Between Hope and Despair: The Parisian Metro and the Catastrophe of Couronnes Station in 1903

Elvan SAHIN

Catastrophes in Modern France

Stephane Gerson

16/05/2014

Between Hope and Despair: The Parisian Metro and the Catastrophe of Couronnes Station in 1903

How resilient are the cities that we live in? This is a question that lies in the heart

of the current scholarship on urban disasters.1 Problematizing resilience assumes the

necessity of it. Cities are vulnerable to multiple threats. According to the scholars in the

field of disaster studies, the disaster can hit the city in the form of natural, technological

disasters or can be a product of terrorist attacks. Writing in the context of 21st century

resilience becomes an indispensible component of the contemporary city life. We need to

have resilient cities and overcome the past and future vulnerabilities so that we can

continue to live in cities.

It is possible to argue that the concept of urban resilience as a necessity is a form

of cultural construction. Like every construction, then, urban resilience has a history. By

borrowing analytical terms from Peter Soppelsa (the fragility of modernity) and scholars

in disaster studies (vulnerability and resilience), I will contribute to the debate on cities

and disasters by historicizing it with the micro study of the fire that took place at Paris

Couronnes Metro station in 1903. At first glance it might seem as an odd choice to study

1 See for example Peter Rogers, Resilience and the City, Change, (Dis)Order and Disaster (Surrey, Ashgate Publishing, 2012), Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanelle, eds., The Resilient City, How Modern Cities Recover from Disasters (New York, Oxford Univesity Press, 2005), Naim Kapucu, Christopher V. Hawkins and Fernando I. Riviera, eds., Disaster Resiliency, Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York, Routledge, 2013), Mark Pelling, The Vulnerability of Cities, Natural Disaters and Social Resilience (London, Earthscan Publications, 2003), Jon Coaffee, David Murakami Wood and Peter Rogers, The Everyday Resilience of the City, How Cities Respond to Terrorism and Disaster (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009)

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a single fire that affected one portion the Parisian Metro. However, the Parisian Metro

was an integral part of the city playing an important role in the daily lives of Parisians

and was important in shaping the meanings of a modern city. Thus when the event

happened in 1903, it was perceived as catastrophe that disrupted the everyday order of

Parisians. The Metro fire revealed the vulnerability of the city to technological disasters,

which in return prompted a process of creation of resilience. By analyzing the

representations and discourses that the 1903 catastrophe generated in the newspapers and

in official bulletins and reports that have been published this study aims to show that the

Parisian metro was a site of fragility, vulnerability and resilience at the same time.

In 1903, Paris was in physical terms a different city than it had been a hundred

years earlier.2 It was a modern city with newly built grand boulevards and new parks,

updated sewer systems and railway connections. Furthermore, as Norma Evenson argues,

the Metro acquired a highly symbolic value as “the prestige of France was embodied in

the image of the French capital as a modern city reflecting the advanced standards of

French science and technology.”3 From its emergence as a project to its construction and

operation, the Metro contributed to the idea of Paris being a modern city.4 In 1900 Paris

celebrated its first metro line and the first major disruption came in 1903 when it was still

in its infancy. Hence, concentration on this moment of disruption in the immediate

aftermath of the construction of the Metro will showcase the deep connections between

the city and its technological infrastructure. 2 For a detailed discussion on the urban change see David Pinkney, Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris, (New Jersey, Princeton, 1972) 3 Norma Evenson, Paris: A Century of Change, 1878 -1978,(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979) 4 Evenson. Or see for example Sheila Hallsted-Baumert, ed., Metro – Cite, Le Chemin de Fer métropolitain a la conquête de Paris, 1871 – 1945 (Paris, Paris Musées, 1997). For cultural frameworks that the underground constituted for the modern city see for example Rosalind Williams, Notes on the Underground, An Essay on Technology, Society and the Imagination (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2008), Christopher Prendergast, Paris and the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992)

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In order to conceptualize this link between the city and the technological

infrastructure, Peter Soppelsa coins the expression fragility of modernity in his

dissertation on Paris’ urban infrastructure between the years 1870 and 1914.5 In his

words, the fragility of modernity is “the special difficulties that confront cities dependent

on increasingly complex networked infrastructures which bind humans, technology and

the natural environment in new ways.”6 Furthermore, this fragility entails a process of

politicization: the relationship between the city as built environment, the local

administration and the city dwellers in everyday life politics compose the elements of

fragility. Soppelsa concludes, “ in moments of crisis when one part of the city collapses

and others begin to fall with it, we can see the complexity and fragility of modern cities

in clear relief.”7 As such Soppelsa’s study draws an image of Paris whose meaning is

constantly ascribed and re-inscribed in a series of struggles with politics, nature and

technology. The modern city is dependent on technological infrastructures, but these

infrastructures are fragile as in the way in which this fragility is expressed in the politics

of urban failings.

At first glance Soppelsa’s analytical term can be seen as a form of vulnerability

specific to urban settings. For example Mark Pelling in his study on modern cities and

their situation vis-à-vis natural disasters defines vulnerability as denoting “exposure to

risk [defined as to be threatened by harm] and an inability to avoid or absorb potential

harm”.8Furthermore, vulnerability can be physical and applied both to humans and

structures, but can also be social. Within this framework Soppelsa’s fragility does

5 Peter Soppelsa, “The Fragility of Modernity: Infrastructure and Everyday Life in Paris, 1870 – 1914” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2009) 6 Soppelsa, 2 7 Soppelsa, 424 8 Pelling, 5

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encompass the term vulnerability. However in the fragility of modernity there is a space

of negotiation, interaction and exploitation. One can see the fragility of modernity as a

social space based on vulnerability that embodies competing forms of narratives to assign

meaning to this vulnerability.

It is possible to argue that one narrative that emerges from this social space based

on vulnerability is that of resilience. Mark Pelling defines resilience as “the capacity to

adjust to threats and mitigate or avoid them.”9 For Françoise Walter it is “la capacité du

système a retrouver son équilibre antérieur.”10Therefore, resilience is either the existence

of systems that would prevent a disaster or to be able to mobilize resources in an effective

way in order to get back to normal as soon as possible. Lawrence Vale and Thomas

Campanella argue that like people who endure disasters the cities themselves can be

traumatized and “a traumatized city endures not only physical injury and economic

hardship but also damage to its image.”11When Parisian Metro was hit by a disaster

besides physical damage and economic concerns its symbolic image was threatened. The

glory of technology was on fire, the vulnerability of technology had surfaced. The

discourses that followed the accident as argued in this paper revealed an effort to

construct a narrative of resilience. Thus resilience discussed in this paper pertains a move

towards normalization. It is also the creation of systems that would prevent the same

mistakes happening again, in an age where these systems did not exist. Resilience is

constructed because it is the result of a tension between technology and vulnerability and

the inclination towards maintaining the symbolic value of technology.

9 Pelling, 5 10 François Walter, Catastrophes, Une Histoire culturelle, XVIe – XXIe siècle, (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2008), 17 11 Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella, “Introduction: The Cities Rise Again” in The Resilient City, 8

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The close reading of the 1903 Couronnes Station catastrophe shows a coexistence

of fragility of modernity, vulnerability and resilience. Resilience is deeply linked to the

concept of and vulnerability and one wouldn’t exist without the other. It is possible to

argue that resilience is an effort to make sense of disruptions and to produce mechanisms

of coping. Hence in the wake of a disaster the city can be the scene of multiple forms of

resilience. For example as Rebecca Solnit argues the aftermath of the disaster can bring

out the good in the people and invoke informal networks of spontaneous solidarity that

leads to assigning meaning to the event as a community.12 In the aftermath of the

Couronnes fire there was also a move towards assigning meaning to the event. However,

this move articulated itself in discourses that dominated the general representations in the

newspapers and official documentations.

One of these discourses is the victim discourse. Victim discourse refers the

framing of the disaster through representations of victims. In other words, the narrative of

the disaster is told through a narrative of victims: How many died, got injured, who were

these people and how did their death got treated in forms of funerals, memorialization

and investigation. Second discourse that can be identified is the prevention discourse.

This discourse frames the event by shifting the attention to the future, a time where the

same kind of disaster would never happen again. Thus the prevention discourse

emphasizes the precautions taken in the aftermath to construct an image of safer and

better Metro. In both discourses, therefore, fragility of modernity, vulnerability and

resilience appear in such an entangled way that a conceptualization of urban

12 Rebecca Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster (New York, Penguin Books, 2009)

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infrastructure through times of disruption would be incomplete without taking into

consideration these concepts as coexisting and see their interactions in the discourses.

Making Sense of the Event: The Field Of Discourses

“Nous savons seulement qu’il y a réellement eu une catastrophe.”13 This is how

the radical newspaper Le XIXème siècle announced the accident that happened in the

night of 10 August in the Parisian Metro. The journalists did not have the details yet but

they were doing their best to get the whole story. The following days, all the major

newspapers gave place to more or less the same story: On August 10, 1903, around 8pm a

subway train on line 2 (Etoile – Nation) encountered an engine problem and emptied its

passengers at the Barbes station. Soon another empty train came to help and while

pushing the malfunctioning train a fire broke due to a short circuit between the stations of

Ménilmontant and Couronnes. But what made this a catastrophe, according to the

newspapers, was the arrival of another train from the opposite direction filled with

passengers. The passenger train managed to reach the Couronnes station but at that time

the station was already being filled with smoke from the fire. Moreover because the fire

was caused by electricity the agents had cut electricity off which made the lights in the

station go off too. According to the official record, 84 people died, most of them due to

asphyxiation. Thus, what took place was a total panic and chaos due to darkness and

smoke.

The first week following the event the newspapers gave great coverage to the

event and articulated the details on the front page. It is possible to call this period the

“Making Sense of the Event Period”. The most specific characteristic of this week is the 13 “Au Métropolitaine”, Le XIXème Siècle, August 12, 1903

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detailed description of the event. At this point, the newspapers published a sketch of the

Couronnes station in order to explain the event clearly to their readers. The newspapers

made sure that they announced the number of the victims. The language used to describe

the event centered on adjectives that would portray the dramatic nature of the disaster. Le

Gaulois called it “effroyable tragédie” while Le Figaro preferred to announce the event

as “une nouvelle effroyable” and La Revue Universelle framed it as “événement

tragique”. For the newspapers the event was a “catastrophe”, and “la panique”,

“l’obscurité” were frequently used words to describe the situation. In these primary days

newspapers gave every aspect of the event at the same time (the victims, the morgue,

investigation, eye witnesses, interviews, experts …etc.) while starting from second week

onwards the focus crystalized into, first, the victim discourse and then to the prevention

discourse.

Even though these discourses became visible starting from the second week, there

were already signs pertaining to them in the description phase. Making sense of the event

through description shouldn’t be seen as an objective task. The newspapers and journals

did not hide their critical stance, which made the vulnerability inherent in the event

visible. Especially a political newspaper like La Croix, which situated itself as catholic

right, saw the opportunity to attack science and religion by sarcastically saying “Le

Métropolitaine, c’était le triomphe de la science au point de la rapidité et de la sureté.”14

A weekly-illustrated leftist journal L’Assiette au Beure devoted its issue of August 22 to

the catastrophe by portraying the event with dark, morbid illustrations.15 They would

seize the opportunity to blame capitalism. One of the strongest images drew a direct line

14 “Cri de Douleur”, La Croix, August 12, 1903 15 “Metro – Necro”, L’Assiette au Beure, August 22, 1903

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between the suppression of the Commune and the catastrophe (figure 1). The first

illustration showed the Mur des Fédérés in La Père Lachaise cemetery and the caption

read: “1871: Mur des Fédérés. Pour la défense de la puissance capitaliste”. Second

illustration depicted a metro employee as the death and showed people lying dead on the

ground in the background and the caption read: “1903: Mur du Metro. Par

l’imprévoyance de la puissance capitaliste. Peuple c’est toujours toi qui écopes!!!”16

These are strong examples that demonstrated the fragility of modernity and vulnerability.

It is possible to argue that within these negative images lied the origins of both victim and

prevention discourses as these discourses while masking vulnerability articulated forms

of resilience in different degrees.

The main sources I use to analyze the 1903 catastrophe are a selection of major

newspapers at the time as their pages where the main space where discourses were

presented. 17 The pages of these newspapers included pieces reported and written by

journalists as well as portions of official statements circulated by the municipality,

prefecture and the commissions of investigation created in the aftermath of the event, as

well as judiciary proceedings. Therefore one set of supporting sources are the Bulletin

Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise and

the report presented to the municipality by the investigative commission. Second set of

supporting documents are articles published in weekly or biweekly journals that discusses

the event critically.18

16 Le Metro Nécro, L’Assiette au Beurre, 22/08/1903 17 Le Figaro (center), Le Temps, Le Gaulois (monarchist), Le XIXème Siècle (radical), La Croix (Catholique) 18 La Science Illustrée, Le Journal des Transports, La Revue Universelle, L’Assiette Au Beure

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The Victims and Vulnerability: Nuancing the Fragility of Modernity

One of the common characteristics of the aftermath of a disaster is to interrogate

on the number and conditions of the possible victims.19The reporting in the immediate

aftermath of the Couronnes fire was no exception. Emile Berr, the correspondent of Le

Figaro reporting on the catastrophe, asked “Quand sera-t-on fixé sur les conséquences de

la catastrophe?” on August 11.20 It became clear in the following issues that what Berr

meant by consequences, in the language of Le Figaro, referred precisely to the question

of victims. How many were there? What was happening in the morgue? What were the

names of the victims? These efforts to define the scope and thus impact of the catastrophe

were the source for the victim discourse. In other words, the initial attention that the

newspapers gave on the victims helped to frame the event through victims in the

following weeks.

The victim discourse could be mobilized in several ways. On one hand, it became

the site of vulnerability in a very specific way. The victims symbolized the lack of means

that the society embodied towards the reality of living in a developed urban environment.

This for example as shown above was strongest in La Croix or L’Assiette au Beure,

where emphasizing victims made it possible to attack the infrastructure. On August 16,

Le Gaulois reported that “Malgré le démentis officiels et les constations faites, dans le

public on continue a croire que le nombre des victimes a été beaucoup plus considérable

que celui qui a été communiqué”.21Le Gaulois as a monarchist paper used the uncertainty

about the number of victims as an opportunity to flesh out the insufficiency of action by

19 Vale and Campanella, “Introduction”, Walter, 163 20 Emile Berr, “Une catastrophe dans le métropolitain”, Le Figaro, August 11,1903 21 “Catastrophe du Metropolitain, Les Travaux de deblaiment”, Le gaulois, August 16, 1903

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the officials. In this form of the victim discourse vulnerability is directly linked to the

fragility of modernity by putting forward the notion of blame.

Other uses of the victim discourse concentrate less on the question of blame and

more on the support towards the victims and their families. For example, both Le Figora

and Le Gaulois published a regular list of subscribers who donated money for the

victims. On August 21, Le Figaro announced that there would be a benefit concert, a

“matinée extraordinaire au bénéfice de victimes de la catastrophe du Métropolitain”.22

Under the notion of public responsibility, the municipality also made sure that the

unclaimed victims received proper funerals and that the families of the victims received

appropriate allocation. What one sees in the Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de

Paris, for example is the publication of a daily list of families receiving allocations and

the amount of money distributed.

The funerals organized for the victims were events that newspapers devoted great

attention. On August 12, La Croix reported that “dans une réunion a laquelle ont assiste le

préfet de police, la secrétaire général de la préfecture de la Seine, le syndic du Conseil

municipal, MM. Rozier et Berthant, conseilleurs municipaux, il a été décide que les

obsèques des victimes auraient lieu aux frais de la Ville de Paris.”23By financing the

funerals the officials demonstrated their level of interest in the victims. The descriptions

of these funerals in the newspapers would, consequently, always emphasize the presence

of officials in the event supporting the families of the victims. The funerals were public

events that brought together the city officials and city dwellers and became spaces where

the disaster could find a meaning. On August 14, Le temps informed its readers that, “la

22 “Spectacles et Concerts”, Le Figaro, August 21, 1903 23 “Les obseques des victimes”, Le Gaulois, August 12, 1903

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foule commence a affluer sur le quai du Marche-Neuf et sur le parvis Notre-Dame ou

s’élève la caserne de la cite.”24Framing the description of the funerals by the notion of

crowd was also the way in which Le Gaulois choose to report on the event but they also

chose to add details that would dramatize the situation further. For example Le Gaulois

reported that , “des onze heures du matin, la foule est arrive: émotionnante théorie de

femmes recouvertes de longs voiles de crêpe, d’hommes er d’enfants vêtus du deuil, les

yeux gonfles de larmes, et secoues fréquemment par des sanglots.”25In this more detailed

description, it is possible to see the appeal of the event for Parisians more in detail. The

funerals took place on August 13. The newspapers reproduced the event the following

day in detailed, and in the case of Le Gaulois, dramatized fashion and thus shifted the

attention from the details of the disaster to the victims.

Framing the question of the victims through insurances, donations and funerals

created a very specific affect. In this frame, there was an acceptance of vulnerability

inherent in the victim discourse. In other words the fragility of modernity created victims

who in turn embodied symbolically the notion of social and physical vulnerability. This

did not mean for the newspapers that people who are responsible should not be detected

and tried. Almost in every newspaper, reports on the funeral were followed by an article

on the search for responsibility in the official investigations. Thus the investigations

became a part of the victim discourse by the link that newspapers provided between the

victims and the investigations.

Meanwhile the victim discourse also contributed to mask the question of

responsibility. This may seem paradoxical at first glance as above I argued that the victim

24 “Les obseques de victimes”, Le Temps, August 14, 1903 25 “Obseques solennelles des victims”, Le Gaulois, August 14, 1903

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discourse was a site of vulnerability that linked the question of victims directly to the

investigations. However this is not a conceptual error. While the victim discourse

generated acceptance of vulnerability towards technology and reproduced events like the

funerals to honor the victims, it also made it possible to downplay the vulnerability of the

institutions in this whole affair. By being present at the site of the catastrophe from the

very beginning, police prefect Louis Lépine painted an image that the police was on top

of the issue and primarily concerned with getting the bodies out of the station. By being

present in the funerals, the president of the municipal council made sure to make their

support and grief public. Emile Combes, president du Conseil des ministers, opened his

speech during the ceremony of August 13 by saying that “Le Gouvernement, en apportant

ici l’hommage suprême qu’il doit aux morts, vient associer la France entier au deuil si

cruel qui frappe la population de Paris.”26 It was the victims who mattered most; it was

the victims who needed attention. As shown above the city covered the costs of the

funerals and allocated funds to the families of the victims. By adopting the victim

discourse, these officials at once accepted and denied vulnerability. M. Deville, president

du conseil municipal, in his speech during the ceremonies said that, “des événements

comme celui-ci font mieux apparaitre et sa vigoureuse vaillance et son généreux esprit de

solidarité.”27 Vulnerability hence turned into an item of negotiation that was being

constructed through the victim discourse. Vulnerability was in the fact that the accident

caused deaths and the negotiation appeared in the fact that the officials were ready to

provide support. By constructing an image of solidarity through the victim discourse

26 “Partie non officielle”, (Discours de M. Emile Combes, président du conseil, ministre de L’Intérieur et des cultes, prononce, le 13 Aout 1903, aux obsèques des victimes de la catastrophe du Métropolitain), Journal Officiel de la République Française, August 16, 1903 27 Bulletin Municipal Officielle de la Ville de Paris, August 14, 1903

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presented in the newspapers, the official authorities created an act of resilience. The

support was symbolic of strength.

This acceptance/denial of vulnerability was further present in the prevention

discourse that was being constructed simultaneously with the victim discourse but would

persist well into the next month as well. The Journal des transports on August 29

commented that “tout d’abord il est bien clair que l’on n’évitera jamais d’une façon

absolue les accidents, de quelque genre d’exploitation qu’il s’agisse, chemin de fer, mine,

industrie etc.” What is specific about this discourse is that it took the dual character of

vulnerability discussed above one step further and brought resilience into the picture in

more visible ways as the author continued to say “le devoir de la société, le rôle des chefs

de ces exploitations, c’est de prévoir dans la mesure possible, mais c’est surtout

malheureusement de profiter des expériences cruelles que les faits viennent apporter”.28

The acceptance of necessary evils of technology combined with lessons learned from

disasters could open a space of resilience that was based on the idea of prevention.

To Prevent it from Happening Again: An Argument towards Resilience

“Des la première heure, le conseil municipal a tenu a se rendre un compte exact

des circonstances de l’accident, de ses causes et des dispositions qu’il convient d’adapter

pour en prévenir le retour.”29 Felix Roussel, author of the report presented to the

municipality states clearly from the very beginning that the main aim was to prevent the

catastrophe from happening again. While the victim discourse played with the notion of

28 “La compagnies du metropolitain et les pouvoirs publics”, Journal des trasnports, no 35 29 M. Felix Roussel, Rapport au nom de la Commission du Métropolitain sur l’accident du chemin de Fer Métropolitain du 10 Aout 1903 et sur les améliorations a apporter a l’exploitation (Conseil Municipal de Paris, 1903), 2

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vulnerability on conceptual plane, I argue that, the prevention discourse carried it to a

temporal plane. In other words it shifted the attention from the present, the event itself to

the future. And it is this realm of the future that embodies optimism that resilience

becomes visible. The prevention discourse by constructing a narrative of resilience tried

to construct the event as being avoidable in the future or at least making it possible to

avoid doing harm to the society. Léon Dorian in an article published in La Science

llustrée comments that, “les améliorations a réaliser peuvent se diviser en deux séries

nettement distinctes; celles ayant trait au retour de tout incendie, celles ayant pour but, un

sinistre éclatant, d’éviter toute conséquence désastreuse pour le public.”30Therefore it is

possible to say that the presence of a victim discourse shaped also the direction that the

prevention discourse would travel.

The victim discourse helped to shape the event by memorializing the victims and

creating an image of solidarity. However this discourse did not say much about how to

explain the disaster. The prevention discourse that also emerges from second week

onwards served for this purpose. It is important to note that the prevention discourse had

an ambiguous nature. Especially in the first weeks of its emergence going well into

September it co-existed with what can be called reverse prevention discourse. This was

the conceptual shift between past and future. The disaster could be prevented in the future

but if it could be prevented in the future, why did those precautions were not already in

place?

The newspapers constructed the (reverse) prevention discourse in relation to

scientific discourses. Science could fix what it created. For example, on September 4, Le

30 Léon Dorian, “Les Améliorations a apporter a la Traction sur le Chemin de Fer Métropolitain de Paris”, La Science Illustrée, no 827, September 3, 1903

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XIXe Siècle published a letter from M. Lippmann a physics professor proposing an

electrical dynamo that could prevent fires caused by electricity. He wrote “nous sommes

en présence non d’un danger a combattre mais d’un danger a supprimer.”31Newspapers

promoted the idea that the only thing to do was to adopt precautions, to learn from the

mistakes. On the other hand, there were instances where, for example Le Figaro, on

August 23 drew attention to an invention that MM. E. de Saint-Senoch and Ch. Bardy

had proposed to the fire commission fifteen years ago. It was a proposition to put

phosphoric plates behind the lamps so that if electricity goes out there would be still

enough light. This is important because one of the reasons that the incident turned into a

catastrophe was the fact the people got lost in the darkness (obscurité) trying to get out of

the station. The article concludes that “cette idée semble tellement pratique et tellement

simple en même temps que peu couteuse, que l’on se demande comment il se peut qu’elle

n’ait pas encore été appliquée dans les théâtres et dans le métropolitain, ne fut-ce qu’a

titre d’essai.”32 Therefore sometimes the prevention discourse shifted from the future and

pointed out that the things that are being envisioned for the future could actually have

been done.

The prevention discourse par excellence would emerge from this ambiguity and

be articulated through the official decrees that Louis Lepine spelled out the precautions

that had to be taken immediately. On August 29, le Figaro published an article titled “Les

Reformes du Métropolitain” which reproduced the instructions that Lepine had sent to the

Company of Métropolitain.33 These instructions merit attention, as they are the source of

the resilience that emerged from the prevention discourse. Firstly, the improvements that

31 “Au Metropolitain”, Le XIXe Siecle, September 4, 1903 32 Le Figaro, August 23, 1903 33 “Reformes du Metropolitain”, Le Figaro, August 29, 1903

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had to be made had time limits, showing the sensitivity of the issue. The most important

precautions were those that have survived until this day. To solve the issue of darkness,

the electrical system providing electric to the track and to lamps had to be separated. All

exits had to be marked very clearly by large signs so that people would know exactly

where to go in a case of emergency. All materials used in the stations and the train had to

be inflammable. The list goes on but these examples are enough to show that by

enforcing these precautions within a given time and making sure that these were applied

the prefecture had taken up the issue of prevention seriously. Furthermore, the wide

circulation of these rules in the newspapers and journals made the prevention discourse

publicly seen.34 On August 19, Le Figaro was already reporting that “La Compagnie du

Métropolitain a commence a faire placer sur les quais devant les escaliers conduisant aux

stations des lanternes de couleur au pétrole avec le mot sortie se détachant en

blanc.”35The precautions presented in the newspapers backed up with such stories that

confirmed action aimed to assure the public that the Metro would be a safe site of travel

and be better than before in the future. The catastrophe was pushed to the background by

shifting the attention from what the Metro was to what it would be. The final report

produced by the investigative committee, which spelled out all the precautions in a

detailed manner, cited above, was the ultimate source of this temporal shift.

By the time that the report was published, enough time had passed also that the

Metro had returned to its normal course. The emphasis on prevention articulated in the

official documents, when coupled with signs of normalcy, made the fragility of modernity

and vulnerability that had been contested in the first weeks leave its place to a stronger

34 All newspapers and journals analyzed in this paper publish a variation – short or long republication – of these precautions 35 “Autour de la Catastrophe”, Le Figaro, August 19, 1903

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association with resilience. These signs of normalcy were again represented in the

newspapers. For example, on September 19, Le Figaro announced the reopening of the

Couronnes station by declaring that “il ne reste aucune trace du drame. La décoration

intérieure a été refaite neuf”.36 Furthermore, in September and October the news on the

catastrophe began to take a less emotional tone and appeared with other news on the

Metro, especially on the expansion and building of new lines. Le Temps, on September 1,

published an article with the title “Ou en sont les travaux et les projets de nouvelles

lignes?”37. The author started the article by reminding the horrors of the catastrophe and

than elaborated on the rise of the tickets sales – which he saw as good sign and an

indication of calmness (normalness) taking back its course – and than gave a survey of

the latest developments on the expansion. This structure showed that bad days were in the

past and future embodied hope. Finally the author provided a detailed survey of the new

lines pointing further to the hopeful character of the future. Not only did the Metro

survived it was expanding.

Overall, by framing vulnerability as a situation that could be taken care of, the

prevention discourse emerged as a site of resilience. The prevention, primarily, focused

on not to produce victims again, which in return articulated the message that the Parisian

Metro could survive into the future in a safe way. If we return to Emile Combes’ speech

it is possible to see these elements. He said “il appartiendra aux pouvoirs publics de faire

qu’il en soit ainsi dans la mesure où ils peuvent intervenir pour garantir la vie humaine

36 “Au metropolitain”, Le Figaro, September 19, 1903 37 “Le Metropolitaine”, Le temps, September 01,1903

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contre les risques professionnels.”38 The final touch “ainsi l’honneur rendu aux morts se

tournera en salut pour les vivants” demonstrated best the temporal shift and resilience.

Conclusion

Today the Parisian Metro with its 14 lines (19 if we count the RER lines) buzzes

with daily users. It is part of the citys identity with its iconic Art Nouveau entrances and

the colorful map that can be purchased almost in every form in tourist shops. Paris has the

sixth most used Metro in the world and transports more than 1.5 billion people each

year.39 Parisians love their metro, and they rely on it heavily. Because they trust the

system to function in extreme measure they walk on a fragile line. But because they rely

on it, they also demonstrate resilience. The strong place that the Metro occupies in the

city and imaginations makes it vulnerable and resilient at the same time.

1903 was the first major disaster that the Parisian Metro encountered and the

analysis of discourses produced in its aftermath showed that vulnerability was overcome

by construction of a narrative of resilience. This was a unique moment as it was the first

major accident when metro was new and a highly symbolic project. The discourses

discussed in this paper showed that the framing of the event through victims and

prevention measures helped to gradually mask vulnerability and restore trust to the

system by creating resilience. However, the fragility of modernity continued, as 7 years

later, in 1910 Paris would be hit by one of the biggest floods of the century crippling the

Metro entirely. The water did not care about exit signs.

Nearly 100 years passed since the Couronnes catastrophe or the flood. Parisian

metro no doubt survived many more disruptions during the course of these years and yet

38 Journal Officiel de la République Française, August 16, 1903 39 “10 facts about the metro in Paris”, http://worldofparis.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/factsmetroparis/

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it stands as the symbol of one the most visited cities in the world. Creation of resilience

made sense in 1903 and we can only speculate that it was recreated over and over again

in the twentieth century.

The opening question of this paper was: How resilient are the cities we live in? By

looking at the Metro, a major component of the city of Paris, this paper showed that

resilience might be a construction as well as concrete acts of mitigation constantly in

negotiation with perceptions on vulnerability. Therefore I believe fragility, vulnerability

and resilience are useful categories of analysis when historicizing the “networked cities”

of the “modern world”. The question remains than in a slightly altered form: Is there a

singular and finite form of resilience, or is it an indefinite process of redefinition and

adaption?

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Figure 1. L’Assiette au Beure, August 22, 1903

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