Beyond imitation and representation: extended comprehension of mimesis in drama education

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Beyond imitation and representation: extended comprehension of mimesis in drama educationBjørn Rasmussena

a Department of Arts and Media Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

To cite this Article Rasmussen, Bjørn(2008) 'Beyond imitation and representation: extended comprehension of mimesis in drama education', Research in Drama Education: The Journal of Applied Theatre and Performance, 13: 3, 307 — 319To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13569780802410673URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569780802410673

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Research in Drama EducationVol. 13, No. 3, November 2008, 307-319

Beyond imitation and representation: extended comprehension of mimesis in drama educationBjørnRasmussen*

Department of Arts and Media Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

In order to understand the complexity of mimesis anddramatic playing, and to perhaps acknowledge a greatvariety of play forms and modes in theatre art anddrama education, one may look beyond hegemonic andhighly restricted understandings of mimesis in arts andsociety. This article will suggest different models ofmimesis that provide possible links between correspondingepistemological views. The article argues that differentunderstandings of mimesis follow the way we positionand value the subject, the object and the symbolic mediumdifferently. The first model of imitation indicates ahierarchical power relation, where the mimetic actrefers to external objectives other than the meaningexpressed in the mimetic act itself. The second model ofrefined representation maintains the hierarchicalrelationship by sophisticated means, adding arepresentational medium. A third model of mimesis asframing underlines a powerful symbolic medium or aestheticpeculiarity, whereas as the model of creative interactionintends to avoid hierarchical relationships and seeks tokeep an open process of interaction between subject,object and medium. The last speculative model of‘masochism’ illustrates the case when the relation betweena subject, an object and the medium collapses, as forexample seen in late modern autobiographical performances.By presenting these models, the intention has been toindicate a framework for drama education that mayrearrange divisions between practice and theory. Apartfrom the different models of mimetic practices, thearticle ends by asserting the important differencebetween practice that is mimetic, and practice where thereis no mimesis. In other words, all forms of mimetic practicemake a difference, and countering what could be named‘anaesthetic indifference’.Keywords: drama; mimesis;arts education

Introduction

In many Western societies, drama teachers experience a lackof recognition and low status in their work. In Norway,many pupils still do not experience regular drama lessonsand, due to lack of training, drama sessions are oflow quality in many cases (Sæbø forthcoming). Oneobvious reason may be the hegemonic tradition of schoolingthat still has little room for aesthetic learning andcreative imagination. This tradition continues to build onthe belief that imposing and imitating pre-given knowledgeis the central task of education. Another and perhapsmore important reason, I believe, may be found bylooking more specifically into the cultural notion ofimitative practice, which can be identified both in theepistemological tradition that dominates schooling aswell as in dramatic arts and drama education. At onelevel, imitative practice in drama education

*Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1356-9783 (print)/ISSN 1470-112X# 2008 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13569780802410673 http://www.informaworld.com

308 B. Rasmussen

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that is concerned with aesthetic and mimetic practice could beseen as a limited application of mimetic practice. Doimitative practices inevitably have a low status, and howmay we claim that drama teachers have a limitedunderstanding of drama as a mimetic practice?

Drama education theory normally underlines two mainclassic understandings of

mimesis since Plato (imitation) and Aristotle(representation) (Bolton 1992; Sæbø 1998), and no researchseems to have investigated whether or not drama teachersunderstand their practices merely as imitative practices. Thephilosophy of mimesis offers a complex understanding ofmimesis as imitation, representation or self-representation(e.g. Taussig1993; Gebauer and Wulf 1995; Diamond 1997; Halliwell 2002).In fact, as Elin Diamond points out, ‘most scholars wantto shear off mimesis from the cruder connotations ofimitation - fakeness, reproduction, resemblance’ (Diamond1997, 3). My experience is, however, that scholars andpractitioners do not always speak the same language and suchnuanced knowledge is not always applied in everyday dramaticpractice. This view is also supported by Gavin Bolton, whothinks (or at least, he thought 16 years ago) that dramateachers have restricted their practice to a notion ofimitation:

I believe it is the notion of drama as imitation that hashad most influence on how we have trained our children indrama. Many teachers adopt this as their principle criterion:‘how close to a resemblance of ‘‘the worlds out there’’ is thechild getting in his acting?’ (Bolton 1992, 1)

Furthermore, this assumption is strengthened by contemporaryphilosophical investiga- tions of mimesis, which reportsthat the meaning of mimesis and imitation have beenwatered down over time. Stephen Halliwell (2002) confirmsthat ‘imitation’ has become widely used as a synonym formimesis, and while ‘imitation’ denoted a lot more than merecopying in the early stages of Western history, mimesishas been limited to the idea of imitation:

[T]he semantics of ‘imitation’ have been considerably narrowedand impoverished in modern usage (and equally, so far as Ican tell, in all modern languages) ... The standard modernsignificance of imitation tends almost inevitably to imply,often with pejorative force, a limited exercise in copying,superficial replication, or counterfeiting of an externally

‘given’ model. (Halliwell 2002, 14)

It is important to see that the reduction of meaning impliedhere applies to both the understanding of mimesis (asimitation) and imitation (as mere copying). With a particularinterest in the ritual and etymology, Wong (2006) alsorecognises the same watering down of the complexity of meaningimplied by the term mimesis. The widespread interpretation ofimitation as ‘false reality’ is probably caused by Plato’stheory of mimesis and imitation articulated in The Republic,a work that has had a massive influence on Western cultureand philosophy. This influence can be identified in, forexample, the grand work of mimesis and literature by ErichAuerbach (1953). The way Auerbach displays realitythrough fiction and literature is critised by laterphilosophers:

He ... fails to recognize the potential inherent inhaving at one’s disposal the means of symbolic expression,which entails the power of interpreting social reality andin that way endowing it with form and meaning. Auerbachdoes not take into account that mimesis in general is a turntoward a world that is by no means identical with empiricalreality. (Gebauer and Wulf 1995, 9)

Finally, it seems that mimesis as imitation orrepresentation of empirical truths naturally makes a linkto the modern movement of positivism, and this concept haseven been re- articulated and defended by late feministtheory (Diamond 1997, vii).

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If such a limited comprehension of mimesis still appearstoday, whether the term used is imitation or representation,the following point has to be made. Though it is evidentthat we always wish to defend imitation as part of dramaticpractice, a limited understanding of mimesis in dramacertainly reduces its aesthetic potential, the scope andforms of drama, and supports the idea that drama is apastime activity, which again weakens its cultural valueand recognition of the practice. We should rediscover orreconstruct a broader and more varied comprehension ofmimetic practice in order to realise the potential of dramaeducation today more fully. This background is importantfor this article.

A second noteworthy implication of imitation indrama education concerns the

instrumentalism of the curriculum, where drama is used as ameans of teaching. While this practice may not be common orsupported by drama teachers, it is continually encouraged bythe educational context. This practice produces a lack ofinterest in, and recognition of, drama education at leastamong artists; in the long run this form of imitativepractice prevents other possible forms of mimeticeducation. A third metalevel of imitation concerns themodernist critique of the way theatre seems to imitateitself through history (Alexander and Seidman 1993),pointing at a rigid art form that copies itsstyles, production forms and discourses, and hence weakensits cultural significance in changing times:

Theatre has ceased to have any significance culturally at all.It has significance for a certain kind of audience, but as partof a debate, as art informing us how to live, or how to think,or what’s going on in the world, it’s completely irrelevant.(Stephen Sewell, in Holgate 1999)

This comment from an Australian renowned artist suggeststhat ‘new’ media such as film and television have replacedtheatre’s role of informing life. The mediatisedsociety challenges or replaces traditional old, ‘live’art forms, and consequently theatre both merges with aswell as resists media technology in the attempt to maintaincultural identity and recognition (Auslander 1999). If itis not, following Auslander, the technology that threatensthe recognition of theatre, it seems that theatre is ratherchallenged by a limited notion of its artistic and

aesthetic possibilities. Following Sewell, film and TVcreate imitative theatre much better than live theatredoes on its own, and hence theatre loses recognition as(imitative) art, as well as in an education that isunderstood as the acquisition of information. Again, weshould re-search for a broader or more varied comprehensionof mimesis that could guide our artistic and educationalpractice today.

Towards new ‘models’ ofmimesisResearchers of mimesis and its etymology (Koller 1954; Else1957; So¨ rbom 1966; Gebauer and Wulf 1995; Halliwell 2002)direct our thinking towards a complex and dualisticmeaning of mimesis. This moves away from imitation andillusion, implying that mimesis is both imitative (less real)and creative (also real):

Reduced to a schematic but nonetheless instructivedichotomy, these varieties of mimetic theory and attitudecan be described as encapsulating a difference between a ‘world-reflecting’ model (for which the ‘mirror’ has been acommon though far from straightforward metaphoricalemblem), and, on the other side, a ‘world-simulating’or ‘world-creating’ conception of artistic presentation.(Halliwell 2002, 23)

Similar to this philosophy of mimesis - and from a quitedifferent position - Gavin Bolton (1998) and many dramateachers have also found that ‘imitation’ is not alwaysappropriate and does not fully explain the play of children.Nor does ‘imitation’ cover the full mimetic

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312 B. Rasmussenpractice of the actor or drama student. In orderto see a fuller range of different comprehensions ofmimesis, and how they may be translated into cultural andaesthetic practices today, post-structuralist theory maybe helpful. Murray (1997) shows how mimesis has beenquestioned and deconstructed as part of a Western culturalbelief system, which included conventional truths ofmimesis as imitation and representation. This critiqueincludes a cultural ‘crisis of representation’, discussedboth in theories of research and arts theory since the1980s (e.g. Denzin 1997). These contributions suggest thatwe have only deconstructed mimesis ontologically, and raisequestions about the hegemonic cultural comprehensions ofmimesis as (only) imitation or representation.

One way of overcoming habitual comprehensions of mimeticpractice is to start by recognising that power relationsexist between the different parts of the mimetic act: themiming subject (S), the mimed object (O), and not leastthe symbolic medium (M) that mediates both subject andobject (Murray 1997; Spariosu 1982, 1984). Such powerrelations are not ontologically given, but representparticular historical practices and thinking. Once this isaccepted, a more dynamic and complex conception of mimesismay appear. I will, therefore, propose several models ofmimesis that indicate the shifting weight and power of thesubject (for example the actor), that which is represented(the mediated product) and the object (the reference, thetext). The representation is understood here as theperformed drama, implying both the aesthetic medium(drama) and its embodied performed expression. As we shallsee, this representation is not always a representation of asubject or object. It may, however, be understood as arepresentation of the specific aesthetic mediated practice(M). Although the models also apply to the spectator as animportant subject/object in theatre, for this discussion Iwill mainly focus on the relation between ‘mimos’ (the actor),the Mimesthai (the mediated event) and the referentialobject. As I shall argue, mimesis is comprehendeddifferently in the way these three aspects are positionedand valued differently. In other words, ourunderstanding of mimesis variesaccording to different power relations betweensubject, object and medium.1 It isinteresting to observe that the implication of poles and

relational power indicates that one comprehension ofmimesis tends to compete or exclude another in correlatingcultural practices. A theatre that imitates a dramatic text(O) is very different from a devised theatre that believes inthe transforming power of mediated process (M). The modelsilluminate why dominating practices of mimesis may happen inspecific contexts and historical times, but also show howthese exclusions might not be a necessity in dramatic artsand drama education. Once traditional comprehension ofmimesis is contextualised in their historical and socialcontexts, new understandings may arise and appear ashorizontal choices rather than vertical positions of power.One may hold different understandings of mimesis and thismay enrich the work and open new opportunities for bothartists and drama teachers.

Mimesis as imitation

(s-O) (S-o)In drama, when we say we imitate something or somebody,we tend to imply a ‘true’original or an objective fact (O) that we imitate. In commonterms, we ‘pretend’ to be the object that we choose toimitate. This endeavour may be explained from a numberof positions: we may seek to reach ‘true’ divinity as inritual ecstasy, we may believe that imitation helps us tosee who we are, or an actor may seek to imitate the true,written role or character. This practice of mimesis in itsmany appearances is, therefore, a basic way of keeping alivethe hierarchical relationship between a subject (s) andobject (O). The object- the original (O) - is impressed as a not so true copy (s).Within the associated discourse, we create roles or dramathat are ‘as real as possible’ or, conversely, are criticisedas ‘false

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314 B. Rasmussenrepresentations’ of the original, as if any representationcould be true to an original (O). In the context of humansurvival and development we should of course notunderestimate the importance of imitation. It is probablyessential to the cognitive processes of assimilation andaccommodation, and also to empathy and learning. Nor shouldwe underestimate this model in the history of the arts, forexample in naturalist theatre, in genres of imitativecomedy, in simulation practices. In contemporary play-actingpractice, we will always see another Elvis imitation, orrole-playing that aims to display real-life situations, aswell as performances that aim to imitate the original drama(O) written by one of our canonical playwrights.

The important context to bear in mind, however, is that our imitative practice can be linked to a modern2 practice that inserted antagonism and a power hierarchy between thereal (O) and a less real illustration (Murray 1997). This isparadigmatically different from a pre- or post-modernconception of what is real and what is also real (in adifferent way). In a pre-modern sense, it is ‘also real’when the player becomes the medium, when gods literallypossess the human body, implying a heightened‘ecstatic’ presence that characterises the protagonist(Wong 2006). This pre-modern conception of ‘real’ play(and hence the collapse of the traditional fiction/realitydualism) re-appears for example in modernism, in JacobMorenos expressionist notion of ‘role-creating’, and wherethe actor in ‘divine’ moments actually creates new life(Rasmussen 1989). The modern interpretation of mimesis as‘imitation’ does not hold a horizon of many realities.This model then collapses when, for example, thepersonification of ‘Elvis’ in late modernity becomes amanifestation not of a true Elvis, but of a real otherSelf. Or, this model collapses when imitation in themediatised society becomes a way to build many identicalrealities where a true original is no longer possibleto trace. In such cases we deal with anothercomprehension of mimesis that will be discussed below.

The one important implication of this model of mimesis is the belief that the mimetic

act refers to external objectives (O) other than themeaning expressed in the mimetic act (M) itself. In thisway, arts and arts education become instrumental to issuesoutside art, for example when drama is used as a curriculum

tool (O). The instrumentalism is however also evidentwithin some performance practice, for example in theway that theatre sometimes imitates itself or isinstrumental to dramatic literature. The art is, withinthis model, only significant in the way it refers to ordisplays a significant ‘object’ that is outside the artprocess itself. Such an apprehension of art is continuallyconfirmed by commercial art practices. In an educationsystem oriented towards the learning of objective fact-and-truths, imagined activity and mimetic acts are considered tohave less value because of their association with pretence,illusion, entertainment or pastime activity. This modelof imitation renounces the dynamic role of a (symbolic)medium (M), it also parallels an old paradigm in sciencetheory that can be seen clearly in basic behaviouristconditioning theory; namely the direct link between thesubject (response) and object (stimulus), or between causeand effect. What I am suggesting is that traditionalimitative practice is still prevailing in much dramatic artand drama education, even when this model of mimesis is outof touch with contemporary art, interactive education orcommunication theories.

If art and nature are regarded as two opposite poles, the position of power changes

throughout arts history, a situation often still evidentwithin the model of imitation. The Romantics, for example,refuted that nature is imitated; instead suggesting thatwhat is imitated is the artist’s soul and the naturalimagination:

They [Schlegel and Moritz] were suggesting that assumptions about nature or universal order, the legitimacy of which neoclassical mimesis seemed to reproduce, were now in doubt.

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Romantics, they imply, will offer truer truths, although to use the soul rather than the landscape as model only shifts direction, produces yet another mimesis. (Diamond 1997,viii)

This is but one example which illuminates how‘imitation’ appears and reappears inWestern culturalbelief systems.

Mimesis as refined representation (s -m - O) (S - m - o)Although mimesis as imitation reflects a predominantand perhaps primitive view inWestern culture, it is not the most common modelfound in Western drama/theatre. Following the Aristoteliantradition (for example his Ars Poetica and Ars Rhetorica),when we speak of poetic or creative art, we imply a mediated(m) mimetic act where the object- subject relationship isnot direct. Following this tradition, mimesis in theatre isunderstood as a poetic production that leads the spectatorto recognise and rediscover the truths of human life andnature. In poetic art, representation is more than a plainimitation; it is refined to present aspects of life in aspecial (aesthetic or poetic) way. The represented aspectsare presented as essences, fragments, perspectives,from which the spectator recognises and gains deep insighton aspects of true life. Mimesis and poesis (art) coincide inthis tradition.

Art remains a representation of something external, an order that is already known or

true. This model, on which most theatre traditions arebuilt, does not challenge the subject-object dichotomyand hierarchies of power that featured in Aristoteliansociety and in most Western societies since. Theatre in thistradition represents something outside or refers to valuesand truths that belong to an object (O) external to themimetic act (m) or the actor/audience(s). We speak of a valued‘object’ that is already seen by the dramatist or anyone thatcomposes, builds or arranges the objective messages intodramaturgical and poetic forms. It is a preservationof the Western subject-object custom by moresophisticated means than imitation, introduced byAristotle and his fellowmen a long time ago.

In the spoken discourse that belongs to this model, we expect the audience to ‘realise’,

‘discover’, ‘unwrap’ or ‘make present’ the meanings that areembedded in the performance. We discover representedmeanings, even if we do not imitate. We realise orrecognise through an act of independent reflection,either through a deductive understanding or aestheticapprehension. When our individual experiences harmonise withthe objective intentions (of the makers), we may as artistsor teachers say that the mimetic acts, drama workshops orartworks ‘worked’: the audience or participants‘understood what was intended’.

Mimesis as representation implies a powerful medium that is ‘mediated’ into a refined

composition. Following the subject-object hierarchyand its accompanying power relations, therepresentational process itself is often concealed. Theaudience is invited to discover meaning by gettinginvolved with a representation that is ready-made.The audience is not, however, invited to see the way thecomposition is realised. The intentions, the motifs, theperspectives that lead to the chosen design and form are notopenly communicated within the representational mode. Thisis not only seen in old Aristotelian theatre, it can beclearly seen in contemporary mediatised versions of thismodel, for example in reality television shows. These showsare seemingly portraits of ‘real-life’ behaviour, and seem tobelong within the imitative model of mimesis. However, therepresentational mode of composition is obvious in theway the scenes are ‘poetically’ selected, cut and editedand presented for the spectator. Again, thesecompositional

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318 B. Rasmussenchoices and intentions are sometimes concealed to theaudience and perhaps also to the actors. In other words, itis far from a ‘real’ show. It is a mediated performance thatis made by a dominant producer subject (S), presented to anobjective recipient (o), or created by a producer objective(O) to be presented to the attending subjects (s). We are,as spectators, seemingly seeing the ‘truth’, but are in factparticipants within a given and meaning- embeddedcommunication. Without suggesting that all reality showsfollow this structure, in some cases they seem to exemplifymimesis as refined representation in late modernity.

The model of refined representation is common in dramaeducation theory, not least in related play theory and inthe way that playing and teaching are seen as different fromthe pure imitative act. Even in the child’s ‘purest’ imitativeplay there is a process of refinement in the way the childabstracts/modifies/understands the reality.

Imitative actions are consequent on the meaning the child isabstracting from reality as s/he understands it. The childabstracts a ‘truth’ from the situation as s/he sees it for thepurpose of representation. (Bolton 1998, 130)

In other words, the child mediates her impressions andrepresents something more, and different from, animitated reality. She nevertheless ‘holds’ the reality inthe mediated, abstract interpretation, as Boltonsuggests. The important epistemological discussion linkedto this model concerns the ‘abstraction process’ andwhether it leads to an autonomous meaning production bythe artist/player/spectator or whether it just imitates thetruth as it is already known in sophisticated ways.

Mimesis as framing (S

- M - o)Gavin Bolton’s understanding of the epistemological valueof children’s play may, at firstsight, cohere well to a classic, representative mode. What isrepresented is not a segment of reality but anabstraction, a ‘refined’ and ‘mediated’ comprehension ofreality. Never- theless, a more radical interpretation,following Bolton, is to claim that the comprehension achieved(and the representation formed) is a result of the mimeticact itself and not just a condensed abstraction of a given

reality. The argument is that play practice does not onlytreat a priori given impressions, it creates new ‘real’comprehension only made possible by the (local) mimetic act,i.e. the process with the medium (M). The new and importantimplication of a third model of mimesis is that therepresentation (re)presents primarily itself, and not ameaning that refers to realities ‘outside’ the mimeticpractice. The simplest way of approaching such anunderstanding is to consider the ‘frame’ as the metaphor of apowerful symbolic/aesthetic medium (M). In the same wayas Gregory Bateson (1976) applied the empty frame and thewallpaper to explain the nature of fiction in children’splay, we may use the same relationship to illustrate mimesisas ‘framing’. When we place an empty picture frame on awall covered with wallpaper, the pattern inside theframe becomes significantly different from the wallpaperoutside the frame. The frame itself has provided a pieceof ‘fictitious’ wallpaper that presents itself asit is, perceptually enlightened and differently seenfrom the wallpaper outside the frame. In this verysimplified example of an art concept, the piece ofwallpaper is a ‘mis-en-sce`ne’, it has become a ‘readymade’.When we allow Duchamp’s urinal to become an art product, itis because the arts institution or museum itself has becomethe frame or the medium (M) in power. The artwork is herenot refined or developed; the art frame allows somethingto show itself as itself (in a different way, but not lessreal). This is the way imitation may be understood as morethan an imitation; it is a framing of another reality,without the reference to the original. Followingcontemporary relational aesthetics (Bourriaud 2002),

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320 B. Rasmussenthe representational mode is replaced by the subordinationto an artistic frame (M) which allows new realities, newrealistic actions, for example when performers maystage a kitchen within an arts museum, in order toinvestigate human interaction or making pizzas as art.

This development in the visual arts has been commented on, or predicted by,

philosophers Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida, who becameinterested in theatricality in the realm of meaningproduction (Murray 1997). Theatricality is hereunderstood as something realised in its own frame,and also understood as something foremost presentingits own form, not representing something else. Accordingto this philosophy, theatricality is seen as educative andreflexive procedures, not only representing meaning, butmore importantly, theatricality reveals the way meaningis constructed or recon- structed. In other words, thismodel of ‘framing’ focuses not only on the perceptuallydifferent apprehension made by the frame, it also turns ourattention to the process of how the artwork is constructedby the frame or its medium (M). In most cases this ‘frame’ isnot abstracted to the arts institution, as in conceptualart, but rather refers to a symbolic medium, includingits complex processes, craft and skills. It is educationallysignificant that these processes do not only present ‘new’meanings in their own form, but also reveal how meaning isde-contructed and reconstructed. In my view, young people’sescalating interest in studying or participating in TV, filmand drama is also a reaction to imitative and representativeculture; there is a strong need or desire to see through therepresentations by ways of mastering and controlling themedium themselves, in fact to cut and edit life itself bymeans of an aesthetic language.

In spite of the highlighted power of the medium (M), the medium is in this model only

powerful because a strong subject (S) makes it powerful. Itis the subject who installs the frame, or allows a‘concept’, a readymade, an interaction or a self-presentation to be defined as significant, as art. In mimeticpractice outside the arts institution, for example in play(Vygotsky) and drama education theory (Bolton), one hasasked why the frame of dramatic play (M) is so important tothe player (S). For example, why do sisters choose to playsisters? One answer following this model of mimesis is: the

play frame is provided by the child in order to show (orcreate?) life as it is in order to understand andconceptualise life. It may illuminate what it means toexperience sisterhood, to comprehend what it is to besisters and its boundaries, and not least to develop theirlocal ‘sisterhood’ (the meta- knowledge of them beingsisters). The epistemological implication is here that theplay frame allows the symbolic abstraction that is necessaryto distinguish knowledge from sensuous experience (theconception of showing itself as itself), and thattheir play constructs their own understanding of whatsisterhood is.

The object (o) that is mediated is still noticeablein this model, but it loses its

dominance and representative power. In theatre, wefind this model apparent in modernism, where thetraditional literary drama and traditional contentsthat made theatre an instrument of dominant culturalObjects was challenged. A helpful example here is thedevelopment of Grotowski’s theatre, where we may follow howhis works increasingly weakened the representational object,reference or content to the benefit of a dominant artist(S) and theatre as a significant frame (M), and that allowed asocial setting where life showed itself as it was (para-theatre). His successor Eugenio Barba also continued todevelop a theatre that relates more strongly to thecreative subject (S) and a theatre medium (M) thanto a pre-given material (o). Finally, followingcontemporary performance work by well-described artists suchas the Wooster-Group (Lehmann 1996; Auslander 1994), weincreasingly notice how the actor performs herself within atheatre art

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322 B. Rasmussenframe. In all this theatre development, what ismade and comprehended is often conditioned by thespecific mise-en-sce`ne (M).

Different from imitation or representation, theepistemological issue for drama

education is no longer a learning outcome that refers tomeaning outside the frame or the art process. In thismodel, learning is a matter of seeing differentrealities, or comprehending our lives, when our lives areframed in aesthetic ways. Furthermore, we also learn tolearn the way meaning is constructed and deconstructed withina medium that not only displays, but also develops ourlives: ‘Theatre becomes a ritual that seeks meaning,but ends by making its own meaning’ (ExeChristoffersen 1998, 53, quote translated from Danish).By this late modern comprehension of mimesis it is notthe American Civil War that is taught better by dramaeducation, it is that the participants see this war or anywar in perspectives that are given by a chosen and localmediated form. We might not teach the facts of the Civil War,but we gain knowledge that is felt, related and owned by thelearner. Or, in a different context, it is not the actualfather we portray in drama therapy. It is theprotagonist’s interpretation of a father given by aspecific meditated frame. In both cases, we haveconstructed the knowledge from a chosen, local form, andhence we also know why we know. In both cases we overcome theinstrumental consequence of imitation and representation. Wemay learn to understand how our perspectives and knowledgehave been/are created. This learning does not exclude factsof wars and families, but the epistemological positionfollowing this model underlines that objective facts are notneutral knowledge. In this way, it is possible to suggestthat the model shows a strong link to phenomenologicalthinking as well as to constructivism.

Mimesis as creative

interaction (s - m - o)Within the models of mimesis outlined above, a dynamicpower relation is involvedbetween a subject, an object or a representative medium. Inthe case of the ‘frame’ model, it is the medium in play that

holds the premises, allowed by a strong subject. The ‘frame’is of course a very simple way of describing the powersof symbolic media, and we may perhaps imagine a continuumbetween the many ways a symbolic or aesthetic medium (M)realises its power and changes both the subjects (s) andobjects (o) in play. A fourth model suggests that the powerrelation itself may be attacked by some cultural, mimeticpractice. The case when the authoritative poles ofsubject, object or medium are denied needs specialattention. This may be seen as an idealist position whereno power hierarchy is given, meaning that any dimensioninvolved is exposed to enquiry and change, including thesubject, object and symbolic media. A model of ‘true’,creative and non-biased interaction in mimesis may bethe intention of many artists or drama teachers. Itis, however, very hard to maintain or realise this inpractice without serving certain ideas (O), serving the needsof a subject (S) or, for that matter, serving the mediumto which one submits (M).

In theatre or drama education, this model may be observedin practices that struggle to

keep the art process open, experimental, and not closed orconfirmed from the perspective of both the maker and receiver.We know that Artaud aimed for a theatre that took form as acreative life stream. Following Derrida, Artaud strivedfor:

[A]n existence that refuses to signify, .. . an art withoutworks .. . In pursuit of a manifestation which would not bean expression but a pure creation of life .. ., Artaudattempted to destroy .. . the history of dualist metaphysics.(Derrida 1978, 175)

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324 B. RasmussenThis state of existence required a sensuous state ofpresence and alertness by those who took part in histheatre. To be ‘present’ means, in this context, to betotally involved in the experience in a way that temporarilyinhibits rational and formal closures and distancedreflection on the experience. Perhaps this nature of ‘purecreation’ is directly connected to the equivalentjuxtaposition of the subject, the medium and theobject, as when we sometimes feel totally engaged andabsorbed in a situation. In theatre, Stanislavski speaks ofthe creative state of an actor in ways that resemble thisideal, and Jean Louis Barrault has stated that ‘the finalaim of mime is not the visual, but presence itself, namelythe moment of theatrical presence’ (1951, 73).

The epistemological significance is that we may not gain cognitive understanding

within this state of ‘orgiastic’ presence (M) exclusively, butrather by experiencing the difference between this‘presence’ and a distanced, reflexive state. Theexperienced symbolic reality occurs within a given frame,and the interactive process between the mediatedexperience (m), the distanced subject and object (s,o), idealistically on a horizontal level, generates newunderstanding. Following historical modernism as well assome contemporary practice we observe many artists thatstrive towards this ideal, for example by the ‘works inprogress’, of workshops and Happenings, and also how theseventures provide certain improvisational and spontaneousstrategies to keep the play‘floating’, alive and not fixed. Works in progressemphasise the art work (process) more than the artwork(product), also openly expose how meaning isconstructed or deconstructed. Improvisational traditions intheatre or drama education may be seen to follow thismodel of mimesis, in theatre-sport or some role-playingactivities for example. In some cases of performance art, theartist tries to make it impossible for the audience todiscover a ‘hidden’ truth; the artist does not deliver a(hidden) message, simply because the artist in her framingdoes not yet cognitively know anything before the audiencedoes, or because she cannot herself conceive or present ameaning before ‘the frame’ has made an impact on herself inthe actual performance.

Mimesis as ‘masochism’(S/M)Some forms of contemporary performance practice show thatthe actor performs herself in such a way that she is boththe object of study (S =O) as well as the symbolic medium asplaying/framed performer (M). This is a mimeticpractice where the relational model collapses: the subjectbecomes the object becomes the medium (S/M). Theatreresearchers such as Josette Fe´ral identified thisperformance practice a long time ago (1982), andsuggested at that time that this kind of mimetic practicehad reached the borders of what may be understood astheatre (or mimetic practice?). Rather thansearching for delimitation of theatre versus performance,such as Fe´ral attempted, we should acknowl- edge that someartists and non-artists mime themselves as themselves, or usethe Other to express and investigate their own selves (Cross2004), and then to follow this by looking for theepistemological implications of their work.

In this model, we recognise an understanding of fiction and reality that is blurred. This

concurrence of the ‘real’ and ‘not real’ is ofcourse not exclusively a late modern phenomenon. What isnew in post-structuralist readings of mimesis, with referenceto late modern practices, is a conception of a differencethat is not limited to the real and non- real, but moreimportantly, to the nature of theatricality itself:

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326 B. Rasmussen

What lies at the heart of theatricality ... is the ambivalentpathos evoked by the divisions of mimesis and their profoundturn of subject and socius against themselves. Put simply,mimesis is the theatricalization of masochism. (Murray 1997,14)

What ‘masochism’ indicates here is that, at the extreme,mimesis not only gives pleasure and leads to progressivegrowth and meaning in a modern context, but also bynature reflects its ‘other’ conceptual compound - pain,insignificance and deconstruction. When something orsomebody turns itself against itself, the mis-en-sce`ne orthe construction of something/somebody is revealed andscrutinised. The ‘other’ is inevitably part oftheatricality and mimesis. When the one and the other isboth concentrated to the one acting Self (S), we mayfind the metaphor ‘masochistic’ illustrative. Thispractice of mimesis is the ultimate reaction to thegiven realities and representations that arecontinually impressed on our lives. When no change seemspossible through real-life action or through the imitativearts, one may speculate that the only possible option leftfor the subject is to turn towards her own body. Thisis an assumption that may need some empiricalverification; nevertheless theatre (or performance art) has,since modernism, continually demonstrated ‘masochistic’ waysof mimetic practice. Most evidently we notice a tradition ofrisk-taking performance/behaviour, where self-mutilation,self-modification,‘jack-assing’ and ‘body art’ seem to be manifested (Hewitt1997). In my own contemporary society, such performancegroups as ‘Pain Solution’ perform extreme body artexercises; piercing, cuts, perforating skin and tissues. Self-violating and highly risk-taking behaviour becomes alifestyle to many young people, evidently also in theartistic arena. In‘Deterioration’, musician and performance artistKristopher Schau stages himself in a window display forseven days and by unhealthy bodily experiments, his bodyslowly deteriorates until the need of medical care andrecovery occurs (NRK 2006).

Whether these practices are accepted as art, spiritualbehaviour or human madness,

they may have in common a narcissistic urge to make life

and body a work of art. Or, perhaps another way ofunderstanding this mimetic practice is to recognise aparadoxical urge to recreate self-understanding and self-respect. This model of mimesis is hence also reflected instudies of contemporary cultural narcissism. SinceChristopher Lasch (1979) depicted strong narcissistictendencies in American life, his aphorism of ‘Life becomes awork of art’ has been seen to be increasingly relevant by theway the popular culture stages itself, for example by the way‘idols’ and ‘sing stars’ literally make a fool out ofthemselves. In his portrait of the British actor StevenBerkoff, Robert Cross documents how this particularactor has constructed and projected his life through histheatre practice, and concludes straightforwardly thatBerkoff as a renowned artist ‘has not been involvedseriously in anything beyond his own ego’ (Cross 2004,220). Lasch also comments that late modern theatricalinnovation reduces the power of illusion by the way the actoracts herself. In Lasch’s opinion, the late modern performanceartist reflects the social pattern of the narcissistic andindifferent person. In my opinion, one can hardlyinterpret the actor who harms her own body as showingindifference. Instead, as I suggest, this ‘masochistic’practice may be interpreted as the last possible waythe tested or alienated individual actually can make adifference in an alienated world. The educationalsignificance of this mimetic practice may be contested. Self-mutilation is hardly a practice that may be seen in any(drama) classroom. Yet if we believe that all mimeticpractices are educative in some sense, this model inspiredfrom late modernity still reflects that mimesis is effectiveeven in times where trust in objectives or symbolic media(other than your own body) is minimal.

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328 B. RasmussenMimesis against the anaesthetic

indifference - a conclusionBy presenting five different models of mimesis, theintention has not been to give acomplete interpretation of mimesis, but rather to indicate aframework for drama art and education that both mayexplain its lack of reputation as well as re-arrangedividing lines between practice and theory. Drama educationand its opponents have often limited the field and reducedits development and reputation by maintaining dichotomiessuch as art/ non-art or process/product. Different models ofmimesis suggest that we face the same fundamentalepistemological challenges, opportunities or choices, whetherwe define ourselves as theatre-makers or dramateachers. There are perhaps more importantdemarcation lines between modern, pre-modern andcontemporary (late modern) practices, of which anyartist or drama teacher should be aware. Furthermore,we are familiar with the practices of imitation andrepresentation in modern theatre and drama education, butdrama education seems less familiar with late modern mimeticpractices. On the other hand, society seems less familiarwith the mimetic practices and understanding that dramaeducation provides. For a long time improvisationaldrama education has carried practices that do not clearlyappear as theatre in a modern, familiar sense.

Today, young people practise fictional play in manyforms and in many life arenas. Society’s interest in dramaeducation is too marginal and out of proportion related tothis reality. This is a paradox that can only be explained byboth the limited scope of orthodox educational practice aswell as the limited knowledge of the value and meanings ofmimetic practices. It may also be explained by a powerlessdrama education field, which has not been able torevitalise and offer strong enough arguments. One such acritique is indirectly offered by Lasch, who in his book TheCulture of Narcissism (1979) fears the indifferent narcissistwho lacks a feeling of reality, of being real. Our senseof reality depends, in Lasch’s opinion, on the ability toexperience different realities: ‘on our willingness to betaken in by the staged illusion of reality’ (Lasch1979, 160). Without discussing his‘illusion’ further, the interesting point that Lasch makesis that indifference appears when

‘everything is the same’, so to speak. Irony is, followingLasch, a device that resists indifference; through ironyone becomes more real by seeing and expressing theother realities of the matter. Following the nature oftheatricality and mimesis, and its embodied difference, wemay finally suggest that the sense of reality is notlinked to the subject, object or fictiverepresentation, but to the very act of makingdifferent (aesthetic) perspectives. The cultural tendency ofanaesthetic indifference can therefore only be healed orcounteracted by the aesthetic difference.

Notes1. In my illustrations this power relation is indicated by a

capital letter (S, M, O) versus the small letter (s, m, o).2. By modern I here mean the cultural practice influenced by

modern classical thinking from the Greeks onwards, asdifferent from a pre-modern and a late modern practice, whichmay hold different attributes.

Notes oncontributorBjørn Rasmussen has been Professor of Drama Education since 1998, andis Head of the Department of Arts and Media Studies, Trondheim andguest professor at Bergen University College. Bjørn was co- convenorand director of Research and Publication at IDEA Congress 2001. Heserves as reviewer of three international research journals in dramaeducation. His latest international publication is: ‘Art as part ofeveryday life: Understanding applied theatre practices through theaesthetics of John Dewey and Hans Georg Gadamer’ (Theatre ResearchInternational, Volume 31, Number 3, 2006).

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