Barry H. Steiner, Diplomacy and International Theory

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Diplomacy and International TheoryAuthor(s): Barry H. SteinerReviewed work(s):Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 493-509Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097934 .

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Review of International Studies (2004), 30, 493-509 Copyright ? British International Studies AssociationDOI: 10.1017IS0260210504006199

Diplomacy and international theoryBARRY H. STEINER*

Abstract. Diplomacy has long been neglected as a preoccupation of international theory. Torepair this deficiency, this essay focuses upon bargaining over interstate disputes and makestwo distinctions. One is between diplomacy as independent and as dependent variable.

Analysis of diplomacy as independent variable studies diplomatic practice as causal influence,as when overcoming pressures that increase the danger of war or deadlock. This perspective isimportant for developing a diplomatic 'point of view'. Dependent diplomacy analysis ispreoccupied with constraints upon diplomatic statecraft and with adaptation to them. Asecond distinction is between negotiated bargaining, to reconcile divergent state interests, and

non-negotiated bargaining that converges upon common interests between states. The essaydwells upon the link between independent diplomacy and negotiated bargaining, on onehand, and dependent diplomacy and convergent bargaining, on the other.

No area of world politics has reflected a greater gap between experience and theorythan diplomatic statecraft. This has placed students of diplomatic statecraft increasingly out of phase with other international relations analysts who have aimed atcontrolled comparisons, broader explanation, and cumulative insights. There are avariety of reasons for this condition.

First, students of diplomacy have not been theoretically oriented. They havestressed its extreme variability, and consequently the difficulty of reaching empiricalgeneralisations. 'Of all the branches of human endeavour', Harold Nicolson wrotein support of this view, 'diplomacy is the most protean'.1 Second, those mostcommitted to comprehensive international theory have excluded diplomacy fromtheir generalisations on the grounds that it is too uncertain and unpredictable. Forexample, John Mearsheimer, a prominent neorealist theorist, criticises multipolarsystems because in them 'coalition strength would depend heavily on vagaries ofdiplomacy'.2 A third reason for the failure to study diplomacy theoretically is that

* This article is a revision of a presentation made to the 41st Annual Meeting of the InternationalStudies Association, Los Angeles, California, on 15March 2000.1 am indebted for helpful commentsto Kenneth Waltz, Richard Betts, Patrick Morgan, and two anonymous reviewers.1Cited in William C. Olson, The Theory and Practice of International Relations, 9th edn. (EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), pp. 122f.

Works on negotiation and diplomacy include Adam Watson, Diplomacy (Philadelphia, PA: ISHIPublications, 1986); Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches inHistory, Theory, andPolicy (New York: Free Press, 1979); I.William Zartman (ed.), The 50% Solution (Garden City, NY:Doubleday, 1976); I.William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (NewHaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell (eds.),Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation, special issue of The Annals, 42 (November

1995); I.William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict:Methods and Techniques (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); RogerFisher et al., Coping with International Conflict (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997); Janice

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Diplomacy and international theory 495

specialised actors. Analysis of diplomacy as dependent variable also focuses on thedegree to which diplomatic practice adapts to these constraints. Nicolson's idea of'protean' diplomacy presumably incorporates the potential of diplomats and their

governments to adapt to political, military, and economic changes affecting the fateof diplomatic initiatives. On the other hand, Morgenthau, critiquing the effects ofideological inflexibility and militarisation on Cold War diplomacy in the latter halfof the twentieth century, was more pessimistic about diplomacy's adaptive potential.

By contrast, diplomacy constitutes an independent variable when diplomats push fordispute management in opposition to pressures that increase the chances of war.When Morgenthau praised the qualities of nineteenth century European diplomatsfor their ability to prevent war between major powers, and argued for taking thecrusading spirit out of diplomacy and for accommodating on secondary questions,7he had inmind diplomacy as independent variable.A second distinction is between negotiated and non-negotiated types of bargaining.8 Diplomacy is negotiated when the interests of states cannot be fully reconciled,and explicit bargaining is required to reveal the area of agreement. For example,

Hedley Bull notes that the problem for diplomacy is that 'states have differentinterests, and . . . common interests have first to be identified by a process of

bargaining before any question of maximization of them can arise'.9 Adam Watsonhas more generally defined diplomacy as 'negotiation between political entitieswhich acknowledge each other's independence'.10 On the other hand, even when thewill or opportunity to negotiate is absent, and when it is not explicit, bargaining canconverge upon and underscore common interests between states, avoid misunderstandings, highlight the potential for communication between adversaries, and definepractical steps to strengthen the harmony of interests. Non-negotiated bargaining iscritical for international norms of behaviour. Convergence is stimulated either byshifts in national interest or by new opportunities to recognise those shifts. Anexample of the former is the r?int?gration of France into the international system,and agreement on holding periodic consultative meetings between highly-placedgreat-power officials, in the era after the defeat of Napoleon. The latter is illustratedby the reconciliation between the United States and China in the early 1970s on thebasis of their common opposition to the Soviet Union.As these distinctions are elaborated upon in this essay, a preliminary conclusion isthat independent diplomacy is especially highlighted in explicit, negotiated bargaining, whereas dependent diplomacy ismore common when bargaining is convergent.

However, the theorist must be alert to other logical possibilities: negotiationfrequently takes place under sharp constraint, and independent diplomacy can behighly significant, as Hitler and Napoleon showed, when a state employs international norms to weaken them.

7Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 446-7, 534-44.8 The distinction between the two kinds of diplomacy was suggested to the present writer by Milton J.Esman. See Esman, 'Political and Psychological Factors in Ethnic Conflict', in Joseph V. Montville(ed.) Conflict and Peacemaking inMultiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1991),pp. 60-62.9 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 177.10Watson, Diplomacy, p. 33.


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496 Barry H. Steiner

The essay also uses independent and dependent diplomacy to define a diplomatic'point of view', using it to evaluate the world politics literature and to raise questionsthat additional theoretically-oriented work can focus upon. Such a viewpoint needsto be further developed and legitimised.

Diplomacy as dependent variable

Diplomacy as dependent variable refers to the consequences of specified constraintsfor the ability of states to cope diplomatically with disputes with other states.Constraints have effects either as possibilities, with some courses of action mademore difficult or impossible by the constraints and others easier to accomplish ornewly possible; or as probabilities that, because of changes in the environment,specified courses of diplomatic action will be taken and others excluded.11To illustrate the use of diplomacy as dependent variable, we study here theassertion that the norms of classical European diplomacy, dating from theeighteenth century, have had a declining impact upon state behaviour for sometime because of intervening modern developments. The classical norms included(1) preserving five great powers in Europe; (2) limiting wars by restrictingcommanders in the field; and (3) limiting the ambitions of states by strengtheningthe balance of power.12 Gordon Craig and Alexander George argue in their studyForce and Statecraft that, beginning about 1890, a 'diplomatic revolution' wascaused by changes in technology, in the public's effect upon diplomacy anddiplomats, in the intrusion of complex and technical economic issues into worldpolitics, and in the rise of ideologically-motivated leaders. They maintain thatthese developments, taken together, weakened diplomats' and governments'commitments to the older diplomatic norms, lessened diplomatic flexibility, andcontributed to intensified war and conflict.13

In showing how the dependent variable - the diplomatic ability to defuse confrontations - has been affected by the diplomatic revolution, Craig and George note thatcrisis management has been complicated by modern difficulties of controlling alliedmilitary forces, of slowing down the tempo of military action, of coordinating

11 I am indebted here to World Politics: A Menu for Choice, by Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, 5th edn.(New York: WH. Freeman, 1996), pp. 20-21.12Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft, 3rd edn. (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1995), p. x.13The full statement of the theory is as follows: 'The diplomatic revolution eroded both the conditionsand norms that supported the classical European system. Developments in technology and sciencerevolutionized transportation, communications, and the art of warfare; the emergence of masspolitical parties and of special interest groups rendered domestic peace more precarious and made it

more difficult for governments to pursue coherent and consistent policies as in the past; and the riseof new ideologies and extreme forms of nationalism tended to increase international friction anddispute. As the international community became more conflict-prone, the homogeneity of thediplomatic community deteriorated. As the new technologies of war became more difficult to control,diplomats and statesmen lost faith in the norms, procedures and modalities that had maintained theflexibility and viability of the balance-of-power system in the past. Increasingly also foreign affairsfell into the hands of popularly-elected heads of state who were more sensitive to the currents ofdomestic politics and public opinion.' Ibid., p. 286.


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military and diplomatic moves, and of countering incentives for pre-emptive militaryaction and military solutions. The well-known case of the outbreak of the FirstWorld War illustrates all four of these problems. Itmight be hypothesised that, as a

consequence of these same problems, the diplomatic revolution rendered diplomatsand governments less able to defuse crisis by peaceful means. If so, a largerproportion of confrontations between great powers in the twentieth century wouldhave ended in war than during the classical period. Craig and George supply anhistorical overview that seems to disconfirm this hypothesis. They note how 'theprincipal powers were engaged in almost continuous warfare against each other'during the classical period of the eighteenth century.14 And in the Cold War periodtwo hundred years later, by the time the diplomatic revolution had presumably takenroot, successful crisis management became a hallmark of Soviet-American relations.Soviet-American peace persisted during more than forty years of dangerous ColdWar conditions, during which - according to Craig and George - the internationalsystem was normatively focused upon mutual superpower concern about crisis

management to prevent a Third World War.To hypothesise a link between the diplomatic revolution and peace or war is tounderstand the variance in the dependent variable in terms of crisis outcomes. Sucha link, if established, would display the impact of the diplomatic revolution on crisis

management in its strongest form. But if the diplomatic revolution is not clearlyrelated to crisis outcomes, itmight nevertheless affect diplomacy by introducing suchpressures as war deadlines, loss of flexibility, and multiple channels of communication. Itmight be hypothesised that these pressures made crisis more dangerous butdid not predetermine crisis outcomes.To state the relationship between the diplomatic revolution and the process ofinteraction between governments in this weaker form is to place the focus upon theresponse of diplomats and governments to the newer pressures. One possibleresponse was diplomatic passivity; that is to say, diplomats and governments werebewildered by the pressures and unable or unwilling to adapt to them. The rapiditywith which the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in July 1914 was followedby the outbreak of major war might suggest such bewilderment. When Morgenthaudescribed diplomacy during Soviet-American Cold War as 'obsolete',15 he seemed toaccept that same position. However, even if war took place as the consequence ofnew crisis pressures, this is insufficient to support the conclusion that diplomaticnorms and efforts were insignificant. According to Richard N Lebow, the mostremarkable feature of German decision-making in 1914 was the great difficultyGerman leaders experienced in going to war;16 that difficulty can be reconciled witholder system norms. Furthermore, passivity can only explain successful crisis

management with reference to fortuitous circumstances. With reference to the recordof successful Soviet-American crisis management, neither fortuitousness nor the fearof nuclear war are adequate explanations.

14Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, 16.15 See fn. 3.16Richard N. Lebow, 'Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?', in Steven E. Miller(ed.), Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1985, p. 167.


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Craig and George for their part reject such an assumption of diplomatic passivityin this context. They instead conclude - much less pessimistically than the full outline of the theory suggests - that 'The diplomatic revolution has both complicatedand aided the ability of statesmen to confine military moves in a crisis to those thatconstitute clear demonstrations of their resolve and are appropriate to their limitedobjectives' (emphasis added).17 Statesmen are aided, they observe, by the availabilityof more sophisticated intelligence resources providing clearer means for topdecision-makers to evaluate the opposing side's military moves. Instead of being anunalloyed negative constraint, technology serves as an opportunity for leaders tocompensate for the military and political conditions impairing their freedom ofaction. Such a conclusion, which helps explain repeated Soviet-American success incrisis management, raises an analytical dilemma for those studying diplomacy asdependent variable. On one hand, emphasis upon the strength of constraints andupon the resulting weakness in the dependent variable should not lead to theassumption that the latter is informed by passivity alone. On the other hand, themore that diplomacy is conceived of as adapting to or compensating for constraintsin the international environment, the less problematic for international stabilitythose constraints appear to be.

Craig and George appear to be of two minds on this subject. In their overview ofinternational history, their focus - consistent with the diplomatic revolution - is withdiplomacy increasingly at bay, impeded in accomplishing what it had notablyachieved in the nineteenth century, namely, peaceful accommodation of majordisputes. The puzzle here is that diplomacy does remain effective during crisesdespite the rising constraints. The ability of diplomats and governments to adaptand to take advantage of new-found opportunities seems to be part of the answer tothis puzzle. However, establishing the impact of the diplomatic revolution will bemore difficult when account is taken of opportunities as well as limitations affectingdiplomatic behaviour, because the channels of influence to be accounted for are

more numerous.By contrast, in that portion of Force and Statecraft inwhich the overall concern isto apply knowledge to statecraft, so as to increase the chances of successful crisis

management (among other goals), Craig and George focus upon opportunitiesavailable to states, and especially upon information about how policies have andhave not worked in the past. This approach highlights how shifts in internationaldevelopments may be less important for crisis management than are the willingnessand ability of policymakers to learn from their past mistakes. Here the puzzle is howpolicymakers learn to overcome international constraints, and why they do or do notdo better on the learning curve. The puzzle is resolved by the discovery, throughnarrower, case-focused analysis, of policy-relevant commonalities and differencesappearing in a variety of cases. Craig and George in fact argue in this connection formore limited, case-grounded theory, rather than for more complex and broaderpropositions such as that of the diplomatic revolution.18

17Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 224. Emphasis added.18 Ibid., pp. 153-63. Such an approach is also advocated by George in 'Case Studies and TheoryDevelopment'.


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Diplomacy as independent variable

Martin Wight understands diplomacy as an independent variable when, contrastingthe inevitability of war in general and the preventability of particular wars, heargues that the difference between them is explainable by diplomatic statecraft. 'It isthe task of diplomacy', he writes, 'to circumvent the occasions of war, and to extendthe series of circumvented occasions; to drive the automobile of state along a oneway track, against head-on traffic, past infinitely recurring precipices'.19 In thenineteenth century, as in the mid-twentieth, the importance of independent diplomatic action was directly associated with the magnitude of the threat of great-powerwar. And while diplomacy was certainly employed as itwas earlier for propaganda,deception and gamesmanship, its greater importance was to counter the prevailingtide of conflict at the time of the greatest need. The crisis management dimension ofdiplomacy in particular can be fully examined, it appears, only by understandingdiplomacy as an independent variable - that is to say, the use of statesmanship tocounter the drift to war, rivalry, and mistrust - by reaching cooperative arrangements in spite of those tendencies.If diplomacy 'circumvents occasions', then intrinsic gain in agreement is lesscritical than avoiding a breakdown of discussions. The larger the risks and dangersof such a breakdown, and the more unacceptable therefore a diplomatic failure, themore understandable is the focus upon diplomacy as independent variable. Despitetreating diplomacy as a dependent variable in relation to the diplomatic revolution,Craig and George appear to treat it as an independent variable in relation to therequirements of successful crisis management, in which the consequences ofdiplomatic failure could mean highly destructive warfare. 'If catastrophe is to beavoided', they write in relation to superpower confrontation, 'decision makers in acrisis must be capable of functioning at a very high level'.20 They justify thisconclusion primarily by the scale of the effort required to restrain armed forcesplaced on war-readiness levels. Of seven crisis management requirements Craig and

George set forth, four relate entirely to military restraint - irrespective of diplomaticoptions. Without such restraint, the most active diplomatic posture designed topreserve peace will be inadequate. However, the distinction between passive andactive diplomacy has a bearing on Craig and George's conclusion even if militaryrestraint is practised. They recognise the importance of diplomatic efforts: one oftheir rules provides for reconciling diplomatic and military moves; a second entails'diplomatic-military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek a

military solution'; and a third entails choosing 'diplomatic-military options thatleave the opponent a way out of the crisis'.21 On the latter two points they citegrounds for optimism: (1) because of the widespread fear of annihilating warfare,'The current generation of policy makers in the industrialized world is likely toexplore every possible avenue of negotiation rather than resort to force'; and (2)

19Martin Wight, Power Politics, eds. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes & Meier,1978), p. 137.20 Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 227.21 Ibid., p. 216. The quotations in the next sentence are also ibid., pp. 225-6.


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because of advances in communication and transportation, governments are betterenabled to 'separate] the opponent's fundamental interests from his rhetoric'.However, these last points appear to underestimate the difficulties of initiating anactive diplomacy under time-urgent, highly pressured conditions. In particular, the

problem of finding a peaceful solution to crisis is likely to be complicated by thecircumstances in which the crisis has arisen: most modern-day crises occur becauseof some diplomatic failure brought about by faulty reading of the opponent'sintentions. As Robert Jervis has noted, upon the onset of crisis the credibility of theopponent and of one's own country will be in question.22 Yet questioning the valueof trusting the adversary will likely prevent a government from 'exploring everypossible avenue of negotiation'. Instead, it can be expected to contribute to selectivediplomatic outlooks, and to retard the willingness to take advantage of communication links compromised by prior misunderstanding. Moreover, trust betweenadversaries may be paradoxically harder to re-establish during crisis when diplomatsmove 'against the flow', so to speak. In short, apart from military restraint, defusingcrisis may require an improbable, even unnatural, transcending of the prevailingpolitical environment.

While independent diplomacy is frequently reflected in frantic and uphill effortsto prevent war, it is also evident in efforts to shape the terms of defection and war.Diplomatic behaviour can affect military realities by (1) increasing or decreasing thefrustration level for which defection is a response; (2) adding to the dependenceupon diplomatic as opposed to military channels; and (3) itself becoming anindispensable means of facilitating defection. With respect to the first of these,numerous cases exist in which the will to defect is conditioned on some preliminary

diplomatic programme. In 1941, for example, the Japanese naval staff postponed itsattack against Pearl Harbor to permit Japanese diplomats inWashington additionalopportunity to work out a territorial arrangement with the United States over theFar East that would make the attack unnecessary. Only when additional discussionsfailed to break the deadlock did the naval staff proceed with its war plans.23 TheSoviet Union went still further as it prepared for war in Afghanistan in 1979: inOctober 1979, it 'telegraphed its intentions to intervene' to the United States so as togauge American reactions. American failure to protest may well have been taken bythe Soviets as evidence that the United States had no objection to the intervention.24In these cases, the decision to defect is linked either to confirmation of an unfavourable diplomatic reality, or to obtaining some favourable one in which certaingoals will not be damaged by the defection.

Second, diplomacy can affect military conditions, not by utilitarian diplomaticdemands, but by a process that can flourish as a substitute for defection - what

22 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1970), p. 95. One reason for this may be that leaders trust their adversary state opponents too

much, presuming the latter would not precipitate a confrontation.For a study concluding that too much trust was a cause of the Cuban missile crisis, see Albert andRoberta Wohlstetter, 'Controlling the Risks in Cuba', Adelphi Paper no. 17 (London: Institute ofStrategic Studies, April 1965).23 Gordon W Prange, The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 368-9.For helpful analysis of this and related issues, I am indebted to unpublished work by Sutee Ketsiri.24 Edward Jay Epstein, 'Secrets from the CIA Archive in Teheran', Orbis, 31 (Spring 1987), pp. 39^10.


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George Kennan has termed 'that cushion of safety that normally existed in theability of governments to talk with one another over the diplomatic channel'.25 Thispoint weakens the relevance for world politics of the much-studied prisoners'dilemma game, which has been adduced in recent decades to explain how, withoutcommunication, defection occurs as mutual suspicions override incentives to cooperate, even in an alliance relationship that otherwise encourages cooperation.From the diplomatic point of view, on the other hand, the decision of states todefect, or to act to exclude each other from the game, is likely to depend on acalculation of whether mutually beneficial outcomes can be obtained, a calculationthat logically requires taking account of existing diplomatic channels.26 There is no apriori reason to assume that states should invariably behave as if communicationbetween them were relatively unimportant or inconsequential, and be compelled, forlack of it, to allow for a condition to develop in which they are required to decideonce and for all whether to defect.27 In addition, the perceived value of the predefection relationship needs to be taken into account by those who emphasise theimportance of defection; if it is not, the importance of defection is deflated. The

question, 'Defection from What?' though coloured by military developments, directsattention as well to the perceived importance of the diplomatic cushion.Finally, diplomacy can itself be a tool of defection. For example, the illusion of a

cooperative Nazi-Soviet framework was critical to Hitler's strategy of defeating theRussians by surprise attack in 1941. Hitler was required to offer Stalin still morefavourable terms than those contained in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 -indeed, virtually any terms that Stalin asked for, in order to establish the cover of theGerman-Soviet alliance.28 In such cases, the underestimate of defection rather thanthe objective danger of defection is the key condition. '[D]ecision makers underestimate the ability of others to defect', Jervis has written, 'and therefore frequentlybelieve, incorrectly, that they can get away with some exploitation ... [They havethought] they could safely act against the other side's interests because they exaggerated the constraints inhibiting the rival's retaliation'.29

25 Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 139.26 To be sure, the formal diplomatic potential can be totally neglected. George Kennan refrained fromany contact at all with Stalin for nearly a year when serving as ambassador in the Soviet Union in1953 and 1954. And, prior to the Seven Years War in 1756, British and French leaders, assumingthat their opposite counterparts did not want war over their relative empires inNorth America, didnot question each other's pacific intent. So confident were they of peace, that when reports offighting inMaine and the Ohio Valley reached London and Paris, the governments rejectednegotiations, preferring to probe their opponents' intentions with force. The two countries decidedto embark upon limited war while maintaining 'cordiality ... at all cost', since they wished toimpress rather than destroy each other. Because of their political and diplomatic optimism, they

played down the urgency of the crisis, and the outstanding issues were never really discussed.Patrice Louis-Ren? Higonnet, 'The Origins of the Seven Years' War', Journal of Modern History,40 (March 1968), p. 78.27 The case inwhich 'the urge to preempt. . .could become a dominant motive if the character of

military forces endowed haste and initiative with a decisive advantage' is incisively discussed inSchelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 227ff.28 Peter Karsten, 'Response to Threat Perception: Accommodation as a Special Case', inKlaus Knorr(ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence, KS: University Press of

Kansas, 1976), pp. 123^1.29 Robert Jervis, 'Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation', World Politics, 40 (April 1988),pp. 338-9.


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Bargaining over divergent and incompatible interests

The case for treating diplomacy as an independent variable ismost compelling whendivergent interests of states in conflict must be taken into account tomanage a crisis.

Wight's view that diplomacy must 'circumvent the occasions of war' suggests thatany bargain that is struck will be viewed differently by the participants because theirinterests and expectations are likely to be different and perhaps irreconcilable.Bargaining may be impeded by a lack of clarity about the adversary's interests, since,as Charles Lockhart has remarked, prior to crises states 'do not adequately recognizeone another's interests, or . . .misperceive that others are able and willing to supportthese interests.30 In such cases, crisis management requires clarifying the adversaries'interests for each other. At the Congress of Berlin, a high-water diplomatic achievement, diplomacy is said to have been facilitated by the fact that peace was morethreatened by the absence of clearly defined objectives than by major incompatibilityof state interests.31 Mediation by Henry Kissinger and later by Jimmy Carter to

manage Israeli-Egyptian conflict over the Sinai also illustrates the importance ofclarifying the opponents' interests for each other.Goals can be clarified under time constraints, if the diplomacy is not tooambitious. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, a 'least effort' agreement inprinciple was reached relatively quickly, inwhich the Soviet Union agreed to removeits missiles from Cuba, in exchange for an American agreement not to invade Cubaand private assurances that American intermediate-range missiles in Turkey wouldbe removed.32 'Least effort' agreement seems particularly desirable when the risks of

miscalculation and of inadvertent war are high - that is,when military preparationsof war must be made, but where the preparing country is not in a position to gaugehow itsmilitary moves are perceived by its adversary.Divergent interests thus need not, in themselves, impede the chances of bargain

ing agreement. Divergent interests stimulate bargaining, because as the parties havecontrasting assessments of the value of agreement they are prepared to exchangebenefits more valued by the other party for benefits more valued by themselves.33 'It

may even be easier', Roger Fisher has written, 'to reach a peaceful settlement if theparties do not see things the same way, but rather see things differently'.34Opposed to those highlighting the potential of diplomatic activism to managecrises are others who view diplomatic activism as a major cause of confrontationsthat constrain diplomats. This second viewpoint emphasises the dangerousness of

30 Charles Lockhart, Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979),p. 141.31 According toWN. Medlicott, '[I]t is probably true to say that the absence of clearly definedobjectives provided a more serious threat to the peace of Europe [at the time of the Congress ofBerlin] than any real incompatibility between the ultimate aims of Austria, England, and Russia'. TheCongress of Berlin and After, 2nd edn. (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1963), p. 4.32 For diplomatic conflict management of the Cuban missile crisis, see Raymond L. Garthoff,Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, revised edn. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,

1989), pp. 97ff.33 This is known as Homan's theorem; see Zartman and Berman, The Practical Negotiator, p. 13.34 Fisher et al., Coping with International Conflict, p. 47. Zartman and Berman (The PracticalNegotiator, pp. 175-6) point out that it is in the details of negotiation that this statement is

illustrated.


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Diplomacy and international theory 503interstate confrontations promoted by the hard bargaining of governments in

dispute. The danger is of a loss of control that can lead to war despite thedetermination of the parties to avoid it, and the hard bargaining reflects inflexibleobjectives. Thomas Schelling conceives of states ascontinually engaged in demonstrations of resolve, tests of nerve, and explorations forunderstandings and misunderstandings . . . through a diplomatic process of commitment thatis itself unpredictable. . . .The resulting international relations often have the character of acompetition in risk-taking, characterized not so much by tests of force as by tests of nerve.Particularly in the relations between major adversaries...issues are decided not by who canbring the most force to bear in a locality, or on a particular issue, but by who is eventuallywilling to bring more force to bear or able to make it appear that more is forthcoming.35

Perhaps the most famous example of a demonstration of resolve that diplomatscould not successfully manage was the crisis that preceded the First World War.Positional concerns were then compounded by prior commitments and the strengthof national will, ruling out flexibility. 'The game of power politics, if really playedhard', Kenneth Waltz argued more generally in reference to multipolarity, 'pressesthe players into two rival camps, though so complicated is the business of makingand maintaining alliances that the game may be played hard enough to produce thatresult only under the pressure of war'.36 Produced by war pressures, hard bargainingunder multipolarity was extremely difficult to sustain without producing widespreadhostilities, because, Waltz maintains, hard-bargaining allies were determined not todefect from their alliances.More recently hard bargaining was a characteristic of the diplomacy of the Sovietcommunist regime in the period immediately after the Second World War, whenSoviet representatives were said to be 'under compulsion to try for a certain numberof times to secure each Soviet point, no matter how minor', and consequently evenminor disputes became 'test[s] of staying power'.37 While posing an extremelydifficult challenge toWestern patience, such tactics were paradoxically contagious: ashard bargaining for individualistic gain is sensible for any one state, it also becomessensible to any and all the others, irrespective of the 'regulated environment' thatwas in conflict with such bargaining. Yet, the more states that are attracted toindividualism, the less attractive as a political instrument free-loading becomes.Indeed, by complicating dispute management and convergence of interests, suchindividualism can make all states worse off by heightening the search for relative

advantage.Questions can be raised from a diplomatic point of view about this problematiccondition. First, Schelling's reference to states 'continually engaged in demonstrations of resolve' (my emphasis) deflates the distinction between pre-crisis and intracrisis diplomacy that permits gauging the full impact of the onset of the sense ofmutual danger, which is in turn conditioned by the confrontation's unpredictability.If diplomacy functions as ineffectively during crisis as beforehand, the chances of

35 Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 93^. Emphasis in original.36 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 167.Emphasis added.37 Philip E. Mosely, 'Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation', in The Kremlin and World Politics:Studies in Soviet Policy and Action (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 21-2.


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504 Barry H Steiner

ultimate defection are quite high, and yet Schelling does not appear to allow for thediplomatic adaptation to the crisis that would help to forestall that result. Moreover,the link between diplomacy and the onset of crisis, as Schelling understands it, canbe questioned. Schelling argues that the dangerousness of crises has an impact uponpre-crisis behaviour of states. 'What deters such crises', he wrote in reference to theCuban missile crisis, for example, 'and makes them infrequent is that they aregenuinely dangerous'.38 But it is not clear why crises should be discouraged in thisway prior to the time that crises appear dangerous, if, as Schelling contends, statescontinually engage in tests of resolve.

Second, while Schelling focuses on problematic diplomacy contributing to confrontation, he is silent on diplomacy that discourages such confrontation. Governmentsappear to make binding commitments more frequently when they assume that thesewill not be tested. IfWaltz is correct, governments under conditions of multipolaritymostly hesitate to make commitments because of their fear of a diplomaticbreakdown, and of the loss in their position that they anticipated from such abreakdown. 'Politics among the European great powers tended toward the model ofa zero-sum game', Waltz argues. 'Each power viewed another's loss as its own gain.Faced with the temptation to cooperate for mutual benefit, each state became waryand was inclined to draw back'.39

Waltz thus agrees with Schelling that concerns about relative advantage impedeinterstate cooperation, but he suggests that the diffidence and suspicions of stateslimit their confrontations of each other. A second limitation on diplomatic tests ofresolve is the use of ambiguity. Without diplomatic ambiguity, Jervis has argued,countries would tend to force their adversaries to retreat as much as possible and

would find itmore difficult to probe each other's views.40 A third limitation is thatthe hardest bargaining is usually associated with minimal rather than maximalpositions. For example, as Henry Kissinger noted, countries desiring a negotiatedagreement will ordinarily begin with maximal objectives that are subject to

modification, while only countries determined to defect will start a negotiation withtheir minimal position.41

Convergent interests

Convergent interests are commonly understood as increasing the potential ofinterstate cooperation. In their most developed form, in international regimes, suchinterests 'establish stable mutual expectations about others' patterns of behaviourand . . . develop working relationships that will allow the parties to adapt theirpractices to new situations'.42 Cooperative arrangements that result from convergentinterests temper concerns about relative advantage that otherwise make cooperation

between states difficult or impossible.

38 Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 96.39Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 70.40 Jervis, The Logic of Images, pp. 127-8.41 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964 [1957]), p. 73.42 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 89.


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Advocates of convergent bargaining employ contrasting assumptions aboutdiplomatic behaviour. On one hand, they hypothesise that convergence defuses crisesby limiting tests of resolve. 'One of the values of laws, conventions, or traditionsthat restrain participation in games of nerve', Schelling has written, 'is that theyprovide a graceful way out. If one's motive for declining ismanifestly not lack ofnerve, there are no enduring costs in refusing to compete'.43 Even as the absence ofcommunication appears to increase the danger of war, tacit rules, situationallydetermined and not requiring any explicit communication, can be a way to resolve acrisis. '[W]hen some agreement is needed', Schelling has written, 'and when formaldiplomacy has been virtually severed, when neither side trusts the other nor expectsagreements to be enforceable, when there is neither time nor place for negotiatingnew understandings, any agreement that is available may have a take-it-or-leave-itquality. It can be accepted tacitly by both sides or by unilateral announcements thatone will abide by it if the other does too'.44On the other hand, Schelling takes account of the possibility that a multitude ofcommunications channels may be available during crisis. This he finds problematicbecause the channels provide opportunities to communicate new objectives, makingcrisis results more indeterminate.45 'One difficulty with overt negotiations', Schellingwrote,

Is that there are too many possibilities to consider, too many places to compromise, too manyinterests to reconcile, too many ways that the exact choice of language can discriminate

between parties involved,too much freedom of choice. In

marriageand real estate it

helpsto

have a 'standard-form contract', because it restricts each side's flexibility in negotiation. Tacitbargaining is often similarly restrictive; anything that can't go without saying can't go into theunderstanding. Only bold outlines can be perceived. Both sides have to identify, separatelybut simultaneously, a plausible and expectable dividing line ormode of behavior, with fewalternatives to choose among and knowing that success on the first try may be essential toany understanding at all....In warfare the dialogue between adversaries is often confined tothe restrictive language of action and a dictionary of common perceptions and precedents.46

When diplomacy is inadequate, and yet the overriding concern of states is withthe search for common interests, the difference between Schelling's two scenarios -the absence of communication and large-scale communication- is insignificant.Assuming that states can define common interests, negotiated diplomacy will eitherbe inconsequential (when diplomatic linkages are severed) or needs to be made so

(when linkages are distractions). Schelling argues more generally that whether theircommunication is minimal or plentiful, antagonists need to coordinate theirexpectations because they have a 'common inability to keep their eyes off certainoutcomes'.47 However, from a diplomatic point of view, the problem of acting oncommon interests raises a different set of questions. First, defining and acting uponconvergent solutions may be problematic because (1) conflicting goals and attitudes

43 Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 120.44 Ibid., p. 139. Emphasis in original.45 Observations by Schelling, cited in The Bomb and the Computer, by Andrew Wilson (New York:Delacorte Press, 1968), p. 71.46 Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 140-41.47 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 73.


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506 Barry H Steiner

may prevent reaching convergent solutions; (2) convergence is not well-defined; and(3) the parties are determined to move beyond convergence.

Second, when common interests and norms exist, diplomatic contacts are likely tohelp define and act upon them. When analysing the Cold War between theWesternPowers and the Soviet Union as an international system, Craig and George assertthat the two sides had only one objective in common - preventing another world war- and this common objective overrode their many conflicts and rivalries. Theyexplain that Cold War crisis management succeeded because of the widespread fearthat any superpower war would escalate, and because of military deterrence.48 Yetdiplomatic practice, particularly the regular exchange of views between Americanand Soviet diplomatic representatives, was also significant in helping to managecrises.49

Diplomatic frameworks commonly constructed to uphold international normsillustrate how states adapt to affirm and strengthen the norms. They also

paradoxically illustrate how states capitalise opportunistically upon those norms forrelative gain. Such frameworks stimulate opportunism as governments are moreconfident that they will not need to pay a high price for their commitments. Writingabout superpower relations in the Middle East, for example, Harold Saunders wrotethat

With the safety net of ... a diplomatic framework to fall back on, [theUnited States andSoviet Union had] been willing to use theArab-Israeli conflict as a vehicle in theircompetition, but each side has recognized some limits of tolerance in the other's willingnessto accept setbacks. . . . Interestingly, they were most cautious in 1967 and 1983 when theirbilateral relationship was least well developed. They were most daring in terms of their owncompetitive military involvement in 1970,when they had begun to develop enough of arelationship to be more confident of their ability to avoid confrontation but were still testingeach other in the process of building that relationship.50

Rather than ruling out confrontation, the safety-net appears to be the primestimulator, in turn, of trust between adversaries that can itself lead to confrontation;the framework emboldens the parties to strengthen their positions and commitmentsin a manner that cannot be sustained by the framework, so that the latter is tested.51

Schelling and Saunders can evidently agree that the same situational problems thatcreate a normative preference for convergent solutions also draw attention to what

48 Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 105.49 In another study, George wrote that 'To urge that the superpowers undertake timely, seriousdiplomatic discussions to clarify their interests in a particular area and to identify actions by the otherside that they would regard as threatening those interests is to do no more than to enjoin US andSoviet leaders to make greater use of traditional diplomatic practices'. He went on to note 'sporadicefforts' to do so, including some successful ones in the 1980s, and noted that 'The question is how toinstitutionalize such traditional diplomatic practices and make them more effective'. 'US-SovietEfforts to Cooperate in Crisis Management and Crisis Avoidance', inGeorge et al. (eds.), US-SovietSecurity Cooperation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 595. Yet regular useful exchangesbetween American and Soviet diplomats are known to have occurred through much of the Cold Warperiod, and appear to have been more important than George acknowledges. See, for example, As ISaw It, by Dean Rusk, ed. Daniel S. Papp (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 357-61.50 Harold H. Saunders, 'Regulating Soviet-US Competition and Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Arena,1967-86', in US-Soviet Security Cooperation, pp. 575, 578-9.51 On the value of trust in negotiations, see The Practical Negotiator, pp. 27ff.


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distracts states away from the convergence. But Schelling's concern that diplomaticactivism weakens the potential of convergent solutions to international crisis istransformed by Saunders to a very different problem: that common norms andinterests embolden governments to take greater risks in exploiting their differences,and indirectly stimulate the tests of resolve that Schelling relies upon commonnorms to temper.

Bargaining may to be more opportunistic with ample convergence because thedangers of breakdown are smaller; the less diplomacy needs to be geared topreventing a breakdown, the more it can be conditioned by narrow demands fornational advantage. But when convergence is insignificant, or absent altogether, therisks of breakdowns are larger and bargaining must be narrower if crisis instabilitiesare to be overcome. In such a case, the context rather than the myopic self-interestsof the contending states forms the major danger to stability.

Concluding observations

This article has tried to develop a diplomatic point of view and to refine concepts toenable the diplomacy of conflict management to be the object of theoretical study.This concluding section summarises the main arguments and elaborates further onthem. It also shows that developing a point of view and refining concepts are related

preoccupations.A diplomatic point of view is developed here in two ways. One is to point out howarguments that do not explicitly focus upon diplomatic practice have unstudieddiplomatic implications. Neglect of these implications detracts from isolating theindependent significance of diplomacy on other developments, which we may term'diplomatic potential'. Understanding diplomatic practice as a causal influence -that is, how it impacts upon other specified variables - requires theorists to anticipate diverse ways in which that potential can be actualised.Failure to appreciate a variety of ways inwhich this actualisation occurs is linkedto the neglect of crisis management diplomacy as an independent variable. In this

article, for example, we have noted the argument made by Craig and George thatcooperation in Soviet-American crisis management is to be explained by the mutualfear that any outbreak of superpower war could escalate, and by deterrence. Whilethese affected diplomacy directed to superpower disputes, they do not focus uponthe independent contribution that diplomacy made to the management of super

power confrontation.This article has argued that diplomacy as independent variable ismost conse

quential when, as in the Cold War period, diplomats 'circumvent occasions' whenfaced with a common, highly threatening danger. At this preliminary point, itmaybe suggested that among the first steps for appreciating the independent significanceof diplomatic practice must be to probe the operational significance of what Wighthas termed 'circumventing] occasions'. The circumventing necessitates negotiatedbargaining, and the negotiations have larger importance because rules and normsare relatively weak.

For example, circumvention necessitates anticipating resistances to diplomaticinitiatives, overcoming them, using the element of danger and the threat of failure to


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establish a basis of accommodation, being able tomake expeditious decisions and toforce expeditious decisions by others, and limiting the focus of negotiations. Circumvention also entails the risks of failure; diplomatic potential should not be overrated, because in many dangerous instances a diplomat may herself rate theprobability of failure in negotiated bargaining as higher than the chances of success.The necessity of diplomatic action evidently drives this effort, and not the chances ofsuccess, yet the chances of success may be increased or diminished by the choicesdiplomats make.A much larger body of writings, some also discussed in this article, suggests thatvariables such as military plans and dispositions, ideology, public opinion, and thediplomacy of making commitments, impact upon crisis management by limitingdiplomatic choices. From a diplomatic viewpoint, the weakness of these writings isthat diplomacy as dependent variable cannot adequately be illuminated solely byhighlighting the constraints upon diplomacy brought about by other variables; itmust also allow diplomats' adaptation to these constraints. Specifically, it shouldallow for opportunistic action based upon skill and ingenuity in particular circumstances, compensating for developments that limit diplomatic choices. Writings thatfail to do so are too confining from a diplomatic point of view. Failure to allowdiplomatic adaptation to constraints, for example, weakens Schelling's discussion ofdiplomatic tests of resolve; Morgenthau's characterisation of diplomacy during thesuperpower Cold War as 'obsolete'; and Craig and George's argument about the'diplomatic revolution'.

Adaptation ismore likely to occur when diplomats accept limitations posed byadded constraints as a given. But the analyst should also anticipate, alternatively,that diplomats may be unaware of the constraints, and thus may act - perhaps incounterproductive fashion - as though they do not exist; or that diplomats may beaware of the constraints and accept them passively without taking compensatoryaction. To determine the weight of the constraints as they impact upon diplomaticpractice, the theorist, who must introduce a null hypothesis as a hypotheticalpossibility, should never accept a priori the constraints as a binding obligatoryelement upon diplomatic action. Instead, their importance will have to be determinedon a case-by-case basis, taking into account whether diplomats understand them aslimits upon their behaviour, and in what ways. If the constraints affect diplomatic

behaviour, presumably they would also affect the results of negotiated bargainingthat takes place.While many types of constraints present themselves for study, and some, such as

domestic political structure, have arguably become more important in recent years,those most emphasised in this article have been norms, rules, and convergentinterests. Schelling's argument that these developments can and should guidediplomats working to promote accommodation should receive empirical study.Perhaps, as Schelling recommends, negotiated bargaining takes its cues from norms,rules, and convergent interests, even when it is potentially able to ignore or downplaythem. Then the norms, rules and interests diminish the independent importance ofnegotiated bargaining, and confine it to more predictable paths. On the other hand,diplomats may not take their negotiating cues from norms, rules, and convergentinterests. This would be more probable when normative and convergence elementsare weaker. It is argued here that the significance of diplomacy as dependent variableis greatest in this context not in relation to negotiated bargaining or to some


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superceded model of diplomatic behaviour, but instead when norms and rules areclear-cut and respected. The logic is that when international norms are strong, thereis relatively little need for diplomacy to circumvent occasions.

Although we have played up the differences and analytical tensions betweennegotiated bargaining, on one hand, and norms and rules, on the other, in practiceneither is likely to fully overshadow the other. As Harold Saunders and RobertJervis have noted, hard bargaining for negotiated advantage is often encouraged

when norms and rules provide a well-established diplomatic framework, as in thenineteenth century great-power concert. And relatively unstable periods, such as theclassical period prior to the Napoleonic Wars and the superpower Cold War rivalry,were not without norms.52 A more difficult issue is that independent and dependentaspects of diplomatic behaviour are illuminated by investigating similar elements,including constraints, the search for leverage and influence, norms, and the diplomatic 'cushion of safety' highlighted by Kennan. We have noted that diplomacy asindependent variable can illuminate the decision of governments about whether todefect from commitments with allies and adversaries. Furthermore, diplomacy isindependent if it constitutes the basis of deception. Diplomacy is highlighted as

dependent variable when governments capitalise upon international regimes tobargain hard for relative advantage, and when they employ their constraints andthose of other states as sources of political leverage for the same purpose. Thesetendencies are particularly significant, it appears, in light of the contemporaryproliferation of international regimes.As between negotiated and convergent bargaining between states, it is doubtfulwhether one can be adequately understood without making assumptions about theother. The dynamics of negotiation can be studied on the assumption that certaininternational norms are given. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have argued, forexample, that sensitivity interdependence, by which they mean the ability of somestates to capitalise on the dependence constraints of others, 'can provide the basisfor significant political influence only when the rules and norms in effect can be taken

for granted'.53 The full effects of this interdependence cannot be understood, theynote, without examining what they term 'the "translation" in the political bargainingprocess'.54 We propose here that this bargaining process, which Keohane and Nyedid not study, will be affected by the balance between negotiated and convergentbargaining, the relative importance of one type of bargaining being inversely relatedto the other.

52A remarkable range of views exists on the importance of norms in the Soviet-American Cold War.Compare the neorealist view in Theory of International Politics, pp. 170ff, with that of StanleyHoffmann in 'International Systems and International Law', in The State of War (New York:Praeger, 1965), pp. 88-122.

Even if it is conceded that the modern diplomatic revolution weakened norms favourable toclassical diplomacy, it remains to be explained how the 'almost continuous warfare' noted by Craigand George in the classical period (Force and Statecraft, p. 16) permitted classical diplomatic normsto arise.53 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power and Interdependence (Boston, MA: Little, Brown,1977), p. 18. Emphasis added.54 Ibid.

Barry H. Steiner, Diplomacy and International Theory

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