-
Being True to the WorkAuthor(s): Lydia GoehrSource: The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp.
55-67Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for
AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/431993 .Accessed:
29/01/2015 04:52
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the
Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,
researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information
technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new
formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please
contact [email protected].
.
Wiley and The American Society for Aesthetics are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
LYDIA GOEHR
Being True to the Work
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, E.T.A. Hoffmann
issued a novel prescription for musical practice: musical
activities, be they of composition, performance, reception, eval-
uation, or analysis, should no longer be guided by extra-musical
considerations of a religious, social, or scientific sort. They
should now be guided by the works themselves. To legitimize this
assertion Hoffmann developed the notion of being true to the work
(Werktreue) and gave it a prominence within the language of musical
crit- icism it had never before had. '
Hoffmann's understanding of the nature of musical works
corresponds closely to that accepted today. Thus, a musical work is
held to be a composer's unique, objectified expression, a public
and permanently existing artifact made up of musical elements
(typically tones, dynam- ics, rhythms, harmonies, and timbres). A
work is fixed with respect, at least, to the properties indicated
in the score and it is repeatable in performances. Performances
themselves are transitory sound events intended to present a work
by complying as closely as possible with the given notational
specifications. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and Schubert's String
Quintet in C, Op. i63 are examples of musical works.
Since Hoffmann's time, and increasingly in this century, many
philosophers have discussed the nature of musical works and the
diverse implications of speaking about music in terms of works. My
concerns are similarly focused. In the present essay, however, I
wish to speak about musical works for the purpose of making two
claims. Both claims are derived, or so I shall argue, from a
particular historical thesis which asserts that the concept of a
musical work first
fully emerged in classical musical practice at the end of the
eighteenth century and that, since this time, it has been used
pervasively in the world of music. The first claim is that the
concept of a musical work is an open concept with paradig- matic
and derivative employment. The second claim, which is dependent
upon the first, is that the counterexample method, used in the
tradi- tional search for definitions of concepts such as that of a
musical work, is undermined in a way hitherto unseen in the
philosophical literature. In the scope of an article it would be
impossible to fully justify the historical thesis itself. This I do
elsewhere.2 So I shall say just enough about it to give the reader
the information on which the two central claims are based.
II. THE HISTORICAL THESIS
Historical inquiry reveals that the beliefs, val- ues, rules,
and patterns of behavior and presen- tation associated with the
concept of a musical work have regulated classical musical practice
only since the end of the eighteenth century. The concept
crystallized as a result of the fusion of four forces: (I) the
articulation of the concepts of Fine Art and of the autonomous work
of art in the mid to late eighteenth century and the subse- quent
inclusion of music under these concepts; (2) the emancipation of
musical sound from poetry and the religious word, and the subse-
quent rise of absolute or purely instrumental music; (3) the
specific and highly complex inter- play between Enlightenment,
Romantic, and Idealist thought notably in German and French
aesthetic theory; and (4) the emergence of a new sort of
marketplace for musical works .3
For most of its history, music was conceived as a practice
entirely subject to the constraints of
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47:1, Winter
1989
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
56
extra-musical occasion and function determined mostly by the
church, court, and scientific acad- emy. The changes which took
place at the end of the eighteenth century gave rise to a new view
of music as an independent practice whose con- cerns were
predominantly musical. This inde- pendent practice became a
practice geared towards producing enduring products insofar as it
was determined by the more general concepts of fine art and the
autonomous work of art. Only with the rise of this new view of
music did musicians, critics, and the like begin to think
predominantly of music in terms of works. Bach did not think
centrally in these terms; Beethoven did. Haydn marks the
transitions
These claims are supported by a whole series of historical
considerations. Thus, in the roman- tic period, changes took place
not only in aes- thetic attitudes toward the status of music and
composers, but also in the meanings of numer- ous musical terms. As
etymological inquiries reveal, words such as 'Stuck', 'Werk',
'Oeuvre', 'composition', and related terms such as 'reper- toire',
'performance', 'rehearsal', 'transcrip- tion', and 'improvisation',
acquired their mod- ern meanings at the end of the eighteenth
century.5 Each of these terms was reconcep- tualized with regard to
their specific relation to the central regulative concept-the
musical work.
There were at the same time significant changes in the
activities of composition, per- formance, and criticism. New
oppositions or new forms of old oppositions quickly became
entrenched. Oppositions arose between: the music composed and the
music played; the com- poser and performer; absolute and program
music; composition and transcription; and com- position and
improvisation. These oppositions were to find institutional
expression in the for- mation of the "imaginary musical museum":
the building of concert halls which moved music from a background
to a foreground object of appreciation; the preparation of the
first pro- gram notes; the new conception of rehearsals as
necessary to an adequate performance; dedi- cated publishing
companies; and new laws investing copyright in the composer and
associ- ated plagiarism policies. In this same period, finally,
bibliographies, biographies, and histo- ries were written, all of
which focused for the first time on the idea that composers were
pro-
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
ducing permanent and independently unique works.
Why should all these changes have fostered the emergence of the
work-concept? Prior to the nineteenth century, musical practice was
regu- lated by beliefs that did not conceptually require the idea
of a work. This was not true after i8oo. Certainly before i8oo
musicians functioned with concepts of operas, cantatas, sonatas,
and symphonies. But none of these were understood in relation to
the idea that there was a composer producing full and original
scores which re- flected and preserved the tonal, rhythmic, and
timbral properties of his composition. Nor did these concepts
depend upon a composition's sur- viving its performance, being
repeated, being performed without interruption, being pre- sented
as a completed and unified product, or being considered significant
in its own right. Indeed, it was only when the production of music
began to be conceived along these lines that many traditional
concepts, such as that of a symphony and sonata, acquired their
modern significance-as kinds of musical work.
All these claims are founded upon the idea that musical
practices, holistically conceived, can be, but need not be,
regulated by the work- concept. It is, at most, historically
contingent which of these two alternatives is realized in fact. But
to say that a given concept arises con- tingently out of a set of
historical circumstances does not imply that it is merely ephemeral
in nature. On the contrary, a concept can become so entrenched
within a given practice that it comes to take on all the airs and
graces of necessity.
III. OBJECTIONS
The thesis that the work-concept began to reg- ulate musical
practice at the end of the eigh- teenth century might seem overly
contentious. Indeed, it can be challenged in a number of ways. One
might challenge my interpretation of historical data or the idea of
musical workhood employed in the above. Although the former cannot
be further defended here, the latter can. Indeed, for the sake of
the argument, it must be.
I am suggesting that the concept of a musical work is intimately
tied to a conception of the complex relationships obtaining between
the composer, the score, and the performance, as
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Goehr Being True to the Work
these are expressed on several levels: within musical and
aesthetic literature; and in terms of institutional codes. These
relationships came to be sharply defined at a particular time
against the background of those theories which first gave to music
its autonomy and, indeed, exalted position among the arts.
Henceforth, I shall refer to this view as the romantic conception
of musical works.6
Objectors might claim that my notion of workhood is too closely
wedded to a romantic understanding of musical practice. They might
suggest that there is an ideologically neutral notion of a work: a
work is either a sound pattern simpliciter; a work is a sound
pattern corres- ponding to appropriate musical or aesthetic
interest. Regarding the former, however, this would mean that any
tune or song is also a work, which is going too far. And regarding
the latter, as soon as we begin to speak of more complex patterns,
perhaps those indicated in scores or embodied in performances, we
adopt that con- ception of music first fully formed in the late
eighteenth century. In other words, the very notions of a score,
indication, and performance employed in this purportedly neutral
descrip- tion are thick with meaning, as, indeed, is the idea of
"appropriate musical or aesthetic inter- est." It is, therefore,
yet to be shown by those who object to the thesis presented here
that the concept of a musical work regulates musical practice with
something other than a deeply romantic significance.7
There are two further objections. The first turns on the claim
that even if circumstances of a given sort do not allow at a
specific time for conscious or explicit use of a concept, this does
not mean that what is produced does not fall under the said
concept. The second rests upon the apparent implication of the
thesis, that we can speak of music in terms of works only if the
music was produced in the period around i8oo. If the concept of a
musical work is tied to its moment of origin-which was effectively
the heyday of romanticism-then its application must similarly be
restricted and the boundaries of its extension closed. I shall
confine myself in the proceeding sections to forestalling both of
these objections by discussing the conditions under which we can
and do, in fact, speak about the music, say of Bach, in terms of
works.
To this end, note that the thesis does not
57
commit us to the view that Bach did not compose musical works.
Indeed he composed some of the greatest works ever written. It
might, in my terms, be anachronistic but in musical terms it is not
implausible to date the golden age of abso- lute music or of
musical works in the second half of the eighteenth century. What I
have claimed is only that the musical world within which Bach lived
was not regulated by the idea of a work. This claim can, at most,
be historically inaccu- rate. The conclusion that he did not
compose works is not implied.8
Of course, the thesis does commit its propo- nent to a view of
meaning and truth as dependent upon the existence of particular
conceptual schemes. Given that we have a concept of a musical work,
Bach composed works. If the concept had never emerged within
musical prac- tice (or, indeed, within any other relevant or
related practice) we would speak instead of Bach's music in terms
perhaps not only more familiar to Bach himself, but also still
evident in other existing musical practices which are not regulated
by the idea of creating fixed, everlast- ing musical products.
IV. EXTENDING THE USE OF A CONCEPT
Nowadays, in fact, there seems to be no form of musical
production excluded from being packaged in terms of works. Most, if
not all, classical music composed before 1800-for example, the
music of Palestrina, Vivaldi, and Bach-is packaged in this way,
despite the fact that the music in question was not so classified
at its moment of origin. We tend, also, to classify most, if not
all, avant-garde or aleatoric music as works. We speak of the works
of Cage, Neu- haus, and Rzewski regardless of the fact that these
composers do not think of themselves as composing within the
romantic tradition. "It's a very deliberate step of mine," Neuhaus
writes, "not to record the pieces. These pieces are not musical
products; they're meant to be activi- ties."9
We often disregard the conceptual differences between a work and
an improvisation or be- tween a work and a transcription. Both
improv- isation and transcription (and arrangement) emerged with
their modern understanding as concepts sibling to that of a work.
Undoubtedly they stand in a very intimate relation to the
latter
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
58
concept, but it is not one of identity. The re- lation seems,
however, to be indeterminate. On occasion, we are content to refer
to certain transcriptions as transcriptions. Sometimes, however, we
speak of them as works in their own right. 0 The same indeterminacy
obtains in the case of improvisations and arrange- ments.
Those interested in avant-garde notions of "found art" might
speak of the phenomena of natural music-bird songs, for example-if
not as works, then at least as instances of music. But suppose that
recordings were made of the phenomena on the basis of which scores
were produced which in turn made possible their in- stantiation in
performance on suitable instru- ments. How easy it would be now to
talk of these phenomena not merely in a loose sense as in- stances
of music but as works. "The objet trouve ... unlike the result of
an individual production process but a chance find ... is
recognized today," Burger argues, "as a 'work of art'. The objet
trouve thus loses its character as anti-art and becomes, in the
museum, an autonomous work among others." "
When we speak of works we do not think immediately of jazz,
folk, or popular music, nor of music serving as an accompaniment to
other art forms, such as film and dance music. Nor do we think
immediately of music which is pur- posefully integrated into the
everyday world- the music in religious services or other rituals.
But this does not exclude the possibility of think- ing about these
kinds of music in terms of works.
With regard to film music we usually speak only of musical or
film scores. But we would be tempted to call these scores works if
and when they were conceived as products to be marketed and
evaluated independently of the films. We might be tempted, also, to
think of an Indian raga (or a particular performance based on a
given raga) in terms of a performance of a work if the music was
produced in the Royal Albert Hall as part of a celebration of music
of other cultures. Thus, even if we would be hesitant to say that
these kinds of music yield paradigmatic examples of musical works,
we could still see them as yielding borderline examples.
It seems, then, that our contemporary use of the work-concept
does not confine us to the music of the romantic period. We are,
appar-
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
ently, tempted to understand musical practices of many kinds as
involving the production of works. But if, as I claim, the
work-concept emerged as a result of a specific confluence of
aesthetic, social, and historical conditions, how have we been able
and why have we wanted to extend the employment of the work-concept
seemingly so pervasively?
V. CONCEPTUAL IMPERIALISM
A major part of the answer to the 'why' in this question is that
the view of the musical world which romanticism originally provided
has con- tinued since i8oo, despite much anti-romantic theorizing
in the intervening period, to be the dominant view. This view is so
entrenched in contemporary musical thought that its con- stitutive
concepts are taken for granted. In fact, we have before us an
obvious case of conceptual imperialism.
Consider any form of music produced any- where in the world.
Have many musicians, interested in what is generally referred to as
classical music, not found good reason to inter- pret all these
musics according to the romantic view?I2 Have they not assumed that
the closer all forms of music approximate in their mode of
presentation to those determined by roman- ticism the more
civilized they are? The more general concept of a work of art is
itself often used as a way of attributing a high value to any kind
of thing. Consider the pleasure a chef would feel from being told
that his Black Forest Gateau is a "work of art, " or the
satisfaction of a car manufacturer who produces a car deemed a
"fine artistic product."'3
One obvious result of seeing the world's musics-including much
of classical music- through romantic-colored spectacles is that
many have assumed that these musics can be packaged in terms of
works: ways are sought to assign the 'works' to composers, to
represent them in full notational form, thereby allowing them to be
regarded as having a fixed structure with a sharply defined
beginning and end, thereby allowing them to be performed on
numerous occasions as part of a program of works in the fine
setting of a concert hall.
Apart from the fact that this way of thinking results in our
alienating music from its various socio-cultural contexts, and
apart from the fact
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Goehr Being True to the Work
that most of the world's music is not originally packaged in
this way, do we not risk losing something significant when we so
interpret it? Do we not lose something when we hear the music of a
flamenco or a blues guitarist in a concert hall?'4 For the
conventions associated with the concert hall determine that the
audience should listen with disinterested respect to the 'work'
being performed. The audience cannot even tap its many feet. Do we
not lose some- thing-even just an acoustic something-when we hear
eighteenth-century chamber music per- formed, outside of the
chamber, in symphonic concert halls? The critic Jonathan Keates, in
thinking specifically about eighteenth-century operas, is aware of
the tendency for roman- ticism to dominate. "However much we might
pride ourselves on our understanding of the eighteenth century," he
writes, "the values of the Gesamtkunstwerk continue to be applied
with ingenious blindness, to appraising the over- all worth of its
art-forms. " '5
This conceptual imperialism has not been one-sided. The beliefs
associated with the ideal of Werktreue have increasingly and
sometimes enthusiastically been adopted by those musi- cians
involved in the production of music of many different kinds. Thus,
jazz musicians have sought and indeed found respect from 'serious'
musicians by dispensing with the smoky and noisy atmosphere of the
club and by perform- ing, instead, in tails. Many have willingly
adopted the institutional conventions associated with 'serious'
music. A Chinese committee, in its bid to produce western-style
musical works, acted together as composer to produce, against all
Chinese traditions, the Yellow River Con- certo. Schoenberg, when
defending his twelve- tone method, emphasized that "one uses the
series and then one composes as before as the great austro-german
composers always have done ... My works are twelve-note composi-
tions, not twelve-note compositions."' 6
That these musicians have justified the pro- duction of their
kind of music to their critics by showing their willingness to
conform to the con- ditions of Werktreue is not altogether
surprising. Think of the powerful effect both the distinction
between civilized and uncivilized (primitive, popular) music and
that between artist and craftsman, has had on a musician's
conception of his respective practice. Recall that classical
59
music is still regarded by many as quintessen- tially
civilized.
Imagine how inferior a Chinese person must feel on hearing the
dismissive words of the romantic Berlioz: "The Chinese sing the way
dogs bark, or as cats vomit when they've swal- lowed a fish
bone."'7 Or the jazz musicians who read in I920 these words of a
French jazz critic: Jazz is cynically the orchestra of brutes with
nonop- posable thumbs and still prehensile toes, in the forest of
Voodoo. It is entirely excess, and for that reason more that
monotone: the monkey is left to his own devices, without morals,
without discipline, thrown back to all the groves of instinct,
showing his meat still more obscene. These slaves must be
subjugated, or there will be no more master. Their reign is
shameful. The shame is ugliness and its triumph.' 8
As recently as i987, a discussion was devoted to establishing
the claim that Duke Ellington "utterly fails to conform to the
criteria of the conventional idea of 'the artist', just as his
improvised productions fail to conform to the conventional view of
the 'work of art'," even though Ellington saw himself "as an
'artist' in this sense and took to composing 'works' for the
concert hall."'9 What, the critic then asks, are we to make of the
music?
Jascha Heifitz tells us that he occasionally performed works by
contemporary composers for two reasons: first, to discourage the
com- posers from writing any more; second, to remind himself of how
much he appreciated Beethoven. Here, works produced around i8oo
serve as the standard. Similarly, this standard operates behind the
facile comment that Vivaldi wrote the same piece 300 times. With
any con- sideration of the times in which Vivaldi lived-a time when
composers were required to produce music for several similar
occasions each week- this comment loses its derogatory force.2o
Con- sider, finally, how cynical classical musicians tend to be of
popular music, on the grounds that a given song has a simple form
or that the music "doesn't last,?" or that popular music is ex-
pressive of infantile emotions. Why should all music meet the
conditions imposed by romantic aesthetics? Simplicity of form is
required in much of the world's music precisely because of the
music's acknowledged subservience to so- cial, political, and
religious functions. Much
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
60
music is not designed to "stand the test of time." Its value and
significance lie elsewhere. 21
Despite numerous practical difficulties, the work-concept with
its conceptually dependent notions of performance and notation have
been adopted by many interpreters and producers of music of all
sorts. Thus, since i8oo, not only have the most disparate arts, as
Walter Pater once said, "aspired to the condition of music" but,
also, many of the most disparate musics have aspired to the
condition of musical works.
The assimilation of seemingly alien concepts into a given type
of music is not, however, all bad. First, the migration of concepts
among different musics is pretty much inevitable given our
conceptual or cultural limitations. We can only comprehend the
music of cultures to which we do not belong by employing an already
familiar conceptual framework. Second, apart from the inevitability
of perspectival com- prehension, there is sometimes a healthy blur-
ring of the boundaries between different musics, something which
can be fostered by conceptual migration. Thus, even given (or
despite) imperialistic influence, the adoption of concepts into
foreign musics can lead-and has led on occasion-to new and
interesting musical styles.22
Thus far, I have explained why the work- concept has come to be
employed-despite its having emerged within a particular practice at
a very particular time-in settings prima facie temporally and
spatially set apart from this orig- inal context. Now I must show
how this has been possible. VI. PARADIGM AND DERIVATIVE
EXAMPLES
The concept of a musical work, I have sug- gested, emerged and
found its regulative func- tion within musical practice as a result
of a specific crystallization of ideas about the nature, purpose,
and relationship between the composer, the score, and the
performance. This crystallization served effectively to shape what
is now our standard interpretation of the concept of a work and of
the musical practice it regu- lates. It also has come to serve as
the basis for our classification of examples of musical works. It
is to this last function that our attention must now turn.
When we use the concept of a musical work we use it with an
understanding revealed in our
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
beliefs, ideals, assumptions, expectations, and actions. We can,
however, use the concept in different ways. At least two of these
ways serve to ground a distinction between paradigm and derivative
examples.
Paradigm examples, sometimes more use- fully called original
examples, are those pro- duced directly and explicitly under the
guidance of the relevant concept. We classify examples as
derivative, by contrast, when we classify them as being of a
certain kind even though these objects were not brought into
existence with the relevant kind in mind or within the appropriate
practice. Whether an example is paradigm or derivative is not,
however, something that is decided independently of how we use the
con- cept. Thus, strictly speaking, we should speak of a given
concept as having a paradigm and derivative arena of employment and
only then of its extension in terms of paradigm and deriva- tive
examples.
The paradigm use of a concept, as defined above, tells a
familiar story about conceptual use. Derivative use, however, is
more compli- cated. There are in fact different aspects to the
derivative use of a concept. Consider the con- cept of a musical
work. We may look first at the extent to which the activities of
non-romantic musicians have approximated to the condition of
romantic music. We may look at how concepts associated with
romantic music have gradually been taken over and thus the extent
to which these musicians have begun to speak of their production in
terms of works.
When non-romantic musicians borrow ro- mantic concepts they
adopt an understanding sufficient to sustain the functioning of
these concepts. In romantic eyes, they more or less successfully
impose the appropriate categories upon their practice. They act in
what the roman- tic considers to be the right way and in a way they
themselves presumably now find satisfac- tory. The concepts come to
be employed in a non-romantic setting in much the same way as
natives incorporate into their understanding concepts introduced to
them by foreigners. Without exposure to foreign concepts, native
musicians remain oblivious to them. It is on this assumption that
we say that the use of the con- cepts is foreign to the native's
own practice and, thus, if the concepts are used at all, they are
used derivatively.
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Goehr Being True to the Work
We can, in addition, look at how musicians steeped in the
romantic view interpret non- romantic musics according to their own
concep- tual framework. This would be more like persons who,
entering into a foreign cultural context, make use of their native
linguistic or social appa- ratus in order to acquire what is for
them a sufficient grasp of unfamiliar customs. Roman- tic musicians
can effectively choose to regard any piece of music as a musical
work if they believe they can, with the relevant understand- ing,
act successfully or usefully in relation to that thing.
Hence, it is possible for romantic musicians to look at a
non-romantic practice, say, one in which the music of Bach or
Palestrina was pro- duced, and to classify the music derivatively
in terms of works. This is possible because the romantic musicians
can identify a composer, represent the music in an adequate
notation, specify a fixed set of instrumental specifica- tions, and
so on. This process is seen clearly in the way in which composers
in the early nine- teenth century began not only to rewrite the
history of music in terms of works, but also to give to composers
and music of earlier centuries what they never had-precise
notations, multi- ple performances, and the possibility of eternal
fame. Recall Mendelssohn's introduction of Bach's St. Matthew
Passion as a musical work. Mendelssohn, to put the point crudely,
took Bach's music away from the church and put it into the concert
hall. In the same manner, again, it is possible for romantic
musicians to identify composers and sound-structures when listening
to transcriptions or improvisations or the music of an original
blues guitarist and to talk of these in terms of works. The use in
all these cases of the terminology of works is derivative.
The assimilation of romantic concepts into different kinds of
music should not be thought of as uniform. It varies from case to
case. Some kinds of music stand in closer conceptual prox- imity to
romantic music than do others: the eighteenth century sonata stands
in closer con- ceptual proximity than the Indian raga. Some kinds
of music will be associated with ideals which conflict with those
associated with the work-concept: the improvisatory nature of jazz
is an obvious example. It is likely, finally, that derivative
works, precisely because they are derivative, will fail to comply
perfectly with the
61
beliefs and expectations associated with the con- cept of a
musical work: notations, if existing at all, might not be as
precise as Beethoven would have liked.
When, however, we are faced with a deriva- tive example which
does not comply perfectly with the conditions of the work-concept,
we do not exclude it from falling under that concept. To do so
would defeat the whole idea of its being a derivative example. The
point can be put this way: when an example falls under a concept it
is less a matter of its having the appropriate prop- erties than
its being brought to fall under the concept by a user of that
concept. If the relevant properties are lacking in the first place,
they can be assigned to the example so that it can be regarded in
the right way. If this is not possible, the attempt fails. Only
then do we exclude the example from falling under the
concept.23
This procedure is made possible in virtue of the connection
holding between the paradigm and the derivative use of a concept.
This connec- tion is a conceptual dependency of the latter upon the
former which has to be understood in terms of the aims and beliefs
of musical agents. To use a concept derivatively one attempts to
match the paradigm or original understanding of the concept with a
'foreign' example. The match can be more or less successful. Often
the match is triggered by a desire that certain productions
replicate or be like those originally falling under the concept.
Often it has to do with a wish to continue or broaden a tradition.
The conceptual dependency of derivative use on paradigm use can
vary in character and complexity. But it always has to do with the
particular under- standing implicit in our involvement in musical
practice, rendering the search for formalized understanding of the
connection misguided.
Although the derivative examples of works are dependent on the
paradigm examples in the way described, it is nonetheless possible
for the former to effect our understanding of the latter. A
derivative example might bring something new to the understanding
of the concept under which it falls. When this occurs we can
respond in different ways. One useful way is to expand or modify
the meaning of the concept itself. When we chose to do this our
choice of paradigm and derivative examples might change. But this
is not problematic. On the contrary, it is precisely this
possibility of expansion and modification of
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
62
conceptual meaning (seen here in terms of the interplay of
paradigm and derivative use) that confirms the desired open nature
of that concept.24
A concept which is treated as an open concept can undergo
expansion and modification in meaning when its associated
understanding is affected by extraneous influences. This is an
inevitable consequence of conceptual migration and social change.
It is also a consequence of the ever present attempt to overthrow
tradition or to change or modify a style. Sometimes, however, the
influence of derivative use is not powerful enough to expand or
modify a concept's mean- ing. In this case the meaning remains the
same. This does not, however, imply that the concept is being
treated as closed. To treat a concept as open leaves open the
possibility of change. Change does not actually have to occur. This
is the case with the concept of a musical work. The imperialistic
attitude which has accompanied the use of this concept has served
as a matter of fact but not as a matter of necessity to prevent
significant change in our understanding of musi- cal
practice."5
The view of the concept of a musical work as described here
leaves open three important pos- sibilities. First, it is possible
that a musician in i8io and one in i988 might both be regulated by
the work-concept, but because of a possible modification of meaning
they might be working with a different understanding and with a
differ- ent range of paradigm and derivative examples. There is,
however, a dynamic and diachronic relation linking together the
successive stages of a concept and serving to preserve its identity
over time.
Second, to talk of paradigm and derivative examples falling
under a given concept does not imply that this is the only way to
classify the given instances. It is possible to interpret and
perform, say, Beethoven's Spring Sonata, in accordance with the
ideals implicit in a rain dance. We would then be obliged-in the
con- text of the corresponding practices-to describe the music not
as a paradigm example of a work but as a derivative instance of a
rain dance. Consider the reconception (and adoption of appropriate
evaluative criteria) involved in our listening to originally
classical works which have been jazzed up, used in films, or even
made into popular hits.
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Third, it is possible to speak of pieces of music as falling
originally or derivatively under more than one concept. Here,
musicians might deliberately produce music which fails to fall
neatly under a single concept. Many musi- cians-especially those of
the avant-garde- have recognized the limitations of producing music
solely under the dictate of romantic ideals and have chosen instead
to employ notions typ- ical of other musics. To what extent, if at
all, the work-concept-or the ideal of Werktreue-has remained
central to their musical production has differed from case to
case.
Thus far, I have explained why-in historical terms-and how-in
philosophical terms-the concept of a musical work has been used so
extensively in the musical world. It remains to be shown what
effect all this has on the philoso- pher's traditional use of the
counterexample method.
VII. COUNTEREXAMPLES
In recent philosophical literature, the concept of a musical
work has been treated less in terms of its genealogy than in its
role as an ontological category. Accordingly, it has been described
in relation to two traditional ontological concerns: a concern to
describe the mode of existence of different kinds of objects in
terms of categories like universals, types, and classes and a
concern to determine the essential properties or the iden- tity
conditions for these objects. The idea has been to describe the
concept by describing the kind of object a musical work is. 26
Within these accounts there has usually been an assumption that
the concept of a musical work is the sort of concept whose meaning
can be given in terms of an unalterable description of its defining
characteristics. The objection has then been forwarded that, for
any definition of "musical work" formulated in these terms, it is
always possible to find an example of what we would in practice
call a work which fails to meet these conditions. 27
With the tension arising from this assumption and the related
objection a crucial ambiguity has surfaced concerning the range of
examples intended to fall under the concept being defined. This
ambiguity has surfaced in the absence of a decisive answer to the
question as to whether a definition of "musical work" is designed
to
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Goehr Being True to the Work
determine just the paradigmatic application of the concept of a
musical work or the boundaries of its entire extension. It has
remained unclear, in other words, whether the concept of a musical
work is being treated as open (in which case one cannot close its
borders) or as closed (in which case one can).
Theorists have taken different routes. Some have explicitly
confined their theories to para- digm examples, thereby engaging in
something similar to what was once called monster bar- ring-the
exclusion of 'difficult' examples. Others have continued to see
their theories as accounting for all examples of musical works. The
justification for either modus operandi has not, however, been made
explicit.
Theorists, furthermore, have apparently had no qualms in using
certain examples as paradigm examples of musical works. Their
theories- almost without exception-have been formulated on the
basis of examples drawn from the reper- toire of the early I8oos.
Their inquiries always begin with the question: "What sort of thing
is Beethoven's Fifth Symphony?" This should no longer surprise us.
But what are we to make of the fact that examples drawn from early
pre- I8oos and avant-garde music and sometimes from folk, jazz, and
popular music, but never from the 1800s repertoire, have been
appealed to when and only when there was an intention to challenge
a given theory or part thereof?28 "It appears that Ingarden's
elitism has a serious consequence for his analysis of the musical
work," Czerniawski writes. "By ignoring pop- ular works, he fails
to realize that the ontic status of a musical work is variable,
since at the popu- lar end ... its identity is uncomplicated by any
score/performance relationship. "29
The success of a challenge using these kinds of examples-the
success of the counterexample method as so employed-depends
entirely on whether the examples are bonafide examples of works.
The challenge rests on the assumption that the work-concept can be
employed when speaking about musics other than that of music
produced around I8oo. But even if it is a worthy assumption it is a
big assumption. Yet the fact that this assumption has been made has
had almost no recognition, let alone adequate expla- nation. We
should not simply take it for granted that any kind of music can be
packaged in terms of works.30 If, however, we do accept that
all
63
kinds of music yield examples of musical works, then those who
would want to reject a purported definition of the work-concept
will have before them an extremely broad range of possible
counterexamples. Herein lies the problem.
If theorists adopt a traditional essentialist approach to
definition, they will likely assume that all examples of
works-past, present and future-are such in virtue of their having
cer- tain essential properties. Either an object of a certain kind
has these properties or it does not (in which case it is an object
of another kind). As long as this is assumed the additional
distinction between paradigm and borderline examples and then a
confinement of one's definition to the former are unnecessary. All
that matters here is that one looks to see if a given object has
the properties associated with the kind in question to see if it is
an example of that kind. If it is, it is immediately entitled to
serve as a counterexam- ple to a definition which excludes it. The
coun- terexample method clearly operates on this view of
things.
The counterexample method is called into serious question,
however, as soon as we em- brace a more complicated account of what
it means for something to count as an example of a given kind or
what it means for an example to fall under a given concept. Such an
account was embraced above when I argued that a given concept is
open and thus does not have its bor- ders closed; when a
distinction was drawn between paradigm and derivative examples; and
when it was suggested that something counts as an example of a kind
not directly because it exhibits the appropriate properties but
directly because it is brought to fall under the concept by users
of that concept within the context of a practice. On this view,
what can count as a counterexample turns out to be a complicated
matter because a derivative or what otherwise we have called a
borderline example cannot any- more be used as a counterexample.
31
Recall the conceptual dependency that deriv- ative examples have
on paradigm examples. Objects come to count as derivative examples
in virtue of the relation in which they stand to paradigm examples.
Without paradigm exam- ples serving as the standard there could be
no conception of the non-standard. In my terms, derivative
instances can only be counted as works if the original instances of
works have
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
64
already been acknowledged as such. Given this, it makes no sense
to think that a derivative example could be used as a
counterexample to challenge either a definition confined to para-
digm examples or one accommodating, say, all currently existing
works. To adapt a Hanslickian principle: no musical practice which
is not guided originally by the work-concept can give the lie to a
practice which is so guided.32
Consider, now, the case of the latest avant- garde work which is
brought forward as a para- digm example of a work; it is produced
with the work-concept in mind. Nonetheless its creator desires to
challenge the traditional notion of a work. Could this example be
used as a coun- terexample? I do not believe so. To see this we
need to clarify the difference between using counterexamples to
challenge philosophical def- initions and using examples-be they
paradigm or derivative-to challenge the traditional mean- ing of a
given concept. When one counts X as an example of a work one
accepts a given meaning of the concept, a meaning which regulates
at least its paradigmatic use. If one subsequently wants X to
challenge this meaning, one becomes involved in trying to expand or
modify the con- cept's present meaning. To engage in this pro- cess
one first acknowledges the present meaning and only then provides a
rationale for its sug- gested expansion or modification. This is
not at all the same thing as using X to challenge a philosophical
definition of the given concept. It is, rather, an indication of
one's real engage- ment in the dynamic tradition in which the con-
cept functions.
Thus, when, for example, an avant-garde composer produces
something which is de- signed to challenge the romantic conception
of the work of music and in turn is designed to expand or modify
this conception, there is no suggestion on the part of this
composer that Beethoven thereby did not compose musical works. He
just composed under a conception of musical practice which is now
thought by the composer to be perhaps aesthetically or ideolog-
ically unsound. The avant-garde composer at no point thinks that
the traditional meaning was 'definitionally' incorrect. VIII.
CONCLUSION
The way in which a concept functions reg- ulatively within a
practice is a complex matter
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
revealed more directly to those philosophers with an historical
eye than to those with an ahistorical eye. The different uses and
the depen- dencies obtaining between them reveal special
complications for those who would like to see all examples of
musical works classified on the same terms. These complications
reveal the methodological basis of the counterexample method and
its limited use. This has been the substance of my argument.
Of course this argument is not only applicable to the concept of
a musical work, for the manner in which this concept has been
treated in the philosophical literature is shared by many other
concepts, be they artistic, aesthetic, legal, or ethical. What has
been said here of the open and extended use of the concept of a
musical work can thus be said also of these other concepts,
although, clearly, their historical emergence and the empirical and
historical conditions of their use will differ from case to
case.
There are many lessons to be learned from analyzing concepts
with a historical eye. I have pinpointed only one: that to be true
to music is not necessarily the same thing as being true to the
musical work. This lesson, by itself, is of substantial musical and
philosophical signifi- cance.33
LYDIA GOEHR
Department of Philosophy Boston University Boston, MA 02215
i. E.T.A. Hoffmann, "Beethovens Instrumentalmusik" in
Musikalische Novellen und Aufsatze, Band I (Regens- burg: Gustav
Bosse, n.d.), p. 69: "Der echte Kunstler lebt nur in dem Werke, das
er in dem Sinne des Meisters aufgefasst hat und nun vortragt. Er
verschmaht es, auf irgendeine Weise seine Personlichkeit geltend zu
machen, und all sein Dichten und Trachten geht nur dahin, alle die
herrlichen, holdseligen Bilder und Erscheinungen, die der Meister
mit magischer Gewalt in sein Werk verschloss, tausendfarbig
glanzend ins rege Leben zu rufen, dass sie den Menschen in lichten,
funkelnden Kreisen umfangen und seine Fantasie, sein innerstes
Gemut entzundend, ihn ras- chen Fluges in das ferne Geisterreich
tragen." For discus- sion of the association between Hoffmann and
the notion of Werktreue, see Friedrich Blume, Classic and Romantic
Music: A Comprehensive Survey, trans. M.D. Herter Nor- ton (London:
Faber and Faber, 1979), p. 112. See also Alfred Brendel,
"Werktreue-An Afterthought" in Musical Thoughts and Afterthoughts,
Princeton Essays on the Arts (Princeton University Press, 1977):
26-37.
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Goehr Being True to the Work 65
2. The thesis is fully defended in my The Work of Music
(forthcoming, Oxford University Press). For other discus- sions of
the emergence of the concept of a musical work, see Carl Dahlhaus,
Esthetics of Music (Cambridge University Press, 1982), chapter 2;
Walter Wiora, Das Musikalische Kunstwerk (Tutzing: Hans Schneider,
I983); Cheryl Seltzer, ed., Musicology and the Musical Composition,
Current Musicology 5-7 (I967-68): 49-126; Gudrun Hennenberg, Idee
und Begriff des Musikalischen Kunstwerks (Tutzing: Hans Schneider,
1983).
3. Notions central to our understanding of the Fine Arts-those
of "art for art's sake," disinterested attention, the museum, and
the distinction between art and craft-are discussed in Immanuel
Kant's Critique of Judgment; Andre Malraux, Museum Without Walls,
from La Musee Imag- inaire, trans. by Stuart Gilbert and Francis
Price (London: Secker and Warburg, I967); Paul Oskar Kristeller,
"The Modern System of the Arts," Journal of the History of Ideas 12
(1951): 496-527 & 13 (1952): 17-46; Peter LeHuray and James
Day, eds., Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and early
Nineteenth Centuries, (Cambridge University Press, 1981). See also
Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful (Indianapolis: Hackett,
I987) for discussion of the 'musical' as opposed to the
'extra-musical'. For discussion of the idea of absolute music see
Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music (London: Sheed and
Ward, 1973); Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music,
trans. Brian Massumi (University of Minnesota Press, I985); Bellamy
Hosler, Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music in
Eighteenth Century Germany (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, i98i)
and John Neubauer, The Emancipation of Music from Language:
Departure from Mimesis in Eigh- teenth-Century Aesthetics (Yale
University Press, i986).
4. I cannot refer the reader here to any specific words of these
three composers as proof of my claim. The most I can do is ask the
reader to consider the kinds of conditions and constraints under
which these composer's lived and the kinds of concerns they had.
For evidence of the latter there are numerous published letters and
biographies.
5. Until late in the eighteenth century, there was no stan- dard
or generic way of referring to works as such. An instrumental
composition when considered independently of, say, a cantata of
which it was part would be referred to perhaps as "le morceau
ddtachd," "la piece de musique," "die Solo" [Sonata], "die Musik,"
or "das musikalische Stuck" [the musical bit-an introduction or an
interlude]. None but the last has modern usage. See entries
relating to the composition and performance of music in James
Grassineau, A Musical Dictionary (New York: Broude Brothers, a
facsimile of the 1740 London Edition); Sebastien de Brossard,
Dictionaire de Musique (Paris: Christophe Ballard, 1703) and Johann
Gottfried Walther, Musikalisches Lexicon (Leipzig: Wolffgang Deer,
1732).
6. To refer to the romantic conception of musical works is not
to refer straightforwardly to what we call romantic music. The
former concerns a way of conceiving of musical practice, the latter
concerns a style of musical composition more closely associated
with Schumann and Liszt than with Beethoven. However, given certain
historical reasons having to do with how Beethoven conceived of his
musical activity, I will adopt what was in fact E.T.A. Hoffmann's
position. Hoffmann saw Beethoven as the paradigmatic romantic
composer.
7. I am reacting here to those theorists who in treating the
"musical work" as a name for an ontological category have treated
it as if it were free from any influence of ideological or
aesthetic theory. For bibliographical references, see note 26
below.
8. The philosophical argument to follow, although not its
impact, functions independently of the idea that the concept of a
work fully emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. We could
shift the date back 50 or ioo years or even to the sixteenth
century-although obviously I think this is inaccu- rate. In the
early part of the sixteenth century Nikolaus Listenius used the
idea of opus absolutum etperfectum in his Musica (Nurnberg: Johan.
Petreius, 1549). This is under- stood by many as indication of the
presence of the idea of a work. See Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music;
Nicholas Wolter- storff "The Work of Making a Work of Music" in
What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music, ed.
Philip Alperson (New York: Haven Publications, i987): 101-129. This
understanding, I believe, is misleading. The notion can be
understood in Aristotelian terms-as an action/performance completed
and produced in the best way the performer knows how. (Consider the
utterance "You have completed your work" meaning "You have
completed your assigned task.") Nothing is mentioned in the
Listenius text of a performance of a work or of a preconceived work
existing independently of and prior to its performances.
9. John Rockwell, All American Music (New York: Vin- tage Books,
I983), p. 146. For useful discussion of avant- garde attitudes
towards the notion of a work, see Peter Burger, Theory of the
Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (University of Minnesota Press,
I984): 55-59 and Chris- topher Ballantine, "Towards an Aesthetics
of Experimental Music," Musical Quarterly 63 (0977): 224-246.
IO. Consider the transcriptions, etc., by Beethoven, Liszt,
Ravel, Schoenberg, and Kreisler which have been notated or recorded
and have come to be appreciated in their own right. What would
determine whether a given transcrip- tion could be regarded as a
work in its own right would depend upon whether it was sufficiently
different from the original work for us to decide that it
independently met the conditions of being a work. See Philip
Alperson, "Musical Improvisation," Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 43 (i984): 17-30 and Jerrold Levinson, "What a Musical
Work is," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), p. 128. In the latter it
is argued, in contrast to my point, that a transcription of a
musical work in all cases yields an ontologically distinct
work.
ii. Burger, Theory of the Avant Garde, p. 57. 12. The very idea
of classical music was formed in contra-
distinction to that of romantic music in the early I800s.
Although it was intended to signify music written before the
romantic era, it came quickly to take on a much wider connotation.
This was partially due to the fact that, with a romantic conception
of music in mind, theorists came to regard the eighteenth century
as having produced the most perfect masterpieces of absolute music
despite the fact that the idea of absolute music was foreign to
eighteenth century composers. As Dahlhaus writes in his Foundations
of Music History, trans. J.B. Robbinson (Cambridge University
Press, I983), p. 28: "The idea of absolute music was formed,
paradoxically, on the basis of works that first had to be
reconstrued before they could even suit this category, a category
whose full significance was, in turn, revealed to the
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
66 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
nineteenth century only by these very works." Blume in Classic
and Romantic Music, p. 67 makes a similar point: "It is a widely
held but erroneous idea that the Classic era was 'the age of
instrumental music'; that, in reality, was the Romantic era."
13. The phrase "musical work" can be used both in an evaluative
and in a classificatory sense. What we see here is an imperialistic
conflation (contamination) of the two senses.
I4. At a concert of flamenco guitar music played by Carlos
Montoya, it soon became clear that the 'endings' of his 'works'
were artificial. He simply stopped playing at a certain point and
the audience applauded. He then continued with what was clearly an
extended improvisation around various flamenco melodies.
I5. From his review of Reinhard Strohm's Essays on Handel and
Italian Opera, Times Literary Supplement (Jan- uary 3I, i986), p. I
i8. The use of the term Gesamtkunstwerk here is not antithetical to
my use of the concept of a work. Recall that the reconception of
instrumental music in the early i8oos was applied not only to
instrumental works but also to operas, cantatas, masses, etc.
Opera, for example, was originally a form of popular entertainment
or in some countries a cultivated form of drama. Like other
eighteenth century musical forms, priority was given to the word
over the sound. Thus, in I711, we hear Alison ridiculing operas
written in a foreign language. With the emancipation of
instrumental music, however, there emerged a new view of opera
amply illustrated in the anecdote reported in i848 by George
Hogarth in his Music History, Biography, and Criti- cism (New York:
Da Capo Press, i969), p. 78: "The oper- ose character of Mozart's
accompaniments was long made an objection to his dramatic music.
The Emperor Napoleon once inquired of the celebrated Gretry, what
was the dif- ference between Mozart and Cimerosa. 'Sire', replied
Gre- try, 'Cimerosa places the statue on the stage, and the ped-
estal in the orchestra: while Mozart puts the statue in the
orchestra and the pedestal on the stage'."
16. Mentioned respectively in Lewis Rowell, Thinking about
Music: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music, (University of
Massachusetts Press, i983), p. 2i8 and Paul Griffiths, A Concise
History of Avant-Garde Music: From Debussy to Boulez (Oxford
University Press, I978), p. 8i.
17. Alain Danieloy, The Situation of Music and Musicians in
Countries of the Orient (Florence: L.S. Olschki, I971), p. 2I.
18. Quoted in Attali, Noise, p. I04. i9. From E.J. Hobsbawm
review of Duke Ellington by
James Lincoln Collier, in New York Review of Books (Nov. i9,
i987): 3-7. Think also of George Gershwin's "classical
compositions" in this context.
20. It has been suggested to me that even if Vivaldi was not
part of a romantic cult, his music was nonetheless valued for its
originality. This I agree with. But one can be original without
producing works. Further, I am speaking about a cliched and I think
unjustified criticism showing that the critic looks down upon
Vivaldi's music because he sees it as failing to meet the
conditions of production characteristic of the romantic cult. The
fact that Vivaldi's Four Seasons, in particular is one (or four?)
of our classics is testimony to the fact that Vivaldi did not write
the same work 300 times.
2I. I am arguing here neither for radical relativism or nihilism
with regard to musical judgment, nor that the influ-
ence of romanticism is justified. I am claiming only that the
latter exists and that this has interesting consequences.
22. For a discussion of racial purity and impurity in musical
styles, see Bela Bart6k, "Race Purity in Music," Modem Music I9
(1942): I53-55.
23. The way in which a musical work exhibits properties is
complex since the object is not physical in any straightfor- ward
sense. It is, however, appropriate to speak of a work as having
such and such properties if it is suitably packaged. If, for
example, an adequate score is written for the music, the music
takes on a set of essential properties determined by that score.
Contrast this with the practice of improvisation where musicians
speak of a basic tune or rhythm as an essential, individuating
principle. If a given improvisation is recorded and notated, one,
so to speak, increases the number of essential properties. Only too
soon the improvisation acquires the status of a work and the work
takes on the property of being composed. The improviser- jazz
musician duly acquires the status of jazz composer.
24. I will make no mention here of the discussion of open
concepts influenced by Wittgenstein for two reasons. First, I do
not want my discussion to be further complicated by the already
existing and mutually conflicting views of open concepts. Second,
my argument although similar in conclu- sion is structured around
premises of a sort not to be found in previous discussions. See
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philo- sophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M.
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), sections 67-88.
25. This is not to say that no musical concepts have changed.
The concept of musical sound, for example, has undergone quite
extensive changes in the last ioo years. But this concept is
distinct from that of a musical work.
26. See the following descriptions of a musical work: as an
abstract particular, William Webster, "A Theory of the
Compositional Work of Music," Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 33 (1974): 59-66; Haig Katchadourian, Music, Film and Art
(London: Gordon and Breach, I985); as an initiated type, Levinson,
"What a Musical Work is"; as a culturally emergent entity and as a
type, Joseph Margolis, "Works of Art as Physically Embodied and
Culturally Emergent Entities, " British Journal of Aesthetics I4
(1974): i87-96; as a norm kind, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and
Worlds of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, i980); as a kind, Peter
Kivy, "Platonism in Music," Grazer Philosophische Studien i9
(i984): I09-29; as a class of performances com- pliant with a score
written in a notational system, Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art:
An Approach to the Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Hackett, I976);
as an interpreted type, R.A. Sharpe, "Type, Token, Interpretation
and Per- formance," Mind 9i (1979): II2-II4; as a generic entity,
Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (New York: Harper and Row,
i968); as the pattern indicated in a score and exhibited in a
performance, Kendall L. Walton, "The Pre- sentation and Portrayal
of Sound Patterns," in Human Agency: Language, Duty, and Value,
eds. Jonathan Dancy, J.E.M. Moravscik, and C.C.W. Taylor (Stanford
University Press, i988): 237-302.
27. See Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Com- monplace
(Harvard University Press, i98i), p. vii. Danto actually speaks of
traditional definitions of 'art' but the same issue is at
stake.
28. Nelson Goodman, for example, who finds that much aleatoric
music does not meet the conditions of his notational
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
Goehr Being True to the Work 67
system is willing to say that we have before us no works. See
his Of Mind and Other Matters (Harvard University Press, i984), p.
I39. For other examples see Levinson "What a Musical Work is";
Peter Kivy, "Platonism in Music"; Roman Ingarden, The Work of Music
and The Problem of Its Identity, trans. A. Czerniawski (University
of California Press, i986); Alan Tormey, "Indeterminacy and
Identity in Art," Monist 58 (1974): 203-2I5; and Paul Ziff, Review
of Goodman's Languages of Art, Philosophical Review 67 (1971):
509-I5.
29. Ingarden, The Work of Music and The Problem of Its Identity,
p. xiv.
30. Wollheim captures the same kind of assumption per- fectly in
Art and Its Objects. His book opens with the lines: "'What is art?'
'Art is the sum of or totality of works of art'. 'What is a work of
art?'"
31. Whether one could use paradigm examples as coun- terexamples
would depend upon whether one adopted an essentialist view of these
examples. I have tried to offer a non-essentialist view which if
successful would enable me to dispense with the counterexample
method as a method cen- tral to philosophical analysis.
32. Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 20: "We see that
vocal music, whose theory can never determine the essence of music,
is moreover in practice not in a position to give the lie to
principles derived from the concept of instru- mental music."
33. I am very grateful to Bernard Elevitch, Steven Ger- rard,
Benjamin Kaplan, Jerrold Levinson, Barry Smith, Kendall L. Walton,
Anna Wessely, and to anonymous read- ers for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
This content downloaded from 129.234.252.65 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015
04:52:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Article Contentsp. [55]p. 56p. 57p. 58p. 59p. 60p. 61p. 62p.
63p. 64p. 65p. 66p. 67
Issue Table of ContentsThe Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 1-107Front
MatterAffect and Aesthetics in Human Evolution [pp.
1-14]Giacometti's Art as a Judgment on Culture [pp. 15-20]Refining
Art Historically [pp. 21-33]No Ethics, No Text [pp. 35-42]Kant and
the Autonomy of Art [pp. 43-54]Being True to the Work [pp.
55-67]Emotions and Music: A Reply to the Cognitivists [pp.
69-76]Aesthetic Laws, Principles and Properties: A Response to Eddy
Zemach [pp. 77-82]Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 83-84]Review:
untitled [pp. 85-86]Review: untitled [pp. 86-89]Review: untitled
[pp. 89-90]Review: untitled [p. 91]Review: untitled [pp.
92-93]Review: untitled [pp. 93-94]Review: untitled [pp.
94-95]Review: untitled [pp. 95-96]Review: untitled [pp. 97-98]
Book NotesReview: untitled [pp. 99-100]Review: untitled [p.
100]Review: untitled [p. 100]Review: untitled [p. 100]Review:
untitled [p. 100]Review: untitled [p. 100]Review: untitled [p.
101]Review: untitled [p. 101]Review: untitled [p. 101]Review:
untitled [p. 101]Review: untitled [pp. 101-102]Review: untitled [p.
102]Review: untitled [p. 102]Review: untitled [p. 102]Review:
untitled [p. 102]Book Note Authors [p. 102]
Books Received [pp. 103-106]Back Matter [pp. 107-107]