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Balochistan versus Pakistan Author(s): Aasim Sajjad Akhtar
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 45/46 (Nov. 10
- 23, 2007), pp. 73-79Published by: Economic and Political
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Balochistan versus Pakistan
AASIM SAJJAD AKHTAR
The conflict between Balochistan and the federal
government of Pakistan has been amongst the most
persistent of the many centre-province contradictions that have
persisted in the country. The four-year insurgency of the 1970s was
suppressed by army action. With the federal government attempting
to reassert its authority by building new military cantonments and
mega development projects across the province, militancy in
Balochistan has resurfaced. This paper argues that the present
stand-off, while still broadly informed by the traditional concerns
of Baloch nationalism, must be considered a response to the state's
commitment to intensive neoliberal accumulation. The purely
reactionary nature of the
insurgency explains its fragmentation.
Aasim Sajjad Akhtar ([email protected]) is a Pakistani
political activist associated with the People's Rights Movement and
teaches at the Lahore University of Management Sciences.
the past three years, a low-intensity conflict between
ethno-nationalists in the south-western province of Balo- chistan
and the centre has raged in Pakistan. This is not the
first time that conflict has erupted between the central govern-
ment and dissident Baloch nationalists claiming a greater share of
resources, and more generally, a stake in the decision-making
structures of the state. A prolonged insurgency took place in the
province in the 1970s while there has always been a claim made by
nationalists that they were actually forced to accede to Paki- stan
in 1948 [Khan 1975].
The Baloch struggle is not the only, or even the most promi-
nent ethno-nationalist challenge to the post-colonial state's
project of unitary nationalism. The Pakistan movement itself was
not supported by the Pakhtuns of the North West Frontier Prov- ince
(nwfp) who were organised in the form of the Khudai Khid- matgar
movement. After the creation of the country, Pakhtun nationalism
remained the major political idiom in the Pakhtun areas. Sindhis
too have been protesting their political and eco- nomic
marginalisation, particularly at the hands of migrants and
allottees of state land, since well before 1947.1 Finally, and most
notably, the eastern wing of Pakistan seceded in 1971 to form
Bangladesh only 24 years after the inception of the state itself.
The nationalist movement in east Pakistan consistently voiced
griev- ances related to the ethnically skewed power-sharing
arrange- ment in which Punjabis and Urdu-speaking 'muhajirs'
(refugees) settled in the western wing dominated. Among the many
effects of this skewed structure of power were language riots
fuelled by Bengali anger over the fact that Bangla - the native
tongue of more than half the Pakistani population - was not
accorded the status of national language; a relationship of
economic colonia- lism between the two wings whereby the export
earnings from jute produced in the eastern wing were used to fund
the indus- trial enterprises based almost exclusively in the
western wing; and dismal representation of Bengalis in the
administrative institutions of the state [Ahmed 1973; Ali
1970].
Both before and after the secession of the eastern wing -
which, importantly, is the only instance in the history of the
modern nation state in which the majority of the population has
seceded - ethno-national resistance has retained a central place on
the country's political landscape, reflecting the fact that the
Pakistani state remains heavily centralised and dominated by
certain ethnic groups. It would not be incorrect to suggest that
ethnic difference remains the single biggest faultline in
Pakistani
[ politics even 60 years after the creation of the state.2 The
current conflict in Balochistan is yet another episode in a long
continuum,
. and must therefore be considered in its historic context.
Economic & Political weekly November 17, 2007 73
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
This paper will attempt to analyse the most recent manife-
station of Baloch nationalism in the "longue dure", with a
particular focus on the continuities and discontinuities between
the present movement that of the 1970s. The existing literature
confirms that the nature of Pakistani state formation and its un-
changing posture towards oppressed nationalities after the sece-
ssion of the eastern wing have ensured that ethno -nationalist
resistance is structurally ingrained into the socio-political
fabric of the country. However, the recent phase of ethno -national
re- sistance would appear to be a direct response to the aggressive
pursuit of neoliberal policies by the current military govern- ment
- and in particular the establishment of direct control of land by
the centre - as opposed to a pro-active and organised movement.
Thus it follows that the current "movement" is far more fragmented
in comparison to that of the 1970s. Nonethe- less, in conclusion we
postulate that, regardless of the weak- nesses of this present
phase of the ethno-nationalist struggle in the province, the
nationalist idiom remains compelling to the ma- jority of the
Baloch and that only a comprehensive change in the unitary state
structure can ensure peace in the province.
Colonial Inheritance and State Formation Hamza Alavi's (1987)
well known, albeit somewhat dated, argu- ment posits the Muslim
nationalist movement in British India to be a struggle of what he
calls the "salariat" - or the auxiliary class of salaried
professionals typically seeking employment within the institutions
of the state - rather than a millenarian movement of a monolithic
Muslim community across the sub- continent. More specifically,
Alavi's contention is that the primary support for the All-India
Muslim League (aiml) that was to become the Pakistan Muslim League
after partition was found amongst the educated elite of the United
Provinces (up) which did not become part of Pakistan. Moreover,
within the Pakistan areas, the Muslim salariat was greatly
overshadowed by its Hindu counterpart, with only the Punjabi Muslim
salariat somewhat comparable in education and professional access
to the up Muslim salariat.
Alavi goes on to show that the Muslim nationalist movement
essentially evolved as a movement of the up salariat to assert
itself vis-a-vis the Hindu majority, and that it reflected the
fears and in- securities of a minority community facing the
prospect of majori- tarian democracy.3 While Alavi's insights
cannot be ignored, more recent scholarship has also suggested the
importance of consider- ing the ideational dimension of the Muslim
nationalist movement [Talbot 1996]. More generally, the precise
nature of the power- sharing arrangement in the new state can only
be understood by considering the role of landed notables,
particularly in Punjab, as well as the role of migrant politicians,
civil servants, and indeed the subalterns who acceded to the logic
of the political economy of defence [Jalal 1990; Waseem 2002] .4 As
such, it was only after the British announced their intentions of
leaving India at the end of the second world war that influentials
in the Muslim majority provinces - and most crucially the Muslim
landlords of Punjab - decided to ally themselves with the aiml, at
which point the latter was able to negotiate with the departing
colonial authority on behalf of India's Muslims [Jalal 1985].
When Partition finally came to pass, the predominant force of
the Pakistan movement - the up Muslim salariat - acquired the reins
of government in cahoots with the Punjabi Muslim sal- ariat, in
spite of the fact that the up was not part of the new state.
Crucially, the Muhajir/Punjabi-dominated civil bureaucracy acquired
almost unchallenged control over the levers of state power with the
complicity of the Punjabi landed notables, and the Muslim League
politicians, the vast majority of whom hailed from outside the
Pakistan areas and therefore had no consti- tuency within the new
state. This "politics of compromise" was based on a consensus
amongst these groups that any democratic dispensation would result
in power shifting to the eastern wing on account of the demographic
majority enjoyed by the Bengalis, who comprised 53 per cent of the
total population of Pakistan [Jalal 1994:154-58].
Over time, a military-bureaucratic oligarchic form of rule was
consolidated as a largely Punjabi army threw in its lot with the
bureaucracy and landed notables of Punjab to keep the Ben- galis
out of power. This oligarchic dispensation remained intact
throughout the first 24 years of the country's existence due to the
complicit support of the propertied classes of the west- ern wing,
and this alliance of forces repeatedly thwarted all at- tempts to
institutionalise a political process through which the ethnic
imbalance in state institutions and the decision- making structure
more generally could be redressed [Alavi 1972; 1990]. It was thus
that Bengali nationalism reached a feverish pitch, and, in the
aftermath of a bloody military operation initiated in March 1971,
and the belated entrance of India into the fray, the new state of
Bangladesh came into being following the Pakistan army's surrender
in Dhaka in December 1971.
While it is indubitable that the ethno-nationalist idiom in
Pakistani politics has been in large part a function of an exclu-
sionary political and economic order, it would be nave to com-
pletely ignore what analysts associated with the "perennialist"
school of thought would assert are the cultural bases of national-
ism [Smith 1998]. By this logic, nationalism cannot be reduced
simply to a political movement that emerges as a corporate group
lays claim to material resources under the guise of being a "na-
tion", but instead national identity should be seen as rooted in
historically shared symbols such as language, territory and broader
aspects of culture. Ethnic nationalism can even deve- lop "as
people mobilise their own social and cultural resources as a
'defence, a resistance against the depredations' of what has been
for many the largely empty promise of the liberal na- tionalism
transported to the third world". In the case of the Baloch there
exists a substantial shared history and cultural imagining which
underpins nationalist sentiment. Accord- ingly Baloch nationalism
cannot be reduced only to functional engagements of the Baloch
elite with the state as a means of secur- ing political and
economic resources [Titus 1996].
Old Wine in New Bottle
Remarkably, a little over a year after the Pakistan People's
Party (ppp) government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power
following the military's ignominious defeat, the centre had once
again
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launched a military operation against another dissenting ethno-
national group. The new populist government managed to piece
together enough support from the parliament to conclude a new
constitution which made considerably more overtures to ethno-
nationalists under the guise of increasing provincial autonomy. The
constitution was begrudgingly accepted by nationalists in the op-
position, most importantly the National Awami Party (nap), which
had formed coalition governments with the Jami'at-e-Ulama-Islam
(jui) in both the nwfp and Balochistan [Leghari 1979:190-93].
However, tension between the two provincial governments and the
centre increased steadily, the former attempting to as- sert their
autonomy, the latter insistent on asserting authority. By October
1972, conflict had already emerged in Balochistan, ostensibly
between tribes that were aligned on either side of the
centre-province divide. By February 1973 the ppp government had
dismissed both the Balochistan and nwfp governors - both mem- bers
of the nap - as well as the Balochistan provincial govern- ment
under the pretext that there was a plot being hatched to overthrow
the central government [Shafqat 1997:102].
It is believed that Baloch guerrillas outside of the nap-jui
government had already been preparing for armed struggle against
the centre following the success of the Bengali nationalist
movement in achieving separation from Pakistan. This guerrilla
faction was led by Sher Mohammad Marri [Noman 1988: 66] .6 While
the nap-jui government was not initially implicated in the
guerrilla preparations, the Baloch sardars who were at the fore-
front of the nap in the province, namely Ataullah Mengal, Khair
Bakhsh Marri, and to a lesser extent Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, respond- ed
to the dismissal of their government by announcing their sup- port
for the guerrillas, insisting that nothing less than independ- ence
for Balochistan was acceptable. The Bhutto regime had thus
squandered the opportunity to once and for all dismantle the
military-bureaucratic oligarchic dispensation and overhaul the
relationship between the centre and ethno-nationalist dissidents;
Bhutto's "deep mistrust of groups demanding greater provincial
autonomy" allowed the military a chance to reassert its power very
soon after the humiliation of December 1971 (ibid: 67).
The struggle of the 1970s was one that enjoyed broad-based sup-
port across Baloch society, as well as nationalist and leftist
forces throughout the country. Broadly motivated by
Marxist-Leninist principles, many intellectuals and activists
joined the struggle from Punjab and other provinces, whereas within
Balochistan, the prominent sardar leadership of the nap was joined
by the urban intelligentsia and professional class, or in Alavi's
words, the Baloch salariat [Harrison 1981]. Among the more active
components of the Baloch salariat was the Baloch Students
Organisation (bso), which captured the imagination of a large
number of Baloch youth. Many bso members spent time abroad in the
then ussr studying and imbibing radical ideas, and have since
become major players in Baloch politics. The leader of the biggest
nationalist party in the Balochistan provincial assembly after the
2002 elections for exam- ple, is a former bso chairperson, Abdul
Hayee Baloch.
The insurgency was able to withstand tremendous levels of state
repression largely because of the active involvement of a wide
cross-section of Baloch society, due to the fact that all major
nationalist forces were united in and around the nap
dissidents,
and ostensibly because there was at least some support provided
by external forces.7 Between 40,000 and 80,000 square miles of
territory in Balochistan were wracked by unrest, an estimated
20,000 insurgents were involved, and at least five direct clashes
between government forces and the insurgents took place weekly
[Ahmad 1974]. Meaiiwhile the government deployed 80,000 troops over
the four-year insurgency [icg 2006:6].
Ultimately, the fact that immediately adjacent countries, and
particularly Iran, were hostile to Baloch nationalism, as well as
the tremendous use of force by the state to crush the move- ment,
ensured that it was suppressed [Harrison 1981]. Leaders fled abroad
or were jailed, while the young cadre of the move- ment was, and
continues to be subjected to, harassment and intimidation. Almost
paradoxically, it was after the Zia-ul-Haq led coup that toppled
Bhutto that many nap leaders including Wali Khan and the major
Baloch sardars were granted amnesty. However, there was to be no
revival of resistance. Instead, in September 1979, two years after
the imposition of martial law, pro-establishment candidates won the
non-party local body elec- tions in the province conducted by the
regime, reflecting just how comprehensively the infrastructure of
the movement had been destroyed [Jalal 1994:17s].8
Myth of Development After a gap of 25 years then, militancy in
Balochistan has resur- faced. Needless to say there are
considerable differences between the present movement and that of
the 1970s. The confrontation this time appears to be between a much
more amorphous band of militants and the authorities over the fate
of Balochistan's natu- ral resources, the building of military
cantonments in the prov- ince, and so-called "mega development"
projects, including the soon to be completed Gwadar port on the
south-western tip of the province. While the broader demand for
provincial autonomy continued to inform the ethno-nationalist
discourse, it is clear that the present phase of the struggle has
emerged in response to the current military regime's initiatives to
establish greater con- trol over the resources and territory of
Balochistan.
This unique conjuncture is explained by the government's
commitment to intensive neoliberal accumulation, and is best
understood through the framework offered by David Harvey (2003) in
explaining, as he calls it, the current phase of capita- list
imperialism.9 Specifically Harvey suggests that since the mid-
1970s when a structural shift took place in the global economy from
a largely production-centred basis to a financial one, there has
been a reassertion of state-led accumulation akin to what Marx
called "primitive accumulation". Harvey calls this "accu- mulation
by dispossession" and defines it as a process thtough which gluts
of financial capital needing spatial outlets acquire, typically
through the medium of the state, territory in which
"spatio-temporal fixes" can be undertaken.
Balochistan's vast land mass - comprising over 40 per cent of
Pakistan's territory - and its reasonable endowment of natu- ral
resources including land, gas, minerals, as well as a highly
strategic coastline, mean that it is a viable target for
spatio-tem- poral fixes. The fact that the regime plans to
construct military cantonments in Sui, home to Pakistan's largest
known supply of
Economic & Political weekly November 17, 2007 75
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
natural gas, Gwadar, a highly strategic coastal city, and Kohlu
where there are reportedly major deposits of untapped energy
reserves, would seem to corroborate this "territorial imperative".
This also seems consistent with the increasingly blatant resource-
grabbing antics of the dominant state actor, the military, which
has in recent decades built up a huge corporate empire, with
capture and commercialisation of land as one of its major
components [Siddiqa 2007] .10 The establishment of territorial
control has also facilitated the expanding interests of
multinational capital which has sub- stantively increased its
presence in Pakistan during the tenure of the present regime. Most
importantly, Chinese companies were given almost exclusive
contracts to undertake construction of the Gwadar port, the first
phase of investment totalling $ 248 million of which the Chinese
provided $ 198 million [gop 2005].
Discourse on Gwadar The nationalist discourse surrounding Gwadar
indicates the broader fears of cultural extinction that remain
embedded within Baloch politics. Alongside the demand that
"development projects" benefit the Baloch, including but not
limited to the pro- vision of employment for Baloch youth,
nationalists have also protested that Gwadar is likely to
precipitate an influx of non- Baloch into the province - for jobs,
and due to broader multiplier effects - that will further skew the
demographic imbalance in the province. For at least two decades the
Baloch have claimed - the Sindhis have been at it for even longer -
that they are being turned into a minority in their own province
due to successive waves of in-migration. Indeed, it is widely
believed within the province that figures in the last national
census held in 1998 were deliberately fudged by the government to
avoid the uproar that would necessarily have ensued if the genuine
extent of the Pakhtun demographic majority in Balochistan had
become public knowledge.11 It has been recently established that
mas- sive land acquisition has taken place in Gwadar that is
nothing less than a transfer of land from Baloch to non-Baloch
hands (Dawn, February 7, 2007). Thus the capture of land is not
only a real mate- rial concern but is considered cultural
encroachment as weil.
It is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of Balo-
chistans territory has remained largely outside formal state juris-
diction since the incorporation of the Kalat state into Pakistan in
1948. Under the British, present-day Pakistani Balochistan was
split up into two distinct entities, namely British Balochistan and
the Kalat state. The former was administered by the colo- nial
authority similarly to the rest of British-administered India,
replete with the formal institutional power of the 'thana' and
'kutchery'. In contrast, Kalat was a princely state and, like the
more than 500 princely states across India, was accorded consi-
derable autonomy to conduct its affairs as it saw fit so long as it
accepted British sovereignty over external affairs and provided
Delhi with a certain fixed revenue [Ahmad 1992: 113]. Accord-
ingly, in many of the areas comprising the former Kalat state, the
Pakistani state's writ has been limited; this not only pro- vides
insight into why insurgents were able to hold the state at bay for
four long years in the 1970s, but also lends weight to this paper's
claim that establishing territorial control over Balo- chistan
represents for this government, an end in itself.
Balochistan has remained largely marginal to public discourse in
recent years, and is still politically and economically the most
excluded of all provinces in Pakistan. The quite sudden atten- tion
that the present government has decided to accord it has been
couched in the language of "development". Indeed General Musharraf
has consistently claimed that the purpose of "security operations"
taking place in the province is to suppress the resist- ance of
"anti-development" forces ('Musharraf Warns Slogan- mongers', May
23, Dawn). In particular, the central government has insisted that
it is the "tribal sardars" that are keen on keep- ing their
subjugated people backward and ignorant, whereas the government is
attempting to extricate the Baloch from the vicious grip of these
sardars.
This official discourse flags a couple of crucial points. First,
while tribal sardars have always maintained a central position
within Baloch politics, they neither monopolise political dis-
course nor maintain substantial political influence but for the
immediate geographical areas in which their tribes are settled. For
example, the Mengal, Marri and Bugti tribes, arguably the most
politically visible of all of the Baloch tribes are concentrated
within a relatively small geographical zone towards the north- east
of the province. Second, ethno-nationalism in Balochistan - while
centred around the broad political slogans of autonomy and
self-determination - is heavily influenced by the real mate- rial
concerns of the Baloch salariat. In fact, as Ahmed (1998) ar- gues
conclusively, of all the major ethno -national movements in
Pakistan's history, the centre has been most successful in reign-
ing in the Pakhtuns primarily because the Pakhtun salariat has been
co-opted through induction into the institutions of the state,
including the military and the bureaucracy.12
As such, the recent history of Baloch nationalism emphasises
exclusion from the power-sharing arrangement, and has been
represented both by the Baloch sardars and the salariat, with
the former often considered the symbolic figurehead of the
Baloch
people. While it would be facile to downplay the importance or
centrality of the sardars, it is important to bear in mind that of
the dozens of tribes in Balochistan, the state has always
patronised a
large number, a practice that can be traced to the so-called
Sande- man system under the British whereby the tribal system that
the colonial power encountered was consolidated through the grant-
ing of hereditary rights to "chiefs" and then vesting in them sub-
stantial authority to effectively mediate between ordinary people
and the state in administrative, judicial and revenue-collection
matters [Ahmad 1992:97-101]. At the present time, one of the major
dissident Baloch sardars of the 1970s, Ataullah Mengal claims that
"72 sardars are sitting in Musharraf's lap" ('Interview with Sardar
Ataullah Mengal', The Friday Times, July 7-13, 2006). Thus the
nationalist movement in Balochistan must be considered much broader
than simply a whim of sardars, and in fact, it can be
argued that Baloch nationalist sentiment has survived in spite
of the complicity of many sardars with the state oligarchy.
Resurgence of Insurgents? The state's attempts to depict the
conflict in terms of a dicho- tomy between itself as pro
-development and the sardars as anti-development are based
primarily on the well-publicised
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series of relatively consistent attacks on gas pipelines,
installa- tions, railway tracks and other targets by unidentified
militas. These attacks started as early as September 2004 and have
taken place mostly in the northern part of Balochistan and in the
bor- dering areas of Punjab and Sindh. It would appear that the
basic objective has been to disrupt supplies of gas and other
resources from Balochistan to the north of the country.13 The
attacks do not appear, however, to be guided by a very coherent
military strategy. As mentioned earlier, it appears as if the
attacks have been reactions to the government's decision to build
new mili- tary cantonments, and the ongoing and intensive
construction of Gwadar port. The spark for the current unrest
however was the rape of a lady doctor at the Sui gas plant by an
army officer, and the subsequent shielding of this officer from
criminal prosecu- tion by the government [icg 2006:8]. Importantly,
it was follow- ing the unrest triggered by the rape incident that
the military actually moved in to take over direct control over the
gas plant under the guise of "protecting the national
installations", which would appear to corroborate our hypothesis
that the state is keen to establish control over at least part of
Balochistan's territory under whatever pretext it can ('Security
Forces to Remain in Sui: Owais', January 30, 2006, Dawn).
In any case, while the state's continuing encroachment into
territory previously controlled autonomously by the Baloch
themselves has continued, the scope of the nationalist response has
not increased, or at the very least, the nationalists do not appear
to have become very organised. On the one hand this is a function
of the fact that Baloch nationalism is now articu- lated by at
least four different parties as opposed to the unified force of the
nap in the 1970s.14 It has been acknowledged by all of these
parties, particularly the np which claims to be representa- tive of
the non-tribal middle classes, that there are considerable
differences between the four parties. While Akhtar Mengal of the
BNP claims that "on the Balochistan issue, we are one", it is clear
that Baloch nationalists in the mainstream political sphere are not
nearly as united as in the 1970s [icg 2006:11].
This is reflected in the fact that all of the major nationalist
parties are unwilling to claim any direct or formal link to the
militants that are actually engaging the state in armed conflict.15
Meanwhile, information about the militants is sparse. Various names
have been floated for the entity perceived to be guiding the
attacks against the authorities, including the Balochistan
Liberation Army (bla) and Balochistan Liberation Front (blf) but
neither of these - or any other organisation - has a public face
that can confirm grievances, demands and the overall contours of
the militants' politics [icg 2006:12-13]. It is clear however, that
support for the militants is increasing because it appears as if
ordinary Baloch are willing to support any entity that challenges
what is perceived to be a colonial army engaged in blatant
self-aggrandisement.
Of the major nap leaders that were involved in the 1970s insur-
gency, only Khair Bakhsh Marri has stayed out of parliamentary
politics entirely. Meanwhile his son Balach Marri is reputed to be
one of the major organisers of the militas current active in the
province. Progressive political elements are also involved in the
present movement, most obviously the bso, which has fragmented
in recent years, but still remains a popular front for a large
pro- portion of the educated youth in Balochistan's cities as well
as in Karachi. The bso's affiliated political organisation, the
Balochistan National Movement (bnm) has also been a parlia- mentary
party for many years, but distinguishes itself from other
parliamentary parties by adopting a more radical position on most
issues, including the militant attacks [bnm 2004]. While there is
no conclusive evidence that bso or bnm activists have been in-
volved in perpetrating sabotage, they have been major targets of
state repression, with a number of activists kidnapped and held for
months without due process in the period after September 2004.
l6
All of these groups - Balach Marri's militia, the various fac-
tions of the bso, and the nationalist formations - have publicly
supported, to varying degrees, the militant activities of the
nebulous groups named the bla and the blf. While Balach Marri and
the bso/bnm are not engaged in any negotiations with the state, the
two bigger parliamentary parties - the Jamhoori Watan Party (jwp)
of the late Nawab Akbar Bugti and the Balochistan National Party
(bnp) of Ataullah Mengal - have adopted a dual policy of
negotiating with the state for great- er power sharing whilst
bolstering their bargaining power by providing support to
militants.
Making of a Martyr In spite of the lack of unity amongst the
various protagonists, the visibility and scope of the Baloch cause
seemed likely to be en- hanced dramatically following the killing
of Nawab Akbar Bugti by security forces in August 2006. Bugti had
emerged as the figurehead of the current nationalist wave because
the Sui gas plant that the central government took over in March
2005 - the one government action that which triggered the most
unrest and violence - is effectively the preserve of the Bugti
tribe of which Akbar Bugti was the chief. Indeed, the govern- ment
too had engaged with Bugti as the de factor spokesperson of the
Baloch.
More specifically, a parliamentary committee was constituted in
the aftermath of the first major battle of the current conflict in
March 2005 to investigate the nature of Balochistan's grievances.
Subsequently, a high-profile visit to Dera Bugti by ruling party
leaders Chaudhry Shujaat and Mushahid Husain was organised in which
they were hosted by Nawab Akbar Bugti. Shujaat and Husain
proclaimed that confidence-building measures would be taken and
that any further use of violence by the authorities would be
eschewed. A report detailing the history of Balochistan's
alienation from the centre and the government's willingness to
address outstanding concerns followed the visit [gop 2006] .17
It appears however that this report was prepared only to tem-
per the anger rife amongst Baloch nationalists and none of its
fundamental recommendations have been implemented. This re- flects
the unwillingness of the military high command to temper the policy
of wielding the big stick by dangling the carrot, an appro- ach
that the authors of the report, Shujaat and Husain, ostensibly
favour. Indeed, following the release of the report, the conflict
in- tensified, leading to the Nawab Akbar Bugti's fleeing into the
hills of Kohlu where he was eventually killed in a military
operation. The response to Bugti's killing was acute, with both
Balochistan
Economie & Political weekly November 17, 2007 77
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SPECIAL ARTICLE - = -=
and the interior of Sindh paralysed by protests. Subsequently
there has been a marked increase in the number of young people
drawn to the militants that have challenged the government's
attempts to establish its control over the province [icg
2006:9].
It was known to the military that the use of force to kill Bugti
would further enfiarne public opinion across the province, yet this
did not discourage the high command. This reflects a number of
important aspects about the stand-off. First, the military appears
to be convinced that the militants do not offer a potent threat to
the state's "development" agenda and in fact that killing the major
figure in the ethno-nationalist movement is likely to weak- en the
movement further. Second, there has been no major shift in the
state's attitude towards the Baloch, notwithstanding major claims
to this effect. And third, the state is undeniably aided in its
suppression of the Baloch resistance by easy recourse to the
"anti-terrorist" discourse that allows states to use force without
impunity to deal with so-called "terrorist" threats, a charge that
has been levelled against the Baloch militants regularly since the
beginning of the stand-off.
The state appears to be right in its analysis that the
nationalist "movement" is poorly equipped to genuinely challenge
Islama- bad. Within two months of Bugti's killing, the tenor of the
pro- tests had died down considerably. For the most part this was a
function of intensified state repression; in particular, a
systematic policy of arresting and even "disappearing" political
activists was clearly implemented, with a particular focus on bso
activists who are reputed to be among the major supporters of
underground militant groups [hrcp 2007]. However, perhaps more
important is what has already been asserted above: that the current
phase of ethno-nationalism has been characterised by the quite
erratic nature of the mobilisations.
Bugti's killing has also reduced the credibility of the
parliamen- tary option, and the mainstream nationalist formations
have been compelled to announce that they too are quickly losing
faith in the "political process".18 The post-Bugti situation has
also exposed the clear divides between the major parties on how to
proceed. The jwp, has been virtually eliminated as a party with the
government variously co-opting and coercing his sons who inherited
the lead- ership of the party. Meanwhile the BNP-Mengal has been
subject to intense repression, with both ex-chief minister Akhtar
Mengal and the member of the national assembly Rauf Mengal on the
list of the hundreds of disappeared persons the whereabouts of
which the government claims to have no knowledge of.
In any case, given the scale and ideological clarity of the last
major insurgency in Balochistan in the 1970s, it would be wholly
inaccurate to call the current wave of militancy a genu- ine
insurgency. While the government's aggressive posture has induced
another wave of nationalist sentiment, the fragmented nature of the
response indicates that it does not pose a chal- lenge to the state
as was the case in the 1970s. There is little doubt that the
slogans of all entities currently charged with rep- resenting
Baloch outrage resonate across a wide cross-section of Baloch
society, including the Baloch salariat, and particu- larly educated
Baloch youth who are continually frustrated by the lack of
employment opportunities in Balochistan, either in the echelons of
the state, or because settler populations have
garnered a significant share of jobs. Furthermore there is also
an unmistakeable fear among the Baloch that the current phase of
expanded state intervention in Balochistan will lead to further
erosion of cultural autonomy. However, this frustration has not
precipitated a revival of a politically coherent nationalist move-
ment that allies with other progressive forces for the purposes of
genuine transformative change.
Future Prospects In spite of the fragmented and somewhat
reactionary nature of Baloch nationalism time, it is clear that it
is one of a handful of is- sues in Pakistan that has become
lightning rod for the resentment felt by a majority of Pakistanis
for the current military regime. The latter is widely viewed as a
client of the us and committed to a ruthless model of neoliberal
accumulation, and the resist- ance of Baloch nationalists has
gained a great deal of popular support, although this has yet to
translate into a challenge to the centre's ongoing policy of taking
control over Balochistan's ter- ritory. It would appear reasonable
to suggest that the seemingly narrow ethno-nationalist struggle of
the Baloch could - if it were to become more coherent and linked up
to other people's move- ments - become a major site of resistance
to the current phase of neoliberalism which is heavily dependent on
the state's coercive power to suppress resistance.
Saul (2005) argues that the re-emergence of the debate over the
relevance of the nation state in the era of imperialist globali-
sation is, one of many "false binaries" that characterise radical
academic and political discourses at the present time. While on the
one hand Saul critiques the oversimplistic approach of those
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~ SPECIAL ARTICLc
committed to challenging the neoliberal globalisation project
through a transformative strategy situated exclusively within the
nation state context, on the other he doubts the efficacy of a
strategy that emphasises global transformation in isolation. Saul,
among others, argues for a strategy that acknowledges the im-
portance of the local, national and global rather than attempting
to identify an exclusive site for radical resistance to neoliberal-
ism. A ethno-nationalist struggle within a rentier post-colonial
state such as Pakistan that challenges the state itself, could be
one such site of resistance.
It is important to further contextualise this assertion. At the
present time Balochistan is of crucial geostrategic significance to
numerous world powers on account of its proximity to Afghanistan
and the Caspian region of central Asia. In fact, the closest warm
water port to the Caspian region will be Gwadar
[icg 2006 : 14] . Thus securing Balochistan is a crucial
requirement for the success of the neoliberal project in the
region, and particu- larly so for the Pakistani state which has
allied itself very closely with western governments and
multinational capital. Conver- sely, Baloch nationalists remain
insecure about the intentions of all players that seek to use the
territory and resources of Balo- chistan for their own parochial
purposes. This is the "New Great Game" and the stakes involved are
extremely high [Rashid 2001]. If the long-standing struggle of the
Baloch is able to recognise the immensely important position that
Balochistan occupies at the present time, and ally itself with
forces commit- ted not only to the rights of the Baloch people, but
also the "roll- back" of neoliberalism and the
military-bureaucratic oligarchy, the potentialities for an overhaul
of the ethnically-skewed and centralised post-colonial state can be
exploited.
notes 1 See Ansari (2005). 2 One could argue that the ethnic
imbalance of the
state is symbiotically connected to the dominance of the
administrative institutions, namely, the civil bureaucracy and the
military.
3 See also Brass (1974) who makes the important point that the
Muslim elite in the UP actually maintained a disproportionate share
of jobs and access to the state in relation to its overall
percentage of the population, but that this share was being
steadily eroded.
4 In Gellner's (1983) language, the state adopted the "high
culture" familiar to Urdu-speaking migrants and members of the
Punjabi salariat as the symbol of Pakistani nationalism while the
"low cultures" of the indigenous groups were marginalised. This
ensured a symbiotic relationship between the state and a criti- cal
mass of migrant subalterns and thereby created a natural
constituency for the state's censure of ethno- nationalist
resistance.
5 See Tan (2005) who traces the roots of military power in
post-colonial Pakistan to the administrative order in colonial
Punjab.
6 Indeed, the Baloch People's Liberation Front (BPLF) which was
the main guerrilla force during the 1970s insurgency had already
come into being while Gen- eral Ayub Khan was in power in the
mid-1960s [Grare 2006:7].
7 It is beyond the scope of this paper to hypothesise on the
nature and extent of support that was garnered by the insurgents
from abroad, but the accepted conven- tion seems to be that major
sources of support were Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
8 This fact becomes even more stark given that in none of the
other provinces were pro-establishment candi- dates so successful.
Nonetheless, this should not be taken to mean that the acute
feelings of resentment amongst ordinary Baloch towards the centre
lessened in any way, just that actual political expression of this
nationalist sentiment was muted.
9 See also Arrighi (2005) . 10 See ICG (2006:16) for details on
the land grab in
Gwadar; locals are quoted as saying "every general has a plot in
Gwadar".
11 The official figures in the 1998 census indicate ethnic
break-up of the population only in terms of "mother tongue". By
this count, approximately 55 per cent of the population of
Balochistan is Balochi- speaking while 30 per cent is
Pushto-speaking. Even if such figures are accurate, they do not
necessarily offer a good proxy of the actual demography of the
province.
12 In both institutions, the Pakhtuns enjoy participa- tion that
exceeds their overall share in the popula- tion. On the other hand,
Sindhis, Baloch and Siraikis are acutely underrepresented in all
administrative institutions of the state, as the Bengalis were
before them.
13 Ahmed (2006) reports that in 2005 there were 187 bomb blasts,
275 rocket attacks, 8 attacks on natural gas pipelines, 38 attacks
on electricity transmission lines and 19 explosions on railways
lines.
14 The parties are the Balochistan National Party headed by
Sardar Ataullah Mengal, the Jamhoori Watan Party of the late Nawab
Akbar Bugti, the Haq
Tawar organisation of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri and the National
Party (NP) of Abdul Hayee Baloch.
15 While all of the political groups do salute the strug- gle of
the militants and warn that support for them amongst ordinary
Baloch will increase if the state does not alter its stance, they
all maintain a distance from the sabotage attacks (interview, Nawab
Akbar Bugti, March 12, 2005; Senator Amanullah Kanrani, July 16,
2005).
16 Incidentally, it has been a falling out over the status of
"disappeared persons" between the chief justice and the military
regime that has precipitated the cur- rent political crisis in
Pakistan.
17 Indeed, on various occasions since the emergence of conflict,
government functionaries have acknow- ledged that there has not
been sufficient attention paid by the federal government to
Balochistan's needs in the past and that this would be rectified by
the pro-development policies of the current regime.
18 Bugti himself had already announced his agreement with the
militants that the time for dialogue was past, saying in January
2006 that "it is war now" [Hussain 2006].
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Economic &Political weekly November 17, 2007 79
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Article Contentsp. 73p. 74p. 75p. 76p. 77p. 78p. 79
Issue Table of ContentsEconomic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42,
No. 45/46 (Nov. 10 - 23, 2007) pp. 1-88Front MatterLettersShameful
Events [pp. 4-4]Coercion in Nandigram [pp. 4, 86]
EditorialsMocking Democracy [pp. 5-6]Skidding on Thin Ice? [pp.
6-6]Continued Uncertainty in Pakistan [pp. 7-7]
From 50 Years Ago [pp. 7-7]Letter from South AsiaMusharraf and
His Collaborators [pp. 8-9]
CommentaryJanadesh 2007: The Land Question [pp. 10-12]Climate
Change Studies in Indian Agriculture [pp. 13, 15-18]Inertia and
Infighting Haunt Europe-Turkey Relations [pp. 18-19]Bureaucratic
Strategies in Relocation [pp. 21-24]Strengths and Challenges of
Andhra Pradesh Power Sector [pp. 24-27]
Book ReviewsInternational Lessons in General Sales Tax
[Corrected title: International Lessons in Goods and Services Tax]
[pp. 28-32]Diasporic Politics and Partition [pp. 33-34]
InsightThe Limits of Justice: An Indian Human Rights Story [pp.
35-41]
PerspectiveEmployment Guarantee, Civil Society and Indian
Democracy [pp. 43-51]
Special ArticlesThe Recovery of India: Economic Growth in the
Nehru Era [pp. 52-66]Exchange Rate Management in Gold Standard Era:
A Historical Overview [pp. 67-72]Balochistan versus Pakistan [pp.
73-79]
DiscussionA Political Conversation in Pakistan [pp. 80-81]
Current Statistics [pp. 82-84]Money, G-Secs and Forex Markets:
Liquidity Challenge [pp. 85-86]Back Matter