Bell Institutions Think

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AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEW OF HOWORGANISATIONS THINK

Dr Wendy Bell

Working Paper 16/97March 1997

Anything whatsoever that is perceived at all m ust pass by perceptual controls. In

the sifting process something is admitted, something rejected and somethingsupplemented to make the event cognizable. The process islargely cultural. Acultural bias puts moral problems under a particular light. Once shaped, theindividual choices come catalogued according to the structuring of consciousn ess,which is far from being a private affair.

Mary Douglas, 1982(a): 1)

Abstract

Models of rational decision making have been widely used to explain how institutions 'think' orbehav e, and to train managers to make decisions. As a model, rational decision making has provenremarkably resilient despite increasing evidence in recent years that culture, rather than logic, iscentral to organisational as well as anthropological study. What will be argued here is that thecultural theories we are accustomed to using in management may need to take into accoimt some ofthe current anthropological models in order to adequately deal with the complexity of futureorganisations.


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Rational decision makingitself, has been defined by the British anthropologist, Mary Douglas, as aform of cultural bias, that is, only one of several rational 'ways of seeing' the world. In 1970, MaryDouglas published a two-dimensional typology designed to capture cultural biases and make themvisible. It formalised her anthropological experience that cultures could be categorised according totwo socio-cultural dimensions; the degree ofgroup pressure which she called Group, and the extentof the social controls exerted upon group members, which she called Grid. In 1990, MichaelThompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky adapted Mary Douglas' Grid/Group schema topropose the existence of five predictable worldviews, or cultural biases, each of which perceives theworld quite differently, and are present in any decision point or in any public debate.

This paper sets out to apply the above model to management decision making, arguing that as weapproach the third millenium, managers will need to harness the energy and engagement of all thecompeting worldviews which Mary Douglas and her colleagues have suggested compriseorganisational and social life. It further suggests that in the future, managers may need to abandontoday's one-dimensional or dualist decision making models in favour of a single, multi-dimensionalcognitive framework capable of holding co-existing and conflicting points of view in an integratedwhole.


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AN ANTHROPOLO GICAL VIEW OF HOW ORGANISATIONS TH INK

Mary Douglas, the British social anthropologist, has argued for many years that our ideas about howthe world works, and hence our decision making, derive not from so-called rational thinking basedon logical self interest, but from our social relations. According to Mary Do uglas , when ind ividualsand organisations disagree over which direction to take, as they frequently do in social andorganisational life, then the cause of their conflict stems from their adherence to institutions basedon incompatible principles' (Douglas, 1987:125).

Mary Douglas has lectured and written extensively for over two decades 'about the social origins ofindividual thought' (Douglas, 1987:10), putting together a powerftil and coherent alternative theoryof the sociology of perception. According to Douglas in How Institutions Think, it is not ourindividual minds that are making decisions at all, but our institutions that are doing most of thethinking (Douglas, 1987:111).

This paper explores Mary Douglas' version of institutional thinking and another of the terms shehas coined, cultural bias in relation to manag ement decision making. It asks whether theseanthropological insights could assist managers to develop different ways of 'seeing' the decisionmaking process, to enable them to harness the energy and engagement of all the competingworldviews in their organisations . This is not the first time that Mary Doug las' cultural theory hasbeen applied to managem ent. Kim and Gfori-Dankwa in a recent paper proposed its use as analternative approach to cross cultural training (Kim and Gfori-Dankwa, 1995:478 -500). Tho mpson,Ellis & Wildavsky have also applied the theory to studying the management of an environmentalpart and foimd expert decision making ranged from spraying insecticide as a solution to notspraying at all (199 0:25-38).

Institutions axe defined by Mary Douglas as conventions that limit the range of options we asindividuals can come up with to solve our difficult problems and inform our decision making 'Alternatively they can be described as the 'products of the social construction of reality', forexample the 'institutionalization of practices' such as marriage or family (Berger & Luckman, 1967)or as beliefs that create social organisation. While as individuals we may believe that we aredeciding in our own, or our organisation's interests, according to Mary Douglas and her colleagueswe are, at the moment of choice, choosing to align our thinking with the social metaphor thatsupports and fashions our particular perception of reality. She has coined the term a 'cultural bias 'to describe a universal set of cosmologies, or worldviews, which she asserts co-exist as equallyrational mode ls for organ ising social life and universally struggle for supremacy in all cultures.

Mary Douglas combined the work of Durkheim and Fleck (See Note 18) to create her theory ofinstitutional thinking, overcoming the apparent weaknesses in one with the strengths of the other byemploying the strategy of sending them out to fight for their theories Tike allies back to back'(Dou glas, 1987 :14). The result is a 'double stranded view of social behaviour' (Do uglas, 1987:19)where 'causal priority, in our conception of ways of life' (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:1) isassigned to neither the individual nor the social relations alone, but sees each as dependent upon theother 'reciprocal, interacting, and mutually reinforcing' (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:1).

One strand was described by Mary Douglas as 'transactional' (Douglas, 1987:19) similar to rationalchoice, 'the individual utility maximising activity described in a cost-benefit calculus' (Douglas,1987:19). The otherhalf, however, reflects the individual need for 'order and coherence and controlof uncertainty'. While the transactional nature of social relations has been well established by


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anthropo logists, it is her arguments for the 'role of cognition in forming the social bond thatrenders Mary D ougla s' arguments compelling in the context of decision mak ing. For it is thiscognitive process, she asserts, that is 'at the foundation of the social order' (Douglas, 1987:45).

In putting forward her particular view of institutional thinking, Mary Douglas is at pains to assertthat institutional thinking is not a kind of sociological determinism from which we as individualsare unable to escape, but rather a window through which we can view our own unconscious mentalactivity; and use it to discover 'how the institutional grip is laid upon our mind' (Douglas, 1987:92).From her perspective, the more marked the conflict over any decision, the 'more useful [it is] tounderstand the institutions that are doing most of the thinking' . Her call is similar to that made bythe earlier writer on culture, Edward Hall, who chided that as long as we remain 'ignorant of thenature of the hidden pathways culture provides' (Hall, 1959:144) , or fail to see the 'hidden rules'we are responding to, we are locked into an organising pattern of which we may be unaw are. LikeHall, Douglas encourages us to learn how our own cosmologies imprison us, to transcend ourignorance of other perspectives, and to understand how our cultural biases are often misrecognisedas individual choice - to enable us to 's ee' unfettered by institutional thinking.

DECISION MAKING

Decision making, defined in one management text as "a choice between two or more alternatives"(McLaughlin, 1993:41) is one of the most highly prized and significant management competencies.For many years it has been acknowledged as one of the three primary managerial roles(interpersonal, informational and decisional (Mintzberg, 1973). As Yvonne McLau ghlin quitecorrectly points out, "Managers are evaluated and rewarded on the basis of the number, importanceand successful ou tcome of their decisions" (McL aughlin, 1993:41). The higher the degree of riskand uncertainty involved in any decision, the more senior are the managers who are given thedecision to ma ke.

Models of rational decision making have been conventionally used to explain how organisations orinstitutions think or behave and to predict how they will make decisions. A rational decisionmaking model assumes that individuals hold 'clear and stable social values and goals' (Wyrme,1982:160), and when they have the information they need to inform their individual choice, willapply their knowledge in self interest. More recent writings have integrated the concept of limited(or bounded) rationality into conventional theories of rational choice (either limited information, orlimited cognitive capabilities) and applied this concept to decision making in 'political, educationaland military contexts' (M arch 1994:9) as well as in various fields of economics.

As James March from Stanford University argues, decision making is a 'central part of modemWestern ideology ... linked to key concepts of the Age ofReason, such as intentional human controlover destiny and human will.' (March, 1994:226). As such decision processes are not absolute, butcultural and symbolic; it is not enough that decisions are good, the processes must also be shown tobe good; and these processes 'exhibit and reassert social beliefs, dramatize commitments to a faithof deliberate and effective human action, and provide opportunities for making individualstatements that fit an individual into that faith.' (March, 1994:226). In other words, March issaying that decision makers are 'portrayed as rational actors, searching for alternatives in a world oflimited knowledge and evaluating [those] alternatives in terms of their preferences' (March,

1994:103).But is this really how decisions are made; can these models explain the moment of choice? Takethe decision by the French nation to conduct nuclear tests in the Pacific at Mururoa (Polynesian


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spelling) this year (NTEU Advocate, 1995:25). Surely both those for and against the Frenchdecision believe that the views they hold are rational? Desp ite the groundbreaking andcomprehensive work on management and national culture conducted by the cultural researcher,Geert Hofstede (1983), can we predict whether an individual or group will agree with the Frenchdecision simply because they are French or Tahitian? Is nationality the cultural variable at work?

From the theories proposed by Mary Douglas and her colleagues, the answer is no. Or is anothercultural variable at work such as a common ethnicity, religion, gender, degree of modernisation orsophistication, vocation, education or cultural identity?. If science produces a specific culture, assome argue, then surely all nuclear physicists would agree and all environmentalists disagree? Eventhis is not found to be true. If culture is gender based, it may be possible that all men will agreewith the decision and all wom en disagree. Perhaps all Catholics will agree and all Anglicansdisagree - or vice versa? We could go on forever testing in this manner, segmenting society intoendless opposing cultural categories: Liberal voters vs Labour voters; government work ers vs non-government workers; greenies vs nukers; rich vs poor; primitive vs modem; indigenous vscolon isers: and still not find a satisfactory explanation.

We may say instead that individuals or groups are motivated by self interest, but it must be thenasked: Upon what basis they have decided what their self interest is? Sociolog ists andanthropologists are interested in the answers to these questions for their own sake; managers usuallyneed answers for action, and action needs to be based on workable frameworks. Understandingdecision making requires a more sophisticated framework to enable us to 'see' what prompts each ofus to arrive at the moment of decision.

Just as managers look to psychology to understand management behaviour, it may be time to lookto anthropology and sociology to gain some further insights into how we organise ourselves insociety. Accord ing to Mary Douglas' theories, the concept of rational decision making is itself a

cultural bias which has been fotmd to have limitations in the real world of decision making and'reconciling disagreements about values in the world of real policy-making' (Gross & Rayner,1985:3), (Russell Hardin, 1982, quoted in Douglas, 1987:18; Wynne, 1982:160).

Managem ent education has focused on rational decision making models such as the model proposedby Simon in 1960, as a means of training future and existing managers to avoid the worst pitfalls offlawed decision making . Bu t this view, it could be argued, stems from what Peter Druckerdescribed as the "comm and/control" management paradigm when owners or founders of companiesneeded managers to handle their decentralised branch operations during the 1950s United States'organisational expan sion. Taking this concept a step fiirther, it could be argued that so -calledrational decision making owed more to the need for these cenfral managers to control andstandardise the decision making of their branch managers in their own interests and with their ownpreferences than it did to any proven capacity of the model as a successful tool.

The increasing automation of both structured and unstructured management decision makingthrough the use of management information, decision support and expert systems (Alter, 1996;Am ott & O'Donnell, 1994) is stimulating new interest in decision rules. Today's organisations needmanagers skilled in the art of making decisions at all levels of the organisation and empowered toact upon the information they gather from their internal and external environment to meet the needsof their customers. These manage rs will need mo re developed cognitive skills to deal with a morecomplex world, and in their efforts to learn more about this important process, management cannot

afford to overlook the insights provided by anthropology about unconscious cultural pathways.


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Metaphors and Decision Making

A major theme to emerge from an analysis of Mary Douglas' work is her proposition, summarisedin the quotation at the top of this paper, that each ofus 'sees' any problem and decides how to solveit in the light of where we are metaphorically 'coming from'. Each of us perceives the situationcoloured by our existing patterns of thinking so that the impressions we gain are filtered through an

invisible screen, predisposing us to see the problem, and its possible resolution, in a particular light(Douglas, 1982(a):7). As a result, it is comm on for several of the parties involved in a decision topropose a totally different model for its solution, rational and realistic to them, and internallyconsistent from some point of view. Yet each option might be perceived as irrational by others .

What this does is to set up irreconcilable tensions, as the number of possible models proposed todeal with any problem increases, until the decision making becomes less of a search for the 'right' orlogical piece to complete the puzzle, and becomes a competition for supremacy b etween contendingworldviews. No t surprisingly, this often results in the parties failing to negotiate a consensus so thatby default the tried and proven solution triumphs. While the puzzle may have been temporarily

solved, it is often at the price of the very innovation it was hoped the decision making processwould achieve (Arrow, 1974:49). At such times voices often call for a 'rational' process as a way ofavoiding this circularity, without realising that irrationality is simply the label we stick onto adifferent or contending worldview .

DESCRIPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL TfflNKING

Institutional thinking is the result of a cognitive process which is 'at the foundation of the socialorder' (Douglas, 1987:45)^. Individuals 'entrenc h in their minds' different m ode ls or me taphor s ofhow the universe works^ founded on an analogy with perhaps the principles of the universe, what is

observable in nature, the structure of the family or even a mechanical model. To test this, asksomeone, 'Why did you decide like this?' and keep asking 'Why?' and you will find that ultimatelythey will arrive at a justification based upon 'the w ay that planets are fixed in the sky or the w aythat plants or humans or animals naturally behave' (Douglas, 1987:47), or even the way a machineor a computer operates. The use of metaphors in studying organisations has been applied tomanagement by several other theorists (Pepper, 1942 in Barton,1994:1^, and Charles Handylikened different m anagem ent styles to Greek mythology in 1978 (Handy, 1978). More recently,the Japanese academic, Yoshihisa Kasima alerted us to his view at a seminar in 1992 that Japaneseorganisations were based on the metaphor 'family' while Western organisations were based on'machine'. Klaus Krippendorff (1991:181), believes that language use can also reveal institutionalthinking because our metaphors are 'tied to a word or expression' so that speaking of the earth as amother, implies fundamentally different attitudes toward interacting with it than speaking of theearth as a resourc e'.

What differs in Mary Douglas' treatment of metaphor, and its relevance for decision making, is herview that it is the recognition of sharing a cognitive metaphor with others which is at the root offorming the social bond. Hence, a decision which 'fits' our particular world view is perceived as'rig ht' because it matches the metaphor upon which our own understanding of society is based. It istherefore likely to sustain our image of society or organisation and is seen as legitimate whileconflicting knowledge is discounted as illegitimate.

Once a metaphor of how the world works is entrenched in individuals' minds, they are motivated toprotect and sustain the assumptions upon which it is based. They act, or make decisions wh ich arelikely to favour their own social processes, and in turn, their actions reinforce the cognitive and


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social bonds which are both created and nurtured by adherence to that particular way oflife. To putit in its most simple form, those who live and work in a hierarchical culture, will be biased towardperceiving and interpreting all of their experiences hierarchically , and will also align their decisionswith those who have the same view of social relations.

What this suggests is that real-world decisions are not about objective problem solving, and evenless about rational decision making. Instead they can be seen as a battle grounded in politicalculture between various points of view, all rational to their proponents, to determine which moralvalues and the ways of life they generate will triumph to become dominant, and which will berelegated to second or third place (Douglas, 1982:2).

THE GRID/GROUP PARADIGM

To recap, the propositions above assvime that our perceived universe is socially constructed in linewith the structure of our world view or cosm ology, and that this in turn influences our perception ofevents and the meaning we confer upon the m ' . However, Mary Douglas has gone beyond this byproposing in an earlier work that institutional thinking is not random. She asserts that it is possibleto predict the 'kinds of [thought or knowledge] imiverse ... likely to be constructed when socialrelations' take particular forms (Douglas, 1970:9) .

In the Preface to How Institutions Think, Mary D ouglas described her work on institutional thinkingas , 'on e more post hoc introduction'. She has, she confesses worked 'backw ards' instead of'forwards' in developing her theories, (Douglas, 1987:x) with the result that the 'theoretical andlogical anchoring' for her 'arguments about the social control of cognition', or institutional thinking(Doug las, 1987:ix), were presented in a much earlier work. While the theory of institutionalthinking has been adopted here, the earlier Grid/Group theory which preceded, and in one sense

created it, has also been incorporated as a useful framework for studying management decisionmaking.

Mary Douglas first proposed Grid/Group theory in Natural Symbols, published in 1970, where shedescribed it as 'an impressionistic account' of the perceptual controls through which all perceptionmust pass She introduced the term 'cultural bias' (Douglas, 1982:1), to describe the distinctiveway people have of looking at the world, which she asserted, reciprocally predisposes them topractise particular social relations. She described it as being similar to the 'megalomania of thecompu ter whose whole vision of the world is its own program' (Douglas, 1987:92). As an example,if our institutional thinking is based upon a metaphor favouring participation, and we areexperiencing difficulties managing the motivation of our sales force, our personal metaphor willtell us that the situation requires "More participation!". If our personal metaphor is dependent uponauthority, it will reply 'More authority!' (Douglas, 1987:92).

According to Mary Douglas, these predictable cultural biases in social relationships comprise alimited stock of cosmological building blocks w hich allow the individual thinker to endlessly createsociety, in what Levi-Strauss called the 'image of mind' (Douglas, quoting Levi Strauss, 1973:199).Working like an amateur craftsman, or what Levi Strauss calls the bricoleur, (Douglas, againquoting Levi-Strauss, 1987:66) we use 'everything there is to make transformations within a "stockrepertoire" ' (Doug las, 1987:66). As thinkers we construct new models by recycling intellectualbric-a-brac: assembling a piece from here and another from there; turning 'th e broken clock into a

pipe rack', an old bath tub into a flower bed, or the management of a newly-emerged concept intoan image of an existing model.


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1 "i

Mary Douglas' Grid/Group paradigm is a two dimensional typology designed to capture culturalbiases and mak e them visible. It formalised her anthropological intuitions that cultures could beanalysed and categorised according to the existence oftwo social dimensions:

the degree of group pressure which she called Group, and the extent of social control the Group exerts upon its members, which she namedGrid.

The first dimension, Group, measures the extent of group commitment and involvementexperienced by an individual or group. Mary Douglas' first defined Group , as 'the experience of abounded social unit'^'', while John Houghton later described it as 'the extent of incorporation intoand commitment to an identifiable group, the extent to which an actor's social life depends onmembership in a social group or groups' (Houghton, 1991:9).

The Group dimension indicates the strength of the outside boundary that people have erectedbetween themselves and the outside world, while thegrid dimension indicates the strength of othersocial distinctions and delegations of authority that a group or organisation uses to limit how peoplebehave towards one another (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982:138).

The Group dimension is shown as Mary Douglas first proposed it in Figure 1 on the horizontal axis.The centre point of this dimension is zero, the point of balance, the moment of decision.Movements toward the extreme right of the Group dimension represent decisions made by movingtoward progressively stronger and stronger group allegiance. Movem ents toward the extreme left ofthis line represent movements away from group allegiance, toward negative group allegiance.

The vertical axis in Figure 1 represents the second social dimension which Mary Douglas calledGrid. The centre point of this dimension is also zero. Movemen ts toward the extreme top of theGrid dimension represent progressively more comprehensive social controls or behavioural

prescriptions exerted by one's group. Grid can also be seen as the 'scope and coherent articulationof a system of classification' experienced by people in social units (Douglas, 1973:82). Movem entstoward the extreme bottom of the Grid dimension represent decisions based upon progressivelyfewer social controls or behavioural prescriptions.

When Group and Grid are drawn along x and y axes respectively, as shown in Figure 1, and groupsare classified by these two social dimensions, that is, the extent of their group commitment (Group),and the extent of social control they experience (Grid), they fall into one of four distinct quadrantson the graph . These quadran ts represent the 'set of limits' (Douglas, 1982:4) within which theparticipants can move around; or, returning to Levi Strauss, the 'stock repertoire' which allows

social reality to be defined.

The linchpin of this theory is that inclusion in a quadrant equates to identification with acosmology, or a cultural bias (Michael Thom pson in Douglas, 1982(a):35). The theory has beenapplied successfully in scientific, economic and social research and there have been sufficientdifferent applications of the theory, and sufficient acceptance in academia, to make further

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exposition here unnecessary .


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Figure 1

GRID AND GROUP

Grid and Group diagram showing axis and centre of power

GRID +

+ *-

System of sharedclassification

GROUP-* +

Ego increasingly exerting pressure thatcontrols other people

Ego increasingly controlledby other people's pressure

Private system ofclassification

Source: Mary Douglas (1973),Natural Symbols,page 84


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What is interesting is that when aGrid/Group analysis is applied to social relations as shown inFigure 2, that distinctive, and recognisable patterns of social relations are generated. A briefexplanation of these social patterns is given below. How this technique will be applied tomanagement decision making is described in the following section.

Square A: Individualists

Square A is inhabited by those who are characterised by low group commitment and involvementwho experience little control or few social rules devised by others. Such groups might be expectedto choose their allies as the situation demands, feel themselves unbounded by regulations orprescriptions, and free to negotiate their way in life, and to respond individually to the opportun itiesthey are presented w ith or perceive as likely to further their own lives. The have been described asthe entrepreneurs, the 'pragmatic materialists', those with a 'culture of individualism' (MichaelThompson, quoted in Wynne, 1983:6).

Square B: Hierarchists

Those who fall into Square B are characterised by high group commitment and involvement, andexperience a high degree of social control, that is, their individual behaviour is constrained by rulesand regulations. John Houghton, refers 'to the extent [ie dimension] of regulation an actorexperiences, that is, the degree to which an actor's actions are controlled or regulated, the extent towhich an actor's social life is restricted by preordained and imposed rules' (Houghton , 1991:9). Thisway of life can be recognised as stratified, bounded, and secure, matching our commonunderstanding of life in a hierarchy. Hierarchists's like 'a place for everything, and everything in itsplace', seek to control life's uncertainties with 'ritualism and sacrifice' (Michael Thompson, quotedin Wynne, 1983:6). The hierarchical way of life is often fashioned by bureau crats who create a

structure in which individuals are arranged by a cascade of authority and communication relations"(March 1994:113).

Square C: Egalitarians

Square C, is the location for those with a high commitment to group norms, but who formthemselves into groups with few levels of stratification. Egalitarians are as group oriented ashierarchists, but by avoiding social prescriptions (Houghton, 1991:13), and with few internal rulesand regulations, differ from them in the internal structure of the groups they form. This is thecommunity organisation, which in its most extreme form is recognised as the sect (Thompson,quoted in Wynne , 1983). However, Kim and Ofori-Dankwa use the term 'equ alita rian ' whichseems a more apt description of this way of life (1995:486).

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Figure 2

CULTURAL BIASES

The five ways of life mapped onto the two dimensions of sociality

GRID +

Adapted from: Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky,1990, page 811


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' Such people are involved almost exclusively with people in the same group, their work and leisure,family and friends are all enmeshed in the close-knit community' (Houghton, 1991:13). Foregalitarians, 'small is beautiful', and communities are 'accountable to nature' (Thompson, quoted inWynne 1983:6).

Square D: Fatalists

Square D is inhabited by those who are characterised by high levels ofimposed and external socialcontro ls, low integration in a group; and consequential low group cohesion. Such groups lack thesecurity and certainty of the hierarchists, or the egalitarians, yet also lack the freedom of theindividu alists. They are bounded by rules, not of their own choosing, and exercise no social controlover their own lives, only being subjected to controls of others. It is a way of life described as'ineffectual', practising 'inconsistent electicism', or more 'like a lottery' (Thompson, quoted inWynne 1983:6, and Thom pson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:226).

An analysis of decision making in line with these cultural categories, is able to show how each ofthe major decision makers makes statements or takes actions which can be perceived as reinforcingtheir preference for a hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian or fatalistic world view . Such studymak es visible the cultural 'cod es' of the key players' institutional thinking' (Douglas, 1987:189).

Cultural theory asserts that these ways of life represent ideal expressions of all the possibilities fororganising social groups (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990:84), and that they areinterdependent as each is a way of disorganising the others because there are a 'limited number ofcombinations of cultural biases and social relations' which are sustainable (Thompson, Ellis andWildavsky, 1990:l,15n5).

As well as dismissing the legacy of nineteenth-century European thought that assumes, what DavidOstrander calls a 'natural, unidirectional evolutionary progression' (Ostrander, 1982:17) fromprimitive to modem, this theory by allowing for more than two categories, also circumvents manyof the dualist distinctions upon which many cultural distinctions are made; black/white;French /Eng lish; manager/bo ss; male/female; good/evil while concepts such as 'collectiv ism ' and'individualism' take on a richer meaning by being able to describe aspects of both a hierarchical andan egalitarian culture.

As one of the more recent exponents of this theory foimd in his study of culture and currency(Houghton, 1991:31-33), clear links can be perceived between 'characteristic styles of thought,characteristic modes of argumentation and patterns of commitment to thought, and value schemas -as cultural biases ' (Houghton, 1991:31). Using cultural theory, John Houghton was able to predictthat, in any controversy in society, particular thought styles and patterns of argument would emergeand battle it out for supremacy. More specifically, he was able to assert that the style of argumen tput forward by hierarchists tended toward empiricist, that egalitarians produced fundamentalistargum ents and individualists preferred the more simplistic cause and effect. Fatalists concentrate ontheir own or their families' survival.

Background and Criticism of the Theory

The concept of political culture embodied in Mary Douglas' work was popular in the late 1950s and

early 1960s as fimctionalism. A functional argumen t is one which claims that a particular behaviouror belief has the function of maintaining a pattern of social relations. How ever, it also im plicitlyclaims that as well as maintaining the social relations, the behaviour itself can be explained by itsconsequences for those social relations. As Phillip Jones explains, functionalism w as the 'be st

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known structural-consensus' theory holding the sociological centre stage in Britain from the 1920sand in Am erica from the 1930s (Jones, 1985:22). It has been 'inextricably bound up with the workof its first major exponent' the Frenchman Emile Durkheim.

However, Mary Douglas did not derive her Grid/Group theory solely from fimctionalism or EmileDurkheim's work, even though Durkheim's 'dimensions of group integration and individualregulation' are essentially identical to Douglas' Grid and Group dimensions (Douglas, 1987:10;Durkheim, 1903, 1912 quoted in Douglas 1987; and Thompson, EUis & Wildavsky, 1990:138).Mary Douglas ' advance was to ask how the two dimensions interacted. Her ideas were furtherinfluenced by the pioneering work on the 'social basis of cognition' by the medical doctor andbacteriologist, Ludwick Fleck.'^

Although other theoretical perspectives were in existence prior to the 1960s, for example conflicttheory 'mainly in the form of Marxism', and interpretive theories such as 'symbolic interactionismand ethnom ethodology' they had little impact on sociology (Jones, 1985:22). How ever, in the late1950s, functionalism attracted loud and strong criticism when it was argued that it reified society ,

could not explain social change, was based upon an oversocialised view of human beings and wasinadequate in accounting for power and conflict in society (Jones, 1985:37). It was described as ,'conservative, static, tautological, ... ignor[ing] power relations and [unable to] explain change'.Despite these weaknesses it was still considered capable of illuminating the 'unintended socialconsequences of people's beliefs and actions' (Jones, 1985:37) and therefore relevant to this paper .

The understandable charge of tautology, the argument that we construct our world according to ourbiases, and that living in that world reinforces them, was rejected by Thompson et al as only beingvalid if the theory preached eternal repetition. Cultural theory is defended by seeing multiple waysof life as 'continually being negotiated, tested, and probed by individuals' (Thompson, Ellis and

Wildavsky , 1990:219). It does not eliminate the possibility that individuals can and do discard oneway of life for another, that individuals constantly renegotiate their social realities, nor that culturalbiases can shift.

Cultural theory's ability to represent power relations as a social dimension has not been spelled outas clearly as the other two dimensions of Grid and Group. This has been another criticism, and alimitation, and various writers have proposed solutions to overcome this perceived deficiency(Hough ton, 1991:10). 'Pow er' has 'pro ved one of the most difficult things to define and measure'(Row se, 1990:3), especially in a cross-cultural context. Klaus Krippendorff, has noted withamazement how many prominent social scientists have adopted the physical science metaphor intotheir discourse about power, using words such as 'energy', 'currency', 'synergy' indicating that theyhave overlooked the notion that power exists in social relationships, continuously constructed andreconstructed in discourse with others (1991:181-187).

Another criticism has been that although may writers adopting the theory have constructed dynamicmodels, originally the Grid/Group diagram was static, like a snapshot showing the outcome of thesocial process of sorting out, where "like rabbits and foxes in the English countryside', varioussocial groups a re pictured in a state of temporary equilibrium. It does not explain how they reachedequilibrium, only that they are there (Thompson, 1982:34 in Douglas 1982(a).

Despite these criticisms, the theory is a useful approach where the data are either actions or

statements in defence of actions. It uses public statements, 'tributes, incorporations, and rejections',in search of 'a social environment that people say constrains them, or act as if it constrains them'.This makes it especially suitable for 'the testing times when people stand up and are counted and

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what they say (Gross and Rayner, 1985:xiii). At these times, our decisions and those of others canbe seen as the public articulation of our cosmologies.

The classification of cultural biases has been conducted in this work at the organisational or grouplevel, and not at the level of individuals within them. If an organisation is defined, for example, ashaving an egalitarian bias, this does not claim that every individual within it, or even leadingnecessarily has that same bias. As Wynne states, 'single organisations may con tain a rich blend ofentrepreneurs, hierarchs, sectists and ineffectuals' (Wyrme, 1983:8), who in response to the need tobecome interveners in the process of technological decision and development, operate 'in constanttension yet overall unity with the organisation as a whole' (Wynne, 1983:8). No r do cultural biasesremain static once they have been established, they are dynamic, responding to the varioussituations in which their adherents find themselves.

In summary, it may be usefiil to comparea widely used decision model such as that proposed byDew ey, with that proposed by Mary Douglas and her colleagues. We must ask ourselves whetherthe older model still remains sufficiently rich to reflect our intuitions about the complexity ofdecision making.

For example, in a typical decision making process we find the following six steps:

S t e p lIdentify the problem:

This implies that the problem is absolute or constant to the rational or logical mind, and that themajor difficulty is to find it. How ever, part of why identifying the problem can be a major hu rdle isthat we all filter our perception of what the problem is; or whether it is in fact a problem at all;throug h our cultural biases. What Mary Douglas' theories suggest is that the problem is that we all' see ' or perceive the problem in terms of where we ourselves are 'coming firom'.

S t e p lGather data and categorise-t>^

As decision makers we tend to gather the data that supports our own view of the 'problem' andcategorise it according to the existing cultural tracks laid down in our minds like sectors on a floppydisk. Unles s we are careful, we categorise in line with the either/or classifications of society whichwere forced upon us in the past by the limits of our technology and social vision. These categoriesof our traditional institutional thinking may no longer enable us to arrive at the 'best' practicedecision . The follov^ng are some very basic either/or examples, provided to illustrate how thisprocess of categorisation can influence our thinking:

malebossrichblackactivemodemrationalgoodFrenchactiverational

femaleworkerpoorwhitepassiveprimitiveintuitiveevilEnglish/Tahitianpassiveirrational

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boundary, and how it should regulate itselfinternally'. In their view, debates about admission rules,leadership styles and resource allocation, 'all draw upon the protagonists' conceptions of thecosm os, of what is fair, what is possible, and above all, wha t is natural or even holy' (1985:18).

We have already considered the distinctive patterns of social relations or cultural biases which canbe revealed by the Grid\Group schema, but it may be helpful to provide three more detailed casestudies to illustrate how the different cultural biases respond to more specific cases of decisionmak ing. In doing so this paper will focus on seven variables selected for their ability to show ho weach of the four cultures apply their particular worldview to decision making in real worldsituations. As Figure 3 reveals, these variables can be listed as:

1 The ownership of the decision or the resource. That is, whether a particular cultural perspectiveleans toward przva^e or public ownership of resources or decisions and thetype of good underconsideration.

2 The type of organisational or societal structure favoured by the cultural bias , for example,

whether it is top down, bottom up or "grass roots", pragmatically dealing or flexiblynetworking, whether imposed byflzte,or by the other three.

3 The type of control, for example, whethercentralised, decentralised, private, or controlled byothers.

4 The model of decision making favotired, for example, whether the members of the quadrant seekexpert, specialist or representative decision making, prefer individual choice informed by selfinterest, or believe in shared local decision m aking . Fatalists, it is predicted, are left with onlylimited personal decisions within the range offered by the other three.

5 The type of and assignment of roles preferred by members. For example, whetherroles arearticulated by the group and members ascribe to them, or whether, alternatively, roles are seen asbeing achieved on the basis of superior skill. Roles may also be idiosyncratic, that is, determinedby the members on the basis of a fit between their needs, skills and wishes and those of the groupas a wh ole. Once again, the roles of fatalists are prescribed by the others.

6 A key indicator of cultural bias is revealed by who each of the four groups believe should'rightly'pay for the good or service.

7 The symb ols favoured by each group are also revealing. For exam ple, we can predict that theymay be associated with status, associated with heroic myths or individual achievements,associated with maintenance of the group, or associated with oppression which reinforces it.

These selected variables are now applied to three cases of decision making.

Application One: Managem ent Attitudes Towards New Technology

Response to new technology is another important indicator of cultural bias, and a more detailedanalysis is given based on the preferences for social organisation shown in Figure 3. Thesepreferences have been used to predict the likely perspectives of each of the four cultural biases tothe introduction of ne w technology.

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Entrepreneurs or Individualists and New Technology

While bureaucrats and entrepreneurs inhabit opposing quadrants on the grid\group diagram, bothshare a different but 'relatively positive view of technological innovation' (Thompson, Ellis &Wildavsky, 1990:271). Entrepreneurs seek to exploit new technology to meet evolving marketopportimities, while bureaucrats, who are more reactive than proactive, seek new structures to

'make good the promise of a better life' which their way of life and processes make possible(Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:271). One would expect entrepreneurs to perceive newtechnologies as they would any other resource,not as a public good, but as another arena in whichto compete.

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Figure 3Cultural Perspectives

GRID +

DFATALISTS

"Life is like a lottery"

Definition of ownershipof resource:

Structure:Ownership:Control:Decision making:Roles:Who pays:Technology:

Owned/controlled byothers

ImposedPersonalControlled by othersLimited personalPrescribed by others?Inaccessible, out ofreach unpredictability

BHIERARCHISTS

.P v)^c?b

"A place for everything and everything in its place"

Public good to regulateefinition of ownershipof resource:

Structure:Ownership:Control:Decision making:Roles:Who pays:Technology:

Top downPublicCentralisedExpert, specialists, representativeAscribed, articulatedTaxesPositive attitude tow ards if can useto regulate and maintain boundaries

INDIVIDUALISTS

^ o ^ o O o

''Pragmatic materialism"

Definition of ownershipof resource:

Structure:Ownership:

Control:

Decision making:Roles:Who pays:Technology:

Resource to own and exploit

Flexible or networkedPrivate

Private, personal leadership"buccaneer", "Big Men"(Douglas, 197 3: 70)IndividualAchieved on basis of skillConsumersPositive attitude towardsopportunity for growth orexpansion, or new market

GROUP

EGALITARIANS

ffgiss^"Accountable to nature"

Definition of owne rship Public good to be sharedof resource:

Structure:Ownership:

Control:Decision making:Roles:Who pays:Technology:

Bottom up, "grass roots"Community

DecentralisedShared, localIdiosyncratic and flexibleCommunity grant/public moneyPromote if it enhances communitygoals, resist if it extends privately-owned, centralised con trol

Source: Wendy Bell (1994)

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something to own and control if possible, and to sell as a marketable commodity in line with theirviews of 'pragm atic materialism '. From this perspective, entrepreneurs embrace new technologicaldevelopments enthusiastically while seeking to~use them to create new opportunities for theirtalents. To the individualist, any risk involved in technological evolution is perceived asopportunity, if there were no uncertainty or danger of loss, the scope for reward would be limited.Any problem s arising they believe, will be solved by fiirther evolving techno logy.

Individualists are attracted toward acentralised structure when it affords economies ofscale. Thesebenefits are not usually available in decentralised systems because of duplication of effort, and notavailable in public organisations because of their history of not appealing to the marke t place. Thiscentralised, ^top down' or anti grass-roots approach is shared with the hierarchist or publicbureaucracy, except that individualists see theuser as paying.

As individualists prioritiseprofit maximisation over serving the public as an obligation, or themeeting of local, social or cultural needs which bring no economic return to shareholders, then theindividualist will be inclined to see any form of regulation as an unnecessary impediment to market

forces. For them, the ultimate authority is the market place, and they argue with some evidence thatthe market knows value when it sees it. This perspective gives them a cultural bias in favour ofreplacing ascribed authority with self-regulation, and maximising the definition of private behaviouras being beyond government regulation.

Hierarchists and New Technology

The first reaction of the hierarchist to a new technology is to seek to regulate it so that it can beslotted into the frameworks of the particular zone of influence which they control. Their preferenceis likely to be for centralised control, and Vop down' stratified authority structures, possiblyaccovmtable to a Board, withrepresentative decision making. Hierarchists tend to be biased toward

'a place for everyone and everyone in his place' (Douglas, 'Cultural Bias' quoted in Ellis &Wildavsky, 1990:106). The hierarchists' bureaucratic bent leads them to perceive new schemes astemporary p rior to their being slotted into an existing service, instead of seeing them as a viable newalternative. This is because hierarchists tend to view all commodities as apublic good' in commonwith egalitarians, but have a tendency to m aximise definitions of public culture to justify increasingtheir own zones of influence, public ownership, their own administrative control processes andpayment through taxation. Hierarch ists assume that the public at large needs them to pay for,control and manage any new services spawned by new technology, but that the public has aninability to pay and needs it to preserve the 'cultural', (and therefore unmarketable) goods ofsociety. Their ability to maintain their hierarchies depends upon definitions ofhigh culture as

valued by the dominant elitist culture, as opposed to 'folk' culture, and relies upon input fromselected experts or specialists who know which cultural expertise the society value s. Therefore'community', or 'grass roots' solutions would not fall within their cultural preferences, because oftheir reliance upon local or community input, and non-specialised access and participation by allcommunity members.

It makes sense that those with a hierarchical cultural bias, which attracts them toward a world viewin which they can be magnanimous because 'life is bountiful' but only within 'strictly accountablelimits' (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:27-29) would argue over mapping and managing theirboundaries in order to remain in their own zones of equilibrium. While bureauc rats are not'squeamish about setting acceptable risk at high levels' it is usually on the condition that they arebacked by experts (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982:63).

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The Egalitarian View and New Technology

Egalitarians respond to new technology by resisting any plans to use it to extend privately ownedand non-locally controlled services, and embrace it if it can be utilised to promote the egalitariangoals of local comm unity access, participation and local control. In arguing against newtechnologies they do not favour, they tend to frame their arguments in apocolyptic statements

warning of dire consequences to humankind and the planet if the technologies are allowed tocontinue unabated.

Egalitarian groups are biased toward the 'small is beautiful', 'grass roots' or community model oforganisation. They favour unique local expertise, and do not necessarily value formally accreditedskills or professionalism above commitment. As a result, a variety of organisational roles are opento community members, and censorship to be resisted.

In common with hierarchists they categorise the goods or services they provide as apublic good, ashareable or community resource, and therefore resist its outside administration to ensure that itrema ins directly accessible and accountable to the comm unity it serves. This might attract them topublic authorities, except for these authorities' lack of local accountability, local decision/makingand local control. Their ^grass roots' or ^bottom up ' structure promotes a decentralised bias, anddecentralised group focused decision making.

However, in minimising bureaucratic publicownership and control in order to maximise localcontrol, and in rejecting private commercial ownership which sells commodities to consumers,egalitarians frequently encounter difficulties aboutwho will pay for their services because theirnon-government, and non-market approach leaves them with limited options . Eschew inggovernment funding as synonymous with control, and markets as commercial they are left to collectrevenue from volunteers in the community they serve in competition with other fund raisers, or to

attract special purpose governm ent funding which must be reapplied for at regular intervals and canbe subject to the vagaries of the economic and political times.

Fatalists and Technology

The Group dimension measures the strength of identification and belonging within a social unit,while the Grid dimension measures the extent of prescription or social control the members of thegroup experience.

Such high levels of social control, as those implied in the fatalists cultural bias; not knowing towhom one is accoimtable, being unable to influencedecisions affecting one's own life, orthe roles

into which one is cast, or determine the resources one is allocated, are all indicative of high 'grid'control. The way of life created when low Group and high Grid are combined, is illustrated in thetop left, or fatalistic quadrant of the Grid/Group schema as shown in Figure 3. Such a way of life isdescribed by cultural theory as having no collective action, no pooling of resources, and sustaining amode of social organisation that 'inhibits economic growth and democracy,... leaving its adherentsvulnerable to the caprices of nature and people, and thus refueling the existing fatalistic culturalbias' (Thom pson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:227). It is important to emphasise that people do notchoose the fatalistic cultural bias, but find themselves in it by not being able to see or gain access tothe other three alternatives. Their only possible response to the coming of new technology are either'... total acceptance (tinged with an ambivalent potential for anxiety in the face of such supernormal

power) or total rejection (tinged with fascination at the sheer technical mastery such technologymay entail)' (Wynne, 1983:18).

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A significant feature of the 'fatalistic' cultural bias is that those who inhabit it are not activelyengaged in the cultural-political struggles of society. They are insteadpassive recipients of thechoices created by the other three engaged ways of life. Fatalists can makepersonal decisions suchas switching off their radio or television sets, changing channels, or refusing to purchase advertisedproducts on personal moral grounds, but their actions are largely ineffectual in altering the actions,or the as sumptions of the other three engaged ways of life. If passive viewers do join an actiongroup, to increase their power and social control, then they are, by definition, no longer leaving the irlives in the hands of fate, but have moved along the axes representing Grid and Group, and out ofthe fatalistic category.

Application Two: Nuclear Testing

The French decision to test nucear weapons in the Pacific which has already been mentionedprov ides another, through briefer application of the theory. Applying the variables in Figure 3 tothis case, it could be predicted that those closest to a hierarchical cultural bias would tend to rely onthe expert advice of nuclear scientists or specialists to decide whether nuclear testing was valid.We might expect them to argue that a top-down decision was preferable because it was made bythose most informed, and that it was necessary for lay people to have such a decision made in thepub lic security interest by those who know. Egalitarians, on the other hand, wou ld be critical ofthis, rejecting the advice of specialists in favour of the voice of the people, and if the theory holdstrue, speaking in apocalyptic terms of the likely ramifications for the planet and humanity if thetests go ahead. Individualists, who are more attracted to self-regulation than the other two, may b einclined to consider the whole question one of individual choice, defining it as a more private thanpublic event and consequently resisting both expert and collective advice. They would argue thatthe egalitarians are mistaken, that nature is more resilient than they believe, and they wouldprivately consider whether the tests benefitted them or could benefit them in any way. Bydefinition, fatalists, not being engaged in any decision making in life, may have strong views butwould shrug and say with a strong sense of what can only be described aslaissez-faire, or 'theworld goes of itself, T do/do not agree, but what can be done? "

This very brief alternative cultural analysis enables us to see how those who agree and those whodisagree with the decision, do not line up on French, Tahitian, or any other isolated cultural variableor charac teristic, bu t upon their preference for a particular set of identifiable social relations.

App lication Thre e: To Immun ise or Not for Hepatitis B

Similarly, the current discussion about whether all Australians need to be immunised against theHepatitis B virus provides another fixiitfiil example of cultural bias and decision making. Only abrief sketch of the argument over the decision is covered here because many of the points have beenalready articulated above. Epidemiologists have wamed that the Hepatitis B virus is becomingmore prevalent Australia and wam ed that the population as a whole is at risk of an epidemic. Oneof the solutions proposed is to decide that all members of the population should be immunised.True to their hierarchical tendencies, the government doctors defined the situation as a public healthissue and called in experts in Hepatitis B and asked for their advice. They were advised that wh ileonly 2% of the general population was at risk, although the figures were higher for some groups,that the cost of immunising all Australians would still be more cost effective than the cost oftreatin g those affected in the long term. We might speculate that medical practitioners in privateprac tice who also had an individualistic cultural bias migh t define the decision as a matter for

private conscience wh ich they did not want forced upon them. At the same time, they maypragmatically feel that if the government did decide to go ahead with it, there might be businessopportunities arising fi-om the decision. We might expect egalitarians, however, to argue that

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medical specialists have frequently got things wrong in the past, that it is an unnecessaryintervention in nature, and that immunising 98% of people unlikely to be infected by the virus wasnot only a waste of money, but could constitute imknown health risks for those unnecessarilyimmunised. They argue against the possible risks of such social experimentation, nor exposing thewhole population to unwanted medical intervention and experimentation. Fatalists, as before, arelikely to end u p living with the ultimate decision.

CONCLUSION

What we now think of as management 'theory', or rational decision making, may well be, accordingto the above arguments, simply one of several points ofview, or one cultural bias. . As this paperhas argued, decision making may well be more than an apparent choice between rational andirrational options. What is important for managers is that organisations can no longer afford tohave managers make decisions based only on a choice between either bureaucrats or marketerswithout taking account of the also valid perspectives of the other two groups. This is important fororganisations too, because flawed decision making as defined by this particular cultural theory,affects the future viability of the organisation as argued by Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky (1990:1).They argue that unless all cultural perspectives, or all cultural biases are acknowledged and allowedto contribute to a society, then the society will not be socioculturally viable. The same it has beenargued here, may well be true of the organisations we manage.

As Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky warn, even if we are personally attracted to a particularcultural bias, it does not make sense to ignore the others, as not one of themon its own can besustained for very long alone. Mainland Ch ina's 'cultural rev olu tion' was in fact just that - anexample of the forced implemen tation of only one form of cultural bias, although part of theproblem arose from the fact that midstream the country switched to another.

As we approach the third millennium, ... the future directions of management are likely to becomeincreasingly involved in both cultural and environmental issues, and managers will be faced withincreasingly complex decisions which will simply not xmravel using the models of decision makingwhich have served so well in an industrial age. This paper suggests, that managers abandon existingmodels of rational decision making which involve 'deciding' which option is the 'right' one, or lookfor decisions which can resolve or dispell cognitive dissonance. Instead they could learn not toperceive the world as a series of 'either/or' categories, and learn to work v^th conflicting points ofview within a single cognitive framework. Managers need to put aside the old dualist modes ofthinking that served society's industrial organisations in the past, in favour of fashioning cognitive

frameworks capable of integrating the multiple and competing cosmologies within theirorganisations into an integrative whole.

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ENDNOTES

As Hall explained in the 1950s, the notion that 'man as a cultural being is ... not master of his fate may come asa shock to some', (Hall, 1959:44) yet he asserted too, that culture controls behaviour in 'deep and persisting ways, many

of which are outside ofawareness and therefore beyond the control of the individual' (Hall, 1959:44).

^ Mary Douglas defmes an institution as 'only a convention', or the practice of a shared understanding thatmediates an individual's behaviour in society, such as 'the family, a game, or a ceremony', the institution of marriage(Douglas, 1987:46). Before a convention can become a 'legitimate social institution it needs a parallel cognitiveconvention to sustain it'.

' What we are up against is 'a completely different way of organizing life, of thinking, and of conceiving theunderlying assumptions about the family and the state, the economic system, and even of man himself (Hall, 1959:48).

* As James G March (1994:2) explains, "Rational theories of choice assume decision processes that areconsequential and preference-based". "They areconsequential in the sense that action depends on anticipations of the

future effects of current actions. Alternatives are interpreted in terms of their expected consequences. They arepreference-based in the sense that consequences are evaluated in terms of personal preferences. Alternatives arecompared in terms of the extent to which their expected consequencs are thought to serve the preferences of thedecision maker." According to March, making a rational choice depends on the answers to four questions -

The question of alternatives - what actions are possible?The question of expectations - what future consequences might follow from each alternative? How likely iseach possible consequence, assuming that alternative is chosen?The question oipreference: how valuable (to the dcision maker) are the consequences associated with each ofthe alternatives?The question of thedecision rule: how is a choice to be made among the alternatives in terms of the values oftheir consequences" (March 1994:2-3). Alternatives compared in terms of the extent to which from expectedconsequences and that how serve preferences of decision maker.

^ Rational choice theory, 'fails to focus on the point at which rational choice is exercised' (Douglas, 1987:124),because the "The real moment of choosing," as Mary Douglas puts it, "is ... choice of comrades and their way of life."From this choice about how to relate to other people are derived the myriad preferences that make up everyday life.'(Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990:57).

* Durkheim's basic hypothesis that "the structure of symbolism parallelled the structure of social life',(Ostrander, 1982:25) argued that the way we classify knowledge is 'not implicit in the nature of things, but grounded inthe social relations of a society', (Douglas, 1975:xiv).

' The function ofa metaphor is to make new information familiar by seeing it from the viewpoint of somethingwell understood. Klaus Krippendorff defines it as 'a pattern, an explanatory structure, tied to a word or expression and

carried from a familiar domain of experiences into another domam whose experiences and actions it thereby organizesand coordinates in its own and usually novel ways' (1991:181).

* For example Pepper's contextural metaphor (Pepper, 1942 in Barton, 1994:1 as elaborated by Emery andTrust, 1965, and Emery in 1993.)

' Personal discussions Craig Mclnnis, University of Melbourne, 1992.

'" Cosmology has been defined by Levi-Strauss as the deep structure level or mythical thinkuig of a culture.Using the analogy of an orchestra Levi Strauss likened a single myth to a single instrumental part in a symphony.'Hearing' or understanding the whole symphony, the whole mythical thinking is the underlying cosmology of thatcultural identity (Levi Strauss, 1962, 1964:25). Mary Douglas writes that although the term 'cosmology' is used to

'include the justifying ideas which tend to be invoked as if part of the natural order', in her definition a cosmology is notpart of the natural order, but 'strictly a product of social interaction'.


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Several of Mary Douglas' colleagues have suggested that the linchpin of the hypothesis is that 'distinctivepatterns of values and beliefs supporting distinctive patterns of social relations - will be strictly limited by the numberof patterns that can be formed from social relationships' (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:98).

In Natural Symbols, Mary Douglas was "thinking' of "scatter patterns' across the diagram instead of "a separatequadran t for each type of society' (Dougla s, 1973:9). Various writers have redrawn the diagram initially proposed byMary Douglas, and a range of different "mnemonic titles' have been suggested for each square (Douglas, 1982:4).

This schema, adapted from Bernstein's essay on theClassification and Framing of Educational Knowledge(1971) attempts to explore the distinctive codings of ritual social forms with types of cosmologies and social patterns.For comm ents on the relationship between typologies, see Douglas 1973:8-9, 43, 54-55, 77 and 190.

"* Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology, London: Barrie andRockliff, 1970, cited inThompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, (1990:17) as her "root definitions'-. the bases from which the other definitions sheprovides have been derived. She later uses the description of 'possibility of owing or not owing allegiance to a group'(Douglas, 1982(a):3) and explained that she had drawn upon political theory to define various commitments to life insociety.

" John Houghton, who wrote about cultural bias and currency, refers "to the extent [ie dimension] of regulationan actor experiences, that is, the degree to which an actor's actions are controlled or regulated, the extent to which anactor's social life is restricted by preordained and imposed rules' (Houghton, 1991:9).

'* A fifth cosmology is included in some extensions of the theory by Mary Douglas' students and colleagues,Thom pson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990: Thompson, M., in Douglas, 1982(a):36-40, Houghton, 1991:1). It is describedas an autonomou s way of life practised by those who neither seek power no r are powerless, but who escape[s] socialcontrol by reftising to control or be controlled by others' (Houghton,1991:11; Ostrander, 1982; Thompson, Ellis andWildavsky, 1990:14). While M ary Douglas acknowledges the work in developing this fifth category, she prefers totake it "off the social map' (Douglas, 1982(a):5; Thompson, 1982:37) because, given its reliance on complete autonomyit is not an engaged w ay of life.

" In particula r see Westview Press Political Cultures Series edited by Aaron Wildavsky. Book s in the seriesinclude Cultural Theory, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, (dedicated to Mary Douglas),Politics, Policy and Culture, Dennis J. Coyle & Richard J. Ellis (1994), andCulture and Currency, John Houghton(1991).

' Ludw ick Fleck's positivist approach to the study of cognition in 1934, led him to focus on cooperativ eindividual achievement, and to develop a "conceptual scheme' showing how the social relations limit and controlindividual cognition (D ougla s, 1987:13) and collectively produce a stock of know ledge (Douglas, 198 7:12). Fleck'ssearch for a philosophy of science led him to the concept of the "thought collective' (similar to Durkheim's social group)and its parallel "thought style' (or Durkheim's "collective conscience') to explain the relationship between individual andcollective thou ght. His writings about co-operative team work failed to compete with the emphasis on individuality and

com petition e merg ing at the time he was writing (Doug las, 1987:14). Ironically, his views themselves fell outside theprevailing "thought style' of his day (Douglas, 1987:14), a thought style celebrating Karl Popper's successfulLogic derForschung (Trenn 1979:x in Do uglas, 1987:14).. Fleck was "reproached' for his lack of emphasis on the role of" individual scientists' in the philosophy of science, an emphasis in which Mary Douglas believes there has now been a"decisive shift' (Douglas, 1987:15).

" That is, assum ed society has a life or existence ofits own.

^ Thom pson, Ellis & Wildavsky, say that in the 1990s, political culture seems to be experiencing "something ofa revival'(1990:215,220n2).

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