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Ballistic Missile Defense
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Ballistic Missile Defense. Three phases of possible interception.

Jan 01, 2016

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Page 1: Ballistic Missile Defense. Three phases of possible interception.

Ballistic Missile Defense

Page 2: Ballistic Missile Defense. Three phases of possible interception.
Page 3: Ballistic Missile Defense. Three phases of possible interception.

Three phases of possible interception

Page 4: Ballistic Missile Defense. Three phases of possible interception.
Page 5: Ballistic Missile Defense. Three phases of possible interception.
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Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

• US Missile Defense Agency THAAD Fact Sheet• http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/

thaad.pdf

• US Wants THAAD in South Korea (can watch video)

• http://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-proposes-advanced-missile-defense-system-in-south-korea/

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THAAD might not be good

• Back in the “good old days” of the Cold War, arms control specialists understood that a missile defense race was just as bad as an arms race. If the United States and the Soviet Union began to pour money into what was then called ABM (anti-ballistic missile) sites, they would spur the other to increase spending on missiles to overwhelm those sites. They would then build more ABM sites. The two sides wisely concluded an ABM treaty in 1972 that limited the two sides to only one site each. The United States eventually withdrew from the treaty in 2002, the first major international arms treaty it abandoned.

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• But THAAD is a waste of money whoever is footing the bill. It has not been demonstrated to work effectively. It pushes China and North Korea to spend more money on more missiles to overwhelm THAAD (just as the United States is moved to spend more money on missile upgrades to counteract the missile defense of other countries). And it is a poor substitute for arms control negotiations. Instead of letting Lockheed Martin determine the security politics of Northeast Asia, it’s crucial to bring the diplomats back to the negotiating table to address the causes of insecurity and not just the symptoms. John Feffer

• http://www.lobelog.com/the-madness-of-thaad/#more-29334

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Who is John Feffer?

• About John Feffer• “John Feffer is the the editor of LobeLog and the director

of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. He is also the author, most recently, of Crusade 2.0. He is a former Open Society fellow, PanTech fellow, and Scoville fellow, and his articles have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Review of Books, Salon, and many other publications.”

• Website: http://www.johnfeffer.com

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What is the Institute for Policy Studies?

• “IPS is a community of public scholars and organizers linking peace, justice, and the environment in the U.S. and globally. We work with social movements to promote true democracy and challenge concentrated wealth, corporate influence, and military power.”

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IPS

• “As Washington’s first progressive multi-issue think tank, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) has served as a policy and research resource for visionary social justice movements for over four decades — from the anti-war and civil rights movements in the 1960s to the peace and global justice movements of the last decade.

• Some of the greatest progressive minds of the 20th and 21st centuries have found a home at IPS, starting with the organization’s founders, Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin. IPS scholars have included such luminaries as Arthur Waskow, Gar Alperovitz, Saul Landau, Bob Moses, Rita Mae Brown, Barbara Ehrenreich, Roger Wilkins and Orlando Letelier.”

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“THAAD’s efficacy in dispute” in South Korea also

• http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150402000987

• 4/02/15 article in Korean Herald. Lots of pros and cons.

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A more pro-THAAD perspective

• http://missilethreat.com/thaad-americas-super-shield-ballistic-missiles/

• Ballistic missiles are an increasing threat to the security of the United States, U.S. forces deployed abroad and our allies. Missilethreat.com is a clearinghouse for information on ballistic missile proliferation and the defenses being developed by the United States and others.

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Problems with BMD

• Ballistic missile interceptors undermine deterrence by theoretically being able to prevent effective retaliation.

• Nuclear weapons allegedly deter would-be attackers by promising devastating retaliation.

• If a nation has BMD, it cannot be deterred.

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Problems with BMD

• Ballistic missile interceptors have not been very successful even when programmed with the target missile’s location.

• ICBMs are travelling 16,000 mph as they near their targets and they can maneuver and wiggle.

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Problems with BMD

• A BMD system would involve very complicated system computer technology which can never be tested as a system until it needs to work.

• ICBMs can deploy hundreds of decoys that are indistinguishable from the real warheads, compromising BMD.

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Problems with BMD

• Offensive missiles are cheaper than interceptors, so a BMD system can be cost-effectively overwhelmed by a nation producing more offensive missiles.

• BMD does not protect against terrorist weapons that could be delivered by a boat, a small airplane, a van, or in a shipping container.

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Problems with BMD

• BMD undermines disarmament with false promises of safety.

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Problems with BMD

• BMD is very expensive and takes money away from foreign aid, education, environmental remediation, renewable energy, and other arenas that would actually make the world safer.

• BMD needs are endless. You can never have enough BMD.

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BMD leads to weapons in space

• BMD, especially if it leads to weapons in space, is decidedly hegemonic and unfriendly and sparks unfriendly responses in nations who are not staunch allies. Russia, in particular, is threated by US BMD. China is threatened by the possibility of weapons in space.

• The US withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2002 in order to research weapons in space, forbidden by that treaty.

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So what’s good about BMD?

• Americans in general support BMD because BMD appears to make us safer.

• The more BMD we have, the safer we will be, or so it seems.

• The military-industrial complex loves BMD! The need for ABM interceptors is essentially infinite, hence unending highly paying jobs are available to those in the military-industrial complex.

• And BMD can be exported also!

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Rogue states with ballistic missiles

• It might be a good idea to have a small number of ground or ship based interceptors that could shoot down a ballistic missile launched by a rogue state like North Korea.

• Have to be careful not to mess with China’s deterrence. Not good to stimulate a large increase in China’s minimalistic nuclear missile forces.

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Ballistic missile defense and space weapons

• What are space weapons?

• Space weapons usually refers to weapons orbiting the earth in low-earth orbit.

• Low earth orbit is 100-1200 miles up.

• Space weapons could target other space weapons or strike targets on earth.

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Why space weapons?

• Boost-phase defense against ballistic missiles.

• Strike the missiles when they are moving slowly over their own territory.

• Strike using space weapons in orbit.

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The High Frontier

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The High Frontier

• www.highfrontier.org

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Was this vision real?

• Well check out the old posting by the US Space Command

• http://fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf