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The Athenian Embassies to Sardis and Cleomenes' Invasion of AtticaAuthor(s): Richard M. BertholdSource: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 51, No. 3, (3rd Qtr., 2002), pp. 259-267Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436657Accessed: 18/08/2008 09:56
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THE ATHENIANEMBASSIESTO SARDIS AND CLEOMENES'
INVASIONOF ATTICA
Sometime
during
the archon
year 508/7 king
Cleomenes
of
Sparta
was
summonedback to Athensby a beleaguered sagoras,whose politicalposition
was crumbling efore hereform acticsof Cleisthenes.Failing n theirattempt
to establisha narrow
oligarchy, he two
men
and
their
supporters
were
driven
out of the city, and Cleomenesbegan organizing
a
three-pronged
nvasionof
Attica, inviting armiesfrom ChalcisandBoeotiain from the north,while he
gathered he Peloponnesianevy
in
the
south.
In
apparent esponse
o
this
threat
the Athenians
dispatched
n
embassy
o
Sardis,perhaps
n the
spring
of
507,
to
seek an
alliance from the Persiansatrap
Artaphernes,
who
demandedof
the
Athenians he usual tokens
of
submission o the empire,earthand water.
"On
theirown
responsibility"
he
envoys provided he
tokens
and
returned
o
Ath-
ens, where hey "themselveswere blamedgreatly"
or this
act.,
While the
intention
of
this
mission is perfectly clear
-
an
alliance with
Persia virtually verything lse about t has been the subjectof debate. t can
hardlybedoubtedhatCleisthenes,ust recalled o Athensafter he expulsionof
Isagoras ndCleomenes,
was
responsible or sending he embassy,2 nd tsgoal
is
clearly
stated
by Herodotus:o concludean alliancewithPersia.WhyPersia?
Because
no
potentialally of any significancewas available.The Peisistratid
Herod.
5.70.1-74.2:
ic't
aqpwv
ai)tiCov
ak6gevot;
wrUT6v
aidia;
"ydXa;
eiXov
(73.3);
as
C.
Hignett,
A
History
of
the Athenian
Constitutiono
the End
of
the
FifthCentury
B.C.
(Oxford 1952)
178
notes,
Herodotus
does
not
actuallysay
the submissionwas disavowed.
The events
leading
to the
embassy
can be no
later thanthe
end
of the
archon
year
in
late
June orearly July andwereprobably arlier n the spring;see pp. 262-265.
2
Actually, it hasbeen
doubtedby M.F.
McGregor,
"The Pro-Persian
Partyat Athens,"
n
Athenian
StudiesPresented o
W.S.
Ferguson
(Cambridge1940)
77-78, followed by
R.J.
Buck, "The
Reforms of 487
B.C. in the
Selection of
Archons," CP 60
(1965) 99.
McGregor's
suggestionthat the
Athenians
recalled Cleisthenesand
sent the
embassy
at
the same
time
perhaps
"does no
violence to
the
tenses of
Herodotus,"but
the
Greek
certainly mplies a
sequence:
Avhva^iot
i jeta
fai'a
KXAtoaOvea
..
gieaxeai6WEvot
1ic4uouat
d6yygXoo
;
dp8t;
(5.73.1).
McGregor's
objection that Persian
alliance
meant he
restoration
f
Hippias s
nonsense; here s no
evidence of Sardis
adopting hat
policy before Cleomenes'
second
failure
to
install
Isagoras, and
the fact is that
Arta-
phernesacceptedAthenian
ubmission
with
no
mentionof
Hippias.His second
objection,
that it
would have
been
political suicide
to propose
submission to
Persia, is an
entirely
subjective
conclusion drawn
from the reactionof
the Athenians
when the
embassy did
return.
Historia,
Band LI/3 (2002)
i)
Franz
Steiner
Verlag
Wiesbaden
GmbH,Sitz Stuttgart
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260 RICHARDM. BERTHOLD
alliance with Thessaly
had likely rested on a personal relationship, and in any
case it is improbable that the Thessalian cavalry could have provided decisive
support against armies of
hoplites.3 The Thessalians may well have been
thirsting for revenge
against the Spartans, but, burned once already, they were
not about to rush to
the
aid of
a city whose prospects must have seemed very
dim. Athens' failure
to
approach Argos,
the natural
ally
of
any enemy
of
Sparta,
is best explained by
the existence of a peace treaty between Argos and Sparta
and the Argives'
remarkableconsistency
in
adhering to such agreements.4
As
has long been recognized, the appeal to Persia
was
born of desperation.
The threat
from
Sparta
was
real
and
imminent,
and
with
nowhere else
to
turn
Cleisthenes followed the lines of his family's old connections to Sardis and
sought help from the
superpower across the Aegean.5
It
is simply inconceivable
that
Cleisthenes
did
not
know
that any relationship with the Persian empire
began
with an
unqualified recognition of Persian superiority through
the
surren-
der
of the tokens
of
earth
and water.
In
addition
to
Alcmaeonid connections
in
Asia Minor there
is
the fact thatthe Asian Greeks, including trading partnersof
Athens,
had
been under Persian
rule
for a
half
century.
Is
it
credible that
when
Cleisthenes and his
people
discussed
whether
to
turn to
Persia,
no
one
asked
what the nature of the alliance would be or
no
one could be found
who
had any
knowledge on the subject? What is known of Cleisthenes does not suggest a
man
who
would
take
a
complete leap
into
the
dark
on
such an
important
ssue
or
fail to
give
the
envoys
instructions
regarding
submission. It is
much
easier
to
believe
that
Herodotus' statement that
the
envoys
were
responsible
for
the
decision is
a
distortion
intended to
spare
the Alcmaeonids
a
further
charge
of
medism, particularly
n
view
of
his
later
enthusiastic defense of
the
family
after
Marathon.6
3 The victory
n 511
was clearlyagainst
a smallandpossibly
disorganized orce
(it came
by
sea, was
not commanded
by a king and seems
to have fought
immediately
after anding);
in contrast, he
Thessalianswere
easily driven off
by Cleomenes'
army;Herod.
5.63.2-
64.2; Arist.Ath.
Pol. 19.5.
4 See J.
Holladay,
"Medism
n Athens 508-480 B.C.,"G&R
25 (1978) 178-79,
who
points
out that
such a treaty
wouldalso explain
Cleomenes'
involvement n
Argos in
495/4.
5
Herod.
6.125.2-5.
6
So
G. Busolt, Griechische
Geschichte2Gotha
1894-1903)
11,441,
n. 9; W.W. How
&
J.
Wells, A Commentary
n Herodotus
(Oxford
1912) II, 40;
E.M. Walker,
"Athens.The
Reformof Cleisthenes,"
CAH
IV (Cambridge
1926) 157-58;
A.R. Burn,Persia
and
the
Greeks. The Defense of
the West,
c.
546-478
B.C.2 (London
1984)
187-88.
G.M.E.
Williams, "Athenian
Politics
5087-480
B.C.:
A
Reappraisal,"
Athenaeum60 (1982)
526-27 wonders f the Philaids,enemiesof PersiaandtheAlcmaeonids,hadanything o
do
with
Cleisthenes
sending
the embassy
to
Sardis,
but this seems extremelyunlikely;
he
external hreat
o
Athens was
clearly
a more compelling motivation
han some potential
domestic problem.
On
submission
to Persiasee L.L. Orlin,
"Athensand Persia
ca.
507
B.C.:
A
Neglected Perspective,"
n L.L.
Orlin,ed.,
Michigan
OrientalStudies
n Honor
of
G.C.
Cameron
(Ann
Arbor
1976)
255-66,
who stresses
the
eternal
and cosmic
signifi-
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The AthenianEmbassies
o
Sardis
and Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica
261
A more
perplexing question
is
exactly
what
Cleisthenes
expected
from
the
Persian gambit. That the mission was connected to the threat from the Pelopon-
nesus is obvious and
accepted by all,
but it is
not
clear how
a
sudden
alliance
with Persia, whatever the
terms,
could thwart that
threat.
Could Cleisthenes
seriously expect that
Cleomenes would be scared off
by
the mere news of
an
alliance with Persia, a power with no presence
west
of the
Aegean?7 And
if
he
was counting on actual
Persian military aid,
how could he possibly expect to see
it in
time,
when
Cleomenes was
already collecting
his
forces
when
the
embassy
was
sent? Even assuming Artaphemes could
implement
a
major
development
in
Achaemenid foreign policy without reference
to
Darius, deploying
an effective
force to Athens would requirea significant amountof time for the collection of
ships, troops
and
supplies
and the
organization
of
a
fairly
complex amphibious
operation.
News
of these
preparations
was more
likely
to
spur
Cleomenes
to
more
aggressive action
than to
deter him,
and he
need only
employ
established
mechanisms
to
summon
the Peloponnesian allies.8 If the
Persians do decide to
send
a
force,
then
Cleomenes
has every
strategic
reason to
move even more
quickly
and
seize Athens
before they can arrive. It seems that
Cleisthenes was
grasping
at
Persian
straws,
and real help from
the east, whether in the form of
deterrence
or actual
military force, was
at
best
a
long shot. Simply establishing
a basis for possible futurePersian intervention was the only realistic hope.
Herodotussuggests
that upon their return
he
envoys were censured ("blamed
greatly") for
submitting the tokens to Artaphernes, but he
fails to explain
exactly why.
The
passage strongly implies that the
people were caught by
surprise
and
displeased, but was it the mission
itself
or
simply the terms it
accepted that offended them? A secret
embassy, sent only
on Cleisthenes'
orders,
is
certainly possible, since Athens was
only
now
departing an age when
foreign policy
was
essentially
the
preserve
of
aristocrats,9but
Herodotus says it
cance of the act; A.
Kuhrt,"Earthand
Water," n
A.
Kuhn
& H.
Sancisi-Weerdenburg,
eds., Achaemenid
HistoryIII: Methodand
Theory Leiden
1988) 87-99. If the tokens had
literally to
be
from the
submitting state, then
the Athenians
would
have had to
know
beforehand
what the terms
would
be, but an
understanding f
the
mythopoeticnature
of
the
tokenssuggests
that
any
earth
and waterwould
do;
see Orlin
(as
in
p. 260
n.
6)
265-
66.
My thanks
o
Jack Balcer
for
information
n
this.
7
The
alliance
as
a deterrence
s
implied by
many
scholars and
stated
explicitly
by
F.
Schachermeyr,
Athenals Stadt
des
GroBk6nigs,"Graz.
Beitr.
1
(1973) 217.
8
If Herod.
5.31.4-32.1
is
to be
believed,
Artaphernes eeded
royal approval or
the assault
on
Naxos.
Persian
preparations
or the Marathon
xpedition
began the
previous
year
(Herod.6.95.1), whereasSparta,Athens andPlataeawereableto prepare orces and get
them to
Marathon
n
a
matter
of
days rather
han
months;notealso
the rapid
Peloponne-
sian
mobilizationbefore
Plataea Herod.
9.9.1-11.3). On the
absolute
chronology
see pp.
262-265.
9
F.J. Frost,
"Politics n
Early
Athens,"
n
G.S.
Shrimpton& D.J.
McCargar,
ds.,
Classical
Contributions.
Studies
in
Honor
of
M.F.
McGregor (Locust
Valley,
NY
1981)
35.
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262
RICHARD
.
BERTHOLD
was "the
Athenians"
who
sent the
mission.
Further, if it
had
been secret,
why
was it now revealed, only to be condemned?Could Cleisthenes, whose political
success
had
been
based on an
understandingof
the demos,
now so
thoroughly
misjudge
them?
The dispatch
of the
embassy, if
not
the terms
it could
expect,
must
have been
public
knowledge.
The
condemnation of
the
embassy
clearly
resulted from
the terms
it
accept-
ed,
which
in
turn
means those
terms
-
submission to
Persia
-
were
refused by
the Athenians.10
Now,
it
is
possible that
upon the
envoys'
return
Cleisthenes
was
confronted
by an
unexpected
anti-Persian
sentiment
among the
people and
simply
abandoned the
embassy,
but such
a sudden
and
politically
decisive
outburstof anti-Persianfeeling seems a bit surprising for a state surroundedby
serious
foes
and
desperately
seeking allies.
The
rejection
of
the Persian
alliance
makes much more
sense
among
a
people
facing
no
immediate
threats and with
a
couple
of impressive
military
victories under
their
corselets, which
would
be
the case
had
Cleomenes'
invasion
already
failed when
the
envoys retumed.'1
With
Cleomenes at
least
temporarily
neutralized
and morale
boosted
by
the
energetic
defeat of
the Boeotians and
Chalcidians the
Athenians
in
their
enthu-
siasm
would
probably
have
rejected
any
deal
that
even
hinted
at
an
inferior
status.
Unfortunately,Herodotusdoes not provide a precise chronology for either
the
embassy
or
the
invasion,
but
the
evidence
strongly
suggests
the summer
of
507 for
Cleomenes'
failed
attack.12Both
Aristotle and
Herodotus
place
Isago-
ras'
political
problems and
thus his
appeal to Sparta
in
the archon
year
508/7,13
which means
Cleomenes' failed intervention
must have taken
place
in the same
10 H. Berve,
Miltiades.StudienzurGeschichtedes Mannesundseiner Zeit (Berlin 1937)
71,
n. 1; Schachermeyras in n. 7) 213-14; and R. Sealey,
"ThePit and the Well: the Persian
Heralds
of
491 B.C.," CJ 72 (1976/7) 17-18 all
believe the alliance was accepted;Berve
points to Herodotus' ilence and the notionthatwere it rejected,Artapherneswould have
no legal basis
for his later demand to restoreHippias. But Herodotussurely implies
rejection (censuring the envoys, but accepting their
deed, is difficult to believe), and
Artaphernes,f
indeedhe neededany legal basis, wouldconsider he submissionunilater-
ally
valid
regardless
of the
acts
of
the Athenian
assembly;
see note 29.
11
So Walker (as
in n. 6) 158-59; Burn (as in n. 6) 188; R. Thomsen, The Origins
of
Ostracism
Copenhagen1972) 125;
M.
Ostwald,"TheReform
of
the AthenianState
by
Cleisthenes,"
CAH2
V
(Cambridge1988) 308, 338.
12
With two exceptions every author places the
invasion in 506, but
no
one offers
the
slightest reason
or
evidence
for
doing
so. The
exceptions are Burn
(as
in n.
6)
188 and
J.M. Cook, ThePersian Empire London 1983) 92, who date it to
507;
four
authorshedge
with the date 507/6: D.W. Knight, Some Studies in Athenian Politics in the Fifth Century
B.C. (Wiesbaden 1970) 24;
R.D.
Cromey, "Kleisthenes'
Fate,"
Hist. 28
(1979) 133;
J.
Hart,Herodotusand GreekHistory (London 1982)
38, 71; L.H. Jeffery, "Greecebefore
the Persian
Invasion,"CAH2
V
(Cambridge1988) 360.
13
Herod.5.70.1-2; Arist. Ath.
Pol.
20.1-2. Ostwald as
in
n.
II)
306-8
places
the reforms
and Isagoras'
appeal n 507/6,
which
flies right
n the face
of
Aristotle.
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The AthenianEmbassies o Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica
263
period. The king brought with him only a small "band"of soldiers,14 who were
easily overwhelmed, and collecting such a tiny force and marching to Athens
could hardly have taken more than a week or two. It is unknown precisely when
in the archon year Isagoras' appeal and expulsion took place, but even
if
they
are dated to the very end of the year
-
and there is no particularreason to believe
this so15
-
Cleomenes would be back in the Peloponnesus collecting his army
by early August
at the
absolute latest.16
It is far more
likely, since
Aristotle
has
Cleisthenes undertaking his reforms "during the archonship of Isagoras," that
these events were earlier, perhaps in the spring of 507 or even in late
508.17
How long
it
took to mobilize the
forces
of the Peloponnesian
alliance
cannot be determined with any precision and undoubtedlythis varied with the
scale of the expedition, but numerous examples indicate
that it cannot have
taken so many months that the expedition would be delayed until
the
following
year. The Spartanarmy could
be
mobilized virtually overnight,
as
demonstrated
by the lead-up to Plataea in 479, when
the
Peloponnesian levy appears
to have
gathered at the Isthmus within weeks of the Spartan decision
to
march.18
During the great war with Athens the Peloponnesian army regularly invaded
Attica in the spring, and while it is true these expeditions were expected and
involved no political wrangling, they demonstrate that
it was
certainly physical-
ly possible for the levy to be collected and rushed north in less than a month.
And in 507 there appears to have been little or no diplomatic dithering, since the
allies were in the dark about Cleomenes' true aims, suggesting they had simply
automatically heeded the call to mobilize. For Thucydides the campaigning
season runs from March or April until at least the beginning of November,19
which means that even if Isagoras' ouster is set at the latest possible moment,
early July, Cleomenes still had at least four months to collect his troops and
march to Eleusis. If this was insufficient time, then it is difficult to understand
14
Herod.
5.72.1: ou
avv
jsey6kqi
Etpi;
Arist. Ath.
Pol. 20.3: jsei
okiywv.
15
A. Andrewes,
"Kleisthenes' Reform
Bill," CQ 71 (1977)
246-47 suggests that since
Isagorasgave
his name to the archon
year he must
have served most of
his
term.
Even
if
this
supposition s true,
which is not at all clear,
Isagorascould
still have been out of
office in the
early spring.
16
In theory the first month
of the Athenianyear,
Hecatombaeon,
began with the first new
moon
after
the
summer
olstice, so
an
archon's ermcould begin
anywhere
rom
lateJune
to very early
August.Itcannotbe
calculatedexactly
when
the
year 507/6 began,but it was
very
probably n mid or late July; see
W.B.
Dinsmoor,The AthenianArchon
List in the
Light of Recent
Discoveries (NY 1939)
205-10.
17 Arist. Ath.Pol. 21.1: en i'Iaay6poudpxovto;. Therelativeorderof Cleisthenes' reform
proposalsand
Isagoras'appeal s
unimportant ere,but see Knight
as
in
n. 12)
13-24 for
a
reasonablechronology;
putting
he
reforms nto practice,which
must take some time,
should
be
distinguished
rom
simply voting for them.
18
Herod.
9.9.1-11.3; some troopswere
already hereworkingon the
wall.
19
See A.W.
Gomme, A Historical
Commentary on
Thucydides III (Oxford
1956) 699-715.
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264
RICHARD
M.
BERTHOLD
how much of fifth and fourth
century military history could have happened
as it
did.
Of
course, just because something could be done in
a certain period of time
does
not
mean it was,
especially
in
the typically plodding world of politics
and
diplomacy.
But
there are good reasons to believe
Cleomenes
acted as
expedi-
tiously as possible. First, there
is
the king himself, by any account a
headstrong
and
supremely energetic
individual, not given
to
caution
and
hesitation.20
A
man
willing to bribe Delphi and play fast and loose with
Sparta's constitutional
practices
to
obtain
his ends was not likely to dawdle,
especially when the issue
was not
just political, but very personal. Besieged on
the acropolis and forced to
retire, Cleomenes had been personally humiliated by the Athenians,andwhat is
known
of
his
career
strongly suggests an individual
particularly eager to take
action
when
so
injured.2'
Second, even a more
cautious man would have
compelling reasons to move
promptly. The longer the
delay, especially into the next year, the more
the
military and
political situation would from his
point of view
deteriorate.
Cleomenes, having already been involved with
Athens
and now
presumably
accompanied by Isagoras,
must have been aware of
the sorry state of Athenian
hoplite forces
in the
wake of
the tyranny,22and he could hardly have failed to
conclude thatthe less time Athenshad to prepare heeasierhis job would be. The
longer he delayed, the longer
his client's enemies,
the Alcmaeonids, would also
have to
solidify their domestic political position,
rendering
his
political task that
much
harder.Further, hathe was
apparently aken by surpriseby the
last
minute
defection of Damaratus
and the
Corinthians
suggests
-
but
only
that
-
an
operation
thrown
together
with
some haste.
Finally,
whether Cleomenes
knew of
the
Athenian
embassy
to Sardis
is
unknown,
but if
he
did,
this
might
be
another,
if
minor, spur
to
action,
since
though
he
might suspect
it
would
take
some
time to
get the
ponderous
Persian
military
machine
moving,
he
could
not be
sure.
All the evidence, circumstantial though it may be, thus points to the sum-
mer of
507
for
Cleomenes' invasion
of
Attica.
The failed attack could
conse-
20
So much
so that
many in antiquityand in the present
have thoughthim insane; see
A.
Griffiths, "Was Cleomenes
Mad?," in A. Powell, ed., Classical Sparta.
Techniques
Behind
Her Success (Norman,Okl.
1988)51-78.
21 Herod.
5.72.1-4; Arist.Ath.Pol. 20.3.
Herod.5.74.1
in fact speaksof Cleomenes'actions
in terms of insult and
personal revenge:
KkeogvIq
be
icrcxatdevo;
reptuppia0cat
xicetat
Kai epyOWat
6
A0A"vaiov
...
reiacaa0ai
Te s0eowv T6v 8i,ov t6v'AOivaxiv.
Cleomenes' subsequent
proposal to
restore Hippias (Herod. 5.90.1-91.3;
Plut. Mor.
860f.) certainlysuggestsa man willingto go to any lengthsto gain revenge.
22
Athens
apparently
ad not employed
a citizen
army
foralmost
forty years,
and Peisistra-
tus may well have disarmed
he populace,seemingly relyingexclusively on
mercenaries;
Arist. Ath.
Pol.
15.3-4 (Thuc.
6.58.1-2 hardlyseems
evidencefor Hippiasdisarming
all
the hoplites, though
hatmay
have
followed);
see most
recently
F.J. Frost,
"TheAthenian
MilitaryBefore
Cleisthenes,"
Hist.
33 (1984)
283-94.
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o SardisandCleomenes' Invasion
of
Attica
265
quently
easilyprecede he return f the
envoys,
especially
f as
representatives
of a low statusstatethey werekeptcoolingtheirheels in Sardisby thesatrap.
And
since
Cleomenes'failure
and
the Athenianvictories n the north
provide
the only
compelling
explanation or
the sudden
repudiation f the Persian
alliance,
t must be concluded
hat
the
embassy
did in fact
return fter
Athens
was
saved.
Cleisthenes
disappears
rom
history
about
his
time,
and some have
linked
that
disappearance
o
the
embassy,
suggesting
hathe fell from
power,ruined
by
his
connectionwith the
unpopular
mission.23This
is
difficult
to
support,
especially
if
one
accepts
thatthe
embassy
retumed
afterthe crisis had
passed.
Granted,hedemoswould aterbeveryfickleinthetreatmentf its leaders,but
it is very
hard o
believethat
n
theflush
of military
ictory he
popularity f
the
man
recognized
as
the
architect f the
government
esponsible
or
the
triumph
would
beunable o
weather
anassociation
withthe
discredited mbassy. n
any
case,
his
bias
towards
he
Alcmaeonids
otwithstanding,
ven
Herodotuswould
have trouble
glossing over what
would
have been a
very
dramatic all
from
power.
Theembassy
would aterreturn o
haunt he
Alcmaeonids,
ut tcertain-
ly doesnot
providea
reliablebasis
forremoving
Cleisthenes
or his
familyfrom
the
centerstage in
Athenian
politics.The most
likely
explanation,
particularly
in view of thefact thatHerodotusypicallydoesnot recorduneventful eaths, s
that
as a
relativelyold man,he
simplydied
or
retired nthe
years
following the
reforms.24
The
first
embassy
o
Sardis
has
beenseen as
an actof
medismon the
partof
the
"pro-Persian"
lcmaeonids,25
utthis
conclusionis
based in
parton the
mistaken
ssumption
hat here
existed n
Athens
definableparties
withconsist-
ent
policies.
Instead,politicsremained
at the turnof
the century
a
timocratic
gameof
individual ristocrats
peratingwithin
a
network f family
connections
and
competing or
temporary
dvantage n
powerand
prestige,
all of which
conspired
against he
emergenceof
partiesand
long-termpolitical
programs.26
It
is
thus
impossible
to
draw
any
conclusions
aboutthe
official
Alcmaeonid
position
regarding
Persiaor
whether, or that
matter,
heyeven
had one. That
23
How
& Wells
(as in n.
6)
11,
40;
Walker as
in
n.
6)
167-68; C.W. Fornara
&
L.J.
Samons
HI,
Athens
rom
Cleisthenes o
Pericles
(Berkeley/Los
Angeles
1991)
10, n.
38.
24
McGregor as
in n. 2)
79, n.
3; J.K.
Davies, Athenian
Propertied
Families
600-300
B.C.
(Oxford
1971)
375;
among
others.The
objections
of
Cromey
(as in n.
12)
133-47
make
absolutely
no
sense, and
his
argument
that
Cleisthenes
went into
voluntary
exile
is
ingeniousbutunconvincing.Cleisthenes s the secondchild of parentsmarried ometime
before
570;
see Davies
(as in n.
24) 372.
25
Walker
(as in
n. 6)
158,
168;
Hignett
(as in
n. 1)
180;
C.A.
Robinson,
Jr.,
"Athenian
Politics
510-486
B.C.,"AJP
66
(1945)
247-48
seems to
imply
this.
26
See
esp. F.J.
Frost,"Tribal
Politics and
theCivic
State,"
AJAH
1
(1976) 66-75
(as
in
n. 9)
Class.
Contr.
33-39.
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266 RICHARD
M.
BERTHOLD
the mission was clearly undertaken in response to an external crisis also
undermines any conclusions about domestic politics; are Roosevelt and the
American Congress to be considered "pro-Communist"because they made an
alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War? Moreover, an
unqualified accusation of medism is at this date completely inaccurate, since it
is only after the
Ionian
Revolt and Marathon and especially after Xerxes'
invasion that dealings with Persia take on the aura of treason and betrayal
generally associated with the term.27
Sometime close
to
the end of the century the Athenians sent a second
embassy to Sardis, this time to deal with the problem of Hippias.28 When
Cleomenes' bizarre scheme to restore him to power fell through, Hippias had
headed for the satrapalcourt, which almost certainly took up his cause because of
Athens' repudiationof the alliance of 507. From the Persian point
of
view
that
submission to Ahura-Mazdaand the Great King was permanent,and Artaphemes
was inclined to support whatever Athenian government
-
in
this case the exiled
tyrant endorsed
this
arrangement.29
While
Herodotus states
that
the
purpose
of
the
embassy
was
to dissuade
Artaphernes
rom
supportingHippias,
it cannot
have
had even
the least
expectation of success,
since
the
satrap
was
hardly likely
to
prefer
the defiant
republic
to the
compliant tyrant.
The mission must
be viewed
as
a diplomatic statement,an assertion to the Persians and anyone else (including
opponents
in
Athens itself)
of
the
legitimacy
of
the
new
government.30
Flush
with
confidence
in the wake of their
military victories,
the Athenians
shrugged
off
Artaphernes' hreatsand accepted
Persian
hostility
as the
price
of
independence.
27 See esp.
Holladay as
in n.
4) 174-91;
also A.W. Gomme,
"Athenian
Notes.
1.
Athenian
Politics
510-483
B.C.,"
AJP 65
(1944)
321-22
(= More
Essays
in
Greek
History
and
Literature
Oxford 1962] 19-20);
J. Wolski,
"MT8tcsa6q,"
list.
22
(1973)
3-5.
28 Herod.5.96.2. For no apparent eason(it appears o go back to R.W.Macan,
Herodotus.
The
Fourth,Fifth
and
SixthBooks
[London
18951
, 245) c.
504 is
the datemost
often given
for the
embassy
e.g.,Walker
as in n. 6])
163, n. 2; Thomsen
asin n. 11 126;
Ostwald
as
in
n.
111
338), but Herod.
5.97.1
(ev
co-i6u
i1T'
catpCo
6
MtAoto;
'Aptaray6p...)
suggests
a
date
closer to
498; could
it be that
the new threat
contributed
o the
military
reformof
501/0?
29 Herod.
5.96.1. On the
permanence
of
submission
see Orlin
(as
in n. 6) 257-65;
by
supporting
Hippias
Artaphernes
was
not attempting
o create
a new alliance with
Athens,
but
was
simply
interfering
n the affairs
of
a
statealready
considered
a vassal.
On
the
Persian
relationship
with
tyranny
see esp.
D.F. Graf, "Greek
Tyrants
and
Achaemenid
Politics,"
in J.W. Eadie &
J. Ober,eds.,
The
Craft of
the Historian.
Essays
in Honor
of
C.G.Starr(Lanham,MD 1985)79-123.
30 Thomsen
as
in
n.
I
1)
126 andOstwald as
in n.
I
1)
338 see
the
purpose
of the
embassy
as
counteringHippias,
but
only
Walker
as
in n.
6)
168 recognizesthe hopelessness
of this,
wrongly
concluding,
however,
that there
is
a problem
with Herodotus'
account.
The
Alcmaeonids
would
certainly
support he embassy
as a way
to counteract
any
negative
publicity
romthe
previous
mission.
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The AthenianEmbassies o Sardisand
Cleomenes' Invasion
of Attica
267
The second
embassy and Artaphernes'
acceptance
of
the tyrant's claim
mark something of a turning point in the domestic affairs of Athens. Hence-
forth, any suggestion
of
rapprochement
with
Persia
meant supporting
a restora-
tion
of the
tyranny,
a
development
that
could
only
make
medizing politically
unacceptable
to
all but
a
handful
who
might benefit from
Hippias'
return.31
Conversely, tyranny, whose popular support was
undoubtedly already rapidly
evaporating with the successes of the new
government,
was
now further tainted
by
its
clear
association
with submission to
a
foreign power. Whatever the
details
of Athenian domestic
politics
in
this
period,
Persian
support
of
Hippias
makes it extremely difficult to accept the
presence
in
the city of any sizable
or
influential group of either medizers or tyrannists. Stepping on to the shore at
Marathon
a
decade
later, Hippias might believe there was such a faction,
but
Miltiades would know otherwise.
University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque
Richard M. Berthold
31
Walker
(as in n.
6) 168
recognizes
this, but
incorrectly believes in the
continued
existence
of
a
"party
of
Hippias"
in
Athens.