-
BERNSTEIN'S DISTORTING MIRRORS: A RejoinderAuthor(s): ALASDAIR
MACINTYRESource: Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 67,
No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 30-41Published by: Penn State University
PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41178282 .Accessed:
05/10/2013 22:28
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the
Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,
researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information
technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new
formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please
contact [email protected].
.
Penn State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Soundings:An
Interdisciplinary Journal.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
BERNSTEIN'S DISTORTING MIRRORS: A Rejoinder
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE
is a large' compliment to have one's views expounded and
criticized by Richard J. Bernstein. Bernstein's three books,
Praxis and Action (Philadelphia, 1971), The Restructuring of
Social and Political Theory (New York, 1976) and Beyond Objectivism
and Relativism (Philadelphia, 1983) constitute jointly a remarkable
achievement, a trilogy which is no less than a narrative interpre-
tation of the history of recent philosophy and social theory from
the nineteenth century to the present. The epigraph to Bern-
stein's this-worldly commedia might well be E. M. Forster's "Only
connect." For one of Bernstein's singular talents is for seeing
hitherto unnoticed or underemphasized connections between thinkers
who, until he took them in hand, had appeared to have little in
common. Bernstein uses this talent to extraordinary synthetic and
reconciling effect. So within a single overall unify- ing argument
in Praxis and Action such heterogeneous figures as Marx,
Kierkegaard, Dewey, Carnap, and Strawson all play a part; and in
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism Winch, Kuhn, Gadamer, Habermas,
Rorty, and Arendt are almost as improba- bly recruited as
cooperative dramatis personae in Bernstein's philosophical
theatre.
The recurrent pattern in these dramas is one which Bernstein
himself characterised aptly in the final paragraphs of The Re-
structuring of Social and Political Theory as a movement towards a
climax of theoretical reconciliation. Two or more of
Bernstein's
Alasdair Maclntyre is W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at
Vanderbilt University and President-Elect of the Eastern Division
of the American Philo- sophical Association. After Virtue, the
subject of his present exchange with Richard Bernstein, is his
eighth book. In the Summer 1982 issue of Soundings, Maclntyre had
the shoe on the other foot - there he was the energetic critic of
Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
30
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Bernstein's distorting mirrors 31
philosophical characters are first brought on stage and the ap-
parently incompatible character of their views is then exhibited
with great clarity, so that we seem to be confronted with an
unavoidable choice, an either/or. But then somehow or other a
transformation occurs, a reconciliation is after all effected and
instead of the either/or of conflict we have a both/and, a new
harmony. How are these reconciliations effected? Is there a genuine
overcoming of what was after all only apparent opposi- tion? Or is
it the reconciliation that is illusory? "In the final analysis"
claimed Bernstein "we are not confronted with exclu- sive choices"
(Restructuring p. 223). How is such a final analysis to be arrived
at and defended?
Bernstein's synthetic conclusions are always reached though the
detail of his interpretative narration of particular theorists and
theories. Two examples which illuminate that mode of interpretation
are his accounts first of Kuhn and later of Habermas. For much in
Bernstein one way or another is a response to Kuhn's thesis that in
certain key episodes in the history of the natural sciences there
occur not only moments of exclusive choice, but moments in which
such choice is between alternative bodies of theory so different in
their conceptual structures, in their characterisations of the
relevant empirical data, and in their identifications of what
problems are central that no theory-neutral standards can be found
by which one can be shown to be superior to its rival or rivals.
Indeed part of the disagreement between the contending parties in
such cases con- cerns how the disagreement between them is to be
resolved. And of course such radical disagreements occur in
philosophy as well as in the sciences.
It does not follow that, whenever such incommensurability of
rival bodies of theory is encountered, rationality is necessarily
devoid of resources. Each of the two (or more) bodies of theory
will bring to such encounters some history of progress and
achievement in solving what each takes to be the key problems that
have been identified from its own point of view, but also some
history of bafflement in the face of its own problems - some
greater or lesser degree of failure. And it may be that one of the
contending bodies of theory will turn out to afford pos- sibilities
of understanding both the achievements and the lim- itations of its
rival(s) - achievements and limitations, that is, judged by the
standards of that rival - which that rival body of
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
32 SOUNDINGS
theory cannot provide either concerning itself or concerning its
theoretical opponents. So it was that the rational superiority of
Galilean and then of Newtonian mechanics over medieval im- petus
theory was vindicated by their ability to identify and to explain
the necessary limitations as well as the achievements of impetus
theory; so it was that the rational superiority of quan- tum
mechanics over Newtonian mechanics was vindicated by its ability to
identify and to explain the necessary limitations as well as the
achievements of Newtonian physics, as these emerged in the later
nineteenth century. The mark of a rationally superior theory is,
then, that it supplies the resources for writing a more adequate
history both of its rivals and of itself than those rivals can
supply. And philosophy is in this respect no different from the
sciences.
Notice however that where the outcome of a conflict between two
or more incommensurable bodies of theory does result in the
vindication of the rational superiority of one of the two
contending parties, the either/or of conflict has not been re-
placed by the both/and of synthesis; the conflict has been re-
solved in the exclusive favor of the victor. But this is something
that Bernstein's perspective never allows him to recognize. In-
deed he makes the claim, after a long discussion of incommen-
surability whose starting-point is Kuhn's work, that "different
traditions or forms of life may be incommensurable, but can
nevertheless be rationally compared" (Beyond Objectivism and Re-
lativism, p. 107). Yet the conception of rational comparison which
he employs is inadequate in at least two ways.
It is first of all a conception which is never provided with a
sufficiently precise characterisation. And the examples of ra-
tional comparison that Bernstein provides, for instance in com-
paring Habermas with Gadamer, are not persuasive. Moreover, even
the work of rational comparison, specified as meagrely as Bernstein
specifies it, can only be undertaken from some par- ticular point
of view, from the standing ground afforded by some particular
tradition. For where we have two radically in- commensurable bodies
of theory, there will be two incompatible standards of judgment not
only as to what it is in each that is both capable of and merits
comparison, but also as to the outcome of such comparison. Hence
the activity of rational comparison will provide no point of
reconciliation for the otherwise irreconcila- ble. The either/or of
incommensurability stubbornly resists dis-
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Bernstein's distorting mirrors 33
solution into Bernstein's synthetic both/and. Indeed, as I shall
argue at a later point in this paper, even in cases of important
disagreement which are less fundamental than are those charac-
terised by radical incommensurability the relationship of either/or
to both/and is a good deal more complex than Bern- stein's
synthesizing enterprise ever allows for.
What consequently is missing from his interpretations of the
history of thought is any recognition of the importance of the
distinction between two quite different kinds of extended argu-
ment and debate, that which can take place only within, and may
indeed be partially constitutive of, a single tradition and that
which gives expression to some fundamental conflict between rival
traditions, conflict of a kind that may on occasion prove incapable
of rational resolution. And perhaps this omission has some
connection with another. Bernstein's history of movements of
thought in which moments of apparent irreconcilability dis- solve
into some further synthesis is a narrative almost entirely at the
level of thought. This is not in itself a matter for reproach.
Standard histories of philosophy are usually deeply sparing in
their references to the social milieu of the philosophers whose
writings provide their subject-matter, and while there are some
splendid exceptions, such as A. W. Levi's Philosophy as Social
Expression and the first volume of A History of Philosophy in
Arnerica by Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphey, most ventures
into this genre are intellectual disaster areas. Lukcs's Die
Zerstrung der Vernunft is a case in point. But in moral, social,
and political philosophy especially, to write the history of
philos- ophy or theory in anything approaching complete independ-
ence of social history is always to risk distortion. For the
concepts articulated by philosophical theorists in those areas
characteris- tically stand in some close relationship to the
concepts actually embodied in human activity and social
relationships. And sys- tematic moral philosophies always do
articulate some moral and cultural standpoint.
Bernstein's narratives are of course deeply informed by a
general awareness of this truth. How could they fail to be when he,
like myself, writes with conscious awareness that we are living in
the aftermath of Marxism? Nonetheless, one of the central features
of Bernstein's own specific positions is that they are formulated
at the level of concepts and theories, often enough indeed at the
level of theories about theories, without more than
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
34 SOUNDINGS
occasional glances at those social realities about which theory
is constructed and within which it finds its point and purpose.
This emerges clearly in some of his criticisms of After Virtue,
criticisms which also depend for their force upon the in-
adequacies of Bernstein's accounts of intellectual conflict and of
tradition.
The conceptual analyses central to the argument o After Virtue
both presuppose and are presupposed by its theses concerning the
actual conflict of traditions. About that actual conflict and its
social history After Virtue says a good deal less than I would have
wished, as I acknowledged in Chapter 5; but perhaps within the
scope afforded by the argument ofthat book it was not possible to
say more. And it may well be the case that what I perceive as the
misdirected character of Bernstein's criticism - for the dis-
agreement between us extends, at least on my side, to disagree-
ment over what our disagreements are and at what level they arise -
is my own fault just because ofthat inadequacy. Wherein does that
misdirection lie?
Bernstein treats my account of the relationship of the virtues
to the practices in which they are rooted as though it is merely a
piece of conceptual analysis. But my claim was not just that the
concept of a virtue is partially to be explicated with reference to
the concept of a practice; it was that the exercise of the virtues
is and always has been actually rooted in practices. The conceptual
relationship is only one aspect of a social relationship. And the
history of the emergence and growth in complexity of the con- cept
of the virtues and of the understanding of that concept is one
aspect of the social history of the exercise of the virtues. It is
perhaps Bernstein's failure to appreciate this and his insistence
on moving not merely at the level of theory, but at that of the
theory of theory, that leads him to misunderstand some crucial
aspects of the different catalogues of the virtues that I describe.
The incompatibilities in these catalogues are of two distinct
kinds, those that exist within and are subordinated to the con-
tinuities of an ongoing social tradition - the Homeric, the Peric-
lean, the Sophoclean, the Aristotelian, and some medieval
catalogues belong in this class - and those that arise between
rival and fundamentally incompatible stances or traditions - that
between Jane Austin's and Benjamin Franklin's catalogues would be
an example.
What Bernstein emphasizes is that it is true of the
catalogues
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Bernstein's distorting mirrors 35
in the first class that they presuppose rival and incompatible
truth claims, just as it also is of the catalogues in the second
class (p. 9 above). But it is at this point that the inadequacy of
his own treatment of incommensurability is crucial to his critique
of After Virtue. For what that inadequacy obscures from view are
the two very different kinds of radical disagreement involved in
the two different sets of incompatible accounts of the virtues. And
Bernstein is consequently blind to the existence of a class of
conflicts and disagreements in which, although one of the con-
tending parties can vindicate its rational superiority, it can do
so only by including within its own perspective a good deal of the
substance of its opponents' claim; in this type of case often
enough it is precisely in the ability of one of the contending
parties to do this, in a way and to a degree that its opponent is
unable to match, that the vindication of its claim to rational
superiority lies. Here indeed there is an either/or in which one of
the alternatives, but not the other, is a both/and.
This is the thesis presupposed in After Virtue concerning the
asymmetrical relationship between the Aristotelian conception of
the virtues and its Homeric and Sophoclean predecessors. From the
Homeric or Sophoclean standpoint it is not possible to confront the
Aristotelian conceptions except antagonistically; but from the
Aristotelian standpoint it is possible to assimilate large parts of
what Homer and Sophocles have to teach, a process of assimilation
in the course of which the Aristotelian standpoint was itself
modified. But this was not of course only or even primarily a
matter of one theory assimilating others; it was a matter of a mode
of life which was able to incorporate within its communal
structures this kind of complexity in the exercise of the virtues.
The actual set of social institutions within which this possibility
was first achieved, even if very imperfectly, was of course that of
the Athenian polis; but xhatpolis, understood by its citizens at
least to some degree in the way that Aristotle under- stood it -
the "we" to whom Aristotle affords a voice in the Ethics and
Politics are the best of the Athenian citizens - was able to
achieve this because it could integrate within itself a variety of
practices; those of poetry, of dramatic art, of athletic and gym-
nastic exercises, of oratory, and, of course, of - in Aristotle's
sense - politics. What is it about practices that makes of them the
primary context for learning and exhibiting the virtues? Here again
there is misunderstanding on Bernstein's part: the types
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
36 SOUNDINGS
of activity that he claims fall under my account - spying, smug-
gling, the art of the executioner, and torturing are examples (p.
13 above) - just do not, so it seems clearly to me, involve sys-
tematic extension of our conceptions of the ends and goals which
excellence may serve - one central characteristic of practices,
understood as I understand them. I suspect that what may also have
mislead Bernstein is that he has underestimated the extent to which
my thesis is articulated in terms of a specific historical
tradition. For when the conception of a practice is introduced in
After Virtue, the concept of a virtue has already been presented.
It is not originally constructed - by some sort of induction? -
from shared features of the set of all possible practices. It is
originally learnt from our predecessors - the "our" here is not
that of the protagonists of post-Enlightenment culture, but that of
the heirs of ancient and medieval Aristotelianism - and the problem
is, as I have already noticed, that they present us with just too
many different accounts of what a virtue is. What we then come to
recognize is the connection, both conceptual and historical, be-
tween the shared virtues of that tradition and the shared prac-
tices of its adherents and reflection on the nature of practices
enables us to specify more accurately the nature of the virtues,
just as reflection on the virtues enables us to understand more
adequately the nature of practices and more particularly the
differences between practices and the types of activity cited by
Bernstein, which are all - unlike practices - definable in terms of
the use of a range of skills to reach a given type of end.
Practices are not definable in terms of any given end. For they
comprise precisely those ongoing modes of human activity within
which new ends emerge, are revised, are lost from sight, are
rediscovered, and so on; while new sets of means have to be devised
and redevised accordingly. And the goods that are pur- sued within
practices are not related to the exercise of the virtues in the way
in which the ends that the successful exercise of some skill
procures are related to the exercise ofthat skill. For the goods
internal to practices which cannot be achieved without the exercise
of the virtues are not the ends pursued by particular individuals
on particular occasions, but the excellence specific to those
particular types of practice which individuals achieve or move
towards in the course of pursuing particular goals on particular
occasions, excellences our conception of which
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Bernstein's distorting mirrors 37
changes over time as the goals pursued within a particular prac-
tice change.
Someone may of course use the type of behavior enjoined by a
particular virtue skillfully to procure certain ends; honesty - or
rather the behavior which honesty would require - may on occa- sion
be the best policy. It is perhaps in part Bernstein's failure to
distinguish between the genuine exercise of a virtue and the
skillful use of the behavior required by a virtue to achieve par-
ticular successes (as well as his failure to grasp the distinction
between practices and types of activity defined in terms of
specific ends) that leads him to accuse me of a "leap of faith" or
"a non sequitur" (p. 14 above) when I say that justice, courage,
and honesty are necessary components of practices. But he has also
not understood - and I certainly bear a good deal of responsibil-
ity for not making this clearer - the extent to which this claim,
too, is an historical one, a claim about the conditions under which
the virtues have actually flourished.
It is worth emphasizing at this point that it is no part of my
position to deny that an individual lacking the virtues cannot by
the development of a high degree of skill be immensely success- ful
in achieving within a given practice. But just because such a
person lacks the virtues, the goods thus pursued by him or her will
not be the goods of those types of excellence-to-be-valued-
for-its-own-sake which are internal to specific types of practice,
but rather those external goods of prestige, fame, money, status,
and power which are only incidentally related to excellence.
Bernstein is right of course to impute to me the view that in the
long run practices cannot be sustained without the exercise of the
virtues. The activity of the skillful, but unvirtuous achiever is
alway parasitic upon the activity of those who by the exercise of
the virtues sustain the practice in which he or she
participates.
A different kind of response to Bernstein's criticisms of my
account of virtues in terms of practices was given by Paul Santilli
in what I judge to have been a highly effective response to
Bernstein's paper when it was first delivered (at a conference on
practical philosophy at Duquesne University in 1983). Santilli
pointed out that the account of the virtues in terms of practices
is only a first stage in my account of the virtues; and that
restric- tions upon what can count as a virtue are imposed by the
second stage of that account in terms of the way relationships are
em-
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
38 SOUNDINGS
bodied in the narrative form of a single human life, and by the
third stage in terms of participation in those tradition-informed
communities whose history provides individual lives with their
context. So that even if qualities which are not in fact virtues
satisfy the conditions of the first stage, they will be excluded by
the later stages of the account. And since I do not deny that under
certain conditions it may be possible for there to be such cases,
it is important for me to accept Santilli's rejoinder grate- fully
as a supplement to my own response.
Santilli has also put me in his debt on another point, stating
my position in some ways more clearly than I had succeeded in
doing. On the view of the human telos taken in After Virtue,
although there is not one kind of life the living out of which is
the telos for all human beings in all times and places, nonetheless
for each individual and community in each time and place what the
human telos consists in for them is a matter of discovery, not of
choice. The objectivity of the moral order is a necessary presup-
position both of our understanding of the virtues and of our
understanding of the human telos. But this objectivity is not in
the least incompatible with the need to make choices between the
claims of incommensurable goods which at particular points in
history are contingently incompatible, for the authority of these
claims does not derive from my choices. Rather, it provides the
context within which even in making such choices I am, in
Santilli's words, "required to submit my will to a vision of the
good" in a way quite incompatible with any Nietzschean ac-
count.
Bernstein seems to believe that ancient and medieval beliefs,
including Aristotelian beliefs, in the objectivity of the moral
order required as a "foundation" (p. 23 above) or were "based upon"
theories about human nature and the nature of the universe. This is
an important, although a common misreading of the structures of
ancient and medieval thought which projects back on to that thought
an essentially modern view of the order- ing of philosophical and
scientific enquiries. On this modern view, ethics and politics are
peripheral modes of enquiry, de- pendent in key part on what is
independently established by epistemology and by the natural
sciences (semantics has now to some degree usurped the place of
epistemology). But in ancient and medieval thought, ethics and
politics afford light to the
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Bernstein's distorting mirrors 39
other disciplines as much as vice versa. Hence from that
standpoint, which I share, it is not the case thatfirst I must
decide whether some theory of human nature or cosmology is true and
only secondly pass a verdict upon an account of the virtues which
is "based" upon it. Rather, if we find compelling reasons for
accepting a particular view of the virtues and the human telos,
that in itself will place constraints on what kind of theory of
human nature and what kind of cosmology are rationally ac-
ceptable. Moreover, it is in key part insofar as a particular
theory of human nature and a particular cosmology give an adequate
explanation of why the structures of moral and political life are
what they are that we have good reason at least to take seriously,
and perhaps to accept, the claims to rational warrant of those
particular theories. It is precisely in this respect that certain
versions at least of medieval theistic Aristotelianism are ration-
ally superior to Aristotle's Aristotelianism.
It is well-recognized that at the core of Aristotle's moral and
political philosophy there is a tension between what is local and
particular and what is general and universal. Aristotle's ethics is
concerned with the good for human beings as such, but the necessary
milieu for the pursuit ofthat good is characterised in terms of the
structures of the polis. What medieval theistic Aris- totelians
achieved with varying degrees of success was an integra- tion and
reconciliation of these two poles of Aristotle's thought within a
scheme which both rescued Aristotle from the defects of his own
parochialism and enables us to understand Aristotle's thought in
the context of conceptions of history and tradition which are alien
to all ancient Greek thought. Conceptions of the place of slaves,
of women, and of barbarians all in consequence undergo radical
transformation, although not always of course sufficiently so.
The explanatory power of medieval theistic Aristotelianism was
not only retrospective, pointing us towards that which could not be
accounted for in Aristotle's terms, even when it had to be
obliquely acknowledged. It was also prospective. A central thesis
of After Virtue is that such Aristotelianism provides the only
standpoint from which in the end a true and adequate moral history
of modernity can be written. I am well aware of how much more needs
to be done both to spell out and to warrant that claim than is
actually achieved in After Virtue. But that is the
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
40 SOUNDINGS
claim. And if it is correct the inadequacies of Enlightenment
and post-Enlightenment thought make a mockery of any hopes of human
emancipation through that thought, a hope which ad- herents of
post-Enlightenment thought, such as Bernstein, still seem to cling
to, albeit more and more vestigially.
Bernstein exhorts me to "appreciate the extent to which [the
Enlightenment] was a legitimate protest against hypocrisy and
injustice" and how it indicted "moral and political ideologies that
systematically excluded whole groups of human beings from
participating in 'the good life' ..." (p. 24 above). He goes on to
invite me to recognize my own indebtedness to Kant (p. 24-25 above)
and, he might well have added, to Diderot and to Mill and to Hegel
and to a significant number of others. But the thesis of After
Virtue is not at all that the thinkers of the En- lightenment have
nothing to teach us. It is that in order to learn from them what
they genuinely have to teach us their insights have to be
integrated into a quite different kind of intellectual framework
and understood in terms of a quite different kind of intellectual
perspective from those offered by what I called the Enlightenment
project.
One of the crucial failures of Enlightenment ideology has been
in respect of the kind of ground for protest and rebellion and the
kind of hope that it offers to those systematically excluded from
the practices and the institutions which make the good life
possible. For it has fatally infected much of modern protest and
rebellion with the idiom of abstract universality. And so it has
not focused upon the tasks of creating practices and institutions
which will actually enable the children of the hitherto deprived
and the hitherto arbitrarily excluded to learn how to read Greek
and to play baseball or cricket and to listen to and to play string
quartets and to value excellence in all these areas. It has instead
encouraged them to pursue fictions of rights and of equality so
that everybody in the end will have equal right to an education
that it is worth nobody's while to have. Marx of course had a good
deal to teach us about the source of this kind of failure, which
has proved to be something we have been unable to learn. And a
contemporary Marxist, C. L. R. James, has had even more to teach.
But I do not think that their lessons can be assimilated in any
fruitful way by the Neo- Marxisms of the present which have failed
so signally to transcend the lim- itations of post-Enlightenment
thought.
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Bernstein's distorting mirrors 41
I have argued in this rejoinder that Bernstein has misinter-
preted some of the central claims advanced in After Virtue; but it
has not of course been my contention that had he understood them
correctly, he would have been able to accept them. The fundamental
standpoint of After Virtue is, as Bernstein clearly recognizes,
deeply incompatible with that of his own overall project and
especially with its culmination to date in Beyond Objectivism and
Relativism. From the standpoint of After Virtue the syntheses and
reconciliations of Bernstein's histories can appear only as blurred
images reflected in a set of distorting mirrors.
This content downloaded from 130.192.119.93 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013
22:28:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Article Contentsp. 30p. 31p. 32p. 33p. 34p. 35p. 36p. 37p. 38p.
39p. 40p. 41
Issue Table of ContentsSoundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal,
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 1-121Front MatterEDITOR'S NOTES
[pp. 1-5]NIETZSCHE OR ARISTOTLE?: Reflections on Alasdair
MacIntyre's "After Virtue" [pp. 6-29]BERNSTEIN'S DISTORTING
MIRRORS: A Rejoinder [pp. 30-41]Of Stage and ScreenFINISHING
SALIERI: Another Act to "Amadeus" [pp. 42-54]THE GOSPEL OF MARK AND
"OEDIPUS THE KING": Two Tragic Visions [pp. 55-69]TO BIND AND LOOSE
ON EARTH: Efficacious Religion "chez" Jean Genet and Bernard-Henri
Lvy [pp. 70-90]EXPERIENCING THE WORLD AS HOME: Reflections on
Dorothy's Quest in "The Wizard of Oz" [pp.
91-102]POST-STRUCTURALIST "READING" AND THE POST-MODERNIST TEXT:
Godard's "Two or Three Things I Know About Her" [pp. 103-121]
Back Matter