U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 1 Liana Fix is Program Director Interna- tional Affairs at the Körber Foundation, with a focus on Russia and Eastern Eu- rope. Steven Keil is Fellow and Program Officer at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., focusing on security and defense policy. U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES: NUMBER 58 February 16, 2017 Berlin’s Foreign Policy Dilemma: A Paradigm Shift in Volatile Times Liana Fix & Steven Keil Introduction Germany’s foreign policy over the last dec- ades has been a paradox. An economic powerhouse with the potential for a key lea- dership role in Europe, Germany has often been accused of being too cautious or un- cooperative in addressing European and transatlantic challenges. At the same time, expectations for German leadership have only grown as numerous internal and external crises plague the continent. In response, Ger- many has significantly stepped up its foreign policy posture, providing new leadership in European affairs and reliable partnership in transatlantic endeavors. From the Ukraine conflicts to the refugee crisis, even Berlin’s harshest critics concede that there has been a notable change in Germany’s policy. However, the context in which Germany op- erates has dramatically changed within the past several months. The Brexit referendum and the election of Donald J. Trump as 45th President of the United States have rein- forced an almost tragic dilemma for Germa- ny. After decades of caution and restraint, German political elites are mostly converging on the need for a stronger German leader- ship role in foreign and security policy. Yet, the institutional order in which Germany can exercise leadership is at risk of crumbling away. The EU, with centrifugal and populist forces on the rise, has become an increasing- ly fragile and contested architecture. And now, following the U.S. elections, the transat- lantic space appears to be in danger of its liberal hegemon abandoning its long-held role as the guarantor of the existing order.
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U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 1
Liana Fix is Program Director Interna-tional Affairs at the Körber Foundation, with a focus on Russia and Eastern Eu-rope. Steven Keil is Fellow and Program Officer at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., focusing on security and defense policy.
U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES: NUMBER 58
February 16, 2017
Berlin’s Foreign Policy Dilemma: A Paradigm Shift in Volatile Times Liana Fix & Steven Keil
Introduction
Germany’s foreign policy over the last dec-
ades has been a paradox. An economic
powerhouse with the potential for a key lea-
dership role in Europe, Germany has often
been accused of being too cautious or un-
cooperative in addressing European and
transatlantic challenges. At the same time,
expectations for German leadership have
only grown as numerous internal and external
crises plague the continent. In response, Ger-
many has significantly stepped up its foreign
policy posture, providing new leadership in
European affairs and reliable partnership in
transatlantic endeavors. From the Ukraine
conflicts to the refugee crisis, even Berlin’s
harshest critics concede that there has been
a notable change in Germany’s policy.
However, the context in which Germany op-
erates has dramatically changed within the
past several months. The Brexit referendum
and the election of Donald J. Trump as 45th
President of the United States have rein-
forced an almost tragic dilemma for Germa-
ny. After decades of caution and restraint,
German political elites are mostly converging
on the need for a stronger German leader-
ship role in foreign and security policy. Yet,
the institutional order in which Germany can
exercise leadership is at risk of crumbling
away. The EU, with centrifugal and populist
forces on the rise, has become an increasing-
ly fragile and contested architecture. And
now, following the U.S. elections, the transat-
lantic space appears to be in danger of its
liberal hegemon abandoning its long-held
role as the guarantor of the existing order.
U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 2
This poses a host of new questions for Ger-
man leadership and the U.S. commitment to
Europe—the backbone of the Euroatlantic
security architecture. While it is unclear how
exactly the Trump presidency agenda to-
ward Europe will unfold, some of the cam-
paign and transition rhetoric suggests that
the approach of a Trump Administration
could be very different from that of its pre-
decessors, effectively calling into question
the commitment of the U.S. to the continent
and to the transatlantic partnership.1 The
new Administration will in all likelihood de-
mand that Europe "take on its fair share of
the burden," maybe even to the extent of
tying the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article
V to its allies’ levels of defense spending.2 This
will put pressure on Germany to seek more
proactive (and European) solutions to securi-
ty challenges. Analyzing and understanding
the potential challenges and limits for Ger-
man foreign policy leadership is therefore
more critical than ever. Is Germany ready
and able to take on a greater leadership role
for Europe even under these new circum-
stances? How substantial and how sustaina-
ble is Germany’s new foreign policy course,
in particular given that Germany faces a
populist challenge in the September 24 elec-
tions this year?
This paper argues that Germany has under-
gone a significant change in its foreign policy
toward a stronger leadership role in Europe,
1 Geoff Dyer and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Trump brands NATO ‘obsolete’ ahead of tough Wisconsin primary,” The Financial Times, April 3, 2016; William James, “Trump says NATO is obsolete but still 'very important to me,’” Reuters, January 16, 2017. 2 “Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World,” The New York Times, July 21, 2016.
exemplified by Germany’s policy toward Rus-
sia and reinforced by changes in its security
policy. Both are key areas of strategic im-
portance, relevant to both Germany and Eu-
rope. Moreover, they provide evidence that
Germany’s new willingness to take on “more
responsibility” in foreign and security policy is
not just talk, but includes a paradigm shift
from a “culture of military restraint” (Kultur der
militärischen Zurückhaltung) to a more prag-
matic use of military instruments.
Nonetheless, Germany’s leadership potential
is subject to external and internal constraints.
In Europe, desire for German leadership is
tempered by a continuing fear of German
hegemony. German capabilities remain lim-
ited, and will largely restrict it to a European
role: Germany will never mimic the U.S.’ un-
paralleled ability to deploy and project pow-
er on a global scale. Finally, there is a real risk
that expectations from European partners
and the U.S. may outpace the ability of the
German public to adapt to Germany’s
changing role. German policymakers need
to be careful not to overstretch their public
support, and to make sure that it remains sus-
tainable beyond the upcoming parliamen-
tary elections in the fall of 2017 against a
backdrop of rising right-wing political forces.
Germany's metamorphosis3 from a problem-
maker in the 20th century to a problem-solver
in the 21st century—“from a consumer to a
3 Liana Fix, “Eine deutsche Metamorphose. Vom unsicheren Kantonisten zur europäischen Führungsmacht,“ Internationale Politik 6 (November/December 2015): 56-9.
4 Charles Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” International Studies Quar-terly 25:2 (1981): 242-5. 5 Radek Sikorski, “Poland and the Future of the European Union,” (speech, Berlin, November 28, 2011). 6 Hanns W. Maull, “What German Responsibility means,” Security and Human Rights 26:1 (2015): 11-24. See also “New Power, New Responsibility,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin, 2013. 7 Heinrich August Winkler, The Long Road West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), Volume I; Heinrich August Winkler, The Long Road West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Volume II.
German historian Heinrich August Winkler
traced the belated development of Germa-
ny as a modern nation state since 1789. He
argued that German “exceptionalism”—the
pursuit of a “special path” (or Sonderweg) in
international politics without regard for inter-
national norms and the interests of partners
or neighbors—unfailingly resulted in a catas-
trophe for both Germany and Europe. In con-
trast, he argued, the continuity of post-World
War II Western integration represents the
golden age of contemporary German histo-
ry. Understanding the importance of continui-
ty is therefore key for understanding German
postwar foreign policy. Conversely, volatility
and change are considered to be a poten-
tially dangerous deviation from this path.8
The fall of the Berlin wall brought this tension
back to the fore, with fears that a reunified
Germany might be tempted to claim a heg-
emonic position in Europe.9 Contrary to the
worst predictions, however, post-Cold War
Germany demonstratively continued the tri-
ad of a normative, civilian, and multilateral
foreign policy, summarized in the phrase
“never again Auschwitz, never again war,”
and “never again alone.”10 Unified Germany
has proven to be a reliable member of the
8 Sebastian Harnisch, “Change and Continuity on Post-Unification German Foreign Policy,” in New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy. German Foreign Policy Since Unification, ed. Webber, Douglas (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 35-60. 9 Gunther Hellmann, “Fatal attraction? German foreign policy and IR/foreign policy theory,” Journal of Interna-tional Relations and Development 12: 3 (2009): 257-92; Volker Rittberger, ed., German Foreign Policy since Unifi-cation. Theories and Case Studies (New York: Manches-ter University Press, 2001). 10 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 344.
cept responsibility, as difficult as it may be.”11
The roots of today’s debate on German re-
sponsibility hence go back at least a decade
and a half.12 The crucial difference to nowa-
days, however, is that in the discussions of the
1990s and 2000s, breaking the taboo on the
use of military force was always framed as a
compelling consequence of external con-
straints (such as alliance obligations, or pre-
venting genocide).13 This has changed into a
more deliberate, voluntarist, and strategic
approach that posits a need for the use of
military instruments out of choice and na-
11 Joschka Fischer, “Rede Joschka Fischers auf dem Außerordentlichen Parteitag in Bielefeld“ (speech, Bielefeld, May 13, 1999). 12 See also: Volker Rühe, Deutschlands Verantwortung, Perspektiven für das neue Europe (Ullstein, 1994); Josef Janning, "A German Europe – A European Germany? On the debate over Germany’s New Foreign Policy,” Inter-national Affairs 72 (1996): 33-41. 13 As Constanze Stelzenmüller has pointed out, this bina-ry paradigm became a trap, making it nearly impossible to argue a case for the use of the military instrument in cases other than the prevention of genocide; see “Ger-many's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe,” Foreign Affairs (2009): 89-100.
tional interest instead of external constraints.
Germany has made a paradigm shift from
caution and military restraint to a more en-
gaged and forward-leaning security posture.
It will continue to prefer civilian power,14 but is
willing to use military instruments, if it deems it
necessary.
The contours of this paradigm shift to a more
“responsible” foreign and security policy
were translated into departmental policy
through the Foreign Ministry’s Review15 and
the Defense Ministry’s new “white book.”16
Both policy reviews stressed that Germany
would not depart from its post-war princi-
ples—the commitment to peace and inter-
national law17—but that it will take on greater
responsibility by stepping up the scope of its
engagement and wielding its toolkit in a
more flexible way.18
14 Civilian power implies: “a) the acceptance of the ne-cessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of in-ternational objectives; b) the concentration on nonmili-tary, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.” Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1990/91): 92-93. 15 German Federal Foreign Office, “Review 2014 – A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy,” Paderborn, 2015. 16 German Federal Ministry of Defense, “The 2016 White Paper: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” Paderborn, June 2016. 17 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Gastbeitrag von Frank-Walter Steinmeier: Deutschland muss Verantwortung übernehmen,“ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, July 5, 2016. 18 Patrick Keller and Gary Schmitt, “Germany and the Spider-Man Doctrine,” The Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2014.
19 Tuomas Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy Towards Rus-sia,” International Affairs 92, vol. 1 (2016): 21-42. 20 Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, “The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy,” Survival vol. 51, no. 2 (2009): 105-122.
policy alignments, such as the joint Franco-
German-Russian “no” to the U.S.-led war
against Saddam Hussain’s Iraq.
Subsequent governments headed by Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, whether in coalition
with the Liberals (2009-2013) or the Social
Democrats (2005-2009 and 2013-2017), fol-
lowed a less cordial, but in substance similar
approach toward Moscow. Rooted in the
paradigm of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, Berlin’s
Russia policy traditionally prioritized econom-
ic ties, arguing that a change in Moscow
could be achieved through intensified trade
relations and people-to-people contacts
(Wandel durch Annäherung, or change
through rapprochement). Then-Foreign Minis-
ter, now President and Social Democrat
Frank Walter Steinmeier—formerly Gerhard
Schröder’s chef de cabinet—modified this
approach into a neo-Ostpolitik narrative of a
globalized, interdependent relationship seek-
ing rapprochement through interlinkages
(Annäherung durch Verflechtung). This idea
was based on the assumption that mutual
interdependence would decrease the risk of
conflict.
The presidency of Dmitry Medvedev raised
hopes that the new Russian leadership could
provide a direly needed impetus for the
modernization of the Russian economy and a
renewed cooperation with the West. Despite
the shock of the Russian-Georgian war in Au-
gust 2008, Brussels and Berlin therefore quickly
returned to business-as-usual with Russia.
Through bilateral and multilateral “Moderni-
zation Partnerships” as an instrument of “inter-
linking” Russia, Germany aimed to prove to its
European partners that Russia was able and
willing to modernize not only its economy, but
also its politics. Both turned out to be an illu-
U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 6
sion, as the return of Vladimir Putin to the
presidency, coupled with Duma election pro-
tests in 2011, abundantly demonstrated. In
consequence, criticism of Russia’s increased
authoritarianism and bleak human rights situ-
ation grew in the German public discourse.
Although Germany was becoming increas-
ingly disenchanted with Russia, the Ostpolitik
policy framework of “change through rap-
prochement” remained in place. The “U-
turn” in German thinking occurred only in
March 2014, after the shock of the annexa-
tion of Crimea, which took most German pol-
icy-makers by surprise. Berlin became the
most important advocate for a common
sanctions policy on Russia. By the downing of
Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine on
July 17, trust in the Russian leadership among
German policy-makers was at an all-time
low. The idea that Russia could be changed
through rapprochement disappeared from
government speeches, as well as the label
“strategic partner.“
Replacing Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, the new-
old reference point for Germany’s Russia
strategy became NATO’s Harmel Report of
1967, which had sought to balance and rec-
oncile deterrence with détente.21 It was re-
purposed to reassure Germany’s domestic
audience that dialogue with Russia would
not be abandoned while Germany at the
same time advocated for an economic
sanctions regime and significantly stepped
up its efforts on defense, deterrence, and re-
assurance for Eastern European member
states. However, many Germans continue to
21 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Rede von Außenminister Steinmeier bei den 12. Petersberger Gesprächen zum Thema Sicherheit,” (speech, Konigswinter, October 8, 2016).
feel reluctant about deterrence as a con-
cept. A fear of ‘sleepwalking’—the term used
by the historian Christopher Clark to describe
how Europe’s great powers slid into the first
World War22—into an open conflict with Rus-
sia is still shared by many in Germany, in par-
ticular among those with memories of the
Cold War.
The turnaround in Germany's Russia policy
was accompanied by a significant increase
in Germany's level of engagement. Germany
has always been a key player—next to
France and Poland—in shaping European
policy toward Russia. However, until the
Ukraine crisis, it generally shied away from
taking an exposed role in cases of conflict,
often preferring to leave these fights to Brus-
sels or other member states. During the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, French President Sar-
kozy took on a leadership role and used
France’s EU Council presidency to shape a
common European response.
The Ukraine conflict in 2014 saw a role rever-
sal. Germany is now leading the diplomatic
response within the main negotiation plat-
form, the “Normandy Four” (Russia, Ukraine,
Germany, and France). France, under Presi-
dent Hollande, has been in the back seat in
these efforts. This has contributed to raising
Germany's leadership profile in Europe. How-
ever, the absence of EU institutions and
mechanisms in these attempts to mediate
the Ukraine conflict is also symptomatic of a
more problematic recent trend in Germany's
relationship with the EU. Within Europe, Ger-
many increasingly tends to create ad hoc
intergovernmental coalitions for crisis man-
agement, leaving at best a coordinating role
22 Christopher M. Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2012).
23 Angela Merkel, “Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Opening Ceremony of the 61st Academic Year of the College of Europe in Bruges,” (Bruges, No-vember 2, 2010). 24 Liana Fix, “Leadership in the Ukraine Conflict: A Ger-man Moment,” in Europe's New Political Engine: Germa-ny's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, ed. Ni-klas Helwig (FIIA Report 44, 2016), 111-131. 25 Ulrich Speck, “Stopping Putin: Can Merkel Succeed Without Force?,” Newsweek, April 2, 2015. 26 “Merkel Says ‘Weapons Won't Help' Resolve Eastern Ukraine Crisis,” Deutsche Welle, February 7, 2015.
tary assistance may have been a fear of un-
dermining European and transatlantic credi-
bility in case rhetoric was never matched by
action. Lastly, such assistance might well
have led to a backlash in German public
opinion. Although 46 percent of Germans
supported a sanctions policy in 2016,27 a ma-
jority continues to prefer dialogue and eco-
nomic exchange with Russia.28
Despite Germany’s reluctance to supply le-
thal military aid to Ukraine, it has contributed
substantially to the new NATO Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and will
lead a battalion of combat troops in Lithua-
nia. Both these moves would have been dif-
ficult to imagine before the Ukraine conflict.
However, Berlin insisted on two qualifications:
First, troop stationing would be “rotational”
rather than “permanent,” and secondly, the
resumption of political dialogue within the
NATO-Russia Council. Both conditions were
based on the NATO-Russia Founding Act,
which in 1997 established a working relation-
ship between NATO and Russia on the basis
of respect for the European security order
and under the condition that NATO would
not station permanent troops in any former
Warsaw Pact countries. Critics of Russia’s ac-
tions in Ukraine—e.g. in Poland and in the U.S.
Congress—have argued that the NATO-
Russia Founding Act should be considered
invalid, because they say Russia’s actions
have violated European security agreements
like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Ger-
many disagrees, because it sees the docu-
27 “Partnerschaft unter Spannung. Wie die Deutschen über Russland denken,” Bertelsmann Stiftung Institut für Öffentliche Angelegenheiten, April 2016. 28 “Annäherung oder Abschottung? Repräsentative Umfrage in Russland und Deutschland,” Körber-Stiftung, April 2016.
29 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier anlässlich der Eröffnung des east forum Berlin,” (speech, Berlin, April 9, 2014). 30 Judy Dempsey, “The (German) Politics of Nord Stream 2,” Carnegie Europe, November 3, 2016.
tion policies which Germany helped design
and implement.
Nonetheless, and contrary to many predic-
tions, Germany has not been a gateway for
Russian influence and attempts to divide the
European Union over the Ukraine conflict. In-
stead, it has become the organizer and
guardian of European unity on a common
policy toward Russia, including economic
sanctions which come with real costs for EU
member states. Germany's Russia policy ‘U-
turn’ shows that Germany is willing to lead
the defense of the European project with
toughness and resolve. In the future, Germa-
ny’s new Russia policy and leadership role
might be put to the test if the United States,
under its new President Donald Trump, should
decide to break with the current transatlantic
status quo and the coordinated sanctions
regime. Not only will it be more difficult for
Germany to keep Europeans united, but
domestic pressure from business associations
and the public might increase out of a fear
of being outrun by the U.S. in a rapproche-
ment with Russia.
Re-conceptualizing Germany’s Security
Distinctive as the ‘U-turn’ in Germany’s rela-
tions with Russia is, the shift in its overall securi-
ty and defense policy in recent years has
been no less important. Germany has revised
its fundamental defense policy documents,
and become much more willing to provide
military support through deployments, train-
ing, and assistance to alliance and coalition
efforts. It is reversing its shrinking security bud-
of capabilities (institutional, civilian, and mili-
tary) for dealing with new threats and risks.33
The annexation of Crimea, the wars in east-
ern Ukraine and Syria, and the refugee crisis,
as well as increasing tensions within Europe,
have catalyzed a consensus that Germany’s
security policy will have to evolve, as well as
take on an increased share of Europe’s
leadership burden. In President Steinmeier’s
words, “Germany has not aspired to be Eu-
rope’s indispensable nation, but circum-
stances have forced it into a central role.”34
NATO continues to be Germany’s essential
military alliance, and Berlin has been quietly
expanding its contributions in recent years.
32 Bettina Luscher, “Schroeder wins key confidence vote,” CNN.com, November 16, 2001 33 “New Power, New Responsibility,” Stiftung Wissen-schaft und Politik and The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin, 2013. 34 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role,” Foreign Affairs (2016): 113.
After the conclusion of the ISAF stabilization
mission for Afghanistan in 2014 (to which
Germany was the fourth-largest troop pro-
vider),35 Germany joined NATO’s follow-on
Resolute Support Mission, deploying 980
troops to provide training, advice, and assis-
tance to Afghan forces. The mission’s renew-
al and expansion in 2015 passed with a
broad majority and mostly without popular
opposition—in marked contrast to earlier de-
ployments of the mid-2000s.
In addition, Germany contributed to the im-
plementation and initiation of NATO’s Rapid
Reaction Force (VJTF). It has pioneered the
Framework Nations Concept in NATO, which
aims to group the development of joint forc-
es and capabilities in the Alliance to increase
real burden-sharing capacities among Euro-
pean allies. Conceptually, this represents a
lesson drawn from the Libya intervention ex-
perience in 2011, where Europeans were
shocked to learn how dependent they were
on U.S. assets, and how powerless they were
without them. Practically, it attempts to de-
sign and develop force constellations for
small to medium-sized operations that would
be undertaken using few or no U.S. assets,
with a large “framework nation”—such as
Germany—supplying most of the operational
backbone and allowing smaller partners to
focus on specialized capabilities.36 Finally,
Germany will lead the aforementioned bat-
talion-sized combat-capable force in Lithua-
nia to bolster the credibility of NATO’s deter-
rent in the Baltics.
35 “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures,” NATO, November 7, 2014. 36 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “The Framework Nations Concept: Germany’s Contribution to a Capable European Defence,” SWP Comments (52), December 2014.
37 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role,” Foreign Affairs (2016): 113. 38 Valentina Pop, “German Defense Minister Supports Calls for EU Army,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2015.
gees that European governments are in con-
trol of national and border security.
Germany is currently participating in four EU
missions, including the anti-piracy Naval
Force Operation Atalanta off the horn of Af-
rica, and EUNAVFOR MED/Operation Sophia,
which is combatting human smuggler net-
works in the Mediterranean. Germany has
also deployed troops to assist with the EU
training missions in Somalia and Mali—stability
and governance in sub-Saharan Africa are
seen in Berlin as an important factor in check-
ing migration flows to Europe. While a Bun-
deswehr contingent has been in Mali as a
part of the MINUSMA mission since 2013, the
German government decided in January
2016 to deploy up to 650 additional soldiers
to Mali following the tragic attacks in Paris, in
order to free the forces of its close partner
France for the fight against the Islamic
State.39 In January 2017, it expanded the up-
per limit of forces to 1,000.40
Germany has recently also become some-
what more willing to venture beyond the tra-
ditional frameworks of the UN, EU, and NATO.
The German government decided in late
2014 to train and equip Kurdish Peshmerga
fighting Islamic State forces in Northern Iraq.41
Since no UN mandate was involved, some
critics argued that this deployment was un-
constitutional. The fact that the measure
39 “Bundesregierung will bis zu 650 Soldaten nach Mali schicken,” Spiegel Online, November 11, 2015. 40 “Auslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr: Mehr Soldaten nach Mali,” Die Bundesregierung, January 26, 2017. 41 This includes, “anti-tank rockets, thousands of assault rifles, mine-clearing equipment, hand grenades, night-vision goggles, field kitchens, and tents;” Justine Dren-nan, “Who Has Contributed What in the Coalition Against the Islamic State?,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2014.
42 “Ausbildungsmission im Irak beschlossen,” Deutscher Bundestag, January 29, 2015. 43 “Acht Prozent mehr für die Verteidigung,” Die Bundesregierung, November 23, 2016, 44 Anton Troianovski, “Germany Plans Modest Boost in Size of Its Armed Forces,” The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2016. 45 Stefan Wagstyl, “Germany to Boost Troop Numbers for First Time Since Cold War,” The Financial Times, May 10, 2016. 46 “Bundeswehr soll mindestens 20 Milliarden Euro mehr bekommen,” Zeit Online, October, 15, 2016.
Germany’s July 2016 defense and security
“White Book” is the country’s key government
defense policy document, ordered by von
der Leyen and the first of its kind to be pub-
lished in a decade. It offers a blueprint for
future strategy, and sets out some bench-
marks for future performance; not least, it
fleshes out the elements of the “greater re-
sponsibility” narrative set out in the Munich
speeches of January 2014. It underscores that
Germany will contribute “early, decisively,
and substantially” to the protection of West-
ern security. It affirms Germany’s commit-
ment to the security of Europe and to NATO.
It states that Russia “will constitute a chal-
lenge for the security of our continent in the
foreseeable future.”47 The document also
recognizes that the threats faced by Germa-
ny and its allies are broad and varied, includ-
ing cyber-attacks, propaganda, economic
pressures, and political destabilization,48 as
well as transnational terrorism.49
In sum, Germany has made a major effort
since the Munich speeches to set out the el-
ements of a more robust and responsible se-
curity policy, and to match its actions to its
words.50 However, policymakers and experts
in Berlin alike are keenly aware of the difficul-
ties of overcoming the Bundeswehr’s existing
weaknesses—and of the immense risks posed
by a potential deterioration of Europe’s secu-
rity environment. A Brexit might well lead to a
47 German Federal Ministry of Defense, “The 2016 White Paper: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” Paderborn, June 2016, 32. 48 Ibid., 39. 49 Ibid., 34. 50 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “Von Libyen nach Syrien. Die Rolle des Militärs in einer neuen deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2016), 28-29.
first time since 1945, raised the possibility that
the White House may no longer be firmly
committed to the transatlantic alliance and
to the defense of Europe. Any and all of
these factors may propel the evolution of
Germany’s security and defense policy even
farther along the course it chose in 2014. But
they could also simply overwhelm it.
How Sustainable? Government policy and
public opinion
Is this shift in Germany’s foreign and security
policy based on a cross-party consensus and
will it remain sustainable beyond the next
elections? How are other elite groups re-
sponding to the shift and what divisions are
visible? Recent polls suggest that attitudes do
not divide neatly along party boundaries, but
rather cut across them. Moreover, differences
are pronounced along generational lines.
It was Angela Merkel’s second grand coali-
tion government that set the shift in Germa-
ny’s foreign and security policy in motion. On
key decisions—e.g. sanctions against Russia
or arming Kurdish Peshmerga fighters—the
chancellor, former Foreign Minister Steinmeier
and Defense Minister von der Leyen (often
seconded by President Gauck) have acted
in close coordination. Parliamentary debates
and votes have shown broad support for
these developments. But there are important
divides within parties and parliamentary
groups. Within the Social Democratic Party
leadership, former Foreign Minister Steinmeier
played an essential part in advancing the
“Munich consensus” on the need for a more
forward-leaning and engaged German for-
eign policy in 2014 and 2015,51 as well as in
crisis-management efforts during the Ukraine
conflict. However, he drew widespread dis-
approval for his comments deploring NATO
‘saber-rattling’ on the eve of the 2016 War-
saw Summit,52 which seemed to contradict
his approval of NATO’s response in the previ-
ous year. In addition, Social Democrat and
new Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel flew to
Moscow in October 2015 in the spirit of tradi-
tional Ostpolitik to encourage unilateral eco-
nomic rapprochement.53 Similar positions can
also be found within the Christian Democrats
and their Bavarian sister party the CSU: Bavar-
ia’s Minister-President Horst Seehofer also un-
dertook a much-criticized trip to Moscow in
early 2016.54
Interestingly, attitude splits on the official
government line on Russia and NATO are
much clearer along generational lines. Some
of the strongest resistance to Berlin’s stance
on Russia’s actions in Ukraine came from
Cold War-era experts and officials, many of
whom signed an open letter titled “War
again in Europe? Not in our name!”55 The list
included Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s former
national security adviser Horst Teltschik and
former German President Roman Herzog,
alongside Social Democrats like former
51 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the 51st Munich Security Conference,” (speech, Munich, February 8, 2015). 52 “Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier on Rela-tions between NATO and Russia,” German Federal For-eign Office, June 19, 2016. 53 Friedrich Schmidt, “Sigmar Gabriel besucht Putin,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 28, 2015. 54 “Seehofer übt Schulterschluss mit Putin,“ Spiegel Online, February 3, 2016. 55 “Aufruf: Wieder Krieg in Europa? Nicht in unserem Namen!,“ Zeit Online, December 5, 2014.
major parties in its criticism of Russian actions,
well before the outbreak of the conflict over
Ukraine. Green party leader Cem Özdemir
and parliamentarians such as Marieluise Beck
have been outspoken regarding Germany’s
new responsibility in confronting Russia over
Ukraine or Syria. Özdemir has not ruled out
using German military options to help imple-
ment a no-fly zone over Syria, even without a
UN mandate.57 On the other hand, a strong
pacifist wing within the Green Party58 contin-
ues to fear a potential militarization of Ger-
many’s foreign and security policy. Die Linke,
Germany’s left wing party, is consistent in its
NATO-critical and anti-interventionist posi-
tions; many of its members advocate the dis-
solution of NATO and a new security alliance
including Russia;59 some have openly sympa-
thized with Russia’s actions in Crimea. The
56 “Friedenssicherung statt Expansionsbelohnung: Aufruf von über 100 deutschsprachigen OsteuropaexpertInnen zu einer realitätsbasierten statt illusionsgeleiteten Russlandpolitik,“ change.org. 57 Annet Meiritz, Roland Nelles, “Interview mit Cem Özdemir: Assad und Putin bomben Syrien in die Steinzeit,“ Spiegel Online, October 15, 2016. 58 “Katrin Göring-Eckardt: Die Grünen waren nie eine pazifistische Partei,” Zeit Online, October 24, 2014. 59 "Programm der Partei, Beschluss des Parteitages der Partei DIE LINKE,“ DIE LINKE, October 2011.
right-wing “Alternative for Germany” (AfD),
founded in 2013, is also critical of the gov-
ernment’s stance on Russia and calls for a
withdrawal of all U.S. troops and nuclear
weapons from German territory.60
Should either the Christian Democrats or So-
cial Democrats be in a position to form a co-
alition with a smaller party after the fall 2017
elections, the only available candidates at
this point are the Greens and Die Linke. It is
not clear whether the liberal Free Democrat-
ic Party (FDP), which failed to reach the entry
threshold of 5 percent of the vote at the last
election in 2013, will be able to make it back
into the Bundestag. All of the mainstream
parties have said that the right-wing AfD is
unacceptable for them as a coalition part-
ner. A follow-on grand coalition would likely
continue Germany’s new foreign policy
course, but there is little appetite in either the
CDU or the SPD for a third round of governing
together.61
Beyond the political elite, how has the tradi-
tionally risk-averse German public reacted to
Berlin’s more forward-leaning foreign policy?
Is it just an elite project, or does it have popu-
lar support? And what potential has the right
wing “Alternative for Germany” to alter the
popular mood in 2017 elections?
Recent surveys and polls show a mixed pic-
ture. Germans seem to be well aware of
Germany’s increased power and its standing
both globally and within the European Union.
According to a recent survey by the Pew Re-
60 “Programm für Deutschland,” Alternative für Deutschland, May 2016. 61 Merkel’s CDU and the SPD governed together 2005-2009 and 2013-; in between (2009-2013), Merkel gov-erned with the liberal FDP.
62 Fifty-three percent of respondents thought Germany should help other countries deal with their problems, 67 percent believe that foreign policy should take into ac-count the interests of Germany’s allies, 70 percent see global economic engagement as ‘a good thing,’ and 62 percent believe that Germany plays a more important role compared to 10 years ago. For more results, see Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, “Europeans Face the World Divided”, Pew Research Center, June 2016. 63 “Die Sicht der Deutschen auf Europa und die Außenpolitik: Eine Studie der TNS Infratest Politikforschung,” Körber-Stiftung, October 2016. 64 Stokes, Wike, Poushter, “Europeans Face the World Divided,” 2016.
tion for humanitarian reasons even without a
UN mandate.65
However, asked if they prefer more interna-
tional engagement or rather restraint in April
2014, at the height of the Ukraine conflict, 60
percent of respondents advocated for re-
straint and only 37 percent for more interna-
tional engagement, with a particularly critical
view of the deployment of German soldiers.66
In a follow-on Körber Foundation poll con-
ducted in late 2016, a small shift toward more
engagement can be observed. Forty-one
percent of those questioned support more
international engagement, but a majority of
53 percent still prefers restraint.67 Respondents
in former East German states are more skep-
tical about German international engage-
ment.
These and other polls suggest that Germany’s
new foreign policy line is not driven by do-
mestic public demand, but by elites from the
political center. Nevertheless, public attitudes
seem to be slowly catching up—particularly
among voters affiliated with the main politi-
cal parties who have already been in power
within federal government coalitions (SPD,
CDU/CSU, Greens, and the FDP) as well as
among younger and more educated voters.
Support for stronger engagement is the low-
est among respondents who prefer the left
and right-wing populist parties.
Consequently, ensuring sustainability beyond
the next elections in September 2017 remains
65 “Die Sicht der Deutschen auf die Außenpolitik: Eine Studie der TNS Infratest Politikforschung,“ Körber-Stiftung, May 2014. 66 Ibid. 67 “Die Sicht der Deutschen auf Europa und die Außenpolitik: Eine Studie der TNS Infratest Politikforschung,” Körber-Stiftung, October 2016.
68 At the end of 2016, it was polling nationally at 13 per-cent; See “ARD-Deutschlandtrend,” tagesschau.de, De-cember 12, 2016. 69 “AfD-AnhängerInnen,” DIW Wochenbericht 34 (2016): 711-724.
long yearned for such a “normalization” of
German foreign policy, having been frustrat-
ed by what they saw as German “freeriding.”
As a former American official said more than
two decades ago:
“It was much easier, after all, for Germany
to be ‘responsible’ during the Cold War,
when others—notably the United States—
were willing to do most of the ‘dirty work’
of international security…In the future,
Germans themselves will doubtless be
confronted by some of these same unsa-
vory but necessary dilemmas in the post-
Cold War world, and they may be no bet-
ter than the United States at confronting
them.”70
But will President Trump look to Germany for
partnership in the same way that that his
predecessors George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton,
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama did? All
indications are that his position might be
more ambiguous, and the feeling might be
mutual. If so, the transatlantic partnership
may enter a troubled new era—and Germa-
ny’s position might become much more diffi-
cult and lonely.
In a 1994 Foreign Affairs essay, Timothy Gar-
ton Ash argued that Germany had four op-
tions for developing its post-unification for-
eign policy.71 The first would be a “Carolingi-
an empire” or essentially a United States of
North-Western Europe with a deeply inte-
grated political and monetary union. The
second was a “wider Europe,” integrating
70 Philip H. Gordon, “Berlin's Difficulties: The Normaliza-tion of German Foreign Policy,” Orbis 38, vol. 2 (1994): 225-243. 71 Timothy Garton Ash, “Germany’s Choice,” Foreign Affairs 73, vol. 73 (1994): 65-81.
tries has recalled its difficult history—a history
shaped first by hunger for power (Machtver-
sessenheit) and then by negligence of power
(Machtvergessenheit).72 Against a backdrop
of uncertainty regarding the US commitment
in Europe and with an impending Brexit on
the horizon, the line for Germany to walk be-
tween dominance and leadership has be-
come even thinner. And yet, the need for
72 This dichotomy was famously coined by the historian Hans-Peter Schwarz, in “Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtversessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit“ (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995).