to Worse’, Manchester Guardian (9 May 1928).142 ‘Many Japanese Killed’, The New York Times (4 May 1928); ‘Japanese Charge

Atrocities’, The New York Times (6 May 1928); ‘Tokyo Plans to Send New Force toChina’, The New York Times (7 May 1928).



222 S H U G E W E I

were seldom mentioned. Chinese soldiers were portrayed as ruthlesskillers who slaughtered Japanese civilians143 and burned and buriedJapanese soldiers alive,144 whereas similar charges against Japan,which were popular in China’s domestic papers, were absent fromthe foreign press.

The New York Times was critical of both Japan and China. Editorsof the paper were not convinced by the Japanese explanation thatthe fighting was started by prearranged looting. They saw Japanesereports on the looting and the subsequent Chinese atrocities simplyas an effort to ‘make a second Nanking Incident out of the affair’.145

Neither did they agree that Japan had staged the fight to block theadvance of Nationalist troops, since ‘Japan has quite enough problemson her hands at the moment to avoid new ones and no war could beas useful to her for some years as a period of peace.’146 The paper sawthe Incident more as ‘spontaneous quarrels’ arising in times of acutetension, and urged a settlement of the conflict as soon as possible.147

The anger towards Japan found in the American treaty-port papers,however, was absent.

Aftermath

The Jinan Incident shaped the Guomindang government’s foreignpropaganda policies in future Sino-Japanese conflicts. During theMukden Incident in September 1931, instead of trying to negotiatewith Japanese generals at the front, the government immediatelysought to publicize Japan’s invasion by seeking mediation from theLeague of Nations. In addition, the need for powerful propagandamachinery was keenly felt among the officials in Nanjing afterthe Jinan Incident. Cai Yuanpei and Tan Yankai, for example,concluded that China’s inadequate propaganda during the JinanIncident was caused by its lack of news facilities and networks andproposed that the Nanjing government establish a centralized foreignpropaganda institution and found English-language newspapers and

143 ‘Many Japanese Killed’, The New York Times.144 ‘Reported Burned to Death’, The New York Times (7 May 1928).145 ‘Japanese Charge Atrocities’, The New York Times.146 ‘British Warships on Way to China’, The New York Times (10 May 1928).147 ‘New Chinese Troubles’, The New York Times (12 May 1928).




news agencies.148 Drawing on the experience in Jinan, foreigndiplomats also repeatedly urged Nanjing to strengthen its foreignpropaganda apparatus so as to improve the image of the Chinesenation and boost the prestige of the Nanjing government.149 AfterChiang Kai-shek overthrew the Beijing government and militarilyunified China, the Nanjing government installed an internationaldivision within the party’s Ministry of Information. The division wasdesigned to supervise the dissemination of information to foreignaudiences in the hope of improving China’s unfavourable internationalimage. In its early days the division did not markedly advance China’sforeign publicity, but when the American-trained Dong Xianguangwas appointed head of this division in the mid-1930s, it became amuch more effective propaganda organ.

Disturbed by foreign newspapers’ interpretations of the JinanIncident, China’s bilingual elites founded an English-language weekly,The China Critic, in Shanghai immediately after the end of the Jinanaffair. The long-term editors of the journal included Gui Zhongshu,Lin Yutang, Ma Yinchu, Liu Dajun, Zhao Minheng, and many otherdistinguished scholars who had received their university degrees in theWest. The editors defined themselves as ‘a small group of Chinese whoare interested in a fair presentation of all issues arising between Chinaand the other powers’, with hopes to ‘prevent the repetition of eventsthat have made the month of May so unhappily memorable [due tothe May Thirtieth Movement and the Jinan Incident]’.150 Liu Dajunalso confirmed in his letter to Hu Shi that the journal was publishedto ‘counter Japan’s harmful propaganda’.151 In the following years thejournal indeed became an important outlet for China to champion itscause in the treaty ports and abroad.

148 Cai Yuanpei and Tan Yankai’s proposal on foreign diplomacy (21 August 1928),the fifth meeting of the second conference of the Central Executive Committee,political files, 6.31.2, the Research Committee of the History of the Guomindang,Taipei.

149 Proposals for improving foreign propaganda (20 March 1929), conference files,3.1/3.12; 3.1/14.17, the Research Committee of the History of the Guomindang,Taipei.

150 ‘Foreword’, The China Critic (31 May 1928).151 Hu Shi (2004). Hu Shi riji quanji, 1928–1930 [Collection of Hu Shi’s diary] Lian

jing chuban gongsi, Taipei, volume 5, p. 417.



224 S H U G E W E I

Conclusion

China was defeated in the foreign propaganda battle over the JinanIncident. Although China made various attempts to present its casein the press, its voice was drowned out by Japanese propaganda.China failed to channel its message effectively to English-languagepapers at home and abroad and its argument failed to win thesupport of the majority of the audience in the treaty ports. Thisfailure can be attributed to China’s disadvantages in text andcontext: China’s inefficient dissemination of news and its indecisivepropaganda policy greatly limited the quantity and quality of itsdiscourse. The precedents of anti-imperialist action both diminishedthe credibility of its news and weakened its argument. Yet behind thesedisadvantages lay the root of the problem—the unsettled politicalsituation. The constant changes of government thwarted China’sofficial and nonofficial efforts to establish a national news network. Thethreat from the northern warlords and China’s intricate relations withthe imperialist powers deterred the Nanjing regime from formulatingdecisive foreign propaganda policies. The lack of coordination withinthe Nanjing government gave rise to inconsistent accounts in thepress. Furthermore, its disputes with Western countries over nationalsovereignty impacted upon public opinion in treaty ports and abroad,estranging the very audience it sought to appeal to.

In contrast, Japan had a strong news network in China and quicklyinstalled its version of events in the media. Its response was swift,consistent, and intensive. It also took the advantage of the NanjingIncident to justify its actions in Jinan.

Opinion in the treaty ports towards the Jinan Incident was splitbetween the British press and American journals, with the formersupporting the Japanese argument and the latter favouring China’scase. However, the support of American papers was unable to bolsterChina’s position in this propaganda battle. It was still the Japanesereports, with the endorsement of the British treaty-port papers, thatwere widely accepted by The Times of London and influenced the viewof The New York Times. Even the Manchester Guardian, which attemptedto give a more balanced view, nevertheless retained an ambiguousattitude to the Incident, largely because of its reliance on reports bythe Japanese agency.

This failure prompted the Nanjing government and non-officialexperts to improve China’s foreign propaganda institutions. Theirefforts would be more severely tested in the 1930s and beyond.


"Beyond the Front Line: China's rivalry with Japan in the English-language press over the Jinan Incident, 1928" Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 48, No.1 (January 2014): 188-224.

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