ANDALUCÍA Política turística Jorge Domenech Sofía Laguna Melani Cabrera
www.nasa.gov
Commercial Crew Insight/Oversight Model
Recommendations
Frank H. Bauer
Project Management ChallengeFebruary 9-10, 2011
Overview
ObjectiveDevelop an insight/oversight model that will contribute to the safe flight and safe return of NASA crew members on commercial space vehicles
Co-LeadsWayne Hale/DAA SOMD-Strategic Partnerships
Frank Bauer/ESMD Chief Engineer
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Approach
Survey different insight/oversight models (Human Space Flight, Launch Services Program, Robotic Spacecraft, COTS, Commercial)
Factor in results from Constellation Insight/Oversight study team and NESC Hybrid Team Model White Paper
Address Technical Authority Engagement, FAA engagement and review team requirements
Develop insight/oversight engagement strategy proposal Obtain feedback & advice on proposed strategy from
agency senior leaders, crew office, key stakeholders Vet final product through HSF Mission Directorates, OCE,
OSMA, OCHMO, Crew Office, CxP Insight/Oversight team, JSC Engineering
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Insight and Oversight Definitions
Insight The capacity to discern the true nature of the project’s efforts to
design, develop, test and operate the vehicle system. It is NASA’s ability to penetrate into the commercial crew
provider’s processes and their vehicle design, development, test and operations in an effort to certify the vehicle for human spaceflight operations and to improve the safety of operations and mission success.
Oversight The watchful and responsible care and management of the
commercial crew development, test and operations efforts. This is accomplished through overseeing the performance of the provider’s vehicle design, development and test efforts and their ability to certify their vehicle for safe human transportation. As such, there are elements of oversight which will require government approval and/or direction.
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Spectrum of Insight/Oversight Models
HumanSpaceflight
~1:10-1:4
Key: 1:XX represents the approximate government/industry headcount ratio
Launch ServicesProgram~1:17
Intense In/OversightLow/No In/Oversight
Scientific & Commercial Spacecraft--Contracted
~1:250-1:10
COTS & CRS
~1:80-1:20
Medium In/Oversight
Insight and Technical Engagement Overview
Insight Model Utilize technical expert engagement, and technical reach-back approach
similar to that used on the Launch Services Program, robotic spacecraft projects and COTS Advisory Team
Use NESC approach to temporarily bring in experts to resolve major issues and ramp down expertise when complete—results in a more efficient use of NASA’s technical resources
Government/industry partnership—must have Civil Servants on contractor floor• Facilitates much better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of vehicle
design, build, test & operations--in line with NASA insight on Mercury, Gemini and Apollo
In-depth government subsystem penetration which varies temporally and based on historic failure risk, contractor subsystem expertise, and design challenges • Core team follows design, development, test and verification• Assigns right experts at the right time• More experts assigned on challenging, high risk areas (e.g. abort systems,
etc)
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Commercial CrewTemporal Insight Support Recommendation
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MissionConceptReview
PreliminaryDesignReview
CriticalDesignReview
MateReview
Launch
InsightSupport
SustainingInsight
Key Decision Points
Problem Resolution Team Example
In addition to Sustaining Engineering Expertise, Cadre of Agency Experts Brought in at Key Decision Points to Thoroughly Review and Critique Design
Risk-Informed Subsystem Engagement
Based on perceived vehicle risk and historic failures, concentrate/augment insight in key areas:
Risk-informed Concentration Propulsion GN&C Avionics Software Electrical Crew Systems Separation Systems
Nominal Concentration (e.g. Power Thermal, Structures, Mission Operations, Ground
Operations, PRA Experts, ECLS, Suit)
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These Experts and the Systems Engineering Team Comprise the Government Sustaining Insight Team
Operational ordnance
6%
Structures6%
Guidance and navigation systems
13%
Electrical systems9% Software and
computing systems9%
Pneumatics and hydraulics
3%
Propulsion54%
\
1980 -2007Worldwide Launch Failure CausesReference: FAA Launch Vehicle Failure Mode Database, May 2007
Clarifications
Contractors supporting government employees, program management, and programmatic administration personnel all book-kept under government side of insight/oversight models
Ramp-up and Ramp-down of agency experts to support key milestone reviews and problem resolution teams is an essential component of this model• Will require good coordination between program office and agency
institutional expert pool; work prioritization• NASA has many good examples of this approach working for Human
Spaceflight, Launch Services and Robotic Spacecraft• NESC represents the best example of this model working for NASA’s better
good Government lab independent testing not included at this time
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Oversight Decision Strategy
Oversight Model NASA Oversight Decisions and Direction performed only when absolutely
necessary---discrete oversight vs. current near-continuous oversight Follow well defined and documented design rules and processes—(e.g.
GSFC Golden Rules, mandatory design and fabrication requirements) Requires Strong NASA Leadership that will implement discrete oversight
strategy—Project Manager, Chief Engineer, Chief Safety Officer & Systems Engineering
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Government Oversight Models
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MCR PDR CDR MateReview
Launch
Oversight Decisions & Direction
Lifecycle Timeline
Oversight Decisions and Direction Substantially Less and More Focused in Commercial Crew Model
Current (Near -Continuous) Oversight Model
Commercial Crew (Discrete) Oversight Model
Oversight Decisions & Direction
MCR PDR CDR MateReview
LaunchLifecycle Timeline
Development Production & Ops
Commercial Crew Program and Projects Government Insight/Oversight Teams
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Commercial CrewProgram OfficeOversight Team
Project AInsight Team
Project BInsight Team
Project CInsight Team
Project DInsight Team
Role: Makes Government Oversight Decisions
Role: Expert Insight, Early Issue Identification & Oversight Recommendations
Government-CommercialInsight/Oversight Interactions
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Commercial Crew Provider
Program OfficeOversight Team Discrete
Oversight Decisions &
Direction
ProjectInsight Team Penetration,
Collaboration, & Influence
InsightEmbedded
Team
Understanding &Oversight
Recommendations
Technical Authority Engagement
Technical Authorities, ISS Rep, Crew Office Rep and FAA Rep are embedded, matrixed from home organizations as the Systems Engineering Team leaders
Leadership roles include Chief Engineer (OCE TA), Chief Safety Officer (OSMA TA), Chief Health/Medical (OCHMO TA), ISS Rep (ensures ISS Safety and Requirements Compliance), Crew Office Rep (ensures crew safety, vehicle compatibility with crew, and crew training approach) and FAA Rep (ensures FAA requirements compliance)
Additional cadre of senior systems experts support systems engineering leadership team and perform SE oversight
TAs will work with Program and Agency to appropriately tailor 7120/7123 and NASA requirements and standards to support the commercial crew model
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NASA Participation in Major Reviews
Civil Servant Sustaining Insight/Oversight Team, consisting of systems engineers, relevant subsystem experts, and cognizant FAA experts, serve as members of NASA Review Team (NRT)
NASA Review Team is augmented with other independent experts from NASA, FAA or industry as appropriate
Technical, Cost, Schedule presented to NASA Review Team at Key Decision Points, in-line with NPR 7120.5 and NPR 7123 requirements
NRT review products include key findings, concerns, actions and recommendations, similar to Key Decision Point (KDP) milestone decision products
NRT contract reach-in primarily limited to supporting major reviews, as compared to current, more continuous Standing Review Board (SRB) model
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Insight/Oversight Model Recommendation
HumanSpaceflight
~1:10-1:4
Key: 1:XX represents the approximate government/industry headcount ratio
Launch ServicesProgram~1:17
Intense In/OversightLow/No In/Oversight
Scientific & Commercial Spacecraft--Contracted
~1:250-1:10
COTS & CRS
~1:80-1:20
Medium In/Oversight
Commercial Crew
Insight-Oversight
“Sweet Spot”
Summary
Overall Summary Examined NASA’s safety and mission reliability role in the commercial
spaceflight market and explored and recommended an insight/oversight model for commercial crew systems
Provides recommendations for the right balance of civil servant workforce insight/oversight that will contribute to the safe flight & return of NASA crew members on commercial vehicles
Key Message Recommendations represent a Huge Culture Shift in NASA’s development of
Human Spaceflight Vehicles Culture changes require outstanding, effective culture change leadership
within the commercial crew leadership team to move the agency on the right course
To be successful, team must simultaneously embrace criticality of safe, reliable flight and adopt insight/oversight changes necessary to accomplish in a commercial crew environment
Crucial for agency senior leadership to invest time---early and often—to guide and mentor the NASA commercial crew teams to be successful in this culture change endeavor. Culture change inertia can only be overcome through actively engaged senior leadership setting the proper course
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Backup
Acknowledgements
Ralph Roe/NESC Alan Lindenmoyer/C3PO Geoff Yoder/ESMD Marc Timm/ESMD Mike Ryschkewitsch/OCE Bryan O’Connor/OSMA Engineering Management Board (EMB) and Safety and Mission
Assurance team members Mark Geyer and Mark Kirasich/Orion Project Kathy Leuders and Amy Stencil/ISS CRS Project CxP Insight/Oversight Assessment Subteam
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Forward Work
1) NASA needs to develop a well defined decision authority with clearly defined roles and responsibilities (ESMD, SOMD, program, project, agency institution, other)
2) NASA Governance Model has potential for being an insight/oversight driver• Need to tailor NPR 7120/7123/8705.2 early in program formulation• Full complement of design, fabrication and test standards, processes and
requirements need to be defined and negotiated between the project and the institution
• Direct or Perceived role of Technical Authorities critical in option development
3) Certification of Flight Readiness Process a critical driver• CoFR signatories will require more or less insight depending on how this
process is structured.• Need to define CoFR process early-on to guide assignment of accountability• This should be a high priority effort• Factor in lessons learned from OSP
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Forward Work (Continued)
4) Procurement must be structured to enable badge-less government “in-reach” by the insight team and strong financial incentives which shift mission success to the provider and their suppliers as an accountable deliverable
5) Crucial to identify clear goals, objectives, requirements, and vehicle operability (ground and flight operations) constraints early
6) Once the vendor is selected, the early identification of risks (cost, schedule, technical, safety) will drive oversight model FTE requirements
7) Development, prior to provider selection, of a compiled list of pre-declared independent analyses to be performed by the insight team and test verifications that will be reviewed by the insight team.
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