Bahrain Policy Paper

8/6/2019 Bahrain Policy Paper

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Institute for Gulf Affairs Policy Brief, May 2011

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POLICY BRIEF:

Institute for Gulf Affairs

POLICY BRIEF:

The Crisis

in Bahrain

BY:ALI AL-AHMED,DIRECTOR

&

JOSHUA JACOBS,GULF POLICY

ANALYST

RESEARCH ASSISTANT:

ABIGAIL CASEY


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The Institute for Gulf Affairs

1900 L Street NW, Suite 309

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 466-9500

www.gulfinstitute.org

About IGA

The Institute for Gulf Affairs is an independent, nonpartisan, tax exempt organization thatdisseminates reliable information about the Gulf region (the Gulf Cooperation Council countriesplus Iraq) and produces thoughtful analyses of Gulf politics and international relations. Based inWashington, DC, the Institute is at the center of a global network of reliable individuals, some ofwhom, due to the closed nature of the Saudi and Gulf political systems, have no other outlet fortheir views. In order to fulfill this mission, the Institute:

Convenes conferences in Washington, where informed analysts debate major issuesconcerning the Gulf countries and US-Gulf Relations.

Conducts independent research and investigations, reports of which are posted on thiswebsite: www.gulfinstitute.org

Fosters a deeper understanding of the Gulf countries among Washington andinternational policymakers and members of the press corps by providing them with up-to-date and exclusive information, and by putting them in contact with reliable analysts.

Sponsors task forces whose reports help define the foreign policy agenda.

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any

information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Published in 2011 in the United States of America by the Institute for Gulf Affairs, 1900 L Street, Suite 309,Washington, DC 20036.
http://www.gulfinstitute.org/http://www.gulfinstitute.org/


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Table of ContentsIntroduction ................................................................................................................................... 4-6

Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 6-9

Political System ...................................................................................................................................... 6-7

Sectarian Discrimination ........................................................................................................................ 7-8

Bahrain as a Strategic Asset ................................................................................................................... 8-9

Regional Policies Towards Bahrain................................................................................................. 9-13

Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................................................................... 9-10

Iran ..................................................................................................................................................... 10-12

Gulf States .......................................................................................................................................... 12-13

US Policy on the Crisis ................................................................................................................ 14-18

Initial Response .................................................................................................................................. 14-15

Current Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 15-16

Analysis and Recommendation for US Policy .................................................................................... 16-18


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Introduction

The Kingdom of Bahrain has cultivated the image of a moderate, democratic, and liberal Arab

state; an example to be emulated. It was thus all the more jarring for many observers when the

waves of the Arab Spring suddenly struck the shores of Bahrain in early February 2011.

However, this surprise is unwarranted. Beneath the veneer of liberalism and the outward

presentation of tolerance lie problems and grievances that have festered at the core of the

Bahraini state since it first gained independence from Britain in the early 1970s. These problems

have remained largely unaddressed despite the introduction of major political reforms in the last

decade. Rather, the flaws in those same reforms have helped to galvanize anger against the

Bahraini political establishment by putting the desired freedoms in reach but still unattainable.

The flaws in the recent reforms have intensely highlighted the problems that remain.

The genesis of the current protests has its roots in two primary grievances. The first is the de-

facto autocracy of the al-Khalifa Monarchy and the nature of its rule, the second is the

widespread discrimination against the Shia, who make up the majority of the population of

Bahrain. The Monarchy has deftly managed to navigate the channels of political reform, granting

the appearance of political liberalization while actually retaining control over the political

apparatus. For example, in the Bahraini electoral system the Crown keeps control via the rigging

of electoral districts and in retaining the power to name legislators to the upper house of the

parliament. The regimes maintenance of autocratic political power is inextricably linked with a

perceived need to control the large Shia community. As a result, Shia in Bahrain face continued

and widespread discrimination across all sectors of Bahraini commercial and civil society.

The current protests which began on February 14 were spurred on by optimism over the success

of revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. Thousands of peaceful demonstrators gathered to rally for

the re-writing of the Constitution, which was penned by the al-Khalifa Monarchy in 2002.

Hundreds moved to the Pearl Roundabout at the heart of Manama to protest. In clashes with the

security forces that were dispatched to disperse the demonstrators some protesters were killed.

As has happened in other Arab countries, the killing of protesters and their consequent Friday

funerals led to an incredible intensification of the protests and created the backbone of the

movement as hundreds of thousands eventually poured into the streets. In reaction to the

magnitude of the demonstrations and seeing the instability in the region, King Hamad announcedhis intention to dismiss several ministers, to give out aid to Bahraini families, and to cancel or

forgive housing loans in an attempt to subdue the protesters. This effort failed to assuage the

demonstrators, and protests continued with six major opposition groups officially submitting

their demands to the government. Their conditions included the abolition of the 2002 constitution

and the election of a constitutional assembly.


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It was at this juncture that the critical decision was made to invite the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) to dispatch the Peninsula Shield Force to Bahrain. Within hours Saudi Arabia had sent

nearly 5,000 troops followed by almost 1,000 police from the UAE. The GCC troops were

brought in under the guise of defending key installations during the unrest and to ward off

alleged Iranian intervention. In reality, they were deployed as reinforcements for the regime and

fortified the al-Khalifa Monarchy on the eve of a major crackdown. As expected, soon after the

GCC deployment King Hamad declared a three month state of emergency and began a massive

crackdown as security forces locked down Manama and fanned out into the country, arresting

hundreds and killing dozens.

Augmented by thousands of GCC troops the Monarchy felt comfortable in its own security and

the government onslaught intensified. In a matter of days thousands of state workers who took

part in the protests were fired, professors who had lent support were dismissed from their posts

or arrested, and even physicians who had provided assistance to the protesters were imprisoned.

The recent doctors trial stems from these early arrests. With the help of the heavy handed

security presence on the streets, the Monarchy succeeded with breaking the back of the

opposition. Once the crackdown began there were no more large scale demonstrations. When the

state of emergency was lifted there some minor disturbances and rallies, including a larger one in

early June that had a reported 10,000 participants but nothing resembling the destabilizing street

movements of the previous months. However, the potential for a second explosion still exists. In

an attempt to flex its muscles and show its strength in the wake of the demonstrations the

Monarchy has foolishly provided plenty of potential flashpoints. One such flashpoint that is

looming is the doctors trial which began on June 13. The Bahraini government chose to indict

48 doctors, nurses, and other medical staff with numerous crimes against the state for their role

in assisting and aiding protesters and opposition members during the demonstrations. Thepossible penalties range from lengthy jail terms to a potential death sentence. The reaction of the

opposition and the Bahraini public to a guilty verdict in the trial, a verdict which is likely, will be

an important test for the regime. Either way, with or without protests the opposition has shown it

was not destroyed by the crackdown. It has also shown that it has the potential for muscular

demonstrations of strength if given the opportunity.

Like the crisis in Egypt, the crisis in Bahrain has more than just domestic importance and has

resulted in profound regional and international political implications. One of most important

decisions made during the crisis was the decision by the GCC and the Kingdom of Bahrain to

invent and propagate the narrative of Iranian involvement in the unrest. The reasons weremultifold. First, it allowed the regimes in question to fortify themselves against a domestic

backlash by presenting the intervention and by extension the protests as nothing more than much

feared Iranian-inspired Shia agitation. It was also an attempt to shield their efforts to break the

opposition and crush the protests from Western and specifically American scrutiny and pressure.

Finally, by blaming Iranian interference for the uprisings it presented an excellent opportunity to

forge a united Gulf front against Iran, a front which has weakened in recent years. This new front


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was forged in reaction to legitimate and perceived fears of Iranian penetration of the Arabian

Peninsula and the wider Middle East. It also has the added benefit of creating a stronger alliance

that can work towards halting the spread of the democratic contagion that has been seeping in

from the Arab Spring. These actions will have and already have had severe implications for US

foreign policy, especially since the US made the extraordinary decision to give its tacit

endorsement of the narrative. It was an endorsement that was given in the pursuit of stability

after facing months of uncertainty caused by the Arab Spring, and in the hopes of mending

relationships with powerful allies in the region unsettled by the American response to the Arab

Spring. However it is an effort that is likely to generate only short-term success while allowing

long term problems to fester.

Overview

Political System

The political system in Bahrain can be best described as a hybrid Constitutional Monarchy with a

long history of autocracy. When Bahrain gained independence in 1973 Sheikh Isa bin Salman al-

Khalifa drafted a constitution that initially allowed for a unicameral legislature of 44 members,of whom 30 would be directly elected. In the ensuing election opposition parties made

significant gains and proceeded to reject the Crowns State Security Law, which granted

sweeping powers to the Monarchy with regard to arrest, detention, and extrajudicial powers. As a

result Sheikh Isa dissolved the legislature and passed the State Security Law by decree. After this

act Bahraini electoral politics went into exile, and aside from the tremors associated with the

Iranian revolution the political landscape was remarkably unchanged. Consequently, from 1975-

2002 there was no legislature, constitutional body, or independent judiciary and the state was

ruled as an absolute Monarchy.

Things appeared to change when Hamid bin Isa al-Khalifa came to power in 1999 following adecade of unrest and violence over a lack of political reforms. In 2001 he promulgated the

Bahrain National Action Charter, which was an outline that significantly called for an

independently elected legislature and judiciary. This charter was approved in a referendum in

2001 with 98.4% of all votes cast in favor and marked by a high turnout.1

This charter was

supposed to form the basis of the 2002 Constitution, and called for two legislative chambers. The

lower chamber would be elected via direct means and would hold the real power over legislation,


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while the upper chamber would be appointed but would serve only in an advisory capacity.

However, the Monarchy reversed its promises and unilaterally penned the 2002 Constitution.

Without consultation the Monarchy made a major revision, giving the upper chamber equal

power with the lower chamber. This revision meant that the Crown could retain de facto control

over any elected parliament by giving it a veto position in the upper chamber. In addition, the

Monarchy also drafted districting laws that made it impossible for Shia opposition parties to win

a majority in parliament by gerrymandering their electoral districts and by giving a huge amount

of weight to the Sunni and royalist districts. As a result, the democratic basis for the new

Bahraini civil society was undercut from the start and the power placed decisively back into the

hands of the Monarchy. That power has remained with the Monarchy to the current crisis.

Sectarian Discrimination

Bahrain is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with about 89% of its

people concentrated in two major cities, Manama and Al Muharraq.2

Bahrain has always had a

relatively cosmopolitan atmosphere and an intricate demographic balance, due to its location

astride the valuable pearl trade routes. Arabs and Persians have both had communities of great

prominence on the island. At various times in history, the island has been ruled by both Shia and

Sunni communities.

Today however, the vast majority of Bahrainis are Shia ruled by a Sunni military and political

elite. Despite comprising two-thirds of the population, the Shia endure discrimination and

disenfranchisement at the hands of the government. The Sunni al-Khalifa family is motivated bya desire to consolidate power and the typical fear of a minority-controlled state of being

overthrown. In an effort to keep power from Shia opposition groups, the Bahraini government

has acted to contain democratic reform. In a fashion typical of autocracies, one of the key moves

to safeguard the Monarchy was the creation of a strong and loyal security apparatus. The police

force is markedly sectarian, as are the army and the internal security forces. The al-Khalifa

family has labored to import thousands of Sunni soldiers and police from throughout the Arab

and Muslim world. This has resulted in a security force that is not sympathetic or connected to

the grievances of the domestic Shia opposition, making them an extremely effective and reliable

constabulary for the government in times of crisis. The government has also been engaged in a

massive naturalization campaign in a poorly concealed attempt to realign the demographicscales. This aggressive effort to introduce Sunni immigrants has angered opposition Shia groups,

and their frustration is not unfounded. According to passport officials, over the past fifty years

about 40,000 people, or 10% of the population, have been naturalized.3

The most recent elections in 2010 brought the issue of the sectarian divide to the forefront of the

challenges facing Bahrains security. Prior to the election there were high profile arrests of


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prominent Shia politicians and activists, and scattered incidents of violence. The frustration of

the Shia community was fueled by King Hamads stranglehold on Parliament, as the Shura

Council sustained veto powers and continued to be appointed, not elected. The position of Prime

Minister was closed to Shia candidates, which barely mattered since the King did not respect the

results of legitimate elections. These grievances caused the principal opposition parties,

including the largest Al-Wefaq party, to boycott the elections. Even with the boycott, Al-Wefaq

easily won control of the lower legislative chamber. However, they would be unable to exercise

any real power due to the Monarchys control of both the upper chamber and the Prime

Ministers office.

One of the main complaints of Bahraini Shia is that the government prevents them from taking

an active role in civil society. Shia hold a mere 18% of the thousands of government and state

corporation positions, and some ministries have no Shia at all.4

This is particularly unsettling

when one considers that Shia make up more than 95% of the unemployed in the Kingdom.5 This

discrimination extends to education, where non-Shia have a much higher chance of receiving

government scholarships and admittance to state universities. Furthermore, the threat of

rescinding admission or withdrawing a scholarship is often used as a tool against Shia students to

encourage them to avoid opposition activities.

The potency of the fear the ruling elite has for the Shia population is best illustrated by the

Bandargate scandal. This alleged political conspiracy was an attempt by the government to

further marginalize the Shia opposition and to aggravate sectarian friction. In 2006, Dr. Salah al

Bandar, an advisor to the Cabinet Affairs Ministry of Bahrain, leaked a report that outlined a

plan hatched by the Sunni elite to disrupt the oppositions efforts. The conspiracy was led and

financed by members of the al-Khalifa family. The key points of the report concerned infiltrating

Shia political parties, attempts to demographically shrink the Shia population through increased

naturalization of Sunni immigrants, the continued rigging of elections, and the creation of fake

NGOs and websites to encourage sectarian hatred and push the government line. Although the

Bahraini government vociferously disputed the authenticity of the report, it has gained

widespread credibility and damaged the reputation of the regime.

Bahrain as a Strategic Asset

The principle reason so much attention has been focused on Bahrain and its political upheavals is

the strategic importance of the island. Bahrain has been a key strut of US defense strategy in theGulf since 1991, when the Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed allowing the US to use

Bahraini military facilities and preposition forces for a future crises. Since that time the US has

refurbished and expanded existing military facilities on the island, based the 5th Fleet in

Manama, and used the operational planning facilities there. In 2001, with Bahrain acting as an

operational base for the War in Afghanistan, President Bush chose to designate Bahrain as a

major non-NATO ally. This act gave Bahrain privileges similar to Egypt and Israel and allowed


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Bahrain to purchase advanced US weapons technology. Since that time US arms exports have

risen dramatically, amounting to nearly $200 million in authorized sales in 2011.6 The US-

Bahrain relationship bore further strategic fruit when the Iraq War broke out in 2003. The US

used Bahrain as one of the primary staging grounds for the invasion and as a central command

post while combat was underway.

The islands strategic importance is underscored by the tense US relationship with Iran. Bahrain

remains one of the most valuable US positions in the Gulf. It serves as a potential base of

operations against Iran and as a staging point for operations throughout the region. As a result

the US has been very careful in its approach to the situation in Bahrain, obviously bearing in

mind the cost of losing such a facility and the potential dearth of replacements should the US

cause anger in the region by taking a sterner stance.

Regional Policy Towards Bahrain

Saudi Arabia

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have historically been very strong. The countries

are so close geographically and politically that it has been taken for granted that Bahrain lies

within the Saudi sphere of influence. The al-Saud Monarchy also retains a special interest in the

future of Bahrain as they are both countries with an enthroned Sunni Monarchy and a large Shia

population, though in the case of Bahrain this obviously constitutes a majority not a minority.

Although the Shia constitute less than 15% of the population in Saudi Arabia they are a strongmajority in the oil rich Eastern Province.7 This is despite years of Saudi efforts to colonize the

east with Sunni citizens in a campaign not that dissimilar from the Bahraini nationalization

program. Additionally the close proximity of Bahrain to those selfsame Saudi oil fields and their

interlinked Shiite population has led to tremendous concern from Saudi Arabia. Because of these

factors, the sectarian issues in Bahrain are acutely felt in Riyadh despite Saudi Arabias

comparatively small Shia population.

As a major financial backer of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia does exercise considerable influence (some

would argue control) over the country. The King Fahd Causeway, built in 1986, physically links

Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, and greatly increased visitation and economic activity between the twocountries. However, it was not built solely to facilitate travel and trade. Just a few kilometers

north of the causeway in Dammam is the Saudi Arabian National Guard's (SANG) Eastern

Region garrison and military city containing the Eastern Region Headquarters and several SANG

regiments. The causeway was built with a clear dual strategic purpose; allowing the Saudis a

route to enter Bahrain and protect the al-Khalifa Monarchy if the need arose.


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This strategic purpose was made clear when Saudi troops spearheaded the GCCs Peninsular

Shield Force and crossed the causeway into Bahrain at the invitation of the Bahraini crown. The

brazen Saudi intervention demonstrates the importance the House of Saud places on the current

regimes stability in Bahrain. It also displays that the al-Khalifa Monarchys survival is being

taken as a red-line issue by the Kingdom, or at least it is making a strong effort to present it as

such to send a message to the West. The sectarian fears remain strong and motivate the Saudi

desire to prevent the rise of a powerful Shia government in Bahrain which could encourage a

similar movement amongst the Shia of the oil rich Eastern Province. A disturbance by the Shia in

the Eastern Province could dramatically disrupt oil production while a revolt would be even

worse.

Saudi Arabia also supports the al-Khalifa regime to defend the notion that autocratic regimes,

specifically the absolute Monarchies of the Gulf, are a legitimate form of government. With the

situation in Bahrain, they needed to send a strong message to their own population and the

international community that the tide of democratic revolution had ceased and would not be

coming to the Gulf. In the past few months Saudi Arabia has lost numerous allies and fellow

autocratic regimes to the revolutionary fervor of the Arab Spring. While the loss of influence in

Lebanon, the failure to get results from their campaign to woo Syria, and the rise of a democratic

Shiite Iraq, are all compounding factors in rising Saudi fears. This has prompted existential fear

in Riyadh that not only could their regional position slip further but that the Crown itself might

become threatened in the near future. It thus comes as no surprise that they perceive it to be in

their utmost interest to draw a line in the sand and stop the domino effect, in this case by

crushing the revolution at its source in Manama.

The Gulf states under the leadership of Saudi Arabia have been engaged in an increasingly frigid

Cold War with Iran. The fear that the Sunni Monarchies, and especially Saudi Arabia, have for

the spread of Iranian influence has dictated much of their foreign policy objectives in the region.

Though claims of Iranian involvement are often unsubstantiated, actual and potential targets for

the expansion of Iranian influence include Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and even the Palestinian

territories. When the protests began to grip Bahrain, the warning lights went off in Riyadh, where

the government was immediately worried about the potential for Iranian penetration into the

Gulf. It is a suspicion not without some foundation. In 1981 an Iranian-sponsored plot to

overthrow the Bahraini government was discovered, and Bahrain remains suspicious of Irans

interest in riling up its Shia majority. However, there is no evidence of Iranian involvement in

the current protests, and it is unclear whether or not Saudi paranoia or colder politicalcalculations played the bigger role in asserting that Iran was involved. In either case the Saudi

and Bahraini narrative has been that Iran played a role in instigating the most recent protests

because of its desire to promote Shia dominance in the region. This narrative has been tacitly

accepted by the United States, who shares similar concerns about Iran in the region. At the

moment, the Saudis can claim to have pulled off a strategic coup, unifying Gulf opposition

against Iran and buttressing it with an American endorsement.


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Iran

The tense relationship between Iran and Bahrain is centuries old, dating back to Irans territorial

and political claims over the island. Iran has historically maintained a sphere of influence over

the Gulf, with Bahrain itself falling under direct Safivid control in the 17th and early 18th

centuries. The waning of Iranian power combined with the coming of the British nullified Iranian

control over much of the Gulf. However, Iranian claims persisted through the 19th

and early 20th

centuries, laying claim to numerous British possessions and protectorates; including Bahrain.

When Mohammed Reza Pahlavi took power in Iran in 1925, he maintained the nationalist

position of claiming Bahrain as an integral part of Iran. However, to the displeasure of Iranian

nationalists, Iran recognized Bahrain in 1971. This was done to smooth over regional relations

and to annex several Gulf islands in a deal with the British. Despite official recognition of

Bahraini sovereignty, memory of the longstanding Iranian claims could not be so easily eroded,and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran they burst forth again.

After the rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, Bahrain became a prime target for the

expansion of the Persian Islamic Revolution. Iran was attracted at least in part by Bahrains large

Shia population. In 1981, an Iranian-backed group called the Islamic Front for the Liberation of

Bahrain mounted a coup attempt against the al-Khalifa Monarchy. The coup failed, but it soured

relations between the new government of Iran and the Bahraini regime. Bahraini distrust for Iran

lingered into the 1990s. With the mass unrest of the mid-1990s, the Bahraini regime once again

looked to Iran as the culprit, albeit with little evidence to support this suspicion.

With the strengthening of the US security presence in the Gulf and the rise of Saudi Arabia, Iran

receded as the undisputed dominant power in the region and Bahrain at times seemed open to

rapprochement with Tehran. The two countries exchanged growing bilateral diplomatic and trade

ties in the late 1990s and official state visits in the 2000s. But Bahraini mistrust flared anew in

2007 when Hoseyn Shari'atmadari, an advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, suggested that Bahrain be

incorporated into Iran as the 14th

province. This caused a major diplomatic crisis; in retaliation

Bahrain re-asserted that Iran was developing a nuclear weapons program, which prompted

strenuous denials from Iran. The crisis culminated in a state visit to Manama by Iranian President

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Yet the issue flared up again in 2009 when a different advisor made the

same comment that Iran had sovereignty over Bahrain; this time infuriating the Bahrainis enoughto cause them to suspend negotiations on a major natural gas deal and demand an official

apology.

Despite the ruling Sunni elites suspicion of Iran, it is widely understood (or at least it was up

until the current crisis), that it is important to maintain relations with Iran due to the precarious

demographic situation in Bahrain. Keeping a cordial relationship with Iran seems wise


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considering Bahrains Shia majority and the history, both perceived and real, of Iranian

involvement in Bahraini unrest. While Bahraini Shia do share a religious bond with Persians,

they are also very aware of their Arab identity. In addition, Bahraini Shia and Iranian Shia often

follow different strands of Shia Islam. There is very little evidence to suggest that the Shia in

Bahrain would welcome Iranian domination of Bahrain, despite government claims to the

contrary. The al-Khalifa Monarchys effort to embroil the oppositions legitimate grievances in

the political and religious dynamics of Iranian foreign policy objectives has been a cornerstone

of the current crisis.

Bahrains status as a US ally has also been a critical point of contention in its relationship with

Iran. Bahrain has relied upon the presence of the US Navys 5th Fleet and subsequent US security

guarantee to protect its sovereignty from predatory regional powers, especially Iran. Tehran sees

the US presence in Bahrain and the Gulf as a direct threat and challenge to Iran. This has

sometimes caused dilemmas for Bahrain as it sought to strike a balance between maintaining the

US security umbrella and protecting smooth relations with Tehran. Yet in recent years, Bahrain

has more often than not chosen to take a strong line on Iran. On the issue of Irans nuclear

program Bahrain has been especially vociferous. In 2007, the Bahraini government rejected

Irans offer to fund and help build a civilian nuclear program, instead choosing to pursue the

GCC nuclear program. The government also repeated its accusation that Iran was pursuing a

weapons program. Bahrain was involved in UN led talks to pressure Iran to suspend its program

in 2008, and publicly asserted that Iran is violating the Non-Proliferation Agreement.

Much of the Bahraini-Iranian relationship in recent years can be viewed through the prism of the

increasingly hostile relations between the Sunni Gulf states and Iran. It seems increasingly clear

that the al-Khalifa Monarchy chose to join the Saudi led anti-Iran front in the late 2000s in the

hope of prompting US action against Iran, as well as to gain regime security from its fellow

Sunni Monarchies in the GCC. Irans current ambitions are in the region are more opaque, with

lingering suspicions of designs on Bahrain. At the very least, the claim that Iran fomented the

most recent unrest in Bahrain can be put aside as unfounded and part of the regimes political

calculus.

Gulf States

The Gulf states and emirates have had a close history and relationship with the island of Bahrain

for centuries. In particular there has been a long legacy of trade and of political intrigue as Emirs

jockeyed for control of the valuable trade ports. Much of this intrigue came to a close with the

arrival of the British as the protective power in the Gulf. From Kuwait down to Oman all of the

Gulf states were put under either direct British supervision or established as protectorates. In

particular the UAE (then called the Trucial States), Qatar, and Bahrain were bundled up into a

single protectorate. At one point it was the earnest hope of Britain to forge all three entities into a


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single Gulf state creating a more plausible country instead of what was then believed to be a

collection of weak under populated emirates. The attempt was unsuccessful but the British

attempt underscores a very important point that remains significant to this day. That is that the

Gulf states individually have proven too small and too weak to resist political domination from

regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Iran save by allying or putting themselves under

the protection of one of those powers. The combined population of the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain,

would stand at a little over 11 million with between $300 billion and $500 billion in GDP

(depending on method used), making it a not unsubstantial power.8

With the failing of the British attempt the Gulf states were granted independence on an

individual basis. The result being as expected their foreign policies were more often than not

made subservient to powerful regional actors which most often meant Saudi Arabia. The unique

position Saudi Arabia had historically, geographically, and religiously with the various Gulf

emirates put it in the most advantageous position to dominate the region. This can be most

clearly evidenced by the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council at the initiative of Saudi

Arabia in 1981. The GCC has existed to further bind the Gulf states together by creating a

common currency, a collective security apparatus as demonstrated by the Peninsular Shield

Force, and the tightening of political ties by knocking down visa restrictions. Disputes,

grievances, and friction still abound as the Gulf states eager to retain their independence in light

of a powerful Saudi neighbor have attempted to maximize their independence and establish

counterweights to Saudi hegemony whenever possible. For the most part this has been relegated

to domestic or trade concerns such as labor flow and reservations about the common currency

within the GCC. However the looming power of Saudi Arabia has been extremely persuasive

over the years and the end result has been that Saudi Arabia exerts powerful influence over the

GCC and its constituent members especially concerning foreign and security policy.

Though relations have often tilted to the Saudi line there has been nuance and disagreement. The

sharpest disagreements for the current crisis occurred in Kuwait in large part due to their unique

religious and political environment. Kuwait is a country under operating under the most

advanced constitutional democracy in the Gulf. The legislator in Kuwait is the second oldest in

the Middle East dating back to 1962 and is empowered with real authority over legislation

including issues of the purse. Despite the ongoing battles between the legislator and the al-Sabah

royal family it is the only state in the Gulf to be ranked by Freedom House as partly free. Kuwait

is also far more split religiously with some 20-45% of the population practicing Shia Islam.9

These factors have led to a much more conflicted view on Bahrain. Kuwaiti politicians have longmaintained links to opposition members in Bahrain, and some have endorsed or invited Iranian

state visits to the country. So when the time came to answer the call for the Peninsular Shield

Force there was great dissension in Kuwait. The initial calls were met with outrage by many

liberal MPs fearful of the precedent set by allowing a Saudi organized GCC military force to

invade a country to put down an anti-royalist opposition. It also sparked outcry from Kuwaiti

Shia groups and human rights organizations and led to some demonstrations in front of the


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Bahraini embassy. The Kuwaiti government already being pressed by an emboldened parliament

took a very cautious approach to Bahrain. Initially Kuwait avoided sending troops and made an

offer to mediate the crisis in mid-March, though pointedly they did not reject the GCC

intervention. Eventually they settled on a compromise of dispatching warships but no ground

troops or police allowing them to avoid direct confrontation.

Aside from Kuwait the rest of the Gulf states for the most part toed the line on Bahrain. Even

traditionally anomalous states like Qatar followed fairly strictly the GCC course of action. This

stands as an indicator both of the extent to which Saudi Arabia dominates the GCC, and just how

intensely Iran and radical domestic upheaval is feared by the Gulf Monarchies.

US Policy on the Crisis

Initial Response

The US has long taken a lukewarm approach towards pressuring reform in Bahrain; as it has for

most of its allies in the Gulf. In Bahrain, it was easy to avoid adopting a strong position due to

the Kingdoms faade of sincere reform and its reputation for liberalism. Because of thisperception, it was rare for the US to criticize the regime in Bahrain. Indeed, King Hamad was

invited for official state visits in 2001, 2003, and 2004, indicating the value the US placed on

close ties with the Kingdom. In recent years the US has also been concerned about the spread of

Iranian influence in the region, and as Bahrain is a majority Shia country the risk of Iranian

penetration is acutely feared. These factors have largely governed the prism through which the

US views Bahrain. That prism resulted in the view that Bahrain was strategically important and

in need of US protection and support.

When the current crisis broke out in Bahrain, the US was caught off guard and without a clear

position. The only initial statements coming from the United States government were statementsfrom the State Department. Press releases stated US opposition to the use of violence on

demonstrators and included a general but vague call for a peaceable hearing of the protesters

demands. This can most likely be interpreted as evidence of an administration that was growing

increasingly uncomfortable with the pace of the Arab unrest as well as with the wider

geopolitical ramifications of the revolutions themselves.


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With the rapid fall of a longtime US political ally in Egypt and with protests challenging another

US ally in Yemen, it seems likely that many analysts in the White House were thinking of 1979

instead of 1989. This mentality was reinforced by the clarion calls being sounded in Riyadh.

Only a few weeks before the crisis in Bahrain, King Abdullah, with the strong support of his

brothers Prince Naif, Prince Sultan, and Prince Faisal, had publically repudiated US calls for

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down. In addition, he offered to match dollar for

dollar any military aid that was withdrawn from the embattled President. With the fall of

Mubarak a wide breach between Riyadh and Washington emerged. To the royal family, the US

had let a staunch Sunni Arab ally fall far too easily to public discontent, and they feared the road

of Iranian penetration had been opened. As a result the rhetoric from Riyadh grew increasingly

cold, and in late February Prince Bandar, the veteran ambassador to the United States and current

head of the Saudi National Security Council (NSC), was dispatched on an Asian whirlwind tour

to drum up support for the Saudi position on Iran and on the protests. His visits to Malaysia,

Pakistan, India, and China caused considerable concern in Washington, where there was fear that

Saudi Arabia was trying to flex its muscles unilaterally and subvert US policy in the region.

This breach and US fears over a Saudi reaction is widely believed to have played a crucial role in

the US response to the crackdown in Bahrain. By mid-February the clashes between the security

forces and the protesters were escalating in size and growing more violent, with several

demonstrators killed. King Abdullah quickly took a strong position of support, declaring Saudi

Arabias unwavering commitment to the continued survival of King Hamad and the al-Khalifa

familys legitimate rule. This strong position by the Saudis was matched by a timid response

from the United States, with Secretary of State Clinton making a meek request for restraint on

the streets of Bahrain. As the US was slowly forming a response to the crisis in Bahrain, Saudi

Arabia, joined by its Gulf allies, was assembling its forces for the intervention in Bahrain underthe pretext of defending the regime from Iranian insurrectionists. Phone calls from President

Obama to King Abdullah attempting to dissuade the King from the suspected intervention

apparently not only failed to produce results but angered the Saudi Crown. The attempt further

undermined Saudi confidence in American support for stability and assistance in the region. It

was against this backdrop that Saudi Arabia took the final plunge and led GCC troops into

Bahrain on March 15, thus presenting the United States with a calculated fait accompli. The US

could either choose to tacitly accept the GCC intervention, or it could break with all of its Gulf

allies, including Saudi Arabia, and oppose their dramatic action publically.

In the end the US not only accepted the Saudi fait accompli, but it tried to use it as anopportunity to repair damaged relations with the Kingdom. In early March, scheduled visits by

Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton to Riyadh were cancelled by the Saudi court under the

pretext of an illness that had stricken King Abdullah. The subtext of the slight was clear, and the

US took notice. Less than a week after the cancelled visit the Saudi-led GCC intervention rolled

into Bahrain, accompanied by US criticism. But on March 24, Secretary Gates echoed Saudi and

Bahraini allegations that Iran was playing a major role in the crisis, and accused Iran of trying to


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exploit the situation in Bahrain for their own gain. While not a literal endorsement of the GCC

position, it served as a tacit endorsement of the Saudi narrative against Iran. Following this

endorsement, Secretary Gates was able to secure a visit to Riyadh on April 6. The meeting was

short and curt by all accounts, and the Saudis reportedly refused to discuss Bahrain. Instead

Gates apparently spent much of the meeting re-emphasizing that US arms sales would continue

on schedule; especially the all-important $60 billion arms package negotiated the previous fall.10

However, as the US response to the GCC intervention in Bahrain remained muted, the Saudis

softened and allowed a more purposeful visit. In late April National Security Advisor Tom

Donilon embarked on a three day junket to Saudi Arabia and the UAE; the two countries

principally involved in the Bahrain intervention. The meeting can likely be marked as the

terminus for the worst of the crisis in the US-Saudi relationship. The US had displayed its anti-

Iranian credentials, shored up its support for the Saudi position, and made clear that it was not

going to challenge the GCC intervention into Bahrain in any significant way.

Despite this tepid reconciliation, the scars of the crisis are unlikely to fade quickly and will mar

the relationship between the two countries. In Riyadh, a fear persists that the US is not

committed to the Gulf regimes and may willingly discard them in pursuit of a dangerous

democracy and human rights agenda. At the same time there is the fear that the US does not

accurately understand the nature of the Iranian threat; or that they do understand it but dont care.

In Washington, there is anxiety that Saudi Arabia may have gonepermanently off the

reservation by having privately committed to pursuing an independent and aggressive foreign

policy in the region, one that conflicts with the objectives and interests of the United States.

Current Policy

The current US policy has been to adhere to the same status-quo that has prevailed in the Gulf

for decades. The United States has not made any clear movement to put additional pressure on

Saudi Arabia, the GCC, or Bahrain. Even when the crackdown reached a new crescendo in late

April and early May with the destruction of the Pearl Roundabout, the razing of Shia mosques,

and the arrest of hundreds of opposition members, the US was silent except for occasional

statements condemning the use of violence. Dialogue with the al-Khalifa Monarchy has taken a

similar tone, with the most high profile example being a telephone conversation held on April 30

between President Obama and King Hamad.

11

In the conversation President Obama claims tohave discussed the need for the respect for human rights and for peaceable dialogue and reform.

The President made no reference to any specific ramifications that would come from the King

refusing to address these concerns.

From the perspective of the United States, most of the risk associated with the crisis seems to

have passed. With the assistance of the GCC, the Bahraini government has largely managed to

crush the demonstrations; thus removing the public face of the crisis. This has led to a steep


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decline in media attention, which dramatically reduces the embarrassment that keeping silent

would cause the Obama administration. As a result it becomes increasingly easy to shove the

issue under the table and take a more relaxed approach, allowing the Saudi and al-Khalifa plans

to take their course. This is best evidenced by the recent example of the May/June trial of

opposition members flimsily charged with trying to overthrow the government. The defendants

were convicted in early June and given draconian sentences of life imprisonment. This sparked

only minor media interest and led to a vague statement of concern from the United States, but no

more. With attention focused in so many other places it seems plausible that the US could ride

out the rest of the crisis without severe incident. The only risk of this course of action is another

explosion, which could bring the crisis back to the attention of the media and US public opinion.

Analysis and Recommendations for US Policy

While it may be possible for the US to exit the crisis without further blemishes by accepting the

Saudi and al-Khalifa narratives and policies in Bahrain, it is not advisable to do so. In the pursuit

of short term stability and political gains, the likelihood is that severe long term damage will be

inflicted.

The US cannot continue to advertise its endorsement of the narrative on Iran, nor can it continue

to give unreserved support to the GCC efforts to suppress the opposition in Bahrain. It is a losing

policy; and continued acquiescence only harms US interests and the interests of democracy in the

region. The crackdowns have only served to transform an opposition with largely moderate

constitutional demands into an opposition becoming virulently opposed to the al-Khalifa

Monarchy. If reconciliation becomes impossible as a result of further crackdowns and a lack of

political dialogue, then a time-bomb of discontent will be planted at the heart of the Gulf. The

primarily Shiite groups in Bahrain have never asked for Iranian assistance, and in fact have

repeatedly rejected offers over the years despite attempted Iranian coups and interventions. But

by giving the opposition no way out and by allowing the Gulf power to continue to assert their

association with Iran, the risk develops that they will indeed turn to Iran for aid. This creates a

self-fulfilling prophecy: by intervening to stop a non-existent Iranian threat, an Iranian threat is

in fact created. Iran would be able to consider the possibilities of exploiting a crushed and

radicalized opposition to potentially expand its influence in Bahrain.

Tehran also gains crucial ammunition for a propaganda campaign which could further inflame

the region, to the obvious disadvantage of the United States. The crisis has prompted protests in

Iraq, a Shia majority country with an incredibly fragile political environment. Iran wields

enormous and increasing influence in Iraq. In Lebanon, Hezbollah teeters on the brink of

suffering a major blow to its legitimacy by remaining silent on the protests in Syria; but has

redeemed itself by decrying the US response to the protests in Bahrain. In this instance, the US


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response to Bahrain actually facilitated the redemption of an organization labeled by the US as a

terrorist group. In Bahrain, instability and the possibility of foreign intervention threatens the

strategic value of the 5th

Fleet. While the risk seems low at first glance, the possibility of Bahrain

becoming a battleground or giving birth to Iranian-aligned radical groups is not one to be taken

lightly. The situation in Bahrain highlights perceived US hypocrisy on democracy promotion, an

incredibly important strut of US foreign policy. The silence on the crackdown has damaged

Americas popular standing and detracted from efforts to create a holistic approach to democracy

promotion in the region. It has also impaired US attempts to come down hard on Iran, Syria, and

Libya by making the rhetoric hollow to citizens of the region.

Finally, the US has the ability to see what its allies are blind to. The reactionary offensive

mounted by the Gulf Monarchies in Bahrain and the region at large via the GCC invitations to

Morocco and Jordan are only short term solutions. The need for basic political reform is essential

if these states are to survive and avoid future chaos. The same recipes that led to revolutions and

street protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria can and will eventually strike the Gulf. The

Gulf Monarchies retain certain advantages such as their wealth and the fact that most regimes,

like the House of Saud, are organic and historic entities with legitimacy. In addition, many enjoy

some general popularity amongst the population. However, these factors cannot forever protect

the regimes from the underlying political and societal problems that face these countries. The

lack of democratic voices or legislative mechanisms is a complaint that has taken on increasing

prominence, even in closed systems like Saudi Arabia. Indeed, this will become especially true

for Saudi Arabia, as unemployment continues to spiral ever higher and the welfare apparatus of

the Kingdom becomes more strained. The Gulf states will have to answer to public discontent as

unemployment and the lack of legitimate political opportunities continue to plague the people.

The people continue to suffer from lack of economic opportunities while the regimes continue toenrich themselves. The prospect of disruptive protests, violence, or even revolution hitting the

Gulf is tremendous, especially if no productive measures are taken in the near future. They are

not problems that can be put off indefinitely, because intervention and retrenchment are deadly

to hopes of necessary reform. It is imperative that the United States work to smooth a path

towards reform if future crisis is to be avoided. Burying its head in the sand is no longer an

option for the United States.

There is precious little time left for the US to effect any change; the window in which the US

could actually influence policy in the Gulf is narrowing. There is a more limited range of actions

the US can effectively take compared with the opportunities available months ago when theinterventions were first launched. After so much inaction, it is implausible to effect a radical

reversal of US policy and declare opposition to the intervention. However, there is still plenty of

time and maneuvering room to begin applying pressure and to start sketching the contours of a

new policy.

Key Recommendations:


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The US must engage with the primary Gulf powers in private to try and extract promisesfor staged withdrawals from Bahrain. It is easier to begin lobbying for this now that theState of Emergency has ended. It is important to secure the withdrawal of GCC troops asa precondition for dialogue and negotiations.

Reinforce US commitments and security guarantees to the UAE and Saudi Arabia againstIran in an attempt to reassure them and convince them to loosen their hold on Bahrain. Itmust be made clear that the US gives the Iranian threat the appropriate weight and thatany concrete Iranian action or aggression will be met by the United States.

The administration should directly engage King Hamad and the Bahraini government andinsist on the need to relax the security apparatus and to extend another invitation for highlevel dialogue and negotiation. The US has the ability to act as a potential mediatorbetween the various opposition groups and the Bahraini Crown. It is an option thatprovides a potential out for some of the reformers/moderates in the royal family, andcan legitimize the opposition in the wake of the crisis.

It is important that the United States begin to increase pressure on the key Gulf states likeSaudi Arabia for political reform. Part of the strategy for this lies in the fact that theUnited States is the stronger partner in the relationship. It is a fact that has beenobfuscated at times, but one that the US must reassert. Although Saudi Arabia and otherGulf states may to dangle the prospect of expanding relations with China or Russia, thereis no replacement for the US security guarantee on a national level, or even on a privatelevel as far as contractors and munitions providers are concerned. The US is capable ofresisting Saudi threats, and pressing for sincere reform. This US needs to reassert itself asthe dominant partner in the relationship.

Should attempts at dialogue and mediation fail in the coming months, the prospect ofwithholding and recalling envoys from Manama should be put on the table. While thethreat of withholding arms packages should remain an option that should be consideredand at the very least an option that can be brought up in negotiations. This could possiblylead to brinksmanship over the fate of the US 5 th Fleet. However remains incrediblyunlikely that the government would take the risk of completely abrogating the USalliance by evicting the 5

thFleet from its berth. The US must be willing to use its superior

position in the relationship, without cowing to the threats and bluffs from its weakerpartners. For far too long this has obstructed efforts to compel real political reform.


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Notes

1 UNDP Programme On Governance in the Arab Region, 2007,http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?t=3&cid=2

2 CIA World Factbook, May 26, 2011,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html

3 US State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, January 20, 2011,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414.htm

4 Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Sectarian Discrimination in the Kingdom of Bahrain: The Unwritten Law,September 26, 2003, http://www.bahrainrights.org/node/384

5 Ibid

6 Business Week, US defense sales to Bahrain rose before crackdown, June 11, 201,http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9NPIH9G0.htm

7John Solomon, Saudi Arabias Shiites and their Effect on the Kingdoms Stability, August 4, 2006

8 CIA World Factbook, May 26, 2011, UAE-Bahrain-Qatar

9 Middle East Countries at a Glance, 2010, http://www.mideastweb.org/countries.htm

10 Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, Top White House aide delivers Obama letter to Saudi King, April 12, 2011,http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/top-white-house-aide-delivers-obama-letter-to-saudi-king/2011/04/08/AF5KD9SD_story.html

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US Embassy, IIP Digital, April 30, 2011,http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/05/20110501145150su0.2513631.html#axzz1Qsu3ljA4
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html

Bahrain Policy Paper

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