Battle of Rzhev, Summer 1942

Battle of Rzhev, Summer 1942

The Battle of Rzhev in the Summer of 1942 was partof a series of battles that lasted 15 months in the center ofthe Eastern Front. It is known in Soviet history of WorldWar II as the First RzhevSychyovka Oensive Oper-ation, which was dened as spanning from 30 July to 23August 1942. However, it is widely documented that theghting continued undiminished into September and didnot nally cease until the beginning of October 1942.[4]

Rzhev lies 140 miles west of Moscow and was cap-tured by the German Wehrmacht in Operation Typhoonin the autumn of 1941, which took them to the gatesof Moscow. When the Soviet counteroensive drovethem back, Rzhev became a cornerstone of the Germansdefense.[5] By the summer of 1942, the city stood at theapogee of a salient that protruded from the front lines,pointing in the general direction of Moscow. In July andAugust 1942, Stalin tasked two of his Front comman-ders, General Zhukov (commanding Western Front) andGeneral Konev (commanding Kalinin Front), to conductan oensive to recapture Rzhev and strike a blow againstthe German Army Group Center forces that would pushthem away fromMoscow. The attack would fall upon oneof their main opponents of the winter battles, GeneralModels 9th Army, which occupied the majority of theRzhev salient.The two months of struggle left a lasting impression onthe Soviet soldiers who fought there,[6] where they suf-fered massive casualties for little gain,[7] earning the bat-tle the title Rzhev meat grinder. By October, the strategicbalance in the centre of the Eastern Front remained essen-tially unchanged; the German army had suered grievouslosses,[8] and whilst their defence was tactically success-ful, they had achieved little more than maintaining thestatus quo.[7] Although the oensive had failed, Zhukovwas given another chance to crush the Rzhev salient soonafterwards.[9]

1 BackgroundThe closing stages of the Battle of Moscow saw the for-mation of the Rzhev salient. The Soviet counter-oensivehad driven the Wehrmacht from the outskirts of Moscowback more than 100 mi (160 km), and had penetratedthe front of Army Group Centre in numerous places.[10]Rzhev, a strategic crossroads and vital rail junction strad-dling theVolga, became the northern corner post of ArmyGroup Centres left wing. It was the only town of notefor many miles and gave the 9th Army something to hang

The formation of the Rzhev Salient, January 1942

on to, in what otherwise seemed a wilderness of forestand swamp in all directions. The salients existence wasthreatened at the very moment of its creation, when theKalinin Fronts 39th and 29th Armies opened a gap justwest of Rzhev and thrust southwards into the Germanrear.[10] Just managing to keep the encroaching SovietArmies away from the vital rail link into Rzhev, the 9thArmy, now commanded by General Model, managed toclose the Rzhev gap, thereby cutting the Soviet supplylines and reducing their ability to deal a crippling blowto the whole Army group.[11] The Soviet counter-attackhad run out of steam and the Germans recovered enoughto mount several operations to clear up their rear area. InJuly 1942, Operation Seydlitz was mounted to trap anddestroy the two Soviet armies and succeeded in little overa week in doing so, making the Army Group once morean almost credible threat to Moscow.[12]

2 Prelude

2.1 Commanders von Vietingho Konev Model Zhukov

General of Panzer Troops Heinrich von Viet-ingho was senior corps commander in the 9thArmy in June 1942, and temporarily led the Armyat the start of the summer battle, whilst Model was

1

2 2 PRELUDE

on convalescent leave. He later commanded 10thArmy and Army Group C in Italy.[13]

General of Panzer Troops Walter Model hadcommanded 3rd Panzer division at the start ofOperation Barbarossa, and had become commanderof XXXXI Motorised Corps in October 1941.[14]He had shown great resolve in the defensive winterbattles, and was promoted to 9th Army commanderon 12 January 1942.[14] He proved to be a tough sol-dier and a defensive specialist. Respected by Hitler,his star continued to rise, becoming a Field Marshalin March 1944.[15]

Georgy Zhukov was Chief of the General Stawhen the Germans invaded the Soviet Union but,following a disagreement with Stalin concerningthe defense of Kiev, was demoted to command ofthe Reserve Front.[16] He became a troubleshooter,commanding the Leningrad Front in the autumn,and back to Moscow to conduct its defense andcounteroensive. Zhukov remained in the centralsector, and he argued in the spring of 1942 that theMoscow axis was the most critical and that ArmyGroup Center posed the greatest threat to the SovietUnion. To him, the German forces at Rzhev repre-sented a dagger pointed atMoscow[17] Zhukov con-vinced Stalin to give him the extra forces he needed.He commanded Western Fronts attacks until, inthe latter part of August, Zhukov became deputysupreme commander and was transferred to Stalin-grad. Later, he continued to hold the highest com-mands in the Soviet Army, and became aMarshal ofthe Soviet Union in January 1943. Zhukov remainedalways in the thick of the ghting until the very endof the war, commanding the 1st Belorussian Frontin the assault on Berlin, still in rivalry with Konev,who commanded the 1st Ukrainian Front in the nalbattle.[18]

Colonel-General Ivan Konev began the war againstGermany commanding the 19th Army, which be-come encircled around Vitebsk in the rst weeksof the conict.[19] Stalin blamed Konev for the dis-aster but Zhukov intervened and ensured his sur-vival and promotion to Front commander.[19] Hewent on to command Kalinin Front in the winterbattles around Moscow with distinction,[19] and stillcommanded Kalinin Front at the start of the RzhevOperation. When Zhukov was promoted to deputysupreme commander, Konev was given overall re-sponsibility for the continuing oensive.

2.2 Battleeld

In the summer months the climate in the Rzhev area waswarm, with long days and a high sun which allowed thearea to dry out after the spring thaw[20] Rainfall was typi-

The Vazuza River near Sychevka

cally moderate, but the summer months of 1942 had seenunusually heavy and persistent rainfall.Rzhev had at, rolling country, with thick forests andpatches of swamp. The neighborhood of Rzhev had openfarmed land with a dense network of small village com-munities, which were often ribbons of houses along theroadside. The roads were mostly mud tracks that becamealmost impassible in the spring and autumn rains, but nor-mally dried out in summer.Of the Red Armys objectives, the city of Rzhev was byfar the largest, with over 50,000 inhabitants. Zubtsovhad under 5,000; Pogoreloye Gorodishche had but 2,500.Karmanovo, to be the scene of much bitter ghting, wasin reality simply a large village.

Rolling stock in Rzhev station today

The Volga is the longest river in Europe, and in boththe central sector of the Eastern Front at Rzhev and atthe southern sector at Stalingrad, German and Sovietarmies struggled for mastery of its banks. Both Rzhevand Zubtsov straddled the river, which was 130 m wideat this point.[21]

Of major signicance to both attacker and defender weretributaries of the Volga, the Drzha, Gzhat, Osuga, andVazuza Rivers, which ran south to north across the line of

2.3 Opposing forces 3

Railway network in the Rzhev region

the Soviet attack. These were normally docile and ford-able at this time of year, but they had become swollenwith the July rains and had risen to the depth of over 2m. By August they constituted a major impediment toZhukovs Western Fronts attack. His forces would haveto cross the Drzha on the start line and then a further oneor even two ooded rivers to reach their nal objectives.From the German point of view, by far the most im-portant objective was the Viazma-Rzhev rail line,[22] theloss of which would sever their supply line to Rzhev andrender the defense of the whole salient untenable. Alsoimportant from the Soviet perspective was the Zubtov-Shakhovskaya rail line, which ran in the direction of theirintended advance, and could be used to ferry supplies for-ward.

2.3 Opposing forces

2.3.1 German Order of battle

German infantry with MG 34, Army Group Center, 1942

The strength of 9th Army varied considerably during thesummer months, as the Army Group shifted forces be-tween its armies for use in dierent operations and de-fensive commitments. In early July the 9th Army wasreinforced so that it could conduct Operation Seydlitz.It reached a total of 22 divisions, including 4 Panzer di-visions organised in 5 higher corps headquarters.[23] Af-ter the successful conclusion of the operation the Armygroup shifted many of its oensive-capable divisionssouthward for its next planned attack against the Sukhim-chi bulge, leaving the 9th Army at the end of July with 16infantry divisions, organised in 3 Corps, with 14 divisionsin the line, 1 in reserve and another in transit.[23]

Nearly all the divisions of Army Group Center had seenheavy winter ghting, which had sapped away their ght-ing strength. According to rehabilitation reports, becauseof the necessity of holding the line, and the 'unabated in-tensity of defensive ghting',[24] the divisions of ArmyGroup Center could only be partially restored to strength.Theywould have limitedmobility and reduced combat ef-ciency, with the greatest gap being the shortage of motorvehicles and horses.[24]

Following the collapse of its front east of Rzhev, theArmy was rapidly reinforced, but the continual strainof persistent Russian attacks led General Model to de-mand further support. By the end of September, thearmy commanded 25 divisionshalf the army groupstrengthincluding 20 infantry and 4 Panzer, as well asthe Grodeutschland division.[23]

2.3.2 Soviet Order of battle

Stalin and his command group, the Stavka, sought to de-velop strong concentrations of forces which would attackacross narrow sectors with heavy assistance from support-ing arms. For example, Kalinin Front was told to 'createa shock group'[25] of no less than 11 rie divisions and

4 3 BATTLE

3 rie brigades, 8 tank brigades and 10 RGK artilleryregiments.[25] To achieve these high force concentrationsthe Stavka handed over from its reserve to K front, 5 ri-e divisions, 6 tank brigades 2 RGK artillery regimentsof 152mm guns, 4 antitank artillery regiments, and 10M-30 battalions.[25]

Support for the operation was to be on a huge scale. Inan attempt to wrest air superiority from the Germans,Colonel General Alexander Novikov, Commander of theSoviet Air Forces, was told to concentrate 1100 aircraft inthe attack sectors, including 600 ghters.[26] They soughtto smash through the German front by implementingthe idea of 'artillery attack' to maximize repower usingmassed collections of guns, mortars and rocket launch-ers. 30th Army, for example, concentrated 1323 gunsand mortars along its 10 km stretch, achieving a densityof 140 tubes per kilometer.[27] The correlation of infantryin the attack sectors were calculated as between 3-4:1in the 30th, 31st, and 33rd army sectors and about 7:1in 20th and 5th army sectors. Artillery advantage wasoverwhelming with 6-7:1 in all armies except in the 30thwhere it was calculated at 2;1.[28]

Soviet tank crews in training, 1942

The majority of the Soviet tank strength still lay in sep-arate tank brigades that directly supported the infantry.30th Army started the oensive with 9 tank brigadeswith 390 tanks,[28] 31st army had 6 tank brigades with274 tanks, and 20th Army had 5 tank brigades and 255tanks.[29] Behind these Army-level forces were newly cre-ated tank corps, the 6th and 8th to the rear of 20th Army,and 5th Tank Corps behind 33rd Army.The tank corps had been created betweenMarch andMayaround a kernel of existing tank brigades and new menfrom the training establishments. They were suppliedwith the best tanks available, but lacked artillery and sup-port units. Initially, even trucks were in short supply.[30]Although formed around a core of veterans from the win-ter ghting, these units had supported the infantry armiesand were not yet used to independent action, and were notable to fulll their exploitation role.[30] Their leaders wereexperienced commanders, many of whom were cautiousof German armored units from the previous years cam-paigning and tended to overestimate German strength.

3 Battle

3.1 Kalinin Front attacks

The front line, which had not changed in this sector sinceJanuary, had given ample time for Soviet intelligence andplanners to pin point the German forward defenses andplan their destruction or suppression. The situation be-hind the front lines was more sketchy to the attackers, andthe Germans, on Models orders, had not been idle, andhad constructed a secondary line outside of Rzhev and anal belt of defenses on the cities outskirts.[34]

The terrain was in places low and prone to swampiness,with the villages constructed on the higher and drier el-evations. These were turned by the Wehrmacht intostrongholds, and linked by trench lines and defences.They were described by Soviet accounts as having solidmineelds, networks of bunkers, and barbed wire laid outin dense lines. [35] Additionally, the unusually wet sum-mer and continued downpours of late July and Augustgreatly enhanced the defenses, hindering the deploymentof both tanks and artillery for the Russians, who provedunable to bring to bear their superiority in these areas.The distance to Rzhev was 7.5 miles (12 km) which theattacking forces hoped to cover in a rapid advance reach-ing the city in two days and fully occupying it by the third.To accomplish this mission, General Major D. D.Lelyschenko, 30th Army commander, had received mas-sive reinforcements, and had 4 rie divisions lined upalong narrow attack sectors, pointing straight at Rzhev,and a further 2 anking rie divisions who would shovethe shoulders of the German defense aside. Behind thesehe had 2 more rie divisions ready to reinforce the mainattack, and another behind the ank. The 6 rie divisionsin line would strike at the junction of the German 87thand 256th infantry divisions and pierce the defenses alonga 6-mile (10 km) front.[29] Each of the main attacking di-visions was reinforced by a tank brigade and backed by animpressive array of army and front level artillery, as wellas Katyusha rocket launchers. In all, the 30th Army de-ployed 390 tanks, 1323 guns and mortars, and 80 rocketlaunchers for the attack.[29]

3.1.1 30 July 1942

At 6.30 am on 30 July, in the low light of early morning,the 30th Army artillery opened re in a tumultuous roar.The artillery commander of the Kalinin Front, Colonel-General NM Khlebnikov, recalled: The power of reimpact was so great that the German artillery after severalfaltering attempts to answer re with re stopped. Firsttwo positions of the main strip enemy defenses have beendestroyed, troops occupying them - almost completely de-stroyed. [36]

After an hour and a half of bombardment, at 8am, therie divisions attacked. In spite of the sudden onset of

3.1 Kalinin Front attacks 5

Katyusha rocket launches in 1942. These batteries were used inthe nal crescendo of the artillery preparations.

more heavy rain, and with infantrymen sometimes wad-ing through sodden elds with water up to their knees,[36]the attack quickly acquired momentum.The 16th Guards Rie Division in the center overran theforward trenches already in the rst hour, and the for-tied villages of the second position soon after, and by1pm its men were deep in the German rear and alreadyapproaching the village of Polunino, half way to Rzhev.[37] To its right, the 379th and the 111th Rie Divisionsalso smashed into the German front line, penetrating intothe depths and capturing 4 batteries of 87th Divisionalartillery.[38]

The Soviet 30th Army had broken through on a frontnine kilometers and a reached a depth of 4 miles, (7km),[35] but already late on the rst day its spearheadswere brought to a halt by German counter-attacks, andominous signs of the diculties ahead started to appear.In the breakthrough sectors the supporting tanks were lag-ging behind, and many remained mired in the mud; theriemen had come up against prepared German lines, andupon digging in found their trenches immediately lledwith water.[39]

Generalleutnant Danhauser, commanding the German256th Infantry Division, committed his pioneer and re-connaissance battalion in a counter-attack from Poluninoand committed his last reserve, the divisions eld re-placement battalion, to try and ll his open ank. Of hisoriginal front line, anchored by Strong-point Emma nearthe old 256-87 division boundary, nearly all was still inGerman hands in spite of severe pressure from the Sovietanking attack. The 9th Army had reluctantly handedover the 54th Motorcycle Battalion, 14th Motorized Di-visions only reserve, to ll the hole in the 256th Divisionsleft ank.[40]

3.1.2 31 July 6 August 1942

The next morning the Soviet attackers expected to be ableto resume the advance, but had diculties coordinatingtheir various arms. Numerous tank breakdowns reduced

German reinforcements move up in the mud

the numbers of supporting armour to a handful, which leftthem vulnerable to German panzerjager defenses. With-out massed artillery support, the German defensive posi-tions remained intact. The Germans had managed to plugthe gaps with divisional reserves and were now ghtingdesperate battles, hanging on until further help could ar-rive. By evening, battalions from 6th Infantry divisions18th and 58th Infantry Regiments began arriving in thevital central sector around Polunino and a small elevationwest of the village, hill 200. For the Soviets, the day failedto deliver anything except heavy losses. The 16 GuardsRie division begin a series of attacks on the village ofPolunino, which it continued all day, and suered over1000 casualties.[37] As its divisional journal laconicallystated, 'the attack was not successful'.[37] The frontal at-tacks of the 31 July set the pattern for the days to come;Soviet commanders did not have the latitude (or some-times the imagination) to develop exible tactics and of-ten rigidly executed orders from above, even if it meantattacking head on across the same ground for days or evenweeks at a time.[41][42]

By 3 August the Germans were already counting the So-viet losses and wondering how much longer the Sovietformations could keep going. They estimated correctlythat many rie divisions had suered thousands of casu-alties, but also noted signs of newmen arriving to ll someof the depleted ranks.[43] Three days later a frustratedStavka issued a pronouncement, demanding 30th Armyprovide solutions to a variety of perceived problems, in-cluding week leadership, failure to mass tanks and poorammunition supply to the artillery. After the success ofthe rst day, seven days of attacks had achieved nothingand the 30th Army called a halt in order to regroup andreorganize.

3.1.3 1030 August 1942

On 10August the Russians attacked the ank of the 256thwith renewed ferocity. 220th Rie Division, which hadbeen battering away at the suborn defence of the 256thInfantry Division since 30 July and had lost 877 dead and3083 wounded in the rst four days alone, nally cap-

6 3 BATTLE

tured the key village of Belkovo on the 12 August.[44] Itsdivisional commander, Colonel Stanislav Poplavsky, sawthat 'the elds were full with the bodies of the dead.' Theday before, Gilyarovich had received a call from the Frontcommander, Konev, who had suggested the supportingtank brigade be pulled out to lead the next infantry attack.But his attached armour, as in so many other sectors, hadbecome mired in the mud and only four tanks could beextracted.[44]

But in other sectors new rie formations had been broughtup. Strong-point Emma, the vital cornerstone of the de-fence that had held out for two weeks, fell; tanks fromthe Soviet 255 Tank Brigade were roaming unhinderedin its rear.[40] Some German defenders noted that the So-viet tankers were employing new tactics: 'staying out ofthe reach of our anti-tank guns, they systematically shotup every position, which had a demoralizing eect on theinfantry, causing tank-panic.'[45]

The continued Russian tank attacks were in danger ofswamping the defence, but Soviet infantry tactics re-mained crude with dense masses of men rushing for-ward, shouting 'Hurrah'.[45][46][47] Replacements were of-ten thrown directly into battle directly from the trainswithout orientation or any time to get to know their o-cers or their outt.[48]

Model, just returning from convalescent leave, saw thatthe German defence had bent but not completely broken.He issued 'not a step back' orders and funnelled in allavailable reserves, including scratch battle groups throwntogether from troops returning on leave trains.[49] At thesame time, he demanded additional reinforcements fromhigher commands.Red Army losses were catastrophic, but the Germandefenders were also under severe strain. The constantattacks exhausted the troops, and break-ins had to beconstantly driven back by local counterattacks. The481th Infantry Regiment was now reduced to 120 ght-ing troops,[40] mostly attached to battle group Mummert,which was composed of units thrown together from 4 dif-ferent divisions.[40] The antitank (Panzerjger) battalionswere the key to the defence against tanks, but the gunscould not be everywhere. It was common for the infantryto use grenade bundles or mines to deal with tanks over-running their trenches. These attacks required great indi-vidual daring.The gains of the anking attacks, although meagre, didnally open a new opportunity east of Pultuno, whichthe 2nd Guards Rie division was able to exploit. Over-running a sector which ran across swampy and forestedground, the division in three days fought its way throughto the Rzhev aireld on the outskirts of the city. Counter-attacks stabilized the front, and Model allowed the 256thInfantry and 14th Motorised Divisions, whose positionsnow bulged out into Soviet lines, to pull back across theVolgas western bank. The Soviets, now in easy artilleryrange, started to pound the city, which together with air

strikes reduced its buildings to smouldering ruins.[50]

By the end of the month, the stubborn German defenceof Putino came to an end as they nally withdrew underheavy pressure, and took up new defensive positions onthe Rzhev perimeter.[50]

3.2 Western front attacksThe attack by western front, planned for 2 August, wasdelayed by another two days, mainly for the additionaldelays imposed by the abysmal weather. Zhukov plannedto penetrate the line at Pogoreloye Gorodishche, and ad-vance towards the Vazuza river, destroying the defend-ing forces of the XXXXVI Panzer Corps, known as theZubtsov Karmanovo grouping in the process. The frontmobile group, 6th and 8th Tanks Corps and the 2ndGuards Cavalry Corps, would be committed towards Sy-chevka with the 20th Army while the 31st Army co-operated with Kalinin Fronts forces to capture Rzhev.[51]

3.2.1 4 August 1942

Attack of Western Front, 4 August 1942

In the early morning hours of 4 August 1942, GeneralZukov unleashed the Western fronts attack against theRzhev salient. The oensive began with a massive pre-liminary bombardment. A concentration of artillery andmortars along a narrow front rained down shells andbombs on the German positions for nearly one and a halfhours, and was followed by a pause in which Soviet air-craft laid smoke along the front line. But the lull was aruse to lure the German defenders back into their forward

3.2 Western front attacks 7

trenches to suer the nal crescendo, which was toppedo by a volley from Katyusha rocket launchers .[52]

The energy of the re-storm in many places destroyed theGerman wire entanglements, and bunkers and xed posi-tions lay smashed. The attack battalions from the Sovietrie divisions, using rafts, boats and ferries to cross theswollen river Derzha, secured the forward German linewithin an hour and with little loss.[52]

Soviet sappers 1942

Pogoreloye Gorodishche, a battalion stronghold of the161st Divisions 364th Infantry Regiment and one of theSoviet 20th Armys main initial objectives, was quicklyoutanked and then cut o by Soviet infantry. Soon aftermidday, aided by another sharp artillery strike and sup-ported by tanks, Russian riemen stormed into the posi-tion from three directions and overwhelmed the garrison,capturing 87 ocers and men and leaving many moredead.[52]

South of Pogoreloye Gorodishche, the 331st Rie Divi-sion rapidly captured the forward trench line and movedswiftly on to take Gubinka, a village in the secondary line.Until that morning it had been the location of 336 In-fantry Regiments headquarters, which was found aban-doned and strewn with sta documents and discardedequipment. [52] All along the 161st Divisions entire front,its soldiers had been attacked in overwhelming force, itsdefences had crumbled and given way, and its remain-ing soldiers were in full retreat. The 20th and 31st So-

viet Armies had torn a gaping hole in the German front,and by evening their rie divisions and supporting TankBrigades had advanced 5 miles (8 km) into the Germanlines.[52]

The German command were quick to realize the dangersof the new Soviet oensive, and Hitler immediately re-leased ve divisions which had been held in reserve forOperationWhirlwind, the planned attack on the Suchinicibulge. These included 1st, 2nd and 5th Panzer Divi-sions and 102nd and 78th Infantry Divisions.[53] Von Vi-etingho, acting 9thArmy commander, had already com-mitted what reserves he had against the Kalinin Frontsattack and had virtually nothing on hand to stop the newSoviet advance except Army schools, teenage helpers anda few ak guns, which he positioned at strategic points.These were not going to stop Soviet tanks for very long;German defences were wide open until the arrival of thereinforcement divisions.[54]

3.2.2 59 August 1942

Battle of Rzhev - Summer 1942, Soviet Western Front continuesits attack against Army Group Center

On the morning of 5 August, in what Halder termed avery wide and deep penetration,[55] the Soviet Rie Di-visions pushed on into the depth of German positionsagainst negligible opposition. However, as the Sovietcommands began to commit their armoured units for-ward, problems started to emerge.Crossing points along the river Darzha were interdictedby Luftwae attacks and complicated by the high waterand the strong current. The TankCorps were taking hoursto get across even fractions of their forces. The roads,

8 3 BATTLE

saturated by the incessant rains, rapidly deteriorated andwere clogged with trac of all sorts, some of which be-came hopelessly mired in themud and could not move.[56]Re-supply carts, artillery, and tanks were stuck in traf-c jams and became disorganized and disorientated.[52]11th Tank Brigade, part of 20th Army mobile group, be-came lost and only turned up days later ghting in thewrong sector.[57] The accompanying motorcyclists, whowere attached to the Army mobile group, were unable tomove their machines forward, and had to abandon them;the riders advanced instead as ordinary infantry, trudgingslowly forward through the mud.[57]

Nevertheless, 20th Army infantry advanced another 18miles (30 km) and was joined by nightfall by the fore-most parts of both 6th and 8th Tank Corps.[52] Theseforces were approaching the rivers Vazuza and Gzhat, butas light faded on the 5 August they began to make con-tact with fresh enemy units. These came primarily from5th Panzer Division, which had been closest to the break-through area, and had been rushed to the crucial sectornorth of Sychevka, where its forward elements crossedthe Vazuza at Chlepen and fanned out, hurriedly occupy-ing defensive positions.[58]

At the southern corner-post of the breakthrough, 36thMotorized Divisions stubborn defence had been the onlybright spot for 9th Army on the 4 August, but its oppo-nent, the Soviet 8th Guards Rie Corps, had quickly inl-trated forces around the divisions northern ank and intoits rear.[59]

The following day, the Soviets broke through fromthe north with tanks and infantry, swept around andover a battery of divisional artillery, 105mmm how-itzers, and reached the tiny community of Dolgie Ni-wuj, barely a mile and a half from the 36th MotorisedDivisional headquarters in Voskresenskoye (Woskresen-skoje). Generalmajor Gollnick, the divisional comman-der, watched the houses of Dolgie Niwuj go up in amesand started to reorganize his defences to cope with whatwas to be but the rst of a series of crises for the division.

The 2nd Panzer division still operated a large number of obsolete38t tanks, which it had inherited from the departing 7th Panzerdivision

Soviet infantry from the 20th Army was pushing past his

rear towards Kamanovo, but were thwarted by the arrivalof 2nd Panzer Division, which pushed them back and senttanks and Panzer grenadiers to the aid of Gollnick.[59]Meanwhile for the 5th Panzer Division, the 6 Augustproved to be a day of crises. Both of its anks were 'hang-ing in the air', and it was assailed along its entire newly-acquired front by infantry and tanks, some of which brokethrough to harass supply units and artillery positions. 14thPanzer Grenadier Regiment had deployed both its battal-ions in line, only to have them badly mauled. Its 2nd Bat-talion became encircled and had to ght its way out, witha supporting tank company losing 8 tanks fending o at-tacks by T34s which seemed to come from all sides.[60]The intense ghting cost the 5th Panzer Division 285 ca-sualties on this day alone,[58] but limited further Russianadvance to only 2 miles.[52]

Substantial Russian forces were getting forward so that bythe 8 August, the Soviet 20th Army had introduced over600 tanks into its sector.[61] As additional forces fromboth sides joined the battle, the intensity of the ghtinggrew, but the forward momentum of the attackers rstslackened, then stopped. Mounted regiments from 2ndGuards Cavalry Corps reached the river Gzhat, exploit-ing the gap between the 5th and 2nd Panzer Divisions,and were able to ford it and carve out a bridgehead onthe southern bank.[52] Its advance was checked by the ar-rival of 1st Panzer division, which attacked and drove theline back. Likewise, 6th Tank Corps reached and crossedthe Vazuza along with some rie forces, but once across,was met with erce counter-attacks and air-strikes, whichprevented further advance.Soviet diculties persisted. 20th Army found its head-quarters communications not up to the task and had dif-culty coordinating its many rie units and cooperatingwith the fronts mobile group. Because of the ongo-ing logistical problems, resupply was dicult; 8th TankCorps complained of running low on fuel and ammuni-tion, which hindered its operations. 17th tank brigadefound that not enough fuel were getting through to keepall the tanks in action,[62] and artillery was having to beheld back in favour of advancing combat units.On the other side, to prevent a breakthrough, von Viet-ingho was having to throw his infantry and armouredunits piecemeal info to combat immediately upon arrival,but by 8 August, had managed to erect a rm cordonaround the Western Fronts entire penetration.With a breakthrough towards Sychevka looking increas-ingly unlikely in the face of German reinforcements,Zhukov ordered the 20th Army to extract 8th Tank corpsand realign it to the south, to cooperate with renewed5th Army attacks.[61] There was some improvement inthe weather which nally allowed the roads to dry su-ciently to bring up ammunition, and Soviet logistics werefurther improved by the restoration of the rail line as faras Pogoreloye Gorodishche.[52]

8th Tank Corps was still tied up with combat against the

9Battle of Rzhev - Summer 1942, Soviet Western Front continuesits advance against increasing resistance from Army Group Cen-ter

1st Panzer Division and could only extract 49 of its tanksfor the attack.[52] Nevertheless, on August 11, after abrisk artillery preparation, it struck, advanced 3 miles (5km) and captured the village of Jelnia. Its opponent, the2nd Panzer Division, noted 'especially heavy attacks onthat day[63] and had just received a delivery of new PzkwMark IV tanks, which it committed immediately into theghting.[64]

5th Army had only managed to made a shallow dent inthe line on 8 August when its 1st rst attack had beenrapidly halted by German reinforcements, now rejoinedthe struggle to add to the pressure on Zorns XXXXVIPanzer Corps from the east. After this 20th and 5th Armycontinued to attack, grinding a mile or two forward ev-ery day with bitter ghting for every village. The Ger-mans, they complained, were continually developing theirtrench systems, which were backed by concealed mortarand anti-tank gun positions, and protected by mineeldsand booby-trapped obstacles.Finally, on 23 August, Kamanovo fell, after which 20thArmy could get no further against a shortened andstrengthened German line and went over to the defensiveby 8 September[65]

3.2.3 Konev tries again for Rzhev - September 1942

On 26 August Zhukov was appointed DeputyCommander-in-Chief, and transferred to the Stalin-grad front, so command of Western front was handed

to Konev. To keep unied command arrangements,Kalinin Fronts 30th and 29th Armies were subordinatedto Western Front authority.Once he had taken over, Konev saw that 'troops weredwindling in number and shells were few' and called fora halt to reorganize, restock ammunition, repair tanksand aircraft.[65] He decided to launch the 31st and 29thArmies from the south east and 30th again from the northand 'close the encirclement ring around Rzhev'.After its initial breakthrough, 31st Army had achieveda steady but unspectacular advance in its sector againstGerman infantry, pushing them back step by step, andinicting a steady drain on German resources but suer-ing greatly itself. By 23 August it captured one of themain objectives of the oensive, taking the southern halfof Zubtsov. Then, its units reached the river Vazuza andcarved out a shallow bridgehead on the western bank.[29]Konev took the 6th Tank out from 20th Army and put itback in the line just below Zubtsov utilizing 31st Armysbridgehead. The attack was planned for 9 September,when sucient ammunition had been brought up.6th Tank Corps assembled in the forests, and at dawnof the 9th, after a half hours artillery barrage, attackedalong side 31st Army Infantry. Achieving immediate suc-cess it cut through a dilapidated infantry battalion from11th infantry regiment seized 2 villages. Moving on, itcaptured the village of Michejewo, threatening a com-plete breakthrough. After some hesitation and much tele-phoning, Hitler released the Grodeutschland division fora counter-attack.

4 Aftermath

4.1 Losses

The participating Soviet armies suered 290,000 ca-sualties in the Rzhev ghting,[66] a gure that coversthe main army groupings for the period of their oen-sive commitments, but does not cover the independentcorps nor air force losses; overall losses were in excessof 300,000. Some sources, such as some reports fromthe participant armies themselves, give higher gures fortheir casualties than those recorded by the Front.[66]

The rie divisions of the attacking armies had to receiveadditional men to continue to attack due to the high attri-tion rate in men. To maintain the oensive into Septem-ber, Konev requested 20,000 replacements for just twoof the armies involved.[67] By 10 September the Sovietarmies had been decimated: losses had reduced them tohalf-strength, with 184,265 men and 306 tanks[28]

Table of Soviet losses[66]

German losses in the 9th army by 17 August alreadynumbered 20,000.[68] On 1 September, von Kluge ew tothe Fuehrer Headquarters to relay what Model had told

10 5 REFERENCES

him the day before: 9th Army was at the point of col-lapse. Its casualties were up to 42,000 and rising at arate close to 2,000 a day. Hitler promised some modestreinforcements, possibly including the Grodeutschlanddivision. Someone, he stated, must collapse. It willnot be us!"[69]

By mid-September, the German infantry divisions in thethick of the ghting suered had suered up to 4,000casualties, and, in the case of the hard-hit 161st infantrydivision, over 6,000. The Panzer divisions all had lostbetween 1,500 to 2,000 casualties, and most of the tanksthey started the battle with. Overall, the 9th army toll layat above 53,000, including in excess of 1,500 ocers[70]Additionally, in the 3rd Panzer army sector, casualty re-ports for around the time of the Soviet attack list over10,000 losses.[71]

5 References[1] Jentz 2004, p. 236: Total tanks possessed by 1st, 2nd, and

5th Panzer divisions at the end of June early July.

[2] Alfred Price, The Luftwae (World War II Data Book) asof 27.July 1942 (gure in brackets = opperational) Air-craft available to Luftwaen Kommando Ost

[3] Gerasimova 2013, pp. 77-78.

[4] Gerasimova 2013, p. 87.

[5] Forczyk 2006, p. 89.

[6] Gerasimova 2013, pp. 96-99.

[7] Gerasimova 2013, p. 168.

[8] Glantz, Zhukovs greatest defeat, P. 12.

[9] Glantz, Zhukovs greatest defeat, P. 18.

[10] Ziemke, Earl; Bauer III, Moscow to Stalingrad, ChapterVII Hitler And Stalin (Kindle Location 2764). KindleEdition.

[11] Ziemke, Earl; Bauer III, Moscow to Stalingrad, ModelCloses the Rzhev Gap, (Kindle Location 3733). . Kin-dle Edition.

[12] Ziemke, Earl; Bauer III, Moscow to Stalingrad, Chap-ter XX Summer On The Static Fronts, (Kindle Location3733). . Kindle Edition.

[13] Mitcham, The Panzer Legions, P. 67.

[14] Mitcham, Men of Barbarossa, P. 254.

[15] Roberts, Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership

[16] Chaney 1996, p. 122.

[17] Glantz, forgotten battles Vol III, P. 151.

[18] Forczyk 2012, p. 11-55.

[19] Forczyk 2006, p. 19.

[20] Weather data for Rzhev on ru.wikipedia.org (Russian text)

[21] Geographical Dictionary of the World, entry on Volga, P.1938.

[22] see Railway line Lihoslavl - Viazma

[23] Tessin, Verbnde und Truppen der deutschen Wehrma-cht und Waen SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945, 9A Kommandoberhorden, P. 123.

[24] Grant, TheGermanCampaign in Russia, planning and op-erations, P. 130.

[25] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 150.

[26] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 151.

[27] Beshanov, 1942 'Learning', Chapter - 'Rzhev andVyazma', P. 319.

[28] Gerasimova 2013, p. 78.

[29] Beshanov, 1942 'Learning', Chapter - 'Rzhev andVyazma'

[30] Forczyk 2014, p. 171-172.

[31] Besganov, 1942 'training', P.318.

[32] Besganov, 1942 'training', P.332.

[33] Glantz, Forgotten basttles Vol III, P.157.

[34] Newton, Hitlers commander. P. 197.

[35] Isaev, When the surprise was gone, The oensive Northof Rzhev

[36] Gerasimova 2013, p. 80.

[37] Extracts from the journal of hostilities 16th Guards Ri-e Division, July 30 & 31, http://rshew-42.narod.ru/200/diary16.html

[38] Halder War Diary, entry 30 July 1942, P. 649.

[39] LA Sorin, Kondratiev, P. Karintsev, Smirnov, E. Ozhogin. Rzhevskaya war of 1941-1943. / / History of Rzhev.- Rzhev: 2000 - p. 149-222. Chapter 13 'ght in theswamp'

[40] Selz, The Green Regiment, PP. 122 - 132.

[41] Gerasimova 2013, p. 101: Quoted conversation betweenStalin and Antonov

[42] Gorbachevsky 2009, p. 434.

[43] Slaughterhouse, p 209

[44] LA Sorin, Kondratiev, P. Karintsev, Smirnov, E. Ozhogin. Battles of Rzhev from 1941-1943.Chapter 13 'Fight inthe swamp'

[45] Haupt, Battles of Army Group Centre, P. 193.

[46] The battle for hill 200, 3 August, http://rshew-42.narod.ru/200/200.html

[47] Gerasimova 2013, p. 100.

6.2 Russian sources 11

[48] Gorbachevsky 2009, p. 139: Replacements had beenbrought up in rail cars, unloaded and sent into the attackthe same day

[49] Haupt, Army Group Centre, P. 198.

[50] History of Rzhev

[51] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 152.

[52] Sadalov, Oensive operations of the 20th Army

[53] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad,(Kindle Location 8830)

[54] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad, Chapter XX Summer OnThe Static Fronts, Also von Plato, History of 5th PanzerDivision and Stoves, 1 Panzer Division

[55] Burdick 1988, p. 654.

[56] Getman, Tanks go to Berlin

[57] Svetlana, Rzhev Slaughterhouse P.85

[58] von Plato, 5 Panzer Division, PP. 234.237.[59] Conrady, Rshew 1942/1943, PP. 88. - 100.

[60] von Plato, 5 Panzer Division, P 234-237

[61] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, p 156

[62] Yaroslavovna and Chernov, article '70th anniversary' seeexternal reference

[63] Strauss, History of 2nd Panzer Division,

[64] Jentz 2004, p. 243.

[65] Gerasimova 2013, p. 94.

[66] Gerasimova 2013, p. 98.

[67] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 171.

[68] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad (Kindle Locations 8900-8901)

[69] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad, (Kindle Locations 8922-8924).

[70] 9th army report dated 10 September 1942, Geramisovaarchives

[71] http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec42.html

6 Bibliography

6.1 English sources Burdick, Charles (1988). The Halder War Diary,19391942. Presidio. ISBN 978-0891413028.

Chaney, Otto Preston (1996). Zhukov. Universityof Oklahoma Press. ISBN 978-0806128078.

Forczyk, Robert (2006). Moscow 1941: HitlersFirst Defeat. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84603-017-8.

Forczyk, Robert (2012). Georgy Zhukov. OspreyPublishing. ISBN 978-1-84908-556-4.

Forczyk, Robert (2014). Tank Warfare on the East-ern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt. Pen and Sword.ISBN 978-1-78159-008-9.

Gerasimova, Svetlana (2013). The Rzhev Slaughter-house. Helion & Company. ISBN 978-1-908916-51-8.

Glantz, David M. (1999). Forgotten Battles of theGerman-Soviet War Vol. III.

Glantz, David M. (1999). Zhukovs Greatest Defeat:The Red Armys Epic Disaster in Operation Mars,1942. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-0944-4.

Gorbachevsky, Boris (2009). Through the Mael-strom: A Red Army Soldiers War on the EasternFront, 19421945. University Press of Kansas.ISBN 978-0700616053.

Jentz, Thomas L. (2004). Panzerttuppen: Vol 1.Schier Publishing LTD. ISBN 978-0887409158.

Mikhin, Petr (2011). Guns Against the Reich: Mem-oirs of a Soviet Artillery Ocer on the Eastern Front.Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0811709088.

Newton, Steven H. (2005). Hitlers Commander:Field Marshal Walther Model, Hitlers Favorite Gen-eral. Da Capo Press Inc. ISBN 978-0306813993.

Ziemke, Earl F. (1987). Moscow to Stalingrad. Cen-ter of Military History, United States Army,. ISBN9780880292948.

6.2 Russian sources

Beshanov, Vladimir (2008). Year 1942 - 'Learning'.Eksmo, Yauza. ISBN 5699302689.

Getman, Andrei (1973). Tanks go to Berlin. Mili-tary. publishing house of the Ministry of Defense ofthe USSR,. ASIN B007WVFFNW.

Isaev, Aleksey Valerevich (2006). (When the ele-ment of surprise was lost). EKSMO, Jauza. ISBN978-5699119493.

SANDAL0V, L.M. (1960). Oensive operations ofthe 20th Army of the Western Front in August 1942.Military publishing house of the Ministry of De-fense of the USSR,.

12 7 EXTERNAL LINKS

6.3 German sources Haupt, Werner (1983). Die Schlachten Die Mitteder Heeresgruppe. Aus der Sicht der Divisio-nen. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag GmbH. ISBN 978-3895555886.

Stoves, Rolf (1961). 1. Panzer-Division 19351945. Podzun. ASIN B0000BOBMM.

Strauss, Franz J (2005). Die Geschichte der 2.(Wiener) Panzer-Division. Drer Verlag GmbH.ISBN 978-3895552670.

Selz, Barbara (1970). Das Grne Regiment Der Wegder 256.Infanterie-Division aus der Sicht des Regi-mentes 481. Kehrer. ASIN B0000BUNXD.

Detlev von Plato, Anton (1978). Geschichte der 5.Panzerdivision (1938 bis 1945). Walhalla und Prae-toria Verlag Regensburg. ISBN 978-3927292208.

Gromann, Horst (1987). Rshew, Eckpfeiler derOstfront. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag GmbH. ISBN 978-3790901269.

Conrady, Alexander. Rshew 1942/1943. ASINB002HLXFZW.

7 External links German 10 day casualty reports listed by Army Articles about the Rzhez battles (Russian Text) The battle for hill 200 Article On the 70th anniversary of the Pogorelov-Gorodyshchenska and Rzhev-Sychevsky operationsin 1942. (Russian text)

Journal of hostilities - 16th Guards Rie Division -07/30/42 to 08/22/42

13

8 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses8.1 Text

Battle of Rzhev, Summer 1942 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rzhev%2C_Summer_1942?oldid=674017417 Contrib-utors: Llywrch, Pluke, Hohum, Ian Lancaster, Bgwhite, Buckshot06, MisterBee1966, Christwelfwww, Gbawden, Sturmvogel 66, Yobot,AnomieBOT, FrescoBot, Zawed, BG19bot, Ymblanter, Robevans123, Yura2404, Jonas Vinther, KevinNinja, Kges1901, Generalization-sAreBad and Anonymous: 6

8.2 Images File:Battle_of_Rzhev_-_5_August_1942_-_Western_Front_continues_attack.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/

commons/5/58/Battle_of_Rzhev_-_5_August_1942_-_Western_Front_continues_attack.jpg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Ownwork Original artist: Christwelfwww

File:Battle_of_Rzhev_-_6-9_August_1942_-_Western_Front_continues_advance.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f2/Battle_of_Rzhev_-_6-9_August_1942_-_Western_Front_continues_advance.jpg License: CC BY-SA 4.0Contributors: Own work Original artist: Christwelfwww

File:Battle_of_Rzhev_-_Situation_Map_-_4_August_1942_-_Western_Front_Attacks.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/Battle_of_Rzhev_-_Situation_Map_-_4_August_1942_-_Western_Front_Attacks.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: Created in Photoshop Original artist: Christwelfwww

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-265-0037-10,_Russland,_Panzer_38t.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-265-0037-10%2C_Russland%2C_Panzer_38t.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This imagewas provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. TheGerman Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalizationof the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Bieling

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-269-0219-24,_Russland,_Soldaten_auf_nasser_Strasse.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/09/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-269-0219-24%2C_Russland%2C_Soldaten_auf_nasser_Strasse.jpg License: CCBY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negativeand/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Bhmer

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-B21964,_Russlandfeld,_Soldaten_mit_MG.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3f/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-B21964%2C_Russlandfeld%2C_Soldaten_mit_MG.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contribu-tors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperationproject. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. thedigitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Lachmann

File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Originalartist: ?

File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax

File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag ofthe Soviet Union.svg.

File:RIAN_archive_303890_A_battery_of_Katyusha_during_the_1941-1945_Great_Patriotic_War.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/RIAN_archive_303890_A_battery_of_Katyusha_during_the_1941-1945_Great_Patriotic_War.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIANovosti archive, image #303890, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#303890Original artist: Zelma /

File:RIAN_archive_67318_Soviet_sappers.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/RIAN_archive_67318_Soviet_sappers.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIA Novosti archive, image #67318, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#67318 35 mm lm / 35 Original artist: Lander /

File:RIAN_archive_90027_Gun_Crew_Moves_to_New_Positions.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/RIAN_archive_90027_Gun_Crew_Moves_to_New_Positions.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIA Novosti archive, image#90027, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#90027 35 mm lm / 35 Original artist: Lander /

File:Railway-osm-likhoslavl-vyazma.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Railway-osm-likhoslavl-vyazma.png License: CC BY-SA 2.0 Contributors: http://openstreetmap.org Original artist: OpenStreetMapcontribtors

File:Rschew_1942.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Rschew_1942.jpg License: Public domain Con-tributors: Own work Original artist: Graf zu Pappenheim

File:Rzhev-I_station.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/06/Rzhev-I_station.jpg License: CC0 Contribu-tors: Own work Original artist: Drozdov VA

File:T34_tanks.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/T34_tanks.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:http://www.avalanchepress.com/ThirdGuardsTankArmy.php Original artist: fotoreporter sovietico sconosciuto

File:Vazuza,_Sychyovka.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/Vazuza%2C_Sychyovka.jpg License: CCBY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Kastey

File:Wikibooks-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Wikibooks-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: Own work Original artist: User:Bastique, User:Ramac et al.

14 8 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Wikinews-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Wikinews-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: This is a cropped version of Image:Wikinews-logo-en.png. Original artist: Vectorized by Simon 01:05, 2 August 2006 (UTC)Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use ocial Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded bySimon.

File:Wikiquote-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Wikiquote-logo.svg License: Public domainContributors: ? Original artist: ?

File:Wikisource-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: Rei-artur Original artist: Nicholas Moreau

File:Wiktionary-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ec/Wiktionary-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

8.3 Content license Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0

BackgroundPreludeCommandersBattlefieldOpposing forcesGerman Order of battleSoviet Order of battle

BattleKalinin Front attacks30 July 194231 July 6 August 19421030 August 1942

Western front attacks4 August 194259 August 1942Konev tries again for Rzhev - September 1942

AftermathLosses

ReferencesBibliographyEnglish sourcesRussian sourcesGerman sources

External linksText and image sources, contributors, and licensesTextImagesContent license